I

n January 2018, the Department of Defense completed the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), a congressionally mandated assessment of how the Department will
protect the United States and its national interests using the tools and resources at
its disposal. That assessment is intended to address an array of important subjects:
the nature of the strategic environment, the priority objectives of the Department
of Defense, the roles and missions of the armed forces, the size and shape of the
force, the major investments in capabilities and innovation that the Department will
make over the following five-year period, and others. The 2018 NDS is a classified
document; an unclassified summary was released publicly.

Providing for the
Common Defense
The Assessment and Recommendations of
the National Defense Strategy Commission

Providing for the Common Defense

To enhance America’s ability to address these issues, Congress also convened
a bipartisan panel to review the NDS and offer recommendations concerning
U.S. defense strategy. The members of the Commission on the National Defense
Strategy for the United States represent a group of distinguished national security
and defense experts. They analyzed issues related not just to defense strategy, but
also to the larger geopolitical environment in which that strategy must be executed.
They consulted with civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense,
representatives of other U.S. government departments and agencies, allied diplomats
and military officials, and independent experts. This publication is the consensus
report of the Commission. The Commission argues that America confronts a grave
crisis of national security and national defense, as U.S. military advantages erode and
the strategic landscape becomes steadily more threatening. If the United States does
not show greater urgency and seriousness in responding to this crisis, if it does not
take decisive steps to rebuild its military advantages now, the damage to American
security and influence could be devastating.

Edelman and Roughead

Providing for the Common Defense

Eric Edelman, Co-Chair
United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
www.usip.org

Gary Roughead, Co-Chair

Christine Fox

Thomas Mahnken

Kathleen Hicks

Michael McCord

Jack Keane

Michael Morell

Andrew Krepinevich

Anne Patterson

Jon Kyl

Roger Zakheim

 The Assessment and Recommendations of
the National Defense Strategy Commission

  Letter from the Co-Chairs
As co-chairs of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the
United States, we are pleased to submit our Commission’s work and
publish our report. In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017,
Congress charged this Commission with providing an independent, nonpartisan review of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and issues of U.S.
defense strategy and policy more broadly. We consulted widely and reviewed numerous classified and unclassified sources in developing our
conclusions and recommendations. Although not every member of this
Commission agrees with every word, the unclassified analysis, findings,
and recommendations expressed herein capture the broad consensus of
this diverse group of Republicans, Democrats, and independents.
We thank all whose cooperation made our work possible: Chairmen John
McCain and “Mac” Thornberry and ranking members Jack Reed and
Adam Smith of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Deputy Secretary Patrick Shanahan,
Department of Defense officials who provided briefings and information,
representatives of other U.S. government departments and agencies, and
allied officials and independent experts with whom we consulted. We especially note the contributions of Senator McCain, who passed away
shortly before this report was completed. Chairman McCain, along with
Chairman Thornberry, played a crucial role in establishing this Commission. We consider it appropriate and fitting that Jon Kyl, a member of the
Commission who participated fully in its deliberations, is now in Senator
McCain’s former seat in the Senate. Finally, we are deeply grateful to
our fellow commissioners and support staff for their time, energy, and
insight. All who contributed to this report embody extraordinary nonpartisan cooperation in the service of a strong, secure, and prosperous
America.
We urge Congress and the Administration to consider fully our observations and recommendations and implement them expeditiously. We affirm strongly the view that the global role the United States has played
for many generations has benefitted our nation enormously, and that this
role rests upon a foundation of unmatched military power. Today, however, our margin of superiority is profoundly diminished in key areas.
There are urgent challenges that must be addressed if the United States is
to avoid lasting damage to its national security. Some observers have

iii

 noted—and we agree—that the United States will soon face a national
security emergency. This report offers our recommendations for ensuring
the United States maintains the strong defense the American people deserve and expect and that current and prospective circumstances require.

Eric Edelman
Co-Chair

Gary Roughead
Co-Chair

iv

 Executive Summary
The security and wellbeing of the United States are at greater risk than at
any time in decades. America’s military superiority—the hard-power
backbone of its global influence and national security—has eroded to a
dangerous degree. Rivals and adversaries are challenging the United
States on many fronts and in many domains. America’s ability to defend
its allies, its partners, and its own vital interests is increasingly in doubt.
If the nation does not act promptly to remedy these circumstances, the
consequences will be grave and lasting.
Since World War II, the United States has led in building a world of
unusual prosperity, freedom, and security—an achievement that has benefitted America enormously. That achievement has been enabled by unmatched U.S. military power. Investments made in our military and the
competence and sacrifice of those who serve have provided for the defense and security of America, its citizens overseas, and its allies and
partners. America has deterred or defeated aggression and preserved stability in key regions around the globe. It has ensured the freedom of the
global commons on which American and international prosperity depends, and given America unrivaled access and influence. Not least,
America’s military strengths have prevented America from being coerced or intimidated, and helped avert a recurrence of the devastating
global wars of the early 20th century, which required repeated interventions at a cost of hundreds of thousands of U.S. lives. Put simply, U.S.
military power has been indispensable to global peace and stability—and
to America’s own security, prosperity, and global leadership.
Today, changes at home and abroad are diminishing U.S. military
advantages and threatening vital U.S. interests. Authoritarian competitors—especially China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony and
the means to project power globally. They are pursuing determined
military buildups aimed at neutralizing U.S. strengths. Threats posed by
Iran and North Korea have worsened as those countries have developed
more advanced weapons and creatively employed asymmetric tactics. In
multiple regions, gray-zone aggression—intimidation and coercion in the
space between war and peace—has become the tool of choice for many.
The dangers posed by transnational threat organizations, particularly radical jihadist groups, have also evolved and intensified. Around the world,
the proliferation of advanced technology is allowing more actors to contest U.S. military power in more threatening ways. The United States
thus is in competition and conflict with an array of challengers and
v

 adversaries. Finally, due to political dysfunction and decisions made by
both major political parties—and particularly due to the effects of the
Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and years of failing to enact timely
appropriations—America has significantly weakened its own defense.
Defense spending was cut substantially under the BCA, with pronounced
detrimental effects on the size, modernization, and readiness of the
military.
The convergence of these trends has created a crisis of national security
for the United States—what some leading voices in the U.S. national
security community have termed an emergency. Across Eurasia, grayzone aggression is steadily undermining the security of U.S. allies and
partners and eroding American influence. Regional military balances in
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific have shifted in
decidedly adverse ways. These trends are undermining deterrence of
U.S. adversaries and the confidence of American allies, thus increasing
the likelihood of military conflict. The U.S. military could suffer unacceptably high casualties and loss of major capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or
Russia. The United States is particularly at risk of being overwhelmed
should its military be forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously. Additionally, it would be unwise and irresponsible not to expect
adversaries to attempt debilitating kinetic, cyber, or other types of attacks
against Americans at home while they seek to defeat our military abroad.
U.S. military superiority is no longer assured and the implications for
American interests and American security are severe.

Evaluating the National Defense Strategy
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the document this Commission was created to evaluate, represents a constructive first step in responding to this crisis. We support its candid assessment of the strategic
environment, the priority it places on preparing for major-power competition and conflict, its emphasis on the enduring value of U.S. alliances
and partnerships, and its attention to issues of readiness and lethality.
That said, we are concerned that the NDS too often rests on questionable
assumptions and weak analysis, and it leaves unanswered critical questions regarding how the United States will meet the challenges of a more
dangerous world. We believe that the NDS points the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the country in the right direction, but it does not
adequately explain how we should get there.
The NDS rightly stresses competition with China and Russia as the central dynamic in sizing, shaping, and employing U.S. forces, but it does
vi

 not articulate clear approaches to succeeding in peacetime competition or
wartime conflict against those rivals. Resource shortfalls, unanticipated
force demands, unfilled capability gaps, and other risk factors threaten
DOD’s ability to fulfill the central goals of the NDS, such as defeating
one major-power rival while maintaining deterrence in other regions. As
America confronts five major security challengers across at least three
important geographic regions, and as unforeseen challenges are also
likely to arise, this is a serious weakness. To meet those intensifying
military challenges, DOD will require rapid, substantial improvements to
its capabilities built on a foundation of compelling, relevant operational
concepts.
Proposed fixes to existing vulnerabilities—concepts such as “expanding
the competitive space,” “accepting risk” in lower-priority theaters, increasing the salience of nuclear weapons, or relying on “Dynamic Force
Employment”—are imprecise and unpersuasive. Furthermore, America’s
rivals are mounting comprehensive challenges using military means and
consequential economic, diplomatic, political, and informational tools.
Absent a more integrated, whole-of-government strategy than has been
evident to date, the United States is unlikely to reverse its rivals’ momentum across an evolving, complex spectrum of competition.

Operational Challenges and Concepts
As regional military balances have deteriorated, America’s advantage
across a range of operational challenges has diminished. Because of our
recent focus on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, and because
our enemies have developed new ways of defeating U.S. forces, America
is losing its advantage in key warfighting areas such as power projection,
air and missile defense, cyber and space operations, anti-surface and
anti-submarine warfare, long-range ground-based fires, and electronic
warfare. Many of the skills necessary to plan for and conduct military
operations against capable adversaries—especially China and Russia—
have atrophied.
DOD and the Congressional committees that oversee national security
must focus current and future investments on operational challenges such
as protecting critical bases of operations; rapidly reinforcing and sustaining forces engaged forward; assuring information systems and conducting effective information operations; defeating anti-access/area-denial
threats; deterring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nuclear or other
strategic weapons in ways that fall short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response; enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and developing an interoperable joint
vii

 command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that supports the warfare
of the future.
The United States needs more than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational concepts that expand U.S. options and constrain
those of China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute
an essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and
budgetary priorities needed to advance them. During the Cold War, the
United States developed detailed operational concepts to overcome
daunting challenges in Europe and elsewhere. Innovative concepts are
once again needed because Russia and China are challenging the United
States, its allies, and its partners on a far greater scale than has any adversary since the Cold War’s end. The unconventional approaches on
which others rely, such as hybrid warfare (warfare combining conventional and unconventional elements), gray-zone aggression (coercion in
the space between peace and war), and rapid nuclear escalation demand
equally creative responses. In other words, maintaining or reestablishing
America’s competitive edge is not simply a matter of generating more
resources and capabilities; it is a matter of using those resources and capabilities creatively and focusing them on the right things. Unfortunately, the innovative operational concepts we need do not currently
appear to exist. The United States must begin responding more effectively to the operational challenges posed by our competitors and force
those competitors to respond to challenges of our making.

National Security Innovation Base
Aggressively pursuing technological innovation and introducing those
advances into the force promptly will be critical to overcoming operational challenges and positioning the U.S. military for success. We
applaud the NDS for emphasizing this issue. We remain concerned, however, that America’s edge is diminishing or has disappeared in many key
technologies that underpin U.S. military superiority, and that current efforts to offset that decline are insufficient. For example, as part of a
whole-of-society approach to innovation, China is currently making
great strides in the race to dominate in key areas such as FifthGeneration Long-Term Evolution (5G LTE) broadband wireless networks. That effort may yield great economic, geopolitical, and military
benefits for Beijing—and equally great dangers for the United States.
DOD and the U.S. government more broadly must take additional steps
to protect and strengthen the U.S. National Security Innovation Base,

viii

 perhaps by increasing investment in key industries and pursuing selective economic disintegration with rivals to avoid dangerous dependencies. The Department must also continue broadening its efforts to find
and incorporate new capabilities commercially developed by the private
sector. Not least, Congress and DOD must find new ways of enabling
more rapid maturation, acquisition, and fielding of leap-ahead technologies. For two decades, the emphasis for defense programs has been on
process and efficiency—navigating smoothly through the acquisition
system—rather than on optimizing them for innovation and warfighting
effectiveness. This has led to a situation in which innovation occurs outside of government, and those innovations are increasingly difficult for
our defense processes to access quickly, if at all. One way of addressing
this problem would be to explore a new, narrowly tailored category of
acquisition pilot programs that would accept greater cost and risk in pursuit of speed and the game-changing technological breakthroughs necessary to sustain U.S. military advantages.

Near- and Mid-Term Force Priorities
Innovations in operational concepts and leap-ahead technologies are vital
to sustaining U.S. military advantages, particularly over the long term. In
the near- to mid-term, the Commission identified a variety of critical improvements to U.S. military posture and capabilities that are imperative
for prevailing against our most pressing security challenges.
In the Western Pacific, deterring Chinese aggression requires a forwarddeployed, defense-in-depth posture, buttressed by investments in capabilities ranging from undersea warfare to strategic airlift. In Europe,
dealing with a revanchist Russia will entail rebuilding conventional
NATO force capacity and capability on the alliance’s eastern flank and
the Baltics, while also preparing to deter and if necessary defeat the use
of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, U.S. security commitments and operations in the Middle East cannot be wished away. As long
as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Middle East remains a major
producer of oil, and as long as the United States has key U.S. allies and
partners in the region, U.S. interests in the Middle East will be profound.
Accordingly, U.S. military posture there should not shrink dramatically,
even as the precise mix of capabilities is re-examined.
Across all theaters—especially Europe and the Indo-Pacific—our forward posture will be essential to deterring competitors and adversaries
and thereby reducing the chances of conflict. In addition, the Army,
Navy, and Air Force will all require selective warfighting capacity enhancements, and America will need to improve its capabilities in key
ix

 cross-cutting areas such as munitions, missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and air and sealift. In particular, it is painfully clear
that America is not competing or deterring its adversaries as effectively
as it should in cyberspace. We must operate more nimbly, aggressively,
and effectively in this crucial domain. Space is also an increasingly important and contested domain and the United States must place special
emphasis on ensuring dominance there by devising a coherent space
strategy that emphasizes technology, policy, organization, broader
awareness through effective communication, and cooperation.
Another critical imperative is modernizing our nuclear deterrent. The
NDS rightly identifies the “re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations” as a primary factor driving U.S. nuclear force
posture and planning. Given the need for a robust deterrent, the aggressive nuclear modernization programs some rivals have been carrying out,
and the increasing reliance of those rivals—particularly Russia—on escalatory doctrines that feature limited use of nuclear weapons, DOD
must remain committed to the bipartisan nuclear modernization program
outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. This pertains especially to
modernizing the triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
ballistic missile submarines. In addition, it is urgently necessary to modernize the supporting infrastructure, including the national laboratories
and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) network.
At its peak, planned spending on nuclear modernization, operations, and
sustainment should consume just 6.4 percent of the defense budget, although the impact on procurement will be greater and will require careful
prioritization and sequencing by DOD, with Congressional support.
Given that investments made today will pay strategic dividends well into
the 2070s and 2080s, America can surely afford to pay this price to preserve such a critical element of its national defense.
Making informed decisions about strategic, operational, and force development issues requires a foundation of state-of-the-art analytical capabilities. In the course of our work, we found that DOD struggled to link
objectives to operational concepts to capabilities to programs and resources. This deficit in analytical capability, expertise, and processes is
intolerable in an organization responsible for such complex, expensive,
and important tasks, and it must be remedied. Specifically, DOD needs a
rigorous force development plan that connects its investment strategy
with its key priorities of winning in conflict and competing effectively
with China and Russia. Repairing DOD’s analytical capability is essential to meeting the challenges the NDS identifies and giving Congress
confidence that DOD’s budget requests reflect its stated priorities.
x

 Readiness
The readiness of U.S. forces to conduct operations as effectively and
safely as possible is another crucial component of America’s national security. Yet the readiness of our forces has suffered in recent years, due to
extended operations in the greater Middle East as well as severe budgetary uncertainty and austerity. The Commission therefore firmly supports
DOD’s efforts to improve readiness. We note, however, that U.S. forces
will need additional resources to train to high levels of proficiency across
a broader and more technologically challenging range of potential missions than in the recent past, particularly those missions focusing on advanced military threats from China and Russia. DOD must also develop
and use analytic tools that can measure readiness across this broad range
of missions, from low-intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, highintensity fights. Moreover, while resources alone can never cure a readiness shortcoming, timely and sufficient funding will be vital to overcoming readiness gaps created in part by a broken budgetary process.
The foremost resource required to produce a highly capable military is
highly capable people—but the number of Americans with both the fitness and propensity to serve is in secular decline, putting the NDS at
long-term risk. DOD and Congress must take creative steps to address
the shortage of qualified and willing individuals, rather than relying
solely on ever-higher compensation for a shrinking pool of qualified
volunteers.

Civil-Military Relations
Constructive approaches to any of the foregoing issues must be rooted in
healthy civil-military relations. Yet civilian voices have been relatively
muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control. The implementation of
the NDS must feature empowered civilians fulfilling their statutory responsibilities, particularly regarding issues of force management. Put
bluntly, allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of
warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently politicalmilitary task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and
responsibility of America’s civilian leaders. Unless global force management is nested under higher-order guidance from civilians, an effort to
centralize defense direction under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff may succeed operationally but produce profound strategic problems. It is critical that DOD—and Congress—reverse the unhealthy trend
in which decision-making is drifting away from civilian leaders on issues
of national importance.
xi

 Resources
The question of resources cuts across many of the issues we examine in
this report, and the Commission assesses unequivocally that the NDS is
not adequately resourced. It is beyond the scope of our work to identify
the exact dollar amount required to fully fund the military’s needs. Yet
available resources are clearly insufficient to fulfill the strategy’s ambitious goals, including that of ensuring that DOD can defeat a majorpower adversary while deterring other enemies simultaneously. The
available resources are also insufficient to undertake essential nuclear
and conventional modernization simultaneously and rectify accumulated
readiness shortfalls. America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its “means” are badly out of alignment with its “ends.”
Notably, this disparity is true despite the two-year funding increase provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2018. Although that increase provides a healthy initial investment in this strategy, the lack of
planned real budgetary growth beyond this two-year period, the lingering
damage caused by the BCA and the pattern of government shutdowns
and continuing resolutions, and the threat of unpredictable and delayed
funding in the future all place the strategy in jeopardy. DOD apparently
plans to fill key resource gaps through savings yielded by organizational
reform. We strongly agree that the Pentagon’s culture and way of doing
business must be brought into the 21st century, yet it is unrealistic to expect that such reforms will yield significant resources for growth, especially within a time frame appropriate to meet the challenges posed by
China and Russia. Without additional resources, and without greater stability and predictability in how those resources are provided, the Department will be unable to fulfill the ambition of the NDS or create and
preserve U.S. military advantages in the years to come. There must be
greater urgency and seriousness in funding national defense.
In accordance with the testimony of Secretary Mattis and Chairman
Dunford in 2017, this Commission recommends that Congress increase
the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above
inflation through the Future Years Defense Program and perhaps beyond.
Although this number is more illustrative than definitive, and although
these estimates were provided prior to the conclusion of the process that
produced the current defense strategy, it is nonetheless indicative of the
level of investment needed to meet the ends the NDS establishes. Making this investment will require lifting the remaining BCA caps for Fiscal
Years 2020 and 2021. Congress should also transfer overseas contingency operations funds back to the base budget, and permit more flexibility by giving DOD authority to spend Operations and Maintenance
xii

 funds for any fiscal year across that fiscal year and the next. More ambitiously, Congress should seek to produce multi-year budget agreements
for defense. Above all, Congress must fix a broken funding process that
wreaks havoc on readiness and the defense program, and avoid the temptation of viewing defense cuts as the solution to the nation’s fiscal problems. Those problems must be addressed through a holistic approach that
scrutinizes the entire federal budget—especially mandatory spending—
as well as taxes to set the nation on a firmer financial footing. Although
the resulting tradeoffs will certainly be difficult, anything short of these
steps will represent an implicit decision not to provide America with the
defense it deserves.
Congress, of course, has a critical role to play in all this. In one sense, it
is the responsibility of Congress to appropriate the resources necessary
for the nation’s defense. More broadly, we urge the Congress to use its
oversight tools to encourage the Department to take many of the steps we
outline in this report. We also urge Congress and DOD to work as partners in addressing the many issues that can only be resolved through collaboration between the executive and legislative branches. The current
crisis is bigger than any single branch of government, and the solutions
must be, as well.
In conclusion, we wish to be crystal clear about one thing. The costs of
failing to meet America’s crisis of national defense and national security
will not be measured in abstract concepts like “international stability”
and “global order.” They will be measured in American lives, American
treasure, and American security and prosperity lost. It will be a tragedy—
of unforeseeable but perhaps tremendous magnitude—if the United States
allows its national interests and national security to be compromised
through an unwillingness or inability to make hard choices and necessary
investments. That tragedy will be all the more regrettable because it is
within our power to avoid it.

