THE INVESTIGATION INTO
THE ATTACK ON THE
U.S.S. COLE
Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff

May 2001

 Executive Summary

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

T

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he October 12,
2000, attack on
the U.S.S. Cole
was the latest in a
series of terrorist
attacks against U.S.
interests and the U.S.
military presence in
the Middle East and
Persian Gulf.
In
December 1992, two
bomb blasts occurred
at hotels in Aden,
Yemen where U.S.
military forces were
staying en route to
deployment in Somalia. These bombings
resulted in the withdrawal
from Aden of U.S. personnel. In November 1995, a
bomb exploded at a joint
military training facility in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 American military
personnel. In June 1996, a
truck bomb at the Khobar
Towers compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19
U.S. service personnel. The
Riyadh and Dhahran attacks
were generally considered
to be directed at the U.S.
military presence in Saudi
Arabia, as part of a broader
effort to force the United States to withdraw from the Middle East. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salem, Tanzania in
August 1998, although not specically
directed against the U.S. military presence, were believed to be part of the
same campaign against U.S. interests in
the region.

“While there was no ‘singlepoint failure’ that led to the
attack, numerous factors
combined in ways that left
the ship and its crew
vulnerable.”

The attack on the U.S.S. Cole
occurred during a brief stop for refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The
bomb blast ripped through the side of
the ship, creating a 40x45 foot hole,

and killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring
dozens more. It was the most serious
attack against U.S. military personnel
since the 1996 Khobar Towers attack.
Although signicant security enhancements and force protection measures
were implemented after the Khobar
Towers incident, those measures
proved inappropriate to deal with the
kind of attack that took place against
the U.S.S. Cole.
A combination of factors contributed to the U.S.S. Cole tragedy. These
included the desire for engagement

with Yemen, operational requirements,
force structure limitations, intelligence
shortfalls
with
respect to the terrorist threat, a confusing threat level
reporting system, a
failure to react
appropriately
to
changes in the geopolitical environment in the region,
inadequate training
and security measures, ambiguity in
the determination of
hostile intent under the rules
of engagement, insufcient
attention to force protection
measures by the ship’s commanding ofcer, and split
responsibilities for supporting Navy logistical and intelligence requirements. There
was no “single point failure”
that was responsible for the
tragedy, nor is it possible to
conclude with any degree of
condence that all required
force protection measures,
if implemented, would have
prevented the attack from
occurring.

At the strategic level, the U.S. policy
of engagement – highlighted in various national security guidance documents and reected in U.S. Central
Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) theater
engagement plan – was the primary
motivating factor behind the desire of
the United States to increase its involvement with Yemen, including an increase
in port visits to Aden and brief stops
for ship refueling. At the tactical level,
the decision to conduct refueling activities in Yemen was based on operational
considerations.

 Executive Summary
The engagement with Yemen was
initiated with a clear understanding
that Yemen was a sanctuary for terrorists. Although the 1992 bombings
in Aden led to the withdrawal of U.S.
personnel, and subsequent threats to
U.S. deminers resulted in an interruption of the U.S. humanitarian demining program, the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole was completely unexpected. Intelligence reporting regarding specic
threats to U.S. interests in Yemen was
scarce and sometimes contradictory.
Consequently, the decision to conduct
port visits in Aden was made on the
basis of incomplete and inconclusive
information, and resulted in
higher risk than was generally perceived.

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
rorist attacks against U.S. military assets
is that they will be perpetrated on
land, not at sea. Many of the Navy’s
force protection measures have been
designed to prevent terrorist attacks on
U.S. naval vessels while docked in port,
including measures to ensure pierside
security. The Navy’s force protection
training program has focused on pierside threats, with little emphasis on
defense against waterborne threats.

implemented were a requirement to
coordinate security measures for the
U.S.S. Cole’s visit with the local Yemeni
husbanding agent and a requirement
to keep unauthorized boats away from
the ship. However, the failure to
implement all measures does not, in
itself, constitute a “smoking gun,” and
it can never be known whether their
implementation would have been sufcient to prevent the tragedy.

Waterborne
terrorist
threats
proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the
Navy’s counterterrorism program. No
one in the chain of command appears

Reductions in force structure have
left the Navy with signicantly
dimished assets. The reduction in
the number of oilers, combatants, and
weapons available may
have led to operational
decisions that contributed
to the U.S.S. Cole’s vulnerability.

“Waterborne terrorist threats
Compounding this was
proved to be the Achilles’
a general mindset that
tended to discount the likeheel of the Navy’s
lihood of a terrorist attack
against a U.S. warship. In
part, this was due to the counterterrorism program...”
fact that previous port visits
had occurred without incident and that there was no concrete
evidence suggesting terrorists were
planning such an attack. In addition,
operations in the region were conducted under peacetime rules of
engagement and without an adequate
appreciation of the “war” that terrorists had declared on the United States.
Therefore, there was a widely held
view that the U.S.S. Cole was not at
particular risk. This ignored previous
terrorist incidents and changes in the
geo-political situation in the Middle
East that should have led to a realtime reappraisal of the desirability of
port visits and a more critical assessment of admittedly sketchy intelligence about possible terrorist actions
in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

It is signicant that the focus of
the U.S. military’s anti-terrorism/force
protection program has been on
land-based, not waterborne, threats.
The general assumption regarding ter-

With respect to the establishment
of threat levels in the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility, a bureaucratic
change in threat level reporting
resulted in a degree of confusion over
whether the threat in Yemen had ofcially decreased when it had not. The
confusion was exacerbated by the fact
that USCENTCOM did not concur with
the changed threat reporting methodology and did not implement it. This
raises issues with respect to the process by which threat levels are established.

Finally, split responsibilities between USCENTCOM, the Navy, DOD, and
the Department of State led
to confusion that could
have been avoided had the
coordination processes functioned
effectively. Contracting issues in support of Navy port visits and refueling
stops are handled by the Navy. However, operational decisions regarding
refueling are USCENTCOM’s responsibility. Moreover, the establishment
of threat levels, as noted above,
requires greater coordination between
DOD and USCENTCOM. The threat
levels set by the U.S. Embassy in
Yemen were based on different criteria and were not communicated to the
U.S.S. Cole. And the existence of multiple force protection standards – one
baseline set by the Navy, the other
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and augmented as necessary by USCENTCOM
– is a recipe for confusion, and a single
standard should be established.

Although the U.S.S. Cole remained
at Threatcon BRAVO, not all 62 force
protection measures required under
this threat condition were implemented. Among the measures not

In short, while there was no “single-point failure” that led to the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole, numerous factors
combined in ways that left the ship
and its crew vulnerable.

to have recognized that additional
security measures were necessary to
protect against waterborne terrorist
threats. A waterborne suicide attack
had not been considered likely.

 Table of Contents

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Introduction…………......…………………………....................…………………………………........................1
The Genesis of the HASC Investigation………..........................….......…………………………........................1
The Department of Defense and Department of the Navy Investigations…….................................................2
The U.S.S. Cole Commission………………………………………………….................................2
The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) Report……………....................................4
U.S. Central Command and Its Area of Responsibility……………………………............................................5
The U.S. Policy of Engagement………………………………………………………...........................................6
Intelligence……………………………….....................................………………...................................................8
Collection………………………………………….......……………………..........................…......8
Analysis……………………………………………….......………………….........................….....8
Dissemination…………………………………………….....……………….................................9
Threat Levels and Threat Conditions……………………………………………...............................................10
Vulnerability Assessments……………………………………………………....................................................11
Force Protection………………………......…………………………………………............................................12
The Navy’s Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Training Program….................................……........12
Force Protection Measures and the Rules of Engagement…………................................……….....13
Operational Issues…………………………………………………………………….........................................16
Organizational Issues………………………………………………………………............................................17
Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of Key Observations and Recommendations
Appendix B: List of Briengs and Interviews
Appendix C: Threat Condition (THREATCON) Measures

 Page 1

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

O

n October 12, 2000, at approximately 11:35 AM local time,
a small boat laden with explosives detonated alongside the U.S.S.
Cole (DDG 67) in Aden harbor, Yemen.
Seventeen sailors died in the explosion
and dozens more were wounded. The
explosion ripped a 40-by-45 foot hole
in the ship. Preliminary press reports
indicated that the small boat carried
more than 500 pounds of explosives
and that the two individuals on board
the boat sought to maximize damage
to the U.S.S. Cole by using a “shaped

I

INTRODUCTION
charge” that concentrated the blast in a
relatively narrow area.

the boat stood and saluted just prior to
the explosion.

The U.S.S. Cole – a sophisticated
Aegis-class ship – had arrived in Aden
several hours earlier for refueling en
route to joining a carrier battle group in
the Persian Gulf. The ship moored at a
fueling “dolphin” located in the harbor
some distance from the port area and
had completed the process of taking on
fuel when the small boat approached it
and pulled up alongside. Press reports
indicated that the two men on board

The attack on the U.S.S. Cole again
demonstrates that the threat of international terrorism directed against the
United States, its military personnel,
citizens, and interests, remains serious.
This attack was the deadliest against the
U.S. military since the June 1996 terrorist attack that killed 19 service personnel at the Khobar Towers compound in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was also the
rst against a sophisticated Navy ship.

THE GENESIS OF THE HASC INVESTIGATION

n 1996, a House National Security
Committee staff investigation concluded that intelligence shortfalls,
coupled with operational and organizational shortcomings, contributed to
the unpreparedness of the military for
the Khobar Towers attack. Since that
attack, the United States has instituted
additional security precautions to pro-

tect against terrorism. Unfortunately,
they were insufcient to prevent the
deadly attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
As part of the U.S. government’s
investigation of the U.S.S. Cole incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a criminal investigation of the attack. U.S. FBI agents
remain in Yemen, working with Yemeni ofcials
to uncover the identity
of those responsible for
planning and executing
the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole. Numerous press
reports suggest that those
responsible have links to
Osama bin Laden, the
wealthy Saudi expatriate
who is thought to be the
mastermind behind the
terrorist attacks on the
U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998. Bin
Laden is also thought to
have been responsible for
the 1996 attack on Khobar
Towers.
In addition to the FBI
investigation, Secretary of

Defense William S. Cohen appointed
retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman,
Jr., former Commander-in-Chief of U.S.
Joint Forces Command, and retired
General William Crouch, former Vice
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, to conduct a broad review of lessons learned
from the attack, including a review of
Department of Defense (DOD) policies
and procedures regarding force protection, rules of engagement, logistical
support, intelligence, and counterintelligence. This report was completed
and the ndings and recommendations
released publicly on January 9, 2001.
The Department of the Navy has also
conducted a Judge Advocate General
Manual investigation to determine
whether the commander and crew of
the U.S.S. Cole exercised the appropriate security precautions prior to its
refueling stop. A redacted version of
this report was released on January 19,
2001. Committee staff has seen and
been briefed on both reports and has
reviewed their conclusions.
This latest attack on the U.S. armed
forces has again raised questions regarding the military’s preparedness to prevent terrorism directed against U.S. forces
overseas. The U.S.S. Cole’s refueling in

 Page 2
Yemen, a country that the Department of
State described in its most recent annual
report on global terrorism as a “safehaven
for terrorists,” has raised questions about
the U.S. policy of “engagement” in the
region, the sufciency of U.S. intelligence
on the terrorist threat, and the adequacy
of security procedures designed to protect Navy vessels, especially during single-ship transits.
With these questions in mind, the
Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) tasked committee
staff to conduct a preliminary investigation into the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
As part of its oversight responsibility,
the HASC received a series of briefings after the incident from the Department of Defense and Department of the
Navy. On October 18, 2000, the HASC
Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
received a classied brieng from the
intelligence community on the attack.
This was followed on October 25, 2000,

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
with an open hearing conducted by
the full committee to receive testimony
from Department of Defense and
Department of State ofcials. The open
session was followed by a closed executive session, during which the committee also heard from the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Committee staff held numerous
meetings with Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense, and intelligence
community ofcials to gain a better
understanding of the U.S.S. Cole tragedy.
HASC staff received numerous briengs
in Washington and requested numerous
documents related to the intelligence
aspects of the incident. HASC staff also
worked closely with staff of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who provided important contributions to the understanding of the role
of intelligence and the intelligence process as it related to events surrounding
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.

