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CLARK

PRESIDENT

 

To the Reader:

Enclosed with this letter is one of four
White Papers my campaign will release. This paper
sets forth a proposal for improving American pros-
pects for peace and security while reducing our

military budget.

The Founders of our country. people like
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, advised
us to cultivate peace and avoid entangling foreign
alliances. As in so many other areas. our govern?

ment in recent years has ignored the wisdom of the
Founders. 

In recent years the U.S. government has attempted
to manipulate the affairs of countries around the
globe. It has propped up dictators-in the name of
freedom and gone to war in the name of peace. Our
military budget has soared, and more than 2 million
Americans are currently on active duty in the armed

services.

What have these policies brought us? Throughout
large parts-of the world, the United States is hated
for its interference. 100,000 Americans have died in
foreign conflicts since the end of World War II. Our
taxes have soared and our economy has been crippled
under the burden of our military Spending. And most
important. we live under the constant threat of nuclear

war .

. I propose a new foreign policy for America it

15 an American foreign policy, based on the ideas of
America's Founders and the realities of today's world.

It is a policy of peace. free trade. and non?intervention.
It 13 a policy that proposes broad economic and cultural

contacts with other nations but that would keep the U.S.

 

government out of the affairs of other countries and reorient
the American military to the defense of the gnlted States.
It is a policy of true internationallsm. an internationalism
that accords other people and other nations the reSpect we

want for ourselves.

With such a policy -- devoted to defending the United
States rather than intervening around the world -- we can
make substantial cuts in ourzmilitary budget while making
Americans more secure than they are at present.

I am well aware that this foreign policy proposal puts
me decidedly at odds with my opponents. .All three of my
opponents are proposing an expanded U.S. military presence
abroad and billions of dollars in new military spending. .As
with every other problem in our society. their solution is
to throw money at our foreign policy problems. Mine is to
eramine the causes of the problem and to propose real solu?
tions based on principle and common sense.

If the American people have the opportunity to compare
the foreign policy proposals of all four candidates. I believe

that millions of them will choose my program of-peace and non-t
intervention.

I urge all Americans to support this principled. common?

sense program. Together we can:move Am 
- erica towar .
security. a peace and

Sincerely,

WM

'Ed Clark

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This White Paper was drafted by a Task Force on Foreign
and Military Policy consisting of the following persons:

Bruce Bartlett

David Cortright

Jay Hilgartner

Earl C. Ravenal, Chairman
James J. Treires

It was co?ordinated and edited by Earl C. Ravenal, professor
of international relations at the Georgetown School of
Foreign Service, former Defense Department Analyst, and
author of numerous books and articles on foreign and military
policy. It was further reviewed by David Boaz and Edward'

H. Crane of the Clark for President staff.



 

1. Introduction: A Libertarian Foreign Policy, 
2. The Shape of the World and the U.S.-Soviet Balance, 5
3. America's Attitude Toward Europe, 10

4. Approaches to the.Middle East
Israel and the Arab Peoples, l7 .
The Persian Gulf and the Flow of Oil, 19

5. Problems in Asia
An Overview. 22
Japan, 23
Korea, 23?24
China, 24_25
Southeast.Asia, 25?25
The Subcontinent, 25
Conclusion, 27

6. The Treatment of the Third World, 23
7. Notes on the International Economy, 35

8. The Logic of National Security, 38
The Strategic Nuclear Balance, 40
Strategic Arms Control, 46
Conventional Forces and Non?Intervention, 48
Less Bang for the Buck, 57
Comprehensive Defense Budget Reductions, 58

9. Domestic Economic Conversion, 64

10. Epilogue: Toward a Non?Interventionist Foreign Policy, 65

 

1.

Introduction: A_Libertarian Foreign Poligy_

For too many years American foreign policy has not served

the true interests of the American people. Our foreign
policy has been directed primarily toward the interests

of other nations, to the detriment of our own-?and ultimately

theirs.

We have gotten away from the foreign policy of America's

Founders. George Washington told us to have with other

nations "as little political conduct as possible." Thomas

Jefferson gave us this succinct outline of our role in

the world: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with
all nations - entangling alliances with none."

A.policy of intervention, entangling alliances, and war,
the Founders were convinced, would bring about a massive,
expensive, and war?torn government, resembling those of
the Old World to which our new and shining republic now'

stood in stark contrast. There were many differences
between our nation and the Empires of Europe, but this was

the most important: They were military machines, dedicated
to the restless search for national power and glory.

Ours was consecrated to a different end: the preservation
of the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
of individual men and women. Just as a foreign policy of
intervention, imperialism, and war was natural to the
European powers?it was what they were all about?so one of
non-intervention, respect for other peoples, and peace

was natural to our republic.

But in recent years we have ignored the teachings of
Washington and Jefferson, and the lessons of history. We
have attempted to manipulate foreign peoples throughout

the world, promoting governments "friendly" to undefined
"American interests," rather than allowing people to form
their own. In the name of "free enterprise" we have propped
up dictators who are "anti-Communist," while these dicta-
torial regimes, and our support of them, are the greatest
single factor undermining the credibility of capitalism
throughout the Third World. We have actively intervened,
through diplomatic, economic, and military means, to pro?
tect American business interests abroad, instead of pursuing
a policy of free trade and noninterference that would allow
firms to invest in other nations at their own risk

We have used American arms, troops, covert operations by
the CIA, the management of international trade, and a host
of other methods to try to shape world events to our liking.

 

 

And we have failed. we went to war in Europe in 1941 to save

it from Nazi enslavement, yet today much of Europe is under
the domination of communism. We went to war to protect South

Korea from communist invasion, yet today that country remains
a dictatorship, lacking many of the freedoms we we
were trying to save. And we squandered fifty thousand .
American lives??not to mention over a million Vietnamese lives
-?and almost half a trillion dollars of American wealth to
save South Vietnam from communist takeover, yet today Vietnam
is a unified and expansionist communist state. Even the
flawed and partial successes that are claimed by some have

_had a brief and unstable existence.

Our foreign policy failures and misdirections have not been
confined to the battlefield. We have lost the respect of 
almost every nation in the world, especially in the so-called
Third World, through other kinds of interventions, such.as
covert actions of the Central Intelligence Agency, heavy-
handed diplomatic pressures by U.S. presidents, and clumsy
efforts to buy loyalty through extensive foreign economic
and military aid, usually directed to propping up dictator?
ships that proclaim.their opposition to communism while
repressing individual liberty in ways that differ little
from those of the communists.

In perpetrating these failures, both of the major American
political parties have had a share. Indeed, the perilous"
state of American foreign policy has been a consequence of
the duopoly of politics, up to now, in the United States,
just as it has been a consequence of their common presumption
of government action and interference in all spheres of

human activity. Libertarians ascribe a good part of the
troubles of the United States and the world, on both sides

of the Cold war, to these false presumptions;.and they intend
to reverse them.

For American foreign policy need not be the way it is. During
most of our history we avoided the petty conflicts that

have been almostcontinuous in Europeanwhistory. Even as a
fledgling nation, we gained respect because we confined-

our relations with other nations to those necessary for trade
and commerce. Although the United States did not always
adhere strictly to the principles laid down in President
Washington's Farewell Address, we did, by and large, avoid

involvement in the political??and thus the military??affairs
of other nations. 

and radically after World War II, when we entered into
literally hundreds of alliances and treaties which involved
the United States intimately in the politicai affairs of
almost every other nation in the world.

 

the United States was unquestionably

.Aft War II . .
er Worl th, militarily and economic-

the most powerful nation on ear . . 
ally. Only the United States, among the major industria

nations, totally escaped the destruction of war: no foreign

soldier or bomb touched American soil. And the United
States had exclusive possession of the most powerful weapon.0n

earth?? the atom bomb. One would have thought that such
advantages, correctly perceived and intelligently deployed,
would usher in a golden age of American foreign policy.

Yet one can find no comparable period of history in which
things have gone worse for the United States.

In our sometimes hysterical efforts to stop communism at
all cost, we succeeded very little and very tranSiently:
and in the process alienated, in one way or another, most
other nations. And if one is to believe the reports from
Freedom House, Amnesty International, and other respected
private organizations, the status of individual freedom
in the world has declined steadily since World War II.

It is not that American foreign policyemakers consciously
intended that their actions lead to the opposite'of what

they publicly espoused. It is just that there are limits

to what any nation can do to influence the behavior of
others. Although the Soviet empire has held together far
longer than most people expected, nationalisms are straining
even the immense power of the Soviet police state to maintain

the semblance of unity. If Soviet methods cannot even

maintain adequate control over the republics within the
Russian orbit, how could the United States exercise political

control over the behavior of foreign nations through the use
of aid or covert action?

The irony--and the tragedy-?is that the United States, by
interfering actively in the affairs of other nations, has
discredited itself as a champion of freedom. .A nation that
was conceived in revolution, the United States has supported
so many counter?revolutionary Rhee in
Korea, Diem in South Vietnam, the Shah of Iran, Somoza of
Nicaragua?-that the people of the nonaligned nations see
little difference between the United States and the Soviet

Union.

Libertarians reject the great aberration of the past thirty?
five or forty years from the original American tradition of
diplomacy. We believe that the Soviet Union would have

been less successful in extending its influence and control
if the United States had recognized the right of all people
to self?determination, rather than bloating our force
structure and defense budget and designing them more for
embroiling ourselves in foreign conflicts than for defending
ourselves from any realistic threat.'

The bedrock of a Libertarian foreign policy is non?inter-
vention: disengagement of our troops and bases from foreign
countries: withdrawal from our defensive treaties and

 

other nations, or draining them of their
shutting down the covert

ering Operations
hannels and lawful
an end to all

alliances with
content of military commitment;
actions and intrusive intelligence?gath
of the C. I. A. and relying on normal 

means to acquire necessary information;
official foreign aid, which does nothing permanent or*

really effective to help other countries; elimination.of
all. trade barriers and opening our doors to the world's
goods, labor, and capital; and ending all coercive inter?d
vention in the affairs of other nations.

Such a policy would demonstrate the true commitment of the
United States to the freedom of all people, and would do
far_more to advance the legitimate aims of American foreign
policy than has the interventionism of the past thirtyh
five or forty years.

 

2.

The Shape of_the World and_the U.S.-Soviet Balance

The case for non -intervention is based on the moral principles
of peace and respect for other peoples and is consistent with
the evolving international system, which presents increasing
challenges and temptations but also imposes greater costs

and risks for less ample and less secure gains. The case is
also made with the realization that our own domestic system--
social. economic, political--imposes constraints that are
becoming tighter and more troublesome for any American leader
who dreams of policies of global intervention. The world,
and our own system. will increasingly have to be taken as
"given." and American foreign policy will increasingly have

to adjust and conform.

We can identify several characteristics of the emerging inter?
national state of affairs: The first is the high probability
of continuing troubles. such as embargoes, expropriations.
coups. revolution, externally supported subversions, thrusts

by impatient irredentist states, and calculated probes of

our defense perimeters. A second tendency is increasing
interdependence; but this will mean problems that will be
aggravated to the point where they become threats to the
security of nations. demanding, but not suggesting, solutions.
Third, there will be no adjustment mechanisms to resolve

these problems in a binding or authoritative way: no over?
arching international organization or even balance?of-power
mechanism will dispense or provide just and stable solutions.
Fourth, interventions in the future will take the form of
unilateral incursions rather than collaborative police actions.
Fifth. the world of the future will be characterized by

even greater diffusion of power than we have already experienced.
A.dozen or a dozen-and-a?half nations, including regional
powers, will assert, and sometimes successfully defend,

their influence. Limits will become evident in existing
military alliances and other groupings: force, whether nuclear?
strategic or conventional or sub-conventional. will be
increasingly vitiated and ineffective; even the two present
superpowers will be reduced to more regional scope. The

sixth condition that will complicate international order is
the incoherence of domestic support, not just in our country
but to a certain extent in all: this lack of public support
might not prevent intervention. but it will critically inhibit

its prosecution.

The overall point that emerges from this analysis is that the
'world that is shaping up will require even a nation such as
ours to adjust and to hedge, rather than hope to intervene

with military force or heavy diplomatic manipulation in an
attempt to control its environment. Simply. the cost?benefit

 

ratio of exercises of control is tilting: It is costing
more to achieve even the dubious goals of American policy-
makers. And this situation has little to do specifically
with "the Russians.? Current politically motivated and
shallowly rhetorical attempts to focus American support
and American energies by invoking "the Soviet threat" are
not so much factually wrong as grossly irrelevant.

Historically, the entire sweep of U.S.?Soviet relations is
punctuated by attempts by the United States to alter or
supplant the Soviet government. Following the Bolshevik
revolution, the United States, along with several other
nations, sent troops to Russia in an effort to overthrow
the Russian leadership. After World War II, in which the
Soviets suffered the greatest losses and damage of any
participant, the United States alone possessed the atom
bomb, and implied the posSibility of using it against the
Soviet Union. In recent years, the United States has
restricted trade with the Soviet Union. twice embargoing
grain exports, while refusing to ratify SALT II, a treaty
in our own interests as much as the Soviets. .American
politicians have often sought high elective posts by
rattling sabers against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet system is not an attractive:model for the rest of
the world, particularly the developing nations. It is losing
out to a reformed and resurgent free?market model all over
the world. But America's response to this phenomenon should
not be a revival of militant and delusive anti?communism--
such as the pronuncements of President Carter and his national
security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. America's experience
with sweeping anti-communism has carried heavy costs. The
Korean War left 34,000 Americans dead, 103,000 wounded, and

a legacy of $70 billion in direct expenses. The Vietnam

War cost us 47.000 dead. 304,000 wounded. and about $120
billion in direct burdens-?perhaps as much as $450 billion in
total, current?value expense. A significant portion of the
U.S. economy is engaged in supplying weapons, a fact that many
economists blame for lower productivity in our economy.

And throughout most of the postwar period the United States
has maintained a military draft, a fundamental violation

of individual liberty.

This is not to say that Soviet political conduct has been
benign or that the Soviet arms buildup has been fictitious.
The actions and the motives of the Soviet state have presented
serious puzzles. In the case of the recent Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, a host of disparate motives has been ascribed-?
some obscurer most reprehensible by any fair international
standards. The same analysis applies to the Soviet political
intervention and intensified aid in the Persian Gulf and the
Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union has earned its reputation

as a predator, as people from Lithuania to Afghanistan will
attest, bUt it is a cautious Predator. It has not launched

 

 

bold or sweeping offensives far from its own borders. We
should realistically recognize the limited nature of the
Soviet threat, but we should acknowledge that a threat does
exist. No doubt, in certain areas the United States--and
those private organizations whose interests could be seriously

affected?-ought to hedge, in important ways, against had,
even "worst," cases.

But we need to ask ourselves what the true nature of the
Soviet "threat" is and whether our reaction has been rational
or exaggerated and misplaced. It is clear, for example,

that the United States has consistently developed more
strategic weaponry than necessary for pure defense. Some
argue that a "military?industrial complex" drives our govern-
ment to produce weaponry to prop up companies that could not
survive by producing consumer goods. (Though this thesis

has perhaps borne more than its share of intellectual
freight, there is some truth in it.) Others argue that the
United States has sought a first?strike capability against
the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. (And it is true
that the United States has acquired significant counterforce
ability?-that is, the ability to hit Soviet military targets,
including their nuclear weapons, particularly in a conflict
in Europe, and indeed such use is an essential element in
the "nuclear umbrella" that we purport to hold over allies
and other strategic objects?-the "extended deterrence" we
maintain, as opposed to the pure deterrence of a Soviet nuclear
strike against our own homeland. And of course the recent
"Presidential Directive 59" would appear to affirm the re-
targeting of our nuclear force to a counterforce position.)

 

Libertarians believe that the United States should renounce
offensive intentions and doctrines, withdraw its forces from
around the world, and concentrate on the defense of the United
States itself. .As much as 70 percent of our defense budget

is attributable to the defense of other nations, however we
may misguidedly equate such defense with our own. As a result,
allied countries such as West Germany and particularly

Japan are able to spend far less than we do on defense, as a

percentage of gross national product.

In addition to phasing out military commitments in other regions
of the world, there are numerous other changes that would reduce
defense spending, while maintaining protection against any
conceivable direct threat to American lives and property.

One action would be the elimination of our land?based nuclear
missiles-?particularly as they become vulnerable to a pre-
emptive first strike by the Soviets. It has been pointed out
that land-based missiles make the continental United States

a prime target of any potential attack. In any case, the
present "triad" of separate nuclear systems??actually about

to become a "tetrad" with the impending deployment of long-
range land-based U.S. cruise missiles in Europe??is not
necessary as a strategic deterrent; a died of systems-?sea?