xiii

  Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1 The Purpose of American Military Power and the Crisis
of National Defense ....................................................................................................... 4
The Changing Strategic Environment .......................................................................... 6
The Crisis of American Military Power and Its Consequences ................................. 11
Chapter 2 Evaluating the National Defense Strategy ....................................................... 18
Strengths and Weaknesses of the NDS ...................................................................... 18
Competition against Russia and China ...................................................................... 19
Under-Resourced Theaters ........................................................................................ 20
Unanticipated Force Demands ................................................................................... 21
Unclear Concepts....................................................................................................... 21
Unanticipated Resource Shortfalls............................................................................. 22
Challenges Requiring More than DOD Capabilities .................................................. 22
Chapter 3 The Force We Need: Meeting Core Operational Challenges
and Strengthening the National Security Innovation Base ........................................... 24
Meeting Core Operational Challenges ....................................................................... 24
Operational Concepts ................................................................................................ 26
National Security Innovation Base ............................................................................ 28
Chapter 4 The Force We Need: Force Priorities, Readiness,
and Civil-Military Relations ........................................................................................ 33
Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities ........................................................................... 33
Readiness ................................................................................................................... 43
Civil-Military Relations ............................................................................................. 47
Chapter 5 Funding the Force We Need ............................................................................ 49
The Lingering Impacts of the BCA ........................................................................... 49
The Need for Additional Funding to Execute the NDS ............................................. 52
Resourcing Priorities and Challenges ........................................................................ 54
Ensuring Timely and Consistent Funding.................................................................. 56
Restoring OCO Funding to the Base Budget ............................................................. 59
Pentagon Reform: Necessary but Not Sufficient ....................................................... 59
Addressing Long-Term Fiscal Challenges ................................................................. 61
Embracing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Strategic Competition ................. 63
Compendium of Findings and Recommendations ........................................................... 64
Additional Views of Andrew Krepinevich ...................................................................... 72
Appendix A Glossary ...................................................................................................... 76
Appendix B Enabling Legislation.................................................................................... 78
Appendix C Schedule of Plenary Meetings ..................................................................... 81
Appendix D Individuals Appearing before the Commission ........................................... 82
Appendix E Commissioner Biographies .......................................................................... 88
Appendix F Commission Staff ........................................................................................ 98

xv

  Introduction
The United States confronts a grave crisis of national security and national defense. No duty of the federal government is more essential than
defending the American people, American territory, and American interests abroad. For generations, international peace and prosperity and the
wellbeing and security of the United States have depended on America’s
unequaled military strengths.
Today, the strategic landscape is growing steadily more threatening. An
array of adversaries and rivals—violent jihadist groups, aggressive regional challengers armed with advanced weapons, powerful authoritarian
regimes possessing significant influence and even greater ambitions—
are challenging U.S. interests and global security. Across these issues,
the United States is not simply facing renewed geopolitical competition.
States and non-state actors are waging conflict against America and the
world it has done so much to build.
Meanwhile, because of foreign and domestic factors, America’s
longstanding military advantages have diminished. The country’s strategic margin for error has become distressingly small. Doubts about America’s ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat opponents and honor its
global commitments have proliferated. Previous congressionally mandated reports, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel and the 2014 National Defense Panel, warned that this crisis
was coming. The crisis has now arrived, with potentially dire effects not
just for U.S. global influence, but also for the security and welfare of
America itself.
This document, the consensus report of the Commission on the National
Defense Strategy for the United States, expresses our view of the dangers
the nation faces and the steps that should be taken to meet them. The
Commission was created pursuant to the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2017, to examine and make recommendations with respect to the
national defense strategy of the United States. More specifically, the
Commission was charged with formally reviewing the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) released by the Department of Defense (DOD) in January 2018, as well as assessing and offering its views on the broad range
of issues that informed that strategy. The Commission was tasked with
reporting its findings to the President, Secretary of Defense, Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
1

 In carrying out these responsibilities, we have deliberated regularly for
the past year. We have reviewed relevant material, both classified and
unclassified, and consulted widely with civilian and military leaders in
the Department of Defense, representatives of other U.S. government departments and agencies, diplomats and military officials from some of
America’s closest allies, and independent experts. We have studied issues related not just to defense strategy itself, but also to the larger geopolitical environment in which that strategy must be devised and
implemented, and in which it must succeed.
Our report proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, we review the role U.S.
military power has traditionally played in protecting U.S. national interests, and we describe how a combination of global challenges and
America’s disinvestment in defense has created the troubling situation
the nation confronts today. In Chapter 2, we evaluate the NDS, focusing
particularly on the question of whether the goals it sets can be accomplished with the resources available and using the approaches DOD has
outlined. In Chapters 3 and 4, we offer our views on the force America
needs, focusing specifically on operational challenges and concepts, the
national security innovation base, near- and mid-term force priorities,
readiness, and civil-military relations. In Chapter 5, we examine resourcing issues.
Our specific findings are outlined in the text. But at the outset, we wish
to underscore the central theme of this report: There is a need for extraordinary urgency in addressing the crisis of national defense. We believe that the NDS is a broadly constructive document that identifies
most of the right objectives and challenges. Yet we are deeply concerned
that the Department of Defense and the nation as a whole have not yet
addressed crucial issues such as force sizing, developing innovative operational concepts, readiness, and resources with the degree of urgency,
persistence, and analytic depth that an increasingly dangerous world
demands.
Put bluntly, the American people and their elected representatives must
understand that U.S. military superiority is not guaranteed, that many
global trends are adverse and threatening, and that the nation has reached
a pivotal moment regarding its ability to defend its vital interests and
preserve a world in which the United States and other like-minded nations can thrive. The choices we make today and in the immediate future
will have profound and potentially lasting consequences for American

2

 security and influence. If we do not square up to the challenge now, we
will surely regret it.1

1

Although this Commission reviewed some classified material during the
course of its deliberations, our major strategic assessments and our key recommended capacity and capability enhancements have been previously discussed
in unclassified settings and reports. Space limitations preclude a full listing of
unclassified sources consulted in the preparation of this report. But see, as representative examples, David Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence of NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016); David Ochmanek et al., U.S. Military
Capabilities for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force
Planning (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017); Eric Heginbotham et al.,
The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015); Michael
Mazarr et al., The Korean Peninsula: Three Dangerous Scenarios (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018); Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional
Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018); Testimony by William Shelton
before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and House
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and
Communications, “Threats to Space Assets and Implications for Homeland Security,” March 29, 2017, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20170329/
105785/HHRG-115-AS29-Wstate-SheltonW-20170329.pdf; Robert Ackerman,
“Intelligence Confronts Space Vulnerabilities,” Signal, September 1, 2018; Sydney Freedberg, “$86,000 + 5,600 MPH = Hyper Velocity Missile Defense,”
Breaking Defense, January 26, 2018; Jen Judson, “Space-Based Laser Weapons
Could Ultimately Take Out Missile Threats in Boost Phase,” Defense News,
August 14, 2018; Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,
https://DOD.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx;
as well as the consultations with numerous non-governmental experts listed in
the appendix.
3

 Chapter 1

The Purpose of American Military Power
and the Crisis of National Defense
Any defense strategy must protect the fundamental interests of the
United States. Since the inception of the Republic, America’s most vital
interests have remained constant. They include the physical security of
the United States and its citizens; the promotion of a strong, innovative,
and growing U.S. economy; and the protection of the nation’s democratic freedoms and domestic institutions. These interests were enshrined
in the Declaration of Independence as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness,” and collectively, they represent the pole star toward which
any American strategy must be oriented.
Since the mid-20th century, there has been a bipartisan consensus that
America should take an international leadership role to secure these interests. The events of the 1930s and 1940s showed that the United States
could not remain prosperous in a world ravaged by global depression,
nor could it remain safe in a world convulsed by instability and war.
Moreover, these events illustrated to Americans the danger that their
own free institutions might not survive in a world ruled by hostile autocracies. As a result, Americans and their elected leaders concluded that
the United States must use its unmatched power to foster a larger global
environment in which America could thrive. This endeavor has often
been referred to as building the “liberal international order,” but it simply
reflects the common-sense idea that America will be most secure, prosperous, and free in a world that is itself secure, prosperous, and free.
This straightforward judgment has underpinned the sustained global
leadership the United States has exercised since the 1940s. America has
anchored an open global economy in which trade and investment flow
freely and Americans can see their creative energies rewarded. It has
built international institutions that facilitate problem-solving and cooperation on important global issues. It has defended democratic values and
human rights abroad in order to enhance U.S. influence and safeguard
democratic values and human rights at home. It has sought to uphold favorable balances of power in key regions and concluded military alliances and security partnerships with dozens of like-minded countries—
not as a matter of charity, but as a way of deterring aggression and preventing conflicts that could pose a serious threat to U.S. national security
and prosperity. These have not been Republican policies or Democratic
4

 policies; they have been American policies, meant to create a world conducive to American interests and values.
The role of alliances and partnerships deserves special emphasis here.
U.S. alliances and partnerships are sometimes mischaracterized as
arrangements that squander American resources on behalf of free-riding
foreign countries. In reality, U.S. alliances and partnerships have been
deeply rooted in American self-interest. They have served as forcemultipliers for U.S. influence, by promoting institutionalized cooperation
between America and like-minded nations. They have allowed America
to call on the aid of its friends in every major conflict it has waged since
World War II. They have buttressed the concept of international order
that the United States seeks to preserve, by enlisting other nations in the
promotion of a world favorable to American interests. They have provided intelligence support, regional expertise, and other critical assistance. In short, alliances and partnerships rooted in shared interests and
mutual respect have reduced the price America pays for global leadership and enhanced the advantages America enjoys over any geopolitical
rival. And although these alliances and partnerships—like all of America’s postwar policies—have required the persistent use of diplomacy,
economic power, and other tools of statecraft, they have ultimately rested
on a foundation of military strength.
Since World War II, America has had a military second to none. After
the Cold War, it possessed military power far greater than that of any rival or group of rivals. This position of unmatched strength has provided
for the defense and security of the United States, American citizens overseas, and American allies and partners. It has been crucial to deterring
and, if necessary, defeating aggression by hostile powers, whether the
Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War or al-Qaeda and Islamic
State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) more recently. It has preserved stability
in key regions from Europe to East Asia and beyond, and ensured the
freedom of the global commons on which U.S. and international prosperity depends. It has prevented America from being coerced or intimidated,
or once again finding itself the situation of the early 1940s, when democracy itself was endangered because aggressive authoritarian powers
were on the verge of dominating the globe. It has given the United States
unrivaled influence on a wide range of global issues.
America’s leadership role has never been inexpensive or easy to play,
and today many Americans are questioning whether it is worth the cost.
But by any reasonable standard, U.S. global engagement has been a great
investment. U.S. leadership has prevented a recurrence of the devastating
5

 world wars that marked the first half of the 20th century and required repeated U.S. interventions at a cost of hundreds of thousands of American
lives. That leadership has also fostered an unprecedented growth in human freedom, with the number of democracies rising from roughly a
dozen during World War II to 120 in the early 21st century. And as democracies displaced dictatorships, America itself became more secure
and influential.
The growth of prosperity has been even more astounding. According to
World Bank data, inflation-adjusted U.S. gross domestic product has increased nearly six-fold since 1960. Both U.S. and global per capita income have also increased roughly three-fold (also in inflation-adjusted
terms) over the same period. To be clear, the evolution of the economy
in recent decades has left too many of our citizens behind, and it is essential that all benefit from our national prosperity. On the whole, however, both the United States and the world are far richer than they would
have been absent the open international economy America has fostered.
Here, too, American policy has been successful in what it has avoided as
well as what it has achieved: the world has not suffered another global
depression that would cause rampant poverty, political radicalism, and
international aggression, and that would surely lead to catastrophic effects for the United States. Decades of experience have taught that
American leadership is not a fool’s errand or a matter of altruism, but a
pragmatic approach to advancing American security and wellbeing.
There is little reason to think the situation has changed today. The fundamental lesson of the 1930s and 1940s—that no country is an island—
remains as relevant as ever. If anything, as the world becomes increasingly interdependent, the security and prosperity of the United States are
becoming ever more closely linked to the health of the larger international environment. And although the United States has many powerful
allies, none of them can fill the singular role America has played in
providing the international peace, stability, and prosperity in which the
United States itself has flourished. U.S. leadership of a stable and open
international environment remains as profoundly in the country’s own
national interests as it was more than seven decades ago. Unfortunately,
in recent years changes at home and abroad have eroded American military advantages and threatening U.S. interests.

The Changing Strategic Environment
After the Cold War, the United States faced a relatively benign security
environment. There remained dangerous challenges to U.S. interests
and—as shown by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—the
6

 American homeland. Yet tensions between the world’s major powers
were historically low, and the actors that threatened the United States,
from so-called rogue states to jihadist terror organizations, were comparatively weak. Today, however, the international landscape is more
ominous. The United States confronts the most challenging security environment in decades. Six trends are particularly worthy of note.
First, and most important, is the rise of major-power competition and
conflict. The world America shaped has brought great security and prosperity to many countries. Yet today, powerful authoritarian rivals—
China and Russia—see U.S. leadership as a barrier to their ambitions.
These countries seek to overturn existing regional balances of power and
re-create spheres of influence in which they can dominate their neighbors’ economic, diplomatic, and security choices. They are also seeking
to project power and exert influence beyond their peripheries. They are
pursuing their agendas, moreover, through the use of coercion, intimidation, and in some cases outright aggression, all backed by major military
buildups that specifically target U.S. military advantages and alliance
commitments and relationships.
The challenge China presents is particularly daunting. It is natural for
China to exert greater influence as its power grows, and the rise of China
would present challenges for America and the world even if Beijing pursued its interests through entirely legitimate means. Unfortunately, China
is increasingly exerting influence in illegitimate and destabilizing ways.
China is using military, paramilitary, and diplomatic measures to coerce
U.S. allies and partners from Japan to India; contest international law
and freedom of navigation in crucial waterways such as the South China
Sea; undermine the U.S. position in East and Southeast Asia; and otherwise seek a position of geopolitical dominance. It is using predatory economic statecraft to weaken its rivals, including the United States, and
give it decisive strategic leverage over its neighbors. Meanwhile, China
is reaping the fruits of a multi-decade military buildup. Beijing has invested in systems designed to counter American power-projection and
thereby prevent the United States from protecting its allies, partners, and
economic interests. China is also modernizing its nuclear forces, developing sophisticated power-projection capabilities, and undertaking the
most thoroughgoing military reforms since the founding of the People’s
Republic. China already presents a severe test of U.S. interests in the
Indo-Pacific and beyond and is on a path to become, by mid-century, a
military challenger the likes of which America has not encountered since
the Cold War-era Soviet Union.

7

 Russia, too, is pursuing regional hegemony and global influence in destabilizing ways. Moscow has invaded and dismembered neighboring
states, used cyberwarfare and other tactics to attack democratic nations’
political systems, and employed measures from military intimidation to
information warfare to undermine and weaken NATO and the European
Union. Russia has intervened militarily in Syria to bolster Bashar
al-Assad’s brutal regime and restore lost influence in the Middle East,
while supporting many other authoritarian governments. Across these initiatives, the Putin regime has demonstrated a propensity for risk-taking
backed up by enhanced military power. Moscow has developed advanced conventional capabilities meant to prevent America from projecting power and aiding its allies along Russia’s periphery and to project its
own power farther afield. Russia is also conducting a comprehensive nuclear modernization, including sustainment and modernization of a large
number of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the development of a
ground-launched cruise missile that violates the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty. These developments are accompanied by Russian
doctrinal writings that emphasize the prospect of using limited nuclear
escalation to control the trajectory of a potential conflict against the
United States and NATO. Russia is seeking to create situations of military strength vis-à-vis America and its allies, and despite its limited resource base, it is having considerable success.
Second, aggressive regional challengers—notably North Korea and
Iran—are expanding their military capabilities consistent with their geopolitical ambitions. The United States and its allies have faced threats
from a brutal, erratic, and aggressive North Korea for decades, but never
before has Pyongyang possessed such destructive power. North Korea
may already have the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon over a major American city; the regime also continues to develop biological,
chemical, and conventional capabilities as a way of guaranteeing its survival and coercing adversaries. Today, Kim Jong Un’s military can
threaten America more directly than his father or grandfather. He can
also exert great pressure on U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan,
sowing doubt about whether America would defend those allies in a crisis. This Commission hopes that ongoing negotiations will lead to the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,
but the history of U.S.-North Korean negotiations give little cause for
optimism. Even successful negotiations would leave America facing significant security challenges on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia,
most significantly the robust ballistic missile threat posed to our allies,
Japan and the Republic of Korea.
8

 The threat from Iran, another longtime U.S. adversary and the world’s
foremost state sponsor of terrorism, has also worsened. Iran has skillfully
utilized asymmetric tactics including terrorism, the weaponization of
sectarianism, support for insurgent groups, and a reliance on proxy and
special operations forces to weaken U.S. influence and pursue hegemony
in the Middle East. Iranian military capabilities are growing in areas such
as unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive boats, advanced naval mines
and submarines, more sophisticated cyber forces, and anti-ship and landattack cruise missiles. Iran is also expanding what is already the largest
ballistic missile force in the region. In a conflict with the United States,
Iran could use these capabilities to obstruct freedom of navigation in regional waterways, target U.S. military facilities and critical infrastructure
in the Persian Gulf, and otherwise inflict substantial costs on America
and its partners.
The challenges of major power conflict and aggressive regional challengers are linked by a third, which is the growing prevalence of aggression and conflict in the gray zone—the space between war and peace.
The means of gray-zone conflict include everything from strong-arm
diplomacy and economic coercion, to media manipulation and cyberattacks, to use of paramilitaries and proxy forces. Singly or in combination, such tactics confound or gradually weaken an adversary’s positions
or resolve without provoking a military response. Gray-zone conflict is
often shrouded in deception or misinformation, making attribution difficult and discouraging a strong response.
Although coercive challenges of this sort are not new, they have become
the tool of choice for those who do not wish to confront U.S. military
power directly. China’s island-building and maritime coercion in the
South China Sea, Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah and other militias as
tools of influence and subversion in the Middle East, Russia’s use of
unacknowledged military and proxy forces in Ukraine, and Moscow’s
information warfare campaigns meant to inflame social tensions and influence political processes in the United States and Europe all represent
examples of gray-zone aggression today. Because gray-zone challenges
combine military and paramilitary measures with economic statecraft,
political warfare, information operations, and other tools, they often
occur in the “seams” between DOD and other U.S. departments and
agencies, making them all the more difficult to address.
Fourth, the threat from radical jihadist groups has evolved and intensified. Groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates pose ongoing
threats to the United States and its allies and partners, from Western
9

 Africa to the Philippines. That threat is not new, but it is expanding.
There are more jihadists in more countries today than at any time since
the birth of the modern jihadist movement in 1979, and there are more
groups capable of mounting major attacks. The most sophisticated
groups have developed state-like military capabilities, conquered (however briefly) large swaths of territory, shown continued interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and commanded or inspired deadly
attacks around the globe. Assisted by poor governance, sectarian conflict, and regional instability, these groups—or their successors—will
threaten U.S. and international security for generations to come.
Fifth, and compounding these challenges, the proliferation of advanced
technology is eroding U.S. advantages and creating new vulnerabilities.
The spread of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic and cruise missiles,
precision-strike assets, advanced air defenses, antisatellite and
cyberwarfare capabilities, and unmanned systems has given weaker
actors the ability to threaten America and its allies in more dangerous
ways. In some cases, we are behind, or falling behind, in critical technologies. U.S. competitors are making enormous investments in hypersonic
delivery vehicles, artificial intelligence (AI), and other advanced technologies. With respect to hypersonics in particular, the United States finds
itself trailing China and perhaps Russia as well. All this raises the possibility that America may find itself at a technological disadvantage in future conflicts. Because the American way of war has long relied on
technological supremacy, this could have profoundly negative implications for U.S. military effectiveness.
The United States thus confronts more numerous—and more severe—
threats than at any time in decades. America must address the threats
posed by major-power rivals, dangerous regional challengers, and
terrorists simultaneously; it must deal with geopolitical conflict, grayzone aggression, and instability from one end of Eurasia to the other. It
must also prepare for the prospect that the U.S. military might be called
into action in a country, region, or contingency that is not currently
envisioned.
The dangers posed by these and other troubling trends have been compounded by a final problem, of America’s own making: budgetary instability and disinvestment in defense. Because of decisions made by both
major parties—especially the enactment of the Budget Control Act
(BCA) of 2011—constant-dollar defense spending (in estimated 2018
dollars) fell from $794 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to $586 billion
in FY2015, according to U.S. government statistics. In percentage terms,
10

 this constituted the fastest drawdown since the years following the
Korean War. Excluding overseas contingency operations accounts—
funding for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—the inflation-adjusted decline
was from $612 billion to $541 billion. This defense austerity was exacerbated by political gridlock, which forced the Pentagon to operate on
short-term continuing resolutions, and which triggered the crippling,
across-the-board cuts associated with the sequester mechanism in 2013.
The effects of these resource challenges have been devastating. By 2017,
all of the military services were at or near post-World War II lows in
terms of end-strength, and all were confronting severe readiness crises
and enormous deferred modernization costs (see Figure 1). A series of
temporary budget increases provided for by the Bipartisan Budget Acts
of 2013, 2015, and 2018 provided welcome but insufficient relief. As the
world has become more threatening, America has weakened its own
defense.

The Crisis of American Military Power
and Its Consequences
Collectively, these trends add up to a perilous situation. In 2010, the
Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel warned of a coming
“train wreck” if America did not retain adequate military capabilities in
an increasingly competitive world. In 2014, the National Defense Panel
warned that the U.S. military had become “inadequate given the future
strategic and operational environment.” In 2018, this Commission believes that America has reached the point of a full-blown national security crisis. The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world, but the
number and geographic diversity of security challenges, the technical sophistication of U.S. rivals and adversaries, and other factors mean that
America’s military capabilities are insufficient to address the growing
dangers the country faces. America is courting unacceptable risk to its
own national security, and to the stability and prosperity of the global environment from which it has benefitted so much.
Across multiple regions, adverse military trends and gray-zone aggression are undermining U.S. influence and damaging U.S. interests. In the
Western Pacific, the regional military balance has shifted dramatically
because of China’s ongoing buildup and coercive activities. In Eastern
Europe, Russian military modernization has left U.S. and NATO forces
with severe vulnerabilities on the alliance’s eastern frontier. In the Middle East, Tehran’s arsenal of asymmetric and anti-access/area denial capabilities, along with its network of proxy forces, can create significant
11

 12

Number of Personnel in Thousands

1964

Army

1970

1968

Navy

1976

1974

1972

Marine Corps

1978

1966

1962

1960

1958

1956

1954

1952

1950

1948

1946

Source: Department of Defense Green Book 2019, Table 7-5.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

In the same timeframe, the Air Force was the
smallest it had been since its founding in 1947.

1992

1990

1988

1984

1982

1980

Air Force (and Army Air Corps)

2000
1998

1996

DOD Civilians
Civilians
DOD

2006

2004
2002

1994

1200

2008

1400

1986

Between 2012 and 2016, the Army and Navy reached their
lowest strengths since before World War II.