On November 15, 2000, committee staff traveled to the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group,
Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia, to
assess the training program and
force protection guidance established for crews aboard Aegis-class
ships. From December 4-8, 2000,
committee staff traveled to Manama,
Bahrain, to discuss the attack with
Navy officials at U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command (USNAVCENT),
headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
Staff received numerous briefings
at USNAVCENT regarding policy,
operations, intelligence, logistics,
and force protection issues. On
December 18, 2000, committee staff
visited USCENTCOM headquarters
in Tampa, Florida.
A complete listing of briefers and
individuals interviewed during the
course of this investigation appears
as Appendix B of this report.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INVESTIGATIONS
The U.S.S. Cole Commission
On January 9, 2001, Secretary of
Defense William S. Cohen released the
ndings of the investigation into the
U.S.S. Cole attack headed by Admiral
Gehman and General Crouch. The
report of the U.S.S. Cole Commission
concluded that, although signicant
improvements had been made since the
1996 Khobar Towers bombing in protecting U.S. installations from terrorist
attack, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole
“demonstrated a seam in the fabric of
efforts to protect our forces, namely intransit forces.” The report contained
30 unclassied ndings and 44 specic
recommendations for improvements to
DOD policies and procedures in order
to enhance the ability to protect U.S. military forces in transit.
The U.S.S. Cole Commission was
tasked with responsibility for reviewing
the attack in light of DOD policies and

procedures in order to assess the lessons
learned. In an October 24, 2000 memo
from Secretary Cohen to Admiral
Gehman and General Crouch, the commission was directed to “address those
matters that you consider pertinent associated with port visits, refueling stops,
and related military activities in the
USCENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility], including, for example, force protection measures, rules of engagement,
procedures for and other matters associated with logistic support, and intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.”
The commission report focused on
ve distinct areas: organizational issues
within DOD; anti-terrorism and force
protection measures; intelligence; logistics; and training. Signicantly, the
report did not address issues related
to the reasons behind the U.S.S. Cole’s
refueling stop at Aden, for example, the
U.S. strategy of engagement, operational
considerations, and Navy force struc-

ture realities. These issues are addressed
in the HASC staff report.
The commission conducted its work
taking the existing national security strategy of engagement as a given. In commenting on the release of the commission’s report at a Pentagon news conference on January 9, 2001, Admiral Gehman
stated, “Our review was conducted in the
context of the national security strategy….
The national security strategy includes the
pillar the United States will be engaged
actively around the world (sic.). We took
that as an assumption. Our review was
intended to determine how you do it more
safely, not to question it…. [W]e did
not review the policy of engagement with
Aden. It wasn’t in our charter.” General
Crouch noted, “Even though… the [U.S.S.]
Cole was the catalyst for our review, the
approach we took was not to nd out what
went wrong in the case of the [U.S.S.] Cole,
but how can we do engagement activities
more safely in the future.”

 Page 3

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
The commission’s support of the
engagement strategy was explicitly
noted by Admiral Gehman, who stated,
“The only thing I can say is that the
premise of our report reects our views
that the national strategy of engaging
in these regions around the world is a
good one. It’s in the U.S. best interests….” General Crouch noted, “What
we are committed to is the continuation
of that strategy of engagement and balancing it… with risk mitigation to protect our troops.”
Another area left unaddressed by
the U.S.S. Cole Commission is the issue
of Navy force structure. The U.S.S.
Cole was in Aden because of operational
requirements that made its transit to
the region necessary. Those operational
requirements were inuenced by the
Navy’s force structure and the assets the
Navy can devote to contingency operations in the region. The commission
concluded, “The current level of Combat
Logistics Force oilers is sufcient to support the refueling and logistics requirements of the national strategy.” However, it did not address the issue of using
oilers to support single-ship transits, nor
did it examine the adequacy of overall
Navy force levels to execute the engagement strategy at an acceptable level of
risk. These issues played a factor in the
U.S.S. Cole’s presence in Aden harbor on
October 12, 2000.
With respect to organizational issues,
the commission concluded that “unity of
effort” among the various entities within
DOD with responsibilities for combating terrorism is essential. Accordingly,
the commission recommended that the
Secretary of Defense designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) to oversee DOD’s combating terrorism efforts.
In fact, this recommendation was a Congressional initiative and previously codied in section 901 of the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398).
That section requires the Secretary to
designate an Assistant Secretary “to provide overall direction and supervision
for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources
for the activities of the Department of
Defense for combating terrorism….” The
commission also called for “greater coor-

“The U.S.S. Cole Commission did
not review the basic premises,
assumptions, or implementation of
U.S. engagement strategy, nor did
it address operational or force
structure considerations.”
dination of engagement activities across
U.S. Government agencies.” However,
the commission did not review the basic
premise, assumptions, or implementation of U.S. engagement strategy.
The commission recommended a
variety of actions to improve the anti-terrorism and force protection capabilities
of transiting units. These included manning and funding enhancements. The
report concludes that Component Commanders must be provided with adequate resources to temporarily augment
security for in-transit units. Moreover,
the commission noted the existence of
conicting threat levels and recommended that the geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) have “sole
authority” for establishing threat levels
within his AOR. The commission also
called for improvements to the threat
condition (THREATCON) system, a
series of increasingly robust force protection measures linked to the probability of terrorist attack. Importantly,
the commission considered the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to be “adequate” and recommended no changes to them. However, the commission did acknowledge
that the SROE “do not provide specic
guidelines or indicators for the determination of hostile intent of a terrorist
threat.” The HASC staff report concludes that, in the case of the U.S.S. Cole,
there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules
of engagement and that this ambiguity
was a contributing factor in the attack.
Finally, the commission noted that “we
must get out of the purely defensive

mode by proactively applying AT/FP
[anti-terrorism/force protection] techniques and assets to detect and deter
terrorists,” and called for establishment
of an “operational risk management”
model to assist in AT/FP planning and
execution.
Among the commission’s key recommendations with respect to intelligence is that intelligence production
and analysis must be reprioritized to
decrease emphasis on traditional Cold
War missions and increase emphasis on
post-Cold War missions, such as combating terrorism. This recommendation
presumes that the existing level of intelligence collection on some traditional
Cold War targets is no longer necessary, a presumption that is certainly
debatable. At the January 9, 2001, Pentagon news conference, Admiral Gehman
stated that although DOD and the intelligence community have shifted resources
“away from Cold War missions and
toward the anti-terrorist mission,” that
shift has occurred “only at the margins.”
He noted that “that shift should continue.” While additional intelligence
efforts directed toward the combating
terrorism mission are admittedly important, they should not necessarily come
at the expense of other intelligence priorities or requirements. The commission also addressed, in accordance with
its charter, counterintelligence requirements, and offered suggestions for
improving threat and vulnerability
assessments.
The commission highlighted existing vulnerabilities in the logistics
requirement process with respect to in-

 Page 4
transit forces and recommended that the
Component Commanders be included
in the logistics planning and contract
award process. In addition, the commission recommended that the logistics support process be modied in ways that
incorporate security and force protection considerations. A number of these
recommendations parallel the ndings
and recommendations contained in the
HASC staff report.
Finally, the commission noted specic AT/FP training deciencies and recommended that such training be accomplished “with a degree of rigor that
equates to the unit’s primary mission
areas.”
In sum, many of the commission’s
recommendations are focused on
improving the ability of Component
Commanders to exercise appropriate
force protection measures. The commission’s report describes the Component
Commanders as “the fulcrum of a balance with the benets of engagement on
one side and the associated risks/costs
on the other side.” While there is clearly
a balance to be struck between the strategy of engagement and the assumption
of risk, the commission did not address
the issue of what a proper balance should
be.

The Navy Judge Advocate
General Manual (JAGMAN)
Report
As part of the ofcial inquiry into
the U.S.S. Cole tragedy, the Navy conducted its own investigation, focusing on
a review of the force protection measures
implemented and not implemented by
the commanding ofcer of the U.S.S.
Cole, and whether the commanding ofcer and crew were negligent or decient
in the execution of their duties.
The Navy’s Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation
was conducted by an ofcer at USNAVCENT. Formal written endorsements
of the ndings were submitted by Vice
Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of USNAVCENT and
the Navy’s Fifth Fleet; Admiral Robert J.
Natter, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

“Although the commanding officer of
the U.S.S. Cole failed to implement
all required force protection
measures, the Navy did not
recommend any disciplinary action.”
Atlantic Fleet; and Admiral Vern Clark,
Chief of Naval Operations.
On January 19, 2001, the JAGMAN
report was ofcially released, containing
the ndings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating ofcer,
along with the written endorsements of
Admiral Moore, Admiral Natter, and
Admiral Clark. The endorsements to the
report contain background information
and the Navy’s perspective on the U.S.S.
Cole’s port visit, threat levels and threat
conditions, Navy training program deciencies, and organizational issues.
Among the JAGMAN report’s ndings were that the commanding ofcer
of the U.S.S. Cole failed to implement
roughly half of the force protection measures required during his refueling stop
in Aden. The implementation of these
measures, according to the report, “may
have prevented the suicide boat attack
or mitigated its consequences.” Despite
this nding, the senior Navy ofcials
endorsing the report recommended that
no disciplinary action be taken against
the commanding ofcer, Commander
Kirk S. Lippold.
In his endorsement to the report,
Admiral Moore disagreed with the conclusion of the investigating ofcer on
this point and noted his view that “had
U.S.S. Cole implemented the THREATCON Bravo force protection measures
appropriately, the ship would not have
prevented the attack.” Admiral Natter
concurred in this assessment, noting that
implementation of those additional measures would have been “inadequate” to
prevent the attack. Admiral Clark also
concluded that “these measures, even
if fully implemented, would not have

thwarted a well-planned, determined
attack of this nature.” Nevertheless, it
is impossible to prove a negative and to
know whether actions not taken would
or would not have been sufcient to prevent the consequences that resulted.
On January 9, 2001, after reviewing
the U.S.S. Cole Commission report,
former Secretary of Defense William S.
Cohen directed the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry
H. Shelton, to review the ndings of
the U.S.S. Cole Commission and the
JAGMAN investigation and to provide
his advice concerning implementation
of the U.S.S. Cole Commission’s recommendations “and any additional actions
the Department should now take.” He
also directed General Shelton to assess
“operational and administrative matters
associated with this incident, including
issues of accountability, as well as any
other matter you deem appropriate.”
At a news conference on January
19, 2001, Secretary Cohen announced
his and General Shelton’s concurrence
with the JAGMAN report’s recommendation that no disciplinary action be
taken against the U.S.S. Cole’s commanding ofcer. He indicated that responsibility for the U.S.S. Cole tragedy lies with
the entire military chain of command,
from the Secretary of Defense on down,
because the chain of command did not
sufciently question the procedures for
protecting U.S. military forces in transit. In a January 19, 2001 memorandum,
Secretary Cohen stated that while force
protection enhancements have focused
on land-based installations, “all of us
who had responsibility for force protection of U.S.S. Cole… did not do enough
to anticipate possible new threats.”

 Page 5

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

U

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND ITS
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM)
is
one of four geographic commands and
encompasses 25 countries in
the Middle East, central and
southwest Asia, and parts of
Africa. This region is one of
the most volatile and dangerous in the world. The commander-in-chief of USCENTCOM (CINCCENT) is the
Department of Defense’s primary liaison and representative to the countries in the
region. USCENTCOM is the
only geographic command
with its headquarters located outside
the command’s area of responsibility
(AOR). CINCCENT is not a force provider – he has no standing military
forces under his command. Rather, he
receives forces from the various other
commands in order to execute the missions he is given. USNAVCENT is
the Navy component command and is
one of ve peacetime component commands within USCENTCOM.
Throughout the course of the HASC
staff investigation, USCENTCOM ofcials emphasized the importance of
their mission, which includes promoting regional stability; maintaining
access to regional resources and markets; supporting a lasting Middle East
peace; and countering terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The three major strategic
chokepoints in the region are the Suez
Canal, the Straits of Hormuz, and the
Bab el Mandeb. The Bab el Mandeb
lies at the southern end of the Red
Sea. Yemen is situated at the northern
end of this waterway, with Djibouti
to the south. Through these narrow
chokepoints ows nearly 80 percent of
the world’s petroleum resources. The
Navy’s main responsibility in the region
is to keep those chokepoints open.

and the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salem,
Tanzania in 1998.

The dangerous nature of operations
in USCENTCOM is typied by the fact
that the “normal” threat condition for
most countries within the AOR is generally higher than in other commands.
However, military operations within
USCENTCOM take place on a routine
basis using peacetime rules of engagement and operating procedures. Port
visits, brief stops for fuel, and military
exercises are conducted as part of the
normal peacetime engagement strategy
for the region.
This peacetime posture belies the
fact that USCENTCOM is conducting
combat or near-combat operations on
a daily basis within the AOR. For
example, OPERATION SOUTHERN
WATCH requires armed U.S. aircraft
to enforce the Iraqi “no-y zone” south
of the 33rd parallel in the face of active
Iraqi air defense systems. The Navy
conducts maritime interdiction operations against ships in the Persian Gulf
suspected of smuggling in violation of
the UN-imposed economic sanctions
regime against Iraq. In addition, there
have been a series of high visibility terrorist attacks in the region, including
the attacks against the joint military
facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995,
the Khobar Towers compound in 1996,

Despite these ongoing
high-risk operations, ofcials
at USCENTCOM indicated
that, prior to the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole, engagement in
the various countries in the
region was viewed as the top
priority.
Since the attack,
the priority within USCENTCOM has changed to force
protection. This change came
about, according to USCENTCOM ofcials, because of the
realization that terrorists are “at war”
with the United States. Up until the
time of the U.S.S. Cole attack, ofcials
did not view the situation in the region
in this light, and continued to conduct
operations with primarily a peacetime
mindset.
This peacetime mindset may have
contributed to an overall atmosphere
within USCENTCOM that colored
commanders’ judgments and allowed
units to maintain an overall security
posture that was inappropriate to the
actual threat in the region. Had the
commander of the U.S.S. Cole felt that
he was entering an actual “combat
zone,” he may have been more diligent in implementing the required
force protection measures when entering Aden harbor. The realization that
the United States is now “at war” with
terrorists should signal commanders
and units in the USCENTOM AOR that
they should approach all operations in
the region as if they were combat operations. As such, they could be attacked
any time, any place, and should take
appropriate force protection actions.
This “combat” mindset is critical to
presenting a credible deterrent posture
toward any would-be terrorist in the
future.