 

based missiles and air-launched medium-range cruise 
would be more than sufficient to deter a Soviet attac . an
would be far less provocative and unstable a force.

What is needed is not so much a change in attitude toward
the Soviet Union--that might not even be necessary--as a
fundamental rethinking of American military strategy and the
requisites of American security. We need realism about the 
actions and motives of the Soviet Union. but we must be.
sober about our own capabilities; the "net assessment is
still not so unfavorable to American interestsT?particularly
if we take the forces of China into our reckoning. we
should concentrate on the defense of the United States. phase
out our defensive alliances with other nations. withdraw-

our troops and close our bases on foreign soil. and pare
down the defense establishment to what is truly required to
defend the territory and political integrity of the United
States and the lives and domestic property of its citizens.

Such a position has often been labeled "isolationist."

But labels are not the point-?and are fraught with misleading
connotations. In.fact. such a policy would allow the United
States to conduct a more truly international foreign policy
than it has been able to do since world War II. 'Our obsessive
anti-communism has often forced us to support governments that
are as hostile to our political values as are the communists.

It has also caused us to meddle in the domestic affairs of
other nations. both overtly and covertly. .And it has caused

the U.S. government to take domestic actions in the name of
national security that are totally contrary to the Constitution-
such as wiretapping. assassinations. and spying on 0.5. citizens.
In many dimensions. anti-communism has been a corruption.

This does not mean that Liberatarians are

neutral about communist-political tenets or Soviet aggression.
Libertarians are fundamentally opposed to communism. as they
are to socialism. fascism. and all forms of government that
rest on coercion. But the central question remains.

excluSively to the pro?
tection and preservation of a pluralistic and free American

society. not the imposition of our values on
exportation of American power 

that wish to have them with the United States. and to strive
for at least correct and useful diplomatic relations with
all others: to impose our will on none. and to maintain a
'modest and purely defensive military establishment_ Such a
policy?-essentially one of neutralityc-has. of courSe.

been characteristic of smaller nations; but it is feasible
and beneficial especially for a major nation such as the United
States. Certainly the very opposite can -

contrary foreign policy that the United States has pursued
Since'World War II under both Republican and Democratic
administrations. 'We spend vastly more on defense than we

did thirty?five years ago. yet we feel??and are-?less secure.
'We have spent billions on foreign aid. yet respect for
America has declined. We have had an overtly anti?communist
foreign policy since a few years after World War II. yet

in many areas communists have made gains. .And we have
rationalized our wasteful and destructive actions in the

name of devotion to individual libertyIr while taking measures

that are its antithesis.

Certainly. with regard to the principal axis of America's
foreign and national security policy, our relationship with

the Soviet Union. it is time for a change.

10

3.



It is true that Europe in many ways is the most important American
interest or the largest collection of interests of individual
Americans and their private organizations. But to say that is not
to support America's commitment to the defense of Europe. It does
not justify the expense, the risk, or the necessity of continu1ng
the Atlantic alliance in the same form as in the past three decades.

Insofar as we can define a "national" interest at all,

Europe is America's most weighty commitment--at least reckoned
in the military resources we now expend and devote to that
area. Europe is by far the largest claim on our defensive
resources??though, curiously, hardly anyone counts its full
cost,or even knows how to count it. To compute the cost to
Americans of Europe or of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), we have to include all the combat units-?

even those located in the United States?-that are kept_
primarily for a conflict in Europe. And we must assign to
them.their full share of "combat support" and Pentagon over-
head. When we do that, we see that in Fiscal Year 1981

alone, the cost of NATO will be no less than $83 billion

(out of the $159 billion requested for defense by the Carter
administration)--half of our entire defense budget. That
means that, over the next decade, conservatively projecting
the present rate of military spending, we will have laid out a
trillion and a half dollars just to defend the European
countries. That is a nice piece of global redistribution, or
a nice international transfer payment-?in this case fro?'the

mildly affluent here to our wealthy cousins across the Atlantic.

Another way of representing the bulk of Europe in our present
defense calculations is this: A potential war in Europe
accounts for at least twelve of the present nineteen active

land divisions we keep in our peacetime force structure. In
addition, Europe is responsible for much of our strategic
nuclear forces, because of the "extended deterrence" or
"nuclear umbrella" that we purport to hold over Europe. And
it is certain that we would not care as much, or spend as

much, for the North Atlantic sea lanes, the Middle East and

the Persian Gulf, or even Africa if it were not for our
commitment to Europe.

of course, not all of the $83 billion a year that we are
spending on Europe could or should be saved, or saved
instantaneously. But toward the end of a phased reduction,
if we were to adopt a non?protective attitude toward Europe,
the forces we still for the time being point toward the

 

11

Atlantic could be costing us two-thirds less than they will

if we keep on our present course; and that means cumulative
savings, over a decade, of $700 billion. Of course, .
exorbitant cost in itself doesn't argue for junking a commit-
ment?-if it were an absolutely vital and irreP}aceabl? 
component of our own national security. That is the issue with
regard to Europe, of course; but Libertarians do not accept
that prOposition.

Moreover, would Americans continue to accept the risks and
costs of our commitment to Europe and NATO if they knew the
whole cost and the full extent of the risks to themselves

and their homeland entailed by this commitment and our present
policies for its defense? ?Would they continue to bear these
costs and risks if they were fully aware of the disabilities
that already cripple the Atlantic alliance? Or if they were
presented with a reckoning that demonstrated that the

European countries themselves could generate and project

a formidable self-defense without the aid of the United States?
The answer is that the American people would hardly continue
to protect an affluent Europe from its enemies, if they

were more aware of the costs of the permanent'U.S. troop
presence, the unbalanced distribution of alliance burdens,

and the periodic courting of nuclear destruction of our own
cities for the sake of cementing deterrence in central Europe.

The Atlantic alliance is beset??indeed, has been beset from.
its very inception??with strategic contradictions that disabde
the alliance and render the American commitment, particularly
of nuclear support, unreliable in a crisis (despite the

danger that an American president might actually use nuclear
weapons). Europeans know this, but understandably see no
profit in inviting open discussion. (Though France long ago
acted on its suspicion of American inconstancy, constructing
its own autonomous nuclear deterrent, and opting partially

out of the institutional structure of NATO in 1965, under
President De Gaulle.)

NATO is already gravely impaired by differences in strategic
concept that are fundamental and long?standing; disputes
about burden-sharing that have never been resolved (European
countries routinely pay a quarter to a half less than the
United States in terms of the portion of their gross national
product going to defense); irreconcilable antagonisms of

pairs of nations such as Greece and Turkey (let alone the
political and economic disintegration of the

and the possible rise again, after a brief re

Eurocommunism in such key countries as Italy, France, Spain

(not formally a NATO country), and Portugal, that would
undermine NATO bases and deployments as well 

common strategy and diplomacy and the economic st:
- uctur
on which the Atlantic relationship rest5_ es

latter nation):
prieve, of

Indeed, NATO's entire thirty?two?year history, since its
foundation in 1949, has been marked by crises. "Disarray?
is a term that was virtually invented to describe the NATO
alliance. The matter goes far deeper than periodic

 

 

12

failures of "consultation" with our allies. There are
deep?seated causes. We have seen the fragmentation of the
original plan for common European defense, the EDP, in 1954:_
the Suez crisis of 1956: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968: the divergent reactions of the Atlantic allies to

the Mideast war of October 1973 and the ensuing oil embargo
and rapid price increases by the OPEC cartel: and now Europe's
grudging response to U.S. calls for a united front to coerce

Iran and answer Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Underlying all these crises is the inability of the Atlantic
allies to resolve the fundamental divergence in strategic
conceptions: How to defend Europe? At whose expense? 0n
'whose ground? With what weapons? The basic strategic flaw
in the Atlantic alliance is the simple fact that, thirty-two
years after the foundation of NATO. the defense of Western
Europe still rests on the proposition that an American
president will invite the destruction of our cities and the
incineration of 100 million of his fellow citizens to repel
a Soviet incursion or resist a Soviet ultimatum.in Western
Europe. It is the ineluctable fact that we dare not risk
the use of our fundamental means of protection: strategic
nuclear weapons. Ironically, America's overt war plan has
always been the first use of nuclear weapons, "if necessary,"
to defend Europe. Thus America constantly threatens to
turn local defeat in Europe into global holocaust.

The word that encapsulates this is "coupling." This means
that. for deterrence in Europe to work, the escalatory chain
from.troops and tanks to American intercontinental nuclear
'weapons must be unbroken. But the root of NATO's problem.is

the suspicion by Europeans that the United States will always
put time and distance between the outbreak of war in Europe
and the need to resort to its own ultimate strategic nuclear
'weapon, with the attendant risk of inviting the destruction

of America's homeland.

Much of NATO's attention now is devoted to the problem of
or theater nuclear forces. At Brussels in December
1979, NATO's foreign ministers tentatively decided to allow
the deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983. of 180
Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk ground-
launched cruise missiles. These are more than the ordinary
"tactical" nuclear weapons, since, for the first time, such
weapons stationed on West European soil would be capable of
hitting all of the European part of the Soviet Union.

True, Europe--especially Germany??initially invited this
American deployment of the 83?20 intermediate-range nuclear
missiles. But the underlying question is: WOuld the
American Pershings and Tomahawks really help Europe create
an independent deterrent to the Soviet intermediate?range
missiles (since the weapons would still be under exclusive
Smerican control)? And would these new weapons therefore
really create an additional layer of defense for the United

 

 

13 I

1
States? These propositions are hardly likely. 
must face the further question: ?Uni: Ehzipihese new i
wea ons in the first place? The answer I 
thegter nuclear systems are not an implement 1
strength; they are a symbol of Europe 3 distrus 

"extended deterrence." . i

It.is hypocritical for Democrats and Republicans to bigme

each other for this or that failure of the.Atlantlc a iance.

In fact, the crisis and the disabilities are part of the 
fabric of fact, of all alliances of sovereign nations

in an age of nuclear parity. Consequently, clever planners

canit apply band?aids even expensive ones -- to patch up i
NATO's tactical deficiencies: because the problems represent 1
contradictions that grow out of the nature of America 

protective relationship with Europe. are 

endemic in the Alliance itself. and will not disappear until i
the replacement of the entire structure of NATO and the

dissolution of the American commitment of its own national

existence to defend Europe. 1

Various groups have proposed remedies in an attempt to overcome
the strategic disabilities of NATO and to prolong the American
posture of defensive protection of Europe. These remedies

have taken a half-dozen classic forms. But none is satisF
factory. All encounter obstacles or embody contradictions

or political and strategic impossibilities.

The first. most common, alternative is to tinker with the:

status quor altering the deployments and configur

rations of American and allied forces??in short, "quick. I
fixes." Quite naturally. that is the policy of the present.

as well as the past half-dozen, administrations. Quick

fixes comprise such items as rapid deployment of troops and I
tactical air; more airlift and sealift; the prepositioning

of military equipment in Europe; common communications.

intelligence, logistics. and command and control of units; 1
the interoperability and standardization of equipment:

thicker deployment of anti-tank weapons; and procedures to

activate European reserves. Though in many cases these

measures are intelligently conceived and energetically I
pursued, the "quick fixes" are not as quick or cheap as their

sponsors sometimes pretend. Moreover. the deficiencies of

NATO's strategic posture are more serious and fundamental 1
than a few tactical moves can remedy. (And it is currently
out of the question-?even if it made sense??that the American

Congress and publicf despite the momentary hawkish sentiment
that we are witnessing. would actually support a more

extensive commitment to strengthening the alliance. if they
had to stare at the actual costs and additional responsibilities.)

Another approach to remedying NATO's deficiencies is to
revive the old Atlanticist dream of "true

But even if one could imagine the attainme
the capacity for JOlht and equal contributions and defensive
responSibilites, it is unlikely that the United States
military or Congress or Public would accept a truly equal

partnership."
nt by Europe of

 

 

 

14

role by Europeans in the command and strategic direction of the
alliance; we would not commit U. 5. forces to a true allied

commands?and properly so.

Another proposed remedy is to go beyond partnership to the 
"devolution" of substantial defensive capability and respons1b11-

ity on the European allies. including nuclear arms and the authority
to use them. But this solution would not work. Even if we could_
imagine the essential requisite, joint nuclear targeting by Britain
and France and perhaps even West Germany the formula of devol-
ution embodies an insupportable contradiction for the United States:
involvement without control. Actually. some sort of devolution

may well occur in the longer run: but it will not be as orderly

and neatly managed a process as its sponsors intend or imply.

Even if Europe were to attain its own means of defense-*which

might be a desirable outcome from a European point of view, and
also an American point of view??this would imply the decommitment,
not the continued commitment, of the United States to the defense

of Western Europe. In short, even if it were to succeed, devolution
would precipitateIr or formalize, American decoupling from Europe.

That brings us to the consideration of policies that would entail
degrees and types of American disengagement from Europe. Two of
these schemes have been considered and have been found wanting.
One is Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which have
been negotiated between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Vienna for the
better part of a decade. Currently the negotiations are hung up
on divergent approaches by the Soviets and the Americans toward
the residual balance of forces in central Europe, and by a dispute
about the starting figure for Warsaw Pact forces from which the

reductions are to be counted.

Another scheme for-partial reduction of forces was the so?called
"Mansfield" reSolution or amendment, which was introduced for eight
sessions of Congress between 1963 and 1975. But this particular
proposal would never have withdrawn more than half or two?thirds

of our troops in Europe, and would have left untouched the seven

or so divisions kept in the United States primarily for the defense
of Europe; and none of these forces were scheduled to be removed
from the force structure. Thus the Mansfield proposal would have
made a very small dent in the now?$83 billion we spend on NATO.
Moreover, it would have retained the U. S. commitment to come to
Europe's defense, creating perhaps the most dangerous imbalance of
all: continued commitment without adequate defensive means.

Libertarians favor-?and consider almost inevitable in the longer
run??a more consistent version of unilateral American disengagement,
in which the United States would shed, over time, the responsibilites
and implications, as well as the burdens, of alliance. We would
stake out a direction for the gradual devolution of defensive
responsibilities to the European states themselves, but would would
not harbor illusions about an orderly and sufficient substitution

of capabilities by our allies, or about a continued exercise of
American control over their decisions. Of course.'during such a
disengagementr we would preserve a constructive atmosphere of

 

 

 

 

 

15

consultation. But the matter goes far beyond atmosphei?ci?

Our overall objective would be to reduce Europe Eiong we
dependence on us, just as we would change the assumP ational
are now making about the significance of Europe in our 
strategy and defensive calculations.

The program outlined here cannot fairly be called an abandon;
ment of Europe. 'Citizens and private groups and governmenta
authorities in the United States would continue to cooperate
closely in every functional category except the political- 
Hdlitary: trade and monetary arrangements and banking; environs
rental measures and conferences; discussions of relationships
with Third World countries; approaches to food and_populat1on:
restriction of arms transfers, both nuclear and conventional; and
examination of waystxicontain dangerous nuclear technology;

But some might object: Wouldn't Europe be ever-

run or dominated by the Soviet Union? The question breaks

down into tow: invasion and "Finlandization." ZFirst of all,

could Europe repel, and therefore deter, attack? ?We must

keep in.mind that the chances that the Russions might seize

the opportunity of an American withdrawl to attck 

Europe are extremely small. A would-be aggressor must cal:-
culate, not whether he will win a war, but whether it will.

be worth it in.terms of his net gains after all the destruction.is
over and above what he can gain without war. Could the Russians
digest, pacify, Europe? Or even any significant individual.
European country? The answer is doubtful. One could make the:
case that Europe whether united or even as separate states
could conduct its own competent defense. 'Western Europe al-
together would be, in theory, the second most powerful entjiar
in the world more powerful than the Soviet Union, and in,
some respects even than the United States. Even now, in comp-

arison with both the United States and the Soviet Union, western.

EMIepe has greater population (400 million), Equivalent economic
potential trillion in gross national prod
of military manpower (3 million active plus a
reserves), a competitive military technology,
nuclear forces of Britain and France. This ar
Ehe probability of European unity-?indeed,

ragmentation is the most likely rediction. 
can't get together, the separate Eations of EuBut even 1f they

midable military opponents??or,
les.

and the respectable

gument does_not imply
continued political

Second, as for "Finlandization," eve

a Finland. It is a large, populous, rich, indus
socially whole, politically resolute country,

that would have far more than nuisance value. E?ml?ltary force
with its wall?to?wall urbanization, is a natural tankf: es, Germany,
the Germans chose to defend tenaciously, the Russians rap. If

be able to push to the Rhine in three days, as in the Eggigegiggly



 

16

imaginations and scenarios of certain retired NATO generals.
Thus, Germany could confidently reject Soviet political .
pressures that carried the further implied threat of hostile
action.