2010

1600

2012

1800

Figure 1. Department of Defense Active-Duty End Strength, 1946–2019

2014

2000

2018

2016

 challenges for U.S. forces and influence, as Russia’s renewed regional
military presence further inhibits American freedom of action. Looking
beyond these regions, U.S. competitors and adversaries—particularly
Russia and China—are increasingly contesting American control of the
maritime, space, and cyber commons and improving their ability to strike
the U.S. homeland (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. U.S.-Russia-China Force Comparison

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance, 2002, 2012,
2018. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Nuclear Notebook.
Notes: Naval vessels include submarines and combat logistics force ships, but exclude
small patrol and landing craft. Fighter aircraft exclude “attack aircraft,” but include
“fighter, ground attack” aircraft, as classified by IISS.

The consequences of these shifts are profound. Because the military balance casts its shadow over international diplomacy, the erosion of U.S.
military advantage is weakening the norms and principles for which
America has traditionally stood. It is no coincidence that threats to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea—through which one-third of
global shipping transits—have increased as the military balance has deteriorated. Similarly, the credibility of American alliances—the bedrock of
geopolitical stability in key areas—will be weakened as allies question
whether the United States can defend them; American rivals and adversaries will be emboldened to push harder. From the Taiwan Strait to the
13

 Baltic region, peace and deterrence have long rested on the perception
that the United States can decisively defeat military challenges. As that
perception fades, deterrence weakens and war becomes more likely.
Should war occur, American forces will face harder fights and greater
losses than at any time in decades. It is worth recalling that during the
Falklands War, a decidedly inferior opponent—Argentina—crippled and
sank a major British warship by striking it with a single guided missile.
The amount of destruction a major state adversary could inflict on U.S.
forces today might be orders of magnitude higher. A war on the Korean
Peninsula, for instance, would expose U.S. and allied citizens and forces
in the region to intense conventional warfare and likely chemical and biological warfare. There would be a real possibility of North Korean nuclear strikes against allied countries in Northeast Asia and perhaps even
against U.S. territory.
If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China
in a war over Taiwan (see Vignette 1), Americans could face a decisive
military defeat. These two nations possess precision-strike capabilities,
integrated air defenses, cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced
cyberwarfare and anti-satellite capabilities, significant air and naval
forces, and nuclear weapons—a suite of advanced capabilities heretofore
possessed only by the United States. The U.S. military would face daunting challenges in establishing air superiority or sea control and retaking
territory lost early in a conflict. Against an enemy equipped with advanced anti-access/area denial capabilities, attrition of U.S. capital
assets—ships, planes, tanks—could be enormous. The prolonged, deliberate buildup of overwhelming force in theater that has traditionally been
the hallmark of American expeditionary warfare would be vastly more
difficult and costly, if it were possible at all. Put bluntly, the U.S. military could lose the next state-versus-state war it fights.

14

 1. Losing Taiwan
In 2024, China undertakes a surprise attack to prevent Taiwan from declaring
independence. As Chinese forces launch air and missile attacks, cripple the
Taiwanese Navy, and conduct amphibious landings, it becomes clear that
decisive U.S. intervention will be required. Unfortunately, America can no longer
mount such an intervention at acceptable cost. China’s missile, air, surface, and
undersea capabilities have continued to grow as U.S. defense spending has
stagnated. Large parts of the Western Pacific have become “no-go” zones for
U.S. forces. The Pentagon informs the President that America could probably
defeat China in a long war, if the full might of the nation was mobilized. Yet it
would lose huge numbers of ships and aircraft, as well as thousands of lives, in
the effort, in addition to suffering severe economic disruptions—all with no
guarantee of having decisive impact before Taiwan was overrun. Allowing Taiwan
to be absorbed by the mainland would represent a crushing blow to America’s
credibility and regional position. But avoiding that outcome would now require
absorbing horrendous losses.
2. Nuclear Escalation with North Korea
In 2019, U.S.-North Korean tensions remain high over Pyongyang’s nuclear and
missile programs. As a precaution, the President directs an orderly withdrawal of
U.S. civilians from South Korea. Yet Kim Jong Un misinterprets this as prelude to
war and strikes first. North Korean artillery hammers Seoul. Conventionally armed
ballistic missiles strike ports, airfields, and U.S. military facilities in South Korea. As
casualties mount, U.S. and South Korean leaders order operations to neutralize
North Korea’s artillery, missile, and nuclear forces. As the conflict escalates,
however, Kim concludes that his only chance of survival is to shock America into
backing down. North Korea launches nuclear-armed ballistic missiles at the South
Korean port of Busan and U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam. As the U.S.
President considers how to respond, Kim announces that if America does not
accept an immediate cease-fire, North Korea will launch nuclear-tipped
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the continental United States—a threat
against which U.S. missile defenses offer only uncertain protection. The President
faces a terrible dilemma: risk devastating nuclear attacks on U.S. cities or let North
Korea prevail.

Such conflicts are also unlikely to stay neatly confined to overseas theaters. Rather, they are likely to reach the American people at home. As
noted, a war against North Korea would expose the United States to the
risk of nuclear strikes on American territories or even major American
cities (see Vignette 2). War with Russia or China would also involve significant risk of nuclear escalation—a risk heightened, in Russia’s case,
by Moscow’s emphasis on the limited use of nuclear weapons to intimidate the United States and NATO into ending a conflict on Russian
terms. Even absent nuclear escalation, a conflict with Russia or China
could involve attacks on U.S. space systems, which would profoundly
disrupt the functioning of a society that is heavily dependent on satellite
15

 communications; attempts to cut undersea fiber optic cables that are crucial to communications and commerce; and devastating cyberattacks on
U.S. critical infrastructure (see Vignette 3). Finally, regardless of
whether a war with Russia or China led to direct attacks on U.S. territory, winning such a conflict—particularly if it lasted months or years instead of days or weeks—would likely require a level of U.S. national
industrial and public mobilization not experienced since the middle of
the last century. It would also inflict devastating economic impacts on
the United States and beyond.
3. Domestic Chaos amid War with Russia
In 2019, NATO-Russia tensions ignite. Responding to false reports of atrocities
against Russian populations in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, Russia invades
those countries under guise of a “peacekeeping” mission. As U.S. and NATO
forces prepare to respond, Russia declares that strikes against Russian forces in
those states will be treated as attacks on Russia itself—implying a potential
nuclear response. Meanwhile, to keep America off balance, Russia escalates in
disruptive ways. Russian submarines attack trans-Atlantic fiber optic cables.
Russian hackers shut down power grids and compromise the security of U.S.
banks. The Russian military uses advanced anti-satellite capabilities to damage
or destroy U.S. military and commercial satellites. The domestic consequences
are severe. Major cities are paralyzed; use of the internet and smart phones is
disrupted. Financial markets plummet as commerce seizes up and online
financial transactions slow to a crawl. The banking system is thrown into chaos.
Even as the U.S. military confronts the immense operational challenge of
liberating the Baltic states, American society is suffering the devastating impact
of modern conflict.

Even short of such scenarios, the military and geopolitical changes
described here are fraught with pernicious implications. America is
already experiencing advanced cyberattacks conducted by rivals and
adversaries—witness Russian intervention in U.S. electoral politics and
the “wannacry” ransomware attacks perpetrated by North Korea in 2017.
As regional military balances grow less favorable, American competitors
will be better able to contest the freedom of the commons and establish
intimidation and aggression as the coin of the geopolitical realm (see
Vignettes 4 and 5). And as Russia and China gain greater influence
within their regions, they may use those positions as spring-boards to
contest U.S. leadership across the full range of its economic and security
interests in ways not seen since the Cold War.

16

 4. Losing Access to the South China Sea
The year is 2022. China has been deploying advanced military capabilities on land
formations in the South China Sea for nearly a decade. Although America and its
allies have decried China’s actions and increased the tempo of their own naval
deployments, Beijing has gradually created a ring of military facilities that extends
the reach of its naval, air, and amphibious forces. Amid tense U.S.-Chinese trade
talks, China begins harassing commercial shipping in international waters that
China claims as part of its exclusive economic zone. When the United States and
its allies hesitate to challenge this behavior, an emboldened China then imposes
heavy tolls on maritime traffic through the South China Sea and begins restricting
transit by commercial vessels from America and other “unfriendly” nations. With
14 percent of America’s maritime trade passing through the South China Sea, the
economic effects are immediately felt in U.S. financial markets, consumer prices,
and manufacturing and agricultural communities. America has fought to preserve
freedom of the seas before. But now, the potential military costs of reversing
China’s control over the South China Sea seem so high, and Washington
confronts so many other global challenges, that America can only acquiesce.
5. Cyber Attacks in Conflict Short of War
Competition with Russia need not erupt into war for the impact to be profound.
In 2020, mass protests against the authoritarian Lukashenko regime in Belarus
prompt Russian intervention to “stabilize” that government. Because this marks
the third time in 12 years Russia has invaded a neighboring country, America
and its European allies impose harsh economic sanctions. Rather than backing
down, Russia responds by exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in cyberspace.
Russian hackers launch massive cyberattacks on the U.S. electoral
infrastructure in November, tampering with registration rolls and vote counts
and thereby throwing the elections into chaos. Russia also launches targeted
attacks against the U.S. electrical grid, leaving Cleveland and Syracuse without
power for days. As the President weighs his options, his advisers warn that
Russia can still escalate further in cyberspace—by attacking other power grids
or the U.S. financial system. Moscow could also provoke a military crisis in the
Baltic region, where it enjoys conventional dominance over outnumbered U.S.
and NATO forces. America has seen the very fabric of its society and polity
attacked, but struggles to find an effective response.

The United States is on the precipice of this future, but it can still act to
secure its long-term advantages. Doing so will require the effective use
of all elements of national power, with particular demands on the Department of Defense.

17

 Chapter 2

Evaluating the National Defense Strategy
Although the NDS represents a constructive first step in responding to
the crisis of national defense and generally sets appropriate goals, the execution of the strategy will likely be hindered by critical resource shortfalls and analytical gaps. After discussing the limitations of the NDS in
this chapter, in subsequent chapters we outline how to build and sustain
the force America needs.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the NDS
The Commission applauds the priority the NDS places on competition
with China and Russia as the central dynamic in shaping and sizing U.S.
military forces and in U.S. defense strategy more broadly. The military
competitions with these two nations, each presenting its own challenges,
are evident today and could further unfold in particularly worrisome
ways. We also agree with one of the key assertions of the NDS—that
U.S. forces must not only dominate key competitions with these two
states, but must also succeed in the face of wide-ranging challenges from
state and non-state actors alike, from combating gray-zone measures
short of war to winning in high-intensity conflict. The goals of restoring
readiness and “prioritiz[ing] preparedness for war” are sound and the
Department of Defense must hold fast to them. We affirm the stress the
NDS lays on strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships,
building or enhancing newer ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in all of these relationships.
U.S. alliances and partnerships will continue to be critical to advancing
American interests for the foreseeable future, and the Department is right
to make this issue a top priority.
The Commission is nonetheless skeptical that DOD has the attendant
plans, concepts, and resources needed to meet the defense objectives established in the NDS, and we are concerned that there is not a coherent
approach for implementing the NDS across the entire DOD enterprise. In
assessing this issue, the commissioners reviewed numerous classified
documents, received briefings, and interviewed many DOD leaders. We
came away troubled by the lack of unity among senior civilian and military leaders in their descriptions of how the objectives described in the
NDS are supported by the Department’s readiness, force structure, and
modernization priorities, as described in the Future Years Defense

18

 Program (FYDP) and other documents. The absence of well-crafted analytic products supporting the Department’s force sizing and shaping
plans was equally notable.
The Commission also questions whether the desired outcomes of the
NDS can be realized within anticipated resource constraints. Although
the NDS lays out ambitious strategic and operational goals, which this
Commission largely supports, to date this administration has proposed
only modest increases in the defense budget and few major long-term capability initiatives. The Department has not clearly explained how it will
implement the NDS with the resources available; in fact, many of the additional resources made available so far have been distributed uniformly
across the defense bureaucracy so that “everybody wins,” rather than being strategically prioritized to build key future capabilities. Above all,
none of the dramatic changes needed to effectively execute the strategy
will be possible without substantial cultural change paired with in-depth
civilian oversight.
Based on available information, the Commission judges that DOD is
assuming too much risk in its approach to achieving its stated objectives
and far greater risk than is publicly understood. The NDS states, “In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating
aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats.” Unacknowledged risk is built into the Department’s force construct and the
resourcing of that force construct in six major ways.

Competition against Russia and China
As we subsequently note in greater detail, DOD and the White House
have not yet articulated clear operational concepts for achieving U.S. security objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential military confrontation with China and Russia. While the NDS properly
focuses on winning high-intensity conflicts and closing near-term capability gaps vis-à-vis China and Russia, DOD leaders had difficulty articulating how the U.S. military would defeat major-power adversaries
should deterrence fail. The Department does not appear to have a plan
for succeeding in gray-zone competitions against these actors, nor does
the administration as a whole appear to have such an integrated plan. The
United States is currently losing those competitions as Russia and China
use measures short of war and employ multiple tools of statecraft to expand their influence and weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships. The
NDS asserts that DOD will “expand the competitive space” but offers
little evidence of how it will do so.
19

 The NDS also states that DOD will plan to employ the force “unpredictably” or “creatively” at the operational level. Horizontal escalation is one
example of such an approach. Based on analysis reviewed by the Commission, the deterrent or coercive value of this approach appears limited.
If China attacked Taiwan or Russia attacked the Baltic states, for instance, it seems unlikely that the United States could force its adversary
to back down by applying pressure—military or otherwise—in secondary areas. Moreover, while the creativity implicit in seeking to “expand
the competitive space” is laudable, force employment must be firmly
grounded in foreign policy goals set by the civilian leadership, and it
must deliberately integrate political-military considerations in order to
avoid unintended or counterproductive strategic effects. Civilian oversight should not be window-dressing in this process; it must entail the
meaningful political-military guidance required by Congress and entrusted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

Under-Resourced Theaters
Because the United States remains a global power with global obligations, it must possess credible combat power to deter and defeat threats
in multiple theaters in a timely manner. Indeed, given the presence of
five serious adversaries, three with nuclear weapons, the United States
must prepare—and resource—for multiple, near-simultaneous contingencies. Today, however, DOD is neither prepared nor resourced for such a
scenario. The Department has largely abandoned the longstanding “twowar” construct for a “one major war” sizing and shaping construct. In the
event of large-scale conflict with Russia or China, the United States may
not have sufficient remaining resources to deter other adversaries in
one—let alone two—other theaters by denying them the ability to
accomplish their objectives without relying on nuclear weapons. The
Department’s suggested means for addressing multiple contingencies—
minimizing involvement in the Middle East, deepening collaboration
with allies and partners, and increasing the salience of nuclear
weapons—are unlikely to solve the problem.
For instance, although multiple defense leaders referenced “accepting
risk” in lower priority areas such as the Middle East, there was little consensus about what this means in practice. Questions remaining unanswered include which forces would be removed from the theater and
what implications this would have for deterring and if necessary defeating Iran (now potentially operating outside the limitations on uranium

20

 enrichment contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) or dangerous terrorist organizations, competing with Russia, or sustaining ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

Unanticipated Force Demands
The NDS emphasizes husbanding resources to build readiness for highintensity conflicts with China or Russia. Yet given the differing needs for
forces across theaters, the challenges of projecting power over great distances, and the fact that the United States has rarely been able to predict
precisely where or how adversaries will challenge its interests, the U.S.
military will surely experience unanticipated force demands in coming
years. This pressure will be particularly acute should there be a military
crisis on the Korean Peninsula, should Iran intensify its proxy warfare
(or worse) in the Middle East, or should there be a large-scale terrorist
attack on the homeland. Following the U.S. departure from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, for example, the potential for conflict in
the Middle East—which was already rising—is probably greater than before. A contingency in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere could consume resources and significantly hamper the U.S.
military’s ability to prevail in a military confrontation or more intense
gray-zone competition with China or Russia.

Unclear Concepts
“How” is as important as “how much” in setting U.S. defense strategy.
Yet key concepts in the NDS—including deterrence and posture shifts
like “dynamic force employment”—lack underlying analytics and maturity. For instance, the strategy does not explain the Department’s thinking on how the United States will deter threats in a second theater of
operations. Due to the increased complexity of evolving domains such as
cyber and space, the challenges of dealing with multiple rivals, and the
reliance of countries such as Russia on highly escalatory approaches,
which may include use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, the requirements for deterrence are significantly different today than during
the Cold War or the early post-Cold War era. Deterring our rivals will be
highly challenging. Although the NDS states that deterring adversaries is
a key objective, there was little consensus among DOD leaders with
whom we interacted on what deterrence means in practice, how escalation dynamics might play out, and what it will cost to deter effectively.
Similarly, the Department’s resolve to rely on a “Dynamic Force Employment” (DFE) model may be ill considered. DFE appears to refer to
creating efficiencies within the force and decreasing the need to expand
21

 force structure by having a single asset perform multiple missions in different theaters on a near-simultaneous basis. Yet the United States must
confront threats in both the Western Pacific and Europe, two very different theaters that require a significantly different type and mix of forces to
best deter aggression and defeat the enemy if deterrence fails. (The likely
force requirements for these theaters are discussed subsequently.) Moreover, successfully competing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region,
while also managing escalation dynamics, requires positioning substantial capability forward (in what the NDS calls the “blunt” layer) to deter
and prevent a fait accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary. Given
the vast distances involved in reaching both theaters and beyond, DFE
may simply place additional strain on already stretched logistics and
transportation networks.

Unanticipated Resource Shortfalls
In 2017, both Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford testified that the Pentagon
required sustained three to five percent annual budgetary growth just to
execute the defense strategy inherited from the previous administration.
Although these estimates were provided prior to the finalization of the
NDS, we believe they are generally reflective of the level of resources
required to execute the ambitious strategy the NDS lays out. Yet based
on DOD’s own projections, real budgetary growth will be essentially flat
beyond FY2019. This creates high risk that the strategy will suffer from
even greater resource shortfalls than those already identified. Should
Congress fail to provide funding on a timely basis, resorting instead to
the habitual use of short-term continuing resolutions, or should it fail to
craft an additional bipartisan budget deal lifting the much lower caps imposed by the BCA for FY2020 and FY2021, resource shortfalls will be
even more pronounced, making it impossible to achieve the goals outlined in the NDS.

Challenges Requiring More than DOD Capabilities
Many of the challenges the United States faces today are not purely military in nature and are not strictly the purview of the Department of Defense. Rather, American adversaries and rivals are using the full range of
tools, from economic coercion to paramilitary action and information
warfare, to accomplish their aims. As noted previously, many of these
activities occur below the threshold of conventional war. Although the
NDS (like this Commission’s report) is properly focused on defenserelated issues, the strategy it outlines is insufficient to protect U.S.
interests from gray-zone competition and other threats that fall short of
22

 outright war or reside in the seams between bureaucratic jurisdictions.
The United States could well lose the competitions and conflicts in
which it is engaged today absent more cohesive, fully-resourced responses that reach across the various U.S. government departments and
agencies, and across the many elements of American power: diplomacy,
intelligence, economic statecraft, information warfare, and others.
Taken together, these risk factors and logic gaps leave us concerned that
DOD will face serious challenges achieving the goals the NDS identifies.
We therefore assess that the United States requires rapid and substantial
improvements to its military capabilities, built on a foundation of compelling warfighting concepts at the operational level of war. This foundation must be built in the context of major-power competition, in which
deterrence and assurance strategies will grow in importance and must be
tailored to meet the specific requirements of particular rivalries and relationships. Due to the rapidly changing security environment and the impossibility of accurately foreseeing all future requirements, the
commission recommends an emphasis on adaptability in force planning
and a serious study of escalation dynamics. We now turn to a more detailed assessment of what will be necessary to sustain a strong and adequate defense, today and in the future.

23

 Chapter 3

The Force We Need: Meeting Core Operational Challenges
and Strengthening the National Security Innovation Base
Building a force that can protect American interests, security, and prosperity in a more complex and competitive world will require determined,
ongoing efforts across a range of issues and challenges. It will entail a
mix of near, medium, and long-term initiatives. Developing innovative
operational approaches that can overcome difficult operational challenges and strengthening the National Security Innovation Base are imperative in addressing current and future threats.

Meeting Core Operational Challenges
The NDS lists a series of key operational challenges to focus U.S. defense investments. Unfortunately, DOD elected to classify those challenges. The Commission believes this limits needed public awareness
and understanding, obscures the urgency of these challenges and makes
it difficult for Congress and the broader defense community to discuss
them, develop approaches to meeting them, and gauge progress in doing
so. Our competitors are well aware of the challenges they are imposing
as a result of their sustained and deliberate investment campaigns. We
recommend strongly that DOD declassify the operational challenges alluded to in the 2018 NDS so that they can be used as a benchmark for
measuring implementation of the strategy. For purposes of unclassified
discussion, the Commission believes the following generally captures the
challenges that exist:









Protecting critical bases of operations, including the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, and allies and partners;
Rapidly reinforcing and sustaining forces engaged forward;
Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting
effective information operations;
Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or areadenial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial
threats;
Deterring and if necessary defeating the use of nuclear or other
strategic weapons in ways that would fall short of justifying a
large-scale nuclear response;
Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and
supporting infrastructure; and
24

 

Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
architecture and capability that supports warfare of the future.

