(1-a/1)

I. INTERPRETIVE CHRONOLOGY
A.) Before the Arab Oil Embargo, 1970-73
Background
As the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.S. was little concerned
for its future energy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
equaled about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern was the
threat of a flood of cheap oil. 0il imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price.
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Com-

) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
equivalent of domestic or imported oil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while gas distribu-
tion companies aggressively sought new customers.

The decline in coal's contribution to U.S. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but nuclear
power held the clear promise for the long-term future, and in the
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.

The memory was still fresh that America could protect itself

and aid its allies when oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was how production

) from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Slope could
be absorbed into the American market.


(1-a/2)
Then came 1970, a bad year for the U.S. petroleum industry. A o
slowdown in leasing resulting from public and media reaction to the
Santa Barbara oil spill of January 1969 began to have its impact.
Tax reform eliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
oil. The first of many lengthy regulatory and court proceedings
blocked construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. Construction of all
sorts of energy facilities became bogged down in lengthy "environ-
mental impact" statements and proceedings, which also compounded
the now mushrooming licensing difficulties of the nuclear industry.
Amendments to the Clean Air Act became law, setting the stage for
added gasoline demand -- a result of the temporary and inefficient
redesign imposed on automobile producers and a prelude to the
longer-term switch to lead-free gasoline.
2
In 1971, the federal government imposed emergency price freezes
and controls on the entire U.S. economy, effectively limiting
the U.S. petroleum industry's ability to develop new supplies --
ironically just months after the first signal that OPEC had come
of age. In February, the Teheran Agreement imposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%, bringing most
to over §2 a barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreement secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya.
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap emerged between con-
trolled interstate natural gas prices and free-market intrastate
gas, reinforcing the shift of supplies away from transcontinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
u.s.


(1-A/3)

) As 1973 unfolded, most producing nations were climbing aboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial acquisition of ownership in
its oil-producing concessions. By June, facing strongly increas-
ing oil demands (U.S. oil imports increased by a fifth in 1972
and another third in 1973, raising the import percentage to 36%
of supply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increase,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Meanwhile, U.S. price controls on domestic oil became
more and more complex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of "old" and "new" oil were created.
And the U.S. replaced mandatory ceilings on the volume of imported
oil with a fee on imports.

D on the eve of the embargo, national energy policy was in total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With few exceptions, the
public, government, and the media did not have the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.

Mobil response

By 1970, Mobil was well aware that the U.S. was heading for a
severe energy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of understanding of
energy issues was made worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the media to business in general and oil companies in particular.

D ine op-Ed progran vas Mobil's prime response for dealing with
emerging issues in a way that would assure control of the context


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same time as Op-Eds began (sporadi-  (@)
cally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil also made the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a $1 million contribution (at that
time the largest from any company) and providing a new dimension of
quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Op-Ed
ads were sometimes used to promote television programs (see III-S),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds.
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
moting selected philanthropies such as the United Negro College
Fund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educa-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar causes (see ITI-R). After oe
these and other, primarily low-key themes in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Eds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes:
Mass transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil company would not be expected to support. Mobil
took the lead among oil companies in calling for a National Master
Transportation Program. Such a program not only would provide
for the highways the country needs, but it would also make possi-
ble adequate public transportation. This was an unusual view for
an oil company but, as we pointed out when we announced our Posi- o
tion in that first ad, "we don't believe the gasoline consumed by


(1-8/5)

n a car idling in a traffic jam...is the best possible use of
America's limited petroleum resources."
The energy situation: Ads (see III-I) dealt with the need for
coherent U.S. energy planning, the loss of incentives for dis-
covery of new natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-use that resulted from these prices, the need
to get Alaskan oil to U.S. markets, and the need for additional
offshore drilling -- all clear responses to issues already
impending, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
of Op-Ed firsts: calling for a national energy policy, warning
of a natural gas shortage, and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems.

D
Growth: We addressed the need for continued economic growth, for
which more energy would be needed, as the only way to provide higher
living standards for poor people, both in the U.S. and around the
world (see II1I-J). We believed this emphasis was extremely impor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns were unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth-type thinking.
Environment: As part of our effort to get greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue with the extremists of the environmental
movement who insisted that cleaning up the environment was an
absolute priority, without considering the need for emergy/envi-

) ronment tradeoffs (see ITI-F).


Se Tee RR
(1-a/6)

Conservation: Knowing that the U.S. had a serious energy problem, o
we ran several ads urging greater conservation of energy, particu-
larly gasoline (see III-G).
Capitalism: Our ads drew attention to the value of the free enter-
prise system in promoting economic growth. In a period of skepticism
about business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (see III-K, L, M).
One Op-Ed that deserves special mention was "The U.S. Stake in Middle
East Peace" which in June 1973 argued the need for a peaceful settle-
ment of outstanding Middle East issues (see III-Q/Attachment 1).
This resulted in a huge volume of anti-Mobil mail, demanding that we
spell out what we thought was an "equitable" solution of the middle
Eastern situation. Sheik Yamani, however, was so impressed with
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani to convey
his personal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mobil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, since war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred soon afterward.
Read today in the light of what has happened in the Middle East in
the intervening years, the ad seems extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed.
In all of these ads, we concentrated on reaching opinion leaders
in government, the media, and elsewhere, as the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


(1-A/7)
During the Pre-embargo period, our Government Relations people in
Washington focused on a variety of issues, including natural gas
pricing, import controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation.
The company continued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Controls program, particularly for small refiners which
already enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
was sympathetic to the oil industry, and oil industry representa-
tives generally had plenty of opportunity to communicate with
officials and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor.
This comparative calm was felt in Mobil's media relations programs,
where a small press relations staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operations in South Africa,
where we were criticized by church groups, but the company mounted
a vigorous defense through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our operations in that


(I-A/Attachment 1)
America has the world's best highways
1% °
And the world's worst mass transit.
We hope this ad moves people...
In recent years the United States has devel- systems are for the most part still in the wild
oped a really superb highway system. It's been blue yonder.
built with tax revenues earmarked specifically Providing for our future transportation
for road building. needs will require very large expenditures. We
But the highway construction boom has believe there's an urgent need for legislators to
been accompanied by a mass transit bust. Train reexamine the procedures used to generate
and bus travel in this country, with few excep- and expend transportation revenues. Such a re-
tions, is decrepit. The air traveler suffers in- view may yield the conclusion that special ear-
creasing indignities despite bigger, faster marked funds are no longer the best approach.
planes. In weighing priorities, no decision-maker
Greater New York is a typical example. You can ignore the increasing congestion on those
can depend on commuting to and from Manhat- fine highways of ours, especially in and around
tan—but only to be undependable and slow. On the great urban centers. But more and better
public transport, the 25 miles to Westfield, N.J. mass transit could stop traffic jams before they
takes 75 minutes at an average speed of 20 start. Just one rail line has triple the people-
miles per hour. The 33 miles to Stamford, Conn. moving capacity of a three-lane superhighway.
takes 60 minutes at 33 mph. The 26 miles to It costs less—in energy consumption and in
Hicksville, LI. takes 55 minutes at 28 mph. money—to move people via mass transit than
When you're on time. on highways. Thus mass transit means less air
You have to be a stoic with stamina to use pollution.
public ground transportation for a trip beyond It also means conservation. Whether the
the commuting range. Fly to a nearby city? You energy comes from gasoline for cars, or fuel
can hardly get at our congested air terminals, oil, natural gas, or coal for electric power plants,
either by land or air. The ride to or from the it's derived from a diminishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight. So we think all forms of transportation should
Mass transit seems to work better abroad. be brought into a national plan for safe, rapid,
Americans are agreeably impressed by the fast, economical ways of moving people—consistent
comfortable, and attractive subways in foreign with the wisest use of our energy resources.
cities. Intercity trains in other countries make While Mobil sells fuels and lubricants, we
ours look pitiful. Japan's high-speed Tokaido don't believe the gasoline consumed by a car
line carries more than 200,000 passengers a idling in a traffic jam (carrying a single passen-
day. Clean, comfortable French, German, Ital- ger, probably) is the best possible use of Amer-
ian, and British trains regularly attain speeds ica's limited petroleum resources. Our products
over 100 mph. European railroads are already ought to help more people get where they want
planning or building expresses that will do bet- to go. i
ter than 150 mph. To us, that means a green light for mass
Yet, in the United States, new mass transit transit . . . soon.
This ad appeared in the New York Times on October 19, 1970
co


(1-B/1)

B.) The Embargo, 1973-74

Jn October 8, 1973, war broke out between Israel and several of
ts Arab neighbors, and the U.S. rushed additional military aid
to Israel. Arab oil-producing nations retaliated by placing an
embargo on shipments to the U.S. and several other nations, and
OPEC unilaterally raised posted prices nearly 70% (to over §5 a
barrel). The exporters, sensing the companies’ ability to rear-
range supplies, quickly shifted to curtailing production, so that
nearly 10% of the free world's oil supplies were removed from
international trade during the winter of 1973-74. By year-end,
posted prices were increased again, to more than $9 per barrel.
By March 1974, the embargo was lifted and production restored.
But the era of ample low-cost energy had ended, and a permanent
change in how nations manage energy supply and consumption had
been wrought. The effects would continue to be felt for a long
time, and throughout the economic systems of the western world.
Actions taken in the U.S. in the heat of the moment persisted
for years. Permanent damage was done to the credibility of the
energy industries because of the lack of understanding of the
issues by the media and government staffs.
specific actions started with the Administration's hastily con-
trived "Project Independence," an attempt to totally end imports
by 1980. It was proposed in November 1973, the month when the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was signed into law -- a law
that plagued the industry with price and allocation controls
at all levels until its expiration (and amendments to it) in


(1-8/2)
September 1981. Government attempts to reduce consumption by o
cutting speed limits, eliminating Sunday sales of gasoline,
allocating shipments, and pressuring major oil companies into
husbanding inventories exacerbated the hysteria and the shortage,
even though (in retrospect) petroleum supplies would have been
adequate for demand for that length of curtailment.
Mobil response
In this situation, Mobil ads
-- Continued to stress the need for improved U.S. energy
production and for additional conservation (see III-G and I).
-- Increased the emphasis on the need for profits, at a time
when the industry was accused of making "obscene profits"
during the embargo, and spoke out against accusations that 2
Mobil was cheating its customers (see III-M, N).
-- Explained some reasons for the shortages (e.g. that motorists
were carrying much more gasoline around in their tanks, thus
contributing to the difficulty of getting more).
One useful new ad format was successfully used for the first time.
This was "Musings of an oil person," which enabled us to address a
number of topics in one ad, in a chatty readable style (Attachment 1).
During the immediate embargo period, however, Mobil Public Affairs
was essentially on the defensive, as members of Congress and the
press accused the oil companies of rigging the shortage, and
Senator Henry Jackson castigated the heads of the seven largest 3
il companies who appeared before his Permanent Subcommittee on


(1-B/3)

Investigations and insulted them on national television, while
labeling oil industry profits "obscene".
Our response was to accelerate reorganization of the Public
Affairs effort. This included appointing a Vice Chairman for
Public Affairs, and a policy coordinator whose responsibility
it was to see that the company spoke with a single voice on all
issues. The company also further geared up for an expanded Media
Relations effort, with visits by top executives to newspapers in
key cities, coordinated with the American Petroleum Institute media
program. Efforts were made to get company executives on television
programs across the country, combating the negative image of the
oil companies portrayed by that medium.
On the cultural front, the highlight of this period was Mobil's
introduction in January 1974 of the Bellamy family to the American
public on Upstairs, Downstairs, perhaps the best remembered of all
Mobil's television productions. The show was eventually to add
seven Emmy awards to those "Masterpiece Theatre" had already reaped
(see 111-5).

)


(1-B/Attachment 1)
Wonder if ofl company sdvertising  yesr of full-page explanations by us
180% risking indecent overexposure | Won't set straight: Hate to be on the
these days. There's 30 much oil on defensive all the time. Am our top
the tube and in print. Guif, Snell Bansgezont people with facts and got
and Texaco all ‘ran fall-pagers on Shenon TV penbls and talk shows.
tho same day last week in ine Times. They still look drab mext toa
Mobil's on the Op-5a page svery Politician making some wild allegation
Thursday, Why do we sil do iif Some against us because he's Tumning for
critics’ think the ads show the Something. Doss he have to un on our
companies are conspiring to brainwash backs? Sure he doss--as long as hers
“he public. Others think tne adversis- are gas lines. What do we tell the Ey
ing deluge proves we can't do anything who's boiling mad at usin our
right, not even conspire. But an oil station or some other company's--sfter
Company has to find some way of speak- Waiting two hours for the privilege of
ing its mind and letting the public paying $1.10 for two gallons of gas?
mon what's going on, capesisily sow Ate we going to tell his helabetn
shen oil companies ate acoused of wasting enesey for years? No may. Te
being secretive. Have to take risk of him to lay off those Jackrabbit
Soving To Wicker to nadses over the  starta? fa'll find that out for
To plous, self-serving, devioss, Binsels. That Detroit's naughty for
sealy-outhed, selfexoulpsting, building ig cars, thas we shouldnt
Bolter than thou, positively sickening have built all those superhighmays,
O11 company advertisements in which ~ that we're sorry we gave away ell iat
) these international behemoths depict glassware? Forget it. Should we remind
Themselves as poverty-siricken §1a'warve been marine for yeacs that
Seragons of virtue scbaitled geinst a Ihe snerey Crisis was coming? feild
Beiesy ana ignorant orld." Ton turms mow down ihe pumps and Who would blame
£ hice phrase, but doesn't, he know him. No, nave’ to fous on the positive
fore frustrated in trying to get things wo can do. Tell hin we're
ntormasion to the pUSLict fry uo buy Tecriling She sotey He para 0: Che
$TEeToa 2 to say acaething suvstentive pup Tight back into oil-Finding
ind she networks clover Jou wiih the offshore, Alaska, anywhere, Into sors
airness doctrine. Suse with Tadic Fotinery capacity. In z
mee vent ihe Pt symtherio Toels From sont, tar sends,
See 5 oiipasy wo subsiantiste its  far-out processes in the lab. Dammit,
Tt ariisie, just as if an ides We're 4 en-do company in a can-do
vers Tike a por foothpaste. Moy dont Coumery. Give us & Tou yess aad weit
“xhuze Uadison and sake biz = gas lines just & quain
Sibssantiave the SILL of Rigmte? sure, EE
“k to print sedia to te Seantize, reason
ER no pn me emit
EO eequontly dont understand lave and regulations. Fight the tro-
Ee xieies of our industry, Only times-imo-equals-five logicisns who
Specialists. And iow ~ think the same outfit that brings you
oe Onews seleases can we send the U.S. Mail can find oil three miles
Ths before they serena for mercy? index the ocean bottom. Give people
eS Deen to use TV 50 127 to reach the facts. Give thes genuine
a ee ahose opinions stout oil information. Speak out, Persuade them
"%y what Cronkite, %o listen. Hever boro them. If at
BE i first we don't succeed, bust a gut
Chanceiior and Reasoner say every rN
Oa 1yi Tn 30 sesonds they trying again. No other wey.
eg nongh wrongloing that a end up morking for the governaent
Mobil
hts ad appeared in the New York Times on February 28, 1974.


(1-a/1)

I. INTERPRETIVE CHRONOLOGY
A.) Before the Arab Oil Embargo, 1970-73
Background
As the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.S. was little concerned
for its future energy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
equaled about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern was the
threat of a flood of cheap oil. 0il imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price.
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Com-

) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
equivalent of domestic or imported oil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while gas distribu-
tion companies aggressively sought new customers.

The decline in coal's contribution to U.S. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but nuclear
power held the clear promise for the long-term future, and in the
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.

The memory was still fresh that America could protect itself

and aid its allies when oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was how production

) from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Slope could
be absorbed into the American market.


(1-a/2)
Then came 1970, a bad year for the U.S. petroleum industry. A o
slowdown in leasing resulting from public and media reaction to the
Santa Barbara oil spill of January 1969 began to have its impact.
Tax reform eliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
oil. The first of many lengthy regulatory and court proceedings
blocked construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. Construction of all
sorts of energy facilities became bogged down in lengthy "environ-
mental impact" statements and proceedings, which also compounded
the now mushrooming licensing difficulties of the nuclear industry.
Amendments to the Clean Air Act became law, setting the stage for
added gasoline demand -- a result of the temporary and inefficient
redesign imposed on automobile producers and a prelude to the
longer-term switch to lead-free gasoline.
2
In 1971, the federal government imposed emergency price freezes
and controls on the entire U.S. economy, effectively limiting
the U.S. petroleum industry's ability to develop new supplies --
ironically just months after the first signal that OPEC had come
of age. In February, the Teheran Agreement imposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%, bringing most
to over §2 a barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreement secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya.
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap emerged between con-
trolled interstate natural gas prices and free-market intrastate
gas, reinforcing the shift of supplies away from transcontinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
u.s.


(1-A/3)

) As 1973 unfolded, most producing nations were climbing aboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial acquisition of ownership in
its oil-producing concessions. By June, facing strongly increas-
ing oil demands (U.S. oil imports increased by a fifth in 1972
and another third in 1973, raising the import percentage to 36%
of supply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increase,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Meanwhile, U.S. price controls on domestic oil became
more and more complex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of "old" and "new" oil were created.
And the U.S. replaced mandatory ceilings on the volume of imported
oil with a fee on imports.

D on the eve of the embargo, national energy policy was in total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With few exceptions, the
public, government, and the media did not have the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.

Mobil response

By 1970, Mobil was well aware that the U.S. was heading for a
severe energy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of understanding of
energy issues was made worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the media to business in general and oil companies in particular.

D ine op-Ed progran vas Mobil's prime response for dealing with
emerging issues in a way that would assure control of the context


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same time as Op-Eds began (sporadi-  (@)
cally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil also made the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a $1 million contribution (at that
time the largest from any company) and providing a new dimension of
quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Op-Ed
ads were sometimes used to promote television programs (see III-S),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds.
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
moting selected philanthropies such as the United Negro College
Fund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educa-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar causes (see ITI-R). After oe
these and other, primarily low-key themes in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Eds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes:
Mass transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil company would not be expected to support. Mobil
took the lead among oil companies in calling for a National Master
Transportation Program. Such a program not only would provide
for the highways the country needs, but it would also make possi-
ble adequate public transportation. This was an unusual view for
an oil company but, as we pointed out when we announced our Posi- o
tion in that first ad, "we don't believe the gasoline consumed by


(1-8/5)

n a car idling in a traffic jam...is the best possible use of
America's limited petroleum resources."
The energy situation: Ads (see III-I) dealt with the need for
coherent U.S. energy planning, the loss of incentives for dis-
covery of new natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-use that resulted from these prices, the need
to get Alaskan oil to U.S. markets, and the need for additional
offshore drilling -- all clear responses to issues already
impending, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
of Op-Ed firsts: calling for a national energy policy, warning
of a natural gas shortage, and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems.

D
Growth: We addressed the need for continued economic growth, for
which more energy would be needed, as the only way to provide higher
living standards for poor people, both in the U.S. and around the
world (see II1I-J). We believed this emphasis was extremely impor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns were unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth-type thinking.
Environment: As part of our effort to get greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue with the extremists of the environmental
movement who insisted that cleaning up the environment was an
absolute priority, without considering the need for emergy/envi-

) ronment tradeoffs (see ITI-F).


