Case: 1:18-cv-02675-CAB Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/18/18 1 of 20. PageID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BRIAN COFFEY
c/o his attorneys Tittle & Perlmuter
2012 West 25th Street, Ste. 716
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
On behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
BUCKEYE SHAKER SQUARE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
11802 Buckeye Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44120
c/o Its Statutory Agent
David B. Bailey
13610 Shaker Blvd. 603
Cleveland, Ohio 44120
—and—
JOHN HOPKINS
c/o Buckeye Shaker Square
Development Corporation
c/o Its Statutory Agent
David B. Bailey
13610 Shaker Boulevard
Suite 603
Cleveland, OH 44120
—and—
GARNELL JAMISON
c/o Buckeye Shaker Square
Development Corporation
c/o its Statutory Agent
David B. Bailey

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CASE NO.
JUDGE
Magistrate Judge

PLAINTIFF’S CLASS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMPLAINT UNDER THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARD ACT AND
STATE LAW

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13610 Shaker Boulevard
Suite 603
Cleveland, OH 44120

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—and—
KENNETH L. JOHNSON
c/o Buckeye Shaker Square
Development Corporation
c/o its Statutory Agent
David B. Bailey
13610 Shaker Boulevard
Suite 603
Cleveland, OH 44120
Defendants.

Plaintiff Brian Coffey, through counsel, respectfully files this Class and Collective
Action Complaint against Defendants Buckeye Shaker Square Development
Corporation, John Hopkins, Garnell Jamison, and Kenneth L. Johnson (sometimes
collectively referred to as “Defendants”).
INTRODUCTION
1.

This case seeks to rectify and remedy Defendants’ failure to pay promised

wages to the hourly employees they engaged to perform grass-cutting, cleanup work,
and other manual tasks. Regarding these unpaid wages, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219, the Ohio Constitution art. II, § 34a, and common law. Plaintiff also asserts claims
under the Ohio Fraudulent Transfer Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.01, et seq.,
alleging that Defendants unlawfully transferred Buckeye Shaker Square Development

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Corporation’s assets to themselves as well as to other persons and entities (sometimes
collectively called “Transferee Parties”) over which Defendants had effective control.
2.

Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability“ prescribed by
the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees
for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.“
Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of himself and other “similarly-situated” persons
who may join the case pursuant to § 216(b) (“Potential Opt-Ins”).
3.

Plaintiff also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

on behalf of himself and other members of a class of persons, defined herein, who assert
factually-related claims under Ohio law (the “Ohio Class”).
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FLSA claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
5.

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims

because those claims are so related to the FLSA claims as to form part of the same case
or controversy.
6.

Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b) because one or more Defendants reside in this district and division and a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred here.

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PARTIES
7.

At all times relevant, Plaintiff Brian Coffey was a citizen of the United

States and a resident of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
8.

Defendant Buckeye Shaker Square Development Corporation (“BSSDC”)

is an Ohio corporation doing business in Cleveland, Ohio. BSSDC’s principal office is
at 11802 Buckeye Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44120. According to records maintained by the
Ohio Secretary of State, its statutory agent for service of process is David B. Bailey,
13610 Shaker Blvd. 603, Cleveland, Ohio 44120.
9.

Defendants John Hopkins, Garnell Jamison, and Kenneth L. Johnson are

principal owners, officers, and/or managers of Defendant BSSDC.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Defendants’ Business
10.

Founded in 1970 as a community development organization with a focus

on rectifying commercial neglect on Buckeye Road, BSSDC claims in its website that
“BSSDC is a community development organization dedicated to growing the Buckeye
Shaker area workforce, preserving our housing stock, making our streets safe,
promoting healthy living and engaging our youth.”
11.

It provides, or purports to provide, those services through such measures

as:
(a) the provision of low-interest construction loans to local businesses and
homeowners;

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(b) the acquisition, rehabilitation, and sale of commercial and residential real
estate;
(c) property maintenance and upkeep for the purpose of construction and reconstruction;
(d) the provision of operational loans for business-to-business service companies;
and
(e) the provision of home weatherization services to income-eligible households.
12.

For many years, BSSDC achieved its community development mission

with some success. Its efforts facilitated such development as the renovation of blighted
homes throughout Cleveland’s Buckeye Road area, as well as the repurposing of the
defunct St. Luke’s Hospital.
13.

Recently, however, BSSDC’s community development activities have

dwindled. In the 2010s, BSSDC’s functions consisted largely of grass-cutting, basic
cleanup work, and other similar manual labor – ostensibly in furtherance of a
redevelopment plan to place subject properties into productive use. BSSDC conducted
those activities through 50-100 hourly, non-exempt employees.
14.