Many of these challenges are similar to the ones DOD identified before
September 11, 2001, when they were largely prospective. Today, they
are real. Nearly two decades on we find it notable that many of these
challenges have informed U.S. defense strategy across multiple administrations, yet the position of the United States has eroded in most, if not
all, of these areas.
As noted, the military balance in key regions has been shifting away
from the United States and toward major-power competitors. Over the
past two decades, while the United States was focused on counterterrorism and defeating insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and
China were focused on acquiring capabilities to overcome America’s
technological edge and operational reach. As a result, America has been
losing its military advantage in a number of key warfighting areas, such
as air and missile defense, anti-surface warfare, long-range ground-based
fires, and electronic warfare. Many of the skills necessary to plan for and
conduct military operations against a capable adversary, such as command and control of large forces and logistical support of large, highintensity operations, have also deteriorated. The United States now faces
far graver challenges in projecting power and operating effectively in the
Western Pacific and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the United States and its
allies must increasingly account for Chinese and Russian activities and
power-projection capabilities beyond their home regions. Major-power
competition is a global challenge, not simply a regional one.
We recommend that U.S. defense investments emphasize achieving and
maintaining a favorable military balance for the United States and its
allies against China in the Indo-Pacific region and against Russia in
Europe—and that those investments be focused on the 2018 Operational
Challenges, represented by the challenges described previously. More
specifically, we recommend that defense investments should seek to yield
an expanded set of U.S. operational options while constraining those
available to China and Russia. They should restore our momentum in
competition with Beijing and Moscow, forcing them to bear considerable
cost in response.

25

 Operational Concepts
The NDS rightly notes the importance of developing innovative operational concepts to maximize the effectiveness of existing and emerging
capabilities. Operational concepts provide the conceptual basis for planning at the theater or campaign level of war. They inform how joint and
combined forces will operate to achieve strategic goals such as preserving a favorable military balance in the Western Pacific and Europe in the
face of growing threats. Operational concepts offer solutions to major
challenges to U.S. and international security and enable the formulation
of military doctrine. In this way, operational concepts constitute an essential link between strategic objectives, defense policy, and budgetary
priorities.
During the Cold War, the U.S. military developed detailed concepts for
overcoming formidable operational challenges. One set of concepts focused on defending NATO’s European frontiers from a Soviet attack.
The problem at that time centered on defeating a numerically superior
foe while avoiding nuclear escalation. To address this problem, the Army
cooperated with the Air Force to develop the AirLand Battle and FollowOn Forces Attack concepts, which focused on defeating successive echelons of Soviet forces. Mechanized formations would block the Soviet
frontline forces’ advance; deep-strike forces, including combat aircraft,
missiles, rocket artillery, and attack helicopters would break up the second and third waves. To ensure sufficient U.S. forces would be available,
and to enable rapid reinforcement of NATO’s flanks, large quantities of
equipment were pre-positioned in Western Europe and Norway. The
Navy developed its Maritime Strategy and Outer Air Battle concepts to
keep the Soviet fleet and aircraft bottled up and enable reinforcements to
move safely by sea. The Marines planned to employ maneuver warfare
concepts to secure NATO’s northern flank. These plans and concepts
allowed DOD and Congress to establish clear defense program priorities.
Today, Russia and China are capable of challenging the United States, its
allies, and its partners on a far greater scale than any adversary since the
Cold War. These countries are also leveraging existing and emerging
technologies to present U.S. forces with new military problems, such as
China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and the Russian hybrid warfare approach employed in seizing eastern Ukraine. Detailed, rigorous
operational concepts for solving these problems and defending U.S. interests are badly needed, but do not appear to exist.
We recommend that DOD more clearly answer the question of how it intends to accomplish a core theme of the NDS—defeating major-power
26

 rivals in competition and war. Without a credible approach to winning a
war against China or Russia, DOD’s efforts will be for naught. Similarly,
the United States needs plausible strategies and operational concepts—
that include but are not limited to efforts by the Department of Defense—
for winning competitions below the threshold of conventional war. DOD
should identify what the United States seeks to achieve, explain how the
United States will prevail, and suggest measures of effectiveness to mark
progress along the way. It should also clarify ill-defined concepts like
“expand the competitive space.” Of note, this effort should provide detail
about how DOD plans to decrease its focus on the Middle East to support
strategies and operational concepts focused on major-power competition
and the risks it foresees such an approach entailing.
In addition, the United States must develop new operational concepts to
achieve strategic advantage, including by addressing the ability of
aggressive regimes to achieve a fait accompli against states on their
periphery, or to use nuclear or other strategic weapons in ways that
would fall short of justifying a large-scale U.S. nuclear response. Deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia’s potential reliance on nuclear
escalation to end a conflict on its own terms is both a particularly difficult and an extremely important operational problem. More broadly,
potential adversaries are increasingly blurring lines between conventional, unconventional, and nuclear approaches; the United States needs
concepts that account for an adversary’s early reliance on nuclear means
and the blending of nuclear, space, cyber, conventional, and unconventional means in its warfighting doctrine. The United States has been
responding—inadequately—to operational challenges posed by our competitors. We must reverse that paradigm and present competitors with
challenges of our own making. Any new operational concepts must be
rigorously validated through experimentation, exercises, and training,
and subjected to the systematic analysis necessary to generate the associated time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD).
We also recommend that DOD establish cross-functional teams to integrate strategies and operational concepts. Congress mandated in the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 that DOD use crossfunctional teams (CFTs) to take on some of its toughest challenges. The
multi-dimensional challenges presented by competition from China and
Russia are well suited to this approach. The Secretary should consider
creating CFTs, which should be led by a civilian with a military deputy,
to advise him on the global challenges posed by China and Russia and to
integrate plans and solutions for advancing U.S. interests in the face of
them.
27

 National Security Innovation Base
Innovation is critical to overcoming operational challenges and positioning the U.S. military for success. In the past, research and development
(R&D) investments leading to new innovations were primarily the purview of the government. Today, the U.S. private sector invests significantly greater amounts than the federal government in research and only
a small portion of government investment goes to developing emerging
technologies. At the same time, the emphasis for defense programs has
been making the acquisition system function more smoothly rather than
optimizing for innovation and technological breakthroughs. This has led
to more innovation taking place outside of the government—in our commercial sector, universities, and R&D labs—making it increasingly difficult for DOD to access new technology quickly, if at all.
Making innovation accessible to the government is a critical issue that is
recognized in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the NDS, as well
as by DOD leaders. Wisely, the NSS expands the traditional notion of
the Defense Industrial Base to the National Security Innovation Base
(NSIB). To better address this issue, however, a commitment to change
is needed by all who participate in the governance of national security
programs and budgets.
In support of the NDS, the Undersecretary for Defense for Research and
Engineering (USD(R&E)) has established ten priority technology domains: hypersonics; directed energy; command, control, and communications; space offense and defense; cybersecurity; AI/machine learning;
missile defense; quantum science and computing; microelectronics; and
nuclear modernization. These are very similar to the “Vectors for Current and Future Modernization” the National Defense Panel identified in
2014. The Commission is nonetheless concerned that our superiority in
these areas is decreasing or has disappeared.
Our competitors, by contrast, are investing heavily in innovation (see
Figure 3). China’s “Made in China 2025” initiative emphasizes areas of
investment and development that very closely resemble the USD(R&E)
priorities. As part of a whole-of-society approach that features strong
collaboration between government and the commercial sector, China is
focusing intensely on and devoting generous funding to technologies
such as AI and synthetic biology. The Chinese government has announced it intends to lead the world in AI advancement by 2025. Beijing
is also emerging as a global leader in critical areas such as FifthGeneration Long-Term Evolution (5G LTE) broadband wireless networks. Should Beijing become dominant in this area, it would not
28

 29

$ Billions

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2004

2005

United States of America

2003

China

2006

2008

2009
Russia
Russian Federation

2007

Using the same metric 20 years later, the U.S. only
outspends our adversaries by 6 cents.

2010

In 1996, for every dollar Russia and China spent on
research and development, the U.S. spent $8.21.

2011

2012

2013

2014

Figure 3. Annual Expenditure on Research and Development (Adjusted For Purchasing Power Parity)

2015

2016

Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization R&D Database, IISS Military Balance and World Bank (for gros s domestic
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization R&D Database, IISS Military Balance and World Bank (for gross domestic
product).
product).

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

 only enjoy great economic advantages. It would also gain strong geopolitical leverage over countries that become dependent on Chinese technology; it would reap tremendous military benefits in the form of
enhanced awareness and freedom of maneuver, superior command and
control, increased lethality, and improved ability to drive future military
innovation. Moreover, China’s Belt and Road Initiative features enormous investments meant to strengthen Chinese influence and proliferate
Chinese technology throughout Eurasia and Africa.
The contrast between Chinese and American investments in technology
and manufacturing is stark. Since enactment of the BCA in 2011, the
United States has lost roughly 17,000 prime defense vendors because of
a lack of sufficient and predictable funding for defense. More broadly, an
estimated 60,000 factories have closed, as China’s own national security
innovation base has grown markedly. The cumulative result has been to
significantly diminish the superiority in innovation and manufacturing
that has long been critical to America’s military edge.
Furthermore, new technologies and capabilities, such as lethal autonomous weapons, biological applications, and AI require intensive attention and investment as they are introduced. Policymakers must consider
whether to pursue these technologies without limit; develop capabilities
to use in some future contingency; seek to develop arms control regimes;
or perhaps seek a global ban on particular technologies. All of this
requires addressing innovation in a more focused and sustained way.
There are several steps that should be taken to close the innovation gap.
First, the United States must better protect and strengthen its own
National Security Innovation Base. China has deliberately sought to
erode our NSIB through predatory economic tactics that America should
not emulate. Moreover, efforts to strengthen the NSIB often reside outside the strict purview of the Department of Defense. But if the United
States does not protect sources of technological innovation and key areas
of manufacturing capability and capacity, its ability to develop and sustain the means through which it pursues the NDS will be at risk. The
U.S. government must give serious consideration to questions such as
whether it should increase investment to preserve and strengthen industries that produce vital technology and components, and whether some
selective economic disintegration with U.S. rivals—namely China—may
be necessary to ensure that America is not dependent on those rivals for
critical components of key systems and platforms. It will be necessary to
intensify U.S. engagement with allies and partners regarding how to
avoid excessive technological or economic dependence on rivals.
30

 Additionally, DOD should broaden its efforts to find and incorporate
new technologies developed commercially by the private sector. Established organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), as well as the newer Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
and Defense Innovation Board, are focused on this task. The government
R&D labs, University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) can play a
greater role as well. All of these organizations are focused on helping
DOD access the private sector to find and exploit new technologies.
Making the most of these interactions will require DOD to be mindful of
commercial interests and the globalization of supply chains, while working assiduously to expand relationships with firms and industries—
including some that have been ambivalent or reluctant about working
with the U.S. government.
While innovation is a first step, what matters most is whether new technologies can be rapidly acquired and fielded to keep pace with changing
threats. DOD has appropriately increased its focus on rapid prototyping
and the military departments are striving to get prototypes out to operating forces for experimentation. Often, the forces keep the prototypes because they provide capability unavailable in existing programs. Yet if
this approach provides advanced capabilities quickly, too frequently
these prototypes are not accompanied by the sustainment, training, and
integration into existing systems needed to provide enduring military
advantage.
Congress and DOD must agree on new ways to more rapidly approve
and acquire breakthrough technologies. There is a growing recognition
of this need. With greater speed, however, comes the acceptance of risk
and the need for more flexible budget authorities. Those have not yet
been provided to DOD at the scale necessary.
Longer-term innovation challenges also require attention. DOD will need
to continue its history of envisioning, finding, developing, and fielding
innovative technologies. Moreover, in some cases, only DOD will acquire these technologies in large quantities for extremely large programs
such as those acquiring aircraft, ships, and satellites.
The Department should explore a new, narrowly tailored category of acquisition pilot programs that would push the boundaries on new technologies. This would not amount to wholesale reform of the acquisitions
process. Rather, DOD would embark on this narrow category of programs with full acceptance of the cost and risk inherent in pursuing technological breakthroughs. To enable this approach, Congress and DOD
31

 would have to collaborate to establish particular acquisition authorities
and waivers to Nunn-McCurdy rules.
This requires a change of mindset as well as a change of procedures and
regulations. Currently, to be judged “successful,” a program needs to
stay on-time and on-budget. Those budgets and schedules are estimated
at the earliest stages of the acquisition cycle. The Department’s major acquisition programs are mostly meeting these requirements today, albeit
with continuing need for aggressive oversight of major programs such as
the Joint Strike Fighter and the new aircraft carrier. But what if DOD is
not taking enough risk? If a realistic schedule and budget can be accurately predicted at the earliest stages of a program, how can that program
be pushing new boundaries? Today’s programs are incrementally fielding new capabilities rather than leaping ahead. To sustain U.S. technological advantages, our national security community needs new
approaches that support riskier, long-term acquisition programs in important new areas.

32

 Chapter 4

The Force We Need: Force Priorities, Readiness,
and Civil-Military Relations
Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities
Innovative operational concepts and creative approaches to force development, design, structure, and acquisition are vital to sustaining critical
U.S. military advantages. Some of these initiatives could produce immediate and important gains. Others, if allowed to mature, may yield benefits that will manifest over time. In the near- to mid-term, the
Commission identified a variety of critical improvements to U.S. military posture and capabilities that are imperative for prevailing against our
most pressing security challenges
Although the Commission lacked the means to perform the sustained
analysis that we call on the Department of Defense to perform to better
link strategy to operational concepts to force requirements, the improvements we recommend here are based on discussions with senior DOD
leaders and a host of non-government experts. They are also based on
briefings the Commission received associated with FFRDC-run wargames. Finally, these recommended improvements are based on the extensive experience and expertise that the members of the Commission
collectively bring to bear.
Global Posture. Forward posture is a key component of deterring
competitors and adversaries and assuring allies and partners. Military
exercises, particularly joint exercises with allies and partners, reinforce
commitments, create doubt in opponents’ minds, and ensure that the U.S.
military has the warfighting capability it needs should a conflict erupt.
Speed matters, and the ability to mobilize and move forces quickly is
increasingly critical given that the most likely conflicts the United States
would seek to deter or win might begin with a small confrontation that
escalates quickly. This places a premium on the U.S. military’s ability to
move in-theater forces quickly, protect emplaced and maneuvering
forces, and rapidly deploy ready forces from other regions, including the
United States. Moreover, once force posture is diminished or eliminated
in key regions, it can be especially difficult to reestablish. In the
European and Indo-Pacific theaters, where the United States confronts
serious challenges from China, North Korea, and Russia, the value of
forward posture is demonstrated every day. If the United States desires to
33

 avoid military conflict in these regions it should ensure there is a
capable day-to-day posture in both theaters to deter adversaries and
engage in prompt escalation control. At the same time, the United States
must recognize that forward-deployed forces are increasingly vulnerable
to attack and strive to make forward-deployed forces more resilient and
survivable.
 Indo-Pacific. Of the five competitors and adversaries named in the

NDS, four—China, North Korea, Russia, and terrorist groups—are
active in the Indo-Pacific region. Deterring aggression in this region
requires establishing a forward-deployed defense-in-depth posture.
Protecting U.S. interests from China and Russia will require additional investment in the submarine fleet; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; air defense; long-range strike platforms; and long-range ground-based fires. Deterring and, if necessary,
defeating North Korea will demand additional air defense assets, as
well as a sustained ground presence with the ability to quickly flow
additional armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), fires and combat
engineer assets, and other capabilities into theater. Given the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States will also
need to expand and modernize its logistics capacity, particularly its
tanker, strategic airlift, and military sealift fleets. Allies can be helpful
in this context by investing in maritime domain awareness, undersea
capabilities, missile defense, precision guided munitions, and cyber
capabilities.
 Europe. The military challenges in Europe are no less serious. To deter a revanchist Russia, the United States and its NATO allies must
rebuild military force capacity and capability in Europe. In terms of
land forces, DOD should have a corps-level headquarters, or at least a
division-level headquarters, to enhance operational command and
control and provide additional capabilities in fires, aviation, combat
engineering, air defense, and ABCTs. Over the long term, DOD
should restore a heavy division to Europe, in addition to the existing
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and 173rd BCT, and invest in
electronic warfare, netted intelligence and command and control.
These improvements should be accompanied by significant improvements from NATO allies, particularly in such areas as expanding advanced munitions stocks and mobile, short-range air defense, as well
as contributing more armored forces. Russia’s advanced air defense
will also demand additional fifth-generation aircraft and ground-based
long-range fires. To support those forces, control of the sea lines of

34

 communication is imperative. Accordingly, additional anti-submarine
warfare capability is needed.
 Middle East. The demise of the core ISIS “caliphate” in Iraq and
Syria is clearly a positive development, but in the near and mid-term,
the United States will still need to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of ISIS and other jihadist groups. Given
Iranian hegemonic ambitions and influence in the Middle East, U.S.
forces must also be poised to actively counter Iranian subversion and
deter Iran and its proxies from overt military aggression. Additionally, Russia’s enduring military engagement in Syria and greater
Chinese involvement throughout the region means that the Middle
East will not be immune from major-power rivalry. Finally,
Afghanistan will require a sustained U.S. military presence to prevent
the country from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. In
total, the Middle East will demand significant special operations
forces, light attack aircraft, ISR assets, close air support, and securityforce advise-and-assist brigades for the foreseeable future. Carrierbased naval aviation and other advanced naval and air capabilities—
including surface warfare capabilities and fifth-generation aircraft—
may also be necessary to deter and if necessary defeat Iran, or project
power into areas where other advanced militaries (such as Russia’s)
operate. Thus, U.S. military posture in the Middle East should not become dramatically smaller, even though the precise mix of U.S. capabilities should be reexamined.
Priority Joint Force Enhancements. As the foregoing discussion of
theater requirements underscores, the United States now faces five
credible challengers, including two major-power competitors, and three
distinctly different geographic and operational environments. This being
the case, a two-war force sizing construct makes more strategic sense
today than at any previous point in the post-Cold War era. Instead, the
NDS adopts what is functionally a one-war force sizing construct and
recommends only modest increases in force capacity, an approach that is
likely to create severe strategic and operational vulnerabilities for the
United States. Even if new technologies such as hypersonic weapons, AI,
cyber, and autonomous systems eventually do change the face of
warfare, in the near- and medium-term conventional capacity will still
matter greatly in fighting and deterring conflict. Consequently, although
further capability and posture enhancements are necessary, they are
likely to be insufficient to meet America’s strategic challenges. As the
old adage goes, “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Simply put, the

35

 United States needs a larger force than it has today if it is to meet the
objectives of the strategy.
 Army. The United States will need capacity enhancements in the









Army. More armor, long-range fires, engineering, and air-defense
units are required to meet the ground-heavy challenges posed by
Russia in Eastern Europe and while maintaining a robust deterrent to
aggression on the Korean Peninsula. In the event of conflict with
China, additional air-defense and logistical forces will be necessary to
support Air Force operations. Army forces also remain very much engaged in a war in Afghanistan, which—despite often being forgotten
or overlooked today—will place further stress on existing structure.
Navy. The Navy, likewise, will have to grow. As China and, to a
lesser extent, Russia invest in their undersea capabilities, the United
States must expand its submarine fleet. Yet the NDS and associated
shipbuilding plan do not provide for that growth; under current plans,
there will actually be a reduction in the number of submarines over
the next decade. Moreover, to project and sustain combat power into
the Western Pacific and other theaters, the Navy must dramatically recapitalize and expand its military sealift forces.
Air Force. Regardless of where the next conflict occurs or which adversary it features, the Air Force will be at the forefront. It will need
more stealthy long-range fighters and bombers to penetrate advanced
enemy air defenses, as well as more tankers to refuel them and allow
them to operate at longer ranges. It will need additional lift capacity,
especially if the United States intends to project power across the Pacific. Above all, it will need more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to give commanders the information they
need to fight and win.
Marine Corps. Finally, as the world remains unpredictable and the
threat of terrorism endures, the United States will need a premier expeditionary, rapid-response force, so it should maintain the Marine
Corps at no less than its current size.
Cyber. America confronts cyberattacks from state adversaries on a
daily basis, will remain vulnerable to such attacks in the coming
years, and will continue to face cyberattacks from non-state actors.
Protecting U.S. cyber networks and infrastructure, and deterring and
responding to attacks by U.S. adversaries, are critical. Presently,
America’s cyber posture and activities are hampered by debates over
authorities and jurisdictional boundaries. These issues have lingered
through several administrations and must be addressed to make the
United States more competitive. The administration and Congress
36

 should evaluate what operational flexibility is required to ensure the
United States can act in ways that are agile, but also prudent, in support of its broader national security goals. The United States should
also lead efforts to establish international norms in cyberspace.
To facilitate this process, Congress should appoint a high-level commission to review U.S. cyber policy, particularly relevant authorities
and organizational relationships and responsibilities within the U.S.
government. That commission should offer recommendations on how
to streamline decision-making and bureaucratic processes so as best
to protect American interests, deter or respond to malign actions, and
still protect civil liberties. It should feature significant input from
DOD and other departments and agencies whose missions may be affected by the findings.
 Nuclear. Successive secretaries of defense from both Republican and
Democratic administrations have identified nuclear deterrence as the
Department’s number one priority. Given increased competition from
nuclear-armed competitors and the need for a robust deterrent, the
United States remains committed to the bipartisan nuclear modernization program of record outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), and especially to modernizing the triad of bombers, ICBMs,
and ballistic missile submarines. This triad, plus dual-capable tactical
aircraft, presents insurmountable targeting challenges for adversaries,
imposes disproportionate costs on adversary defenses, and hedges
against unforeseen geopolitical or technological changes. In addition,
it is urgently necessary to rationalize and modernize the supporting
nuclear infrastructure, including the national laboratories and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) network, which
is critical to ensuring U.S. leaders remain situationally aware and in
control of the nuclear arsenal in all situations.
With all legs of the triad, as well as much of the supporting infrastructure, approaching the ends of their service lives, nuclear modernization must receive sustained and predictable funding from Congress.
Sustained and predictable funding is equally important to sustaining
the portion of the defense industrial base devoted to nuclear matters.
As discussed in Chapter 5 triad modernization should not be sacrificed to pay for conventional force investments. At its peak, planned
spending on nuclear modernization, operations, and sustainment
should consume just 6.4 percent of the defense budget. And as the
NPR states, “Given the criticality of effective U.S. nuclear deterrence
to the assurance of allies, and, most importantly, the safety of the

