Confidential and Security-Sensitive Work Product

To:

President Toni Preckwinkle

Cc:

Lanetta Haynes Turner, Chief of Staff, Office of the President
Laura Lechowicz Felicione, Special Legal Counsel, Office of the President

From:

Ted Berger, Interim Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the President
William Barnes, Executive Director, DHSEM
Kelvin Pope, Chief of Police, FPDCC

Date:

Friday, October 26, 2018

RE:

CONFIDENTIAL: President’s Security Detail Working Group Initial Assessment

____________________________________________________________________________________
At the request of the President, on Monday, October 15, 2018, Chief of Staff Lanetta Haynes Turner and Special
Legal Counsel Laura Lechowicz Felicione commissioned the establishment of the President’s Security Detail
Working Group (“working group”) to assess the current administrative, management and operational challenges
facing the President’s security detail (“security detail”). The formation of this working group was in response to
the initial findings associated with the Independent Inspector General Report 16-0299 issued on Friday,
September 28, 2018. The working group’s charge was described as follows:
The President has requested that you along with the District Police Chief, DHSEM Director and the
President’s Security Detail undertake a review of the Security Detail’s operations and practices and
recommend any necessary improvements for her review. The operational review should include, but not
be limited to an analysis of how the Security Detail is assigned and uses the County owned vehicles; where
and how those vehicles should be stored in order to ensure the safety and security of those vehicles and
the persons traveling in said vehicles; what security practices are utilized and what best practices in the
field of executive protection are used and should be implemented. In addition, this group is charged
with evaluating what training the Security Detail has received and additional training is required, including
but not limited to first responder training, and/or protective detail refresher courses.
To fulfill this mandate, we have determined the working group shall conduct this review in two phases: an initial
assessment and a final report. The initial assessment addresses previous and ongoing challenges, deficiencies
and/or risks deemed critical to the successful management of the detail as identified by the detail’s previous
employer, the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (“DHSEM”). The
initial assessment also reflects input from the detail’s current (and recently assigned) employer, the Forest
Preserve District of Cook County Police Department (“District Police Department”). The purpose of the initial
assessment is to provide the Cook County Board President with an immediate initial status report to highlight past
and current challenges, risks and areas for improvement. The initial assessment is being submitted within 14 days
of the request for action. The full report is designed to review the cursory findings of the initial assessment with
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 Confidential and Security-Sensitive Work Product
greater detail, to examine industry-recognized best practices and to make recommendations for corrective action
or the development and implementation of new operational policies and procedures.
It should be noted that during the development of the initial report, only DHSEM and the District Police
Department were consulted. This was due in part to the absence of the security detail chief while on personal
vacation. It was also deemed appropriate given the initial assessment’s intent to review the overall management
of the team from the vantagepoint of the team’s employer.
The initial assessment highlights the following areas of concern:
Lack of Management Oversight and Failure to Adequately Follow Chain of Command:

Failure to Report the Theft of a County Vehicle:

Failure to Implement a Policy to Adequately Secure Vehicles Used to Transport the Executive:

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 Confidential and Security-Sensitive Work Product
Need to Regularly Conduct Risk, Vulnerability and Threat Assessments:

Failure to Develop Operational and Tactical Standard Operating Guidelines or Other Job-Related Aides:

This assessment serves as the working group’s initial findings relative to the management of the security detail.
Please note these findings do not constitute a final recommendation for action; in many of these findings,
with which additional scrutiny and/or a
recommendation for reform is needed. The working group will now undertake the necessary research to complete
a full report to include recommendations for consideration.

End of report.

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