The overall point is that an American withdrawal from NATO
would not be a stark rejection of Europe. or an open invitation
to defeat for the United States at the hands of the Soviets.

It would have to be seen more as an adjustment--to the inevit?
able strategic compartmentalization of the international system.
and an attempt to gain an interval of peace and security in a
nuclear age. It would be to recognize a different role for the
United States in the very different type of international system
that is shaping up.

The main point. however. is that a strategic disengagement from
Europe would produce a net increase in the security of the United
States and its citizens and their property. precisely by decoupling
the defense of Europe from the security of the United States.

 

 

 

17

4.

Approaches to the Middle East

Israel and the Arab Peo les

 

The Middle East contains two distinct. yet related arenas for
possible conflict and the possible involvment of the United
States. The first is the Eastern Mediterranean, the cockpit
of the struggle between Israel and the surrounding Arab powers
and peoples (though now with the significant deletion of Egypt,
at least temporarily). The other is the Persian Gulf.

The dramatic diplomatic and political events of the past half?
decade, including the Sadat visit to Jerusalem.in 1978 and the

"Camp David process," have not changed the logic of the situation,
especially for U. S. diplomacy (for we must view this situation,
from the standpoint of any of the nations or peoples in the region,
however our sympathies might be variously attracted). The trouble
'with the "Camp David process" is not so much that it was a separ?
ate peace, but that, in so many ways, it has turned out not to-be

a separate peace. It is revealed as highly conditional and general,
turning on justice for the Palestinians, even settlement of the
East Jerusalem question. What this means is that the United States,
because it has incorporated all these questions in the framework

of Camp David, and because it has implicated itself wholly in the
negotiating process,_is a hostage to the ambitions, wishes, and
'whims of a host of local politicians, national remnants, and

fanatic groups.

Most of the "mainstream" schemes to solve the problems of the
Middle East rely too much on the offices and guarantees of the
United States and not enough on the will of the parties to the
conflict. This was certainly true of Kissinger's "step?hy-step"
diplomacy, which came to a dead-end in the second?stage Sinai dis-
engagement of October 1975. It has been equally true of the
"comprehensive" proposals that have been floated by the Carter
administration, which have coupled U. 5. pressure on Israel to
relinquish territory and accept a Palestinian state on the West
Bank with explicit U. S. guarantees for Israel.

Both Kissinger's detachment of Egypt from the Eastern bloc and his
"expulsion" of the Soviets from the Eastern Mediterranean, and the
Camp David process have fostered expensive American protection of
both Egypt and Israel, and have sealed the dependence of these
states on U. S. diplomacy and arms and warped the independent will
of these nations and their leaders to perfect the peace process by
themselves. They now play every shot off the wall of Washington
instead of directly to each other.

13

Of course, many in the United States foreign policy establishment?-

both intellectuals and members of the administration and.even.
cmitics-?favor this intensified involvement of the UH1t9d States
in the fate and fortunes of the Middle East. Some have even.
proposed the placement of military bases (we already have several
quasi?bases in Egypt) and the stationing of.Amerlcan combat units
in Israel, the Sinai, and Egypt. The flaw in these proposals

is that they would create abject dependence by both Israel and.
various Arab nations or factions on the diplomacy and guarantees
of the United States, precisely when American popular support for
further political and military involvement in this area is wearing
thin. That means the the United States can promise, but it cannot
reliably deliver on its guarantees, because the guarantees of its
Executive Branch have no widespread and specific basis in American
public support or sentiment. This set of facts has two altemm-
native consequences: First, since Israel cannot ultimately trust
American guarantees of military and diplomatic support, it 
continue to obstruct and hedge against American diplomatic:
pressure. Second, the United States will apply less than suffic-
ient coercion to Israel, precisely because it is not willing to
compensate Israel sufficiently, and Israel will probably reject
concess1ons that depend on compensatory moves by the United States

that have such shallow public support and are therefore so un-
reliable. 

The poignant conclusion is that there may not be any comprehensive
solution to the Middle East conflict that U. S.wdiplomacy can.
easily or prudently bring about. There are just some hard choices

for all the parties to the situation-?choices that th
tried, so far, to elude. ey have all

The United States must resolve its present multi le 
objectives?-by dropping them. At present it seeEs 
rate the Soviets' strategic designs to penetrate the;?iddle 
and perpetuate their "expulsion" from the area; (2) r- as
the position of Israel: (3) maintain decisive ipfiserve

on the diplomacy of both Israel and the moderatehArab uence
region; (4) insure its access to oil.
maintain these objectives (even if they 
dictory) is heavy. It starts with a slic
of to 30 billion a year, and includes
igniting a conflict that could further esc

In view of the heavy liabilities of our present policies the

United States should move awa
- - . from fUther res on 
peace, stability, and justice in the Middle for'
to disengage from the area. This is not to . ould move

eiFher toward Or aw?ay from Israel Dr the Ara-Ea :aken a5 a :?Shiftll
third a neutral -- solution. Ultimat p'wers. It 15 a
of the world will have to be without the intruslo .
States. We should avOid particularly 0f the United
lateral, bilateral, or multilateral, .

able to deliver, and avoid creati
not be able to fulfill. ng 

the appreciable risk of
alate to nuclear war.

19

It should be an American objective to encourage Israel and
Egypt to make the hard choices for themselves, and to reduce
our own coercive and costly dominating role, which has come to
include grant aid to Israel and Egypt, and shipments of 
increasingly sophisticated and potent arms. (U. S. aid just

to support the peace treaty in May 1979 came to a pachage

worth $4.8 billion for Fiscal Year 1980 alone, in addition to
the further burden, over the next several years,.of modernizing
Egypt's military forces.) we should abstain from impo51ng

agreements, whether substantive or cosmetic.

Such a course would also mean buffering ourselves against the
economic impact of a future war or of the hostility of certain

Middle Eastern countries.

 

 

The Persian Gulf and the_Flow of Oil

Mention of the possible cutoff of oil raises a set of issues_
pertaining to the second arena in the Middle East: the Per51an

Gulf.

Both in Iran, previously, and now in Saudi Arabia and the smaller
Gulf states, the United States has been supporting basically
unstable, politically fragile regimes, and has been drawn into the
conflicts that attach to the fates of these countries.

Iran furnishes more than a footnote to the discussion. .A long
history of American involvement with the Shah led to the Islamic
revolution, the elevation of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the
seizing of the American embassy and the hostages in retaliation

for our alleged failure to deliver the Shah and his property up

to the processes of Islamic retributory justice. No military
actions-like the April rescue mission?can be considered acceptable.
The important point is that the real tangible interests and private
activities of Americans are scarcely touched--except conceivably
unfavorably--by these diplomatic games.at the so?called "official"
level. It would be ill-advised to attempt further unilateral
coercive operations, arbitrary restrictions on private trade, or
attempts to strong?arm allies into parallel activities against their
own interest and better judgement.

The American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was
the blustering "Carter Doctrine," another great leap forward in
the extension of America's security perimeter. In this case, the
United States has added an-area halfway around the world to its
-security turf, has acquired another extensive, open-ended commit-
ment of American arms and lives, and has once again put its own
fate at the disposal of Soyiet initiative. The near?term tangible
effects are a significant increase in the already bloated U. S.
defense budget, further political support for eight- to ten?percent
real annual increases in defense spending, and further rational-
ization for the 110,000-man Rapid Deployment Force.

20

Speculation has abounded in academic and policy-making Circles
about Soviet motives for the invasion of Afghanistan-?whether
an unjustified power reach toward warm water ports. Gulf Ojl
supplies. and the energy lifeline of the West; or an intris?
ically "defensive" move to insulate the Soviet state against
Moslem unrest and preserve a friendly regime on its borders.

Was it. in short, "aggression" or "paranoia"? Indeed: most
discussion has seemed to center on this question. as if lt-

held the key to America's proper response. The Soviet action
was reprehensible, in terms of the liberties of the Afghan
people and reSpect for international law. But Soviet motives
are largely irrelevant to America's situation and prospects.
What matters is the American response: whether it is to be an
extension. justified or not. welcome or not. of American arms;
or an intelligent adjustment to our new situation~-not just the
regional one, but the global situation that is evolving. That
situation can be characterized overall as a diffusion of power.
Such an adjustment on our part would undoubtedly result in somer
American strategic "losses." But if these regional setbacks are
routinely or rhetorically regarded by ambitious American politi-
cians as national humiliations or intolerable national dangers.
they will inevitably pitch the United States into periodic wars.
On the other hand. if this diagnosis of the diffusion of power
in the is accurate?-and trends seem.to be
unfolding that support this interpretation-?then the Soviet
Union also will not profit ultimately. any more than the United

States can maintain the zenith of its post?World War II position
in the world.

Therefore, "Afghanistan" should be read neutrally as a symbol of
what is happening in the world and as an indication of the need

for American foreign policy to adjust to these conditions. not to
spend ever more resources and'risk ever more American lives in an

attempt to reverse these tendencies and to control the conduct of
the rest of the world. 

As for continued access to the oil of the Middle East, this is a

tangible interest for Americas and will be at - -

decades. until substitute production, either nii?i?ciiglzgizga?r

other sources. can be brought on stream. But if we cannot

dominate the present sources of' our economic necessities including

energY: we must be prepared to substitute and hedge. But this

does not mean central planning or forced conservation. Actually

such substitution and hedging and conservation are being undertaken:

in an impreSSive way. by individuals and private organizations

- As a result. the American economy as a whole is adjusting to the
Steep rises in the cost of oil (which actually are-valuable if

somewhat premature._Signals of the scarcity and depletion that

loom in a more distant future.) What we are seeing is evidence

that the price mechanism. if allowed to operate??even in a

partially controlled way! as at the moment?-will mediate between

"shortages" and consumption and bring them into line. as well as

provide incentives for the private develo -
sources and technologies; pment 0f alternative

1







I
I
I

 

21

is the freest operation of the market,

with its information and incentives, and the least possible
politicization of the economic mechanism. Unfortunately, both
of the other political parties, and all of the other candidates,
differ very little in their commitment to politicize the econ-
omics of energy, both international and domestic. They would
-assert governmental control and inject national interest and
national power into the situation, with destructive consequences
for all. In short, they would establish "linkage" between

energy and geopolitics.

What we need, in short,

Quite the contrary, the key to resolving the problems of both
energy and the Middle East is to deflink oil and politics.
Certainly we should not try to preserve our very real interest
in this area by force or military threat.

Waging or even risking nuclear war to preserve access to countries
and their resources is not an appropriate foreign policy for the
last two decades of the twentieth century. One of the first
orders of business is to let energy flow on its own terms--to get
politics and strategy (indeed, to get the government in all its
aSpects) out of the regulation of energy supplies, abroad and at
home.

The United States has failed in the Middle East by trying to enforce
"comprehensive" solutions that would dissolve contradictions for
ourselves and absolve local parties from the choices only they

can make. we have tried to achieve both peace and justice, and

we have mixed politics and economics. Peace alone, and oil

alone, are hard enough to secure. We certainly lack the encompass?
ing wisdom to establish justice and construct a durable political
framework for the area. The United States should lessen its
involvement in this area which, of all the regional situations,
currently has the most potential to bring us into nuclear confront-
ation with the Soviet Union. We do not need to "solve" the
problems of the Middle East, in the usual sense, but rather to dis?

solve them.

22

5.
Problemglin_Asia

 

 

An Overview

 

Certainly a wide range of outcomes could occur in Asian situations.
But the point is that hardly any plausible outcome would damage
American vital interests or justify American intervention by force
or the preparation and maintenance of any capability for that.
And in any case, most of this range of outcomes is beyond the
control of the United States.

There-is a corresponding artificiality in the rationalisations
offered for the continuing exercise of American power in Asia.
American officials have to strain to find new justifications for
leftover deploymentsIr military transfers. and commitments??concepts
such as "stability." and "influence."

'Wide changes have taken place in the Asian political configuration
since the late 1960's and early 1970's. Two of the major struct-
ural changes are these: (1) The United States is now largely in
a fluid and remote offshore stance (with the notable exception

of Korea); and (2) dynamic triangular politics have long since
superseded the static regional bipolar confrontation between

the United States and China. The result is a much "looser"
situation in Asia.

Some of the particular developments are: the rise of the Soviet
Union to the position again of principal antagonist. particularly
in Northeast Asia: the exercise by Japan of a more independent
diplomacy; the disintegration of the American alliance system.in
East Asia; the failure of any superpower to dominate the region
strategically in the aftermath of the era of predominant American
power. There has been a revival of fragmented conflicts in various
sub-regions, not in every case related to each other: the Soviet
Union and China; North and South Korea; the People's Republic
of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan; China and Vietnam;
Thailand and its communist neighbors; Indonesia and the Philli-
pines; China and India: India and Pakistan. There are also
continuing insurgencies in Thailand. Malaysia, the Phillippines,
and Burma.

The characteristic point about virtually all of these situations
in Asia is that there is little the United States could do that
would be effective. To say this is to say something more general
about the international system. In Asia. as elsewhere. we are
seeing the progressive confinement of the superpowers to tighter
and more restricted geographical spheres. Though it is not
apparent to all. this encompassing point applies to the Soviet
Union as well as to the United States.

To comment on the proper American response, it might be useful to
take a look at the various separate theaters of action in Asia.

23

Japan

 

The United States need not fear Japan's assumption of more
diplomatic independence. With regard to Japanese defens1ve
capabilities, that country should not be constantly pushed

by American statesman to assume a "larger regional role in
Asia, involving increased defense budgets, offenSive forces,
wider-ranging naval patrols, and espeCially nuclear weapons.
Left to itself, even without the Mutual Security Treaty with
the United States, it is far from inevitable that Japan would
develop and deploy nuclear weapons. The Japanese perpetually_
express the belief that such a course would be counterproductive
for Japan itself.

As for the controversies in other dimensions between the United
States and Japan, and the conflicting interest that are develop-
ing in the areas of money, trade, and investment, these are
quite normal within the world of developed capitalist countries.
Japanese export competition, even if it is state-favored, is
basically the product of organization, intelligence, and drive,
and is not inimical, to say the least, to the interests of
individual American consumers. Rather than contemplating pro-
tectionist barriers, the American government should take this
competition as a useful spur to the revitalization of our own
productive base. - 

gorea

 

With regard to Korea, President Carter's early plan to remove

the bulk of American ground forces by 1932 was predictably
reversed early in his presidency. Only 674 men were ever with-
drawn from the country. And our nuclear weapons??some 900 war-
heads??remain. In any case, this plan was never really a
disengagement, but rather an attempt at a more aseptic involvement.
it would have left a powerful naval striking force inl?hgoziza.and
Moreover, the withdrawal was bought at the price of more than

$2 billion of additional arms transfers and the strong reaffirm?
ation of our defense to South Korea.

We should be very wary of such falsel
schemes. considering a real alter
realizing that our commitment to Kore
objective strategic necessity, but of

even if intelligence estimates of the strength of
North
forces have recently been revised sharply upwards, the figgEan
balance on the peninsula, even without the American troops still
I

favors a successful defense by South Korea . 
. or
city, against North Korean attack. I th Of its capital

y.conceived "withdrawal"
native, we should start by
a is the result, not of
historical accident. And

24

The standard "liberal" approach has always been to threaten
partial American military withdrawal in order to coerce pol-
itical "reforms," or the semblance of them, from the South
Korean government. This theme was heard constantly in the

time of President Park, before his assassination last year;
and we are hearing it again with Park's successor, the current
military dictator, General Chun Doo Hwan. But American troop
deployments should not be considered a reward for palatable
political behavior. Conversely, troop withdrawals should

not be considered a punishment for failing to emulate Western
democratic forms. There is no hard strategic reason for the
continuation of deployment of.American troops (now about 39,000)
in Korea or the continuation of the Mutual*Defense Treaty
concluded in 1953.

China

 

In addressing the problem of China, we should avoid the intricate
calculations and the geopolitical games now fashionable in the
washington strategic community. The playing of the "China card"
was begun, of course, by the Republican administration of Nixon
and Kissinger in 1971: it was continued in the Ford administrat?
ion; and now this has been enthusiastically embraced by the
Carter?Brzezinski regime, which is caught up in the enterprise

of "triangular politics," attempting to influence Chinese behavior,
particularly toward the Soviet Union, through the transfer of arms,
military intelligence, and technology.