 Page 6

F

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

THE U.S. POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT

or the past eight years, U.S.
national security policy has
emphasized a strategy of “engagement.” Engagement can take many
forms, but at its root lies the forging
of closer ties between the United States
and other countries in furtherance of
U.S. national security objectives.
As articulated in the most recent
White House national security strategy
document, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” dated January 5, 2000, “Our strategy is founded on
continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad.” The 1997 National Military Strategy, prepared by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, notes that “Our global
engagement makes the world safer for
our Nation, our citizens, our interests,
and our values.” In a preface to the
report, then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, noted, “The military has an
important role in engagement – helping
to shape the international environment
in appropriate ways to bring about a
more peaceful and stable world.”
Often, the U.S. military is the tool for
implementing the strategy of engagement. The U.S. military is respected
around the world for its capabilities,
professionalism, and adherence to the
highest principles. The Navy bears a
major share of engagement responsibilities in the region because of its continuous forward-based presence, which
is often non-permanent and less intrusive than other types of military deployments.
Engagement with Yemen was seen
as an important priority because of
Yemen’s strategic location astride the
Bal el Mandeb. Until 1990, Yemen was
divided into North and South Yemen.
South Yemen was a Marxist state. A
bloody but relatively short civil war
between both Yemeni states was fought
in 1994. Despite the end of the civil
war, Yemen remained unstable and a
harbor for terrorists. As Admiral Moore
described it, former USCENTCOM
Commander-in-Chief, Marine Corps

General Anthony
Zinni, saw an opportunity to try to
prevent
Yemen
“from
becoming
another
Afghanistan.” Defense ties
between the United
States and Yemen
expanded
after
1997.
In accordance
with
U.S.
engagement strategy, the regional
CINC developed a
Aerial view of U.S.S. Cole refueling in Aden harbor.
Theater
Engagement Plan (TEP) that outlined the spe- for Yemen identied the specic ratiocics for engagement with countries nale for engagement with Yemen, and
within the USCENTCOM AOR, includ- addressed the security environment in
ing Yemen. The TEP is a classied doc- the country. One of the unclassied
ument that is prepared, reviewed, and assumptions in this document was that
amended on a cyclical basis during the “Yemen will remain stable and be able to
course of each year. The last TEP pre- provide security for USG/DOD [United
pared prior to the attack on the U.S.S. States Government/Department of
Cole – TEP 1250-01 – was dated April 1, Defense] personnel conducting engage1999, and covered a seven-year period ment activities.”
from 2001-2007. The document was
not solely a product of USCENTCOM.
General Zinni requested the ComAll national agencies had the ability mander of U.S. Naval Forces Central
to review the particulars of the TEP Command (USNAVCENT) and the
and to recommend changes or modi- Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles
cations to the engagement plans it out- W. Moore, Jr., to help formulate spelined. According to USCENTCOM of- cic recommendations for the Navy’s
cials, no agency articulated any objec- support for engagement with Yemen.
tions with respect to the TEP section Admiral Moore suggested three specic
dealing with Yemen.
options: conducting military-to-military
exercises with Yemen, assisting in the
In an unclassied entry in the TEP, development of Yemen’s coast guard
General Zinni stated, “We need to capabilities, and conducting brief port
broaden our relationships with nations visits in Aden. General Zinni accepted
in our AOR through expanded engage- these recommendations and added a
ment activities….” He noted that a fourth: assisting Yemen in the clearnumber of states in the USCENTCOM ance of land mines left over from the
AOR “face both transnational dangers country’s civil war. In this regard, the
and internal threats to stability. Chief Navy conducted a “train-the-trainer”
among these is anti-government terror- program to assist Yemen in the deminism, fostered by various Islamic extrem- ing effort.
ist groups.” Yemen, he noted, faced
“internal problems between the national
The U.S. Navy strongly supported
government and the tribes,” exacerbated the engagement policy with Yemen and
by the country’s “extreme economic dis- continues to do so even after the attack
advantage.” USCENTCOM’s August on the U.S.S. Cole. Admiral Moore
2000 classied country campaign plan stated that, in general, the Gulf coun-

 Page 7

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
tries view the U.S. naval presence in the
region as a matter of “prestige” and that
they do not want the United States to
disengage from the region. The Gulf
states view Iran as the primary threat to
their security and see the United States
as providing a necessary deterrent to
Iranian aggression.
In practice, USNAVCENT conducts
50 exercises annually in 13 Gulf states
for engagement purposes. According
to Admiral Moore, the Navy had “no
discomfort” going to Yemen. In accordance with the specic engagement

worse. The port was extremely busy,
many small boats, the conditions ashore
and in the government were not satisfactory.” In addition, the quality of
the fuel being provided in Djibouti was
questionable, the fuel pumping rate was
inadequate compared to other ports, fuel
storage capacity was less and storage
costs were higher than in Aden, and
refueling took place pierside.
In additional to operational considerations that made Yemen look like an
attractive refueling option, the desire
for engagement with Yemen provided

“The desire for engagement with
Yemen outpaced an understanding of
the terrorist threat there, increasing
the risk to U.S. military personnel.”
plans accepted by General Zinni, some
joint U.S.-Yemeni training exercises had
been conducted. U.S. deminers were
also assisting Yemen in clearing the
country of land mines left over from
the civil war. In addition, planning was
being done to help develop Yemen’s
coast guard capabilities. And, by the
time of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, at
least 27 U.S. Navy ships had already
conducted brief stops for fuel in Aden
harbor.
The original decision to refuel Navy
ships at Aden was viewed by the Navy
in the context of the operational benets
it would provide. Yemen not only was
situated adjacent to the Bab el Mandeb,
but also was roughly half the steaming
distance between the Suez Canal and
the Persian Gulf. The refueling situation at other ports in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility was becoming increasingly difcult. For example,
Djibouti was becoming increasingly tenuous as a refueling stop because of escalating instability. In testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on
October 19, 2000, General Zinni stated,
“We had been in Djibouti and refueling. We were interested in terminating that contract, because at that time,
Djibouti, the threat conditions were far

the Navy with a strategic rationale for
increasing the number of planned refueling stops there as part of the overall
engagement strategy developed by the
USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief. In
short, the decision to go to Yemen accomplished multiple objectives, both strategic and operational.
From the Navy’s perspective, the
decision to refuel in Yemen was logical
and appropriate. In fact, the Navy continues to support the engagement strategy with respect to Yemen and considers Aden to be the best refueling port
option in the AOR. This is one reason
why the Navy expects to return to Aden
in the future. In the wake of the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole, the Navy sees a return
to Yemen as both a matter of sound
operational policy and a matter of political necessity driven by the requirement
not to withdraw in the face of terrorist
attacks. Both Admiral Moore and the
current USCENTCOM Commander-inChief, General Tommy R. Franks, stated
their belief that the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole was an “act of war” designed to
force U.S. disengagement from the
region. According to General Franks,
“Terrorists have declared war on us. We
shouldn’t back away. I will never recommend disengagement.”

The decision to refuel in Aden
harbor was made with full knowledge
of the fact that Yemen was home to a
variety of terrorist groups, some with
anti-American agendas. Yemen is also
the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden,
the Saudi expatriate and suspected mastermind behind the attacks on U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and
the embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania. The Department of State, in
its report, Patterns of Global Terrorism
1999, concluded that Yemen remained
“a safehaven for terrorist groups.”
With this background, the deterioration in the political and security environment with respect to Israel and the Palestinians in the summer of 2000 should
have provided early warning that U.S.
interests in the region might be placed at
greater risk because of a perceived U.S.
bias toward Israel. As a result of this
change in the geo-political situation, a
more careful and deliberate review of the
CINC’s TEP and U.S. engagement plans
with Yemen should have taken place.
Unfortunately, this did not occur.
Key observations: U.S. national security
strategy called for engagement with Yemen.
USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy through port visits and
brief refueling stops, among other initiatives.
Yemen was seen as “win-win” – it solved an
operational need and met U.S. engagement
policy guidance at the same time. However, the desire for engagement with Yemen
outpaced an understanding of the terrorist
threat in that country, increasing the risk
to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an
increase in the number of U.S. Navy ships
refueling there. Changing geo-political conditions in the AOR should have led to a more
critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities
and engagement plans for Yemen, but they
did not.
Recommendations: A policy of engagement
must be pursued cautiously in areas where
the potential for terrorism is high. The balance between the desire for engagement and
the assumption of risk must be recalibrated
to place increasing emphasis on force protection requirements. Implementation of the
TEP should be reviewed and adjusted in
accordance with changing geo-political factors in the AOR.

 Page 8

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

A

ccurate intelligence information
on terrorist plans and activities
has historically been difcult to
obtain. Even the small amount of intelligence that referenced Yemen specically
was occasionally contradictory. Generally, “strategic” intelligence - containing
information about threats and preparations for possible attacks on U.S. interests or personnel - can be useful in providing early warning of terrorist actions.
However, because terrorist groups tend
to be small, close knit, very security conscious, and difcult to penetrate, “tactical” intelligence - that intelligence containing specic information regarding
the target, method, timing, and location
of an attack - is generally more difcult to
obtain, if not nearly impossible. Further,
it is generally agreed that there are insufcient resources, particularly in terms of
human intelligence assets, to properly
counter the difcult terrorist threat.

Collection
Since the 1996 bombing of the
Khobar Towers compound in Saudi
Arabia, intelligence collection efforts
have improved signicantly. A sizable amount of intelligence information,
much of it non-specic, is collected,
processed, and disseminated daily by
the various national intelligence agencies. While there is always a risk that
source information gathered through a
variety of means may be deliberately
or unintentionally erroneous, much of
the intelligence product is sufciently
accurate and timely to be “actionable.”
As the USCENTCOM AOR is one of
the most volatile and dangerous regions
of the world where U.S. military forces
operate, accurate and timely intelligence
is essential to ensure the safety of U.S.
military personnel conducting their missions. Ofcials at USCENTCOM and
USNAVCENT noted that a number of
planned terrorist attacks in their AOR
were thwarted as a result of accurate and
timely intelligence. Both General Franks
and Admiral Moore praised the work
of the national intelligence agencies with
respect to their efforts in providing crit-

INTELLIGENCE
ical intelligence that allowed successful
preventive defensive actions to be taken.

to attack a U.S. Navy vessel remained
undiscovered.

The national intelligence community - including the Central Intelligence
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
and National Security Agency - has
helped the United States to score notable, but largely unheralded, counterterrorism successes. Unfortunately, despite
signicant efforts, failures to provide
tactical warning may occur, as intelligence efforts will rarely result in absolute knowledge of terrorist activities.

In retrospect, it is clear that
USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT
operated with respect to Yemen on the
basis of engagement and operational
factors without complete and accurate
threat information. Moreover, recent
press reports indicate that the FBI had
access in 1998 to information about a
possible terrorist attack against a U.S.
Navy vessel in Yemen and that this
information was disseminated to several DOD organizations. Nevertheless, engagement activities with Yemen
increased and a bunkering contract to
provide for the refueling of U.S. Navy
ships was concluded in December
1998.

General Franks noted that intelligence must be “actionable” to be effective.
In testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on October 19, 2000,
General Zinni stated that “Aden never
had a specic terrorist threat. All the other
ports that have been mentioned here, that
we should have considered as options,
have had specic terrorist threats, and
we’ve had to emergency sortie out of
them.” However, recent press reports
indicate that information on a possible
terrorist threat to U.S. Navy ships in Aden
was conveyed by the FBI to the Department of Defense in August 1998.
Much of the U.S. intelligence collection effort is dedicated to signals intelligence (SIGINT) - the exploitation of communications. Over the years, modern
technology has made communications
more difcult to intercept and exploit.
Encryption software, devices, and other
technologies have become readily available on the open market and have complicated the task of gathering accurate
intelligence regarding the terrorist threat.
Moreover, terrorists have become more
sophisticated in their use of these technologies and more cautious in their communications. In addition to SIGINT, human
intelligence (HUMINT) often provides a
valuable source of information.
Published reports suggest that
planning to attack a U.S. Navy warship
in Aden may have begun as early as
1997 - three years before the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole was actually carried out.
In addition, a previous failed attempt

Analysis
It is common knowledge that the
intelligence community circulates a
large number of intelligence messages
daily regarding terrorist threats. This
intelligence trafc must be sorted, prioritized, analyzed, and disseminated in
a timely manner. At the level of a ship
commander, it is impossible to wade
through the sheer quantity of raw intelligence reports. Therefore, intelligence
analysts must accurately separate the
critical from the uncritical and the reliable from the unreliable. This is a key
role of intelligence analysis.
Source reliability is a key factor in
the determination of how seriously to
take an intelligence report of a possible terrorist threat. Analysts often disagree on how much credibility to lend
to a given source, and this can result
in points of dispute between analytical
agencies. Nevertheless, these disputes
may result in healthy competitive analysis. In addition, the credibility of
threats may also be linked to seemingly
unrelated external factors, such as geopolitical developments in the region.
In the summer of 2000, the Middle
East peace process began to falter.
Anti-Israeli and anti-American senti-

 Page 9

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
ment among many Arabs in the region
increased. In this period of increased
regional tension, it was reasonable to
expect a higher probability of attacks on
U.S. interests in the region. Prudence
suggests that intelligence normally considered to be relatively benign with
respect to threats against U.S. interests
should have been viewed by the operational consumers with greater seriousness and urgency than was the case.
Both USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT ofcials indicated that more analysis of raw information is needed.
Admiral Moore also noted a
need for more timely analysis.
He indicated that the U.S.S.
Cole had all the relevant intelligence information, but was
not knowledgeable of conicting assessments with respect
to source material.