Se Tee RR
(1-a/6)

Conservation: Knowing that the U.S. had a serious energy problem, o
we ran several ads urging greater conservation of energy, particu-
larly gasoline (see III-G).
Capitalism: Our ads drew attention to the value of the free enter-
prise system in promoting economic growth. In a period of skepticism
about business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (see III-K, L, M).
One Op-Ed that deserves special mention was "The U.S. Stake in Middle
East Peace" which in June 1973 argued the need for a peaceful settle-
ment of outstanding Middle East issues (see III-Q/Attachment 1).
This resulted in a huge volume of anti-Mobil mail, demanding that we
spell out what we thought was an "equitable" solution of the middle
Eastern situation. Sheik Yamani, however, was so impressed with
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani to convey
his personal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mobil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, since war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred soon afterward.
Read today in the light of what has happened in the Middle East in
the intervening years, the ad seems extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed.
In all of these ads, we concentrated on reaching opinion leaders
in government, the media, and elsewhere, as the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


(1-A/7)
During the Pre-embargo period, our Government Relations people in
Washington focused on a variety of issues, including natural gas
pricing, import controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation.
The company continued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Controls program, particularly for small refiners which
already enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
was sympathetic to the oil industry, and oil industry representa-
tives generally had plenty of opportunity to communicate with
officials and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor.
This comparative calm was felt in Mobil's media relations programs,
where a small press relations staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operations in South Africa,
where we were criticized by church groups, but the company mounted
a vigorous defense through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our operations in that


(I-A/Attachment 1)
America has the world's best highways
1% °
And the world's worst mass transit.
We hope this ad moves people...
In recent years the United States has devel- systems are for the most part still in the wild
oped a really superb highway system. It's been blue yonder.
built with tax revenues earmarked specifically Providing for our future transportation
for road building. needs will require very large expenditures. We
But the highway construction boom has believe there's an urgent need for legislators to
been accompanied by a mass transit bust. Train reexamine the procedures used to generate
and bus travel in this country, with few excep- and expend transportation revenues. Such a re-
tions, is decrepit. The air traveler suffers in- view may yield the conclusion that special ear-
creasing indignities despite bigger, faster marked funds are no longer the best approach.
planes. In weighing priorities, no decision-maker
Greater New York is a typical example. You can ignore the increasing congestion on those
can depend on commuting to and from Manhat- fine highways of ours, especially in and around
tan—but only to be undependable and slow. On the great urban centers. But more and better
public transport, the 25 miles to Westfield, N.J. mass transit could stop traffic jams before they
takes 75 minutes at an average speed of 20 start. Just one rail line has triple the people-
miles per hour. The 33 miles to Stamford, Conn. moving capacity of a three-lane superhighway.
takes 60 minutes at 33 mph. The 26 miles to It costs less—in energy consumption and in
Hicksville, LI. takes 55 minutes at 28 mph. money—to move people via mass transit than
When you're on time. on highways. Thus mass transit means less air
You have to be a stoic with stamina to use pollution.
public ground transportation for a trip beyond It also means conservation. Whether the
the commuting range. Fly to a nearby city? You energy comes from gasoline for cars, or fuel
can hardly get at our congested air terminals, oil, natural gas, or coal for electric power plants,
either by land or air. The ride to or from the it's derived from a diminishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight. So we think all forms of transportation should
Mass transit seems to work better abroad. be brought into a national plan for safe, rapid,
Americans are agreeably impressed by the fast, economical ways of moving people—consistent
comfortable, and attractive subways in foreign with the wisest use of our energy resources.
cities. Intercity trains in other countries make While Mobil sells fuels and lubricants, we
ours look pitiful. Japan's high-speed Tokaido don't believe the gasoline consumed by a car
line carries more than 200,000 passengers a idling in a traffic jam (carrying a single passen-
day. Clean, comfortable French, German, Ital- ger, probably) is the best possible use of Amer-
ian, and British trains regularly attain speeds ica's limited petroleum resources. Our products
over 100 mph. European railroads are already ought to help more people get where they want
planning or building expresses that will do bet- to go. i
ter than 150 mph. To us, that means a green light for mass
Yet, in the United States, new mass transit transit . . . soon.
This ad appeared in the New York Times on October 19, 1970
co


(1-B/1)

B.) The Embargo, 1973-74

Jn October 8, 1973, war broke out between Israel and several of
ts Arab neighbors, and the U.S. rushed additional military aid
to Israel. Arab oil-producing nations retaliated by placing an
embargo on shipments to the U.S. and several other nations, and
OPEC unilaterally raised posted prices nearly 70% (to over §5 a
barrel). The exporters, sensing the companies’ ability to rear-
range supplies, quickly shifted to curtailing production, so that
nearly 10% of the free world's oil supplies were removed from
international trade during the winter of 1973-74. By year-end,
posted prices were increased again, to more than $9 per barrel.
By March 1974, the embargo was lifted and production restored.
But the era of ample low-cost energy had ended, and a permanent
change in how nations manage energy supply and consumption had
been wrought. The effects would continue to be felt for a long
time, and throughout the economic systems of the western world.
Actions taken in the U.S. in the heat of the moment persisted
for years. Permanent damage was done to the credibility of the
energy industries because of the lack of understanding of the
issues by the media and government staffs.
specific actions started with the Administration's hastily con-
trived "Project Independence," an attempt to totally end imports
by 1980. It was proposed in November 1973, the month when the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was signed into law -- a law
that plagued the industry with price and allocation controls
at all levels until its expiration (and amendments to it) in


(1-8/2)
September 1981. Government attempts to reduce consumption by o
cutting speed limits, eliminating Sunday sales of gasoline,
allocating shipments, and pressuring major oil companies into
husbanding inventories exacerbated the hysteria and the shortage,
even though (in retrospect) petroleum supplies would have been
adequate for demand for that length of curtailment.
Mobil response
In this situation, Mobil ads
-- Continued to stress the need for improved U.S. energy
production and for additional conservation (see III-G and I).
-- Increased the emphasis on the need for profits, at a time
when the industry was accused of making "obscene profits"
during the embargo, and spoke out against accusations that 2
Mobil was cheating its customers (see III-M, N).
-- Explained some reasons for the shortages (e.g. that motorists
were carrying much more gasoline around in their tanks, thus
contributing to the difficulty of getting more).
One useful new ad format was successfully used for the first time.
This was "Musings of an oil person," which enabled us to address a
number of topics in one ad, in a chatty readable style (Attachment 1).
During the immediate embargo period, however, Mobil Public Affairs
was essentially on the defensive, as members of Congress and the
press accused the oil companies of rigging the shortage, and
Senator Henry Jackson castigated the heads of the seven largest 3
il companies who appeared before his Permanent Subcommittee on


(1-B/3)

Investigations and insulted them on national television, while
labeling oil industry profits "obscene".
Our response was to accelerate reorganization of the Public
Affairs effort. This included appointing a Vice Chairman for
Public Affairs, and a policy coordinator whose responsibility
it was to see that the company spoke with a single voice on all
issues. The company also further geared up for an expanded Media
Relations effort, with visits by top executives to newspapers in
key cities, coordinated with the American Petroleum Institute media
program. Efforts were made to get company executives on television
programs across the country, combating the negative image of the
oil companies portrayed by that medium.
On the cultural front, the highlight of this period was Mobil's
introduction in January 1974 of the Bellamy family to the American
public on Upstairs, Downstairs, perhaps the best remembered of all
Mobil's television productions. The show was eventually to add
seven Emmy awards to those "Masterpiece Theatre" had already reaped
(see 111-5).

)


(1-B/Attachment 1)
Wonder if ofl company sdvertising  yesr of full-page explanations by us
180% risking indecent overexposure | Won't set straight: Hate to be on the
these days. There's 30 much oil on defensive all the time. Am our top
the tube and in print. Guif, Snell Bansgezont people with facts and got
and Texaco all ‘ran fall-pagers on Shenon TV penbls and talk shows.
tho same day last week in ine Times. They still look drab mext toa
Mobil's on the Op-5a page svery Politician making some wild allegation
Thursday, Why do we sil do iif Some against us because he's Tumning for
critics’ think the ads show the Something. Doss he have to un on our
companies are conspiring to brainwash backs? Sure he doss--as long as hers
“he public. Others think tne adversis- are gas lines. What do we tell the Ey
ing deluge proves we can't do anything who's boiling mad at usin our
right, not even conspire. But an oil station or some other company's--sfter
Company has to find some way of speak- Waiting two hours for the privilege of
ing its mind and letting the public paying $1.10 for two gallons of gas?
mon what's going on, capesisily sow Ate we going to tell his helabetn
shen oil companies ate acoused of wasting enesey for years? No may. Te
being secretive. Have to take risk of him to lay off those Jackrabbit
Soving To Wicker to nadses over the  starta? fa'll find that out for
To plous, self-serving, devioss, Binsels. That Detroit's naughty for
sealy-outhed, selfexoulpsting, building ig cars, thas we shouldnt
Bolter than thou, positively sickening have built all those superhighmays,
O11 company advertisements in which ~ that we're sorry we gave away ell iat
) these international behemoths depict glassware? Forget it. Should we remind
Themselves as poverty-siricken §1a'warve been marine for yeacs that
Seragons of virtue scbaitled geinst a Ihe snerey Crisis was coming? feild
Beiesy ana ignorant orld." Ton turms mow down ihe pumps and Who would blame
£ hice phrase, but doesn't, he know him. No, nave’ to fous on the positive
fore frustrated in trying to get things wo can do. Tell hin we're
ntormasion to the pUSLict fry uo buy Tecriling She sotey He para 0: Che
$TEeToa 2 to say acaething suvstentive pup Tight back into oil-Finding
ind she networks clover Jou wiih the offshore, Alaska, anywhere, Into sors
airness doctrine. Suse with Tadic Fotinery capacity. In z
mee vent ihe Pt symtherio Toels From sont, tar sends,
See 5 oiipasy wo subsiantiste its  far-out processes in the lab. Dammit,
Tt ariisie, just as if an ides We're 4 en-do company in a can-do
vers Tike a por foothpaste. Moy dont Coumery. Give us & Tou yess aad weit
“xhuze Uadison and sake biz = gas lines just & quain
Sibssantiave the SILL of Rigmte? sure, EE
“k to print sedia to te Seantize, reason
ER no pn me emit
EO eequontly dont understand lave and regulations. Fight the tro-
Ee xieies of our industry, Only times-imo-equals-five logicisns who
Specialists. And iow ~ think the same outfit that brings you
oe Onews seleases can we send the U.S. Mail can find oil three miles
Ths before they serena for mercy? index the ocean bottom. Give people
eS Deen to use TV 50 127 to reach the facts. Give thes genuine
a ee ahose opinions stout oil information. Speak out, Persuade them
"%y what Cronkite, %o listen. Hever boro them. If at
BE i first we don't succeed, bust a gut
Chanceiior and Reasoner say every rN
Oa 1yi Tn 30 sesonds they trying again. No other wey.
eg nongh wrongloing that a end up morking for the governaent
Mobil
hts ad appeared in the New York Times on February 28, 1974.


ES...
Evolution of
Mobil's
Public Affairs
Programs
1970-81


SEEN NN
Evolution of Mobil's Public Affairs Programs, 1970-81
INTRODUCTION

Mobil's Public Affairs programs have evolved around three
basic premises as outlined by Rawleigh Warner, Jr., in 1970:

(1) build our reputation as an outspoken responsible company

concerned about our energy future and major social issues;

(2) initiate debate on major public issues that concern us;

(3) broaden the spectrum of information and viewpoints avail-
able to the American people, to help them reach the
conclusions necessary for sound public policy in a
democratic society.

(Excerpts from statements by Mr. Warner more fully setting forth
his original Public Affairs concept for Mobil, and outlining some
major activities, follow immediately after this introductory section.)

Taken together with support for public television and other
cultural institutions, these underlying themes of social respon-
sibility and determined advocacy have given Mobil a unique position
in America's social consciousness. The purpose of this volume is
to provide an overview of how Mobil's Public Affairs programs have
evolved -- becoming a part of American culture itself as well as
part of the American dialogue on major public issues involving our
company . -

In this volume's review of more than a decade of Mobil's Public
Affairs programs, we will survey the major directions, activities,
and objectives. Some of these may be familiar to you, particularly
the more prominent national programs. But some may be fresh and

TE


itd

noteworthy, especially if you have not had the. opportunity to oo
directly experience all the years of all these, programs, for we

have included representative samples of some logal.or. specialized

areas.

Since we will be dealing with some long out-of-date events

from a dozen years that involved major dislocations in-supply,

hostile Federal Administrations, and a climate. in.which politicians
inflamed public doubts about our industry and company, se begin by
recapitulating with a chronology since 1970. We.break the entire

period into five time frames -- before, during and after the 1973-

74 oil embargo, the Iranian crisis, and since. sIndividual chro-

nology sections may include materials documentingssemes points of

the time periods, but most supporting material -iscelSewhere in the
volume, and is cross-referenced. Together, the sections review ®
what happened in the world and nation, and what:Mebil Public

Affairs attempted and accomplished in response tastheseevents, or
frequently in anticipation of them. oned asd

The second part of this volume organizes our du¥ivities by

the publics we address -- opinion leaders (the media! federal and

state officials, and others), the general public) the investment
community, our own employees, and foreign governménts.’- Here we

consider not the year-by-year programs, but the overall impact

they have had -- and this is substantial. Where'podéible we

include polls, surveys, and other systematic assessments of our
effectiveness -- for example, the survey showing that "Observations"
readers have been influenced toward Mobil's opinions on several @
important energy issues where non-readers have continued to hold
views less favorable to us. Of necessity, other mdtéFials are

ne


= a3
) descriptive -- a Study, for instance, correlating the substantial
change in The ‘New York Times editorials over the years toward the
Very positions we have argued (though, of course, we can't prove a
direct relationship since so many other factors affect an editorial
writer). Some materials are narrative, such as a case study of how
Mobil's Governmerit Relations and Public Relations led the industry
fight against “divestiture proposals in the mid-1970s -- a signal
success. Still other materials are examples -- for example, what _
the media actually said about Mobil, or what views are held by
other opinion leaders.: And some materials are simply anecdotal,
vet illustrative == to-mention one example not cited elsewhere,
the Mobil executive who had three separate seat companions on a
recent trip to-Indonesia; all three volunteered complimentary
| remarks about our Op-Ed ads, and wondered why other oil companies
weren't doingsthe same. In the wide variety of materials, you
will find even cartoons, presented as illustrative of the thesis
that "Mobil" has become synonymous with "corporate good works".
The third and final portion of this volume describes and pre-
sents some of ‘the main themes we have argued over the years.
Throughout, of course, you'll find some of the high points --
for example: in 1975, Advertising Age, the "bible" of the ad indus-
try, named Mr. Warner as "Adman of the Year." Said Ad Age:
_ . i'Mr. Warner was selected as representative
_ of a.company whose shoot-from-the-hip, 5
.. ¢.gutsy 'idea' advertising has added a new
_ dimension to corporate advertising during
; 5 a period of unprecedented attacks by gov- :
_., .., emment, the media and consumer advocates i
Ai a] i


i
En
not only on the oil industry, but on oa
American business in general."
In fairness, we also have included some of! olr” less-successful
campaigns. Example: The 1978 series of ads like Op-Eds intended
for various labor publications; these were designed to strike a
common theme for labor and business in promoting policies toward
economic growth. The series might have worked. withothe readers,
but some of the publications' editors rejected. ths idea of filling
their labor-union pages with so prominent a management voice as
Mobil's. :
For all of the voluminous content of this briefing book, we
have touched only the outlines and a tiny portion of the relevant
details of all that we have attempted and done...To limit the bulk,
we have eliminated duplication of explanation and example wherever @
possible, relying instead on cross-references where necessary; still,
there simply isn't room for a thorough-going condensation of the 220
file drawers of material from 12 years of our Public Affairs programs
through 1981. This volume merely sets the stage, and even that
limited attempt might not succeed since so much has been excluded.
But what emerges nonetheless is a picture of some of the
facets of Mobil's corporate personality: sagt 3
-- Reasoning, intellectual, sensible, and attractive to many
intelligent people. ar
-- Demonstrating a well-defined economic philosophy, and a
thoroughly expert awareness of our business and of the world's
energy realities.
-- Showing social concern and sensitivity to environmental issues. ®
TS


ot

~~ Concerned with culture and other institutions of our broad
society.

-- Not. just blindly trying to make a profit at any and all cost --
damn the. consequences -- but certainly not operating to be loved.

~~ Willing ands able to defend ourselves against misunderstandings
or attacks, ‘whether from malevolence or simple ignorance.

-- And successful in presenting our belief in abundant energy and
economic growth as the way to solve social problems.

The nation may not always agree, but it definitely does respect
our opinions... In summary then:

-- Mobil's image has greatly improved since the Sixties among
the general public and with key target groups, including
journalists ‘and government officials.

-- Mobil is now recognized as an outspoken, responsible company
with a high level of visibility and, very importantly, high
credibility.

—- Mobil has succeeded in reaching and influencing opinion
leaders.

~~ Mobil has sparked public debate on many issues important
to us.

-- And Mobil has provided the public with an alternative source
of information on major national issues.

4h
I ————


inl
Excerpts from remarks by ®
RAWLEIGH WARNER, JR.
Chairman,
Mobil Oil Corporation
a) —
before
ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT
Detroit, Michigan :
March 5, 1973 fy FE
(2) thes
42nd Annual Convention
of the >
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE = *
New York, N.Y.
June 3, 1974 th
(3) :
Upon receiving the
Alumni Association Award *
Graduate School of Business
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
New York, N.Y. ike
April 26, 1978 EE
) bre
As you hardly need reminding, American industry and indeed all of
our institutions including especially government have grown larger
and more complex in recent years. News sources have become more
prolific, communications have become instantaneous; and issues
have become more public. One result of all this is to make it
increasingly difficult for the average citizen to understand
issues of public policy in any great depth. This seems to be par-
ticularly true when technology or economics is involved, and even
truer when both are involved. 102
If we in business are to retain our franchises, we had better
recognize that this situation places a special obligation on us
to share our particular knowledge with the public so that it may
understand these complex issues. E:
The issues swirling around the oil industry today with respect
to adequacy, security, and cost of supply seem to be of just such
a nature. They are caused largely by the fact that this country
is passing from a watershed characterized by ample, cheap, and
seemingly endless energy supplies to one characterized by expensive gg
and limited supply and actual shortages. The transition has been
accelerated by the growth in demand, which has often been quite
sharp and, of course, on a larger base each year. -


- vii -
Au We move from the old era to the new, our conduct both within
* boundaries and among our worldwide trading partners must change

to reflect the changing conditions. It is difficult enough for the
jverage person to see and comprehend the changes taking place. It
3s especially difficult to see and understand these forces at a
time when emotional issues mask the greater issues forcing the
change. ...

[As to what Mobil 0il is doing to explain complex subjects and
help people make the decisions that will best serve the country
as a whole...] we are carrying to the American people issues of
public policy relating to our business of supplying energy. I

an under no delusion that Mobil is the only company, or even the
only oil company, engaging in such a dialogue. Nor do I maintain
that we are necessarily doing a better job of it than anyone else.
Mobil's program started because about two years ago some of us.

in the company decided we had views on some topical subjects that
we should communicate to the public.

How do we go about it?

We make speeches, which we sometimes print and distribute. We
try to engage politicians, reporters, editors, and publishers

in dialogues, and we meet with people in television and radio.

We distribute a number of television film clips each year,
running about a minute to a minute and a half each, to 100 TV
stations across the country, and we reach several hundred radio
stations every month with recorded interviews of about three
minutes each. We also use spot advertisements on radio.

One of the most effective ways we have found, however -- at

least in New York and, I suspect, elsewhere as well -- is to buy
advertising space. We have found it totally ineffective to rely
on letters to the editor to rebut even the most misinformed
reporting. No letter can compete in timeliness or impact with

an adverse headline, no matter the retraction later made. Even
news releases are of limited effectiveness.

specifically, we publish a quarter-page advertisement every
Thursday, year-round, on the page opposite the editorial page

of The New York Times -- called, as you might surmise, the op-ed
page. The space the Times has made available to advertisers in
that part of the paper is the only advertisement appearing on
those two facing pages. Thus it has high visibility. The space
is large enough for essay-type ads and is an integral part of an
SBitoraal SeChion thal 1 vonste Feeding For SpImIOR leaders,
policy-makers, educators, journalists, legislators, business
executives, and intellectuals. Our messages there are often
more in the nature of paid editorials than advertisements. ...
We have taken the offensive -- but tried not to be offensive in
doing it -- on such subjects as the energy crisis, the need to
conserve energy and ways to do it, the role of profits, the need
for public transportation, capital formation, the need for national
energy policies, business as a catalyst of change, and...the costs

’


- viii -

of controlling automotive emissions. We are relying on facts

and persuasive presentation to give people a true picture of

some of the options open to them and the order of magnitude of

the costs involved. Some of these ads, too, have been published

in other papers as well.