Certainly the initial contacts with China were constructive; and
the process of normalization of relations, not entirely perfected
yet, should be pursued. 'We should remove legal obstacles to trade
and investment, with American entrepreneurs, traders, and investors
making their own calculations of profit and risk. But these things
should not be done with a view to tilting the global or regional
political?military balance. Among other things, we simply don't
understand Chinese internal politics with sufficient depth or
precision to premise American moves minutely on their presumed
effects on Chinese decision?making. The occasions for a backfiring
of such approaches, with China, or China's Asian neighbors, or the
Soviet Union, are multiple. In particular, professions of a comm-
unity of strategic interest with China, such as those of Vice
President Mondale and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in their

trips to China over the past year, are not to our country's
advantage and should be avoided.

?With regard to Taiwan, there is nothing wrong with continuing our
mutually beneficial trading and cultural connections. It was
correct for the United States to drop its formal security ties
with Ta1wan?-and it only remains for the United States to relinq?
uish also often?expressed "interest" in a "peaceful" settle?
ment of the dispute between the two Chinas in the Taiwan Strait.

25

Our insistence that this is an "international" matter,
allowing the continuing intrusion of American diplomacy

and military threat, reassures on one, is offensive tot 
Beijing, and is unnecessary to the core of American in eres 

in the area. In fact, Taiwan can defend itself unaided .
aGainst mainland China for the foreseeable future: and China
is making no plans for the recovery of province by force.

Needless to say, there is also no reason for discriminatory
and invidious treatment favoring China over the Soviet Union
in Most Favored Nation trade relations. we ought to be drop?
ping any restrictions on trade??universally, globally--and
allowing our commercial firms to deal on terms of equality

and freedom with all agencies, private and governmental, in any
accordance with various forecasts and hopes. But the p01nt 15
not to exploit the partially mythical "China trade" that has
intrigued two centuries of American traders and polit1c1ans,
but rather to respect the open-ended principle of freedom.of
commerce, unhampered and undistorted by the political or
geopolitical concerns of state.

Southeast Asia

 

In view of Vietnamls aggressive conduct in Indochina, and now*
more widely in Southeast Asia against Thailand, and in view'

of Vietnam's breaches of the Paris accords of January 1973, it
it quite proper that the United States not extend the several

hundred million dollars of economic assistance ?promised" in

the accords.

There is a case to be made, however, for normalization, as soon
as comfortable, with Vietnam. This has nothing to do with bestow-
ing an accolade on that nation or assuaging guilt feelings from

should be part of our philosphy of interstate relations, and
recognition of a government should not be construed to imply
approval. A certain minimum (and sometimes that would also be
the maximum) of diplomatic contact should be maintained as a
rule, so that it would not encourage, by exaggerated symbolism,
any expectations regarding the substantive content of relations
between the peoples and the private or public interests in either
country. In short, these matters between states, as with so many
other aspects of international relations, should be put on a
basis of neutrality and pragmatism.

Further in Southeast Asia, the current Vietnamese robe
. 3 across
the border of Thailand to strike at the-base campspef the

 

26

Promise of greater American assistance to Thailand. This
kind of reflex should be avoided. Millenary problems
between traditional enemies--even if they carry a somewhat
different political meaning in our generation-?ought to be
'worked out in the long course of history between the antag?
onists, without the intrusion of American concern and
presence.



 

 

Finally, with regard to South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh),
a correct American policy would be the cliche "low profile?

that Washington professes to have maintained from December 1971,
the time of the detachment of East Bengal from Pakistan and the
famous American "tilt" toward Pakistan, until December 1979, the
date of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ?We should acquiesce
1n, and make the best of, regional dispostions, whether they

come about by force or diplomacy or influence.

'Unfortunately, the American pretense of a low profile was mostly

a pretense. The seventies were marked by a naval buildup in the
Indian Ocean, and the fortification of the mid-Indian Ocean base
Diego Garcia, acquired in conjunction with the-British in 1965.
Both of those moves were rationalized as responses to an increase
in Soviet ship movements in the Indian Ocean. Now, especially
after Afghanistan, a dramatically increasing American presence

in this ocean is excused by the alleged need to defend the approach-
es to the Persian Gulf. There is a scramble for allies and
regional bases, for naval forces and for staging for rapid deploy-
ment forces, under the aegis of the "Carter Doctrine." Diego-
Garcia is slated for major development (perhaps over a billion
dollars). And the foundations of a separate "numbered" Indian
Ocean Fleet are being put in place, or at least strenously

asserted.

Such expansive moves, into an area of relatively low intrinsic
.American interest, should be discouraged. Admittedly, the interest
-of certain friendly countries, such as Japan and those of western
Europe, in the peaceful and unimpeded flow of oil across these
waters is a matter of concern. But it remains to be demonstrated

how this flow can be assured by force or threat of arms. In
an era of nuclear geopolitics, it would be more than anachion?
o1

istic??possibly fatal??to make insurance_of the flow of
dependent on the risk of general war.

27

Conclusion

 

The payoff question for the'united?States. indgha?o?iviEEOf
the various situations in Asia, is: what to .

A benign and useful formula might be:

(1) Strive for peaceful access to all the sub-regions of 
where access is denied or threatened, choose peace ra er*

than insistence on access.

(2) Practice war?avoidance, rather than thejpresent relianc:
on bluster in a vain effort to reinforce deterrence 
present and possible challengers.

(3) Move to a posture of non-intervention, severing rather
than frantically reinforcing alliance connections.

(4) Execute a withdrawal of American forces from the Western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean to a point no farther west
than Guam, abandoning the means and the facilities as well
as the intention and the pretext for re?intervention in
the affairs of Asia.

(5) Refrain from replacing our presence with presumed proxies,

(6) Do all this. as in other cases, in a phased manner, over

no more than five years. with diplomatic tact and imagina-
ion, and full consultation and candor.

But this is, of course. not the program of the Carter administr?r
tiona any more than it has been of any other Am 

tion. This administration has taken every occas'

or not, to reiterate the ritual incantation that the 

States is "a Pacific power." If this were only a vac nltEd
evident definition. there might be no particular harm
But if 1t implies continued American intervention,

for intervention. in disputes on the mainland of A5
shore Asian Sltuations. then it 

well as expensive. We should re
from this momentary historic role and ambitio

in it.

28

6.

The Treatment of the Third world

With continued state intervention, the poorest countries in
the world have remained desperately poor, and the perceived
gap between them and the rich countries grows wider. Yet
most of the solutions offered by establishment sources-? by
both major parties and by all other candidates--are more of
the same. For most governments in the world, the political
and economic policies that prevail are moving backwards,

to the protectionist policies and trade wars and state
control of resources and labor that exemplified the age of
mercantiliam, and in some reapects even feudalism.

Unguestionably, the poorer countries of the Third World--
or:more properly their societies and people??have real
problems and real needs. But most of the current solutions--
some that they themselves generate, others that their leaders
have been taught by the West to seek, still others that are
offered or imposed by the larger powers??are not constructive.
Perhaps nowhere is this backward movement more apparent than
in the call, in Nairobi two years ago by representatives of
the Third World governments, for a "New International

Economic Order" (NIEO). NIEO, a program for international
economic planning, embraces a number of demands. It is based
on the historically false premise that the economic growth of
the developed countries occurred at the expense of the less
developed countries and therefore the Third World needs "comp-
ensation" for the "discriminatory" operation of the present
economic order; and that foreign direct investment and the
activiities of multinational corporations in the Third World
should be greatly reduced, in favor of direct transfers to
Third World governments (and other related measures, such as
commodity stabilization funds and debt rescheduling or remission).

Before we go into the effects of these policies, it should be
pointed out that those countries collectively known as the "Third
world" are a far more heterogeneous group than the developed
countries. There is great diversity of economic conditions,
productivity, and mutual interests. A number of Third World
countries, particularly those in the Middle East and Latin
America, have actually progessed more rapidly than has the United
States or Great Britain, while others, the so?called "Fourth
World," remain in abject poverty. A number of Third World coun?
tries are at war with each other, or are in a state of acute
confrontation: India and Pakistan, Morocco and Algeria, Ethiopia
and Somalia, to name a few. If there is any one thing that seems
to bring the Third World governments together as a single interest,
it is their guest for aid and credit form.the the developed

countries of the North.

 

29

Certainly, the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Middle East have many reasons to critic1ze the eXPlOlt?
ations of their countries by the developed nations. But
this exploitationand harm are caused by state 1nterventlon
and manipulation, not private economic activity: where that
occurs without government support or coercion. TodaY:
American guns and credit to Latin American governments
perpetuate the land?holding oligarchies, discourega peaceful
reform, and encourage political oppression. The people 0?
Africa are still paying dearly for certain Europeen C?i?nlal
practices of the nineteenth century: Whole African tribes
and peoples were murdered, displaced, or enslaved, often
forced into labor for a white land?holding aristocracy. INew
African nations were created piecemeal, with no recognition
of traditional tribal boundaries, their borders arbitrarily
drawn by European administrators and politicians years ago.
Today, European colonial oppression has been replaced by
dictatorships again underwritten by credit and arms from the
United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union. Southeast A51a
lies in ruins, the result of French colonial practice and
twenty years of American military intervention??but also the
genocidal practices of the current indigenous Southeast Asian
dictatorships. For many years, the developed countries have
turned a blind to the cultures, economies, and political
structures of the peoples of other countries in the quest toh
exploit by force those countries' resources.

At first glance, the demand that the developed countries (DCs)
compensate the Third world with capital and resource transfers
has strong humanitarian appeal. With people starving in Subw
Saharan Africa, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, it is
difficult to turn down appeals for "aid." However, government
foreign "aid" programs do nothing to alleviate world poverty.
This is because such aid does not go to the poor but to their
rulers, whose spending policies are determined by their own
personal and political interests. Such aid is used to increase
patronage, to purchase the security apparatus to buttress:their
rule, to build impressive government works projects, or to provide
goods at profit to the black markets created by their centrally
planned economies.

Even if an "ideal" program existed, where goods purchased by tax
monies from the developed countries went directly to the poor

the results would still be counterproductive for recipients as
well as, of emirse, givers. Real wealth lies in the production
of goods and services. Even such "ideal" government foreign aid
would not be production but forced transfer through taxation

from one people to another. The more taxes confiscated the less
taxpayers in the donor countries have to spend on eithef domestic
or imported goods. The less they Spend on imports the oorer
become those aid-recipient countries that are heavily regiant

on exports to the deveIOped countries. Thus, for the reci ie ts
such "aid"-dumPEd at 10? cripples domestic markets and I
makes them reliant on imports for basic necessities As an
example, within a decade after the U. S. Department of A ricult re
began an aggressive "aid" policy to Iran, the country fegl fromu

30

producing 90 percent of its food requirement to less than 50
percent. (As will be described laterr this is no accident
of U. 8. foreign aid policy). With government foreign aid.
everyone in both the donor and recipient countries loses--
except for the ruling classes or special interests.

The roots of NIEO proposals include the fallacious assumption
that because natural resources in the world are finite.

somehow the potential wealth of the world has a finite limit.
Therefore. the argument goes, developed countries such as the
United States and Europe are depriving lesser-developed
countries of their "fair share" of the pie by their disproport-
ionate use of the earth's resources. While there is certainly

a finite amount of oil, coal. magnesium. etc. in the earth.
mankind has a long way to go before exhausting these substances.
Long before we exhaust themr technological breakthroughs will
yield new opportunities and_we will be tapping the resources

of the sea bottom and the planetary bodies. Left alone. free
market prices will direct resources to those areas of the world
where they are most in demand and provide incentives for tech?
nological advancement and resource conservation. But again,
real wealth arises from the production of goods and services and
has little to do with the amount of resources within any single
country. The prosperous free ports of Hong Kong and Singapore.
with dense populations (in some areas of Hong Kong. 400,000 per
square mile) and very few natural resources. are dramatic examples

of this fact.

 

The same logic applies to commodity stabilization schemes. They
interfere with. and sometimes obscure. incentives to produce
truly needed commodities. They raise prices artificially for
the world's consumers. And they perpetuate distortions and post-
pone adjustments in the producing countries' economies, by

reinforcing false investment patterns.

.Appeals from Third World governments for the-forcible redistrib?
ution of wealth are often cynical diversionary tactics. For the
greatest obstacles to prosperity for many of the peoples of the
Third World are the very governments that rule over them.
Production can continue and thus real wealth expand as long as
people are free to produce and profit fully from their labors.
Forcible intervention in the marketplace. in the form of taxes,
regulations. or transfer programs. destroys the ability and
incentive to produce. Thus. there is a direct relationship between
the extent of poverty and unemployment in any country and the .
degree of government intervention in that country's economy. This
is why the wealthier nations of the Third World are those with
relatively freer economies, while the poorer countries, such as
Pakistan, Mozambique. and Zaire (India is doing much better these
days). are those with centrally located economies. Centrally 
lanned economies in lesser?developed countries. fueled by foreign
"aid" from the DCs. result in a politicization of all aspects of
life. As political power is used more and more to increase
patronage and allocate resources. political power becomes the only
thing worth having in the first instance. Productive individuals

 

31

ll 
will either leave the country (as in the so-called brain
drain") or will seek political power rather than pursu1:g_
productive labor. Violations of property rights are anfi
libertarian in themselves and lead to the suppre551on 0
other civil liberties. When the state owns, controls, or
allocates economic resources, the allocation of newsprint -
for example - becomes a political dec1s1on, and such resources
will be (and have been in innumerable cases) withheld from
dissidents and those without political influence._ Thus, 
centrally planned economies are marked by oppre531on. P?ilt-l
ical struggle, and economic decay. But the New lnternationa
Economic Order is not the solution. It offers little that is
new. It presents the same rehash of rationalizations. albeit
rather more sophisticated, for the political control of human

beings.

A curious but distressing point is that the underlying philos?
ophy and assumptions embodied in NIEO are accepted by the
governments of nearly all countries. including the UnltEd
States. This is exemplified in the current Law of the Sea
Conference. where the major conflict among nations is not
about the underlying approach but merely about the division

of spoils. The seas and the ocean floor are the last great
untapped wilderness on earth. with enormous potential for?
mineral wealth.and food. But what threatens the efficient.
utilization.of this wilderness is the view. held by virtually
all governments attending the Conference. that the seas are:
the "common heritage of mankind" and should therefore be con-
trolled by politicians-and bureaucrats through a United Nations
regulatory body. Again the accepted policy is state ownership
and control of wealth and labor on a superficial humanitarian
pretext. 'The legacy of the "common heritage" concept, however.
is a tragic one. Resources. whether in the land, air, or sea.
that are. in theory. owned by everyone are owned by no one.
Under common ownership. the benefits of using the resource go
directly to the individ al user while the negative costs.are

user to exploit a commonly owned resource to the fullest. be-

fore the next user can profit. Destructive exploitation and
antifconservationlst practices abound. Government planners are
no different. Assailed from all sides by government and cor-

porate state interests, the U.N. ocean resources planner will
have every incentive to advance h'

is employment by givin in to
spec1al interests and very little incentive to maintaingthe
full capital value of the

Se Co fe enc Ecean resourcesreaty in its present form. the same

tragedy 0: the commons that encouraged the depletionrof the

ocean is eries will become the law for min 

area covering three-guarte erals, too, in an

rs of the earth's surface A ain
the solution lies away form state ownership and controlgof I

resources. Instead of internationalizin

. . the ocean fl or the
Unlted States ShGUld pursue a policy that recognizes the rights
of individuals and private organizations to "homestead? area5
of the ocean and see bottom for mining, fishing,:mariculture

32

PIOjects, scientific study, and conservation. Ocean resources
would be used and managed prudently as each private owner would
have the incentive to maintain the full capital value of his
Property. Instead of a polluted, unproductive area under com-
mon ownership, the seas could become dynamic and productive

regions.

With respect to foreign aid, American political parties have 
differed in practice much less than in rhetoric. Both Republi-

cans and Democrats would bleed massive amounts of American 
resources to fill the "needs" of other countries that have mis-

managed their economies and have funneled large portions of
their national wealth into military adventures and domestic
repression. Economic and military aid to the underdeveloped
countries actually promotes central economic planning and, in
the process, secures the rule of dictatorial regimes abroad, as
it promotes inflation and unemployment at home.

Foreign countries receive tax-subsidized goods and credit through
a host of U.S. or U.S.?supported agencies, principally the

Department of Agriculture and the Export?Import Bank, and
through U.S. participation in the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). Such official transfer programs have several
effects. Direct aid, in the form of commodities and other goods,
dumped on the markets of other countries, retards the local in-
dustries of the recipient countries, which find it difficult to
compete with the cheap goods, and thereby increases reliance on
imports. Through extensive aid programs, the Third World has
thus become addicted to food exports from the DCs. Transfer and
credit programs to foreign industry and governments then provide
dollars to purchase exports from American business. All foreign
"aid" programs combined, then, amount to little more than a very

expensive welfare package for big business.