A low threshold for the dissemination
of intelligence information was established and all intelligence reporting was
disseminated appropriately and in a
timely manner. Message trafc was
relayed as expected. However, some
highly classied message trafc could
not be relayed directly to the U.S.S.
Cole because the ship did not have the
equipment to receive sensitive compartmented information, which is not
an unusual conguration for a U.S.
destroyer on a normal deployment.
In addition, selective message trafc
from Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bah-

is likely no possible set of conditions
for establishing a rigid reporting
threshold for this type of information,
and the intelligence community
should, absent such, continue reporting as it has.
USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT
ofcials indicated that, even with the
benet of 20/20 hindsight, they would
have made the same call to refuel the
U.S.S. Cole in Aden, given the same
intelligence information at the time.
The determination to refuel in Aden
was a policy decision, made with the
known lack of specic information on terrorist cell activities in
Yemen. Unfortunately, in this
instance, the intelligence community produced no timely
tactical warning of the attack.

“Intelligence shortfalls led
to a failure to provide
‘tactical’ warning to the
U.S.S. Cole.”

In a January 18, 2001
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary
of the Navy Richard Danzig noted,
“While more than a dozen people
participated over eighteen months in
a plot against naval ships in Aden,
focused intelligence resources in that
port amounted to less than a man year,
contributing to poor insight about the
actual threat.” As a result, he concluded that the commanding ofcer of
the U.S.S. Cole “did not have full situational awareness.” In his endorsement to the JAGMAN report, Admiral Moore conceded simply, “we did
not believe an attack in Yemen would
occur.”

Committee staff also reviewed the
analysis produced by DIA analyst Kie
Fallis, who resigned from DIA after the
attack on the U.S.S. Cole. According to
press reports, Mr. Fallis’ analysis suggested that the terrorist threat should
have been taken more seriously than it
was. Specic comments on the Fallis
analysis are contained in the classied
annex to this report.

Dissemination
Overall, the dissemination of threat
intelligence reporting was extensive.

rain, including analyses of intelligence
data, was transmitted to the U.S.S. Cole
before the ship transited the Suez Canal
and entered the USCENTCOM AOR.
USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT ofcials indicated that the U.S.S. Cole had
access to all relevant intelligence information.

Because an examination of
the specic intelligence information available to USCENTCOM, the U.S. Navy, and the
U.S.S. Cole, as well as a description of how the intelligence process
worked in this instance, necessarily
involves a discussion of classied information, it is not included in this unclassied report. However, a full discussion of intelligence factors relevant to
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole appears in
the classied annex to this report.

Unfortunately, the massive quantity of non-specic intelligence information that was broadly disseminated
contributed to an under-appreciation
of the seriousness of the terrorist threat.
USCENTCOM ofcials in Tampa, Florida and USNAVCENT ofcials in
Manama, Bahrain indicated they had
no concern that the signicant quantity
of raw intelligence reporting being disseminated would lead to “information
overload.” However, they acknowledged that a high volume of general
intelligence information could have a
“numbing effect” on personnel. The
low threshold for dissemination of
intelligence may lead to a blizzard of
information that causes some to be dismissed inappropriately. This is not
to suggest that the intelligence community should raise its threshold for
reporting terrorism information. There

Key observations: There was clearly a
shortage of intelligence information with
respect to the specic attack on the U.S.S.
Cole. In spite of the fact that the intelligence community had known of general
and ambiguous planning activities for an
unspecied action or actions for some time,
the lack of specic information led to a failure to provide “tactical” warning to the
U.S.S. Cole. Likewise, there was no specic information to suggest that the intelligence community could have provided
tactical warning to other U.S. Navy ships
in Aden. Further, there was no intelligence information about a previous failed
attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel in
the Aden port. There is sufcient evidence to believe that additional HUMINT
collection personnel would enable broader
coverage of the USCENTCOM AOR and
provide an increased anti-terrorism collection effort. The intelligence dissemination

 Page 10
system worked well, as the threshold for
reporting was low. However, the sheer
volume of non-specic intelligence placed
a premium on accurate analysis.
Recommendations: Policy determinations
that place U.S. military personnel in
harm’s way must not be made without a
full understanding that there may be an
absence of specific intelligence to support
them. Additional intelligence collection
personnel and analysts with the proper
training are needed to sort through the
voluminous supply of raw intelligence

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
and make accurate judgments regarding
the credibility of the data. The process
for resolving competing analyses within
and between intelligence agencies should
be strengthened by encouraging alternative analyses. Improved qualitative analysis is also required. A better process is
required for ensuring that useful, operationally oriented intelligence is available to ship commanders. The intelligence staffs of the regional commands
must be more proactive in pushing the
national intelligence community to provide better intelligence support and anal-

ysis in areas where existing intelligence
collection and analysis is deficient. This
should include the operational elements
informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of
deployments so that focused intelligence
collection can be undertaken. Intelligence
assessments should also be viewed in the
context of broader geo-political developments within the AOR. Greater coordination between Department of Defense
officials in Washington and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

THREAT LEVELS AND THREAT CONDITIONS

T

he system of
threat
level
reporting
is
designed to provide a
simple barometer of
terrorist threats to
U.S. interests in other
countries. The threat
levels in various
countries are continuously assessed and
reassessed based on
existing intelligence
information. In accordance with Department of Defense
Directive 2000.12 on
“DOD Antiterrorism/
Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,”
country threat levels are established by
DIA and promulgated by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conict (ASD/
SOLIC). The Directive also stipulates
that the establishment of country threat
levels is supposed to be coordinated
with the regional commanders-in-chief
in their respective areas of responsibility.
Unfortunately, part of the general
and prevalent complacency about the
threat to U.S. interests in Yemen was
the result of confusion brought about
by the introduction of a new threat level
reporting methodology on October 1,
2000. The change in the threat level
reporting methodology was intended
to clarify understanding of the threats
facing the United States globally.

“High”
representing
the highest level of
threat. Admiral Moore
stated that the commander of the U.S.S.
Cole may have misinterpreted this revision as signifying a
decrease in the threat
level in Yemen. This
was also a conclusion of
the U.S.S. Cole Commission, headed by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman.

According to a September 29, 2000,
DIA report on the new methodology,
“Customers of the new methodology
should receive a clearer picture of the
terrorist threat in a particular country.”
In the case of the U.S.S. Cole incident,
this change may have had the opposite
effect.
Prior to October 1, 2000, the threat
level reporting system classified
countries according to five categories: Negligible, Low, Medium, High,
and Critical. After October 1, 2000,
the methodology was streamlined to
reflect only four categories: Low,
Moderate, Significant, and High.
Under the old methodology, the
threat level in Yemen was classified
as “High.” However, under the new
methodology, the threat level was
classified as “Significant,” with

USCENTCOM
never concurred with the
change in reporting methodology and
did not adopt it because of concerns
over possible confusion that might
result. Although it appears likely that
this concern was realized in the case
of the U.S.S. Cole, ofcials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT pointed out
that the commander of the U.S.S. Cole
maintained threat condition (THREATCON) Bravo.
At the time of the U.S.S. Cole’s visit
to Aden, the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a,
the Yemeni capital, was at a higher
threat level than USNAVCENT. This
elevated threat level was the result of
factors that USCENTCOM ofcials suggested were not relevant to the Navy’s
operations in Yemen, for example, the
prevalence of street crime and rioting.
Because the U.S.S. Cole’s visit was a
brief stop for fuel and not a port visit

 Page 11

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
involving crew liberty, USCENTCOM
ofcials discounted the relevance of
the Embassy’s higher threat level. The
U.S.S. Cole was unaware of the different threat level in effect at the U.S.
Embassy. They were also unaware of
the fact that the Embassy was closed
for security reasons from October 5-8,
2000. Had they been made aware, it
is possible that this information might
have factored into the U.S.S. Cole’s force
protection plan.

was under THREATCON Charlie until
May 2000, when it reverted to THREATCON Bravo. The THREATCON Charlie status was initiated as the result of
a threat to U.S. deminers in Yemen,
who were removed from the country in
response. It was not instituted as a result
of any threat against a U.S. naval vessel.

Threat conditions, or THREATCONs, are a measure of the force protection requirements that must be implemented in response to the threat level
in a given country. THREATCON
Normal reects a routine security posture. THREATCONs increase from
Alpha to Delta as the threat of terrorism
becomes more pronounced. (The specic unclassied THREATCON measures are included at Appendix C of
this report.)

By May 2000, USNAVCENT and
USCENTCOM determined that there
was insufcient intelligence to justify
remaining at THREATCON Charlie in
Yemen. U.S. naval vessels that had
previously made brief stops for refueling in Aden had reported no security
problems and at least one after-action
report received by USNAVCENT recommended a loosening of security measures for subsequent refueling stops.
The reduction in the threat condition
from Charlie to Bravo was coordinated
with the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a and
supported by the in-country U.S.
Defense Representative at the embassy.

Normally, USCENTCOM operates
under THREATCON Bravo, a higher
threat condition than generally found in
other regions of the world where the
United States has military forces. Yemen

THREATCON Charlie involves
security
measures
that
require
increased vigilance and additional personnel standing watch, which can place
difcult strains on a crew. It is also

A

usually limited to short periods of time.
Since the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, all
ports in the USCENTCOM AOR have
remained at THREATCON Charlie and
will likely remain there for some time to
come. However, ofcials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT acknowledged that maintaining THREATCON
Charlie for too long can lead to a mindset that it is normal and people can
become “numb” to threats. After May
2000, THREATCON Bravo was considered to be the appropriate threat condition for Yemen. Unfortunately, critical waterborne threat security measures that must be implemented under
THREATCON Charlie are not required
under THREATCON Bravo.
Key observation: Confusion with respect to
threat levels could have contributed to a
false sense of security and complacency by
the commanding ofcer of the U.S.S. Cole.
Recommendations: Standardization of the
system of threat level reporting is essential
to avoid confusion regarding the nature
and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The
sufciency of THREATCON measures to
accomplish their intended objectives should
be reviewed and revalidated periodically.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

fter the bombing of the Khobar
Towers compound in 1996,
revised antiterrorist security
measures were instituted. However,
the focus of these enhancements was
on hardening land-based installations
against terrorist attack. It is conceivable that these improvements played
an indirect role in the terrorists’ choice
of a U.S. navy vessel as a target.

Among the security enhancements
instituted after the Khobar Towers
bombing was the conduct of vulnerability assessments of U.S. military installations and facilities abroad.
After
the decision was made to support
engagement with Yemen, four vulnerability assessments were conducted in
Aden. Two were conducted by the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) and one by the Coast Guard.
The NCIS vulnerability assessments
focused on ground-based threats to U.S.

deminers in Yemen. They did not consider waterborne threats to U.S. Navy
ships. In May 1998, USCENTCOM conducted a vulnerability assessment of the
Aden port. This was the only vulnerability assessment of Aden conducted
by USCENTCOM and it occurred more
than two years prior to the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole.
An unclassied entry in the
USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief’s
Theater Engagement Plan 1250-01
stated, “USCENTCOM has an active
Force Protection program responsible
for vulnerability assessments and site
surveys. The assessments will be used
as part of the overall theater assessment
process and will assist in determining
the appropriate level of force protection
required for forces conducting engagement activities.” Regrettably, USCENTCOM did not believe it was necessary to
conduct additional vulnerability assess-

ments, even though the threat level and
threat conditions in Yemen changed.
The lack of NCIS personnel
assigned in Aden may also have
exposed a vulnerability. While there is
no way to know whether NCIS personnel on the ground watching the port
might have precluded the attack, an
NCIS presence would have allowed
for a more knowledgeable assessment
regarding port security.
Key observations: Formal vulnerability
assessments focused primarily on landbased threats in Yemen. Only one vulnerability assessment of the Aden port was conducted, but that was more than two years
prior to the U.S.S. Cole attack.
Recommendation: Formal vulnerability
assessments should be conducted at regular
intervals, and when threat levels within the
AOR change.

 Page 12

U

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

FORCE PROTECTION

SNAVCENT, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, prides
itself on having the best force
protection program in the world. In
fact, in April 2000, USNAVCENT was
awarded top honors by the Department of Defense for having the “best
force protection program anywhere.”
Admiral Moore noted that USNAVCENT headquarters enjoys “the best
security money can buy.” Yet, again,
these measures are primarily oriented
toward defending against shore-based
attacks. Unfortunately, even the best
force protection measures in place at
the time did not protect the U.S.S. Cole.
Extensive training is conducted to
familiarize military personnel with
force protection measures and procedures. However, there is always concern that additional force protection
measures – usually adopted after an
unexpected vulnerability is exploited –
compromise the military’s ability to execute its missions and leave the armed
services “looking backward” rather
than “looking forward.”

This concern was voiced repeatedly
at USCENTCOM headquarters and at
USNAVCENT. Admiral Moore was
particularly strong in expressing his
view that the reaction to the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole in terms of additional
force protection measures will leave the
United States better defended against
a threat that is unlikely to be repeated.
The terrorists have successfully attacked
a U.S. Navy ship, he noted, arguing
that they are planning their next type
of attack while the United States military spends time bolstering its defenses
against the last type of attack.
Force protection, as practiced, is
an inherently defensive activity. Both
Admiral Moore and General Franks
commented that the war against terrorism cannot be won if the United
States only plays defense. Implicit
in their comments was a recognition
that the United States cannot defend
against every type of attack, in every
place, at every time, and that some

offensive activity on the part of the
United States is necessary if terrorism
is to be defeated. Also implicit in their
remarks was an apparent belief that by
only playing defense, the U.S. military
is being placed in an untenable situation and that incidents like the attack on
the U.S.S. Cole are inevitable unless the
United States adopts a more aggressive
approach toward counterterrorism.
Nevertheless, risk is an inherent element in U.S. force deployments. Whether
U.S. military deployments are justied on
the basis of a strategy of engagement or
a requirement for power projection, risk
must be managed effectively and reduced
to a minimum wherever possible. Consequently, force protection measures must
be thorough and adequate.