This lawsuit challenges Defendants’ failure to pay wages due and owing

to those lower-wage, hourly employees it engaged to perform such services as grasscutting, property cleanup work, and other manual tasks while simultaneously lining the
pockets of the individual Defendants and insiders of BSSDC.

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Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins and Class Members
15.

The employees that Defendants failed to pay include Plaintiff Brian

Coffey, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and
all members of the Ohio Class.
16.

Plaintiff Coffey worked for BSSDC as an hourly, non-exempt employee for

several years and continuing through August 2018.
17.

All of the Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members

were hourly, non-exempt employees within the meaning of the FLSA and Ohio law.
Defendants’ Failure to Pay Employees for All Hours Worked
18.

The FLSA and Ohio law required BSSDC to pay employees for all hours

they were “suffer[ed] or … permit[ted] to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g); O.R.C. §
4111.03(D)(1).
19.

BSSDC did not pay Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class

Members for all of the hours they were suffered or permitted to work. In fact, BSSDC
failed to pay these employees at all for the hours they worked from mid-July through
August 2018.

Defendants’ Failure to Pay Minimum Wages
20.

The FLSA and Ohio law required BSSDC to pay employees at least the

minimum wage for all hours worked. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206; Ohio Constitution art. II, § 34a.

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21.

BSSDC did not pay the minimum wage to Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins,

and the Ohio Class Members for the hours they worked from mid-July through August
2018.
Defendants’ Status as “Employers”
22.

Defendant BSSSDC was as an “employer” of Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-

Ins, and the Ohio Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
23.

Individual Defendants John Hopkins, Garnell Jamison, and Kenneth L.

Johnson were “employers” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) in that they were “person[s]
[who] act[ed] directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer,” BSSDC, “in relation
to employees,” including Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members.
Defendants Hopkins, Jamison, and Johnson were principal owners, officers, or
managers of BSSDC. All had operational control over significant aspects of BSSDC’s
operations and day-to-day functions, including compensation of employees.
24.

Department of Labor regulations provide that employees may work

simultaneously for two or more joint employers. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). Joint employment
occurs when the two employers are “not completely disassociated” from one another.
Id. Joint employers are “responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with
all of the applicable provisions of the act, including the overtime provisions.” Id.
25.

BSSDC, John Hopkins, Garnell Jamison, and Kenneth L. Johnson were

joint employers of Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members under
the FLSA and Ohio law.

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26.

At all times relevant, BSSDC, John Hopkins, Garnell Jamison, and

Kenneth L. Johnson were an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).
Willfulness of Defendants’ Violations
27.

Defendants knew that their employees were entitled to the wages they

had been promised as well as minimum wages under federal and state laws, or acted in
reckless disregard for whether they were so entitled.
28.

Defendants willfully circumvented and violated the requirements of the

FLSA and Ohio law. Defendants deliberately withheld compensation from the
employees for the hours they worked in July and August 2018, and Defendants knew or
had full reason to know that withholding their compensation would deprive them of
minimum wages for the unpaid workweeks.
COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS
29.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
30.

Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability “prescribed by
the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees
for and in behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated. “
31.

The Potential Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with

respect to Defendants’ FLSA violations consist of: All hourly, non-exempt

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employees of Buckeye Shaker Square Development Corporation during July or
August 2018.
32.

Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendants’ FLSA

violations in that all were subjected to Defendants’ unlawful wage-and-hours practices,
all were injured by those practices, and all have the same claims against Defendants for
unpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
33.

Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Courtauthorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the
opportunity to “opt in.”
34.

Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons

but avers, upon information and belief, that they total at least 50-100 persons. Such
persons are readily identifiable through the records Defendants have maintained, and
were required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29
C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
35.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
36.

Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on

behalf of himself and other members of two classes of persons defined herein.

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37.

Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of himself and other members of a

proposed Ohio Class, defined as: All hourly, non-exempt employees of Buckeye Shaker
Square Development Corporation during July or August 2018.
38.

The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is

impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but avers,
upon information and belief, that they consist of more than fifty persons. The number of
class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from records Defendants have
maintained, and were required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29
U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a.
39.

There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but

not limited to whether Defendants paid class members for fewer than all hours worked
and whether Defendants paid class members at hourly rates less than the minimum wage
for some or all workweeks.
40.

Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio

Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendants,
and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members.
41.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class.

Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of
other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action
litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and are fully qualified to prosecute the
claims of the Ohio Class in this case.

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42.

The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate

over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will
determine Defendants’ liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a
whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members.
43.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their
claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication
of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims
are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense,
and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class
members with the efficiencies of class litigation.
COUNT ONE
(FLSA Minimum Wage Violations)
44.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
45.

Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage

provisions on behalf of himself and the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this
action pursuant to § 216(b) is attached hereto.

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46.