Some argue that agencies such as the Export?Import Bank are self?
supporting, receiving no tax monies or subsidies. But the
original capital stock for the Ex?Im Bank, a U.S.?owned corpor-
ation -- some $1 billion was paid for from the U.S. Treasury,
and on this the bank is currently authorized to borrow up to

$6 billion. The indirect subsidy occurs because the Ex-Im Bank
can borrow, mostly from the government, at government bond rates
and lend at a rate lower than that in the export finance market.

Such aid is often advocated as a way to secure American jobs.
This is like saying that it is beneficidal to have your property
stolen so long as the thief returns part of the loot. Government
aid programs are financed by taxes. The higher the taxes, the
less money is available in the private sector to purchase goods
and invest in ij?creating enterprises. The net result of
government aid, then, is to increase unemployment in the United
States as well. 

 

33

rams is
Another rationale for government 
to insure political and economic "stability' in the recipient

countries. For the U.S. government, "stability" means 
venting Third World countries from drifting into thedSoEiet
sphere of influence. Foreign aid is seen as a metho 
bribing Third World governments to follow the political in-
terests of the U.S. government. Naturally. Third World
regimes play this theme to the hilt. threatening to turn to
the Soviet Union whenever there is talk of reducing foreign .
economic and military aid. This leads to some bizarre poliCies.
where the United States has funded both sides of a conflict
(for example Turkey vs. Greece. to the tune of $7 b111}0n and
$5 billion respectively) and has shared military aid with the
Soviet Union to 17 Third World countries. For all of this
aid. the United States and the Soviet Union maintain very 
little ?stability" in world events. .After extenSive'U.S. aid
to the dictatorships of the shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicara?
gua. popular revolutions have taken power and installed anti-
American governments. Growing anti-Americanism in South Korea
and Zaire results from the same U.S. policy.

Past U.S. aid to Vietnam, Israel. and South Africa has tended
rather to isolate America from the Third World and encouraged
Third world countries to turn to the Soviet Union for aid. But.
on balance. the Soviet Union has fared no better. having lost.
influence in Egypt. the Sudan. Iraq and Somalia after trans-
ferring massive amounts of resources. Indeed. Soviet influence.
as measured by adherence to Soviet policy. trade and arms agree-
ments. and Soviet presence in the Third WorLd. has declined
since its height in the late 1950s. .Marxist ideology has failed
to supplant Moslem.nationalism in Africa and the.Middle Easti

The world. with its diversity of cultures. traditions. religions.
is impossible for the ruling clique of any one country to control.
Most governments of the Third World have. in fact. made it clear
at the meetings of the recent Islamic conference in Islamabad
that they want no interference by either of the superpowers.

The American people would be incensed if they knew first?hand
the human suffering their tax dollars have bonght. Support
for the repressive governments of Suleyman Demirel in Turkey.

Mobutu in Zaire. Suharto in Indonesia. "Baby Doc" Duvalier in
Haiti. and General Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea to name a

There is an alternative to the planned governmental chaos
engendered by these disastrous "aid" policies. It is the
spontaneous order of a free society. For the peoples of the
underdeveloped countries. America must serve as an example

We should remove restrictions from our own 
i l' i Omestlc
abolish.immigration laws. eliminate restrictions 

and exports. and pursue a foreign policy of non?' .
in the affairs of other countires. Individuals 

34

to do business abroad. but at their own expense and risk.
The Ex-Im Bank and Department of Agriculture subsidy pro-

grams. and foreign assistance programs should be discon-
tinued. U.S. financial support. on its present basis, for
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should
be withdrawn.

Private organizations such as the Red Cross or religious
funds are effective means of bypassing antagonistic and
Corrupt governments to deliver needed aid directly to the
world's poor. The reduction of taxes and regulations in
our own_economy would leave more money in the private sector
available for humanitarian concerns.

The people of the world need a new political philosophy --

one that will address the injustices of dictatorial regimesIr
both fascist and communist. The American Revolution of 1776
embodied such a new philosophy. The libertarian principles
contained in the Declaration of Independence swept away the

remnants of feudalism, mercantilism. and theocracy in America
and replaced them with a recognition of human liberty, freedom
of speech and press, free trade, and the separation of church
and state. The same can be done for the citizens of the Third_
'World, burdened and oppressed by governments. The right of
all people to be free to govern their own lives is a universal
revolutionary principle. Libertarian land reform policies -
granting full ownership of land to those who have worked it
for centuries under the control of feudal masters - should

be applied.in those countries whose people remain subjugated
by landrholding aristocracies. Laws and edicts restricting
trade, commerce, and civil liberties and perpetuating poverty
and oppression should be swept aside. The path to peace. pros-
perity. and justice for all the peoples of the world lies not

in more controls and subjugation. but in freedom.

35

7.

Notes on the International_Economy

Free trade is the fundamental principle of the Libertarian
approach to international economic relations. Goods, capi?

tal, and labor should have mobility among the nations of the
world. Such a policy will ultimately be to the benefit of

all.

Today many question the desirability of even the hobbled free
trade practiced by the United States. It is said that the
United States should restrict the importation of many cate-

gories of foreign goods notably automobiles, steel, textiles,
and electronics in order to protect American jobs. Similarly,

it is said that the United States should restrict the immigration
of Vietnamese, Cuban, Haitian, and Mexican refugees, because.
this too costs American jobs. 

It is tragic that American labor unions should be in the
forefront of efforts to restrict trade and immigration, when
not too many years ago unions were the staunchest advocates of
free trade and free mobility of labor. The change is explained
largely by the fact that U.S. policies have reduced economic
growth to such an extent that people are driven to such xeno?

phobic attitudes.

In reality, foreign trade creates jobs, and immigrants are a
source of wealth, not poverty. Opponents of trade and immi-
gration assume that if people didn't buy a foreign good, they
would buy the comparable domestically produced good, even
though it might cost more and be of inferior quality. They
also assume that whenever an immigrant gets a job this nec-
essarily displaces a native American from that job. But the
fact is that in many cases the foreign goods are cheaper and
of higher quality than domestically produced goods. And immi-
grants often do work for which native Americans cannot be found.
Further, immigrants create new demand as well as new supply.
This increases the market for goods and therefore the demand
for labor. No sales would be created by trade barriers and no

jobs created by immigration barriers. We are just as badly off
as we would be otherwise.

In recent years, one of the greatest impediments to trade has
been the declining value of the dollar. The declining value

of the dollar at home and overseas results from one cause:
debasement of the currency by U.S. monetary authorities. When?
ever monetary authorities create money to cover budget deficits
or simply through the expansion of the Federal Reserve's money

36

SUpply, this reduces the value of all other dollars held by
U.S. citizens or foreigners, constituting a breach of faith
with those who accepted the dollars at face value and an
immoral transfer of wealth. Therefore, Libertarians favor the
issuance of currencies, public and private, that would be.
soundly based. This would insure their purchaSing power in
domestic and international trade and would restrain govern-
mental monetary authorities from creating money in response

to domestic political considerations.

With the importance of OPEC in today's international economy,
many people believe that free trade is no longer desirable,
even if it once was. But OPEC exists only because the U.S.
government has artificially restricted the production of
energy in the United States by price controls and other reg-
ualtions. Furthermore, the impact of OPEC on the domestic
economy is grossly exaggerated by politicians eager to seek
scapegoats for their own failures. The total value of petro~
leum imports into the United States constitutes about 2.5
percent of our gross national product hardly enough to 
eXplain double?digit inflation under any theory -- and certainly
not enough to justify going to war. The present ill-conceived
effort to gain energy self-sufficiency by pumping billions of
dollars into exotic fuel-development will only cause

consumers to pay higher prices for energy than if a free mar-
ket prevailed.

It is ironic that those nations that actually suffer the most
from OPEC's oil monopoly are not the:major industrialized
nations, but the less?developed countries of the Third World.
The plight of these poor nations is a cause for international
concern, but the billions of dollars of international economic
aid given out by the United States each year do nothing real
or lasting to help these nations. Because foreign aid is a
government-to?government transfer, our efforts ultimately end
by building up the governments of recipient nations, rather
than building up their economies. Such aid has not even been
successful in terms of creating support for the United States:
since most aid recipients resent the paternalism and inter-
ference in their domestic affairs. Ultimately, we would do

more to help these nations by opening our doors to their trade
and standing as an example to them.

Another point has to do with trade sanctions, such as the
measures the United States has lately applied to Iran and to

the Soviet Union to punish them for their unlawful or aggressive
actions. With regard to the Soviet Union, trade sanctions will

not have the intended political effect, and will actually have

gounterproductive_economic effects in the longer run. The

tes autarky. A fairlY

. . conom such as that
of the Soviet Union, can and will eventually Zeplace the im-

port of even highly technological goods with th enous
capability to produce them. The Soviet Union h:s13:;g this
in the case of certain types of computers and gas and oil
exploration equipment. Also it should not be forgotten that:

37

even in the case of goods with a considerable technological
content, trade is not a one-way street. We have imported
and licensed production processes for some highly sophis-
ticated products, which have proved to have considerable

utility in the United States.

Finally, we should note the intimate connection between free
trade and peace, which the great free traders, Cobden and
Bright, actually considered synonymous. Almost all wars have
had important economic origins; more often than not, goods or
people were not free to travel between nations. As Bismark
once said, when goods cannot cross borders, armies will. And
many thinkers such as Joseph Schumpeter and William Graham
Sumner have pointed out that free trade removes most economic
incentives for war, since two nations with borders open to
goods, labor, and capital are, in an economic sense, one

nation.

Of course, these arguments can be exaggerated. Free trade
cannot eliminate war. But it would unquestionably lead to

a more prosperous world economy and remove one important set
of causes of war. Although a free trade system works best
when all abide by it, U.S. policy should not be contingent

on the actions of other nations. Although we should work for
the mutual reduction of trade barriers wherever possible, even
a unilateral free trade policy would be in the best interest

of Americans, providing them with better' goods at lower prices.

38

3.
The Logic of_?ational Security

Foreign policy and national security are Closely related.

The basic issue--always present, though sometimes under the
surface of the debate-?is the avoidance of direct conflict be-
tween the United States and any antagonist that has sufficient
nuclear force to destroy a significant part of our homeland.

At present, the only such antagonist is the Soviet Union (but

that situation could change). Most people would agree with

that proposition. A more controversial one, that bears on the
question of limited war, is that we should not even edge near

the substantial possibility of nuclear confrontation. The
avoidance of nuclear war is better achieved by also avoiding lower-
level regional conflicts, since escalation to nuclear war is more
likely from.a situation of regional conflict than from a situation
of disengagement.

For the past decade or so, it has been fashionable in American
foreign policy circles to assert that the purpose of our national
security policy is to preserve certain American "values." That
may be true, if (1) we concentrate on preserving them, not pro-
jecting them into the world; and (2) we define our
"values," equating them essentially with our political indepen-
dence and the safety of our citizens and their domestic (not
foreign} property. The trouble for our national security policy
stems from the fact that a succession of American governments
has attempted to assert a far more ambitious list of goals than
that, and to enforce them upon a good part of the rest of the
world. That is entirely too extensive a mission for our country,
and ultimately for its armed forces. The more we contrive or
contract to manipulate or defend in the world, the greater will
be our exposure to conflict.

The logic of national security runs from foreign policy through
"national" strategy, then military strategies: from there to
tactics and doctrines, force structures, and major weapons
systems; and finally to defenSe budgets. Before addressing the
composition of U.S. forces and the size of the military budget,

an examination must be made of the "mission requirements" that
determine these capabilities. Any alternative budget must begin
with an explicit redefinition of the fundamental mission of the
armed forces. A libertarian foreign and military policy empha-
sizes the legitimate purpose of our armed forces as one of defense
of the United States?-our people, property, and freedom. The U.S.

39

government should not involve American soldiers and taxpayeis 
in foreign conflicts. Nor is it appropriate or gust to ris 
destruction of our people in a.nuclear conflict in the name 0
defending foreign governments. Therefore, the goals of U.S.

military policy should be to: .
-?defend the people of the United States, and our liberty

and property,
-?deter and prevent nuclear war, and 
??reduce sources of international tenSion that could lead

to war. .
This is a more precise and limited definition of U..S military
purpose than is traditionally offered. It Specifically_r?JECtS
the concept of being the world's policeman. This definition_
also renounces intervention and confrontation and seeks to dis?
entangle the United States from dominating or unilateral comm1t?
ments that can lead to unwarranted foreign military adventures.

 

The existing policy assumptions??that the United States should be
prepared to fight 1-1/2 wars simultaneously and that it stands

as the primary military guardian of Europe and much of the rest
of the world-?are unrealistic and contrary to American national
security interests. Political influence in the world does not
rest with military capabilities'alone. Equally important are

the state of 'a nation's economy-?particularly its industrial
capacity-?and its domestic social harmony. To the extent that

excessive military spending erodes industrial competitiveness and
exacerbates social divisions at home, it reduces Mexican strength.

 

Moreover, the use of military force often has severe limits in
achieving a particular political goal. Over $10 billion of arms
sales to Iran could not prevent a revolution by unarmed masses.
America's deployment of half a million troops and its unleashing
of the heaviest bombing in the history of warfare were unable to
achieve victory in Vietnam. Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan has not quashed resistance to the government in

Ka .

40

The Strategic_Nuclear Balance

The greatest national security threat to the United States is
the risk of nuclear war. The dominant fact of the nuclear age is
that no nation, regardless of how much it spends on arms, can
defend itself against strategic nuclear attack. Between 200 and

400 0.8. nuclear bombs could destroy the entire Soviet Union.
A similar number of Soviet bombs could annihilate the United
States. Nothing either side does can alter these fundamental

facts.

The overriding fact about the strategic nuclear balance, however,
is that it is not "sensitive" to swings in numbers, within very
wide limits. This has to do with the logic of incentives.
hawkish ones?- can't just cite statistics
about throw?weight and other indices of comparative strength.

They must couple them with some credible scenarios. And when

they try to do that, we see that a superiority in some index

or other would not, in itself, give the Soviets an incentive to
initiate or even threaten nuclear war, any more than our advantage

would give us such an incentive.

This does not mean, however, that certain characteristics of the
nuclear forces of either antagonist cannot create instability and
danger. -And that is the situation that we face today. The threat
of nuclear war is increasing. This is not only because of the
sharp rise in the number of nuclear weapons, but also because

of the "limited war" doctrine and technology impelling both

sides to a first strike capability. The pursuit of technical

and military superiority is fruitless and leads to an endless arms
race and a steadily mounting threat of war. The present return

to the nuclear P0110195 6f the Cold War is particularly dangerous
and must be halted. Negotiating limits on nuclear weapons is

too important to be sacrificed to presidential politics or public
pique over Russian bullying in Afghanistan.

The claim of Soviet nuclear superiority??so often made by anxious
and urgent hawks?-is not grounded in thorough analysis, and is
certainly not true across the board. The United States has over
9,200 strategic nuclear weapons (that is, separately targetable
warheads), compared to approxi?ately 6,000 for the Soviet Union.
Even though Soviet numbers are increasing, perhaps more rapidly
than those of the United States, and even though the Soviets

may have a lead in some indices of strategic nuclear "power"
(such as throw-weight or gross megatonnage or even "equivalent
-megatonnage"), such measures are not relevant to questions of

 

41

war and peace, destruction and survival. .A few qg?tgtgi?iefrom
official sources can document these points. In Horold
Statement of January 29, l980, Secretary of Defenset ato destro
Brown said: "The hypothetical ability of the Sovie :h same thin
even 90 percent or more of our ICBM warheads is not 

as a disarming first strike nor even, by itself, amagorSSEV:Et
military vulnerability of our ea "c I
mean an increased probability of a Soviet surprise attack. 
another place, he said: "It is simply a that from.th:fsta3d?
point of responsible policymakers the United States hasbsuldere

a major loss of leverage because of the SoViet nuclear ui_ up?
a golden age of American nuclear superior}tY ever ex1ste 
sober decision?makers starting with President Eisenhower never
thought so at the time."

Though.these official statements?~as all of them do??have mis?
leading overtones, the general point is clear. There can be no
Soviet "superiority" in the face of tens of thousands of Amer-
ican strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. There are no:
winners in the nuclear age.

Certain policy recommendations flow from these considerations.

In general, the present nuclear forces, perm-
ticularly first?strike development, should be halted immediately.
This policy would amount to a "cease?fire in place," a morator-
ium on further increase. The present enlargement of the strategic
triad (land missiles, submarine missiles, and aircraft) shouldi

be halted. Actually, it should be noted, American nuclear forces
have four legs, not three?-the fourth being the so?called.