The Navy’s Anti-Terrorism/
Force Protection Training
Program
In general, the U.S. Navy’s anti-terrorism and force protection (AT/FP)
program is focused almost exclusively
on shore-based, rather than waterborne,
threats. Until now, terrorist threats to
ships were considered to emanate from
shore, such as truck bombs on the pier
when a ship is docked in port. In
the case of the U.S.S. Cole, waterborne
threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of
the Navy’s counterterrorism program.

The Navy’s AT/FP training program is run by U.S. Joint Forces Command. USCENTCOM does not inject
itself into the training program. However, USCENTCOM has certain knowledge and experience regarding threats
that would make its inputs valuable to
U.S. Joint Forces Command in structuring the AT/FP training program. There
is no indication anyone in the chain of
command suggested a change in the
training program to improve capabilities against waterborne terrorist threats.
There are few opportunities for
formal force protection training to hone
the skills of the commissioned ofcer
(collateral duty assigned to one of the
junior ofcers aboard ship) or the
enlisted intelligence specialist responsible for advising the ship commander of
the threat. In the case of the U.S.S. Cole
and similar Aegis-class ships, these two
personnel, along with the ship’s executive ofcer, are principally responsible for the training of shipboard personnel and, if necessary, implementation
of the ship protection plan. They are
also responsible for assisting the commander in conducting the required realtime assessment of the specic threats
against his ship.
There is no Navy-wide standard
core curriculum for force protection
unique to Navy vessels. This fact

 Page 13

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
reects the primacy of the domain of
the East and West coast Navy commanders-in-chief. The Force Protection
Ofcer course, which lasts ve days,
addresses the development of ship protection plans. However, the training
focuses on shore installation protection
and does not teach perimeter security
(pier, water, or air) or the skills needed
to execute the ship protection plans.
An additional training program for
shipboard security personnel (the
Shipboard Security Engagement
Tactics Course) trains them to
locate and neutralize intruders,
protect vital ship areas, and
recover hostages. It does not
address threat analysis, external
threats, or perimeter security.
Law of the Sea training is also part
of the pre-deployment training
that each ship undergoes, with
written certication that the training was conducted.

force protection standards used. For
example, the Navy’s Sixth Fleet operates under the Navy baseline force protection measures while the Fifth Fleet
operates under the JCS measures. The
U.S.S. Cole was transitioning from the
Sixth Fleet to the Fifth Fleet and operating under the JCS guidelines.
According to DOD Directive
2000.12 on anti-terrorism and force
protection, the USCENTCOM Com-

frustration at the fact that he has no role
in the selection of husbanding agents,
as this is strictly a Navy contracting
activity. Nevertheless, he suggested
that allowing USNAVCENT to select
the husbanding agent, based on host
country considerations that would not
necessarily be part of the evaluation
process, would make the host country
a “partner” in providing protection to
U.S. Navy ships.

“The Navy’s AT/FP
program is focused
almost exclusively on
shore-based, rather than
waterborne, threats.”

Training of ship personnel with
respect to the use of deadly force is
also considered an essential part of the
ship protection measures. The ofcial
U.S. Navy policy in this regard is that
members of the ship’s self-defense force
(SSDF) and all armed watch standers
should receive pre-deployment and ondeployment refresher briefs, as well as
tailored scenario training relative to the
use of deadly force. The Navy traditionally leaves weapons release authority to the commanding ofcer or it
may be delegated to another senior ofcer. However, even if the watch sentries on board the U.S.S. Cole had recognized a threat from the small boat
that approached the ship, they may not
have been able to engage it without rst
obtaining authorization from the commander or another ofcer.

Force Protection Measures and
the Rules of Engagement
The Navy operates under multiple
force protection standards: the Navy
has developed its own baseline force
protection standards and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have developed
another set of more stringent measures.
Navy operations are inconsistent in the

mander-in-Chief has the responsibility
to “assess and review the AT/FP
programs of all CINC-assigned military forces and/or activities in the
AOR.” USNAVCENT conducted a
review of force protection programs in
the summer of 2000. USCENTCOM
indicated that the CINC review progress is an ongoing one, with programs
reviewed on an annual basis. It is not
a formal review process, and is conducted by “exception,” meaning that
the force protection procedures remain
unchanged unless an issue is raised that
requires reexamination.
While in port, or during a refueling
stop, U.S. Navy ships require various
services, for example, trash removal.
These services are generally provided
by a local “husbanding agent.” The
contracting procedures for selecting a
husbanding agent primarily emphasize cost considerations. Security is
not an element in selecting a husbanding agent. Background checks are
not required in the contracting process
and are generally not requested by the
United States. This raises signicant
issues with respect to security and force
protection for U.S. Navy ships during
port visits. Admiral Moore expressed

Under
THREATCON
Bravo, 62 specic force protection measures are required to
be implemented by the commanders of U.S. Navy ships
(see Appendix C). Each successive threat condition requires
implementation of all force
protection measures under
lower threat conditions and
imposes additional measures
to be adopted.

In accordance with the
Navy’s standard operating procedure,
the commanding ofcer of the U.S.S.
Cole led a force protection plan with
USNAVCENT prior to transiting the
Suez Canal, indicating that he would
implement all 62 THREATCON Bravo
measures during the brief stop for refueling at Aden. Despite this assurance,
the U.S.S. Cole did not implement a
number of force protection measures
that might have had a bearing on the
ability of the attackers to conduct the
attack.
The Navy Judge Advocate General
Manual (JAGMAN) investigation found
that roughly half of the 62 THREATCON Bravo measures were not implemented by the U.S.S. Cole. For example, THREATCON Bravo requires that
the ship commander coordinate security
arrangements for the ship’s visit with
the local husbanding agent. The commander of the U.S.S. Cole did not do so.
In addition, THREATCON Bravo measures require that small unauthorized
boats be kept away from the ship. However, no waterborne security measures
were required, and none were implemented. Despite this signicant security
lapse, neither General Franks nor Admiral Moore suggested that the implemen-

 Page 14

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

tation of all 62 force protection measures
would have prevented the attack. It
is conceivable, though unprovable, that
some of the measures not implemented
could have either prevented the attack
or mitigated its consequences.
The operations order issued by
USNAVCENT establishing threat condition procedures for ships in the
USCENTCOM AOR indicated that the
ship commander “must maintain exibility” in determining the appropriate
force protection measures. Nevertheless, that exibility does not allow for
failing to implement specic THREATCON measures that the ship commander
agrees to take in the force protection plan
led and approved by USNAVCENT.
As Admiral Moore noted, ship commanders, in exercising exibility, will
generally take the minimum force protection measures stipulated by the existing threat condition and add to them.
However, this does not appear to have
been the case with the U.S.S. Cole.
According to USNAVCENT’s operations order, implementation of appropriate THREATCON measures serves
two purposes: “First, the crew is alerted,
additional watches are created, and there
is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship’s resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat.
These actions will convey to anyone
observing the ship’s activities that the
ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should
look elsewhere for a vulnerable target.”
A July 21, 2000, message from the
commander of the George Washington
Battle Group disseminating force protection guidance to ships in the Fifth
Fleet AOR noted: “The potential for
our ships and personnel to become targets for terrorist groups signicantly
increases while inport/ashore in the
gulf. No port should be considered
completely safe. To help prevent terrorist attacks against personnel, ships,
and aircraft, commanders must make
force protection a top priority and an
integral part of the planning process.”
USNAVCENT’s operations order
explicitly acknowledged the possibility of waterborne attack, even under

THREATCON Alpha.
Specically,
Measure 18 noted, “Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft
require special concern because they
can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists.” In light of this, Measure 18
stated, “Unauthorized craft should be
kept away from the ship.” THREATCON Bravo required the U.S.S. Cole to
“implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship” and
to “coordinate with host nation/local
port authority, husbanding agent as
necessary, and request their assistance
in controlling unauthorized craft.” The
JAGMAN investigation found that the
U.S.S. Cole “waived” 19 specic force
protection measures and “failed to
accomplish” 12 others.
THREATCON Bravo did not
require the establishment of a small
boat exclusion zone around the ship,
nor did it mandate the presence of
“picket boats” around the ship to provide a cordon that could be used to
keep unauthorized boats away from the
ship. It did require the commander to
make “random” picket boat patrols in
the immediate vicinity of the ship only
“if the situation warrants.” Unfortunately, picket boats were not used in
this instance, and could not have been
used once the ship was tied up, because
the position of the U.S.S. Cole against
the fueling dolphin placed the picket

boats up above the dolphin. Therefore, they could not be lowered into the
water. However, they could have been
launched prior to mooring. In reality,
USNAVCENT considered the location
of the fueling dolphin away from the
Aden pier to be a force protection benet that would reduce the risk of terrorist attack.
USNAVCENT guidance on the use
of force explicitly noted that a ship
commander has “the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary
means available and to take all appropriate action in self defense.” However,
the USNAVCENT rules of engagement
(ROE) were also clear that “commanding ofcers… should avoid actions that
may be interpreted as provocative or
inimical by host country authorities.”
Moreover, the ROE noted that “‘warning shots’ are inherently dangerous,
and will not be used.”
The USNAVCENT rules of engagement allowed the use of deadly force
to defend against hostile acts or hostile
intent. Unfortunately, because the small
boat did not maneuver in a threatening manner and demonstrated no clear
hostile intent against the ship, the presumption was that it was involved in
support activities for the refueling stop
and, therefore, not a threat to the U.S.S.
Cole.

 Page 15

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
The determination of what constitutes hostile intent is ambiguous in certain circumstances, and the USNAVCENT ROE do not provide clarifying
guidance. The “Standing Rules of
Engagement for U.S. Forces,” prepared
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does dene
“hostile intent.” However, that denition does not cover the specic situation in which the U.S.S. Cole found
itself.

measures could be implemented without host nation coordination. Although
USNAVCENT believes that the Yemeni
government was aware, in a general
sense, that the U.S.S. Cole’s commanding ofcer would take whatever action
was necessary to protect his ship and
crew, the Yemeni government was
unaware of the specic force protection
guidance developed for various threat
conditions.

Because the commander of the
U.S.S. Cole stated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures,
USCENTCOM presumed the ship was
sufciently equipped to implement them. None of the previous U.S. Navy ships stopping
at Aden for refueling indicated
that they lacked the resources
to implement required threat
condition force protection
measures. In addition, some
ships requested and received
approval for deviations to the
required THREATCON measures.

Until the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
security at the Aden harbor was considered to be sufcient. The Aden
port had also been used by ships of

never relied exclusively on host country
security procedures. The commanding
ofcer of the U.S.S. Cole indicated his
intention to implement all 62 force protection measures required under THREATCON Bravo. However, he failed to do this.
In addition, there was ambiguity in the
determination of hostile intent under the
rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems during previous U.S. Navy
ship visits to Aden may have resulted in a
sense of complacency regarding the threat
that might face the U.S.S. Cole. Moreover,
there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands.
Other security shortfalls have been identied with respect to U.S. Navy host
country contracting activities. The
selection of husbanding agents is
performed by a contracting agency
outside the purview of the CINC’s
component commanders.

“The location of the
fueling dolphin away
from the Aden pier was
considered to be a
force protection benefit
that would reduce the
risk of terrorist attack.”

Under customary international law, the host nation
assumes responsibility for the
security of visiting naval vessels. Nevertheless, the United
States has never relied solely on
host nations to provide security for U.S.
ships, and the force protection guidelines have been developed to allow a
commanding ofcer to take whatever
actions are necessary to defend his ship
or crew. The commanding ofcer of
the U.S.S. Cole did not request assistance from Yemeni ofcials in providing security for the ship while it was in
Aden.

Some of the force protection measures the U.S.S. Cole was supposed to
implement required host country coordination. In his endorsement to the
JAGMAN report, Admiral Clark noted
that permission to implement certain
measures, such as the use of force, must
be obtained from the host country, and
that “[t]here was no special authority for
visiting U.S. ships to Aden to use such
force.” According to USCENTCOM,
only 45 of the 62 THREATCON Bravo

other nations without incident. Not
a single U.S. Navy ship complained
about lax security at Aden during the
previous 24 ship visits beginning in
February 1999 that took place under
the December 1998 bunkering contract. In fact, at least one after-action
report led by the commanding ofcer
of a U.S. Navy ship that had stopped to
refuel in Aden recommended a relaxation of the THREATCON Charlie
security measures that were in effect
at the time.
Key observations: The anti-terrorism/force
protection program of the U.S. Navy trains
sailors primarily to deal with terrorist
threats emanating from land. There is little
focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although the host nation
is responsible for port security under customary international law during the visit
of foreign vessels, the U.S. Navy has

Recommendations: In the wake of
the U.S.S. Cole attack, the threat
of waterborne attack must receive
more attention as part of the Navy’s
AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of port security in
the USCENTCOM AOR should be
conducted. There should be a single
force protection standard for all U.S.
Navy ships, and it should be the
more stringent standard developed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic
CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port visits and brief
stops for fuel, and should include measures that provide for adequate ship standoff distances and the inspection of small
boats. The regional commanders-in-chief
must enlist the support of host countries
in providing security for U.S. Navy vessels while in foreign ports, where appropriate. Necessary agreements with host countries regarding rules of engagement and the
implementation of required THREATCON
measures must be worked out in advance
of any port visit or refueling stop. The
rules of engagement should be reviewed
with the objective of clarifying procedures
and addressing the issue of hostile intent.
Additional security measures are required
with respect to contracting for local port
services. Component commanders should
also be involved in the contracting process.