I am glad to say the response has been strong and generally

favorable, though we do get denounced for some of them in letters

to the editor -- which at least shows people are reading them.

We have distributed thousands of reprints, and will be glad to

give copies to any of you who request them.

I would be considerably less than honest if I did not say that

we have our differences of opinion with the editorial policies of

The New York Times. At the same time, however, that paper has made

a forum available in the form of paid space in which we can express

our opinions. And the Times' readership encompasses some important

publics.

I would urge that you and businessmen across the country try

to persuade your local newspapers to make similar space available --

and, whenever they do, that you utilize that space to try to give

the American people the sort of information they need if they are

to make intelligent choices in the realm of public policy. In my

view, we in business must reach the opinion leaders in our communi-

ties before we can hope to have appreciable impact on the general

public... as

You will not, of course, achieve believability overnight or auto-

matically. I myself like to think that Mobil began to change --

and to improve -- the public's impression of it seven.or eight

years ago, when we changed our logotype and spent a great deal

of money to devise what we believe is a more attractive service

station, and, among other things, conducted a nationwide adver-

tising campaign on safety with the theme "We Want You to Live."

I suppose I could catalog other activities, such as our support

for public broadcasting. The point I am making is that in the

last analysis a company will be judged by its actions, the per-

suasiveness of its ads and other communications, its willingness

to listen to both sides of questions, and the extent to which it

involves itself in the mainstream of life. -

In Mobil's case, the response we have been getting leads us to

conclude that that segment of the public which exerts impact on

decision-making is increasingly reading what we have to say and

judging us both on our logic and on our record, with generally

favorable results....

(2)

One reason we think our advertisements, along with those of other De

oil companies, may be having some effect is that several Congress-

men and Senators have recently tried to inhibit us. We believe
EEN


i
The Wall Street Journal was close to the target when it said,
"Indeed, the reason their critics are rushing to have them gagged
is that the oil companies have been making legitimate arguments
worthy of being heard."
- That brings me to the biggest roadblock we have encountered --
the refusal of national television networks to sell us time in which
to state our viewpoints on matters of great public import.
When the energy crisis hit full-blown last October, there were
very few reporters in any media anywhere in the country, outside
of oil-producing areas and the oil trade press, who knew much
about oil. This was particularly true of commercial television,
and seems still to be true. As a result, we have a very difficult
communications problem, and we recognize that. The energy crisis
is complex, both in its origins and in its manifestations. The
TV networks, by their very nature, seldom seem able to do justice
to such a complex issue.... While we are not accusing the networks
of bias in their reporting, we nevertheless feel that their
structural deficiences [limited air time, costs that restrict TV
news' responsiveness, the "star" system as part of the quest for
ratings, lack of specialist reporters for business or energy, and
the nature of television as visual entertaimment] have combined
to make much of their coverage of oil news inaccurate an
misleading.... [So] Mobil has sought to buy air time for commer-
cials that would convey our point of view -- commercials that would
deal in ideas rather than in products. But networks have refused
to sell us time for many of the commercials we have submitted.
Their position was pretty well summed up in a letter of
February 27, 1973, from the law department of the Columbia Broad-
casting System to a vice president of Mobil, from which I quote:
w...it is the general policy of CBS to sell time only for the
promotion of goods and services, not for the presentation of
points of view on controversial issues of public importance.
CBS has adopted this policy because it believes that the public
will best be served if important public issues are presented in
formats determined by broadcast journalists..."
1 have these comments to make on that.
First, this country was founded in controversy -- hard, openly
expressed controversy -- and it has remained free and democratic
through the continuing clash of opinion and of value patterns.
Second, if the networks dedicate themselves almost exclusively
to merchandising products, via the entertainment route, they
may raise serious questions as to whether what they merchandise
as news is actually just entertainment.

, today's energy crisis is controversial largely because
eS a hive helped make it controversial by printing and
broadcasting material so inaccurate that anyone with any know-
ledge of our industry would have to disagree with it.

AA


ir
When as powerful and pervasive a medium as television will not
sell time for controversial issues, it seems to me our country ov
has reached a rather critical juncture. How can a democracy
operate effectively without broad public access to clashing
points of view?
It is worth recalling what the U.S. Supreme Court said in 1969,
in what is known as the Red Lion case: "It is the right of
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance the monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or by a
private licensee. It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."
The real issue seems to be whether the commercial networks should
have total control over what is broadcast to the American people.
since network broadcasting is among the most concentrated of U.S.
profit-making industries, it would appear that our country may be
facing a danger of monopoly censorship.
I hope you realize how reluctant we in Mobil are to adopt any
posture that would appear to place us in an adversary position.
We would much rather just live and let live. But we have con-
cluded that we have no alternative to standing up for what we oO
believe to be right. It is a dreadful set of circumstances at
which we have arrived. What we're battling for is something at
least approaching fair treatment in a medium that seems to be
the main source of news for the vast majority of the public, yet
one that seemingly has decided that in order to be successful,
it must concentrate more heavily on showmanship than on present-
ing news in any depth....
I hope nothing I have said here will be construed as ignorance
or insensitivity on my part toward the contributions a free press
has made throughout our country's history. Quite the contrary.
We could not have remained a free people without it. Freedom
of the press is clearly an essential ingredient of a democratic
society -- essential not only to the press itself, but to all
of us. I submit, however, that it is inseparably linked to
freedom of speech, and that both are in turn linked to a free
economy.
Unlike some politicians, I am urging not less but more free speech,
and for everyone -- including most importantly those whose views
some of us may find totally abhorrent. I would hope that those
who write and speak the most about freedom of the press will come
to comprehend that if they help to destroy our free economy, no
matter how unwittingly, it could be only a matter of time before
they lost their own freedom. I do not know which of our freedoms @
might be the first to go, but I do know that once we lose any one
of them -- whether free speech, free press, or our free economy ==
the others are apt soon to follow.


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- xii -
As anyone knows who has followed our advocacy advertising and
our other external communications, we enjoy being an active o
participant in many arenas, and these two -- education and
cultural activities -- are important to us and in many ways
are as rewarding as any in which we have involved ourselves.
I might add, with further reference to our advocacy advertising,
that we believe our outspoken support of the American system of
democratic capitalism is all of a piece with our support of
higher education and cultural programs. I am convinced that if
our economic system is destroyed or fatally weakened by the
relatively small but highly articulate elitists who seem bent
on doing just that, whether from ignorance or for whatever
reason, then our democratic society and our cultural institu-
tions -- including higher education -- will be imperiled.

#4


(1-a/1)

I. INTERPRETIVE CHRONOLOGY
A.) Before the Arab Oil Embargo, 1970-73
Background
As the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.S. was little concerned
for its future energy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
equaled about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern was the
threat of a flood of cheap oil. 0il imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price.
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Com-

) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
equivalent of domestic or imported oil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while gas distribu-
tion companies aggressively sought new customers.

The decline in coal's contribution to U.S. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but nuclear
power held the clear promise for the long-term future, and in the
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.

The memory was still fresh that America could protect itself

and aid its allies when oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was how production

) from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Slope could
be absorbed into the American market.


(1-a/2)
Then came 1970, a bad year for the U.S. petroleum industry. A o
slowdown in leasing resulting from public and media reaction to the
Santa Barbara oil spill of January 1969 began to have its impact.
Tax reform eliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
oil. The first of many lengthy regulatory and court proceedings
blocked construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. Construction of all
sorts of energy facilities became bogged down in lengthy "environ-
mental impact" statements and proceedings, which also compounded
the now mushrooming licensing difficulties of the nuclear industry.
Amendments to the Clean Air Act became law, setting the stage for
added gasoline demand -- a result of the temporary and inefficient
redesign imposed on automobile producers and a prelude to the
longer-term switch to lead-free gasoline.
2
In 1971, the federal government imposed emergency price freezes
and controls on the entire U.S. economy, effectively limiting
the U.S. petroleum industry's ability to develop new supplies --
ironically just months after the first signal that OPEC had come
of age. In February, the Teheran Agreement imposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%, bringing most
to over §2 a barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreement secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya.
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap emerged between con-
trolled interstate natural gas prices and free-market intrastate
gas, reinforcing the shift of supplies away from transcontinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
u.s.


(1-A/3)

) As 1973 unfolded, most producing nations were climbing aboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial acquisition of ownership in
its oil-producing concessions. By June, facing strongly increas-
ing oil demands (U.S. oil imports increased by a fifth in 1972
and another third in 1973, raising the import percentage to 36%
of supply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increase,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Meanwhile, U.S. price controls on domestic oil became
more and more complex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of "old" and "new" oil were created.
And the U.S. replaced mandatory ceilings on the volume of imported
oil with a fee on imports.

D on the eve of the embargo, national energy policy was in total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With few exceptions, the
public, government, and the media did not have the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.

Mobil response

By 1970, Mobil was well aware that the U.S. was heading for a
severe energy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of understanding of
energy issues was made worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the media to business in general and oil companies in particular.

D ine op-Ed progran vas Mobil's prime response for dealing with
emerging issues in a way that would assure control of the context


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same time as Op-Eds began (sporadi-  (@)
cally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil also made the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a $1 million contribution (at that
time the largest from any company) and providing a new dimension of
quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Op-Ed
ads were sometimes used to promote television programs (see III-S),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds.
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
moting selected philanthropies such as the United Negro College
Fund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educa-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar causes (see ITI-R). After oe
these and other, primarily low-key themes in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Eds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes:
Mass transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil company would not be expected to support. Mobil
took the lead among oil companies in calling for a National Master
Transportation Program. Such a program not only would provide
for the highways the country needs, but it would also make possi-
ble adequate public transportation. This was an unusual view for
an oil company but, as we pointed out when we announced our Posi- o
tion in that first ad, "we don't believe the gasoline consumed by


(1-8/5)

n a car idling in a traffic jam...is the best possible use of
America's limited petroleum resources."
The energy situation: Ads (see III-I) dealt with the need for
coherent U.S. energy planning, the loss of incentives for dis-
covery of new natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-use that resulted from these prices, the need
to get Alaskan oil to U.S. markets, and the need for additional
offshore drilling -- all clear responses to issues already
impending, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
of Op-Ed firsts: calling for a national energy policy, warning
of a natural gas shortage, and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems.

D
Growth: We addressed the need for continued economic growth, for
which more energy would be needed, as the only way to provide higher
living standards for poor people, both in the U.S. and around the
world (see II1I-J). We believed this emphasis was extremely impor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns were unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth-type thinking.
Environment: As part of our effort to get greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue with the extremists of the environmental
movement who insisted that cleaning up the environment was an
absolute priority, without considering the need for emergy/envi-

) ronment tradeoffs (see ITI-F).


Se Tee RR
(1-a/6)

Conservation: Knowing that the U.S. had a serious energy problem, o
we ran several ads urging greater conservation of energy, particu-
larly gasoline (see III-G).
Capitalism: Our ads drew attention to the value of the free enter-
prise system in promoting economic growth. In a period of skepticism
about business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (see III-K, L, M).
One Op-Ed that deserves special mention was "The U.S. Stake in Middle
East Peace" which in June 1973 argued the need for a peaceful settle-
ment of outstanding Middle East issues (see III-Q/Attachment 1).
This resulted in a huge volume of anti-Mobil mail, demanding that we
spell out what we thought was an "equitable" solution of the middle
Eastern situation. Sheik Yamani, however, was so impressed with
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani to convey
his personal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mobil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, since war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred soon afterward.
Read today in the light of what has happened in the Middle East in
the intervening years, the ad seems extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed.
In all of these ads, we concentrated on reaching opinion leaders
in government, the media, and elsewhere, as the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


(1-A/7)
During the Pre-embargo period, our Government Relations people in
Washington focused on a variety of issues, including natural gas
pricing, import controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation.
The company continued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Controls program, particularly for small refiners which
already enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
was sympathetic to the oil industry, and oil industry representa-
tives generally had plenty of opportunity to communicate with
officials and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor.
This comparative calm was felt in Mobil's media relations programs,
where a small press relations staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operations in South Africa,
where we were criticized by church groups, but the company mounted
a vigorous defense through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our operations in that


(I-A/Attachment 1)
America has the world's best highways
1% °
And the world's worst mass transit.
We hope this ad moves people...
In recent years the United States has devel- systems are for the most part still in the wild
oped a really superb highway system. It's been blue yonder.
built with tax revenues earmarked specifically Providing for our future transportation
for road building. needs will require very large expenditures. We
But the highway construction boom has believe there's an urgent need for legislators to
been accompanied by a mass transit bust. Train reexamine the procedures used to generate
and bus travel in this country, with few excep- and expend transportation revenues. Such a re-
tions, is decrepit. The air traveler suffers in- view may yield the conclusion that special ear-
creasing indignities despite bigger, faster marked funds are no longer the best approach.
planes. In weighing priorities, no decision-maker
Greater New York is a typical example. You can ignore the increasing congestion on those
can depend on commuting to and from Manhat- fine highways of ours, especially in and around
tan—but only to be undependable and slow. On the great urban centers. But more and better
public transport, the 25 miles to Westfield, N.J. mass transit could stop traffic jams before they
takes 75 minutes at an average speed of 20 start. Just one rail line has triple the people-
miles per hour. The 33 miles to Stamford, Conn. moving capacity of a three-lane superhighway.
takes 60 minutes at 33 mph. The 26 miles to It costs less—in energy consumption and in
Hicksville, LI. takes 55 minutes at 28 mph. money—to move people via mass transit than
When you're on time. on highways. Thus mass transit means less air
You have to be a stoic with stamina to use pollution.
public ground transportation for a trip beyond It also means conservation. Whether the
the commuting range. Fly to a nearby city? You energy comes from gasoline for cars, or fuel
can hardly get at our congested air terminals, oil, natural gas, or coal for electric power plants,
either by land or air. The ride to or from the it's derived from a diminishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight. So we think all forms of transportation should
Mass transit seems to work better abroad. be brought into a national plan for safe, rapid,
Americans are agreeably impressed by the fast, economical ways of moving people—consistent
comfortable, and attractive subways in foreign with the wisest use of our energy resources.
cities. Intercity trains in other countries make While Mobil sells fuels and lubricants, we
ours look pitiful. Japan's high-speed Tokaido don't believe the gasoline consumed by a car
line carries more than 200,000 passengers a idling in a traffic jam (carrying a single passen-
day. Clean, comfortable French, German, Ital- ger, probably) is the best possible use of Amer-
ian, and British trains regularly attain speeds ica's limited petroleum resources. Our products
over 100 mph. European railroads are already ought to help more people get where they want
planning or building expresses that will do bet- to go. i
ter than 150 mph. To us, that means a green light for mass
Yet, in the United States, new mass transit transit . . . soon.
This ad appeared in the New York Times on October 19, 1970
co


(1-B/1)

B.) The Embargo, 1973-74

Jn October 8, 1973, war broke out between Israel and several of
ts Arab neighbors, and the U.S. rushed additional military aid
to Israel. Arab oil-producing nations retaliated by placing an
embargo on shipments to the U.S. and several other nations, and
OPEC unilaterally raised posted prices nearly 70% (to over §5 a
barrel). The exporters, sensing the companies’ ability to rear-
range supplies, quickly shifted to curtailing production, so that
nearly 10% of the free world's oil supplies were removed from
international trade during the winter of 1973-74. By year-end,
posted prices were increased again, to more than $9 per barrel.
By March 1974, the embargo was lifted and production restored.
But the era of ample low-cost energy had ended, and a permanent
change in how nations manage energy supply and consumption had
been wrought. The effects would continue to be felt for a long
time, and throughout the economic systems of the western world.
Actions taken in the U.S. in the heat of the moment persisted
for years. Permanent damage was done to the credibility of the
energy industries because of the lack of understanding of the
issues by the media and government staffs.
specific actions started with the Administration's hastily con-
trived "Project Independence," an attempt to totally end imports
by 1980. It was proposed in November 1973, the month when the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was signed into law -- a law
that plagued the industry with price and allocation controls
at all levels until its expiration (and amendments to it) in


(1-8/2)
September 1981. Government attempts to reduce consumption by o
cutting speed limits, eliminating Sunday sales of gasoline,
allocating shipments, and pressuring major oil companies into
husbanding inventories exacerbated the hysteria and the shortage,
even though (in retrospect) petroleum supplies would have been
adequate for demand for that length of curtailment.
Mobil response
In this situation, Mobil ads
-- Continued to stress the need for improved U.S. energy
production and for additional conservation (see III-G and I).
-- Increased the emphasis on the need for profits, at a time
when the industry was accused of making "obscene profits"
during the embargo, and spoke out against accusations that 2
Mobil was cheating its customers (see III-M, N).
-- Explained some reasons for the shortages (e.g. that motorists
were carrying much more gasoline around in their tanks, thus
contributing to the difficulty of getting more).
One useful new ad format was successfully used for the first time.
This was "Musings of an oil person," which enabled us to address a
number of topics in one ad, in a chatty readable style (Attachment 1).
During the immediate embargo period, however, Mobil Public Affairs
was essentially on the defensive, as members of Congress and the
press accused the oil companies of rigging the shortage, and
Senator Henry Jackson castigated the heads of the seven largest 3
il companies who appeared before his Permanent Subcommittee on


(1-B/3)

Investigations and insulted them on national television, while
labeling oil industry profits "obscene".
Our response was to accelerate reorganization of the Public
Affairs effort. This included appointing a Vice Chairman for
Public Affairs, and a policy coordinator whose responsibility
it was to see that the company spoke with a single voice on all
issues. The company also further geared up for an expanded Media
Relations effort, with visits by top executives to newspapers in
key cities, coordinated with the American Petroleum Institute media
program. Efforts were made to get company executives on television
programs across the country, combating the negative image of the
oil companies portrayed by that medium.
On the cultural front, the highlight of this period was Mobil's
introduction in January 1974 of the Bellamy family to the American
public on Upstairs, Downstairs, perhaps the best remembered of all
Mobil's television productions. The show was eventually to add
seven Emmy awards to those "Masterpiece Theatre" had already reaped
(see 111-5).