Theater Nuclear Forces deployed forward near the Soviet Uniom.
Though defined as tactical, these several thousand carriere,
aircraft-, and landrbased weapons pose a direct nuclear threat.

to the Soviet territory and are thus strategic in effect_
Additions to these systems should also be halted

Soviet Union. Perhaps the best current diplomatic

moving toward such a policy is not, at the moment, SALT (which
is mired in the U.S. Congress and has become an integral part
of the 1980 presidential campaign), but the Comprehensive Test

Ban.Treaty (CTB). This treaty has been the subject of extensive
Soviet?American negotitions and could ea 

Sily be revived and
strengthened as a means of mOVing toward a freeze on further.
nuclear escalation.

MK. The top candidate for cuts (and pro

land-based ICBM's will become vulnerable .

. . . -
strike in the mid-1980s._ This "vulnerabilitinRgisian fl?5t
actually suSpect. however, in the face of practicglmigzlliorld

42

considerations, such as the untested technical ability of large
numbers of Russian warheads to target precisely our Minuteman
silos, and the capability of U.S. air and submarine strategic
forces to retaliate with devastating force. -The United States

has 5,000 sea?based warheads aboard 41 submarines. As President
Carter said in his State of the Union address: "Just one of our
relatively invulnerable Poseidon enough war?
heads to destroy every large and medium city in the Soviet Union."
An alternative longurange strategy of phasing out land?based
missiles was proposed by General Maxwell Taylor several years ago,
and has been supported by many credible defense experts.

Among other objections to the MX, the shell?game logic of shut-
tling 200 missiles among 4,600 garages scattered through the

Great Basin of Nevada?Utah relies on the SALT II ceiling on

Soviet warheads. If no SALT limits are adopted, the whole logic
of the MX becomes questionable. The potential need to double

the system by 1989 without SALT II was acknowledged by Dr. William
Perry, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,

in a press briefing on September 7, 1979.

The General Accounting Office has asked the Secretary of Defense
to address unresolved problems concerning: (1) cost (the Air Force
estimate of $56 billion does not include warheads); (2) schedule:
(3) performance; (4) legal obstacles to land use: (5) cement

and construction materials impact on the Western states: and

(6) the effect of all of these if there is no SALT II agreement.
The Simon Amendment to cut MK basing funds received 152 votes on
May 15, 1980. This iS'another indication of the unpopularity of

the MX system.

The entire MX system should be scuttled, along with other
potentially vulnerable land?based missile systems. This policy
would lead to a "diad rather than the present "triad" of strate?
gic nuclear weapons systems. Relying on air and sea-based nu?
clear weapons would reduce and delay tendencies toward first-
strike capability and thereby lower nuclear war tensions. Land?
based missiles also make the land area of the United States a
primary target for Soviet missiles; elimination of land?based
missiles would make American citizens safer.

Cutting the MX would produce total savings in FY 1981 of $1.6 
billion. In FY 1982, the savings from anticipated costs would be
$2.3 billion.

ICBM_Improvement?. At the same time, the Administration has been
proceeding with introduction of the more accurate and powerful
marklZ-A warhead in the present Minuteman missiles. This
program is a first?strike accuracy measure that is unnecessary
for deterrence purposes. Although much of the modernization
program has been completed, the remaining efforts can and should
be halted. This would save $179 million in FY 1981.

 

43

TTident. The Trident program continues to be 
nuclear weapons initiative. with costs in FY 1931 0 -

(for the submarine and the Trident I misSile). The t' on.
budget contains funding for the beginning of construc iil 
the ninth submarine (even though the first boat has sti no

gone through sea trials).

 

The Trident could be significantly cut back and'SlD?ifE'd- While
submarine?based nuclear weapons are less destabilizing than land?
based missiles (less vulnerable, less accurate): the present .
Trident program provides an unnecessary expansion of destructive
capability. The present Polaris and Poseidon fleet of 41 sub?I .
marine?launched missiles is in the realm of first?strike capability
and thus is extremely dangerous. The program is slated to cost
$7.5 to 8.5 billion over the next ten to twenty years. ?It should
be cancelled in its entirety. This would save $36 million in

FY 1931 and much larger sums in the years ahead.

Tomahawk Cruise Missile. This year Congress has authorized the
Navy to purchase?106 new Tomahawk cruise missiles for deployment
on attack submarines. This will transform these submarines for
the first time into strategic weapons. According to present plans,
88 cruise missiles will be deployed on ll attack submarines by
1933. The Tomahawk is also capable of deployment by 1983.

Because of the extreme accuracy of these cruise missiles and the
intractable difficulties such weapons pose for arms verification
(they are. tiny and can carry conventional or nuclear warheads),

this, program should be halted. Such action would save over $250
million in FY 1981, and.much-more in years to come.

Manned homer/Strategic Weapons Launcher De$pite cancellation of
the B-1 bomber. funding continues for various versions of a new
manned bomber. The Administration has urged research on an alter-
native to the B-1, while the House Armed Services Committee has
recommended $200 million for development of a "Strategic Wee 
Launcher" (basically an aerial platform for launchin cruisp n3
missiles). These and other proposals for a new strat: ic 
craft are unnecessary. The present 13?52 fleet (now quippz?r

with attack missiles, 20 per plane. and recentl 
upgraded) can deliver thousands of warheads on gh?nosdernized and

for years to come and is more than suffi Union

cie - .
deterrent. The 13?52 is also designed to nt to provide a credible
ing the Air-Launched Cruise Missile,
range system that. in effect,

as a component of our strategic deterrent .
to replace the 3-52 at this time in that rile-CBS! we don't need

All new bomber development or 
be halted. The savings from this
approximately $200 million.

44

Eheater Nuclear Forces Ground-Launched Cruise_Missiles 
fourth leg of the nuclear arsenal, usually ignored in dis-
Cussions of strategic weapons, has become highly controversial.
Under pressure from the Carter Administration and the government

Of West Germany, the NATO alliance approved, in December 1979,

the deployment of 572 new nuclear missiles in Europe. These
weapons -- 464 and 108 Pershing IIs will vastly improve
the accuracy, destructive power, and range of U. S. theater nuclear
weapons. The Pershing rockets, for example, will be able to strike
Moscow from West Germany in approximately eight minutes flying time.
The accuracy and verification difficulties of the cruise missiles
also contribute to strategic instability. These weapons are un?
necessary and dangerous and should not be deployed. The savings

from their elimination in FY 1981 would-be $333 million.

Anti?Ballistic Missile_Defense. Partly because of the MX program
(which may require and ABM to compensate for the system's inability
to assure absolute invulnerability for land?based missiles). re?
search and development on ABM systems is continuing. ABMs are
receiving renewed attention despite the fact that such systems

are prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty, and despite the opinion of
numerous independent experts and scientists that ABMs simply cannot
work. There are three major problems with the ABM systems which
have been considered so far: There is no good evidence to suggest-
that they will work. They are extremely expensive, and they are
potentially very destabilizing, in that they may encourage American
officials to consider nuclear war more thinkable or cause Soviet
officials to launch an attack before the system is in operation.
Nevertheless, we should not rule out consideration of defensive
systems. It would be possible to construct such a system.in con?
junction with a clear policy of disengagement from.world trouble
spots and moves toward disarmament. Such a_po1icy should reassure
the Soviets that construction of the system was not designed to
facilitate a nuclear attack. Put in such a context, a defensive
weapons system could be considered if it was effective, was re-
latively inexpensive, and was designed to protect population centers
rather than missile silos. In the absence of such a context of
disengagement, the 1972 treaty should be maintained and strengthened.
Once a non-interventionist policy is implemented, the treaty will

no longer be necessary and a defensive weapons system could be
considered. For the present, the Pentagon's request of $385 million
for such programs in FY 1981 should be rejected.

 

AntiTSatellite Weapons; These weapons do not carry nuclear war-
heads, but they directly affect strategic capability by posing

a threat to the satellites that provide surveillance and assist
mis51le guidance. Much has been made of alleged Soviet advantages
in this area, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General David Jones
has conceded that Soviet systems are deficient "in terms of the
number they can launch and the types of U. S. satellites they can
go against." American programs in this area are provocative and
unnecessary and should be greatly reduced. Potential savings in
FY 1981 would be $100 million.

 

45

Weapons Complex Restoration. In order to Pr?du?3: th: {?2179 22::
,000 nuclear warheads that will be needed in e_c mi Y3 th
for the MX, Trident, cruise, and other new strategl? weapon 
major capital restoration

Department of Energy is in the midst of a .
ing weapons production capac1ty.

program, to expand and improve exist ?k
This program is designed for the production of first-strl weaponry
scalation of nuclear fire-

and for an unwarranted and dan erous 
for a sav1ng of $94 million

power. It should be cancelled entirely, 
in FY 1981. (This saving, as well as the followulg one, would come

strictly out of the Department of Energy budget.)

DOE Warhead Production. The Department of Energy will spend $3.4

billion in FY Iggl i371 percent of its budget) on military programs.
Part of this is for new, unnecessary nuclear weapons. Much of this

additional production could and should be cancelled, for an estimated
1981 saving of $1.5 billion. The remainder should be transferred
to the Department of Defense.

Civil Defense. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary,

persist that a society can survive nuclear war and that civil
defense preparations have strategic significance. The Civil Defense
program should be cancelled, for a saving in FY 1981 of $120 million.

 

46

Etrabegic Arms gontrol

 

Real security in the nuclear age can come only through
arms limitation. The highest national security priority
should be negotiations and independent initiatives to re-
duce and eventally eliminate nuclear war threats.

To date, nearly all arms control negotiations and agreements
between the superpowers have been fundamentally flawed. They
do not limit the arms race; they merely codify it. They are

a form of mutual expansion. This does not mean that the
limitation of arms should not be an object of our policy.

We should continue our negotiations with the Soviets, but

we should aim at genuine agreements that contain provisions
for actual substative disarmament. But the formal "arms
control" process to date has certain inherent flaws: It imr
plies an explicit and semi?public bargaining forum. where
political posturing rather than hard negotiating often occurs;
formal agreements carry the expectation of effective inspection
and even policing, and these procedures have inhibited agree?
ments. just as they imply the possibility of war to prevent
war; and. above all. the formal process implies reciprocity.
It is precisely these conditions that have made it hard to
achieve progress in the regulation of arms competition, and.

even where agreements have been reaches. have given rise to
recriminations and accusations of cheating.

We need not equate formal "arms control" with all efforts at
the limitation of arms. let alone with disarmament. While
continuing to bargain, we need to concentrate on the merits

of independent (even unreciprocated) initiatives in reducing
our own arms acquisition. This is essentially a third position.
different from that of the "hawks" and the ?doves." It holds
that the authentic purposes of arms control stability.
deterrence. and morality can be best served, not by force
expansion as the hawks urge, not by the rigid reciprocal bar-
gaining on which the liberal doves pin their hopes. but by
moves of independent restraint. Proposals of independent restraint
have_been made before. but only as gambits, bait.
to be cancelled or reversed if they are not reciprocated.
Genuine independent moves would have to make strategic sense

in themselves. so that they could be sustained whether or not

they were reciprocated by the other nuclear superpower.

We have to be clear about our purposes and about the logic

of arms restraint. We should attempt to restrict the targeting
of civilians without increasing the likelihood of nuclear war.
We should specify the targeting of strictly military objectives.
but avoid counterforce in the specific sense of targeting mis-
sile silos (which would be a destabilizing doctrine).

47

The recently announced or leaked stratngIOf the .
Carter Administration, the so-called "PreSidential Directive
59," does not satisfy these purposes. It speCifies a greater
proportion of targeting military objectives, but its targets
are not bases but military silos. The targeting of misSile
silos is a mistake for two reasons. First, it is enormously
wasteful.and expensive because huge additional numbers of
warheads are required to overcome the heavy protection pro-
vided for Soviet missile silos. Second, and more important,
it de?stabilizes the balance of power because it may cause
the Soviet Union to fear an American first strike and thus
possibly to launch an attack of its own. What is needed is
not the administration's counterforce strategy but a counter-
military (or counter?combatant) strategy of targeting'military
objectives other than missile silos -- bases, airfields,
military production facilities. and the like. This would 
clearly not be a first?strike strategy. but would be a suffi?
cient deterrent to discourage a Soviet strike.

Such restricted targeting would be accompanied by a pledge

of no-first-use of nuclear weapons,'which would be unilateral
if no reciprocity could be obtained. Strategic stability

would be enhanced_by reducing incentives for an adversary to
strike at our nuclear force (since, of course, an adversary's
first strike would.logically have to be a counterforce strike),
We would accomplish this by moving to a died of forces, instead
of the present triad. eliminating our fixed land?based mdssiles
as they become vulnerable to enemy attack, and not replacing
them.with movable or multiple-based missiles such as the MK.

We would not make this move hastily, but only as we developed
the technology to insure accurate coverage of equivalent tar-
gets with our undersea weapons systems. (This minimally re-
quisite degree of accuracy is not designed to enable us to

wage a preemptive strike against Soviet missiles but to con-
fine collateral damage as closely to legitimate military tar-
gets as possible.) Among other things. we would need to solve
the "command-and-control" problem. the problem.of sending fool-

proof orders and receiving timely information from.submarines
on station.

This move from triad to diad is not a form of "unilateral
disarmament"_in the careless pejorative sense of the word

The new posture would enhance strategic stabil'
incentives for an adversary to strike

It is an illustration that. in the

control are as follows:

48

The SALT process must be viewed objectively and
Critically. Limited agreement is perhaps better than un-
restrained rivalry, but the contents of the SALT II treaty

are inadequate from an arms reduction perspective. The

SALT treaty should be ratified, but not at the expense of
concessions to Congressional hawks. President Carter's
attempts to gain support for SALT by "buying off" potential
Opponents with military spending increases were not justified,
and SALT is not worth that price. We should ratify the SALT
treaty as it stands and move immediately to negotiate a real

arms?reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

Comprehensive Test Ban. The only justification for making

the effort to ratify SALT II would be if this could lead
immediately to much more meaningful arms limitation through
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This should be the highest
disarmament priority. It provides a direct route to a mora-
torium on further increases in nuclear arsenals, and has the
additional advantage of having already received substantial
official government attention from both the United States

and the Soviet Union. The Russians have made important con-
cessions in recent years, agreeing to halt peaceful explosions
and to allow on?site inspection. These gestures were never
answered by the United States. They should be pursued, so
this treaty can be swiftly concluded.

European Theater Nuclear4Weapons. Urgent diplomatic attention
should also be directed to European negotiations for a freeze
and reduction of theater nuclear forces. The West German pro-
posal of Helmut Schmidt, while not halting preparations for
the deployment of the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles,
nevertheless offers at least the promise of freezing actual
deployment pending negotiations for mutual reductions of
medium?range systems. This significant initiative, which
the United States initially clumsily rejected, should be
supported, as the first step toward larger negotiations for
nuclear force reductions in Europe.

Conventional Forces and Non-Intervention?

 

The vast bulk of our force structure consists of (non?strategic?
nuclear) forces. And the largest portion of these conventional
forces, over half of the entire military budget, is for NATO.

The payroll alone for U.S. troops stationed in Europe is over

$6 billion a year. In general, the United States maintains

over 490,000 troops abroad, including 330,000 in Europe and

over 100,000 in the Pacific. These are forces for intervention
and so-called forward defense. They are, in effect, "trip wires"
that insure that regional conflicts in Europe, Korea, the
Philippines, Turkey, or elsewhere would quickly involve the

United States in war. The recent tensions surrounding the
in South Korea illustrate this point: the 39,000 U.S.

49

I ive
troops stationed in Korea are hostages to the repress

politics of the ruling military clique 
become involved in local conflicts that a

on U.S. security.

In general, the U.S. role as world policeman, astt22-233221an
of security in countries all over the globeour security interest and in fact cou 

into unwanted conflict.

in ervention is fre uently the cause of regional
instability,qcertainly not its cure. The
assumption that the United States (or the Soviet_Union) can?l
or should involve itself in every local problem in the worl
is a relic from the past age of colonialism. .Most of the
peoples in the developing nations are strongly and militantly .
opposed to such great power intrusion (notwithstanding the
preferences of U.S.?imposed military dictators). The intro_
duction of the great powers into regional conflicts can only

exacerbate and inflame local tensions and increase the like-
lihood of major war.