 Page 16

A

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

fter the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole, the questions raised most
often with USNAVCENT were,
“Why Aden? What were we doing
there?” Admiral Moore stated that
he was “abbergasted” by such questions, noting that the engagement plan
regarding Yemen was fully coordinated
and approved by superiors. He forcefully articulated his view that refueling in Aden made good sense from an
operational perspective.
In April 1997, the U.S. resumed
port visits to Aden after a suspension
of several decades.
Three visits
occurred prior to the negotiation of a
bunkering contract in December 1998.
As explained in an unclassied entry
in a September 8, 1999, NCIS classied threat assessment, “In 1999, Aden
became the site for the primary U.S.
Navy bunkering contract in the Horn
of Africa, replacing Djibouti. Ships visiting Aden will now be able to refuel at
one of two fueling ‘dolphins’ located
near the mouth of the harbor. The dolphins will allow U.S. naval vessels to
enter Aden and refuel without having
to go pierside.”
Under current U.S. Navy guidelines, the U.S.S. Cole was required to
refuel when its fuel stocks were
depleted to a certain level. Exceptions
to this general rule must be authorized.
The reasoning behind this requirement
is to ensure that Navy vessels are able
to fulll operational requirements on
short notice.

In the case of the U.S.S. Cole, the
ship was transiting from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. At that
time, events in the Gulf raised concerns
that Iraq was mobilizing forces for a
possible military action. The U.S.S. Cole
was en route to the Gulf in order to
participate in any possible U.S. contingency action that might be required in
response to Iraqi actions.
Reductions in force structure over
the years have left the Navy with significantly diminished assets. Most single

ship transits are required by operational
demands that cannot be satised with
the existing number of assets. A key
reason the U.S.S. Cole was conducting a
single ship transit from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was because it
provided capabilities the Navy needed
for contingency planning in the region
and there were no other Navy assets
available at the time that could be positioned in as timely a manner. Unfortunately, the reduction in force structure,
coupled with an increase in the operational demands on the service, has left
the Navy facing serious strains in its
ability to execute its required missions.

ered Yemen a “perfect place” to refuel
because of its location roughly halfway
between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. In addition, Aden had existing infrastructure to support refueling
operations. Unfortunately, the perceived operational desirability of refueling in Aden may have contributed to an
inadequate consideration of appropriate force protection and security measures.

In addition, single ship transits
expose ships to greater vulnerability
than when they travel as part of a
carrier battle group. This was a key
conclusion of the U.S.S. Cole Commission report, which noted that “intransit units…are particularly reliant
upon non-organic support (dispersed
throughout the organization) to combat
terrorism.”

From an operational standpoint,
refueling at sea has signicant advantages over refueling in port. For example, environmental considerations are
less onerous at sea. Fuel spillage creates less of an environmental problem
at sea than it does in port. To avoid
possible spillage, ships are refueled
in port only to approximately 85 percent of fuel capacity. At sea, the refueling capacity is closer to 95 percent.
Refueling is also faster at sea than in
port. Finally, time and training advantages make at-sea refueling a preferable
option to in-port refueling.

The U.S.S. Cole was steaming at a
transit speed of approximately 25 knots
in order to arrive on station in time
to meet potential operational objectives. The U.S.S. Cole’s fuel reserves
had been signicantly reduced when it
reached Yemen. USNAVCENT consid-

The U.S. Navy lacks sufcient assets
to make at-sea refueling a credible
option in all circumstances.
The
number of oilers and other combatants
in the active inventory has decreased
in recent years. Therefore, sending
a tanker to meet a single ship was

 Page 17

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
considered “inefcient.” Nevertheless,
the Navy’s operational preference is to
refuel at sea.
The reduction in the number of
oilers, combatants, and weapons available for theater use may have led to
operational decisions that contributed
to the U.S.S. Cole’s vulnerability. The
U.S.S. Cole was transiting as a single
ship to join the Fifth Fleet and provide
a weapons platform capability needed
to support possible contingency operations. In the past, when the Navy eet
was signicantly larger, such single
ship transfers were unnecessary. Moreover, the replenishment of Navy ships
was mostly accomplished at sea, as they
traveled in battle groups.
The collapse of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Persian Gulf War
led to a decline in Navy force structure. This, coupled with USCENTCOM’s need to maintain certain force
level requirements in the AOR, resulted
in an increase in the number of single
ship transits. The availability of addi-

U

tional oilers may have made it possible
to position assets in the area to accommodate all refueling requirements in
the USCENTCOM AOR. With current
assets and the existing demands, it is
impractical to consistently provide oiler
support for replenishment of single ship
operations.
The relative benets of refueling
in port are limited to support of the
engagement strategy, providing shore
leave for the crew, and conducting
maintenance operations. However,
few actual port visits in Aden involving crew liberty were authorized. Brief
stops for fuel do not constitute port
visits because they do not provide for
crew liberty. In fact, USNAVCENT
supported liberty visits in Aden. In at
least one instance, the U.S. Ambassador in Yemen did not. Consequently,
most stops in Aden were brief refueling stops only. Therefore, there was
no particular crew benet to refueling in Yemen, other than to “show
the ag” as part of the broader U.S.
engagement strategy. While refueling

in Aden solved an operational problem for the Navy, it was a problem
that could have been addressed by
other means.
Key observations: It is generally preferable
to conduct refueling operations at sea rather
than in foreign ports for a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has
insufcient at-sea refueling assets to support single ship transits on a regular basis.
Moreover, the need for single ship transits
has increased as a result of the decline in
Navy force structure and the need to maintain certain force level requirements in the
USCENTCOM AOR.
Recommendations: The U.S. Navy should
reassess the desirability and practicality of
port visits and refueling stops in regions
where high threat levels exist. Alternative
procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea
should be developed. Crew liberty should
not be an option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR.
Increases to the Navy’s force structure are
necessary to limit the requirement for single
ship transits.

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

SCENTCOM is the only geographic, or regional, command
with its headquarters located in
the continental United States and not
in its own area of responsibility. In
addition, all of USCENTCOM’s component commands are based in the United
States, with the exception of USNAVCENT. This has implications for the
conduct of operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. In the case of the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole, USCENTCOM’s distance from the theater of operations
probably was not a signicant factor
with respect to the ability of the attackers to carry out the attack or the ability
of the United States to prevent it.
USNAVCENT, with headquarters
in Bahrain, is USCENTCOM’s “operational functionary” in the AOR. While
acknowledging benets and liabilities
to having the USCENTCOM headquar-

tered in Tampa, General Franks indicated that the normal chain of command would still apply regardless of
the physical location of USCENTCOM
headquarters.

Although USCENTCOM contends
that there is no split command or confusion as to who is in charge of operational
and security considerations within the
AOR, USCENTCOM, the Department
of the Navy, and various other Department of Defense components have different responsibilities in support of
Navy requirements and operations in
the region. For example, refueling
arrangements with host countries are
made by USCENTCOM, through the
Defense Energy Support Center
(DESC), but the Department of the
Navy, through the Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), makes contracting arrangements with local hus-

banding agents, based on standard contracting procedures that emphasize cost
and value considerations and ignore
security issues. The NRCC coordinates
with USNAVCENT, but the USNAVCENT commander has no role in the
process of selecting a husbanding agent.
Appropriate threat levels for each country are determined by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and promulgated
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conict (ASD/SOLIC). However,
USCENTCOM also sets its own threat
levels in the AOR that occasionally
differ from those established by DIA
and ASD(SOLIC). In the case of the
U.S.S. Cole, a decision by ASD(SOLIC)
to modify the threat level reporting
system at the beginning of October 2000
was not agreed to by USCENTCOM,
which continued to operate under the
former reporting system. This appar-

 Page 18
ently resulted in confusion in the mind
of the commanding ofcer on the U.S.S.
Cole with respect to the level of threat
in Yemen. These are issues that need to
be addressed.
The location of USCENTCOM
headquarters in the United States
results in a “tyranny of distance” that
affects USCENTCOM’s ability to communicate effectively in a timely manner
with its component commands. There
is an eight hour time difference between
the east coast of the United States and
Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
Although the daily dialogue between
headquarters staff and component commanders would be easier if headquarters were located in the AOR, it is
unlikely that, in the case of the U.S.S.
Cole incident, additional information
would have been passed that would
have prevented the attack.
USCENTCOM headquarters has
appropriate ties to the U.S. national
intelligence community.
Representatives from the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
the Air Force Ofce of Special Investigations, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service are on the staff at USCENTCOM headquarters. This arrangement
provides for a relatively seamless ow
of information.
In the aftermath of the Khobar
Towers attack in 1996, DOD Directive
2000.12, “DOD Antiterrorism/Force
Protection (AT/FP) Program,” was pro-

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
mulgated. This Directive establishes
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as “the principal advisor and focal
point to the Secretary of Defense” for all
DOD anti-terrorism and force protection issues. It also denes the responsibilities of the military departments,
commanders of the Combatant Commands (CINCs), and Defense Agencies
for DOD activities in their respective
organizations.
DOD Directive 2000.12 prescribes a
policy that species that the geographic
CINC’s force protection policies take
precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any DOD Component deployed in that command’s AOR
and not under the security responsibility of the Department of State. It states
that “the CINC or a designated representative (for example, a component
commander or Joint Task Force commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DOD personnel not under the responsibility of the
Department of State.”
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) is responsible for reviewing Service doctrine and CINC, Service,
and Defense Agency standards, and is
tasked with reviewing, coordinating,
and overseeing the AT/FP training for
all DOD personnel. In addition, the
CJCS must “assess the implementation
of threat conditions (THREATCONs)
for uniform implementation and dissemination. The geographic CINCs
exercise tactical control (for force protection) over “all DOD personnel

assigned to, temporarily assigned to, or
transiting through, or training in the
CINC’s AOR.” This provision authorizes the CINC “to change, modify,
prescribe, and enforce force protection
measures for covered forces.” The
CINCs also serve as “the DOD point
of contact with host-nation ofcials on
matters involving AT/FP policies and
measures.”
In addition, no system was evident
for review of the adequacy or relevancy
of the prescribed force protection measures.
Key observations: USCENTCOM operations
are impacted by its headquarters’ physical
location outside the AOR. The “tyranny of
distance” has an effect on the ability to communicate effectively between headquarters and
the component commands. However, it does
not appear that this was a factor in the U.S.S.
Cole attack. In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of
the prescribed force protection measures.
Recommendations: The operational impact
of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in
the continental United States instead of in
the AOR should be reviewed. Responsibilities for support of U.S. Navy visits to foreign
ports, including for refueling stops, should
be centralized, with the regional Commander-in-Chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities
under force protection directive 2000.12
should be evaluated, along with procedures
for evaluating the adequacy of force protection measures.

 Appendix A

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Policy of Engagement
Key observations: U.S. national security strategy called for engagement with
Yemen. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy
through port visits and brief refueling
stops, among other initiatives. Yemen
was seen as “win-win” – it solved an
operational need and met U.S. engagement policy guidance at the same time.
However, the desire for engagement
with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat in that country,
increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an increase in
the number of U.S. Navy ships refueling there. Changing geo-political conditions in the AOR should have led to a
more critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities and engagement plans for
Yemen, but they did not.
Recommendations: A policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in
areas where the potential for terrorism
is high. The balance between the desire
for engagement and the assumption
of risk must be recalibrated to place
increasing emphasis on force protection
requirements. Implementation of the
TEP should be reviewed and adjusted
in accordance with changing geo-political factors in the AOR.

Intelligence
Key observations: There was clearly
a shortage of intelligence information
with respect to the specic attack on
the U.S.S. Cole. In spite of the fact that
the intelligence community had known
of general and ambiguous planning
activities for an unspecied action or
actions for some time, the lack of specic information led to a failure to provide “tactical” warning to the U.S.S.
Cole. Likewise, there was no specic
information to suggest that the intelli-

gence community could have provided
tactical warning to other U.S. Navy
ships in Aden. Further, there was no
intelligence information about a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S.
Navy vessel in the Aden port. There
is sufcient evidence to believe that
additional HUMINT collection personnel would enable broader coverage of
the USCENTCOM AOR and provide
an increased anti-terrorism collection
effort. The intelligence dissemination
system worked well, as the threshold
for reporting was low. However, the
sheer volume of non-specic intelligence placed a premium on accurate
analysis.
Recommendations: Policy determinations that place U.S. military personnel
in harm’s way must not be made without a full understanding that there may
be an absence of specic intelligence to
support them. Additional intelligence
collection personnel and analysts with
the proper training are needed to sort
through the voluminous supply of raw
intelligence and make accurate judgments regarding the credibility of the
data. The process for resolving competing analyses within and between intelligence agencies should be strengthened
by encouraging alternative analyses.
Improved qualitative analysis is also
required. A better process is required
for ensuring that useful, operationally
oriented intelligence is available to ship
commanders. The intelligence staffs of
the regional commands must be more
proactive in pushing the national intelligence community to provide better
intelligence support and analysis in
areas where existing intelligence collection and analysis is decient. This
should include the operational elements
informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of
deployments so that focused intelligence collection can be undertaken.
Intelligence assessments should also be

viewed in the context of broader geopolitical developments within the AOR.
Greater coordination between Department of Defense ofcials in Washington
and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

Threat Levels and Threat
Conditions
Key observation: Confusion with
respect to threat levels could have contributed to a false sense of security and
complacency by the commanding ofcer of the U.S.S. Cole.
Recommendations: Standardization of
the system of threat level reporting is
essential to avoid confusion regarding
the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The sufciency of THREATCON measures to accomplish their
intended objectives should be reviewed
and revalidated periodically.