37

 American people, there is no doubt that these programs are both necessary and affordable.”
We are concerned by the disequilibrium between the aging of
America’s nuclear arsenal and our rivals’ vigorous modernization
programs. Further, it is clear that U.S. competitors have not followed
America’s lead in decreasing the role and number of nuclear weapons
in their defense strategies. Russia and China are both years into thoroughgoing nuclear modernization programs and have been thinking
creatively about how to employ nuclear weapons for deterrence and
coercion. U.S. policies have remained appropriately restrained in
response—they have not lowered the U.S. threshold for nuclear use
but sought to raise our competitors’ thresholds. Because the strategic
environment can change rapidly, U.S. leaders must prioritize adaptability in U.S. nuclear forces to meet shifting deterrence requirements.
Decisions made today will have strategic effects well into the 2070s
and 2080s. We believe that the 2018 NPR offers an appropriate option for meeting U.S. nuclear deterrence and assurance requirements
in this era of major-power rivalry, and we urge DOD to proceed
along the path the NPR lays out.
 Space. During the Cold War, space was an arena of intense majorpower competition. Subsequently, the lack of a peer competitor produced a casual assumption of U.S. space dominance and diminished
attention to potential rivalries in space. Today, however, the United
States is again competing with major-power rivals, and space is once
again—and will remain—a critical and an increasingly contentious
domain.
This poses real challenges for the U.S. military. In recent decades, the
U.S. military has become increasingly dependent on space-based assets across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to space underpins
our ability to project power globally, strike targets precisely, and discern and respond to threats before they endanger the homeland or
U.S. global interests. Yet space has also become a far more crowded
and competitive domain. Other nations have noted the military and
economic advantages space provides to the United States. Some have
attempted to replicate U.S. space capabilities; others have developed
counterspace capabilities to reduce or eliminate U.S. advantages.
China and Russia are pursuing both strategies. Their technical advances have made U.S. space systems and vehicles more vulnerable
to kinetic and non-kinetic attacks that can degrade or destroy important U.S. capabilities. At the same time, the increasing role of the
private sector is changing the economic and business dimensions of
38

 space exploration and exploitation and further challenging U.S. dominance. The United States needs a space posture suited to an era of
major-power competition.
This administration and Congress deserve credit for elevating this
critical national security issue. DOD recently issued a report to Congress on the Organization and Management Structure for the National
Security Components of the Department of Defense. Congress has yet
to respond to the Department’s recommendations. This Commission
believes there must be greater urgency in devising a coherent and coordinated space strategy.
As the United States rethinks how it approaches space, it should emphasize five themes: technology, policy, organization, communication,
and cooperation. First, regarding technology, DOD should strengthen
research on and acquisition of key capabilities, particularly space vehicles and launch systems. Second, regarding policy, there must be a
higher level of clear accountability and oversight within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, commensurate with the complexity and importance of the problem. Third, regarding organization, the United
States must develop a space cadre that ensures an enduring focus on
space capabilities and unmatched competence in this area. Because
the organizational issues in this area are complex, any proposed
changes should identify new seams between existing organizations
and bureaucratic jurisdictions; consider when space would be in a
supported or supporting role; explore how and whether the spacebased capabilities resident in the intelligence agencies should be integrated with military space organizations; examine how to optimize
the costs and overhead of creating new organizational structures; and
consider how to strike the balance between operational control and
man, train, and equip functions.
Fourth, although much of the space portfolio is classified, there is a
pressing need for more communication and public awareness regarding the challenges we face. Those challenges must be brought into the
open through appropriate public release of information. Fifth, regarding cooperation, DOD should re-examine existing protocols and
agreements with allies and partners so it can aggressively pursue
modifications to enhance collective space capabilities. Space, after
all, is not simply the domain of the U.S. military or the U.S. government. It is a global domain, one with no borders or territory and one
where steps taken by a single actor can affect all others that use the
domain. By emphasizing the five themes outlined here, the United
States can improve its ability to compete and deter malign activities in
39

 space and become sufficiently resilient that the military and economic
effects on Earth are minimized should deterrence fail.
 Missile Defense. Missile defense is foundational to U.S. deterrence
and assurance strategies. As the missile threat to the U.S. homeland
from North Korea and Iran grows, and as Russia and China modernize their nuclear arsenals and conventional strike forces, the United
States will need effective, integrated, and credible missile defenses to
deter American adversaries. It will also need those defenses to assure
U.S. allies and partners that America itself will not be deterred from
aiding them in the event of conflict. U.S. missile defense strategy
therefore should prioritize increasing the reliability and survivability
of current defenses, fielding a resilient space-based sensor layer,
providing persistent surveillance of missile threats, moving to a more
resilient and proliferated space architecture, developing non-kineticbased defenses, investing in directed energy and hypervelocity projectiles, and assuring communications in a degraded environment.
Whereas competitors’ missile programs have imposed costs on us, by
forcing the United States to spend increased resources on missile defenses, we should look to new missile defense technologies as a way
of imposing costs on our competitors.
To ensure an adequate defense, the highest levels of the Department
must actively ensure the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) retains its
special acquisition authorities (while preserving the appropriate level
of oversight), until broader DOD acquisition authorities have recovered the ability to act with sufficient nimbleness to support innovation
in this critical area.
The Commission recommends that a senior official in OSD (e.g., the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) should be
designated by the Secretary of Defense with the complete authority—
including budgetary authority—and responsibility for developing and
implementing an integrated, long-term plan for acquisition and development of air and missile defense capability. To avoid redundancies
and inefficiencies, and to ensure our defenses outpace evolving
threats, DOD must operate according to a single, unified vision of air
and missile defense goals and plans. In support of this vision, we recommend that the Secretary finally implement the original mission for
the MDA by transferring to the military services the responsibility
and resources for post-research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) acquisition of current and future missile defense systems.
Finally, the United States should invest in research and development

40

 to anticipate future threats, operate effectively from space, and enhance resiliency against kinetic and non-kinetic attack.
 Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare capabilities will be critical in
any future conflict, especially those against major-power rivals. U.S.
competitors have invested heavily in electronic warfare as a way of
neutralizing U.S. advantages, undermining U.S. command, control,
and communications, and weakening America’s ability to project
decisive military power in contested environments. Russia and China
have made particularly significant strides in this area. DOD must
enhance its electronic warfare capacity and capability to allow the
United States to overcome adversary electronic warfare investments,
and to degrade and defeat advanced anti-access/area denial
capabilities and adversary command, control, and communications
architectures.
 Munitions. Nearly any conflict between the United States and its most
capable competitors would entail significant demand for long-range,
high-precision munitions so that U.S. forces can remain outside the
range of advanced air defense systems and other anti-access/areadenial capabilities. (Large quantities of shorter-range high-precision
munitions will be needed, as well.) Illustrative capabilities include the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER),
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and a longer-range HighSpeed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). Current and planned DOD
investments promise some gains in this area, but more must be done
to ensure a substantial, sustainable, and rapidly scalable supply of
preferred weapons. To this end, DOD should also explore options for
strengthening the part of the National Security Innovation Base that
produces high-precision munitions to ensure that the country has the
surge capacity needed to prevail in high-intensity conflict.
 Mobility. Because the U.S. military must project power over vast distances, strategic mobility is fundamental to the American way of war.
The NDS places an extraordinary premium on mobility and then proposes managing that demand through a Dynamic Force Employment
model that envisions shifting assets rapidly across theaters. The Commission, however, has serious reservations about DOD’s ability to
support its global operations, particularly in the event of a highintensity contingency or multi-theater operations. Inadequate lift and
tanker support, a lack of secure communications, and insufficient capabilities and infrastructure are impeding strategic mobility. The

41

 investments U.S. competitors have made in overseas infrastructure—
and, in some cases, their growing ability to target U.S. strategic mobility assets—worsen this trend. The Department must invest in a
more resilient and secure logistics and transportation infrastructure,
especially if it chooses to rely on DFE. Those investments should be
rooted in a systematic study of U.S. Transportation Command’s
(TRANSCOM’s) capabilities, capacity, and command structure, and
the extreme logistical and transportation demands that would be imposed by key contingencies. The Department should also consider
whether there is a sufficiently strong “logistics voice” within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense given the recent restructuring of
that office.
 Analytical Support. Making informed decisions about strategic, operational, and force development issues requires a foundation of stateof-the-art analytical capabilities. If DOD is to make such decisions
with appropriate rigor, it will be critical to revitalize analytical support for the Secretary of Defense. Throughout our work, we found
that DOD struggled to link objectives to operational concepts to capabilities to programs and resources. This inability is simply intolerable
in an organization with responsibility for tasks as complex, expensive,
and important as the Department of Defense. It hampers the Secretary’s ability to design, assess, and implement the NDS, and it makes
it difficult for Congress to have faith that the administration’s budget
request supports its strategy.
This deficit in analytical capability, expertise, and processes must be
addressed. OSD-Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
and the Joint Staff—working closely with OSD-Policy—must rebuild
their decision support capability to ensure that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary can make hard decisions grounded in expert analysis,
particularly as they consider the warfighting return on investments.
Specifically, the Department needs a rigorous force development plan
that connects its investment strategy with its key priorities of winning
in conflict and competing effectively with China and Russia. That
plan must have a clear force sizing construct to illuminate the strategy’s ambition and risks. Such a force development architecture
should provide answers to the following questions:
- What are our objectives?
- What operational concepts will animate how we plan to deter
and fight?
- How might operational concepts, force posture, and attendant capabilities be tailored to specific regional and functional contexts?
42

 -

-

-

What assumptions is DOD making about multi-theater demands
in timing, scale, and other key aspects? How is DOD hedging
against the possibility that these assumptions may not prove out?
If the United States finds itself in conflict in a first theater, what
constitutes “deterrence” in the second theater and how does it
change the force requirements projected prior to the NDS’s release (i.e., under the previous defense strategy)?
How do component program priorities reflect these assessments?
What role do strategic nuclear forces and allies and partners play
in meeting the strategy’s objectives?

Addressing these issues will be essential to meeting the key challenges
the NDS identifies. We encourage Congress to seek answers to these
questions through its oversight tools.

Readiness
The readiness of U.S. forces to conduct operations promptly, effectively,
and safely is a crucial component of America’s national security. When
developing budgets, readiness must be balanced with the size of the
force, modernization strategies, and levels of personnel compensation required to maintain a high-quality force. Readiness is highly sensitive not
just to the level of resources provided by Congress, but also to the timeliness and predictability of that funding, as well as how the services measure readiness and the practices they adopt to achieve it.
The readiness of our forces has suffered in recent years, due to unfettered
high demand on a smaller force, persistent budgetary uncertainty, and inadequate funding. Evidence of this can be found in the testimony of the
Joint Chiefs over many years, as well as in increases in mishap rates, including aviation accidents and collisions at sea. The Commission therefore applauds the efforts of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and
the entire Department of Defense to improve the readiness of U.S.
forces. The Commission strongly supports those efforts and does not believe DOD requires detailed guidance on how best to do so, provided
other issues raised in this chapter are addressed.
It has long been the Department’s practice not to send into harm’s way
men and women who are not properly trained and ready for their mission. But the broader and more demanding those missions are—particularly in dealing with major-power adversaries—the more difficult that
commitment becomes to fulfill, as it entails more extensive training for a
higher percentage of the force. U.S. forces will therefore need additional
resources to train to high levels of proficiency across a broader range of
43

 more complex missions than in the recent past. Each of the five major
challenges identified in the NDS—China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and
terrorist groups—requires our forces to train and be proficient in different capabilities, tactics, and techniques. Additional resources will also be
needed to support the exercises and experiments needed to develop and
refine innovative operational concepts and incorporate them into doctrine. Furthermore, training for gray-zone operations will require doctrine and scenarios that go beyond military operations. Interagency
involvement in such training will be greater than has been the case for
counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We recommend that
the Department develop analytic tools that measure readiness across
this range of challenges, from low-intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity fights with major-power rivals.
In training for these missions, the Department must overcome what the
NDS labels “the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous
stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.” For over a decade, and
with good reason, training for much of our conventional and special operations forces emphasized the specific challenges of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Commission thus supports the view that major-power competition should be at the center of the Department’s strategy as well as its budget, and that a greater share of training and
readiness efforts must be devoted to the full range of potential missions
our forces face.
DOD must simultaneously overcome years of unprecedented budgetary
turmoil. This turmoil has included multiple government shutdowns and
near-shutdowns, nine consecutive years beginning under either shutdowns or short-term continuing resolutions that have consumed over
one-third of the time available to plan and execute readiness activities,
the defense caps within the BCA, the application of sequestration, and
unpredictable budget top-lines (see Figure 4).

44

 45

 We address the issue of resources in more detail in the next chapter. Here
it is simply important to note that resources alone rarely cause, and cannot in isolation cure, a readiness problem. Readiness is a complex function of having the right people with the right tools and training, led by
people who themselves have had the proper experience and leadership
development. Lost time and missed opportunities to develop doctrine and
experience over a wide range of operations cannot be bought back just
by adding more funds. Nevertheless, the Commission emphasizes that
sufficient funding—provided on a timely, consistent basis—is imperative
to address current readiness challenges. We recommend that Congress
work with the Department to ensure a level of funding adequate to execute the NDS, and that it take steps to ensure such funding is not held
hostage to budgetary unpredictability. One concrete step would be for
Congress to authorize DOD to expend Operations and Maintenance
funds from any given fiscal year during that fiscal year and the subsequent one.
The Commission is also concerned that the rates of attrition and consumption involved in the conflicts the NDS prioritizes are not adequately
appreciated. As recently as 2015, the Air Force ran dangerously low on
Hellfire missiles due to the vigorous campaign against ISIS. As the Air
Force sought to replenish those stocks, it found that the existing munitions manufacturing capacity could barely meet the need. As noted, the
kind of campaigns envisioned by the NDS will require preferred munitions in enormous quantities, with an underlying manufacturing capacity
that can sustain those campaigns. As a result, it seems likely that the
United States needs to expand its defense industrial base in some sectors,
while also increasing preparations to mobilize that base in the event of
war.
Perhaps most importantly, the Commission believes that the most critical
resource required to produce a highly capable military force is highly capable people willing to serve in the numbers required. That requirement
will only loom larger in the future, because it will be necessary to increase the size of the force while also developing the ability to overcome
new operational challenges and execute innovative operational concepts.
Current trends, however, indicate that the number of people who have
the required fitness and propensity to serve is in decline. In April 2018,
service personnel chiefs testified that only one in four 17-to-24 year-olds
meets the criteria to enlist in the military. This is due to several factors,
including the rise in obesity, existing criminal records, and failure to
meet basic educational requirements. Manpower challenges are further
46

 complicated by the fact that, among those eligible for service, only one
in four exhibits the propensity to serve. This, too, is a result of many factors, including misinformed impressions of military service and benefits
and a lack of exposure to positive advocates for military service.
These factors present a very serious challenge to the execution of the
NDS. Programs to address issues such as shortcomings in physical fitness, nutrition, and general educational preparation in our national
school-age population are not part of the Department’s role in U.S. government or society. Nevertheless, it is clear that DOD and Congress
must take creative steps to address those aspects of the problem that are
within their purview, rather than relying solely on ever-higher compensation for a shrinking pool of qualified volunteers. Without a marked
change in the way America approaches the idea of military service and
the fitness and education of future generations, DOD will struggle to fill
its ranks with highly qualified individuals, with profound implications
for national security.

Civil-Military Relations
Constructive approaches to addressing any of the challenges the U.S.
military confronts must be rooted in healthy civil-military relations. In
the course of its evaluation, however, the Commission was struck by the
relative imbalance of civilian and military voices on critical issues of
strategy development and implementation. We came away with a troubling sense that civilian voices were relatively muted on issues at the
center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control. Strong civilian oversight is the central hallmark
of the U.S. civil-military relations, codified in the Constitution and embraced throughout the nation’s legislative history. The implementation of
the NDS must feature empowered civilians fulfilling their statutory
responsibilities.
One area where an increased civilian voice appears particularly important is integrating responses to global challenges, particularly as that
task relates to force management. The Secretary should have a robust
and capable civilian staff with regular opportunities to advise him on
these issues. For “Global Integration” to work well, DOD should ensure
a substantial civilian oversight role to facilitate consideration of politicalmilitary issues at key junctures. Put simply, allocating priority—and
forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an
inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the
proper competency and responsibility of America’s civilian leaders, informed by the counsel they receive from military leadership.
47

 According to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Secretary of Defense is the
“principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense,” and has “authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.” These Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the
specific Title 10 responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to guide and review war plans, are particularly meaningful here.
Unless Global Integration is nested under higher-order guidance from civilians, an effort to centralize defense direction under the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff may succeed operationally but produce
profound—and potentially catastrophic—strategic problems. For DFE
and Global Integration to work well, the Department must give serious
thought to decision-making processes that highlight the relevant
political-military dynamics of force management shifts in addition to the
direct impacts on readiness and other opportunity costs (e.g., in the “losing” theater). The Commission urges the Secretary of Defense and Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy to exercise fully their Title 10 responsibility for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans. In
particular, we view the Contingency Planning Guidance and the plans
that result from it as vital to implementing the NDS and we urge the Secretary to give these documents close attention.
The Commission also recommends that Congress ensure thorough oversight of the Department’s civil-military relations. The issue here is not
that the existing Title 10 responsibilities of the Secretary and his civilian
advisers are inadequate, but that they have not been used effectively, and
that responsibility on key strategic and policy issues has increasingly migrated to the military. Congress has provided the Secretary of Defense
with significant discrimination to manage and direct the Department, but
it has also levied specific requirements for civilian oversight. It should
hold the Secretary accountable for the Department meeting the spirit and
the letter of these Title 10 requirements. In doing so, Congress will help
uphold the authority of civilian leaders and reverse the unhealthy trend in
which decision-making is drifting increasingly toward the military on
issues of national importance.

48

 Chapter 5

Funding the Force We Need
“Strategy wears a dollar sign,” the strategist Bernard Brodie wrote: The
United States will only have as much military strength and security as it
is willing to pay for. Military effectiveness is about far more than having
enough funding and forces, of course, but these are necessary—if not
sufficient—components of an effective defense. Although the NDS generally reflects the right priorities and objectives, it is not supported by
adequate investments. It is beyond the scope of this Commission’s work
to identify the exact dollar amount required to fully fund the military’s
needs, but the available means are clearly insufficient to fulfill the
strategy’s ends.
This is true despite the two-year funding increase for FY2018 and
FY2019 provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. Although that
increase provides a healthy initial down payment on the defense strategy,
a number of factors—the lack of planned real budgetary growth beyond
this two-year period, the continuation of the BCA caps through FY2021,
and the threat of unpredictable and delayed funding due to a persistent
failure to pass year-long appropriations in a timely fashion—combine to
place the strategy in jeopardy. Without a long-term commitment to
providing additional resources, and without greater stability and predictability in how those resources are provided, DOD will be unable to execute the existing strategy. The details of defense budgeting may seem
arcane, but the basic point is simple: If the United States does not adequately fund its military now and in the future, it risks forfeiting any
near-term financial savings with vast long-term costs in blood, security,
and treasure.

The Lingering Impacts of the BCA
A significant part of the resourcing challenge DOD faces today can be
traced back to the effects of the BCA. The BCA was passed into law in
August 2011, a time when many observers expected an extended period
of U.S. military retrenchment following the most intensive phases of
long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within three years, however, ISIS
had established a caliphate following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq,
Russia had invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, and China had intensified its drive for dominance in the South China Sea and undertaken a
more ambitious global strategy. Meanwhile, U.S. spending caps remained in force. Despite periodic agreements to raise the defense topline,
49

 funding for America’s military failed to keep pace with changing security challenges.
Resources are always constrained to some degree, of course. Yet the inflexible limits of the BCA—and the havoc wreaked by start-and-stop
funding and a reliance on continuing resolutions in place of year-long or
multi-year budgets—are contrary to effective and efficient long-term
planning. Under the Obama administration, the military had difficulty
carrying out the more modest objectives of its defense strategy even with
the additional resources provided by periodic modifications to the BCA
caps. The current NDS, with its emphasis on competition against majorpower rivals, will require more than marginal increases to the defense
budget.
If artificial spending constraints and continuing resolutions were thus
harmful before the new strategy was issued, they are downright reckless
today. Budget Control Act (BBA) 2018 is a step in the right direction,
but it does not fully fund the NDS for the long-term. Even factoring in
the $237 billion in cumulative defense funding recovered by that agreement plus two earlier bipartisan agreements in 2013 and 2015, the BCA
still resulted in a net $539 billion in cuts to base national defense spending between 2012 and 2019, relative to Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates’s final spending plan before the BCA became law (see Figure 5).
According to the Pentagon’s most recent projections, spending in
FY2020 and beyond would exceed Gates’s plan, but only barely. If
spending continued at a constant rate, it would take roughly two decades
to fully offset the funding lost under the BCA. Furthermore, the Department’s envisioned funding levels beyond FY2019 may be excessively
optimistic. The BCA remains law into 2021, meaning a final two-year
budget agreement will be required to avert a reversion to BCA cap levels, which are much lower than what the Department is expecting. Without such a deal, the Defense Department could face an additional $171
billion in base budget shortfalls in FY2020 and FY2021.
There must be greater urgency in addressing the damage caused by the
BCA. Recognition, on the part of the Congress and the White House’s
Office of Management and Budget, that any strategy should be adequately resourced is overdue. One important signal of this recognition
would be bipartisan agreement to eliminate the final two years of spending caps under the BCA.