The U.S. presence in Europe also increases the likelihood

that a regional conflict would lead to direct superpower con-_
frontation, with the added risk of nuclear war. American armies
in Western Europe, like those of the Soviet Union in the East,
are instruments of political leverage over the internal affairs
of the host countries. If a major goal of'U.S. foreign.and.
military policy is the prevention of nuclear war, our present
policy of deploying massive military forces (including a large:
number of theater nuclear weapons) in.Europe contradicts this
declared aimi To the extent that these forces increase the:
likelihood of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union,

they increase the probability of nuclear war.

It.is also_important to note that the United States carries
a disproportionate share of the responsibility for European
defense. _The United States spends over 5 1/2 percent of its
gross national product on arms, compared to an average oi'

3 1/2 percentrfor our 13 NATO allies. 'West Germany the
largest NATO power in Europe, spends under 4 percent of its-
GNP on its military. These inequities exi
that many Common Market countries are now i
and economic condition than the United Stat
to approve greater spending may reflect a more 

9 Europe.

for example with
the Carter Administration's revival of salient featuresgof th

a 0 i I
with the Sov1et Union despite profound differe?czgt?g: relath?'
policy issues. The fundamental question is- .r many
we are supposed to be defending do 

of the risk, why are we continuing to - -
I ma
military posture in Europe? lntain our present

50

The Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area has become a special
priority for American military attention.. The.military
force expansion in the Indian Ocean that 13 now underway
rapresents a peculiarly dangerous form of American inter?
vention. In recent months,r the United States has maintained
an armada of 31 ships (including 2 aircraft carriers) and
20.000 sailors off the Persian Gulf. The Rapid Deployment
Force is also being trained primarily for use in this area.
The expansion of the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean is also accelerating. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
announced in early April that they are studying a plan to
spend_over $1 billion over the next several years to enlarge
this base. In addition, the United States is negotiating
for new military bases in Oman. Kenya, and Somalia. Talks
are also underway concerning the possible construction of

a major carrier port in the West Australian city of Perth.
The long-term goal is a permanent U.S. fleet in the Indian

Ocean. backed by a new series of military installations.

This new and unprecedented U.S. commitment to policing the
Indian Ocean is directly related to the drive to renew con-
scription. The U.S. Navy (which shoulders the primary res?
ponsibility for this policy) is already suffering personnel
shortages. and these will increase as new ships and commitments
are added. The House Armed Services Committee, for example,
-added four new ships and reactivated two older ones in its
military authorization bill. thereby increasing naval manpower
needs. The overall force levels for the Navy in FY 1981 are
scheduled to be nearly 10,000 more than in 1980. Said the
Committee: "Because the Navy is operating a sizable task

force in the Indian Ocean the existing personnel shortages
have become exacerbated." These shortages will strengthen
arguments for a return to the draft. It is significant that
the first member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publicly
advocate renewed conscription was the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Thomas Hayward.

Recommended policy moves in the area of general purpose
(or conventional) forces take the form of force structure and

weapons systems proposals. Recommendations for force structure
cuts are as follows:

Nithdrawls from_Europe. Even a minor reduction in our com-
mitment to Europe would allow American manpower levels to

be lowered by 90,000. This would amount to the combat and
related slices of two Army divisions and one or more Air Force
wings. The annual savings from a reduction and deactivation

of just 90,000 troops in Europe would be $1.2 billion. Of
course. there would be further related cuts in the combat
support. sustaining support. and general overhead that is
realted to these troops that would be withdrawn and deactiv?
ated; and the other active units we keep in Europe could also be
removed and deleted from the force structure, as well as a
considerable portion of those units we keep in the United States
primarily for combat in Europe. These aspects of force re?
duction will be discussed below. The proposed reductions in

 

51

troops would be accompanied by deletions of theater nuclear

forces.

These reductions could be unilateral. But they Sh?Ul? Pei
conducted in conjunction with a concerted diplomatic initia?
tive to seek similar reductions from the Soviet Union. The
announcement of an initial withdrawl of U.S. troops might be
combined with an invitation to the Soviet Union to enter

into serious negotiations for mutual reductions. Such ne?
gotiations should avoid the pitfalls that have beset the . .
Mutualand Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks the 
difference in perspective on residual forces, and the more
recent dispute about the starting figure for Warsaw Pact troOps.
But our program for troop withdrawal from Europe should not be
mortgaged to the hope of eventual progress in mutual force
Ireduction talks with the Russians. It makes sense in.1tself,

and should be pursued independently.

Withdrawl from Asia. Present U.S. force commitments in Asia
are By and?large in support of repressive dictatorships
(especially in Korea and the Philippines). The alleged imr
portance to Japan's security of the troops we keep in the
Western Pacific (46.000 in Japan itself and the rest of the
100,000 throughout.the area) has been greatly exaggeratedd
Japan is more than capable of defending itself if the need
arises. Simplistic scenarios of the Soviet menace are unr
realistic, especially in light of the Sino-Soviet dispute

and the vulnerability of Russia's long supply lines across
Siberia.

 

 

The more than 100,000 Army. Air Force. Navy, and.Marine troops

we keep in Asia can and should be withdrawn and disbanded from
the force structure. The annual savings from such a move

would be $1.4 billion in immediate. direct costs. (Again.

as in the case of forces in and for EurOpe, these do not
represent the totality of the forces the United States main-
tains both in and for Asia, and correspondin 1 th 
cuts do not exhaust the possibilities for 

comprehensive reductions of our forces for.Asia are indicated
below.)

Othe?_hanpower Savings

In addition to the savin that co

reductions in our force gtructure 
cutbacks in the personnel area can be realized thro ?ml? 
efficiency and fairness. One form of abuse fre ug Simp 
by the National Taxpayers Union is "double?d.

 



52

on such additional retirement income for

A $20.000 ceiling 
$1 billion annually.

such personnel would save

Further efficiencies could come through lowering officer?

enlisted ratios to pre-Vietnam levels (this would save
$200 million annually) and cutting new Civilian hiring by

the Pentagon (this would save $400 million annually.)

The second category of general purpose forces where con-
Siderable savings are possible is the procurement of cov-
ventional weapons systems. The largest capital expenditures
in the military budget are for the acquisition of new con?-
ventional arms. The total procurement budget for FY 1931 is
$40.6 billion. (This includes some funding for strategic
programs as well.) The House and Senate Armed Services
Committees have increased that sum, which represented the
Administration request. Conventional weapons spending now
slated for FY 1981 includes: $17 billion for aircraftr $7
billion for missiles, and over $8 billion for new ships

(the latter are the House Armed Services Committee figures).

This massive upgrading of U.S. forces is wasteful and un-

necessary, and could be substantially scaled down. especially
if the force reductions recommended elsewhere were implemented.

Vast financial savings could be realized through the deferment
or cancellation of many of the present large?scale procurement

programs.

The number of specific procurement programs that could be
reduced or eliminated is too large for consideration here.
A precise figure for the potential dollar savings from sub-

stantial cutbacksis hard to determine; but a reasonable
estimate (in the context of the initial force reductions

recommended for Europe and the Pacific) would be $8 billion
annually. with additional savings in future years as other
reductions take effect.

Listed below are a few of the most expensive and controversial
conventional weapons systems now being deployed or developed.
with recommendations for potential reductions:

r?lB Naval_Fighter. The is one of the most expensive
items in the entire military budget. Full-scale production
is beginning this year, with an anticipated total expenditure
in FY 1981 of $1.7 billion. This program is plagued with
numerous cost and performance difficulties. The estimated
cost of the entire 1,366?plane program hasx?sen 125 percent
in the last five years, with unit costs jumping 25 percent in
the last year alone. Moreover. the GAO has raised serious
questions about the plane's reliability and performance. The
GAO has critiCized the Navy for rushing into production on the
program. saying that the result could be "increased costs and
a poSSibly ineffective aircraft." Senator Gary Hart (D-CO)

 

 

 

53

has urged a halt to the program because the Ell-1121135113.;
inferior to other designs and because it comrru. Sircraft

to continued production and operation of large a tailed
carriers. The program should be severely cur 

for a saving in FY 1981 of $1.5 billion.

F-14. DeSpite numerous problems with cost and performance,
procurement of the F-14 continues at a high rate. The House
Armed Services Committee has recommended the expenditureof
$927 million in FY 1981. The F-l4 has skyrocketed in price
and now costs nearly $30 million each. The program has been
criticized as a bailout for the financially troubled Grumman
Corporation. It should be drastically curtailed. Potential
savings are $500 million for FY 1981.

 

Air Force procurement of the troublesome and ex? 
pensive F-15 also continues, with a scheduled 1981 expenditure

of $743 million. The unit cost of these planes has also risen
dramatically and is now approximately $24 million. Production
of the should be reduced, and cheaper alternatives (the
costs ?only" about $10 million per unit) should be de-
veloped. Potential savings for FY 1981 would be $350 million.

Advanced Attack Helico ter (AAH) . The Army is beginning full-
We. AAH this year, despite the
fact that the Cobra helicopter it is designed to replace is
still being produced and is adequate to meet combat require-
ments. The GAO has questioned whether the AAH will be more
effective than the Cobra (deSpite a considerably higher price)
and has called for further study and testing. The production

decision on the MH should be indefinitel dafer
saving in FY 1981 of $200 million. red, for a

 

eration of missile design
these missiles among
substantial savings.

tifia
programs 15 the Army's Patriot missile Theb?:t:?o:list1?:?e

air missile to replace

many performance failures and It has been plagued With

Services Committee reported

. an out -
ls unworkable and unnecessar Of ten misses. The system
apped in its

54

Main Battle Tank This is the first bailout.
The has certain positive features (such as a laser
range finder that greatly improves accuracy). but it is

also a costly. potentially unworkable monster. and it should
be thoroughly reassessed. The GAO has sharply criticized
the performance ability of the tank's turbine engines and
has recommended a slower rate of development until the bugs
are eliminated. The program should be substantially reduced
from the requested 1931 production rate of 569 tanks. The
potential savings from a slower development rate in FY 1981

could be $500 million.

 

 

 

 

Infantr Fightin _ehicle stem This system. de-
s1gned ?extremely expensive
and unnecessarily complicated attempt to provide greater
mobility to infantry troops. The Congressional Budget Office
says that FVS costs per vehicle have doubled in the last year.
and that cheaper alternatives are available. This program

should be halted. for a FY 1981 saving of $460 million.

55

Shipbuilding. The Administration has requested authorisatlog
in FY_19Slmfor the construction of 16 new ships: at a 0 
$6.2 billion. The House Armed Services Committee added to 
the authorization of four new ships and two reactivations.
bringing the total shipbuilding budget to over $3 

 

Arguments for this naval buildup are usually based on allega?
tions of Soviet naval superiority. However. the United States
and the Western allies have a substantial naval advantage over
the Soviet Union and have no need for further expans1on. Cone
gressional Budget Office figures on the naval balance are as
follows:

U.S. and Allies Soviet Union

 

 

Attack submarines 259 263
Aircraft and helicopter carriers 34 4
Escorts of over 1,000 tons 658 321

In general. the United States has a huge lead over the Soviet
Union in ship tonnage and the number of major capital vessels.
The Soviets have a.larger total number of ships tmaking comr
parative figures seem alarming) but 45 percent of these Soviet
vessels are small patrol class ships of under 1,000 tons disb-
placement. Furthermore. the Soviets are severely hampered by

a lack.of overseas naval bases and easily accessible ice?free
domestic ports.

The present frenetic naval buildup is thus totally unnecessary.
more important. it is an invitation to foreign intervention and
war. since such naval forces are the primary instrument for'
projecting U.S. power abroad. The buildup of the.American Navy
in the Indian Ocean is a dangerous case in point.

This naval expansion should be halted and a more orderly pace
of gradual modernization put in its place. A more rational
shipbuilding program would allow for the cancellation or defer-

ment of numerous ships now under construction. These would
include: 

Nuclear.Attack Submarines. 3 more are being authorized

for FY 1981 (35 are already authorized). Eliminate

these new ships and slow the rate of 
. nd
others. Savings for FY 1931: $1 on

Aegis C1ass_Cruisers. 2 more are be
FY 1981 (forma total of 4).
duction of the two already un
for FY 1981: $1.5 billion.

56

Guided Missile Frigates. 6 more are being authorized.
They can be slowed and partially eliminated. Po-
tential savings in FY 1931: $750 million.

gmphihious Assault Ships. The first of 6 planned ships
's being authorized in FY 1931--more to follow.
These are primarily to support intervention against
armed opponents. They should be eliminated,

for savings in 1981 of $380 million.

57
Less Bang for __the Buck_

for a eneral note on the effiCiency 
ggliaci :Eeiilffeof our gresent conventional armed forces.
The current tendency toward the procurement of multiple
models of high technology ("gold-plated") weaponry giners
military capability. The proliferation of weapogz seggns
four new jet fighters. the agd_ .
are being developed at the same time) and thea_ 1t10n
of multiple performance specifications (particularly in
electronic imaging and tracking) have greatly increased the
unit cost of new weapons. New fighters. tanks. or 
are now often three or four times the cost of the systems
they are replacing. For example, eachiF-14 costs nearly'
$30 million. compared to $2.6.million for the F74. The
MmY's new tank will cost nearly $1.8 million. more
than.four times the price of the Because of these
price increases, the United States ends up buying fewer
numbers of more expensive weapons and gets less military'
capability despite higher budgets.

These exorbitant procurement expenditures also detract from
the funds available for the Operation and Maintenance of
existing forces. It is much flashier (and more profitable
to military contractors) to fund a new jet fighter than

to buy additional spare parts. Nobody becomes a general

by recommending more maintenance. But the need for suf?
ficient Operation and Maintenance funding has become a major
national security issue. Glaring deficiencies now plague
forces. Part of the savings realized through the reduc?
tions we are proposing couldbe redirected to the upkeep and
maintenance of the weapons we now possess. (Of "course. the

drastically reduced forces we recommend would also require
much lower operation and maintenance funds.)

Another problem area that is being neglected in the rush.to
purchase new weapons is the all-volunteer force. specifically
the shortages of skilled professionals and the widespread re-
cruitment fraud. Efforts to resolve these problems could
also defuse current pressures for a return to the draft

Since at least part of the argument for reviving conscription
concerns the alleged failings of the volunteer force. Hal-
practice is particularly widespread. One study discussed in
the House Armed Services Committee Defense.Authorization re?
port found 5 percent of the Army's recruiters and 8.4 percent

of the Navy's recruiters uilt of . 
tests. Cheating on enlistment

. that milit - - -
involuntary servitude. ary conscriptlon ls

. It is unconstitutional un
Thirteenth.Amendment, it is COmPIetely inimical tgeihzhe

 

58

fundamental American principle of individual liberty,

and it can never be considered an acceptable policy. In
any case, the personnel problems faced by the armed forces
do not stem from the all-volunteer force. The shortage

0f skilled professionals, particularly in the Navy, will
not be solved by a return to the draft. Indeed, the House
Armed Services report stated that "the reinstitution of
conscription may make it more difficult to solve these
deficiencies." In order to attract and keep the skilled
professionals a modern force needs, we must be willing to
pay competitive wages. Such a policy will not cost very
'much: perhaps up to $1 billion annually to improve the
Pay of some 100,000 personnel. Of course, the much lower
overall force levels recommended in this White Paper would
greatly alleviate the present presumed "manpower shortage"
and would allow the continuation of an all?volunteer force,
'with improved levels of average competence.

Comprehensive Defense_Budget Reductions

"We are now almost in a position to translate our new prin?
ciples of foreign policy and our suggestions on reducing
the force structure and cutting major weapons-systems into
some important changes in America's defense budget.

But first, let us consider the defense budget put forward

by the present Administration, and some of its implications.
The FY 1981 military-budget, as requested by the Carter
Administration, is $159 billion (in total obligational author?
ity). This represents a 5 percent increase, over the rate of
inflation, from the'FY 1980 defense budget of $139 billion.
The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have recommended
an even larger increase. The House request is $161 billion;
the Senate request is $164 billion. The arms budget has

been increasing above the rate of inflation every year since
1976. The total increase over the last four years has been
$63 billion (in current dollars).

The future outlook for the defense budget is for continued

and accelerated increases. The five-year budget submitted

by Secretary of Defense Brown shows a 25.4 percent real in?
crease above expected inflation between now and 1985, with

the budget in 1985 reaching a figure of $248 billion:

FY 1981 $159 billion
FY 1982 $180 billion
FY 1983 $201 billion
FY 1984 $224 billion
FY 1985 $248 billion

59

High.as they sound, those figures are conservative._ A
less friendly (but probably more realistle) prOJectleerld
assuming a less optimistic rate of inflatien, would yie
1985 defense spending of as much as $329 billion.