)


(1-B/Attachment 1)
Wonder if ofl company sdvertising  yesr of full-page explanations by us
180% risking indecent overexposure | Won't set straight: Hate to be on the
these days. There's 30 much oil on defensive all the time. Am our top
the tube and in print. Guif, Snell Bansgezont people with facts and got
and Texaco all ‘ran fall-pagers on Shenon TV penbls and talk shows.
tho same day last week in ine Times. They still look drab mext toa
Mobil's on the Op-5a page svery Politician making some wild allegation
Thursday, Why do we sil do iif Some against us because he's Tumning for
critics’ think the ads show the Something. Doss he have to un on our
companies are conspiring to brainwash backs? Sure he doss--as long as hers
“he public. Others think tne adversis- are gas lines. What do we tell the Ey
ing deluge proves we can't do anything who's boiling mad at usin our
right, not even conspire. But an oil station or some other company's--sfter
Company has to find some way of speak- Waiting two hours for the privilege of
ing its mind and letting the public paying $1.10 for two gallons of gas?
mon what's going on, capesisily sow Ate we going to tell his helabetn
shen oil companies ate acoused of wasting enesey for years? No may. Te
being secretive. Have to take risk of him to lay off those Jackrabbit
Soving To Wicker to nadses over the  starta? fa'll find that out for
To plous, self-serving, devioss, Binsels. That Detroit's naughty for
sealy-outhed, selfexoulpsting, building ig cars, thas we shouldnt
Bolter than thou, positively sickening have built all those superhighmays,
O11 company advertisements in which ~ that we're sorry we gave away ell iat
) these international behemoths depict glassware? Forget it. Should we remind
Themselves as poverty-siricken §1a'warve been marine for yeacs that
Seragons of virtue scbaitled geinst a Ihe snerey Crisis was coming? feild
Beiesy ana ignorant orld." Ton turms mow down ihe pumps and Who would blame
£ hice phrase, but doesn't, he know him. No, nave’ to fous on the positive
fore frustrated in trying to get things wo can do. Tell hin we're
ntormasion to the pUSLict fry uo buy Tecriling She sotey He para 0: Che
$TEeToa 2 to say acaething suvstentive pup Tight back into oil-Finding
ind she networks clover Jou wiih the offshore, Alaska, anywhere, Into sors
airness doctrine. Suse with Tadic Fotinery capacity. In z
mee vent ihe Pt symtherio Toels From sont, tar sends,
See 5 oiipasy wo subsiantiste its  far-out processes in the lab. Dammit,
Tt ariisie, just as if an ides We're 4 en-do company in a can-do
vers Tike a por foothpaste. Moy dont Coumery. Give us & Tou yess aad weit
“xhuze Uadison and sake biz = gas lines just & quain
Sibssantiave the SILL of Rigmte? sure, EE
“k to print sedia to te Seantize, reason
ER no pn me emit
EO eequontly dont understand lave and regulations. Fight the tro-
Ee xieies of our industry, Only times-imo-equals-five logicisns who
Specialists. And iow ~ think the same outfit that brings you
oe Onews seleases can we send the U.S. Mail can find oil three miles
Ths before they serena for mercy? index the ocean bottom. Give people
eS Deen to use TV 50 127 to reach the facts. Give thes genuine
a ee ahose opinions stout oil information. Speak out, Persuade them
"%y what Cronkite, %o listen. Hever boro them. If at
BE i first we don't succeed, bust a gut
Chanceiior and Reasoner say every rN
Oa 1yi Tn 30 sesonds they trying again. No other wey.
eg nongh wrongloing that a end up morking for the governaent
Mobil
hts ad appeared in the New York Times on February 28, 1974.


(1-c/1)

C.) Between Crises, 1974-78
The shortages, as perceived by the public, ended as abruptly as
they started when the President appealed to oil companies to
release their inventories to the maximum extent possible. Clearly,
government had intensified the shortage but the companies got the
resentment for the inconvenience suffered by the public and were
unjustly maligned by the inaccurate and sensational news report-
ing -- reporting that included accusations of "contriving" the
shortage for profit and accounts of phantom fleets of tankers and
barges cruising offshore waiting for prices to rise. This resent-
ment made good political fodder; an estimated 4,000 bills were
introduced in Congress to break up, tax and otherwise penalize the
oil companies.
Just after the embargo ended, the generalized price controls
imposed on all industries were terminated. But petroleum remained
under controls due to the legislation enacted during the crisis.
And these controls then became even more unmanageable; layer
upon layer of schemes began to be created to take care of each
new problem as it arose. In November 1974, the “Entitlements
Program" went into effect, to share access to cheap domestic
crude among refiners. And, of course, the vested interest
groups began to nibble away at the program, intent on getting
more than a fair share. February 1975 brought the imposition of
an additional oil import fee of $1 per barrel for crude and a
60¢ fee per barrel of imported products.

ET


(1-c/2)

Fanned by politicians, hostility toward the industry continued to o
mount in the U.S. Percentage depletion allowances were entirely
eliminated for all but the smallest producers. The fungibility of
the foreign tax credit among the various foreign functions of U.S.
companies was severely curtailed, but only for oil companies. On
October 4, 1975, the U.S. Senate narrowly defeated a measure to
break up the U.S. petroleum companies. And in December of 1975,
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act became law, giving the
President some flexibility in setting crude prices, cementing the
concept of "new" and "old", and most importantly keeping the price
of domestic crude below the cost of imports. With this new legis-
lation in effect, the $2 a barrel crude import fee was removed at
year's end. An attempt to deregulate new natural gas prices passed
the Senate but was defeated in the House by a vote of 205 to 201 in 2
February 1976, despite the fact that U.S. gas production had been
declining since 1973 and oil imports were continuing to skyrocket
(they reached their maximum level at 48% of U.S. oil supplies in
1977).
At the beginning of the 1976-1977 winter, the FEC announced that
gas curtailments would exceed those of the previous winter and
reach 25% of total requirements. In its last major action before
its demise, the FPC nearly tripled the allowed price for the latest
finds of natural gas prices from 52¢ to $1.42/MCF and indicated
that in future rulings it would begin using the equivalent oil
price as its standard in setting gas price ceilings. A January
1977 survey by the FPC claimed that gas curtailments had caused lay- ®
offs of nearly one-half million workers in 7,000 closed factories.

Libs —


(1-c/3)
But by February, the Administration declared the gas crisis over.
Accusations of withholding natural gas supplies in the Gulf of
Mexico began to make headlines.
Despite counterproductive actions in many areas, the glimmerings
of sense in national energy policy began to show. In January 1977,
the ban on development of oil and gas in the Santa Barbara channel
was lifted. In June, the first oil started flowing through the
Alaskan Pipeline. And in July, the first oil began to flow into
the nation's Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
But these positive developments were far outweighed by the announce-
ment of President Carter's National Energy Plan (NEP). The plan
included continued price controls on crude oil; extension of price
controls to intrastate gas; a tax on domestic crude oil to equate
its price to foreign; an excise tax on automobiles that varied
inversely with fuel efficiency; a tax on industrial users of oil
and natural gas; and a standby gasoline tax. The emphasis was all
on conservation, with nothing for new supplies. Even coal was
further hobbled when President Carter signed the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, which mandated the use of expensive scrubbers
with all coals regardless of quality and need for cleaning.
In August 1977, the Department of Energy was established, ineffi=-
ciently combining regulatory, administrative, and policy functions
in one agency -- and thus completing the transition of energy
policy formulation and regulation from a small group of several
dozen people operating out of the white House Office of Emergency
ee —— 1 TR


(1-c/4)
Preparedness in 1970 into a gigantic bureaucracy with many thousands  ()
of regulators.
Adding insult to the NEP and DOE injuries, President Carter on
October 13, 1977, accused oil companies of "seeking to profiteer
and grab money from the U.S. consumer."
By the summer of 1978, Congress had approved essentially all the
items asked for by President Carter a year and a half earlier,
including the Natural Gas Policy Act. While this act was pre-
sented as a move towards decontrol, it actually established more
than 20 gas price control categories, brought intrastate gas under
price controls for the first time and delayed any significant
deregulation until 1985 or later. @
As the end of 1978 approached, the U.S. government had done little
to encourage any form of new domestic energy supply. It had not
created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of any significance, despite
two years of ample international supplies that would have permitted
acquisition without disturbing the international market. It had
emphasized conservation only to find energy and oil demands higher
than when the embargo began. By the ultimate measure, oil imports,
the nation was nearly three times as badly off as in 1970. The
figures tell the story -- oil imports: 1.2 billion barrels in
1970; 2.3 billion in 1973; 3 billion in 1978, despite the fact that
Alaskan oil had begun to flow in quantity. The fact that for most
of the period from 1975-1978 the real price of imported crude oil °


(1-c/5)

had been stable or declining has been ignored, and the opportunity.
to take advantage of this breathing spell was lost.
Mobil response
During this period, Mobil's total Public Affairs effort was geared
to counter hostile sentiment in Washington and in the media. In
addition to continuing our Op-Ed program with continuing emphasis
on the need for growth in energy and the economy (see III-I, J),
we were called upon to respond to a variety of new attacks.
Of these, the greatest threat was the series of moves in Congress to
break up the 18 largest oil companies into separate exploration and
producing, marketing and refining, and transportation units. In an
emotional anti-oil company atmosphere, Mobil took a prominent part,
both on its own initiative and in cooperation with the API, in beat-
ing back this threat.
In the crucial hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Mobil played a key role in
lining up witnesses to show in Congress and the media that divesti-
ture could not reduce oil prices, but on the contrary would cause
serious economic, political, and strategic problems for the United
States. One of these witnesses was Mr. Tavoulareas, for whom Public
Affairs prepared testimony and briefing material. His testimony was
reprinted by Public Affairs and widely distributed in a booklet
entitled "Why Divestiture Won't Work" (see Attachment 1). Public
Affairs also produced a briefing paper, rebutting charges against
the oil companies in detail, which was used by Senators opposed to
divestiture.

TEE


(1-C/6)

We also helped produce testimony for Mr. Massad before the House ®

Judiciary Committee on the joint venture aspect of divestiture,

with the result that committee staff members asked for a meeting

with Mobil, where we explained how prohibition of joint ventures

would seriously impact on our operations, particularly in the Mid-

dle East. The same staff members also asked to meet with Mobil on

the whole divestiture issue. Those discussions helped contribute

to a report by the House committee on horizontal divestiture favor-

able to the oil industry.

Mobil also backed up its efforts in Washington with a strong

public relations effort to convince the public that vertical

divestiture made no sense. The effort included Op-Ed ads (see
II-C/Attachments la to 1i), "Observations" columns, tours in which ®
top executives visited 21 cities in 18 states, special TV appear-

ances by Mr. Schmertz, 160 talks given by the Speakers’ Program

by volunteer employees, and the placement of by-lined articles in
newspapers and magazines. Gradually it became clear that divesti-

ture was indeed a non-solution to the problem of increasing energy

prices, and the issue was left to simmer on a back burner where it

still sits.

Mobil Public Affairs also played a prominent role, both indepen-

dently and in close collaboration with API, in defeating the equally
ill-advised proposals to prevent oil companies from diversifying

into other enery source development, or to make them give up their
: is holdings. Mr. Schmidt and later Mr. Schmertz, chaired the °
Mu Tang Industrial Organization of the API, which coordinated
re 0 Cr


eR Re NE
(1-C/7)

) the oil industry's effort to turn back Congressional pressure for
horizontal divestiture. This issue, too, died in Congress as it
became clear that prohibiting oil companies from investing in other
Energy sources would deprive the coal and other industries of
needed financial and technical resources.

Mobil also engaged in dialogue with others who proposed a variety
of inadequate solutions to the nation's energy problems. Prominent
among these was our criticism of the Ford Foundation's energy study,
A Time to Choose, that urged conservation as the primary thrust of
energy policy, and attacked the oil industry for allegedly gaining
all kinds of subsidies at the consumers’ and taxpayers' expense.
That study's strongly pro-conservation stance led to a change in
our own Op-Ed statements, to argue now that "conservation isn't
enough" (see III-G).
similarly, we criticized a proposal that OPEC nations should be
encouraged to break their "cartel" by being asked to submit sealed
bids for imports into the U.S. energy market -- a proposal which
was obviously impractical in a period when the U.S. was greatly
dependent on OPEC for a large proportion of its imports.
The emergence of soft energy technology as a major issue in this
period led to Mobil efforts to put the energy issue in perspec-
tive, by explaining that solar and some other technologies would
not make a major addition to U.S. energy supplies, at least not in
the near term.
a me CC


RRR RRR,
(1-c/8)
During this period, we also tried to reach out to organized labor o
with a series of ads stressing the point that business and labor
shared a vested interest in continued economic growth, and that
labor should therefore favor greater U.S. energy development.
These ads, however, ran into difficulties when labor publication
editors balked at subjecting union members to advocacy advertising
by a leading company.
Also, Congress's anti-business mood led to enactment of measures
to combat the Arab boycott of goods produced by companies viewed
as favorable to Israel. A good deal of misinformation led to the
writing of bills in Congress that would indeed have prohibited
imports of Arab oil into the U.S. at all. By drawing attention
to this issue (see III-Q), and by making our views known in o
Washington, we were instrumental in getting a less onerous,
although still unsatisfactory, bill that was passed into law.
In our print communications, this period was characterized by the
introduction of innovative techniques to get our messages across.
The year 1975 was proclaimed by Mobil as the "Year of Energy Action,"
(YEA), with Op-Ed ads, magazine ads, accompanying booklets, and spe-
cial publications all spelling out the theme (Attachment 2). During
this time, we ran several series of Op-Eds, urging the formation of
a coherent national energy policy (Attachments 3 and 4). In an
attempt to freshen our basic energy messages, we fashioned some
novel campaigns -- fables in 1976 (Attachments Sa-d) and "Energy
Mysteries" in 1977 (Attachment 6). (In 1980, TV commercials based °


SET IS NESSES
(1-c/9)

on these fables and a later series attracted a great deal of
attention, much controversy, and two "Clio" awards.)
This period also saw an intensified battle between Mobil and tele-
vision on the whole question of a company's right of access to
the airwaves. Television's biased reporting of events during the
Arab embargo, including failure to permit oil-company executives
to explain what was really happening, led to a Mobil campaign to
get paid ads on television. But, despite even an offer by Mobil's
president to pay for rebuttal ads if Mobil could get across its own
message, the networks insisted that their own journalists should
determine what views would be presented (see II-B/Attachment 6).

| Mobil did successfully counteract some biased TV reporting by taking
out full-page ads in the print media to dissect TV correspondents’
inaccurate reporting. Perhaps as a result of this tactic, irrespon-
sible TV reporting of energy news on TV has considerably diminished.
In this regard, the Op-Ed program was reinforced by the start of
the "Observations" column (Attachment 7), appearing in newspaper
sunday supplements. In a relaxed way, these columns got across
Mobil's major themes, not only the need for energy but the need
for less regulation (gaining much of the initial publicity in the
U.5. for Murray Weidenbaum). The program was gradually expanded
to reach close to half the households in America.

) in all, considerable progress was made. The New York Times, in
particular, began to recognize that Mobil had a position worth


Sa ES
(1-c/10)

evaluating on some energy issues, and some ads caused newspapers ®
to clarify their views, making them more in alignment with Mobil's.
On occasion, there were actual dialogues between newspaper edito-
rials and our Op-Eds (see III-B).
Mobil's efforts to get across the company's messages in Washington
and to opinion leaders through the print media were supported by
a major program of media "blitzes" in which top executives criss-
crossed the country, appearing on television and meeting with
the press, with heavy backup support from Public Relations. For
example, three blitzes were conducted between 1975 and 1977, on
Mobil's proposals for a National Energy Plan, on the divestiture
issue, and on the topic "Is America Running Out of Oil and Gas?"
This last involved 23 senior Mobil managers, who visited 29 cities (@
in 21 states, calling on 30 newspapers and appearing on 69 tele-
vision shows and on 68 radio programs. The first two blitzes
included visits to 90 newspapers and 450 radio and TV news shows.
Also in this period, Mobil began to produce on a regular basis
Public Service Announcements in which third-party commentators
spoke on issues important to Mobil such as profits, gasoline prices,
offshore drilling, federal lands, and environmental protection (see
II-B). About 175 stations regularly carried the messages (without
charge to Mobil), reaching about 20 million people. The company
also produced two-minute news clips in which Mobil people discussed
important issues, and these were picked up by many stations across
the country. Q


EE ne RR
(1-c/11)
Press relations were also greatly expanded during this period.
Mobil put special emphasis on getting adequate responses to any
inquiry as fast as possible, with top executives being aware that
our credibility depended on giving quick, full, and honest answers.
Mobil also set up a Speakers Program, in which company executives
around the nation were encouraged to speak out. They were supported
by pattern speeches written on important topics by the Public Rela-
tions department, and by a bi-weekly newsletter with information on
energy issues and backup materials. Some 250 executives received
these materials, and used them to good advantage in addressing
Kiwanis, Rotary, and other civic organizations. New speakers
received professional speech training.
Mobil initiated a new program to make its own employees more
aware of the issues, and to supply them with information needed
to enable them to respond to criticisms of 0il companies. This
program included:
-- Executive Forums, in which top company executives were
invited to respond to questions from employees. In crisis
periods, the company conducted as many as 10 of these a year.
Highlights of executives' responses were videotaped and made
available at company headquarters, in the field, and in some
cases overseas. Also, special programs of interest, on such
topics as Mobil's operations in the Middle East, profits,
and the gasoline shortage, were videotaped and shown to wide
audiences.
——SEL rE


(1-c/12)
-- A wall poster program, in which information on company ry
activities and events of interest was regularly maintained.
Topics have included divestiture, profits, the need to get
rid of excessive government regulation, and the role of alter-
nate energy sources.
-- The company's regular employee publication, Mobil World, has
since 1976 included a feature known as "Playback," in which
a selection of anonymous employee inquiries and management
responses are printed. These are only a few of the 1,000 or
so questions a year handled in the full-scale "Playback" pro-
gram of Employee Relations.
-- Distribution of news releases and other materials in the head-
quarters lobby, and a program of mass mailings to the field
to alert employees to imminent problems, so that they can &
express their views to their Congressman and Senators if they
wish. A publication, Making Your Voice Heard in Washington,
was developed to aid them in their letter writing.
Investor relations were also greatly upgraded during this period,
with Mobil taking the initiative to establish far greater personal
contacts with key analysts and portfolio managers. Whereas during
1960-75 the company scheduled only occasional meetings with the
financial community, from 1976 onward company representatives met
with various analysts and portfolio managers on a frequent and
increasing basis. Activities have included a regular luncheon
program, in which senior executives meet with key analysts in New
York, and regular visits to selected analysts and portfolio man- 9
agers around the United States and in Europe. As a result, Mobil


ES ne
(1-c/13)

1S perceived as a company which keeps up its contacts with the
investor community in both good times and bad, as contrasted with
some companies which are thought of as communicating only when the
company is doing well. A variety of articles in the business
press, such as Finance Magazine (Attachment 8), also attest to
Mobil's improved relations with the financial community.
This heightened effort to get across Mobil's viewpoints on major
issues was supported by a great expansion of the company's cul-
tural programs, both at home and abroad. Besides continuing to
support Masterpiece Theatre and putting together an informal
network to show quality drama on commercial television (see III-S),
Mobil also increased its sponsorship of art exhibits, catalogues,
and community projects, in which Public Affairs wrote or produced
backup art and culture ads and promotion. The company supported
museums through its popular Summergarden program at the Museum of
Modern Art and other efforts, essentially using Mobil funds to keep
museums open additional hours. A noteworthy development, in this
period of oil-company unpopularity around the country, was that in
1975 cultural events were sponsored and promoted in many scattered
locations where Mobil was represented: Torrance, california,
Anchorage, Alaska; Philadelphia. ..not just New York and Washington
(Attachment 9a-e).
These cultural activities were extended overseas with booklets and
filmstrips designed to buttress Mobil's operations abroad. Thus
in a period when Mobil was concerned with increasing its access to
incremental supplies of Saudi Arabian crude oil, Mobil produced a

SETS TEE


(1-C/14)

major book, The Genius of Arab Civilization, which attracted much °

favorable attention in the Arab world, and supported the founding

of a Committee to Honor the Fourteenth Centennial of Islam and the

development of a Middle East "outreach" program that now includes

approximately 50 colleges and universities in the U.S. Our quality

intellectual/cultural magazine designed for overseas audiences,

Pegasus, continued to be in demand by affiliates. Additional books

were produced on Nigerian art, the "living treasures" of Japan, and

"famous living Austrians".

Within the United States, Public Affairs cooperated with Mobil

Foundation in determining what programs in the field should

receive company financial support. Under this effort, some 60

managers in the field are encouraged to forward nominations for o
the support of cultural activities. Besides being good citizen-

ship, this program helped improve Mobil's image in periods when

we were under serious attack.

Outside its regular Public Affairs activities, Mobil also

strengthened relations with influential "think tanks," which

began to issue an increasing volume of materials questioning the
"left-of-center" wisdom of the time. These institutions included

the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution, and the
Heritage Foundation. By so doing, Mobil indirectly participated

in changing the national climate of opinion, which manifested

itself in the 1980 election. These activities also paid off by

giving Government Relations staff early access to several key o
ENS ee


(1-c/15)
| executives in the present Administration, since they were drawn
from these organizations.