50

 51

$ Billions

420

470

520

570

620

670

720

2010

2011

Gates Plan

2013

Gates Plan

2012

2015

2019 DOD Budget

2014

Years

2016

2017

2018

Sequestration BCA Caps

Sequestration BCA Caps

Actual BCA
caps

2019

2020

2021

If spending continued
at the 2022 rate, it
would take another
19 years to reverse all
the Budget Control
Act’s cuts

2019 DOD Budget

Figure 5. Base 050 Spending Under the Budget Control Act

2022

actual cuts,
FY12―19

$539 billion

planned cuts,
FY12―21

$1.02 trillion

gained,
FY20―21

$53 billion

 The Need for Additional Funding
to Execute the NDS
Eliminating the final two years of BCA caps would be helpful but is not
enough to adequately fund U.S. defense strategy. Although the NDS emphasizes strategic and military competition with China and Russia, the
administration’s proposed budgets for FY2019 and beyond do not fund a
level of military capacity and capability adequate to defeat either adversary should war occur while deterring other enemies simultaneously.
In 2017, Secretary Mattis and Chairman Dunford testified to Congress
that DOD required three to five percent annual budgetary growth (in
inflation-adjusted terms) if the U.S. military was not to lose its ability to
project power and uphold alliance commitments. Although this number
is more illustrative than definitive, and although these estimates were
provided prior to the conclusion of the process that produced the current
defense strategy, it is nonetheless indicative of the level of investment
needed to meet the ends the NDS establishes. The need for sustained
budgetary growth remains, and we are deeply troubled by the lack of
such growth in the Department’s five-year budget plans (see Figure 6).
If this shortfall is not corrected, the Department may find itself able to
prosecute just one conflict successfully, without the ability to simultaneously deter other adversaries. Given that the United States could plausibly face threats from both Russia and China at once, given the persistent
dangers posed by North Korea and Iran, and given that the U.S. military
will also continue to face challenges that require enduring effort in the
Middle East, this outcome entails an intolerable level of national risk.
The United States may find itself confronted with agonizing choices:
abandoning commitments in other theaters to focus on one, mobilizing
American society to a degree not currently envisioned in order to meet
simultaneous threats, or relying on high-risk strategies including nuclear
escalation to avoid conventional defeat.
Congress should increase the size of the base defense budget significantly through the Future Years Defense Program and perhaps beyond.
We believe that three to five percent annual real growth is indicative of
the investment required. Failing that, it may be necessary to alter the expectations of U.S. defense strategy and our global strategic objectives.

52

 53

$ Billions

2017

Enacted Spending Through BBA18

5% Real Growth

2018

3% Real Growth

2019

McCain Plan

2012 (Pre-BCA) Plans

2020

Trump's 2019 FYDP

2021

Figure 6. Projected 050 National Defense Spending at Various Toplines

Obama's 2017 FYDP

BCA Cap

2022

Source: President’s Budget 2012, 2017, 2019; Congressional Research Service “The Budget Control Act and the Defense Budget;”
Restoring American Power; Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.

575

625

675

725

775

825

875

925

 Resourcing Priorities and Challenges
The Commission endorses the priority the NDS places on modernizing
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including all three legs of the nuclear triad—
ballistic missile submarines, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable aircraft—as
well as related command and control systems. This recapitalization has
been repeatedly deferred and cannot be further delayed because so many
elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent are rapidly nearing the ends of
their service lives at a time when U.S. rivals are aggressively modernizing and in some cases expanding their arsenals. History and basic arithmetic suggest that this recapitalization cannot be accomplished within
currently projected budget levels unless DOD reduces its conventional
capabilities (see Figure 7).
At the same time, DOD faces an impending “bow wave” of conventional
modernization costs, driven by the need to reinvest in key capabilities
that sustain deterrence and preserve a warfighting advantage. Yet here,
too, existing and envisioned funding levels are insufficient. Between
FY2012 and FY2017, the military lost $200 billion in modernization
spending compared to pre-BCA/sequestration plans. Under the Department’s current five-year budgetary outlook, funding to support the NDS
will add back only $20 billion—just 10 percent of the overall reduction
(see Figure 8). Without serious conventional force modernization, the
United States may need to rely on its nuclear arsenal in ways that hamper
effective competition with Russia and China. But undermining the nation’s strategic deterrent to pay for conventional deterrence also entails
unacceptable risks.
The Commission finds that nuclear and conventional forces are both indispensable to a balanced, effective defense: The nation should not hollow out one set of capabilities to pay for the other. Congress should
therefore fund DOD at a level to permit critical conventional and nuclear modernization.

54

 1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975
Total Nuclear Weapons Spending

2021

2019
2017

2015

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

Nuclear Spending as Fraction of Total DOD Spending

2023

1967

1965

1963

1961

1959

1957

1955

1953

Billions 2019 $

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Fraction of Total DOD Spending

2045

2043
2041

1973

1971

1951

1949

1947

Source: Department of Defense Green Book Table 6-5; Atomic Audit for methodology on processing data; Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), “Approaches for managing the costs of US Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046.”

0

Second Wave: 1979-1991
$886 billion expended
12% average of annual spending

1991

20

First Wave: 1951-1965
$1.7 trillion expended
25% average of annual spending

1993

40

1995

60

Third Wave: 2017-2046
$1.2 trillion expended
5% average of annual spending

2025

80

2027

100

2029

120

1969

Both waves of historical nuclear
modernization required sharp increases
from the status quo; future planning may be
unrealistically optimistic.

2031

140

2033

160

2035

Figure 7. Department Of Defense Nuclear Spending 1947–2046

2037

180

2039

55

 Figure 8. Modernization Investment Lost Under BCA
250

$20 Billion Potentially Gained
FY18–23

2012 Planned
Modernization Budget
200

90% of funding cuts
not recouped

$ Billions

$200 Billion Lost
FY12–23
150

100

Planned Modernization

Enacted Modernization

50

0
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Source: PB12 Table 32-1, 2019 Green Book Table 6-25, 2018 Appropriations.
Note: Because they were not divided by public law, this graphic does NOT
reflect the amended (higher) base toplines announced in the round of overseas
contingency operations (OCO)-to-base movements in the wake of BBA18 and
after the release of PB19.

Finally, the readiness challenges across the U.S. military took years to
create and will require years to redress. Long-standing readiness problems will not be fixed by a single two-year budget deal. It will take years
of sustained, predictable, and increased funding to repair readiness and
ensure that U.S. forces are fully prepared to fight when needed. Moreover, capable modern systems and fully funded training and readiness
accounts are key to recruiting and retention. The Commission recommends that DOD and Congress balance new funding to emphasize readiness, capacity, and capability across the force rather than focusing on a
subset of capability.

Ensuring Timely and Consistent Funding
The importance of providing adequate resources is obvious. Yet our
forces also need funding that is timely, sustained, and predictable. Our
political leaders have been failing that test miserably. Put simply, the
funding process is broken.
For nearly a decade, DOD did not receive its funding on time. In the last
nine years, the military has operated under a continuing resolution for the
56

 equivalent of three calendar years. During such periods, operations are
restricted and acquisition and contracting processes grind to a halt. The
five longest continuing resolutions in the Department’s history have all
occurred in the past eight years. Washington’s inability to appropriate
funding on a timely basis or at anticipated levels conveys a lack of seriousness divorced from growing worldwide challenges. This dysfunction
has had grave material impact, encouraging inefficient, “use-it-or-loseit” spending by the services at the end of the fiscal year, resulting in delays in acquisitions and modernization, and exacerbating readiness problems throughout the force (see Figure 9). The failure to provide timely,
sustained, and predictable funding is a strong negative message regarding the worth of the men and women who serve in uniform.
Just as swift budget reductions harm readiness, adding back large
amounts of money in unpredictable fashion also constrains the Department’s ability to make carefully considered choices and investments. To
relieve this pressure, Congress should give the Department authority to
spend Operations and Maintenance funds for any given fiscal year
across that fiscal year and the subsequent one. More ambitiously, Congress should produce five-year budget agreements for defense. It is
hypocritical for policymakers to advocate that American allies commit to
multi-year defense budgeting while the United States refuses to do so itself, and Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to set future
year spending targets for defense through the BCA.

57

 58

$ Billions

80/20 Rule (Historical)

75/25 Rule (Enacted)

Spread Evenly Until End of FY18

Spread Evenly Over One Calendar Year

Figure 9. Average Fiscal Year 2018 Operations and Maintenance Spending Per Day

Source: 2018 Appropriations.

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

 Restoring OCO Funding to the Base Budget
Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and
the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas
contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in
the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives. Yet
this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its
own. For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the
BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the
greater Middle East. Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top
priority as articulated in the NDS. Finally, reorienting the military
toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities
beyond the current program of record. OCO is not the way to provide
adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its
lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used
to buy.
As a general rule, the cost of operations and programs paid for by OCO
should be reabsorbed into the base Pentagon budget. This also requires
a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer of costs does not result in an overall
spending cut. It is critical that as much DOD spending as possible be
covered by the base budget, to provide the Department with the stability
and long-term planning and investment capability needed to execute the
NDS.

Pentagon Reform: Necessary but Not Sufficient
Resourcing a strategy is not only an issue of providing reliable, adequate,
and timely funding. It also entails ensuring that the available dollars are
spent as efficiently and effectively as possible. This is more than a matter
of treating taxpayer dollars with respect, as vitally important as that is. It
is equally a matter of sharpening the U.S. military’s ability to compete
with its rivals by wringing maximum value out of the resources at hand.
This being the case, the NDS is correct to argue that the Pentagon’s culture and way of doing business must change. Sustained reforms, implemented across every aspect of the Department’s activities, are sorely
need to bring one of the world’s largest bureaucracies into line with
21st century business practices. This will be critical to fostering innovation, improving responsiveness and agility, enhancing the speed at which
capabilities are developed and fielded, and improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability with which the Department expends limited funds. Every recent Secretary of Defense has recognized this
59

 imperative, which has only become more pressing as America’s competitive edge has eroded.
As important as reform is, however, it is an illusion to believe that savings from efficiencies alone will provide sufficient funds for near-term
reinvestment in modernization. Every previous attempt to subsidize
modernization through internal reform has come up well short of expectations. We believe the Department should continue to pursue reform on
its own merits, to enhance competitiveness and assure taxpayers that
their tax dollars are well-spent. Yet DOD and Congress must understand
that even the most optimistic advocates of reform cannot identify sufficient savings to make this approach a reliable source of real growth in
defense capability.
Furthermore, Congress should recognize that the best way to manage
reform is not by instituting wholesale changes every year. The Pentagon
needs time to implement existing guidance before undertaking further
reforms. It is true that the Pentagon’s broken, 20th century acquisition
system is insufficient for the problems of the 21st century, and there are
some areas in which further acquisition reform may be necessary, as
discussed in Chapter 3. To better adapt, DOD must embrace risk, and
thus the possibility of failure. To facilitate this cultural change, DOD
must move away from a vulnerable few projects with timescale
measured in decades, to a larger volume of smaller bets on
groundbreaking technologies.
In considering further reforms, Congress should take this same approach
to heart. The best way to manage Pentagon reform is not by instituting
grand organizational changes every year, but to adopt a succession of
smaller measures that allow the Pentagon to internalize changes before
pursuing additional reform. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Work has noted, waves of innovation and change at DOD are
generational affairs. They are not problems that can be fixed in one
legislative calendar. In lieu of additional broad, near-term acquisition
reform, Congress should emphasize thoughtful oversight and assessment
of changes to date. Lawmakers should focus on prodding the Pentagon to
use its newly established authorities to field equipment more quickly and
cheaply. If the Department is not given time to absorb these acquisition
policy shifts, new efforts at wholesale reform may overload the system
or attempt to solve problems that the Pentagon might work through on its
own as it absorbs new ways of doing business.

60

 Addressing Long-Term Fiscal Challenges
This Commission is under no illusions about the magnitude of the resource investments it advocates. Moreover, we recognize that in any discussion of resources, there are larger fiscal pressures squeezing defense
and other national security priorities such as diplomacy, foreign aid, and
homeland security. As Secretary Mattis noted in his confirmation hearing, the growing national debt itself constitutes a significant national security threat. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that
continued deficit spending will take the amount of federal debt held by
the public to roughly 100 percent of gross domestic product by the end
of the 2020s. Without changes to revenues or expenses, this ratio would
climb to an unprecedented 152 percent by 2048. Such unconstrained
growth in federal debt would imperil both the creditworthiness and economic stability of the nation and undermine its ability to adequately fund
any number of national priorities.
That said, under-resourcing defense signals weakness to American foes
and breeds insecurity in American allies. Equally important, when addressing the nation’s long-term fiscal challenges, Congress and the public should remember an oft-forgotten fact: that defense simply is not
where most of the money is. Neither is discretionary spending more
broadly. Rather, mandatory spending on domestic entitlement programs
and interest payments on the national debt constitute the majority of federal outlays and will be the source of most growth in federal spending in
the coming decade. If these principal drivers of the national debt are left
unaddressed, they will crowd out spending for discretionary spending for
both domestic and defense programs (see Figure 10).
The nation has ignored this reality for too long. The BCA disproportionately targeted discretionary spending, and forced DOD to bear half of
total cuts despite accounting for less than a fifth of annual federal outlays. This approach induced false comfort among lawmakers that they
were meaningfully addressing the nation’s fiscal woes. In reality, the
deep discretionary reductions had minimal impact on the overall fiscal
outlook, but real and severe consequences for the U.S. military. Moreover, untargeted spending cuts failed to produce dramatic improvements
in Pentagon efficiency. Consider that the size of the Pentagon’s civilian
workforce is nearly equivalent to pre-BCA levels, even as active-duty
end strength has fallen by more than 100,000 personnel. Lawmakers
should not confuse targeted and justified Pentagon reform efforts with
across-the-board spending cuts imposed by the BCA. Simply put,
America’s fiscal woes cannot be solved on the back of defense.

61

 62

$ Billions

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

FY21

Mandatory (including offsetting receipts)

FY23

Defense Discretionary

FY22

FY25
Non-Defense Discretionary

FY24

Net Interest

FY26

FY27

Meanwhile, net interest surpasses defense discretionary outlays
in FY23 and non-defense discretionary outlays in FY25.

Even with offsets, mandatory entitlement
programs drive spending growth.

Figure 10. Federal Outlays, FY17–28

Source: CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook, 2018 to 2028, Table 2-1.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

FY28

 Looking ahead, policymakers must address rising government spending
and decreasing tax revenues as unsustainable trends that compel hard
fiscal choices. Net interest payments to service the growing debt are rising
rapidly, and the retirement of the baby boomers will exacerbate the problem caused by exploding entitlement costs. As for revenues, over the
past two decades there have been several significant tax cuts (President
Bush’s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, President Obama’s payroll tax cuts, and
President Trump’s 2017 tax reform bill) that have decreased resources
available to fund defense and address broader fiscal challenges. No serious effort to address growing debt can be made without either increasing
tax revenues or decreasing mandatory spending—or both. Without such
an effort, it will be impossible to stabilize the nation’s finances, and to
fund and sustain an adequate defense. Rather than viewing defense cuts as
the solution to the nation’s fiscal problems, Congress should look to the
entire federal budget, especially entitlements and taxes, to set the nation
on a more stable financial footing. In the near-term, such adjustments will
undoubtedly be quite painful. Yet over time—and probably much sooner
than we expect—failing to make those adjustments and fully fund America’s defense strategy will undoubtedly be worse.

Embracing a Whole-of-Government
Approach to Strategic Competition
This Commission was charged with making recommendations regarding
U.S. defense strategy. Yet even if America were to fund the Department
of Defense lavishly, and even if all the other recommendations in this
report were to be implemented, that would not be sufficient to address the
threats and challenges facing the country today. America’s two most powerful competitors—China and Russia—have developed national strategies
for enhancing their influence and undermining key U.S. interests that
extend far beyond military competition. Encompassing economic, diplomatic, covert, political, and other initiatives, those strategies draw on the
full array of foreign policy tools; they include many actions that fall short
of war but nonetheless alter the status quo in dangerous ways. As noted,
comprehensive solutions to these comprehensive challenges will require
whole-of-government and even whole-of-nation cooperation extending far
beyond DOD. Trade policy; science, technology, engineering, and math
education; diplomatic statecraft; and other non-military tools will be
critical—so will adequate support and funding for those elements of
American power. Without such a holistic approach, the United States will
be at a competitive disadvantage and will remain ill-equipped to preserve
its security and its global interests amid intensifying challenges.
63

 Compendium of Findings and Recommendations
Evaluating the NDS
1. The NDS generally sets the right strategic goals, but unacknowledged risk factors, analytical gaps, and resource shortfalls are likely
to hamper its execution.
Recommendation: The United States urgently requires rapid and
substantial improvements to its military capabilities, built on a foundation of compelling and relevant warfighting concepts at the operational level of war.

Operational Challenges and Concepts
2. The best way to develop operational concepts that address the operational challenges identified by the NDS is to promote a fuller discussion within the national security community.
Recommendation: DOD should declassify the operational challenges
specified by the NDS.
3. The military balance in key regions has been deteriorating and the
United States faces a worsening position across a range of key operational challenges. While the United States was focused on defeating
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and China were focused
on acquiring capabilities to defeat American forces.
Recommendation: U.S. defense investments should emphasize
achieving and maintaining favorable military balances for the United
States and its allies against China in Asia and against Russia in Europe. Specifically, those investments should be focused on the 2018
operational challenges; they should seek to yield expanded U.S. operational options while constraining those available to China and
Russia.
4. Detailed, rigorous concepts for solving key operational problems are
badly needed, but do not appear to exist.
Recommendation: DOD must more clearly answer the question of
how it intends to defeat major-power rivals in competition and war.
It should develop plausible strategies and operational concepts that
identify what the United States seeks to achieve and how it will prevail, and suggest measures of effectiveness to mark progress along
the way. It should also clarify ill-defined concepts like “expand the
competitive space.”

64

 5. Potential adversaries are blurring lines between strategic and conventional approaches; they are blending nuclear, space, cyber, conventional, and unconventional means in their warfighting doctrines
and pursuing coercive aims through a mix of military and nonmilitary means.
Recommendation: DOD must develop new operational concepts to
achieve strategic advantage, including by addressing the ability of
aggressive regimes to achieve a fait accompli against states on their
periphery, or to use nuclear or strategic weapons in ways that would
fall short of justifying a large-scale U.S. nuclear response. The
United States must also develop more holistic strategies and operational concepts for prevailing in competitions short of war. DOD
should establish cross-functional teams to integrate responses to
these and other difficult challenges.

National Security Innovation Base
6. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared. U.S. competitors are investing heavily in innovation while
using predatory tactics to undermine the U.S. National Security
Innovation Base.
Recommendation: The United States must better protect and
strengthen its National Security Innovation Base. The U.S. government needs to consider whether it should increase investment in
threatened industries that produce vital technology and components,
and whether some selective disintegration with rivals—namely
China—is necessary to avoid dangerous dependencies.
7. Much of the needed innovation in technologies suitable for national
defense purposes is happening outside of traditional defense
industry.
Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should capitalize on the
Defense Innovation Board and make maximum use of organizations
such as DARPA, DIU, government R&D labs, UARCs, and
FFRDCs to broaden DOD’s reach into the commercial world.
8. Current acquisition programs are risk-averse. Finding, developing,
and fielding new capabilities in the future will require a new
acceptance of risk to identify and exploit potential “leap-ahead”
technologies.
Recommendation: DOD should partner with Congress to explore the
potential of a new, narrowly tailored category of acquisition pilot

65

 programs to enable more rapid maturation, acquisition, and fielding
of break-through technologies.

Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities
9. Forward posture is a key component of deterring competitors and adversaries and assuring allies and partners. Speed matters, and the
ability to mobilize and move forces quickly is critical given that
likely contingencies could begin with a small confrontation that escalates quickly.
Recommendation: If the United States desires to avoid military conflict and control potential escalation, it should ensure there is a capable day-to-day posture in key theaters. Deterring aggression in the
Western Pacific will require using focused investments to establish a
forward-deployed defense-in-depth posture. To deter a revanchist
Russia, the United States and its NATO allies must rebuild military
force capacity and capability in Europe.
10. Even after the demise of the core ISIS “caliphate,” the United States
will still face state and non-state military challenges that require persistent military engagement in the Middle East.
Recommendation: U.S. military posture in the Middle East should
not become dramatically smaller, even though the precise mix of
U.S. capabilities should be reexamined.
11. The United States now faces five credible challengers, including two
major-state competitors, and three distinctly different geographic and
operational environments. A two-war force sizing construct makes
more strategic sense today than at any previous point in the postCold War era, yet the NDS adopts what is functionally a one-war
force sizing construct.
Recommendation: The United States needs a larger force than it has
today if it is to meet the objectives of the strategy. The Air Force,
Navy, and Army will all need capacity enhancements in addition
to—not in place of—the capability and posture changes this Commission recommends. The Army will need more armor, long-range
fires, engineering and air-defensive units, as well as additional airdefense and logistical forces. The Navy must expand its submarine
fleet and dramatically recapitalize and expand its military sealift
forces. The Air Force will need more stealthy long-range fighters
and bombers, tankers, lift capacity, and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance platforms. Finally, the United States must maintain the Marine Corps at no less than its current size.
66

 12. The United States confronts cyberattacks from adversaries on a daily
basis, yet efforts to defend against and respond to those attacks are
hamstrung by debates over authorities and jurisdictional boundaries.
Recommendation: Congress should appoint a high-level commission
to review U.S. cyber policy. That commission should focus on issues
surrounding the relevant authorities and jurisdictional boundaries,
and offer recommendations on how to streamline decision-making
and bureaucratic processes, while protecting civil liberties and leading efforts to establish international cyber norms.
13. In view of the rapid aging of America’s nuclear arsenal and the aggressive nuclear modernization programs undertaken by U.S. rivals,
it is urgently necessary to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad and much
of the supporting infrastructure.
Recommendation: The findings of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
offer an appropriate option for meeting U.S. nuclear deterrence and
assurance requirements, and we urge DOD to proceed along the path
the NPR lays out.
14. Space is once again becoming an increasingly critical and contentious domain. The U.S. military is heavily dependent on space-based
assets across the full spectrum of conflict; other nations are attempting to replicate U.S. space capabilities for themselves and developing counterspace capabilities to reduce or eliminate U.S. advantages.
Recommendation: America should improve its ability to compete
and deter malign activity in space, and to be sufficiently resilient that
the military and economic effects on Earth are minimized should deterrence fail. As the United States rethinks its approach to space, it
should emphasize five themes: technology, policy, organization,
communication, and cooperation.
15. Missile defense is foundational to U.S. deterrence and assurance
strategies. As the missile threat to the U.S. homeland from North
Korea and Iran grows, and as Russia and China modernize their
nuclear arsenals, America will need more credible and effective
defenses.
Recommendation: A senior DOD official should be given full
authority to develop and implement an integrated, long-term plan for
acquiring and developing air and missile defense capability. The
Secretary should transfer the responsibility and resources for postRDT&E acquisition of missile defense systems to the services; DOD
should invest in a robust R&D program to anticipate future threats,
operate effectively from space, and enhance resiliency.
67

 16. Electronic warfare capabilities will be critical in any future conflict,
especially those against major-power rivals. U.S. competitors have
invested heavily in electronic warfare as a way of neutralizing U.S.
advantages and weakening America’s ability to project power.
Recommendation: DOD must enhance its electronic warfare capacity
and capability to overcome adversary electronic warfare investments, and to degrade and defeat anti-access/area denial capabilities
and adversary command, control, and communications architectures.
17. Nearly any conflict between the United States and its most capable
competitors would entail significant demand for long-range, highprecision munitions. Large quantities of shorter-range high-precision
munitions will be needed, as well.
Recommendation: DOD must ensure a substantial, sustainable, and
rapidly scalable supply of preferred weapons such as Joint Air-toSurface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), LongRange Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and a longer-range High-Speed
Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). DOD should explore options for
strengthening the part of the National Security Innovation Base that
produces high-precision munitions to ensure that the country has the
required surge capacity.
18. The Commission has serious reservations about DOD’s ability to
support its global operations. Inadequate lift and tanker support, a
lack of secure communications, and insufficient capabilities and infrastructure are impeding strategic mobility.
Recommendation: DOD must invest in a more resilient and secure
logistics and transportation infrastructure, especially if it relies on a
Dynamic Force Employment model that envisions shifting assets
rapidly across theaters. Those investments should be rooted in careful study of TRANSCOM’s capabilities, capacity, and command
structure, and whether there is a sufficiently strong “logistics voice”
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
19. DOD lacks the analytical ability, expertise, and processes to link objectives to operational concepts to programs and resources; many
key concepts emphasized in the NDS are imprecise or unrealistic.
Recommendation: OSD-CAPE and the Joint Staff—working closely
with OSD-Policy— must rebuild decision support capability to ensure that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary can make hard decisions grounded in serious analysis, particularly as they consider the
warfighting return on investments. Specifically, the Department
needs a rigorous force development plan that connects its investment
68

 strategy with its key priorities of winning in conflict and competing
effectively with China and Russia.

Readiness
20. For over a decade, training for U.S. conventional and special operations forces emphasized the specific challenges of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, however, each of the five major challenges identified in the NDS requires U.S. forces to train and be proficient in different capabilities, tactics, and techniques.
Recommendation: A greater share of training and readiness efforts
must be devoted to the full range of potential missions U.S. forces
face, with particular—but not exclusive—emphasis on major-power
rivals. DOD should develop analytic tools that can measure readiness across this broad range of challenges, from low-intensity, gray
zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity fights.
21. Although readiness is not a function of money alone, sufficient
funding—provided on a timely, consistent basis—is necessary to
address current readiness challenges.
Recommendation: Congress should work with the Department to ensure an adequate level of funding. To provide greater flexibility and
stability, it should also authorize the Department to expend Operations and Maintenance funds from any given fiscal year across that
fiscal year and the subsequent one.
22. The most critical resource required to produce a highly capable military is highly capable people willing to serve in the quantity required. Yet the number of people who have the required fitness and
propensity to serve is in decline.
Recommendation: DOD and Congress must take creative steps to
address those aspects of the problem that are within their purview,
rather than relying solely on ever-higher compensation for a
shrinking pool of qualified volunteers. Without a marked change in
the way America approaches the idea of military service, DOD will
struggle to fill its ranks with highly qualified individuals.

Civil-Military Relations
23. There is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of
strategy development and implementation. Civilian voices appear
relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national
security policy. Allocating forces across theaters is an inherently

69

 political-military task, decision authority for which should be held
by America’s civilian leaders.
Recommendation: An increased civilian role is crucial in integrating
responses to global challenges. DOD, with Congressional oversight,
must emphasize decision-making processes that highlight the
political-military dynamics of force management shifts. The Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy must
fully exercise their responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans.

Resources
24. Budget caps were—and still are—harmful to American defense.
Recommendation: Congress should eliminate the final two years of
caps under the BCA.
25. At current funding levels, the U.S. military may not be able to fight
one major-power rival while still maintaining deterrence and stability in other regions.
Recommendation: Congress should increase the size of the defense
budget through sustained annual real growth in the out years, or
DOD should alter the expectations of the strategy and America’s
global strategic objectives. An average of three to five percent real
growth per annum is indicative of the investment required.
26. Recapitalization of the nuclear triad cannot be further delayed, yet
this recapitalization cannot be accomplished within currently projected budget levels unless DOD reduces its conventional capabilities. Additionally, DOD faces an impending “bow wave” of
conventional modernization costs.
Recommendation: Nuclear and conventional forces are both indispensable to a balanced, effective defense. The nation should not hollow out one set of capabilities to pay for another. Congress should
fund DOD at a level that permits critical conventional and nuclear
modernization.
27. The readiness challenges across the U.S. military took years to create. It will take years of sustained, predictable, and increased funding
to repair readiness and ensure that U.S. forces are fully prepared to
fight when needed.
Recommendation: Congress and DOD should balance new funding
to emphasize readiness, capacity, and capability across the force
rather than focusing on a subset of capability.
70

 28. The funding process is broken. Congress has failed to provide the
military with funding that is timely, adequate, sustained, and predictable. This dysfunction has had grave material impact and conveyed a
lack of seriousness in the face of growing global challenges.
Recommendation: Beyond eliminating BCA caps, Congress should
return to regular order and pass annual spending bills on time. Congress should seek to produce five-year budget agreements for defense to permit greater stability and flexibility for DOD.
29. The reliance on OCO is no longer appropriate to the new strategy’s
emphasis on preparing for prolonged competition with major-power
rivals.
Recommendation: To better prepare for major-power competition,
Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the
base Pentagon budget. This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase
in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this
transfer does not result in an overall spending cut.
30. Reforms to the Pentagon’s way of doing business are critically necessary but insufficient to reap substantial savings in the near-term.
Reforms cannot be seen as a primary source of funds for investment
and growth.
Recommendation: DOD should pursue reform for its own merits, but
understand this is not a reliable source of real growth in defense
capability.
31. Defense spending, and discretionary spending more broadly, are not
primary drivers of the federal deficit.
Recommendation: Congress should look to the entire federal budget,
especially entitlements, as well as taxes, to set the nation on a more
stable financial footing.
32. In the realm of major-power competition, China and Russia have national strategies integrating all tools of national power. The United
States does not.
Recommendation: A whole-of-government and even whole-of-nation
effort is required to address these challenges, which are bigger than
the Pentagon’s portfolio, and Congress must fund that effort
adequately.

71

 Additional Views of Andrew Krepinevich
Meeting Core Operational Challenges
I fully concur with the Commission’s recommendation that the Department of Defense declassify the operational challenges alluded to in the
2018 NDS. This is essential if our military is to develop and refine the
innovative operational concepts Secretary Mattis rightly notes are essential to addressing the emerging threats to our security.
With an eye to filling this gap, the Commission offers a list of seven
“core” operational challenges. As the Commission’s report notes, these
challenges are “similar” to those listed in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review. In fact, they are almost identical.2
Moreover, the Commission’s operational challenges suffer from several
clear shortcomings. In fact, most of these operational “challenges” are
not challenges at all. This may stem, in part, from a lack of precision as
to what constitutes an “operational challenge.” Neither the NDS nor the
Commission defines the term. As used here, “operational challenges” are
compelling real-world problems posed by adversaries at the operational
(or campaign) level of war.
For example, the Commission lists as one of its operational challenges:
“Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop
an interoperable, joint C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) architecture and
capability that supports warfare of the future.”
This is not an operational challenge; rather, the Commission is calling
for the creation of a capability. Nor does the Commission link this capability to any particular challenge, stating only that it should support
“warfare of the future.”
Continuing this line of argument, three of the Commission’s “operational
challenges” call for the military to protect “critical bases of operations,”
“forces abroad,” and “allies and partners.” Specifically, the Commission
emphasizes “assuring information systems” and “enhancing the survivability of space systems.” The Commission does not explain why space
and information systems are singled out for special consideration as
Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” September 30,
2001, p. 30; available at https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. The 2001
QDR refers not to “challenges” but rather operational “goals.”
2

72

 opposed to, for example, naval combatants or brigade combat teams. In
brief, rather than providing a set of operational challenges that reflect
real-world problems posed by adversaries identified in the NDS, the
Commission presents a list of what might best be described as generic
tasks we would like our military to perform against any adversary.
To be fair, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review was prepared when the
United States lacked a major military rival. Consequently, it could focus
on what was then called “capabilities-based” planning rather than
“threat-based” planning. As the NDS states, this is no longer the case.
The United States confronts clear challenges posed by two revisionist
great powers, China and Russia, as well as Iran, North Korea, and radical
non-state groups.
Consequently, it is now possible to identify the character of major threats
to our security with far greater clarity than it was 17 years ago. Threatbased planning enables DOD and the Commission to be far more specific in identifying the principal operational challenges confronting our
armed forces.
Given these considerations, the following principal operational challenges are submitted for consideration:3







Defending the U.S. homeland and its treaty allies from strategic attack, to include by weapons of mass destruction, as well as by advanced conventional and cyber weapons (i.e., against technically
advanced, numerically superior enemies).
Defending fundamental U.S. security interests in the Indo-Pacific,
particularly along the first island chain, from Chinese aggression and
coercion (i.e., against a technically advanced, numerically superior
enemy).
Defending fundamental U.S. security interests in Europe from Russian aggression and coercion (i.e., against a technically advanced, locally numerically superior enemy).
Defending fundamental U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf region from aggression and coercion (i.e., against a technically inferior, numerically inferior enemy).

3

There should be no more than five or six key operational challenges. These
challenges should be prioritized to inform matters pertaining to strategic choice.
As doing so would require analysis that is beyond current resources, the ones
listed here are suggestive, rather than definitive.
73

 

Maintaining access to key lines of communication linking the United
States to major overseas theaters of operation and vital trading
partners/resources (i.e., against a technically advanced, numerically
inferior enemy).
(Of course, to the degree our military can successfully address these operational challenges, its ability to deter acts of aggression and coercion
will be enhanced as well.)
These challenges meet the definition stated above: they provide our
military with real-world problems at the campaign level of warfare to
inform and facilitate their planning. They also do so in a manner
consistent with what the Commission describes in its report under
“Operational Concepts.”

Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities
In its discussion of “Near- to Mid-Term Force Priorities,” the Commission indirectly establishes program and force priorities. It does so with
little if anything in the way of analytic support. To take but one example,
in discussing the Indo-Pacific region, the Commission states that, among
other things:
Protecting U.S. interests from China and Russia will require additional investment in the submarine fleet; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; air defense; long-range strike platforms; and long-range ground-based fires. Deterring and, if necessary, defeating North Korea will demand additional air defense
assets, as well as a sustained ground presence with the ability to
quickly flow additional armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs),
fires and combat engineer assets, and other capabilities into theater.

Other than stating the obvious—it’s better to have more military capability than less—no analytic support is presented as to why these particular
forces and capabilities are more deserving of priority than others.
This is startling, given that the Commission criticizes the Department for
its lack of analytic rigor. As the Commission states with respect to
DOD’s ability to make informed decisions with respect to defense
priorities:
If DOD is to make such decisions with appropriate rigor, it will be
critical to revitalize analytical support for the Secretary of Defense.
Throughout our work, we found that DOD struggled to link objectives to strategy to operational concepts to programs and resources.”
[Emphasis as in the Commission’s report.]

74

 Simply put, the Commission would do well to follow its own advice before advancing recommendations regarding the size, structure, mix, and
posture of U.S. forces and their capabilities. As the Commission states:
Specifically, the Department needs a rigorous force development
plan that connects its investment strategy with its key priorities of
winning in conflict and competing effectively with China and Russia. That plan must have a clear force sizing construct to illuminate
the strategy’s ambition and risks. Such a force development architecture should provide answers to the following questions:










What are our objectives?
What operational concepts will animate how we plan to deter
and fight?
How might operational concepts, force posture, and attendant
capabilities be tailored to specific regional and functional
contexts?
What assumptions is DOD making about multi-theater demands
in timing, scale, and other key aspects? How is DOD hedging
against the possibility that these assumptions may not prove out
If the United States finds itself in conflict in a first theater, what
constitutes “deterrence” in the second theater and how does it
change the force requirements projected prior to the NDS’s release (i.e., under the previous defense strategy)?
How do component program priorities reflect these
assessments?

The Commission does not address these issues in any depth, let alone
with the kind of analytic rigor it recommends DOD pursue prior to establishing defense priorities.
In summary, it seems profoundly unhelpful for the Commission to state
the analytic foundation required for DOD to make informed choices regarding defense priorities, and then proceed to ignore it in advancing priorities of its own.

75

 Appendix A

Glossary
5G LTE

Fifth-Generation Long-Term Evolution

ABCT

armored brigade combat team

AI

artificial intelligence

BBA

Bipartisan Budget Act

BCA

Budget Control Act

BCT

brigade combat team

C4ISR

command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAPE

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CBO

Congressional Budget Office

CFT

cross-functional team

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DFE

Dynamic Force Employment

DIU

Defense Innovation Unit

DOD

Department of Defense

FFRDC

federally funded research and development center

FY

fiscal year

FYDP

Future Years Defense Program

HARM

High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies

ISIS

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JASSM-ER

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended
Range

LRASM

Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
76

 MDA

Missile Defense Agency

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NC3

nuclear command, control, and communications

NDS

National Defense Strategy

NPR

Nuclear Posture Review

NSIB

National Security Innovation Base

NSS

National Security Strategy

OCO

overseas contingency operations

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

R&D

research and development

RDT&E

research, development, test, and evaluation

TRANSCOM

U.S. Transportation Command

UARC

university-affiliated research center

USD(R&E)

Under Secretary for Defense for Research and
Engineering

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

77

 Appendix B

Enabling Legislation
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
Division A—Department of Defense Authorizations
Title IX—Department of Defense Organization and Management
Subtitle E—Strategies, Reports, and Related Matters
Section 942. Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the
United States.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established a commission to
be known as the ‘‘Commission on the National Defense Strategy for
the United States’’ (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’).
The purpose of the Commission is to examine and make recommendations with respect to the national defense strategy for the United States.
(b) COMPOSITION.—
(1) MEMBERSHIP.—The Commission shall be composed of
12 members appointed as follows:
(A) Three members appointed by the chair of the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(B) Three members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(C) Three members appointed by the chair of the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
(D) Three members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) CHAIR; VICE CHAIR.—
(A) CHAIR.—The chair of the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representative and the chair of the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate shall jointly designate one
member of the Commission to serve as chair of the
Commission.
(B) VICE CHAIR.—The ranking minority member of the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representative
and the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate shall jointly designate one member of
the Commission to serve as vice chair of the Commission.

78

 (3) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.—Members
shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in
the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original
appointment.
(c) DUTIES.—
(1) REVIEW.—The Commission shall review the current national
defense strategy of the United States, including the assumptions,
missions, force posture and structure, and strategic and military
risks associated with the strategy.
(2) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—The Commission shall conduct a comprehensive assessment of the strategic
environment, the threats to the United States, the size and shape of
the force, the readiness of the force, the posture and capabilities of
the force, the allocation of resources, and strategic and military
risks in order to provide recommendations on the national defense
strategy for the United States.
(d) COOPERATION FROM GOVERNMENT.—
(1) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the Commission
shall receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of
Defense in providing the Commission with analysis, briefings,
and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its
responsibilities.
(2) LIAISON.—The Secretary shall designate at least one officer
or employee of the Department of Defense to serve as a liaison officer between the Department and the Commission.
(e) REPORT.—
(1) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than December 1, 2017, the
Commission shall submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a
report on the Commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The report shall address, but not be limited to, each of the
following:
(A) The strategic environment, including threats to the United
States and the potential for conflicts arising from such threats,
security challenges, and the national security interests of the
United States.
(B) The military missions for which the Department of Defense should prepare and the force planning construct.

79

 (C) The roles and missions of the Armed Forces to carry out
those missions and the roles and capabilities provided by other
United States Government agencies and by allies and international partners.
(D) The force planning construct, size and shape, posture and
capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, organization, personnel,
and other elements of the defense program necessary to support the strategy.
(E) The resources necessary to support the strategy, including
budget recommendations.
(F) The risks associated with the strategy, including the relationships and tradeoffs between missions, risks, and resources.
(2) INTERIM BRIEFING.—Not later than June 1, 2017, the Commission shall provide to the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate a briefing on the status of its review and assessment,
and include a discussion of any interim recommendations.
(3) FORM.—The report submitted to Congress under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(f) FUNDING.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by to
this Act for the Department of Defense, $5,000,000 is available to fund
the activities of the Commission.
(g) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 6 months after
the date on which it submits the report required by subsection (e).

80

 Appendix C

Schedule of Plenary Meetings
Date

Location

September 12, 2017

The Pentagon
Arlington, VA 22202

December 7, 2017

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

January 22, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

February 23, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

March 19, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

April 9, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

May 4, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

May 23, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

June 19, 2018

LMI
7940 Jones Branch Drive
Tysons, VA 22102

81

 Appendix D

Individuals Appearing before the Commission
Mr Takahiro Araki
Senior Coordinator, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division,
Embassy of Japan
Mr. James Baker
Director, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense
Ms. Gabrielle Burrell
Minister Counsellor Defence Policy, Australian Defence Staff,
Embassy of Australia
Mr. Dean Cheng
Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
Mr. Eric Chewning
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and
Industrial Base Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment, Department of Defense
Major General Phillip Churn
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve
Matters
Air Vice Marshal Alan Clements, CSC
Head Australian Defence Staff Washington & Australian Defence
Attaché, Embassy of Australia
Mr. Elbridge Colby
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense
The Honorable Robert Daigle
Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, Department of
Defense
Mr. Chris Danielewski
Strategic Outreach, Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
Department of Defense
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Iran, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Korea, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
82

 Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Middle East-Military Issues, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Military Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Russia-Eurasia, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Transnational Issues, Director Red Cell, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
Deputy National Intelligence Officer
Transnational Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Mr. Christopher Dougherty
Senior Advisor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy & Force Development, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Ret.
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
Mr. Matthew Dubois
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Integration, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Department of Defense
Dr. Tony Echevarria
Editor, Parameters, Army War College
The Honorable Mark Esper
Secretary of the Army, Department of Defense
Mr. William Fabian
Senior Strategic Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy & Force Development, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
Mr. David Feith
Office of Policy Planning, Asia Policy, Department of State
Ms. Suzanne Fry
Director, Strategic Futures Group, National Intelligence Council
Mr. Markus Garlauskas
National Intelligence Council

83

 Mr. Richard Girven
Associate Director, Intelligence Policy Center and International
Market Manager, National Security Research Division, RAND
Corporation
General David Goldfein, USAF
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Department of Defense
Lieutenant General Samuel Greaves, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense
The Honorable Michael Griffin
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense
Mr. Brian Hahs
National Intelligence Council
Admiral Harry Harris, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Department of Defense
Dr. Richard Hooker
Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council
General John Hyten, USAF
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Department of Defense
Mr. Greg Kausner
Deputy Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department
of Defense
Mr. Chris Kevork
Counsellor Defence Strategic Policy, Australian Defence Staff,
Embassy of Australia
Mr. Iain King
Defence Counsellor, Policy & Nuclear, British Embassy
Dr. Sean M. Kirkpatrick
Director, National Security Strategy, National Security Council
General Joseph Lengyel, USAF
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Department of Defense
The Honorable James Mattis
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
Dr. Michael Mazarr
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
Mr. Steve McCarthy
Minister Defence Materiel and Civil Secretary, British Embassy
84

 General Darren McDew, USAF
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Department of Defense
Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, USMC
Director, Joint Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department
of Defense
Mr. Michael McNerney
Associate Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center
and Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND Corporation
General Mark Milley, USA
Chief of Staff of the Army, Department of Defense
Mr. R. James Mitre
Principal Director for Strategy & Force Development, Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Force
Development, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense
Général de brigade Jean-Pierre Montégu
Defense Attaché, Embassy of France
Colonel Philippe Geay de Montenon
Deputy Defense Attaché for Strategic Affairs, Embassy of France
Dr. Karl Mueller
Senior Political Scientist and Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate
School, RAND Corporation
General Robert Neller, USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Department of Defense
Dr. Leigh Nolan
Director for Strategic Analysis, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Force Development, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
Mr. Dave Ochmanek
Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND Corporation
Mr. Jay Okey
Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper
Senior Research Scholar in Law and Senior Fellow, Paul Tsai China
Center at Yale Law School/Adjunct Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific
Security Program at the Center for a New American Security
Admiral John Richardson, USN
Chief of Naval Operations, Department of Defense
85

 Ms. Lynn Robinson
National Intelligence Council
Admiral Michael Rogers, USN
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, Department of Defense
Dr. Phillip Saunders
Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, National
Defense University, Department of Defense
Ms. Kelley Sayler
Strategic Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy & Force Development, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
General Curtis Scaparrotti, USA
Commander, U.S. European Command, Department of Defense
Dr. Nadia Schadlow
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Strategy,
National Security Council
Mr. Anthony Schinella
National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues, National Intelligence
Council
The Honorable Patrick Shanahan
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
Ms. Pamela Shepherd
Deputy for Strategic Planning and Integration, Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense
Mr. Matthew Shipley
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Force Readiness, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Department of Defense
Dr. Robert Soofer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense
The Honorable Richard Spencer
Secretary of the Navy, Department of Defense
Dr. Michael Spirtas
Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

86

 Dr. Sue Mi Terry
Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Mr. Matthew Turpin
Director for China, National Security Council
General Joseph Votel, USA
Commander, U.S. Central Command, Department of Defense
The Honorable Heather Wilson
Secretary of the Air Force, Department of Defense
Dr. Yuna Wong
Policy Researcher and Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School,
RAND Corporation
Mr. Taro Yamato
Principal Director, Director for Defense Policy, Embassy of Japan

87

 Appendix E

Commissioner Biographies
Co-Chairman, Commission on the National Defense Strategy
for the United States
Ambassador Eric S. Edelman was appointed to the Commission by House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-TX).
Ambassador Edelman currently serves as Roger Hertog Practitioner in Residence at Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies and Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He retired as a career minister from the U.S. Foreign Service on
May 1, 2009. He has served in senior positions at the Departments of State
and Defense as well as the White House, where he led organizations providing analysis, strategy, policy development, security services, trade advocacy,
public outreach, citizen services, and congressional relations.
As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August 2005 to January
2009, he was DOD’s senior policy official, overseeing strategy development
with global responsibility for bilateral defense relations, war plans, special
operations forces, homeland defense, missile defense, nuclear weapons and
arms control policies, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, arms sales, and defense trade controls. He served as U.S. Ambassador
to Finland in the Clinton administration and Turkey in the Bush administration and was Vice President Cheney’s principal deputy assistant for national
security affairs. He was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott, special assistant to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert Kimmitt, and special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz.
His other assignments included the State Department Operations Center,
Prague, Moscow, and Tel Aviv, where he was a member of the U.S. Middle
East delegation to the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks. Ambassador
Edelman has been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Presidential Distinguished Service
Award, and several Department of State Superior Honor Awards. In 2010, he
was named a knight of the French National Order of the Legion of Honor.
Ambassador Edelman received a B.A. in history and government from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from Yale University.
He is a distinguished fellow at the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessment and a senior associate of the international security program at the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He
also serves on the National Defense Panel and on the bipartisan board of
directors of the United States Institute of Peace.