The FLSA required Defendants to pay their employees at least the

minimum wage for all hours they were “suffer[ed] or … permit[ted] to work.” 29
U.S.C. § 203(g). See 29 U.S.C. § 206.
47.

Defendants failed to pay minimum wages and overtime compensation to

Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins, in violation of the FLSA.
48.

In doing so, Defendants’ willfully violated the FLSA and regulations

thereunder that have the force and effect of law.
49.

As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and

overtime provisions, Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not
receive compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. Section 216(b) of the FLSA
entitles them to unpaid compensation, as well as “an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall … allow
a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendants, and costs of the action.”
COUNT TWO
(Ohio Minimum Wage Violations)
50.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
51.

Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio Fair Minimum Wage

Amendment (“OMFWA”), Ohio Constitution art. II, § 34a, on behalf of himself, the
Potential Opt-Ins in Ohio, and the Ohio Class Members.
52.

The OMFWA, Ohio Constitution art. II, § 34a, required Defendants to pay

their employees at least the minimum wage for all hours worked.

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53.

Defendants failed to pay minimum wages to Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-

Ins in Ohio, and the Ohio Class Members, in violation of the OMFWA. The OMFWA
entitles them to “equitable and monetary relief” including “two times the amount of the
back wages,” as well as “the employee's costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”
COUNT THREE
(Breach of Contract)
54.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
55.

Defendants had a contractual obligation under Ohio common law to pay

Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members for the hours they worked
according to the pay rates and other terms and conditions regularly observed.
56.

Defendants breached their contractual obligations to Plaintiff, the

Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members by failing to pay them for work
performed in July and August 2018, causing injury to them in the amount of the unpaid
wages, plus interest.
COUNT FOUR
(Unjust Enrichment)
57.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
58.

Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class Members conferred a

benefit on Defendants by working many hours for which they received no
compensation.

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59.

Defendants knew they were receiving a benefit by retaining and utilizing

Plaintiff’s, the Potential Opt-Ins’, and the Ohio Class Members’ labor while providing
no compensation.
60.

Defendants obtained the benefit of Plaintiff’s, the Potential Opt-Ins’, and

the Ohio Class Members’ labor under circumstances in which it would be unjust for
Defendants to do so without payment.
COUNT FIVE
(Fraudulent Transfer Liability)
61.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
62.

The Ohio Fraudulent Transfer Act prohibits any transfer of assets made

“with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1336.04(A)(1).
63.

The Act further prohibits any transfer made “without receiving a

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer,” where either “the debtor was
engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction”
or “the debtor intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that
the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.”
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.04(A)(2).
64.

The Act further prohibits any transfer of assets, as to a creditor whose

claim arose before the transfer, if the transferor made the transfer without receiving a

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reasonably equivalent value in exchange, and the transferor was insolvent at that time
or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. Ohio Revised Code § 1336.05(A).
65.

Plaintiff and other class members are “creditors” within the meaning of

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.01. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a]n individual
possessing a cause of action … is a ‘creditor’ within the meaning of R.C. 1336.01(C) and
has the right to question an alleged fraudulent conveyance.” Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St.
3d 305, 308 (1985), cited in Prokos v. Hines, 2014-Ohio-1415, ¶ 71 (Ohio App. 2014). A
transfer “is fraudulent as to a creditor” when the creditor’s claim arose “before, or
within a reasonable time … after, the transfer” (not to exceed four years). R.C. 1336.04(A).
66.

The Ohio Fraudulent Transfer Act nullifies “every conveyance made with

actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a present or future creditor.” Stein, 18 Ohio St.
3d at 308, cited in Walters v. Walters, 2013-Ohio-2554, ¶ 34 (Ohio App. 2013). Thus, the
statute applies to “transfers made with the intent to defraud future creditors.” Blood v.
Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App. 3d 545, 554 (2005). This application of the statute is designed
to cover situations in which “a debtor [makes] a fraudulent transfer in anticipation of a
claim.” Id.
67.

In recent years, Defendant Buckeye Shaker Square Development

Corporation has had revenues in excess of $1,000,000 per year, and paid yearly
compensation to disqualified employees – those individuals in a position to exercise
control over the organization - in excess of $500,000. Yet, beginning in July 2018 and
continuing thereafter, BSSDC has had insufficient funds to pay (or otherwise refused to
pay) its employees whose hourly wages are at or near Ohio’s requisite minimum wage.
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68.

Assets of BSSDC have been transferred in substantial amounts to

Transferee Parties related to BSSDC. The Transferee Parties include John Hopkins,
Garnell Jamison, and/or Kenneth L. Johnson to whom BSSDC paid transfers include
exorbitant salaries disproportionate to the services they rendered. BSSDC assets were
also transferred in substantial amounts to other persons and entities over which
Defendants had effective control.
69.