These increases are almost certain to occur, given the cur-
rent direction of arms policy. The Research end Development
budget, for example, increased in real terms in 1931 by 13
Percent (the House Armed Services Committee has an
even greater increase), from $13.5 billion to $16.7 billion.
And this RED budget contains funding for new weapons that

will enter production in.coming years, causing even steeper?
increases later. Other factors that will impel arms expen-
ditures higher include the present buildup of military forces
in the Indian Ocean (of which we have seen+only the beginning),
the Plan to increase the number of Navy ships, and the 
of new military bases in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.

Our analysis of the defense budget suggests two ways which
are complementary and_consistent with each other, as well

as being alternative -- to calculate reductions in defense
spending. The first is the conclusion of thewdetailed analysis
already conducted above, considering specific elements of the
force structure and.specific major weapons systems and arms
projects. Such an.analysis yields the following summary of
possible savings, all in terms of the.Fiscal'Year 1981 defense
budget (even though.perhaps only half-or at most two-thirds

of the savings could actually be realized in that year even.

if they were adopted):

 

 

billion

Troop reductions/withdrawls, Europe and-Asia 2.6"
Other manpower efficiencies 1.6
MK out 1.6
Other strategic weapons'cuts 4_39
Conventional weapon cuts . 4.01
'Shipbuilding cuts 3_53

I TOTAL ?17.83

A more comprehensive analysis starts with an a
defense budget, indicating the functional and
purposes of the large blocks of U.S.
how a non?interventionist foreign pol
itself into greatly reduced force re
purposes and various regions.

natomy of the
geographic
forces and considering
1ey would translate
quirements for various

 

60

The entire defense budget of $159 billion can be allocated
to either "strategic" (nuclear) forces or "general purpose"
(conventional) forces.

And general purpose forces (those forces that do not deter
or mitigate direct attacks by the Soviets or others on our
homeland) in turn can be identified with geographical re-
gions where we have commitments. It is in this way that
foreign policy and defense budgets are linked. The linkages
'might not be meticulously precise, but forces must be for
something.

 

General purpose forces take up about 78 percent of the entire
defense budget: for FY 1981, $124 billion out of the total
requested authorization of $159 billion. The regional allo-
cations of general purpose forces are: Europe with its
"southern flank", the Middle East, $83 billion: Asia $25
billion: the rest of the world and the strategic reserve

$16 billion. This allocation of costs assumes that, if we
cut missions and correspondingly cut combat forces associated
?with those missions, we would also take "full slices" in-
cluding support units and overhead out of the defense budget.
Of course, support costs and overheads do not diminish auto?
matically with cuts in the more obvious combat forces. They
must be decreased by decision.

'When we view the horizon of defense budget cuts in this way,
and if we base our force calculations on a non?interventionist
foreign policy, we find that we could defend our essential
security and our core values with a much smaller and tighter
force structure than we now have. Such a force structure
would provide the following general purpose forces: 8 land
divisions (6 Army and 2 Marine), l9 tactical air wing equiva-
lents (11 Air Force, 2 Marine which are equal to 4, and 4
Navy), with 6 carrier task forces. ?With the addition of a
diad of strategic nuclear deterrent forces (submarines and
stand-off bombers), it would require 1,250,000 men and women
(Army 390,000, Air Force 360,000, Navy 370,000, Marine Corps
130,000). The total defense budget, at the end of a period
of adjustment, would be about $90 billion a year, in FY 1981
dollars. In contrast, the Administration is asking, for FY
1981: forces: 2,059,000 men: and $159 billion.

What emerges from this analysis is that we could save 40

to 45 percent of our defense budget. At the end of half a
decade we would be spending $98 billion a yeardecade this could be reduced further to $90 billion
(in 1981 dollars, or $150 billion, assuming the same optimis-
tic rate of inflation, 6 percent, used by Harold Brown in his
projection), while projections of the Administration's figures

61

$434 billion
would yield a defense budget in that 3168125058 13 billion

I I I 
(the optimistic calculation) or as muc have
(if we dare to assmue the rates of inflation that we

been experiencing) - The cumulative 
decade would be: our forces, $1.5 trillion.

tion's program, on an optimistic calculation, 
the Administration's program, on somewhat more 
assumptions about inflation, $4.2 trillion.

These differences are not just impressive: they are startling.
And the point is that, even with the immense sawings that our
program could achieve, this country and its essential interests
and values would be well defended.

A suggested and feasible series of defense budgets would be
as follows:

 

 

 

Resulting
(FY 1981 bil.) Ini_t_i_ate__guts* Realize _Cu_ts* Defense Budget
FY 1931 13. 9. 150-
FY 1982 .32. 18.+16. 125.
FY 1983 6. 18.+32.+3. 106.
4. 101.
FY 1985 etc. etc. 98.
FY 1986 96.
FY 1937 94
FY 1933 92should be kept in mind - - .
would be only about 50 perce ?d in any year

62

-A_table describing the allocation of defense dollars. land divi-
310n5. tactical air wings, and naval carrier forces to functions
and regions is as follows (figures are present forces/proposed forces).

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tactical Naval
bil. Land Air Carrier
.Area (EX 19311 Divisions Wings Task Forces
EurOPe. 33./31. 11-2/3 19-1/3 6/3
.Atlantic 3?1 3 7-2 3
Asia. pacific 25./17. 4/2 14/6 - 6/3
Other. Strate- 16./16. 3+1[3 19?2/3: 
gic Reserve 2?2/3 5?1/3
TOTAL GENERAL 124./64. 19/3 44/19 12/5

PURPOSE FORCES

Strategic 35./26.
Nuclear Forces

TOTAL 159./90.

Reciprocity by the_Soviet Union

 

 

The troop withdrawls and weapons cutbacks outlined above stand on
their own merits. They are in the interest of the United States.
and they should be pursued unilaterally if necessary. Nevertheless.
such initiatives offer an excellent opportunity for encouraging
reciprocity by the Soviet Union. We can turn world public opinion
around. as it has been changing somewhat already. The United
States will be recognized as a superpower engaged in initiatives
for peace -- withdrawing its forces from around the world, reducing
its nuclear arsenal. and lessening the risk of nuclear holocaust.
The Soviet Union will be under great pressure to reCiprocate.

.As we withdraw troops from Europe. we can call upon the USSR to
withdraw its troops. We can join with the French and the Islamic
nations in calling for the withdrawl of both superpowers from the
.Middle East. We can call for Soviet arms reductions
-when we are clearly reducing our own nuclear arsenal.

If the Soviets reciprocate on these matters. of course. the world
-will be an even safer and more peaceful place. The nations of the
-world will be able to solve their own problems without superpower
involvement. and the people of the world will find the risk of
nuclear war greatly reduced. If the Soviets do not reciprocate,
they will be viewed by the world as an aggressive nation. Their
'military position will not improve, and their influence will de-
cline dramatically. World public opinion will turn strongly

63

against the USSR. In either case, the United States 1will
find its reSpect and legitimate influence in the world

greatly enhanced.

This opportunity to call for reciprocal troop WithdranS and
arms reduction by the Soviet Union is a great benefit of our
program of non?intervention. But, as we pointed out above,
these programs stand on their own merits. Raciprocity
should he pursued, but we must move forward with our own
disengagement and arms reduction regardless Of whether the

Soviet Union matches them.

 

 

64

9.

Domestic Economic Conversion

The U. 5. defense budget could be cut by 40 to 45 percent
without significantly increasing the risk to our essential
security. But after three decades of alternating cold and
hot war, with military budgets during that time totalling
'well over $2 trillion, a peace-oriented American economy
would require some drastic changes. What would happen to
'the millions of Americans, in and out4of the armed forces.
who now derive their income from the military establishment?

The common-sense answer is that these people and resources
'would be put to work producing the goods and services, private
and public, that make life better for all Americans. For
historical reasons, however, many Americans doubt that this
would happen.

During the 1930's, thousands of factories and farms lay idle
while millions of families were reduced to bare subsistence
through drastic wage cuts and massive unemployment. The ex-
plosion of production that made victory in world war II possible
showed clearly that the nation's productive power had not been
well adapted to meet the needs of the people. After'world War
II, in what was perhaps the sharpest demobilization in world
history, the U. S. economy adjusted quickly, without major
governmental intervention, and established the foundations

for the sustained boom of the 1950's and the first half of

the 1960's.

The postwar economic success of Japan shows that a well-coordin?
ated free enterprise economy can attain full employment without
high military spending. Yet millions of Americans cling to the
belief that a large cut in the military budget would plunge the
country into recession or even depression. This deep?seated
fear must be removed if progress is to be made in stopping the
arms race and restoring the U. 5. economic strength.

In the wake of the tax revolt, widespresd sentiment for cutting
federal expenditures and relieving tax burdens has made itself
felt on Capitol Hill. Since the Pentagon gets the biggest
piece of the pie, one would expect that the budget-cutters
-would want to take a long, hard look at military spending.

65

But logical consistency is not much in evidence 1n ?0n9:3551?tr
just as it has not shown itself to be very evident in a.
forms and the rhetoric of the major politicaljpartlesa 

of those who speak of cutting federal also want to'
beef up the military budget. In the continuing battle between
the military spenders and the social spenders for more federal.
dollars, the only sure loser is the taxpayer and the non-
military, consumer?serving private sector that supports the
whole shaky structure,

It is no accident that the United States now finds itself in a
position of preeminence in weapons design. Large and increa51ng
federally financed research and development have made U. S.
aircraft, missiles, and submarines unquestionably the world's
best. But the effects on the U. 3. economy of this concentration
on the military sector have not been healthy. Rapid advances

in weapons technology have been accompanied by a sharp reduc-
tion in technological innovation in civilian industries. As

the Washington Post reported, "Something's Happened to Yankee
Ingenuity".

Foreign manufactured goods, once restricted to expensive luxuries,
now account for a significant share of the consumer goods sold
in the American mass market. The productivity of many U. S.

consumer goods producers. has failed to keep pace with major foreign
competitors.

Whatever else it may have accomplished, the militari
that has developed over the last two decades has fai
vide sustained full employment, healthy growth, or
creases in the average standard of living.
the United States finds itself with neither
security nor the kind of civilian prosperity
envy of the world. Reversing this decline wi
changes in the organization of the-nations's
consistent with America's herita

by the misguided presumptions of the . . 
in national affairs. ?f military predomnance

zed economy
led to pro-
steady in-

As we enter the 1980's,
greater military

that was once the

11 require basic

 

 

66

In the years since World War II, big Pentagon budgets and pro?
curement contracts have brought into American manufacturing 
industry a number of military concepts and practices which un-
dermine efficiency and destroy competitive vigor. Designing
products for maximum performance without regard to cost, writing
contracts that guarantee profits through "change ordersf,

claims litigation, and a variety of other devices that trans-
form fixed price contracts into cost?plus contracts--these are
some of the consequences of an alliance of military men and
Private weapons manufacturers.

EmPhasis on military strength by a succession of presidents and
_the participation of most of the major manufacturing corporations
in some part of the defense business have focused much of the
nation's top technical and managerial talent on military pro-
duction. One result has been a decline in the prestige, influ-
ence, and competence of manufacturers who serve consumer goods
:markets. Conglomerate managers with close government connections,
such as Harold Geneen of ITT, Roy Ash, formerly of Litton, and
G.'William.Miller, formerly of Textron, have replaced the Henry
iFords and.Andrew Carnegies as folk heroes of American industry.

In the process, many Americans have forgotten that it is the
nation's farms, mines, and civilian goods factories that underc
gird the entire economy. If the present military emphasis
continues, it will not be long before U. S. military strength
itself begins to wane-?regardless of how high the military
budget is pushed?-because the production_base on which it rests

is deteriorating.

To reverse the destructive trend of the past three decades, the
United States should move to restore its manufacturing industries
to a climate of free enterprise. There is no reason other than
bad economic policies and attitudes for the dangerous decline in
American productivity. It is not to be assumed, however, that
reconversion of our economy from.its present state of militariza?
tion to a healthy orientation toward production of needed goods
and services depends on government "planning". Thousands of
private American firms can adjust to demilitarization, as they
adjust to any other shift in taste, technology, and supply.

That process of adjustment is diffuse and largely private, and
can hardly be dictated by a clique of remote bureaucrats. It
should be kept in mind that job creation is entirely the function
of private business??and largely small and mediumrsized business,
at that. Last year more than 4 million new jobs were created in
the private sector, but fewer than were in the
2,000 largest U. 5. companies. The many small businesses that

 

 

67

perform this function would perform it even better if defense
spending were cut. and if the government did not interfere in 
the adjustment process. A constructive attitude toward economic
conversion would provide a greater degree of econom1c_security
for most Americans and a continuation of the gradual improve?
ments in the standard of living that have characterized most

of our history. This means less unemployment and more production.
Maximum employment in wealth-creating activities always provides
the greatest prosperity. Not only will more goods and services
be produced, but the number of citizens receiving income for their
wort in productive non-government activities will also be at a
maximum.

Recognition by political leaders that unemployment is created
to a large extent by federal economic policies would be an
important step toward sensible alternatives to current policy.
If much of the $159 billion now slated for the Pentagon were
returned to the taxpayers, it would not only generate new em-

ployment but would also increase the production of civilian
goods and services.

The pursuit of maximum military power over 

gradually eroded our primary source of strengtle]e 3:325:12:

economy. If the United States is to maintain the soundn nf

its soc1ety--which is its real reserve of security--th ess 0

must'end its preoccupation with military matters and sin lt-

minding the store. There are other ways for nations aigtsocieties
I l'

to lose "power" than through losin 
. . a . . 
Economic stagnation is one of them. ary comPEtltlon'

68

10.

Epilogue:l Toward 

 

 

For more than thirty years, since the inception of the Cold War,
the United States has operated under the sway of a_general
"Paradigm? that can be described in two components: deterrence
and alliance. Deterrence works mostly at the level of strategic
nuclear arms, but it also applies to regional contests: it in-
cludes nuclear "umbrellas" and the threat of first use of nuclear
'weapons, and it implies "essential the
Soviet_ Union at all levels of military potential. Alliance
translates into forward defense; it includes troop deployments,
bases, military assistance, proxy regimes, security commitments,

the export of repressive technology, and an intereSt in political
"stability".

Of course, these two components, deterrence and alliance, have
been mixed in various proportions over the past three decades.
ZBut the basic paradigm has scarcely been challenged during that
time. unless this paradigm.is substantially altered, we will
be condemned to periodic exercises of "brinkmanship", credi?
bility-enhancing regional confrontations, and limited wars--
and to the hovering threat of_global nuclear destruction.

So we have to challenge both of the underpinnings of this de-
structive but pervasive and durable paradigm: deterrence and
alliance. "we have to challenge the very idea of military
balance--not whether we are currently enjoying such a balance,

but whether we need a military balance at all, as opposed to

the more limited notions of strategic stability and basic security,
'which are quite essentail. We must also challenge the doctrine

of forward defense, in the name of which we have acquired, directly
or indirectly, close to a hundred allies and clients around the
world. We can no longer afford all the old cliches, the tradi-
tional pretexts or excuses for an American global posture. Even
the invocation of "human rights" should not require these national
exertions, which have been so destructive of the very values they
purport to defend. There may well be many "fallen torches"--
endangered causes, threatened values-~lying around the world (as
James Schlesinger used to remind us): but this must not imply

that the United States has to pick up these sputtering flames.

It is time to realize that even the most sympathetic activities,
the most worthy causes, are not free. As in all things, there

69

is a price to be paid; and that price'has been_growing higher.
It is time to think of the most restricted perimeter we 

maintain to protect that core of essential Americandvilliuesaf 
that must be preserved: our political integrity an 

of our citizens and their domestic property.

Clearly, we need a counter to the destructive'f0r61gn 
paradigm that has reigned unchallenged for thirtY'Yea-rs- The
essence of this counter?paradigm would be war?avoidance and
self-reliance. In a word, now-intervention must be established
as the broad premise for American foreign and military Foal-103!-
A non-interventionist approach would base our foreign policy
and our military program on the stringent, minimal requirements
of defending our own national existence and integrity. There
might well be continuing troubles in the world. But we would
no longer consider peace to be seamless and indivisible.
Interactions with other nations, groups, and interests in

the world would continue--would intensify. and multiply, no
doubt. But we would no longer try to "manage interdependence"
by controlling the'conduct of others; we would, rather, hedge
against the conditions we could not control, and protect our
securityr by reduc1ng vulnerabilities to the practical minimum.

In short, we would opt for the realityr of ad'ustm
than the illusion of control. 3 ent rather

Ilg'CLARK

PRESIDENT

2300 Wisconsin Ave.. NW.
Washington. D. C. 20007
[202] 333-8263