(1-D/1)
)  D.) The Iranian Crunch, 1978-80
One month after Congress approved a law extending price ceilings
to intrastate natural gas, a strike by Iran's oil workers began
to affect that country's exports of crude. But this was largely
obscured in the public's perception of energy by reports of unre-
lated spot shortages of some grades of gasoline (due to the workings
of the allocation mechanism) and claims by the Department of Energy
that oil refiners had been overcharging for home heating oil since
price controls loosened two years earlier. The stage was set for
Ayatollah Khomeini. In December of 1978, OPEC announced a plan to
increase by April 1979 the price of marker crude by about $2 to
$14.50/barrel, sensing strong worldwide demand and trouble in Iran
)
By January, Iranian oil exports had fallen to zero, depriving the
western world of 5 million barrels/day. By late February, the
Iranian cutoff began to affect U.S. refiners. Gasoline lines began
to spring up again in some areas of the country, while other areas
had a surplus of gasoline shipped there under the mandates of the
allocation program -- a situation that was to prevail through June.
From New Year's Day 1979 to New Year's Day 1980, the price of
world crude oil doubled. This time price increases had a tremen-
dous impact on demand and as demand fell other nations (especially
Saudi Arabia) increased production. The U.S. shortage's hysteria
y of the spsing of 1979 quickly faded; indeed, it is difficult to
determine just how much of a shortage occurred in the U.S. during
that period -- especially since the inconvenience felt by the public


(1-0/2)
vas probably largely caused by the government allocation mechanisns. gy
But this was a fact that could be easily misinterpreted, and media
reports about profit gouging, contrived shortages and phantom tanker
fleets again abounded.
The renewed hostility against the oil industry took its toll.
Faced with the prospect of a September 1981 termination of crude
price control authority, President Carter proposed phasing out
controls in order to bring domestic prices into line with world
prices. But he and Congress would not let either the revenue or
the incentive go towards the production of new domestic supplies;
the result: the passage of the Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980
which taxes away most of the allowed increase in domestic price.
Fortunately, intervention by Mobil in particular (see page I-D/3) @
helped persuade Congress to allow some additional incentive for
oil that had not yet been discovered, although not the full incen-
tive of the marketplace. And the response by the industry, even
to the small increase in incentives, was predictable and dramatic:
Drilling for oil and gas in each instance surged forward, setting
new records.
Throughout the period since the 1973 embargo, some producing
countries often found themselves with revenues surplus to their
immediate development requirements. These surpluses surged into
the world's banking centers, creating the basis for money supply
growth and inflation. Since 1973, economic growth has been dra-
matically curtailed and recessions occur with increased frequency e
and severity. The adjustments to expensive energy are difficult


(1-D/3)

and costly and the countries of the less-developed part of the

J world have been the least able to cope. The price escalation
surrounding the Iranian supply curtailments seem to have created
new recessionary and conservation effects at the very time the
longer term conservation effects of the 1973-74 price increases
were beginning to become apparent. The result has been a sharp
curtailment in the free world's demand for crude oil, a curtail-
ment which focused entirely upon OPEC.
Mobil Response
Although the Iranian crisis led eventually to government measures
to decontrol oil prices, it was also a period of new and in some
ways unprecedented attacks on oil companies.

-- Mobil's major effort in this period was directed at obtaining

> changes in the proposed Windfall Profits Tax legislation, which
in its original form consisted almost entirely of punitive tax
on oil companies without any incentives for increased explora-
tion and production. In this effort, Mobil parted company with
the rest of the oil industry by urging that oil still to be
discovered should not be subject to such a tax and should be
free of price controls and that, if the U.S. government agreed
to this, we would be willing to forego decontrol of existing
reserves beyond increases for inflation.

—- Public Affairs backed up this Mobil policy by explaining the
company position to many who thought we simply favored con=
trols, and by a campaign urging employees and annuitants to

s write to their Congressman and the House and Senate leadership.


(1-D/4)

The Mobil initiative, which attracted many inquiries and com-
ments on Capitol Hill, was reflected in the modified final ®
bill in which new oil was given more favorable treatment than
old.

-- Realizing that the United States would have to rely on coal and
nuclear fuels to provide energy in the near and intermediate
term, Mobil stepped up its advocacy of these energy sources,
particularly nuclear (see III-I). We especially noted the
need for reduced restrictions on nuclear development.

-- We took issue with newspaper reports of government accusa-
tions of oil company overcharging under price controls, since
the accusations got prominent headlines and the oil companies’
denials were given less prominence. Frequently, too, when the
accusations were dismissed in the courts, that news vas either @
not printed at all, or given short shrift on an inside page.
We predicted the outcome of some of these cases and reminded
readers that we had done so (see ITI-B).

—- This period also saw the emergence of state issues, as hard-
pressed state governments latched on to the idea of taxing
il companies to generate revenues in a politically acceptable
way. We spoke out when we considered these measures to be
unfairly biased or illegal (see III-D).

—- Also, we had the unprecedented problem that a U.S. President
more than once singled out Mobil by name for attack. While
this might be considered a reverse tribute to our Op-Ed pro-
gram, we had to correct the President's misstatements (see
111-C). e

|


(1-D/5)
While developing these themes, we continued to urge a return to a
free enterprise economy, and to discuss what energy prospects would
be if a free market were to be restored.
The company maneuvered around the TV network boycott of advocacy
ads in 1980 when we arranged to have our issue-oriented "Fable"
commercials aired on 54 independent stations and network affiliates
in the top 50 markets comprising what we called the "Mobil Showcase
Network". The messages reached about 22 million people and were
the subject of a Time magazine story because of the uniqueness of
the approach.
Also in this period, Mobil took out full-page ads criticizing CBS's
coverage of our third quarter 1979 profits (Attachment 1). To
help improve coverage of our fourth quarter and year-end earnings,
we distributed to the media a detailed background paper called
“Earnings in Perspective," and invited television people to inter-
view company executives. The company also issued a nine-page press
release describing our earnings. These efforts paid off with gen-
erally improved press coverage, and ABC-TV network news and Channels
5 and 11 in New York ran objective stories.
In this way, Mobil was able to draw on the credibility established
in the years since the 1973-74 embargo to gain much more under-
standing from the media in the new Iranian crisis. Other prograns
in place, like the employee communications program and the speakers
: Bureau, were also valuable in getting across Mobil's messages and
combatting new unfounded attacks on the oil companies.


ee EE rR
(1-E/1)

E.) The Emerging Glut, 1980-today
Since 1981, a major change in the world oil position has again
taken place. Price-induced conservation (after the shock of the
near tripling of prices since the Iranian revolution) and reces-
sion have cut demand all over the Free World. Production had
increased rapidly outside OPEC, especially in the North Sea and
Mexico; even in the U.S. the downtrend in crude output has been
halted, at least temporarily. Inventory change also alters
the balance of supply and demand: after the crisis cooled in
mid-1979, the expectation of continued price increase and short
supply provided a powerful incentive to build and hold inventories
which delayed through much of 1981 the appearance of glut. Now
with prices weak and interest rates high, the incentive has
reversed, possibly prolonging the glut. There are only limited
data on Free World inventories, largely those held by major oil
companies and governments; there are almost none for inventories
held by end-users of petroleum products. Yet, the fact is clear:
OPEC production has been cut back by more than a third in the
past 2% years.
These then are the uncertainties that must be faced by policy
makers and planners. How much does price reduce the usage of 0il?
How much is it due to deepening recession? Can OPEC become a real
cartel enforcing production curtailment? How much incentive should
be given to non-OPEC energy production? How much, at what price,
and who will pay for strategic inventories? Should we develop
plans to manage another crisis, and how can we do so? How much


ES IEERRERERRRES—S————.
(I-E/2)
attention should be paid to the long term when resources, such as I
oil, will become scarce ‘through depletion instead of politics?
One answer was given by the Reagan Administration at the start
of its term: It is better to err on the side of oversupply. In
January 1981, crude oil and products were decontrolled. For a
brief instant prices rose and allegations of profiteering, manipu-
lation, and gouging again arose. Soon, with excess refinery capacity
and world crude oil in oversupply, competition began forcing prices
down -- vindication for the free market. This, however, is a lesson
that even the Reagan Administration is not yet ready to put fully
into practice, and one that those who oppose expansion of domestic
energy by private enterprise still largely ignore. For example,
approaches to speeding decontrol of natural gas have been delayed
or aborted by partisan election politics.
Many other issues of national energy policy and security remain
unresolved -- hampered not only by fundamental political problems
but also by a still too low level of understanding of energy supply/
demand dynamics by the public at large, the media, and policy makers.
Dismantle the DOE? Yes, but the how of it stymies efforts to make
both policy formulation and regulation more effective. With falling
world crude-prices, proposals abound to impose an import fee, moti-
vated more by the need to raise tax revenues than by consideration
of domestic supply, equity, or effectiveness.
Similarly, the program to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
is threatened by questions of cost and need for it, with little


RR RR RRR REE...
(1-E/3)

recollection of the opportunity lost just prior to the Iranian
Cut-off. On the other side, how and when to release oil from
§t ar emergency, is questioned by those who would use it as
an instrument of control of the private sector and those who
seek to carve out special privileges for themselves. This is an
issue that has had greater prominence as "Emergency Preparedness"
legislation: After a year's debate Congress passed the legisla-
tion recently vetoed by the President who claimed he has enough
authority already. But is the U.S. really better able to handle
the next emergency since gasoline rationing is not on the books
any longer?
A host of other key issues, some valid and some contrived to take
political advantage of anti-industry sentiment, are on the current
agenda. Of the former, regulatory reform and constructive changes
in the Clean Air Act, which is up for renewal, are important to
domestic energy supply development. Of the latter, attempts to
legislate divorcement of oil company marketing functions and
"open supply" for branded service stations, are indicative of
unconstructive, but politically productive, schemes.
On a more general level, the question of relations with the key
foreign suppliers -- including Mexico, Canada, and Saudi Arabia --
is not handled consistently or with adequate regard for supply
security; the excessively emotional debate over the AWACs sale
is one example. Canada complains about the U.S. burning too
much coal while it acts against expansion of its oil production.


EE ee ES
(I-E/4)

Imports of natural gas from Mexico become hostage to arguments ~~
over emigration and nationalism.
On an even more general level, the whole issue of the measurement,
adequacy (or as some still say: excessiveness), and role of prof-
its in the development of new energy supplies remains a subjective,
rather than objective, dilemma for national policy. Activists who
believe company profits are excessive still protest in front of
oil company headquarters and get good coverage on the evening TV
On the most general level, that of the national economy, oil pro-
ducers and consumers have become attractive targets for new taxes
in a time of recession and unacceptable federal deficits. Such
ideas need careful examination not only for potential revenue,
but also for the impact on demand and supply incentive. Also, the
foreign tax credit is again under assault -- this time in the guise
of a "minimum corporate tax" -- despite its effects on the position
of U.S. companies in an extremely competitive foreign market
and the role these foreign operations play in U.S. supply security.
Looking back to pre-embargo 1973, many of the issues of emerging
national policy and the state of public attitudes look much the
same. Most distressingly, oil imports as a share of domestic
supply are also about the same: 36%. How will resurgent energy
demand be met when the U.S. economy emerges from recession, as
well as in the 1990s? With what security, cost effectiveness,
environmental impact, and by what kind of institutions?


a Sr EE
(1-E/5)

Mobil Response
In a radically different political climate, Mobil has begun to
realign its public affairs efforts so as to address many new
problems, as the world enters a new energy era.
One new major emphasis has been our efforts to strengthen the hand
of the Administration as it has made determined strides towards a
free market in energy and in the economy generally (see III-E). So
we welcomed this new regime, and highlighted the beneficial effects
of crude oil decontrol on U.S. oil production. During the ongoing
controversy over the proposed budget deficit, we urged constructive
steps to minimize the deficit by delaying tax reductions and some
defense expenditures, and imposing a tax on decontrolled natural
gas, but not on gas yet to be found.
In this period, in which Mobil has made two major attempts to
improve its crude oil self-sufficiency through purchase of other
oil companies, we have forcefully presented our views in Washington
while exhausting legal and financial remedies. Advocacy advertising
was sparingly used in this effort, since success essentially hinged
on legal interpretations rather than public opinion. We did, how-
ever, use in ads and a letter to shareholders a W. P. Tavoulareas
article in The New York Times (Attachment 1), in which we noted
after the Conoco/Marathon failures that the interests of company
shareholders have been shortchanged in the maneuvering by company
executives to avoid takeover of their companies and enrich them-
selves.


Ss re
(I1-E/6)

We have continued to speak out in favor of constructive moves -

towards peace in the Middle East.

We have forcefully presented our views on some issues that are

unresolved. For example, we have urged changes in the Clean

Air Act Amendments, which we believe would be cost-effective

without endangering environmental progress already made. We

made another effort to explain the basics of the foreign tax

credit, which is still imperfectly understood by the news media.

Our Government Relations efforts moved into several new fields.

The company expended considerable effort (including an Op-Ed ad)

to support the Administration's efforts to achieve passage of the

controversial AWACs legislation so that these planes could be

sold to Saudi Arabia, and this effort was acknowledged by senior

Administration officials to the general manager of Government

Relations. GR arranged meetings for top Mobil executives with

members of the Canadian embassy and the ambassador to discuss

aspects of Canada's National Energy Plan which seriously impact

on Mobil. GR has also taken part in efforts to adjust the status

of aliens of exceptional ability, when the company would benefit

from their presence in the U.S.

In Investor Relations, special emphasis has been given in early

1982 both to appraising the financial community of the severity

of market conditions prevailing during this period of crude supply

imbalance (so that investors will not be unduly surprised by finan-

cial results when issued), and to re-emphasizing Mobil's underlying
SGA REE


EE ES NEN
(1-E/7)
strengths, both upstream and downstream (so that investors do not
underestimate our longer-term strengths).
This year, Investor Relations has set up meetings for Messrs. Warner
and Tavoulareas with investment officer groups of several large
institutions in New York, and for Messrs. Massad and Murray with
oil analysts in Boston and New York. The Investor Relations group
has also met with institutional investors in 12 major cities.
Special brochures on our upstream and downstream strengths are
being prepared for distribution to analysts and investors through-
out the U.S. and Europe. (See II-E)
In its cultural activities, Mobil undertook a significant venture
in 1981 by supporting amateur athletics (see III-T). In a period
of rising costs, and when American athletes were deprived of the
opportunity to appear in the Olympic Games in Moscow, Mobil is
underwriting the USA/Mobil Indoor Track and Field Championships,
held at Madison Square Garden in New York. Mobil's sponsorship
of these events has generated a great deal of favorable press
Continuing its support of Masterpiece Theatre, Mobil sponsored
such dramas as A Town Like Alice and a major documentary on
evolution, Life on Earth.
We hope to increase our corporate giving in areas where the poor
directly benefit, responding to the President's appeal to business
to help in areas where Federal aid has been reduced or eliminated.
Esso E———— TS ER


SET eee NEE
(1-E/8)
This will be a very selective process in which we will seek out
the effective, visible and imaginative. «
As other new issues are formulated, in a period of chronic eco-
nomic and political difficulty around the world, we will continue
to address our various publics in a provocative and, we hope, use-
ful way. We will increase our activity at the state and regional
levels, to which some of the energy action is now shifting, to
insure that Mobil is fairly treated. We will continue to present
Mobil to the investment community as a company of improving poten-
tial, aggressively seeking to improve its crude oil position and
diversify into alternate energy development as this is economically
justifiable. We will continue to keep shareholders and employees
especially well informed on public affairs matters, recognizing the
value of their support.
oH oH


ES...
Evolution of
Mobil's
Public Affairs
Programs
1970-81


SEEN NN
Evolution of Mobil's Public Affairs Programs, 1970-81
INTRODUCTION

Mobil's Public Affairs programs have evolved around three
basic premises as outlined by Rawleigh Warner, Jr., in 1970:

(1) build our reputation as an outspoken responsible company

concerned about our energy future and major social issues;

(2) initiate debate on major public issues that concern us;

(3) broaden the spectrum of information and viewpoints avail-
able to the American people, to help them reach the
conclusions necessary for sound public policy in a
democratic society.

(Excerpts from statements by Mr. Warner more fully setting forth
his original Public Affairs concept for Mobil, and outlining some
major activities, follow immediately after this introductory section.)

Taken together with support for public television and other
cultural institutions, these underlying themes of social respon-
sibility and determined advocacy have given Mobil a unique position
in America's social consciousness. The purpose of this volume is
to provide an overview of how Mobil's Public Affairs programs have
evolved -- becoming a part of American culture itself as well as
part of the American dialogue on major public issues involving our
company . -

In this volume's review of more than a decade of Mobil's Public
Affairs programs, we will survey the major directions, activities,
and objectives. Some of these may be familiar to you, particularly
the more prominent national programs. But some may be fresh and

TE


itd

noteworthy, especially if you have not had the. opportunity to oo
directly experience all the years of all these, programs, for we

have included representative samples of some logal.or. specialized

areas.

Since we will be dealing with some long out-of-date events

from a dozen years that involved major dislocations in-supply,

hostile Federal Administrations, and a climate. in.which politicians
inflamed public doubts about our industry and company, se begin by
recapitulating with a chronology since 1970. We.break the entire

period into five time frames -- before, during and after the 1973-

74 oil embargo, the Iranian crisis, and since. sIndividual chro-

nology sections may include materials documentingssemes points of

the time periods, but most supporting material -iscelSewhere in the
volume, and is cross-referenced. Together, the sections review ®
what happened in the world and nation, and what:Mebil Public

Affairs attempted and accomplished in response tastheseevents, or
frequently in anticipation of them. oned asd

The second part of this volume organizes our du¥ivities by

the publics we address -- opinion leaders (the media! federal and

state officials, and others), the general public) the investment
community, our own employees, and foreign governménts.’- Here we

consider not the year-by-year programs, but the overall impact

they have had -- and this is substantial. Where'podéible we

include polls, surveys, and other systematic assessments of our
effectiveness -- for example, the survey showing that "Observations"
readers have been influenced toward Mobil's opinions on several @
important energy issues where non-readers have continued to hold
views less favorable to us. Of necessity, other mdtéFials are

ne


= a3
) descriptive -- a Study, for instance, correlating the substantial
change in The ‘New York Times editorials over the years toward the
Very positions we have argued (though, of course, we can't prove a
direct relationship since so many other factors affect an editorial
writer). Some materials are narrative, such as a case study of how
Mobil's Governmerit Relations and Public Relations led the industry
fight against “divestiture proposals in the mid-1970s -- a signal
success. Still other materials are examples -- for example, what _
the media actually said about Mobil, or what views are held by
other opinion leaders.: And some materials are simply anecdotal,
vet illustrative == to-mention one example not cited elsewhere,
the Mobil executive who had three separate seat companions on a
recent trip to-Indonesia; all three volunteered complimentary
| remarks about our Op-Ed ads, and wondered why other oil companies
weren't doingsthe same. In the wide variety of materials, you
will find even cartoons, presented as illustrative of the thesis
that "Mobil" has become synonymous with "corporate good works".
The third and final portion of this volume describes and pre-
sents some of ‘the main themes we have argued over the years.
Throughout, of course, you'll find some of the high points --
for example: in 1975, Advertising Age, the "bible" of the ad indus-
try, named Mr. Warner as "Adman of the Year." Said Ad Age:
_ . i'Mr. Warner was selected as representative
_ of a.company whose shoot-from-the-hip, 5
.. ¢.gutsy 'idea' advertising has added a new
_ dimension to corporate advertising during
; 5 a period of unprecedented attacks by gov- :
_., .., emment, the media and consumer advocates i
Ai a] i


i
En
not only on the oil industry, but on oa
American business in general."
In fairness, we also have included some of! olr” less-successful
campaigns. Example: The 1978 series of ads like Op-Eds intended
for various labor publications; these were designed to strike a
common theme for labor and business in promoting policies toward
economic growth. The series might have worked. withothe readers,
but some of the publications' editors rejected. ths idea of filling
their labor-union pages with so prominent a management voice as
Mobil's. :
For all of the voluminous content of this briefing book, we
have touched only the outlines and a tiny portion of the relevant
details of all that we have attempted and done...To limit the bulk,
we have eliminated duplication of explanation and example wherever @
possible, relying instead on cross-references where necessary; still,
there simply isn't room for a thorough-going condensation of the 220
file drawers of material from 12 years of our Public Affairs programs
through 1981. This volume merely sets the stage, and even that
limited attempt might not succeed since so much has been excluded.
But what emerges nonetheless is a picture of some of the
facets of Mobil's corporate personality: sagt 3
-- Reasoning, intellectual, sensible, and attractive to many
intelligent people. ar
-- Demonstrating a well-defined economic philosophy, and a
thoroughly expert awareness of our business and of the world's
energy realities.
-- Showing social concern and sensitivity to environmental issues. ®
TS


ot

~~ Concerned with culture and other institutions of our broad
society.