The transfers of BSSDC assets by and to Defendants were “transfers” of

“assets” within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.01.
70.

The transfers of BSSDC assets violated Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.04.

The transfers were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud BSSDC’s
creditors, and rendered BSSDC unable to pay the obligations Defendants knew were
being incurred to BSSDC’s hourly employees. BSSDC made the transfers without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange. When the transfers were made,
BSSDC and Defendants Hopkins, Jamison, and/or Johnson were engaged in a business
or transaction, or were about to engage in a business or transaction, for which the
remaining assets were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction, and
said Defendants intended to incur, or reasonably should have believed they would
incur, debts beyond BSSDC’s ability to pay as they became due.
71.

The Transferee Parties were “insiders” within the meaning of Ohio Rev.

Code Ann. § 1336.01.
72.

The transfers of BSSDC assets further violated Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §

1336.05. One or more of their transfers were made after obligations to Plaintiff and
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other class members arose. Such transfers were made without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange. When the claims of Plaintiff and other class members are
taken into account, BSSDC was insolvent at the time of the transfers, or became
insolvent as a result of the transfers.
73.

The Ohio Fraudulent Transfer Act authorizes the Court to set aside the

transfers, attach the transferred assets and other property of the transferees, enjoin
Defendants from further transfers, appoint a receiver to take charge of the transferred
assets and other property of the transferees, and award “any other relief that the
circumstances may require.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.07.
74.

The Act further authorizes the Court to award compensatory damages

and attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff and other class members, as well as punitive damages to
deter Defendants and others from such unlawful conduct. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1336.07(A)(3). See, e.g., Renbolt v. Kern, 2013-Ohio-1359, 2013 WL 1390607 (Ohio App.
Apr. 5, 2013) (§ 1336.07 “provides not only for the setting aside of a fraudulent transfer”
but also “any other relief that the circumstances may require,” including “punitive
damages and attorney fees”); Individual Bus. Servs. v. Carmack. 2013-Ohio-4819 (Ohio
App. Nov. 1, 2013) (quoting Aristocrat Lakewood Nursing Home v. Mayne, 133 Ohio App.
3d 651, 729 N.E.2d 768 (8th Dist. 1999) (“the amount of recovery in a fraudulent
transaction case is not always limited by the amount of the fraudulent transaction”)).
COUNT SIX
(Civil Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Transfers)
75.

Plaintiff incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully re-written herein.

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76.

BSSDC and Defendants Hopkins, Jamison, and/or Johnson planned and

arranged to transfer assets of BSSDC to themselves and other Transferee Parties, and
effectuated the transfers in furtherance of their plan.
77.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conspiracy to

commit fraudulent transfers, Plaintiff and other class members have suffered damages
including but not limited to unpaid wages and interest.
COUNT SEVEN
(Declaratory Relief)
78.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

rewritten herein.
79.

Under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.02, “courts of record may declare rights,

status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”
80.

Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 2721.01 to 2721.15, a justiciable

controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
81.

A declaratory judgment will aid in determining the rights and

obligations of the parties.
82.

As a part of the Court’s final judgment in this action, Plaintiff requests a

declaration that:
(a)

Assets of BSSDC were transferred to Transferee Parties;

(b)

The transfers violated provisions of the Ohio Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.01, et seq.;

(c)

The transfers were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud their creditors, and rendered BSSDC unable to pay

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the obligations Defendants knew were being incurred to
BSSDC’s hourly employees;
(d)

The transfers were made with ill will toward the hourly
employees, or with conscious disregard for their rights that had
a great probability of causing substantial harm; and

(e)

The transfers should be set aside for the payment of Plaintiff’s
and other class members’ claims.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:
A.

Conditionally certify this case as an FLSA “collective action”
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and direct that Court-approved
notice be issued to similarly-situated persons informing them of
this action and enabling them to opt in;

B.

Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on
behalf of Plaintiff and other members of the Ohio Class;

C.

Enter judgment against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff, the
Opt-Ins who join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the
Ohio Class;

D.

Award compensatory damages to Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins, and the
Ohio Class in the amount of their unpaid wages and commissions,
as well as liquidated damages in an equal amount;

E.

Award Plaintiff his costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in
prosecuting this action and such further relief as the Court deems
equitable and just.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Scott D. Perlmuter
Scott D. Perlmutter (0082856)
2012 West 25th Street, Suite 716
Cleveland, OH 44113
Phone: 216-308-1522
Fax: 888-604-9299
scott@tittlelawfirm.com

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s/ Thomas A. Downie
Thomas A. Downie (0033119)
46 Chagrin Falls Plaza #104
Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022
440-973-9000
tom@chagrinlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
s/ Scott D. Perlmuter
Scott D. Perlmuter (0082856)

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