88

 Co-Chairman, Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the
United States
Admiral Gary Roughead, USN, Retired was appointed to the Commission by
House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).
Admiral Roughead is a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He became the 29th Chief of Naval Operations in September of 2007, after holding six operational commands. He is one of only two officers in the history
of the Navy to have commanded both the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
Ashore he served as the Commandant, U.S. Naval Academy where he led
the strategic planning effort that underpinned that institution’s first capital
campaign. He was the Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs, responsible for
the Department of the Navy’s interaction with Congress. Admiral Roughead
was also the Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command during the massive
relief effort following the tsunami of 2004.
In retirement, Admiral Roughead is Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished
Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and serves
on the boards of directors of the Northrop Grumman Corporation, Maersk
Line, Limited and the Center for a New American Security. He is a Trustee
of Dodge and Cox Funds, a Trustee of the Johns Hopkins University, and
serves on the Board of Managers of the Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory. He advises companies in the national security and medical sectors.
The Honorable Christine H. Fox was appointed to the Commission by Senate
Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI).
Ms. Fox currently serves as Assistant Director for Policy and Analysis of the
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). Prior to joining APL, she served as Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense from December
2013 to May 2014, making her the highest-ranking female official in history
to serve in the Department of Defense. From 2009 to 2013, Ms. Fox served
as the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. In that position, she was the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for analyzing and evaluating plans, programs,
and budgets in relation to U.S. defense objectives and resource constraints.
From 2005 to 2009, Ms. Fox served as the President of the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA), a Federally Funded Research and Development Center,
and as the scientific analyst to the Chief of Naval Operations. During her
28-year career at CNA, Ms. Fox oversaw analysis of real-world operations,
from the first Gulf War and the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990s, to the operations in Afghanistan immediately following the September 11th attacks, and the operation in Iraq in early 2003. From 2003 to 2005,
Ms. Fox served as a member of NASA’s Return to Flight Task Group, chartered by the NASA Administrator to certify the recommendations made by
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

89

 Ms. Fox currently serves on the Board of Trustees for the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She previously served on the Advisory Board of the Applied Physics
Laboratory, University of Washington.
With nearly 6,000 staff at what is the nation’s largest University Affiliated
Research Center, Johns Hopkins APL makes critical contributions to a wide
variety of national and global technical and scientific challenges. As the
Director of Policy and Analysis, Ms. Fox leads efforts to increase APL’s
engagement on technical policy issues and directs research and analysis
projects on behalf of the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other
federal agencies.
Ms. Fox is a three-time recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. She has also been awarded the Department of the
Army’s Decoration for Distinguished Civilian Service.
Ms. Fox earned a B.S. in mathematics and an M.S. in applied mathematics
from George Mason University.
The Honorable Kathleen H. Hicks was appointed to the Commission by
House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).
Dr. Hicks is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of
the International Security Program at CSIS. With over 50 resident staff and
an extensive network of nonresident affiliates, the CSIS International Security Program undertakes one of the most ambitious research and policy agendas in the security field. Dr. Hicks is a frequent writer and lecturer on
geopolitics, national security, and defense matters. She served in the Obama
administration as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. She
led the development of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review. She also oversaw DOD contingency and theater campaign planning. From 2006 to 2009, Dr. Hicks served as a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program. From 1993 to 2006, she
served as a career civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, rising from Presidential Management Intern to the Senior Executive Service.
Dr. Hicks is concurrently the Donald Marron Scholar at the Kissinger Center
for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
She serves on the Boards of Advisors for the Truman Center and SoldierStrong and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Hicks
served on the National Commission on the Future of the Army and currently
serves on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. She holds a
Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an
M.P.A. from the University of Maryland, and an A.B. magna cum laude and
Phi Beta Kappa from Mount Holyoke College. She is the recipient of distinguished service awards from three secretaries of defense and the chairman of

90

 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and received the 2011 DOD Senior Professional
Women’s Association Excellence in Leadership Award.
General John M. “Jack” Keane, USA, Retired, was appointed to the
Commission by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain
(R-AZ).
General Jack Keane is president, GSI Consulting. He serves as chairman of
the Institute for the Study of War and the Knollwood Foundation, executive
chairman of AM General, a director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Smith Richardson Foundation, and a former and recent member, for 9 years, of the Secretary of Defense Policy Board. General
Keane is also a Trustee Fellow of Fordham University, and an advisor to the
George C. Marshall Foundation.
General Keane, a four-star general, completed over 37 years of public service in December2003, culminating in his appointment as acting Chief of
Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. As the chief operating officer of the Army for over 4 years, he directed 1.5 million soldiers and civilians in 120 countries, with an annual operating budget of $110 billion.
General Keane was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and provided oversight and support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 2004, General Keane spent a
decade conducting frequent trips to Iraq and Afghanistan for senior defense
officials with multiple visits during the surge period in both countries directly assisting General David Petraeus.
General Keane appears before Congress regularly, offering testimony on
matters of foreign policy and national security, having provided testimony in
May on “ISIS: Post Caliphate.” As well he regularly speaks throughout the
country on leadership and America’s global security challenges.
General Keane is a career infantry paratrooper, a combat veteran of Vietnam,
decorated for valor, who spent much of his military life in operational commands where he commanded the famed 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault) and the legendary 18th Airborne Corps, the Army’s largest
warfighting organization.
General Keane graduated from Fordham University with a Bachelor of
Science degree and received a Master of Arts degree from Western Kentucky
University. He is a graduate of the Army War College and the Command and
General Staff College.
Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. was appointed to the Commission by House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-TX).
Dr. Krepinevich currently serves as President and Chief Operating Officer of
Solarium LLC, a defense consulting firm. From 1995 to 2016, he served as
president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA),
which he founded in 1995. His service at CSBA was preceded by a 21-year
career in the U.S. Army. In 2005, he published an influential Foreign Affairs

91

 article, “How to Win in Iraq.” The article called for adopting a populationcentric counterinsurgency strategy much like the approach implemented
during the “Surge” of U.S. forces two years later.
Dr. Krepinevich has served in the DOD’s Office of Net Assessment, and on
the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He has also served as a
member of the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Joint Experimentation, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s
Defense Policy Board. He currently serves as chairman of the Chief of Naval
Operations Executive Panel and on the Advisory Council of Business Executives for National Security.
Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences, and has served as a consultant for many senior government
officials, including several secretaries of defense, as well as all four military
services. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point, George
Mason University, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University.
Dr. Krepinevich’s most recent book is The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall
and the Shaping of Modern Defense Strategy, which he co-authored with
Barry Watts. He also authored 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century. Dr. Krepinevich received the Furniss Award
for his book, The Army and Vietnam. His recent articles are “Preserving Primary: A Defense Strategy for the New Administration” (with Congressman
Mac Thornberry), and “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” both published in Foreign Affairs. His recent monographs include:
“Preserving the Balance: A U.S. Eurasia Defense Strategy;” and “Archipelagic Defense: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Preserving Peace and Stability
in the Western Pacific.”
A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an M.P.A. and Ph.D. from
Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He
is married to the former Julia Ellen Milians. They reside in Leesburg, Virginia, and have three children, Jennifer, Andrew, and Michael, and five
grandchildren.
Senator Jon L. Kyl (R-AZ) was appointed to the Commission by Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-AZ). He is the junior
U.S. Senator from Arizona, having succeeded the late John McCain in
September 2018.
Prior to returning to the Senate, Senator Kyl advised companies on domestic
and international policies that influence U.S. and multi-national businesses
and assisted corporate clients on tax, health care, defense, national security,
and intellectual property matters among others. He retired from Congress in
January 2013 as the second-highest ranking Republican senator.
During Senator Kyl’s 26 years in Congress, he built a reputation for mastering the complexities of legislative policy and coalition building, first in the
92

 House of Representatives and then in the Senate. In 2006, he was recognized
by Time magazine as one of America’s Ten Best Senators. Kyl was ranked
by National Journal in 2007 as the fourth-most conservative U.S. Senator. In
2010, Time magazine called him one of the 100 most influential people in
the world, noting his “encyclopedic knowledge of domestic and foreign policy, and his hard work and leadership” and his “power to persuade.”
Senator Kyl sat on the powerful Senate Finance Committee where he was the
top Republican on the Subcommittee on Taxation and Internal Revenue Service Oversight. The senator also served as the ranking Republican on the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism. A
member of the Republican Leadership for well over a decade, Senator Kyl
chaired the Senate Republican Policy Committee and the Senate Republican
Conference, before becoming Senate Republican Whip.
Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken was appointed to the Commission by Senate Armed
Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-AZ).
Dr. Mahnken currently serves as President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a Senior Research
Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns
Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies. He was formerly the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography
and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College.
Dr. Mahnken served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy
Planning from 2006 to 2009. In that capacity, he was responsible for the
DOD’s major strategic planning functions, including the preparation of guidance for war plans and the development of the defense planning scenarios.
He was the primary author of the 2008 National Defense Strategy and contributing author of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). He spearheaded the Secretary of Defense’s Minerva Research Initiative, which will
provide $100 million in grants to universities to conduct basic research in the
social sciences, and led an interagency effort to establish, for the first time in
five decades, a National Security Council-run interagency policy planning
body.
Prior to joining DOD, he served as a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval
War College. From 2004 to 2006, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Merrill
Center at SAIS. During the 2003 to 2004 academic year, he served as the
Acting Director of the SAIS Strategic Studies Program. His areas of primary
expertise are strategy, intelligence, and special operations forces. Dr.
Mahnken has held positions in both the government and the private sector.
He served on the Staff of the 2014 National Defense Panel and as Staff Director of the 2010 QDR Independent Panel’s Force Structure and Personnel
Sub-Panel. He served on the staff of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. He
served in DOD’s Office of Net Assessment, where he conducted research
into the emerging revolution in military affairs. He also served as a member
93

 of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, commissioned by the Secretary of the
Air Force to examine the performance of U.S. forces during the war with
Iraq. Prior to that, he served as an analyst in the Non-Proliferation Directorate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was responsible
for enforcing U.S. missile proliferation policy. In 2009, Dr. Mahnken received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.
Dr. Mahnken is the author or editor of Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present,
and Future of Regional Security (2014), Competitive Strategies for the 21st
Century (2012), Secrecy and Strategem: Understanding Chinese Strategic
Culture (2011), Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945
(2008), Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 (2002), and (with James R. FitzSimonds) of The Limits
of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (2003). He has appeared on Fox News, CNN, BBC, and CBC, among
other networks. He is editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies.
Dr. Mahnken earned his master’s degree and doctorate in international affairs from SAIS and was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. He was a summa cum
laude graduate of the University of Southern California with bachelor’s degrees in history and international relations (with highest honors) and a certificate in defense and strategic studies.
The Honorable Michael J. “Mike” McCord was appointed to the Commission
by House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith
(D-WA).
Mr. McCord currently serves as the Director, Civil-Military Programs at the
Stennis Center for Public Service Leadership and as an Adjunct Research
Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
Prior to his current positions, Mr. McCord had 32 years of service in national
security in the executive and legislative branches. From 2009 through January 2017, he served at the Department of Defense as the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer and as the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). In these roles he served as principal advisor to four secretaries of defense on all budgetary and financial matters including contingency operation funding and policy, and management
and financial audit of the world’s largest military budget. While at DOD, he
was a four-time recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.
Mr. McCord joined DOD with 24 years of experience in national security issues in Congress, including 21 years as a Professional Staff Member on the
Senate Armed Services Committee for former Senators Sam Nunn and Carl
Levin. He served on the full committee staff from 1987 through 2002 and
again from 2004 through 2008, with oversight of defense funding issues.
From 1995 through 2008, he also served as the minority or majority staff
lead on the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support where he
94

 was responsible for readiness, military construction and basing, and base closure matters.
He has also served as a defense and veterans affairs analyst on the staff of
the House Budget Committee and began his career as an analyst at the Congressional Budget Office.
Mr. McCord has a degree in economics from the Ohio State University and
currently serves on the Board of Advisors of their Department of Economics.
He also has a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the University of Pennsylvania. He guest-lectures on national security and budgeting at the American University and George Washington University, and is a Fellow of the
National Academy of Public Administration.
Mr. Michael J. Morell was appointed to the Commission by Senate Armed
Services Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI).
Mr. Morell currently serves as Senior Counselor and Global Chairman of
Geo-Political Risk at Beacon Global Strategies LLC. He served as the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2010 to 2013
and twice as its Acting Director.
In his over 30 years at the Agency, he played a central role in the United
States’ fight against terrorism, its initiatives to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and its efforts to respond to trends that are altering
the international landscape—including a revanchist Russia, the rise of China,
and cyber threat.
As Deputy Director, he oversaw the Agency’s analytic, collection, and covert action operations; represented the Agency at the White House and on
Capitol Hill; and maintained the CIA’s relationships with foreign intelligence services and foreign leaders. He was one of the leaders in the search
for Osama bin Laden and participated in the deliberations that led to the raid
that killed bin Laden in May 2011. Mr. Morell served as Acting Director
longer than anyone in the history of the CIA, for two months following Leon
Panetta’s confirmation as Secretary of Defense and for five months following David Petraeus’ departure from government. He served as a member of
the National Security Council’s Deputies Committee.
Mr. Morell started his career at the CIA in 1980. He worked on East Asia
for 14 years, holding a number of jobs in analysis and management. In 1999,
Mr. Morell became the Director of the Office of Asian Pacific and Latin
American Analysis. He also served as President George W. Bush’s intelligence briefer and as the Executive Assistant to CIA Director George J.
Tenet.
In July 2006, Mr. Morell was named the Executive Director of the CIA,
overseeing the administration of the Agency. In this role, he worked to
strengthen the CIA’s leadership development program and established a
cost-savings program for the Agency’s numerous support elements. In 2008,
Mr. Morell became the Director for Intelligence at the Agency, leading the
95

 CIA’s analytic effort. In this assignment, he strengthened the quality of CIA
analysis and enhanced professional development opportunities for analysts.
He served in this role until he was appointed Deputy Director in May 2010.
Mr. Morell received a B.A. in Economics from the University of Akron and
an M.A. in Economics from Georgetown University.
Throughout his career, Mr. Morell has received a number of awards. These
include the Presidential Rank Award, the CIA’s Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, the Department of Defense Service Medal, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the National Intelligence Reform Medal,
the Intelligence Community Seal Medallion, and five CIA Director’s
Awards.
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson was appointed to the Commission by Senate
Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI).
Ambassador Patterson served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs from 2013 to 2017. She previously served as United States Ambassador to Egypt until 2013 and as United States Ambassador to Pakistan from
July 2007 to October 2010.
Ambassador Patterson was the Deputy Inspector General of the Department
of State from 2003 to 2004, Ambassador to Colombia from 2000 to 2003,
and Ambassador to El Salvador from 1997 to 2000.
Ambassador Patterson joined the Foreign Service in 1973 as an economic officer. She has served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Interamerican Affairs and as Office Director for Andean
Affairs. She also served as political counselor to the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations in Geneva from 1988 to 1991 and as economic officer and
counselor in Saudi Arabia from 1984 to 1988. She has held a variety of other
economic and political assignments, including in the Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.
She received the State Department’s superior honor award in 1981 and 1988,
its meritorious award in 1977 and 1983, and a Presidential honor award in
1993. She has also received the Order of the Congress, from the Congress of
Colombia, and the Order of Boyaca, from the Government of Colombia, for
her work in that country. She was also recognized by the Government of El
Salvador with the Order of Jose Matias Delgado.
Ambassador Patterson was born in Fort Smith, Arkansas. She graduated
from Wellesley College and attended graduate school at the University of
North Carolina. She is married and has two sons.

96

 Mr. Roger I. Zakheim was appointed to the Commission by House Armed
Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-TX).
Mr. Zakheim is the Washington Director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Foundation. Prior to his appointment at the Ronald Reagan Presidental Foundation, he served as Partner at the law firm Covington & Burling LLP and
practiced in the firm’s Public Policy and Government Affairs practice group,
where he served as co-chair, as well as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and Government Contracts practice groups.
Mr. Zakheim provided advisory and advocacy support to clients facing policy and regulatory challenges in the aerospace, defense, and national security
sector.
Before joining the firm, Mr. Zakheim was General Counsel and Deputy Staff
Director of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. In this role,
Mr. Zakheim managed the passage of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The NDAA is the annual defense policy bill that authorizes the Defense Department’s budget.
Mr. Zakheim’s previous experience includes serving as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, where he managed the department’s policies and programs related to the Iraq and Afghanistan coalition affairs.
Mr. Zakheim frequently speaks and writes on national security and defense
issues. His views have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times,
Politico, National Public Radio, Fox News, CNN, BBC, The Weekly Standard, and National Review, among other media outlets.
Defense News called Mr. Zakheim one of the “100 Most Influential People
in U.S. Defense,” noting that he is widely “regarded as one of the top GOP
young guns.” Foreign Policy magazine recently named him one of the “Top
50 Republicans in GOP Foreign Policy.”

97

 Appendix F

Commission Staff
Paul Hughes
Executive Director
Hal Brands
Lead Writer
Thomas Bowditch
Senior Adviser
Raphael Cohen
Matthew Costlow
Mackenzie Eaglen
Giselle Donnelly
Mara Karlin
Mark Lewis
LMI Support Staff to the Commission
George Sinks
LMI Support Lead
Jessica Bryan
Wayne Cragwell
Adam Schmidt
David Walrath
U.S. Government Liaison
Webster Bridges
DOD Liaison to the National Defense Strategy Commission
Christopher Maletz
Chief of Staff, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy and Force Development

98

 I

n January 2018, the Department of Defense completed the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), a congressionally mandated assessment of how the Department will
protect the United States and its national interests using the tools and resources at
its disposal. That assessment is intended to address an array of important subjects:
the nature of the strategic environment, the priority objectives of the Department
of Defense, the roles and missions of the armed forces, the size and shape of the
force, the major investments in capabilities and innovation that the Department will
make over the following five-year period, and others. The 2018 NDS is a classified
document; an unclassified summary was released publicly.

Providing for the
Common Defense
The Assessment and Recommendations of
the National Defense Strategy Commission

Providing for the Common Defense

To enhance America’s ability to address these issues, Congress also convened
a bipartisan panel to review the NDS and offer recommendations concerning
U.S. defense strategy. The members of the Commission on the National Defense
Strategy for the United States represent a group of distinguished national security
and defense experts. They analyzed issues related not just to defense strategy, but
also to the larger geopolitical environment in which that strategy must be executed.
They consulted with civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense,
representatives of other U.S. government departments and agencies, allied diplomats
and military officials, and independent experts. This publication is the consensus
report of the Commission. The Commission argues that America confronts a grave
crisis of national security and national defense, as U.S. military advantages erode and
the strategic landscape becomes steadily more threatening. If the United States does
not show greater urgency and seriousness in responding to this crisis, if it does not
take decisive steps to rebuild its military advantages now, the damage to American
security and influence could be devastating.

Edelman and Roughead

Providing for the Common Defense

Eric Edelman, Co-Chair
United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
www.usip.org

Gary Roughead, Co-Chair

Christine Fox

Thomas Mahnken

Kathleen Hicks

Michael McCord

Jack Keane

Michael Morell

Andrew Krepinevich

Anne Patterson

Jon Kyl

Roger Zakheim