-- Not. just blindly trying to make a profit at any and all cost --
damn the. consequences -- but certainly not operating to be loved.

~~ Willing ands able to defend ourselves against misunderstandings
or attacks, ‘whether from malevolence or simple ignorance.

-- And successful in presenting our belief in abundant energy and
economic growth as the way to solve social problems.

The nation may not always agree, but it definitely does respect
our opinions... In summary then:

-- Mobil's image has greatly improved since the Sixties among
the general public and with key target groups, including
journalists ‘and government officials.

-- Mobil is now recognized as an outspoken, responsible company
with a high level of visibility and, very importantly, high
credibility.

—- Mobil has succeeded in reaching and influencing opinion
leaders.

~~ Mobil has sparked public debate on many issues important
to us.

-- And Mobil has provided the public with an alternative source
of information on major national issues.

4h
I ————


inl
Excerpts from remarks by ®
RAWLEIGH WARNER, JR.
Chairman,
Mobil Oil Corporation
a) —
before
ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT
Detroit, Michigan :
March 5, 1973 fy FE
(2) thes
42nd Annual Convention
of the >
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE = *
New York, N.Y.
June 3, 1974 th
(3) :
Upon receiving the
Alumni Association Award *
Graduate School of Business
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
New York, N.Y. ike
April 26, 1978 EE
) bre
As you hardly need reminding, American industry and indeed all of
our institutions including especially government have grown larger
and more complex in recent years. News sources have become more
prolific, communications have become instantaneous; and issues
have become more public. One result of all this is to make it
increasingly difficult for the average citizen to understand
issues of public policy in any great depth. This seems to be par-
ticularly true when technology or economics is involved, and even
truer when both are involved. 102
If we in business are to retain our franchises, we had better
recognize that this situation places a special obligation on us
to share our particular knowledge with the public so that it may
understand these complex issues. E:
The issues swirling around the oil industry today with respect
to adequacy, security, and cost of supply seem to be of just such
a nature. They are caused largely by the fact that this country
is passing from a watershed characterized by ample, cheap, and
seemingly endless energy supplies to one characterized by expensive gg
and limited supply and actual shortages. The transition has been
accelerated by the growth in demand, which has often been quite
sharp and, of course, on a larger base each year. -


- vii -
Au We move from the old era to the new, our conduct both within
* boundaries and among our worldwide trading partners must change

to reflect the changing conditions. It is difficult enough for the
jverage person to see and comprehend the changes taking place. It
3s especially difficult to see and understand these forces at a
time when emotional issues mask the greater issues forcing the
change. ...

[As to what Mobil 0il is doing to explain complex subjects and
help people make the decisions that will best serve the country
as a whole...] we are carrying to the American people issues of
public policy relating to our business of supplying energy. I

an under no delusion that Mobil is the only company, or even the
only oil company, engaging in such a dialogue. Nor do I maintain
that we are necessarily doing a better job of it than anyone else.
Mobil's program started because about two years ago some of us.

in the company decided we had views on some topical subjects that
we should communicate to the public.

How do we go about it?

We make speeches, which we sometimes print and distribute. We
try to engage politicians, reporters, editors, and publishers

in dialogues, and we meet with people in television and radio.

We distribute a number of television film clips each year,
running about a minute to a minute and a half each, to 100 TV
stations across the country, and we reach several hundred radio
stations every month with recorded interviews of about three
minutes each. We also use spot advertisements on radio.

One of the most effective ways we have found, however -- at

least in New York and, I suspect, elsewhere as well -- is to buy
advertising space. We have found it totally ineffective to rely
on letters to the editor to rebut even the most misinformed
reporting. No letter can compete in timeliness or impact with

an adverse headline, no matter the retraction later made. Even
news releases are of limited effectiveness.

specifically, we publish a quarter-page advertisement every
Thursday, year-round, on the page opposite the editorial page

of The New York Times -- called, as you might surmise, the op-ed
page. The space the Times has made available to advertisers in
that part of the paper is the only advertisement appearing on
those two facing pages. Thus it has high visibility. The space
is large enough for essay-type ads and is an integral part of an
SBitoraal SeChion thal 1 vonste Feeding For SpImIOR leaders,
policy-makers, educators, journalists, legislators, business
executives, and intellectuals. Our messages there are often
more in the nature of paid editorials than advertisements. ...
We have taken the offensive -- but tried not to be offensive in
doing it -- on such subjects as the energy crisis, the need to
conserve energy and ways to do it, the role of profits, the need
for public transportation, capital formation, the need for national
energy policies, business as a catalyst of change, and...the costs

’


- viii -

of controlling automotive emissions. We are relying on facts

and persuasive presentation to give people a true picture of

some of the options open to them and the order of magnitude of

the costs involved. Some of these ads, too, have been published

in other papers as well.

I am glad to say the response has been strong and generally

favorable, though we do get denounced for some of them in letters

to the editor -- which at least shows people are reading them.

We have distributed thousands of reprints, and will be glad to

give copies to any of you who request them.

I would be considerably less than honest if I did not say that

we have our differences of opinion with the editorial policies of

The New York Times. At the same time, however, that paper has made

a forum available in the form of paid space in which we can express

our opinions. And the Times' readership encompasses some important

publics.

I would urge that you and businessmen across the country try

to persuade your local newspapers to make similar space available --

and, whenever they do, that you utilize that space to try to give

the American people the sort of information they need if they are

to make intelligent choices in the realm of public policy. In my

view, we in business must reach the opinion leaders in our communi-

ties before we can hope to have appreciable impact on the general

public... as

You will not, of course, achieve believability overnight or auto-

matically. I myself like to think that Mobil began to change --

and to improve -- the public's impression of it seven.or eight

years ago, when we changed our logotype and spent a great deal

of money to devise what we believe is a more attractive service

station, and, among other things, conducted a nationwide adver-

tising campaign on safety with the theme "We Want You to Live."

I suppose I could catalog other activities, such as our support

for public broadcasting. The point I am making is that in the

last analysis a company will be judged by its actions, the per-

suasiveness of its ads and other communications, its willingness

to listen to both sides of questions, and the extent to which it

involves itself in the mainstream of life. -

In Mobil's case, the response we have been getting leads us to

conclude that that segment of the public which exerts impact on

decision-making is increasingly reading what we have to say and

judging us both on our logic and on our record, with generally

favorable results....

(2)

One reason we think our advertisements, along with those of other De

oil companies, may be having some effect is that several Congress-

men and Senators have recently tried to inhibit us. We believe
EEN


i
The Wall Street Journal was close to the target when it said,
"Indeed, the reason their critics are rushing to have them gagged
is that the oil companies have been making legitimate arguments
worthy of being heard."
- That brings me to the biggest roadblock we have encountered --
the refusal of national television networks to sell us time in which
to state our viewpoints on matters of great public import.
When the energy crisis hit full-blown last October, there were
very few reporters in any media anywhere in the country, outside
of oil-producing areas and the oil trade press, who knew much
about oil. This was particularly true of commercial television,
and seems still to be true. As a result, we have a very difficult
communications problem, and we recognize that. The energy crisis
is complex, both in its origins and in its manifestations. The
TV networks, by their very nature, seldom seem able to do justice
to such a complex issue.... While we are not accusing the networks
of bias in their reporting, we nevertheless feel that their
structural deficiences [limited air time, costs that restrict TV
news' responsiveness, the "star" system as part of the quest for
ratings, lack of specialist reporters for business or energy, and
the nature of television as visual entertaimment] have combined
to make much of their coverage of oil news inaccurate an
misleading.... [So] Mobil has sought to buy air time for commer-
cials that would convey our point of view -- commercials that would
deal in ideas rather than in products. But networks have refused
to sell us time for many of the commercials we have submitted.
Their position was pretty well summed up in a letter of
February 27, 1973, from the law department of the Columbia Broad-
casting System to a vice president of Mobil, from which I quote:
w...it is the general policy of CBS to sell time only for the
promotion of goods and services, not for the presentation of
points of view on controversial issues of public importance.
CBS has adopted this policy because it believes that the public
will best be served if important public issues are presented in
formats determined by broadcast journalists..."
1 have these comments to make on that.
First, this country was founded in controversy -- hard, openly
expressed controversy -- and it has remained free and democratic
through the continuing clash of opinion and of value patterns.
Second, if the networks dedicate themselves almost exclusively
to merchandising products, via the entertainment route, they
may raise serious questions as to whether what they merchandise
as news is actually just entertainment.

, today's energy crisis is controversial largely because
eS a hive helped make it controversial by printing and
broadcasting material so inaccurate that anyone with any know-
ledge of our industry would have to disagree with it.

AA


ir
When as powerful and pervasive a medium as television will not
sell time for controversial issues, it seems to me our country ov
has reached a rather critical juncture. How can a democracy
operate effectively without broad public access to clashing
points of view?
It is worth recalling what the U.S. Supreme Court said in 1969,
in what is known as the Red Lion case: "It is the right of
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance the monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or by a
private licensee. It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."
The real issue seems to be whether the commercial networks should
have total control over what is broadcast to the American people.
since network broadcasting is among the most concentrated of U.S.
profit-making industries, it would appear that our country may be
facing a danger of monopoly censorship.
I hope you realize how reluctant we in Mobil are to adopt any
posture that would appear to place us in an adversary position.
We would much rather just live and let live. But we have con-
cluded that we have no alternative to standing up for what we oO
believe to be right. It is a dreadful set of circumstances at
which we have arrived. What we're battling for is something at
least approaching fair treatment in a medium that seems to be
the main source of news for the vast majority of the public, yet
one that seemingly has decided that in order to be successful,
it must concentrate more heavily on showmanship than on present-
ing news in any depth....
I hope nothing I have said here will be construed as ignorance
or insensitivity on my part toward the contributions a free press
has made throughout our country's history. Quite the contrary.
We could not have remained a free people without it. Freedom
of the press is clearly an essential ingredient of a democratic
society -- essential not only to the press itself, but to all
of us. I submit, however, that it is inseparably linked to
freedom of speech, and that both are in turn linked to a free
economy.
Unlike some politicians, I am urging not less but more free speech,
and for everyone -- including most importantly those whose views
some of us may find totally abhorrent. I would hope that those
who write and speak the most about freedom of the press will come
to comprehend that if they help to destroy our free economy, no
matter how unwittingly, it could be only a matter of time before
they lost their own freedom. I do not know which of our freedoms @
might be the first to go, but I do know that once we lose any one
of them -- whether free speech, free press, or our free economy ==
the others are apt soon to follow.


cor 5
Corporasi xi =
pe ome 30
e Jeers Xe p 3)
se ci Mc €0)
i Siig lob: ple
- -ou: of ges il he , tes
aggre comp. a hpe Senin &
a ems eo n rd, ould gq al
nr Siig rar 550 the
inte: than 2 at felt bcs hd ee
asd rest 200 hd I it ri ommui to b aI :
Ny ad $n es oa Sie rears ory  oaty
fn icant ve Ten. = Faia SEE 2 ie
hil on the ha al activi fy ow Bann 2
re = a EE 2 an erates
Ir s fret titited Sat HE
ER Hei o Hopi” nes e 2 ana ou:
is asti y Sh to lic cogni have ect reasi our: It
Taud pI Lh art 7 Lo Ty s is
In thi LE ay io ay 2
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Hn em ecti nythi Ee Jo ne well
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fo En geile ae Th fel puss
sou air: rwri th: mm t menti whi SS “Healt em tx uns
zestuEeey pesyiies SoSi tes tio pore of ob
Sen an ite programe 0 go Suet E he natio "0% punt
Intent Goad ih ans ecord wii Mobi os erthinly”
a on 2 the re has ad, nore
In a i ion il so irs 10 stro ror
In sketch Sian Snails Pn RZ = Cl ann
Sate sti I ie ir engtasny ou
sen iti ng fro ion behi ra ize of a tse:
Set hess nat ve yt sad) ind audience © HE
1 ot r e 3 , ne
Einsls mal oyed 5 ie aofes ea mee) Fok pi Sa mE
Ca nt al ot ts SE eries Somers
Sadun o HEAT nay Pag He
te busi sm. er i a
props in a siness it a 2 ins an
s ts ig sellin shod enj ects’ ay i ducati ividui bu-
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Med 9% olives 3 our v ie i ot een
ie - ie oi Ea
pairs 2 en wan
rae 2 pyres ir a a ot ih ph
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and ve loge: 2st on TH pAb
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peliete re as an purc er o: ae
isinecsts. RE aioe ha h to
Ry Ra Tr om
DRefee 2 Wey 2% paces RL Pitt y th
b. IC 0d: 0 It
adv y, edi 5 il of wa ce i s S] er an
aah Tesicrtion g, Lave 2 Ea peciive and
: nd elytra BS ny Sein
Fat at prised i
at Yo do with tour goo ne
FRR x g
LY ont respect oe
maton m Beliefs
ee in Sues
as
Re


- xii -
As anyone knows who has followed our advocacy advertising and
our other external communications, we enjoy being an active o
participant in many arenas, and these two -- education and
cultural activities -- are important to us and in many ways
are as rewarding as any in which we have involved ourselves.
I might add, with further reference to our advocacy advertising,
that we believe our outspoken support of the American system of
democratic capitalism is all of a piece with our support of
higher education and cultural programs. I am convinced that if
our economic system is destroyed or fatally weakened by the
relatively small but highly articulate elitists who seem bent
on doing just that, whether from ignorance or for whatever
reason, then our democratic society and our cultural institu-
tions -- including higher education -- will be imperiled.

#4


SEEN NN
Evolution of Mobil's Public Affairs Programs, 1970-81
INTRODUCTION

Mobil's Public Affairs programs have evolved around three
basic premises as outlined by Rawleigh Warner, Jr., in 1970:

(1) build our reputation as an outspoken responsible company

concerned about our energy future and major social issues;

(2) initiate debate on major public issues that concern us;

(3) broaden the spectrum of information and viewpoints avail-
able to the American people, to help them reach the
conclusions necessary for sound public policy in a
democratic society.

(Excerpts from statements by Mr. Warner more fully setting forth
his original Public Affairs concept for Mobil, and outlining some
major activities, follow immediately after this introductory section.)

Taken together with support for public television and other
cultural institutions, these underlying themes of social respon-
sibility and determined advocacy have given Mobil a unique position
in America's social consciousness. The purpose of this volume is
to provide an overview of how Mobil's Public Affairs programs have
evolved -- becoming a part of American culture itself as well as
part of the American dialogue on major public issues involving our
company . -

In this volume's review of more than a decade of Mobil's Public
Affairs programs, we will survey the major directions, activities,
and objectives. Some of these may be familiar to you, particularly
the more prominent national programs. But some may be fresh and

TE


itd

noteworthy, especially if you have not had the. opportunity to oo
directly experience all the years of all these, programs, for we

have included representative samples of some logal.or. specialized

areas.

Since we will be dealing with some long out-of-date events

from a dozen years that involved major dislocations in-supply,

hostile Federal Administrations, and a climate. in.which politicians
inflamed public doubts about our industry and company, se begin by
recapitulating with a chronology since 1970. We.break the entire

period into five time frames -- before, during and after the 1973-

74 oil embargo, the Iranian crisis, and since. sIndividual chro-

nology sections may include materials documentingssemes points of

the time periods, but most supporting material -iscelSewhere in the
volume, and is cross-referenced. Together, the sections review ®
what happened in the world and nation, and what:Mebil Public

Affairs attempted and accomplished in response tastheseevents, or
frequently in anticipation of them. oned asd

The second part of this volume organizes our du¥ivities by

the publics we address -- opinion leaders (the media! federal and

state officials, and others), the general public) the investment
community, our own employees, and foreign governménts.’- Here we

consider not the year-by-year programs, but the overall impact

they have had -- and this is substantial. Where'podéible we

include polls, surveys, and other systematic assessments of our
effectiveness -- for example, the survey showing that "Observations"
readers have been influenced toward Mobil's opinions on several @
important energy issues where non-readers have continued to hold
views less favorable to us. Of necessity, other mdtéFials are

ne


= a3
) descriptive -- a Study, for instance, correlating the substantial
change in The ‘New York Times editorials over the years toward the
Very positions we have argued (though, of course, we can't prove a
direct relationship since so many other factors affect an editorial
writer). Some materials are narrative, such as a case study of how
Mobil's Governmerit Relations and Public Relations led the industry
fight against “divestiture proposals in the mid-1970s -- a signal
success. Still other materials are examples -- for example, what _
the media actually said about Mobil, or what views are held by
other opinion leaders.: And some materials are simply anecdotal,
vet illustrative == to-mention one example not cited elsewhere,
the Mobil executive who had three separate seat companions on a
recent trip to-Indonesia; all three volunteered complimentary
| remarks about our Op-Ed ads, and wondered why other oil companies
weren't doingsthe same. In the wide variety of materials, you
will find even cartoons, presented as illustrative of the thesis
that "Mobil" has become synonymous with "corporate good works".
The third and final portion of this volume describes and pre-
sents some of ‘the main themes we have argued over the years.
Throughout, of course, you'll find some of the high points --
for example: in 1975, Advertising Age, the "bible" of the ad indus-
try, named Mr. Warner as "Adman of the Year." Said Ad Age:
_ . i'Mr. Warner was selected as representative
_ of a.company whose shoot-from-the-hip, 5
.. ¢.gutsy 'idea' advertising has added a new
_ dimension to corporate advertising during
; 5 a period of unprecedented attacks by gov- :
_., .., emment, the media and consumer advocates i
Ai a] i


(t=as1)
, I. INTENMETIVE CHRONOLOGY
Before the Arab 01) fabacge, 1970-73
ground
the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.5. was little concerned
its future nergy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
gualed about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern vas the
threat of 4 flood of chaap oil. OL1 imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Come
) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
squivaleat of domestic or imported sil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while ges distribe-
tion coxpanies aggressively sought new Customers
The decline in coal's contribution to U.5. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but muclear
power beld the clear promise for the long-term futsre, and in thw
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.
The menoty was still fresh that Americs could protect itself
and aid its allies vhen oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was hov productice
y from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Siope coald
be absorbed into the American market,


(1-7)
wii Camm 1470, 3 bad year for the U.0. petroleum industry. A
law lean resulting from public and sedis reaction to the o
. » ob ¥ f January 196% began to Dave ita lapact
: sliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
s fiest of many lengthy teguletery and court procesdings
fw tr t £ the Alaskan Fipeline Construction of all
wort energy fecilities became bogged sown in lengthy “emviren
ent part® statements and procesdings. which alse cospounded
: w mushrooming licensing Alffisulties of the nuclear industsy
Aewndaniits to the Clean Air Act became lav, setting the stage for
udded gasoline demand == & result of the tesparary and inefficient
redesign imposed on autoschile producers and a prelsde to the
longes-ters switch to lead-free gasoline
In 1971, the federsl government impesed mmergency price freeces .
and controls on the entire U.S. ecosvey, effectively limiting
the U.3. petroleum induatiy’s ability to develcp nev supplies ==
fronically just months after the first signal that CFEC had come
of age. in February, the Tetmran Agreement Laposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%. Bringing sost
to over 52 & barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreesect secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya,
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap esarged betwess ced
trolled interstate materal gas prices and fres-market istrastate
gas, relnforcing the shift of supplies away from tramscentinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
ws.