Vulnerability Assessments
Key observations: Formal vulnerability assessments focused primarily on
land-based threats in Yemen. Only one
vulnerability assessment of the Aden
port was conducted, but that was more
than two years prior to the U.S.S. Cole
attack.
Recommendation: Formal vulnerability assessments should be conducted
at regular intervals, and when threat
levels within the AOR change.

Force Protection
Key observations: The anti-terrorism/
force protection program of the U.S.
Navy trains sailors primarily to deal with
terrorist threats emanating from land.
There is little focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although
the host nation is responsible for port
security under customary international

 Appendix A
law during the visit of foreign vessels, the
U.S. Navy has never relied exclusively
on host country security procedures.
The commanding ofcer of the U.S.S.
Cole indicated his intention to implement
all 62 force protection measures required
under THREATCON Bravo. However,
he failed to do this. In addition, there
was ambiguity in the determination of
hostile intent under the rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems
during previous U.S. Navy ship visits to
Aden may have resulted in a sense of
complacency regarding the threat that
might face the U.S.S. Cole. Moreover,
there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands.
Other security shortfalls have been identied with respect to U.S. Navy host
country contracting activities. The selection of husbanding agents is performed
by a contracting agency outside the purview of the CINC’s component commanders.
Recommendations: In the wake of the
U.S.S. Cole attack, the threat of waterborne attack must receive more attention as part of the Navy’s AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of
port security in the USCENTCOM AOR
should be conducted. There should
be a single force protection standard
for all U.S. Navy ships, and it should
be the more stringent standard developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port
visits and brief stops for fuel, and

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE
should include measures that provide
for adequate ship standoff distances
and the inspection of small boats. The
regional commanders-in-chief must
enlist the support of host countries
in providing security for U.S. Navy
vessels while in foreign ports, where
appropriate. Necessary agreements
with host countries regarding rules of
engagement and the implementation
of required THREATCON measures
must be worked out in advance of any
port visit or refueling stop. The rules of
engagement should be reviewed with
the objective of clarifying procedures
and addressing the issue of hostile
intent. Additional security measures
are required with respect to contracting for local port services. Component
commanders should also be involved
in the contracting process.

Operational Issues
Key observations: It is generally preferable to conduct refueling operations
at sea rather than in foreign ports for
a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has insufcient at-sea
refueling assets to support single ship
transits on a regular basis. Moreover,
the need for single ship transits has
increased as a result of the decline in
Navy force structure and the need to
maintain certain force level requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.
Recommendations: The U.S. Navy
should reassess the desirability and
practicality of port visits and refueling

stops in regions where high threat levels
exist. Alternative procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea should be developed. Crew liberty should not be an
option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR.
Increases to the Navy’s force structure
are necessary to limit the requirement
for single ship transits.

Organizational Issues
Key observations: USCENTCOM operations are impacted by its headquarters’
physical location outside the AOR. The
“tyranny of distance” has an effect on
the ability to communicate effectively
between headquarters and the component commands. However, it does not
appear that this was a factor in the U.S.S.
Cole attack. In addition, no system was
evident for review of the adequacy or
relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures.
Recommendations: The operational
impact of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in the continental United States
instead of in the AOR should be
reviewed. Responsibilities for support
of U.S. Navy visits to foreign ports,
including for refueling stops, should
be centralized, with the regional Commander-in-Chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities under force protection directive
2000.12 should be evaluated, along with
procedures for evaluating the adequacy
of force protection measures.

 THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

Appendix B

APPENDIX B:
LIST OF BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS
November 15, 2000 – Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic
Norfolk, Virginia
Commander Frank Pandolfe, Commanding Ofcer, U.S.S. Mitchner (sister ship to Cole)
Captain Trif Rigas, Atlantic Fleet, Force Protection (N34)
Captain Jim Landay, Director, DDG-51 In Service Engineering
Rear Admiral Lindell Rutherford, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/Training (N3/5/7)
Captain Ralph Rickard, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/Training (N3/5/7)
Captain Gerrald Becker, Atlantic Fleet, Current Ops
Captain Ned Herbert, Executive Ofcer, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic
Mr. Al Johnson, Director of Curriculum, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic

December 4-8, 2000 – U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (U.S. Fifth Fleet
Headquarters)
Manama, Bahrain
Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander, USNAVCENT/US Fifth Fleet
Captain Van Mauney, Chief of Staff
Captain Kurt Tidd, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Operations (N-3)
Commander Samuel Cox, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Intelligence (N-2)
Captain Julius Gostel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Directorate of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N-4)
Captain Richard Kikla, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Directorate of Naval Operations (Policy) (N-5)
Captain Greg Steele, Commanding Ofcer, Naval Support Activity Bahrain
Colonel Gary Supnick, Force Marine Ofcer/Force Protection Ofcer
Commander Carlton Cramer, Special Assistant, Judge Advocate General
Special Agent James Lindner, OIC, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Deacon, Joint Intelligence Support Element
Colonel Larry Grundhauser, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2), Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia

December 18, 2000 – U.S. Central Command Headquarters
Tampa, Florida
General Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM
Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong, USMC, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM
Major Scott Berrier, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2)
Lieutenant Colonel Bud Rasmussen, Policy Division, Directorate of Plans and Policy
Captain Jack Dorsett, Commander, Joint Intelligence Center
Colonel Joseph Schott, Joint Security Directorate
Lieutenant Colonel John Sarver, Directorate of Logistics and Security Assistance
Captain Shelly Young, Staff Judge Advocate
Others Present:
Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell, USN, Director of Plans and Policy (CCJ5)
Major General Dennis K. Jackson, USA, Director of Logistics and Security Assistance (CCJ4/7)
Colonel Stanley G. Silverman, CCDJ2
Colonel Dario Compain, CCDJS

 Appendix B

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

Colonel Richard R. Perez, CCDJ6
Rear Admiral George E. Mayer, USN, Deputy Director of Operations (CCDJ3)
Colonel James W. Danley, CCDJ1
Colonel Brian P. Hoey, USAF, Director of Public Affairs (CCPA)

October 2000–January 2001 – Washington, D.C. Briengs
Captain Tony Kouthron, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Targeting
Mr. Ron Brunson, Head, Anti-Terrorism Alert Center, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Mr. Richard E. Sunday, Ofce of Congressional Affairs, National Security Agency
Ms. Mary Jo Coyner, National Security Agency
Mr. Kie C. Fallis, Former Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency
Admiral J. Cutler Dawsen, Chief, Ofce of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy

 THE ATTACK ON THE COLE Appendix 

APPENDIX C:
THREAT CONDITION (TH REATCON) MEASURES

TAB TO APPENDIX 1 OF ANNEX TO 

OPORQ 99g
SHIPBOARD THREATCON MEASURES

1. Shipboard Terrorist THREATCON Measures. The measures outlined below are for
use aboard all US Naval vessels (combatant and non-combatant) 1n the
AOR and serve two purposes. First. the crew is alerted.
additional watches are created, and there rs greater security. Second, these measures
display the ship' 5 resolve to prepare for andcounter the terrorist threat. These actions will -
convey to anyone observing the ship's activities that the ship is prepared. the Ship is an
undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target. The
measures outlined below do not account for loeal conditions and regulations or current
threat intelligence. The ship' command must maintain ?exibility. As threat conditions
change, the ship's crew must be prepared to take actions to counter the threat. Wham

necessary, additional measures must be tak- immediately. The simple solution to
THREATCON CHARLIE or DELTA is to get under way, but this option may not always
be available. Speci?c non-combatant shipboard THREATCON Measures are identi?ed

as: Measure Number CMSC).

 

a. THREATCON ALPHA. This condition is declared when a general threat of
possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations vessels, and personnel, the
nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and where circumstances do not Justify full
implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to
implement certain selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO as a result of
intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be

capable of being maintained inde?nitely.

(1) Mi. BRIEF CREW ON THE PORT SPECIFIC THREAT, THE
SECURITY PROTECTION PLAN, AND SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TO BE
TAKEN WHILE ASHORE. ENSURE ALL HANDS ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF
VARIOUS THREATCON REQUIREMENTS AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND
THEIR ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES. REMIND ALL
PERSONNEL TO BE SUSPICIOUS AND INQUISITIVE 0F STRANGERS, BE
ALERT FOR ABANDONED PARCELS OR SUITCASES AND FOR 
VEHICLES IN THE VICINITY. REPORT UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES TO THE 00D.

 

(2) Mm; MUSTER AND BRIEF SECURITY PERSONNEL ON THE
THREAT AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

(3) Measure 3. REVILW SECURITY PLANS AND KEEP 
AVAILABLE. RETAIN KEY PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE NEEDED TO
IMPLEMENT SECURITY MEASURES ON CALL

(4) Miami. SECURE AND PERIODICALLY INSPECT SPACESNOT IN
USE. -- -

Appendix THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

- (5) Measure 5. CONS ISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS. AND
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, POST QUALIFED ARMED FANT AIL
SENTRY AND. FORECASTLE SENTRY. RIFLES ARE THE PREFERRED

WEAPON.

(6) Measure 6. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND
SOFA, POST QUALIFIED ARMED PER SENTRY AND PIER ENTRANCE

SENTRY.

. (7) MM. ENSURE SENTRES, ROVING PATROLS, RESPONSE
FORCE, AND THE QUARTERDECK WATCH HAVE THE ABILITY TO
COMIVIUNICATE. IF PRACTICAL, ALL GUARDS WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH AT
LEAST TWO SYSTEMS OF COMIVIUNICATION (E. G. TWO- WAY RADIO,
TELEPHONE, WHISTLE, OR SIGNAL LIGHT). .

(8) 33%. IF AVAILABLE. ISSUE NIGHT VISION DEVICES TO
SELECTED POSTED SECURITY PERSONNEL.

(9) w. REVIEW PIER AND SHIPBOARD ACCESS CONTROL
PROCEDURES. .

(10) MW. COORDINATE PER AND FLEET LANDING SECURITY
WITH COLLOCATED FORCES AND LOCAL AUTHORIT ES. IDENTIFY
ANTICIPATED NEEDS FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT (SECURITY PERSONNEL,
BOATS, AND EQUIPMENT) AND DEFINE METHODS OF ACTIVATION AND

-. COMMUNICATION.

(l 1) TIGHTEN SHIPBOARD AND PER ACCESS CONTROL
PROCEDURES. POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ALL PERSONNEL ENTERING PER

AND
FLEET LANDING AREA-NO EXCEPTIONS.

(12) W. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES. REGULATIONS,
AND SOFA, ESTABLISH UNLOADING ON TIE PER AWAY FROM

THE SHIP.

(13) MM. DEPLOY BARRERS TO KEEP VEHICLES AWAY FROM
TI-E SHIP. BARRERS MAY BE VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT, PORT
PROVIDED BARRER SYSTEMS, MARINE CONTAINERS, OR ITEMS
AVAILABLE LOCALLY. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL CONDITIONS, 400 
STANDOFF FROM TI-E SHIP IS PREFERRED.

(14) mm. POST SIGNS IN LOCAL TO EXPLAIN
VISITING AND RESTRICTIONS.

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE Appendix 

(15) MM.NSPECTALLVEHICIES ENTERING PIERANDCHECK
FOR UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES.

(16) Measure 16. INSPECT ALL PERSONNEL. HAND CARRIED ITEMS,
BEFORE ALLOWING THEM- ON BOARD. WHERE -
AVAILABLE USE BAGGAGE SCANNERS AND WALK THROUGH OR HAND
HELD METAL DETECTORS TO SCREEN PACKAGES AND PERSONNEL PRIOR
TO BOARDING THE SHIP.

- (17) W. DIRECT DEPARTING AND ARRIVING LIBERTY BOATS
TO MAKE A SECURITY TOUR AROUND THE SHIP AND GIVE SPECIAL
ATTENTION TO THE WATERLINE AND HULL. BOATS MUST BE
IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY TO PERSONNEL.

(18) W. WATER TAXIS, FERRIES, BUM BOATS, AND OTHER
HARBOR CRAFT REQUIRE SPECIAL CONCERN BECAUSE THEY CAN SERVE
AS AN IDEAL PLATFORM FOR TERRORISTS. UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT
SHOULD BE KEPT AWAY FROM THE AUTHORIZED CRAFT SHOULD BE
CAREFULLY CONTROLLED, SURVEILLED, AND COVERED. INSPECT
AUTHORIZED WATERCRAFT DAILY.

(19) MM. IDENTIFY AND INSPECT WORKBOATS.
(20) Measure 20. SECURE SPACES NOT IN USE.

- (21) M34121. REGULATE SI-IIPBOARD LIGHTING TO BEST MEET
THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT. LIGHTING SHOULD INCLUDE ILLUMINATION
OF THE WATERLINE.

(22) RIG HAWSEPIPE COVERS AND RAT GUARDS ON ALL
LINES. CABLE, AND HOSES. CONSIDER USING AN ANCHOR COLLAR.

(23) Liam. RAISE ACCOMMODATION LADDERS, STERN GATES.
JACOB LADDERS. ETC., WHEN NOT IN USE. CLEAR SHIP OF ALL.
UNNECESSARY STAGES, CAMELS, BARGES, OIL DONUTS. AND LINES.

(24) W. CONDUCT SECURITY DRILLS TO INCLUDE BOMB
THREAT AND REPEL BOARDERS EXERCISES.

(25) W- REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN THREATCON
BRAVO FOR POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION.

Appendix THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

. b. THREATCON BRAVO. This condition is declared when an increased and
more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON
must be capable of being maintained for weeks Without causing undue hardships, without
affecting operational capability, and without aggravanng relation_s_grith_ local authorities.

 

(l w. MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE THREATCON ALPHA 
MEASURES. . . .. .

(2) MW. REVIEW LIBERTY POLICY IN LIGHT OF THE THREAT
.AND REVISE IT AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAINTHE SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF THE SHIP AND CREW. 

(3) Measure 28. CONDUCT DIVISIONAL QUARTERS AT FOUL
WEATHER PARADE TO DETERIVIINE THE STATUS OF ON-B OARD
PERSONNEL AND TO DIS SEMINATE INFORMATION.

(4) Measure 29. ENSURE THAT AN UP-TO-DATE LIST OF BILINGUAL
PERSONNEL FOR THE AREA OF OPERATIONS IS READILY AVAILABLE.
ENSURE THE WARNING TAPE IN THE PILOT HOUSE QUARTERDECK
THAT WARNS SMALL CRAFT TO REMAIN CLEAR IS IN BOTH THE LOCAL
LANGUAGE AND ENGLISH. -

(5) Measure 30. REMIND PERSONNEL TO LOCK THEIR PARKED
VEHICLES AND TO CAREFULLY CHECK THEM BEFORE ENTERING.

(6) Measure 3] . DESIGNATE AND BRIEF PICKETBOAT CREWS.
PREPARE BOATS AND PLACE CREWS ON ALERT. IF THE
SITUATION WARRANTS. MAKE RANDOM PICKET BOAT PATROLS IN THE
IMIVIEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SHIP WITH THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT OR GIG.
BOAT CREWS WILL BE ARMED WITH M16 RIFLES, ONE M60 WITH 200
ROUNDS OF ANLMUNITION, AND 10 CONCUSSION 

Measure 31 (MSC). IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO KEEP 
UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT AWAY FROM SHIP. COORDINATE WITH
HUSBANDING AGENT AND PORT AUTHORITY, As NECESSARY -

(7) W- CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS,
AND SOFA, ESTABLISH ARMED BROW WATCH ON PIER TO CHECK
IDENTIFICATION AND INSPECT BAGGAGE BEFORE PERSONNEL BOARD

SHIP. 

. (8) Measure 33. RESTRICT VEHICLE ACCESS TO THE PIER.
DISCONTINUE PARKING ON THE PIER. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES.
REGULATIONS, THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, ESTABLISH
UNLOADING AND MOVE ALL CONTAINERS AS FAR AWAY FROM 
THE POSSIBLE (400 FEET DISTANCE PREFERRED).

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE Appendlx 

(9) M11915. MAN SIGNAL BRIDGE OR PILOT HOUSE AND ENSURE
FLARES ARE AVAILABLE TO WARD OFF APPROACHING CRAFT.

(10) Measure 35. AFTER WORKING HOURS, PLACE ARMED SENTRIES
ON A LEVEL FROM WHICH BEST COVER
AREAS ABOUT THE SHIP. 

- OF
THE QUARTERDECK WATCH AND SAT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A SAT, ARM
TWO MEMBERS OF THE SDF. 

 

(12) W. PROVIDE SHOTGUN AND AMMUNITION TO
QUARTERDECK. IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS, PLACE SENTRY 
SHOTGUN INSIDE THE AT A SITE FROM WHICH THE
QUARTERDECK CANBE COVERED. .

13) Mm. ISSUE ARMS TO SELECTED QUALIFIED OFFICERS TO
INCLUDE COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND ASSISTANT COMMAND
DUTY OFFICER (ACDO). -

w. IMPLENIENT MEASURES TO KEEP UNAUTHORIZED
CRAFT AWAY FROM THE SHIP. AUTHORIZED CRAFT SHOULD BE
CAREFULLY CONTROLLED. COORDINATE WITH HOST 
PORT AUTHORITY, HUSBANDING AGENT AS NECESSARY, AND REQUEST
THEIR ASSISTANCE IN CONTROLLING UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT

(15) Mm. IFNOT ALREADY ARMED, ARM SOUNDING AND . 
SECURITY PATROL

(16) w. MUSTER AND BRIEF AMMUNITION BEARERS 0R
MESSENGERS.

(17) w. IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES FOR EXPEDIENT ISSUE OF
FIREARMS AND FROM SMALL ARMS LOCKER (SAL). ENSURE
A SET OF SAL KEYS ARE READILY AVAILABLE AND IN THE POSSESSION OF
AN OFFICER DESIGNATED FOR THIS DUTY BY THE CONTMANDING OFFICER.

(18) W. LOAD ADDITIONAL SMALL ARMS MAGAZINES TO
ENSURE ADEQUATE SUPPLY FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL AND RESPONSE
FORCES.

(l9) MeaSure 43. INFORM LOCAL AUTHORITIES 0F ACTIONS TAKEN
AS THE THREATCON INCREASES.

 

Appendix THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

- (20) Measure 44. TEST INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS. 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS
WITH OTHER US NAVAL SHIPS IN PORT.

(21) Measure 45. WATCHES TO CONDUCT FREQUENT
RANDOM SEARCHES UNDER PIERS, WITH EMPHASIS ON POTENTIAL
HIDING PLACES, PIER PILINGS, AND FLOATING DEBRIS. 

(22) MM. CONDUCT SEARCHES OF THE HULL AND .
BOATS AT INTERMITTENT INTERVALS AND IMMEDIATELY BEFORE IT PUTS

TO SEA.

Measure 47. MOVE CARS AND OBJECTS SUCH AS CRATES AND
TRASH CONTAINERS AS FAR FROM THE SHIP AS POSSIBLE.

(24) mm. HOIST BOATS ABOARD WHEN NOT IN USE.
(25) Measure 49'. CONSIDER TERMINATING ALL PUBLIC VISITS.

(26) Mm. SET MATERIEL CONDITION YOKE, MAIN DECK AND
BELOW. .

Measure 50 . SECURE ALL WATERTIGHT DOORS AND
HATCHES MAIN DECK AND BELOW.

- (27) W. AFTER WORKING HOURS, REDUCE ENTRY POINTS TO
THE INTERIOR BY SECURING SELECTED ENTRANCES FROM THE

INSIDE.

. (28) m2. DUTY DEPARTMENT HEADS EN SURE ALL SPACES
NOT IN REGULAR USE ARE SECURED AND INSPECTED PERIODICALLY.

(29) Mmure 53. IF TWO BROWS ARE RIGGED, REMOVE ONE OF THEM.
USE ONLY ONE GANGWAY TO ACCESS THE SHIP. 

(30) Mwsure 54. MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO GET UNDER WAY ON
SHORT NOTICE OR AS SPECIFIED BY SOP. CONSIDER POSSIBLE
RELOCATION SITES (DIFFERENT PIER, ANCHORAGE, ETC). RIG BROW AND
ACCOMMODATION LADDER FOR IIVIIVIEDIATE RAISING OR REMOVAL.

(31) Measure 55. ENSURE .50-CALIBER MOUNT ASSEMBLIES ARE IN
PLACE WITH AMMUNITION IN READY SERVICE LOCKERS (.50-CALIBER
WILL BE MAINTAINED IN THE ARMORY. PREFIRE CHECKS
COMPLETED, AND READY FOR USE).

(32) mm. PREPARE FIRE HOSES. BRIEF DESIGNATED

Appendix 

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

 

PERSONNEL ON PROCEDURES FOR REPELLING BOARDERS, SMALL BOATS,
AND ULTRALIGHT AIRCRAFT.

(33) Measure OBSTRUCT POSSIBLE HELICOPTER LANDING AREAS
IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT HOSTILE HELICOPTERS FROM.
LANDING. .

(34) Measure 53. REVIEW RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL PROCEDURES.
ASYLUM-SEEKER PROCEDURES, AND BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES.

(35) mm. MONITOR LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS (E.G.,
TV, RADIO, POLICE SCANNERS).

(36) M13410. IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR
HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL AS APPROPRLATE. 

(37) mm INFORM LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF ACTIONS BEING
TAKEN AS THREATCON INCREASES.

(38) M_eas_t_1_re_62. REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN THREATCON
CHARLIE FOR POSSIBLE 

Appendix THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

c. THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition is declared when an incident occurs or
intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations,
vessels or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON for more than a
short period will probably crate hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the

ship and its personnel.

(1) Mia?asgc?. MAJNTAIN APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR
THREATCONS ALPHA AND BRAVO.

(2) Mam. CANCEL LIBERTY. EXECUTE EMERGENCY RECALL.

(3) Maggi. BE PREPARED TO GET UNDER WAY ON ONE 1 HOURS
NOTICE OR LESS. IF CONDITIONS WARRANT, REQUEST PERMISSION TO

SORTTE.

(4) WE. MUSTER AND ARM SAT, BAP, AND RESERVE FORCE
(RF). POSITION SAT AND BAF AT DESIGNATED DEPLOY RF TO
PROTECT COMMAND STRUCTURE AND AUGMENT POSTED SECURITY

WATCHES.

. Measure 66 (M39. CONSIDER REQUESTING ARMED SECURITY
AUGMENTATION FORCE FROM FLTCINC.

(5) Mia-9M PLACE ARMED SENTRIES ON A 
LEVEL FROM WHICH THEY CAN BEST PROVIDE 360 DEGREE COVERAGE

7 ABOUT THE SHIP.

(5) W- ESTABLISH .50- OR MACHINEGUN
POSITIONS. 

(7) W. IF AVAILABLE, DEPLOY STINGER 
MISSILES IAW ESTABLISHED ROE.

(8) LEM. ENERGIZE RADAR AND ESTABLISH WATCH.

(9) ENERGIZE RADAR SON AR, ROTATE SCREWS
AND CYCLE AT FREQUENT AND IRREGULAR INTERVALS, AS
NEEDED TO ASSIST IN DETERRING, DETECTING OR THWARTING AN
ATTACK. MAN PASSIVE SONAR CAPABLE OF DETECTING BOATS.
OR UNDERWATER VEHICLES. POSITION ANY NON-SONAR-
EQUIPPED SHIPS WITHIN THE ACOUSTIC ENVELOPE OF SONAR-EQUIPPED

- SHIPS.

(10) W. MAN ONE OR MORE REPAIR LOCKERS. ESTABLISH
COMMUNICATIONS WITH AN EXTRA WATCH IN DC CENTRAL.

THE ATTACK ON THE COLE Appendix 

(1 MeasUrc 73. DEPLOY PICKET BOAT. BOATS SHOULD BE
IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY FROM THE SHIP (E. (3., BY LIGHTS OR

FLAGS).

Measure 74. COORDINATE WITH HOST PORT
AUTHORITY, OR HUSBANDING AGENT TO ESTABLISH SMALL BOAT
EXCLUSION ZONE. 

(13) mm. 1F FEASIBLE, DEPLOY A HELICOPTER As AN
OBSERVATION OR GUN PLATFORM. THE HELICOPTER SHOULD BE
IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY FROM THE SHIP.

. IF A THREAT OF ATTACK EXISTS,
ACTIVATE AN WATCH

(15) Measure 77. CONSIDER ISSUING WEAPONS T0 SELECTED
OFFICERS AND CHIEF OFFICERS IN THE DUTY SECTION (I.E.. THE
COMMANDING OFFICER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER. DEPARTMENT HEADS).

(16) W. IF AVAILABLE ISSUE CONCUSSION GRENADES TO
TOPSIDE ROVERS, FORECASTLE AND FANT AIL SENTRIES, AND BRIDGE
WATCH. -

(17) w. ERECT BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES AS REQUIRED TO
CONTROL TRAFFIC FLOW.

(18) W. STRICTLY ENFORCE ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES
AND SEARCHES-NO EXCEPTIONS.

(19) m. ENFORCE BOAT EXCLUSION ZONE.
(20) M. MINIMIZE ALL OFF-SHIP ADMINISTRATIVE TRIPS.

(21) DISCONTINUE CONTRACT WORK.

(22) w. SET MATERIEL CONDITION ZEBRA, SECOND DECK 
AND BELOW. -

Measure 83 (M89. CONSIDER SECURING ALL ACCESS DOORS AND
HATCHES MAIN DECK AND BELOW.

(23) W. SECURE FROM THE INSIDE ALL UNGUARDED ENTRY
POINTS TO THE INTERIOR OF THE SI-IIP.

(24) Measure 86. ROTATE SCREWS AND CYCLE AT
FREQUENT AND IRREGULAR INTERVALS.

Appendix THE ATTACK ON THE COLE

(75) w. RIG ADDITIONAL FIREHOSES. CHARGE THE
FIREHOSES WHEN MANNED JUST PRIOR TO ACTUAL USE.

(26) Measure REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 1N THREATCON
DELTA FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

d. Mien a mom" mack" has .
occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terronst
action against a speci?c location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON 18

declared as a localized warning.

Measure 89. MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE THREATCONS ALPHA.
BRAVO, AND CHARLIE MEASURES. -

(2) Meats?urgiq. PERMT ONLY NECESSARY PERSONNEL TOPSIDE.

Measure 91. PREPARE TO GET UNDER WAY AND, IF POSSIBLE,
CANCEL PORT VISIT AND DEPART. 

Measure 92. POST SENTRIES WITH M60 TO
COVER POSSIBLE HELICOPTER LANDDIG AREAS.

(9w. ARMSELECTED PERSONNELOFTHESDF.

(6) Measure DEPLOY GRENADE LAUNCHERS T0 COVER
APPROACHES TO SHIP.

Measure 94 MSC ENIPLOY ALL NECESSARY WEAPONRY T0
DEFEND AGAINST ATTACK. -