(1-1)

J As 197) unfolded, most producing nations vere climbing sboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial scquisition of ownership in
its oll-preducing concessions. By June, facing strongly increase
ing oil demands (U.5. oll imports Lacreased by a fifth im 1972
and another third in 197), raising the import percentage to MX
of wopply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increas,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Messwhile, U.3. price controls on demestic oil became
more and more cssplex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of “old® and “new® oil were crested
And the 0.5. replaced mandatory ceilings on the voluse of imported
oll with a fee on tsports

) On the eve of the embargo, mational energy policy was ia total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With fav exceptions, the
peblic, government, and the media 41d not Nave the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.
Mobil response
By 1970, Mobil vas well avare that the U.S. was heading for &
severe epargy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of snderstasding of
energy issues vas sade worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the sedin to business in general and oil companies in particular.

& The Op-E progres vas Nobil's prime response for dealing with
wmerging issues in a vay that would assure control of the context

-


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same tise an Cp-fde began (mporati-  (@
Sally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil alse sade the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a 81 million contribution (at that
time the largest from amy company) and providing a nev dimension of
Quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Opgd
ads ware sometimes used to prosote television programs (ses 111-8),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
noting selected philanthropies such sx the United Negro College
Pund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educe-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar cesses (see III-A). After o
these and other, primarily low-key theses in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Bds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes|
Mags transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil compesy would mot be expected to support. Nabil
took the lead ascag oil cospanies in calling for National Nester
Transportation Progras, Such a progres net caly would provide
for the highways the cosntry needs, but it would also make possi:
ble adequate public traneportaticn. This was an uwsusual view for
wn 011 company but, as we pointed out when we announced cur poei~ °
tion in that first ad, “we don't believe the gaseline consumed by

Eo


(1-A/5)
P  * SUF Ming in 4 traffic jum... in the best possible use of
wtica's Limited putroleus resources.
_SOSIgY situation: Ade (ses 111-1) Sealt with the need for
WEEBL U.S. energy planing, the loss of incentives for dis-
ry of tev natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-sse that resulted from these prices. the need
to get Alaskan 0il to U.S. markets, asd the seed for additieoal
ffabore drilling «= all clear tespooes to issues already
ispeoding, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
=f Op-Ed firsts: calling for & national esergy policy, warming
of a natural gas shortage. and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems
D
Growth: We addressed the seed for continued economic growth, for
which more asergy would be needed, as the caly way to provide higher
Living standards for poor pecple. both in the U.5. and arcund the
world (see 11-3). We believed this emphasis was extremely ispor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns wers unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Orowth-type thimking.
Environmest: As part of our effort to gut greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue vith the extremists of the environmental
movement vho insisted that cleaning up the envircement was Af
abwolute priority, without comnidaring the need for enesgy/enivie
) ronment tradeoffs (eee 111<F}


A I TE rE
(1A)
anrrat Knowing that the 1,5. Had # serious energy peobles °
we tan wwnial edn wring GreAlar conwmrvaticn of wnergy, particus
pita st ade drew Attestion to the valse of the free aster
. presoting ecossmle growth, In « period of skepticism
shoul Business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (ase 1T5=R n
se Op-Ed that deserves special ssntion vas "The U.5. Stake im Middle
Last Peace® which in June 197) argued the need for a peaceful settle
sent of outstanding Widdle East imsues (see [17-Q/Attactment 1)
This resulted in & huge volume of anti-Mobil wail, demanding thet we
upell cut what we thought was an “equitable solution of the Middle 2
Eastern situktion. Sheik Yamani, bawever, ves so impressed vith
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani te coavey
his perscnal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mebil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, wince war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred scom aftervard
Bead today in the Light of what has happened in the Riddle East in
the intervening years, the ad seess extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed
In all of these adn, we concentrated on reaching cpinion leaders
|= government, the media. and elsewhere, a3 the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


11-a/7)

TIBG the pre-embargo period, our Coverraant Relstions people in

“uhington focused on & Variety of issues, including natural ges
ing. lepart controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation

* Company contimued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Cootrols program, particularly for small refiners whieh

ady enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
wit sympathetic to the oil isdustry, and oil industry representa
tives generally had plenty of cpportunity to communicate with
[ficial and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor
This comparative calm was falt in Mebil's media relations progress,
where & small press relaticos staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operaticas in South Afric,
wbarw we were criticized by church groups, but the Company mounted
# vigorous defecse through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our cpersticas in that
county

Fo =


(I-A/Attoackawnt 1)
We hope this ad moves people...
In facet years the Listed States Sas deve tpaiems are for the most part 1231 ia the wild
000 a rely Ser higheay system 13 Deen Dh yonder

for 108d buising reacts wii OGUTH vary [ATR eiEnditurer. Wa

But the highway comtruction Soom fas Dalieve there san urgent heed for legislator 10
Deen accompanied by 8 Mass rans bust. Tren reexamine the procedures Used 19 generate
2° SUB travel in this Country, with few oxceD- 9c 4ependd SRTREONTATIOn TENURES. Sch & Te
100s, 1 Oecrepit. The air traweier suffers in view may pd the CONCHLON That Special sar
cresting indignities desoite bigger. tater Marked Hundt are 1c longer The best ICOMACR
So a cn

Grater New York 8 3 tyscHl example You Can ignore the increasing congestion on those
Can depand on commuting te ang from Menta. Tne Rigrwayy of ours, #aDacaly in and around
1a But ony 10 De undependatie and gow, On the great rten centers. But more and better
Buti Sranaport, the 25 miles 13 Westfeid, NJ. mah tranalt COE Wop alice Defore they
tok 75 mowtes ot an average soeed of 20 tart Just one ral line Son Srgle he pease:
mies par howe: The 33 miles 10 Stamond, Conn eving Capacity of & Thrwe-iane saoerhighwary
tases 50 mines at 33 mph The 26 miles COB Metin aNF gy COPSIMER ON Bd IN
Hicksville, LL tekes 55 minutes at 28 mon. money—t0 Move pecoie via mats transit than
When you're on tema on fghwirys. Thus mas Irannit meses ees ov

You have 10 De # SIC with SITING 10 use Pathan.
pute ground transportation for a tip beyond It 8's0 means coraenvation. Whether the
he Commuting range. Fly 10.8 hearty oty? You oewrgy comes trom gawoline for cars, of fet
can hardy get Bt Sur CONGRSIDd Br MRA, oil, natural gas. Of Cos for sRectric power plants,
either Dy nd or a¥, The fide In of from the derived fromm § Srinishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight So we think a dorms of Sravagortation should

Mass transit seems 10 work Detter strosd Be brought into a national plan for sate, rapid,
Amercars ire agreeatyy Imoressed Dy he fal, economical wars of mowing peu —Consatent
Comforiatie, 30 BIractive Subways in loregn with the wisest use of CUP BNRrRY MEICAFTEL
Cities. irdercity iraing in Other Courtried ahd Wide Maobi( sadly fumts and luteicanes, we
surs lock pA. Jacan's highaceed Tokaido don't Dalleve the Grecine commad By A CF
ine carries mute than 200.000 passengers 4 ing (na traffic jam (Carrying 8 single passan:
day. Clan, coticetati Franch, German, Ral or. Drobably} is the Dest posstie use of Amer.
@n, anc Brian Uae regulary attee wads a's Iimvited Detrobeun rescues. Our products
over 100 moh. Eurspesn caieasds ae aireacy SUM 10 tp more pecgie gut where they wit
plan TulCng espressen that will 3o et we
i A To wh. that means green ight or mem

et, in the United Sates. ew Mans rates ranuit won

This ad appesred in the Sev Tork Tises oo Ooteber 18, 1900
aaa ail


(1-a/1)

I. INTERPRETIVE CHRONOLOGY
A.) Before the Arab Oil Embargo, 1970-73
Background
As the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.S. was little concerned
for its future energy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
equaled about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern was the
threat of a flood of cheap oil. 0il imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price.
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Com-

) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
equivalent of domestic or imported oil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while gas distribu-
tion companies aggressively sought new customers.

The decline in coal's contribution to U.S. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but nuclear
power held the clear promise for the long-term future, and in the
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.

The memory was still fresh that America could protect itself

and aid its allies when oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was how production

) from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Slope could
be absorbed into the American market.


(1-a/2)
Then came 1970, a bad year for the U.S. petroleum industry. A o
slowdown in leasing resulting from public and media reaction to the
Santa Barbara oil spill of January 1969 began to have its impact.
Tax reform eliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
oil. The first of many lengthy regulatory and court proceedings
blocked construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. Construction of all
sorts of energy facilities became bogged down in lengthy "environ-
mental impact" statements and proceedings, which also compounded
the now mushrooming licensing difficulties of the nuclear industry.
Amendments to the Clean Air Act became law, setting the stage for
added gasoline demand -- a result of the temporary and inefficient
redesign imposed on automobile producers and a prelude to the
longer-term switch to lead-free gasoline.
2
In 1971, the federal government imposed emergency price freezes
and controls on the entire U.S. economy, effectively limiting
the U.S. petroleum industry's ability to develop new supplies --
ironically just months after the first signal that OPEC had come
of age. In February, the Teheran Agreement imposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%, bringing most
to over §2 a barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreement secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya.
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap emerged between con-
trolled interstate natural gas prices and free-market intrastate
gas, reinforcing the shift of supplies away from transcontinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
u.s.


(1-A/3)

) As 1973 unfolded, most producing nations were climbing aboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial acquisition of ownership in
its oil-producing concessions. By June, facing strongly increas-
ing oil demands (U.S. oil imports increased by a fifth in 1972
and another third in 1973, raising the import percentage to 36%
of supply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increase,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Meanwhile, U.S. price controls on domestic oil became
more and more complex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of "old" and "new" oil were created.
And the U.S. replaced mandatory ceilings on the volume of imported
oil with a fee on imports.

D on the eve of the embargo, national energy policy was in total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With few exceptions, the
public, government, and the media did not have the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.

Mobil response

By 1970, Mobil was well aware that the U.S. was heading for a
severe energy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of understanding of
energy issues was made worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the media to business in general and oil companies in particular.

D ine op-Ed progran vas Mobil's prime response for dealing with
emerging issues in a way that would assure control of the context


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same time as Op-Eds began (sporadi-  (@)
cally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil also made the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a $1 million contribution (at that
time the largest from any company) and providing a new dimension of
quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Op-Ed
ads were sometimes used to promote television programs (see III-S),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds.
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
moting selected philanthropies such as the United Negro College
Fund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educa-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar causes (see ITI-R). After oe
these and other, primarily low-key themes in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Eds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes:
Mass transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil company would not be expected to support. Mobil
took the lead among oil companies in calling for a National Master
Transportation Program. Such a program not only would provide
for the highways the country needs, but it would also make possi-
ble adequate public transportation. This was an unusual view for
an oil company but, as we pointed out when we announced our Posi- o
tion in that first ad, "we don't believe the gasoline consumed by


(1-8/5)

n a car idling in a traffic jam...is the best possible use of
America's limited petroleum resources."
The energy situation: Ads (see III-I) dealt with the need for
coherent U.S. energy planning, the loss of incentives for dis-
covery of new natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-use that resulted from these prices, the need
to get Alaskan oil to U.S. markets, and the need for additional
offshore drilling -- all clear responses to issues already
impending, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
of Op-Ed firsts: calling for a national energy policy, warning
of a natural gas shortage, and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems.

D
Growth: We addressed the need for continued economic growth, for
which more energy would be needed, as the only way to provide higher
living standards for poor people, both in the U.S. and around the
world (see II1I-J). We believed this emphasis was extremely impor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns were unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth-type thinking.
Environment: As part of our effort to get greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue with the extremists of the environmental
movement who insisted that cleaning up the environment was an
absolute priority, without considering the need for emergy/envi-

) ronment tradeoffs (see ITI-F).


Se Tee RR
(1-a/6)

Conservation: Knowing that the U.S. had a serious energy problem, o
we ran several ads urging greater conservation of energy, particu-
larly gasoline (see III-G).
Capitalism: Our ads drew attention to the value of the free enter-
prise system in promoting economic growth. In a period of skepticism
about business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (see III-K, L, M).
One Op-Ed that deserves special mention was "The U.S. Stake in Middle
East Peace" which in June 1973 argued the need for a peaceful settle-
ment of outstanding Middle East issues (see III-Q/Attachment 1).
This resulted in a huge volume of anti-Mobil mail, demanding that we
spell out what we thought was an "equitable" solution of the middle
Eastern situation. Sheik Yamani, however, was so impressed with
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani to convey
his personal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mobil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, since war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred soon afterward.
Read today in the light of what has happened in the Middle East in
the intervening years, the ad seems extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed.
In all of these ads, we concentrated on reaching opinion leaders
in government, the media, and elsewhere, as the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


(1-A/7)
During the Pre-embargo period, our Government Relations people in
Washington focused on a variety of issues, including natural gas
pricing, import controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation.
The company continued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Controls program, particularly for small refiners which
already enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
was sympathetic to the oil industry, and oil industry representa-
tives generally had plenty of opportunity to communicate with
officials and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor.
This comparative calm was felt in Mobil's media relations programs,
where a small press relations staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operations in South Africa,
where we were criticized by church groups, but the company mounted
a vigorous defense through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our operations in that


(I-A/Attachment 1)
America has the world's best highways
1% °
And the world's worst mass transit.
We hope this ad moves people...
In recent years the United States has devel- systems are for the most part still in the wild
oped a really superb highway system. It's been blue yonder.
built with tax revenues earmarked specifically Providing for our future transportation
for road building. needs will require very large expenditures. We
But the highway construction boom has believe there's an urgent need for legislators to
been accompanied by a mass transit bust. Train reexamine the procedures used to generate
and bus travel in this country, with few excep- and expend transportation revenues. Such a re-
tions, is decrepit. The air traveler suffers in- view may yield the conclusion that special ear-
creasing indignities despite bigger, faster marked funds are no longer the best approach.
planes. In weighing priorities, no decision-maker
Greater New York is a typical example. You can ignore the increasing congestion on those
can depend on commuting to and from Manhat- fine highways of ours, especially in and around
tan—but only to be undependable and slow. On the great urban centers. But more and better
public transport, the 25 miles to Westfield, N.J. mass transit could stop traffic jams before they
takes 75 minutes at an average speed of 20 start. Just one rail line has triple the people-
miles per hour. The 33 miles to Stamford, Conn. moving capacity of a three-lane superhighway.
takes 60 minutes at 33 mph. The 26 miles to It costs less—in energy consumption and in
Hicksville, LI. takes 55 minutes at 28 mph. money—to move people via mass transit than
When you're on time. on highways. Thus mass transit means less air
You have to be a stoic with stamina to use pollution.
public ground transportation for a trip beyond It also means conservation. Whether the
the commuting range. Fly to a nearby city? You energy comes from gasoline for cars, or fuel
can hardly get at our congested air terminals, oil, natural gas, or coal for electric power plants,
either by land or air. The ride to or from the it's derived from a diminishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight. So we think all forms of transportation should
Mass transit seems to work better abroad. be brought into a national plan for safe, rapid,
Americans are agreeably impressed by the fast, economical ways of moving people—consistent
comfortable, and attractive subways in foreign with the wisest use of our energy resources.
cities. Intercity trains in other countries make While Mobil sells fuels and lubricants, we
ours look pitiful. Japan's high-speed Tokaido don't believe the gasoline consumed by a car
line carries more than 200,000 passengers a idling in a traffic jam (carrying a single passen-
day. Clean, comfortable French, German, Ital- ger, probably) is the best possible use of Amer-
ian, and British trains regularly attain speeds ica's limited petroleum resources. Our products
over 100 mph. European railroads are already ought to help more people get where they want
planning or building expresses that will do bet- to go. i
ter than 150 mph. To us, that means a green light for mass
Yet, in the United States, new mass transit transit . . . soon.
This ad appeared in the New York Times on October 19, 1970
co


(1-B/1)

B.) The Embargo, 1973-74

Jn October 8, 1973, war broke out between Israel and several of
ts Arab neighbors, and the U.S. rushed additional military aid
to Israel. Arab oil-producing nations retaliated by placing an
embargo on shipments to the U.S. and several other nations, and
OPEC unilaterally raised posted prices nearly 70% (to over §5 a
barrel). The exporters, sensing the companies’ ability to rear-
range supplies, quickly shifted to curtailing production, so that
nearly 10% of the free world's oil supplies were removed from
international trade during the winter of 1973-74. By year-end,
posted prices were increased again, to more than $9 per barrel.
By March 1974, the embargo was lifted and production restored.
But the era of ample low-cost energy had ended, and a permanent
change in how nations manage energy supply and consumption had
been wrought. The effects would continue to be felt for a long
time, and throughout the economic systems of the western world.
Actions taken in the U.S. in the heat of the moment persisted
for years. Permanent damage was done to the credibility of the
energy industries because of the lack of understanding of the
issues by the media and government staffs.
specific actions started with the Administration's hastily con-
trived "Project Independence," an attempt to totally end imports
by 1980. It was proposed in November 1973, the month when the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was signed into law -- a law
that plagued the industry with price and allocation controls
at all levels until its expiration (and amendments to it) in


(1-8/2)
September 1981. Government attempts to reduce consumption by o
cutting speed limits, eliminating Sunday sales of gasoline,
allocating shipments, and pressuring major oil companies into
husbanding inventories exacerbated the hysteria and the shortage,
even though (in retrospect) petroleum supplies would have been
adequate for demand for that length of curtailment.
Mobil response
In this situation, Mobil ads
-- Continued to stress the need for improved U.S. energy
production and for additional conservation (see III-G and I).
-- Increased the emphasis on the need for profits, at a time
when the industry was accused of making "obscene profits"
during the embargo, and spoke out against accusations that 2
Mobil was cheating its customers (see III-M, N).
-- Explained some reasons for the shortages (e.g. that motorists
were carrying much more gasoline around in their tanks, thus
contributing to the difficulty of getting more).
One useful new ad format was successfully used for the first time.
This was "Musings of an oil person," which enabled us to address a
number of topics in one ad, in a chatty readable style (Attachment 1).
During the immediate embargo period, however, Mobil Public Affairs
was essentially on the defensive, as members of Congress and the
press accused the oil companies of rigging the shortage, and
Senator Henry Jackson castigated the heads of the seven largest 3
il companies who appeared before his Permanent Subcommittee on


(1-B/3)

Investigations and insulted them on national television, while
labeling oil industry profits "obscene".
Our response was to accelerate reorganization of the Public
Affairs effort. This included appointing a Vice Chairman for
Public Affairs, and a policy coordinator whose responsibility
it was to see that the company spoke with a single voice on all
issues. The company also further geared up for an expanded Media
Relations effort, with visits by top executives to newspapers in
key cities, coordinated with the American Petroleum Institute media
program. Efforts were made to get company executives on television
programs across the country, combating the negative image of the
oil companies portrayed by that medium.
On the cultural front, the highlight of this period was Mobil's
introduction in January 1974 of the Bellamy family to the American
public on Upstairs, Downstairs, perhaps the best remembered of all
Mobil's television productions. The show was eventually to add
seven Emmy awards to those "Masterpiece Theatre" had already reaped
(see 111-5).

)


(1-B/Attachment 1)
Wonder if ofl company sdvertising  yesr of full-page explanations by us
180% risking indecent overexposure | Won't set straight: Hate to be on the
these days. There's 30 much oil on defensive all the time. Am our top
the tube and in print. Guif, Snell Bansgezont people with facts and got
and Texaco all ‘ran fall-pagers on Shenon TV penbls and talk shows.
tho same day last week in ine Times. They still look drab mext toa
Mobil's on the Op-5a page svery Politician making some wild allegation
Thursday, Why do we sil do iif Some against us because he's Tumning for
critics’ think the ads show the Something. Doss he have to un on our
companies are conspiring to brainwash backs? Sure he doss--as long as hers
“he public. Others think tne adversis- are gas lines. What do we tell the Ey
ing deluge proves we can't do anything who's boiling mad at usin our
right, not even conspire. But an oil station or some other company's--sfter
Company has to find some way of speak- Waiting two hours for the privilege of
ing its mind and letting the public paying $1.10 for two gallons of gas?
mon what's going on, capesisily sow Ate we going to tell his helabetn
shen oil companies ate acoused of wasting enesey for years? No may. Te
being secretive. Have to take risk of him to lay off those Jackrabbit
Soving To Wicker to nadses over the  starta? fa'll find that out for
To plous, self-serving, devioss, Binsels. That Detroit's naughty for
sealy-outhed, selfexoulpsting, building ig cars, thas we shouldnt
Bolter than thou, positively sickening have built all those superhighmays,
O11 company advertisements in which ~ that we're sorry we gave away ell iat
) these international behemoths depict glassware? Forget it. Should we remind
Themselves as poverty-siricken §1a'warve been marine for yeacs that
Seragons of virtue scbaitled geinst a Ihe snerey Crisis was coming? feild
Beiesy ana ignorant orld." Ton turms mow down ihe pumps and Who would blame
£ hice phrase, but doesn't, he know him. No, nave’ to fous on the positive
fore frustrated in trying to get things wo can do. Tell hin we're
ntormasion to the pUSLict fry uo buy Tecriling She sotey He para 0: Che
$TEeToa 2 to say acaething suvstentive pup Tight back into oil-Finding
ind she networks clover Jou wiih the offshore, Alaska, anywhere, Into sors
airness doctrine. Suse with Tadic Fotinery capacity. In z
mee vent ihe Pt symtherio Toels From sont, tar sends,
See 5 oiipasy wo subsiantiste its  far-out processes in the lab. Dammit,
Tt ariisie, just as if an ides We're 4 en-do company in a can-do
vers Tike a por foothpaste. Moy dont Coumery. Give us & Tou yess aad weit
“xhuze Uadison and sake biz = gas lines just & quain
Sibssantiave the SILL of Rigmte? sure, EE
“k to print sedia to te Seantize, reason
ER no pn me emit
EO eequontly dont understand lave and regulations. Fight the tro-
Ee xieies of our industry, Only times-imo-equals-five logicisns who
Specialists. And iow ~ think the same outfit that brings you
oe Onews seleases can we send the U.S. Mail can find oil three miles
Ths before they serena for mercy? index the ocean bottom. Give people
eS Deen to use TV 50 127 to reach the facts. Give thes genuine
a ee ahose opinions stout oil information. Speak out, Persuade them
"%y what Cronkite, %o listen. Hever boro them. If at
BE i first we don't succeed, bust a gut
Chanceiior and Reasoner say every rN
Oa 1yi Tn 30 sesonds they trying again. No other wey.
eg nongh wrongloing that a end up morking for the governaent
Mobil
hts ad appeared in the New York Times on February 28, 1974.


(1-a/1)

I. INTERPRETIVE CHRONOLOGY
A.) Before the Arab Oil Embargo, 1970-73
Background
As the decade of the 1970s opened, the U.S. was little concerned
for its future energy supplies. Throughout the '60s, oil imports
equaled about 20% of demand, and the overriding concern was the
threat of a flood of cheap oil. 0il imports were restricted by a
mandatory program, while prorationing in Texas and other states
maintained spare production capacity and a higher U.S. price.
Natural gas prices remained regulated by the Federal Power Com-

) mission in the interstate market at levels far below the energy
equivalent of domestic or imported oil prices. Yet the national
pipeline network continued to grow and expand while gas distribu-
tion companies aggressively sought new customers.

The decline in coal's contribution to U.S. energy was accelerating
in response to a new national concern with air quality, but nuclear
power held the clear promise for the long-term future, and in the
interim low-sulfur oil filled the gap for electric utilities.

The memory was still fresh that America could protect itself

and aid its allies when oil supplies were disrupted, as during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The real concern was how production

) from the 1968 discovery of oil on the Alaskan North Slope could
be absorbed into the American market.


(1-a/2)
Then came 1970, a bad year for the U.S. petroleum industry. A o
slowdown in leasing resulting from public and media reaction to the
Santa Barbara oil spill of January 1969 began to have its impact.
Tax reform eliminated most percentage depletion tax allowances for
oil. The first of many lengthy regulatory and court proceedings
blocked construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. Construction of all
sorts of energy facilities became bogged down in lengthy "environ-
mental impact" statements and proceedings, which also compounded
the now mushrooming licensing difficulties of the nuclear industry.
Amendments to the Clean Air Act became law, setting the stage for
added gasoline demand -- a result of the temporary and inefficient
redesign imposed on automobile producers and a prelude to the
longer-term switch to lead-free gasoline.
2
In 1971, the federal government imposed emergency price freezes
and controls on the entire U.S. economy, effectively limiting
the U.S. petroleum industry's ability to develop new supplies --
ironically just months after the first signal that OPEC had come
of age. In February, the Teheran Agreement imposed posted
price increases on Persian Gulf oils of up to 25%, bringing most
to over §2 a barrel; in April, the Tripoli Agreement secured
almost another dollar per barrel for Libya.
By the winter of 1972-73, a substantial gap emerged between con-
trolled interstate natural gas prices and free-market intrastate
gas, reinforcing the shift of supplies away from transcontinental
pipelines and creating sporadic shortages in several areas of the a
u.s.


(1-A/3)

) As 1973 unfolded, most producing nations were climbing aboard the
bandwagon started by Libya's initial acquisition of ownership in
its oil-producing concessions. By June, facing strongly increas-
ing oil demands (U.S. oil imports increased by a fifth in 1972
and another third in 1973, raising the import percentage to 36%
of supply), OPEC was able to impose yet another price increase,
despite the fact that the Teheran Agreement was supposed to last
five years. Meanwhile, U.S. price controls on domestic oil became
more and more complex. In an attempt to yield to pressures for more
domestic incentive, the concepts of "old" and "new" oil were created.
And the U.S. replaced mandatory ceilings on the volume of imported
oil with a fee on imports.

D on the eve of the embargo, national energy policy was in total
disarray and largely counterproductive. With few exceptions, the
public, government, and the media did not have the basic under-
standing necessary to interpret what was happening and what would
be happening.

Mobil response

By 1970, Mobil was well aware that the U.S. was heading for a
severe energy crunch, but was unable to get this message across
in the newspapers and on television. Lack of understanding of
energy issues was made worse by the overall hostile attitude of
the media to business in general and oil companies in particular.

D ine op-Ed progran vas Mobil's prime response for dealing with
emerging issues in a way that would assure control of the context


(1-A/4)
Of the message. At about the same time as Op-Eds began (sporadi-  (@)
cally in 1970-71, weekly beginning in 1972), Mobil also made the
decision to provide large-scale funding for quality programs on
public television, starting with a $1 million contribution (at that
time the largest from any company) and providing a new dimension of
quality on the airwaves. These two efforts worked together: Op-Ed
ads were sometimes used to promote television programs (see III-S),
and the television programs created a climate of greater receptivity
for the Op-Eds.
In addition, Mobil set about improving its public image by pro-
moting selected philanthropies such as the United Negro College
Fund and the Urban Coalition, and by supporting vocational educa-
tion, jobs for veterans, and similar causes (see ITI-R). After oe
these and other, primarily low-key themes in the early days, the
Op-Ed voice grew stronger, sharper when necessary, but still stylish,
in 1972. Op-Eds in the pre-embargo period were primarily concerned
with these themes:
Mass transit: Our initial ad (Attachment 1), in the fall of
1970 was designed to draw attention to Mobil through advocacy of a
cause which an oil company would not be expected to support. Mobil
took the lead among oil companies in calling for a National Master
Transportation Program. Such a program not only would provide
for the highways the country needs, but it would also make possi-
ble adequate public transportation. This was an unusual view for
an oil company but, as we pointed out when we announced our Posi- o
tion in that first ad, "we don't believe the gasoline consumed by


(1-8/5)

n a car idling in a traffic jam...is the best possible use of
America's limited petroleum resources."
The energy situation: Ads (see III-I) dealt with the need for
coherent U.S. energy planning, the loss of incentives for dis-
covery of new natural gas due to unrealistic pricing and the
dangers of over-use that resulted from these prices, the need
to get Alaskan oil to U.S. markets, and the need for additional
offshore drilling -- all clear responses to issues already
impending, though scarcely perceived. These made 1972 a year
of Op-Ed firsts: calling for a national energy policy, warning
of a natural gas shortage, and linking economic and energy growth
to solve social problems.

D
Growth: We addressed the need for continued economic growth, for
which more energy would be needed, as the only way to provide higher
living standards for poor people, both in the U.S. and around the
world (see II1I-J). We believed this emphasis was extremely impor-
tant in a decade when thought patterns were unduly influenced by
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth-type thinking.
Environment: As part of our effort to get greater U.S. energy
growth, we took issue with the extremists of the environmental
movement who insisted that cleaning up the environment was an
absolute priority, without considering the need for emergy/envi-

) ronment tradeoffs (see ITI-F).


Se Tee RR
(1-a/6)

Conservation: Knowing that the U.S. had a serious energy problem, o
we ran several ads urging greater conservation of energy, particu-
larly gasoline (see III-G).
Capitalism: Our ads drew attention to the value of the free enter-
prise system in promoting economic growth. In a period of skepticism
about business, we explained the role of profits in generating this
growth (see III-K, L, M).
One Op-Ed that deserves special mention was "The U.S. Stake in Middle
East Peace" which in June 1973 argued the need for a peaceful settle-
ment of outstanding Middle East issues (see III-Q/Attachment 1).
This resulted in a huge volume of anti-Mobil mail, demanding that we
spell out what we thought was an "equitable" solution of the middle
Eastern situation. Sheik Yamani, however, was so impressed with
the ad that he showed it to King Faisal, who asked Yamani to convey
his personal thanks to the Mobil Board. The ad demonstrated Mobil's
courage and, in this case, foresight, since war and the resulting
embargo of Arab oil to the United States occurred soon afterward.
Read today in the light of what has happened in the Middle East in
the intervening years, the ad seems extraordinarily moderate and
even-handed.
In all of these ads, we concentrated on reaching opinion leaders
in government, the media, and elsewhere, as the key to changing
public opinion as rapidly as possible. °


(1-A/7)
During the Pre-embargo period, our Government Relations people in
Washington focused on a variety of issues, including natural gas
pricing, import controls, environmental restrictions, and taxation.
The company continued to argue against further concessions under
the Import Controls program, particularly for small refiners which
already enjoyed advantages over the majors. But the Administration
was sympathetic to the oil industry, and oil industry representa-
tives generally had plenty of opportunity to communicate with
officials and members of Congress. Some issues were resolved
without rancor.
This comparative calm was felt in Mobil's media relations programs,
where a small press relations staff handled routine queries. One
major issue at the time was Mobil's operations in South Africa,
where we were criticized by church groups, but the company mounted
a vigorous defense through exploratory meetings with church leaders
and a special report to all stockholders on our operations in that


(I-A/Attachment 1)
America has the world's best highways
1% °
And the world's worst mass transit.
We hope this ad moves people...
In recent years the United States has devel- systems are for the most part still in the wild
oped a really superb highway system. It's been blue yonder.
built with tax revenues earmarked specifically Providing for our future transportation
for road building. needs will require very large expenditures. We
But the highway construction boom has believe there's an urgent need for legislators to
been accompanied by a mass transit bust. Train reexamine the procedures used to generate
and bus travel in this country, with few excep- and expend transportation revenues. Such a re-
tions, is decrepit. The air traveler suffers in- view may yield the conclusion that special ear-
creasing indignities despite bigger, faster marked funds are no longer the best approach.
planes. In weighing priorities, no decision-maker
Greater New York is a typical example. You can ignore the increasing congestion on those
can depend on commuting to and from Manhat- fine highways of ours, especially in and around
tan—but only to be undependable and slow. On the great urban centers. But more and better
public transport, the 25 miles to Westfield, N.J. mass transit could stop traffic jams before they
takes 75 minutes at an average speed of 20 start. Just one rail line has triple the people-
miles per hour. The 33 miles to Stamford, Conn. moving capacity of a three-lane superhighway.
takes 60 minutes at 33 mph. The 26 miles to It costs less—in energy consumption and in
Hicksville, LI. takes 55 minutes at 28 mph. money—to move people via mass transit than
When you're on time. on highways. Thus mass transit means less air
You have to be a stoic with stamina to use pollution.
public ground transportation for a trip beyond It also means conservation. Whether the
the commuting range. Fly to a nearby city? You energy comes from gasoline for cars, or fuel
can hardly get at our congested air terminals, oil, natural gas, or coal for electric power plants,
either by land or air. The ride to or from the it's derived from a diminishing natural resource.
airport often takes longer than the flight. So we think all forms of transportation should
Mass transit seems to work better abroad. be brought into a national plan for safe, rapid,
Americans are agreeably impressed by the fast, economical ways of moving people—consistent
comfortable, and attractive subways in foreign with the wisest use of our energy resources.
cities. Intercity trains in other countries make While Mobil sells fuels and lubricants, we
ours look pitiful. Japan's high-speed Tokaido don't believe the gasoline consumed by a car
line carries more than 200,000 passengers a idling in a traffic jam (carrying a single passen-
day. Clean, comfortable French, German, Ital- ger, probably) is the best possible use of Amer-
ian, and British trains regularly attain speeds ica's limited petroleum resources. Our products
over 100 mph. European railroads are already ought to help more people get where they want
planning or building expresses that will do bet- to go. i
ter than 150 mph. To us, that means a green light for mass
Yet, in the United States, new mass transit transit . . . soon.
This ad appeared in the New York Times on October 19, 1970
co


(1-B/1)

B.) The Embargo, 1973-74

Jn October 8, 1973, war broke out between Israel and several of
ts Arab neighbors, and the U.S. rushed additional military aid
to Israel. Arab oil-producing nations retaliated by placing an
embargo on shipments to the U.S. and several other nations, and
OPEC unilaterally raised posted prices nearly 70% (to over §5 a
barrel). The exporters, sensing the companies’ ability to rear-
range supplies, quickly shifted to curtailing production, so that
nearly 10% of the free world's oil supplies were removed from
international trade during the winter of 1973-74. By year-end,
posted prices were increased again, to more than $9 per barrel.
By March 1974, the embargo was lifted and production restored.
But the era of ample low-cost energy had ended, and a permanent
change in how nations manage energy supply and consumption had
been wrought. The effects would continue to be felt for a long
time, and throughout the economic systems of the western world.
Actions taken in the U.S. in the heat of the moment persisted
for years. Permanent damage was done to the credibility of the
energy industries because of the lack of understanding of the
issues by the media and government staffs.
specific actions started with the Administration's hastily con-
trived "Project Independence," an attempt to totally end imports
by 1980. It was proposed in November 1973, the month when the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was signed into law -- a law
that plagued the industry with price and allocation controls
at all levels until its expiration (and amendments to it) in


(1-8/2)
September 1981. Government attempts to reduce consumption by o
cutting speed limits, eliminating Sunday sales of gasoline,
allocating shipments, and pressuring major oil companies into
husbanding inventories exacerbated the hysteria and the shortage,
even though (in retrospect) petroleum supplies would have been
adequate for demand for that length of curtailment.
Mobil response
In this situation, Mobil ads
-- Continued to stress the need for improved U.S. energy
production and for additional conservation (see III-G and I).
-- Increased the emphasis on the need for profits, at a time
when the industry was accused of making "obscene profits"
during the embargo, and spoke out against accusations that 2
Mobil was cheating its customers (see III-M, N).
-- Explained some reasons for the shortages (e.g. that motorists
were carrying much more gasoline around in their tanks, thus
contributing to the difficulty of getting more).
One useful new ad format was successfully used for the first time.
This was "Musings of an oil person," which enabled us to address a
number of topics in one ad, in a chatty readable style (Attachment 1).
During the immediate embargo period, however, Mobil Public Affairs
was essentially on the defensive, as members of Congress and the
press accused the oil companies of rigging the shortage, and
Senator Henry Jackson castigated the heads of the seven largest 3
il companies who appeared before his Permanent Subcommittee on


(1-B/3)

Investigations and insulted them on national television, while
labeling oil industry profits "obscene".
Our response was to accelerate reorganization of the Public
Affairs effort. This included appointing a Vice Chairman for
Public Affairs, and a policy coordinator whose responsibility
it was to see that the company spoke with a single voice on all
issues. The company also further geared up for an expanded Media
Relations effort, with visits by top executives to newspapers in
key cities, coordinated with the American Petroleum Institute media
program. Efforts were made to get company executives on television
programs across the country, combating the negative image of the
oil companies portrayed by that medium.
On the cultural front, the highlight of this period was Mobil's
introduction in January 1974 of the Bellamy family to the American
public on Upstairs, Downstairs, perhaps the best remembered of all
Mobil's television productions. The show was eventually to add
seven Emmy awards to those "Masterpiece Theatre" had already reaped
(see 111-5).

)


(1-B/Attachment 1)
Wonder if ofl company sdvertising  yesr of full-page explanations by us
180% risking indecent overexposure | Won't set straight: Hate to be on the
these days. There's 30 much oil on defensive all the time. Am our top
the tube and in print. Guif, Snell Bansgezont people with facts and got
and Texaco all ‘ran fall-pagers on Shenon TV penbls and talk shows.
tho same day last week in ine Times. They still look drab mext toa
Mobil's on the Op-5a page svery Politician making some wild allegation
Thursday, Why do we sil do iif Some against us because he's Tumning for
critics’ think the ads show the Something. Doss he have to un on our
companies are conspiring to brainwash backs? Sure he doss--as long as hers
“he public. Others think tne adversis- are gas lines. What do we tell the Ey
ing deluge proves we can't do anything who's boiling mad at usin our
right, not even conspire. But an oil station or some other company's--sfter
Company has to find some way of speak- Waiting two hours for the privilege of
ing its mind and letting the public paying $1.10 for two gallons of gas?
mon what's going on, capesisily sow Ate we going to tell his helabetn
shen oil companies ate acoused of wasting enesey for years? No may. Te
being secretive. Have to take risk of him to lay off those Jackrabbit
Soving To Wicker to nadses over the  starta? fa'll find that out for
To plous, self-serving, devioss, Binsels. That Detroit's naughty for
sealy-outhed, selfexoulpsting, building ig cars, thas we shouldnt
Bolter than thou, positively sickening have built all those superhighmays,
O11 company advertisements in which ~ that we're sorry we gave away ell iat
) these international behemoths depict glassware? Forget it. Should we remind
Themselves as poverty-siricken §1a'warve been marine for yeacs that
Seragons of virtue scbaitled geinst a Ihe snerey Crisis was coming? feild
Beiesy ana ignorant orld." Ton turms mow down ihe pumps and Who would blame
£ hice phrase, but doesn't, he know him. No, nave’ to fous on the positive
fore frustrated in trying to get things wo can do. Tell hin we're
ntormasion to the pUSLict fry uo buy Tecriling She sotey He para 0: Che
$TEeToa 2 to say acaething suvstentive pup Tight back into oil-Finding
ind she networks clover Jou wiih the offshore, Alaska, anywhere, Into sors
airness doctrine. Suse with Tadic Fotinery capacity. In z
mee vent ihe Pt symtherio Toels From sont, tar sends,
See 5 oiipasy wo subsiantiste its  far-out processes in the lab. Dammit,
Tt ariisie, just as if an ides We're 4 en-do company in a can-do
vers Tike a por foothpaste. Moy dont Coumery. Give us & Tou yess aad weit
“xhuze Uadison and sake biz = gas lines just & quain
Sibssantiave the SILL of Rigmte? sure, EE
“k to print sedia to te Seantize, reason
ER no pn me emit
EO eequontly dont understand lave and regulations. Fight the tro-
Ee xieies of our industry, Only times-imo-equals-five logicisns who
Specialists. And iow ~ think the same outfit that brings you
oe Onews seleases can we send the U.S. Mail can find oil three miles
Ths before they serena for mercy? index the ocean bottom. Give people
eS Deen to use TV 50 127 to reach the facts. Give thes genuine
a ee ahose opinions stout oil information. Speak out, Persuade them
"%y what Cronkite, %o listen. Hever boro them. If at
BE i first we don't succeed, bust a gut
Chanceiior and Reasoner say every rN
Oa 1yi Tn 30 sesonds they trying again. No other wey.
eg nongh wrongloing that a end up morking for the governaent
Mobil
hts ad appeared in the New York Times on February 28, 1974.


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