Complaint regarding a Police
investigation into inappropriate
contact between a teacher and
student
December 2018

 Contents

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 5
Background ........................................................................................................................... 6
The Authority’s Investigation ............................................................................................... 24
The Authority’s Findings ....................................................................................................... 26
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 53
Appendix A - Applicable Laws and Policies ............................................................................ 55
Appendix B – Index of Officers and Civilians Involved ............................................................ 58

 Introduction
1.

In April 2014, the Gisborne Police Child Protection Team (CPT) commenced an investigation
into inappropriate contact between an intermediate school teacher, Sam Back, and a 13 year
old student, Reiha McLelland.

2.

The investigation was completed towards the end of June 2014, with Police concluding that
there was insufficient evidence of criminal offending. No charges were laid.

3.

On 31 July 2014, Reiha died in Gisborne Hospital and her death was referred to the Coroner.

4.

In February 2016, Mr Back was subject to a Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal hearing
regarding the alleged inappropriate contact with Reiha.1 Allegations of serious misconduct,
relating to inappropriate contact with Reiha, were upheld and his teacher registration was
cancelled. In September 2016, the Coroner held an inquest into Reiha’s death.2

5.

In April 2017, after attending both the Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal hearing and the
Coroner’s inquest, Reiha’s parents made a complaint to the Authority. They raised a number of
concerns about the Police investigation into the alleged inappropriate contact by Mr Back, and
the subsequent Police response to Reiha’s sudden death, to the Coroner’s inquest and to the
Disciplinary Tribunal hearing.

6.

The Authority commenced an independent investigation into the complaint. Police also
commenced a separate investigation which, at the time the Authority publishes this report,
has not yet been completed.

7.

This report sets out the results of the Authority’s investigation and the Authority’s findings.
The Authority has examined issues relating to:

1
2

1)

the initial response by the Gisborne CPT when they were alerted to the alleged
inappropriate contact;

2)

the Police investigation into the alleged inappropriate contact;

3)

whether the CPT effectively communicated with other agencies;

4)

whether Police leaked information to the Gisborne Herald;

5)

whether adequate support and advice was provided to Reiha’s parents following her
death;

6)

whether Police provided timely and adequate disclosure to the Coroner; and

The Teachers Council is now called the Education Council.
The Coroner’s findings were published in June 2017.

33

 7)

4 4

whether submissions made by a Police sergeant to the Teachers Council Disciplinary
Tribunal regarding name suppression constituted an attempt to pervert the course of
justice.

 Executive Summary
8.

The Independent Police Conduct Authority has found that the Police investigation into
inappropriate contact between a teacher, Sam Back, and 13 year old Reiha McLelland was
deficient in several respects, including that:
1)

the investigating officer did not adequately assess the evidence;3

2)

the investigating officer’s supervisor had a conflict of interest which was not properly
managed, and consequently the investigation was not adequately supervised;

3)

the investigation plan was inadequate and not all appropriate enquiries were
conducted;

4)

information obtained from the interviews of Reiha and Mr Back was not recorded
appropriately; and

5)

the interview of Mr Back was not conducted properly.

9.

The Authority also found that the Police’s initial consultation with Child, Youth and Family
(CYF) was delayed.4 While Police policy at the time did not require a ‘multi-agency’ approach to
the investigation, Police should have further considered how the information they held might
be relevant for other agencies involved in Reiha’s care.

10.

Although the investigating officer’s supervisor had a conflict of interest, the Authority
concluded that the supervisor was not actively involved in the investigation, the case was
appropriately assigned and the outcome was not pre-determined.

11.

However, the supervisor did make submissions to the Teachers Council regarding name
suppression for Mr Back which were patently wrong and misleading. This was contrary to
Police policy and amounted to misconduct at the serious end of the spectrum, but there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the supervisor intended to mislead the Teachers Council
(and therefore attempt to pervert the course of justice).

12.

The Authority also determined that:
1)

Police did not leak an internal report to the Gisborne Herald;

2)

while Police initially failed to disclose all the relevant data to Coroner, this was not a
deliberate attempt to withhold information; and

3)

there was a lack of ongoing support for Reiha’s family during the inquest process, but
this was not due to any neglect of duty by Police.

3

Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the Police assessment, the Authority agrees that there was insufficient evidence
available to Police to charge Mr Back with a criminal offence.
4
CYF is now known as Oranga Tamariki.

55

 Background
13.

This section of the report provides a summary of the incident and the evidence considered by
the Authority. When quoting or describing the accounts of any officer, complainant or witness,
the Authority does not intend to suggest that the Authority has accepted that particular
account.

14.

Analysis of the evidence and explanations of where the Authority has accepted, rejected or
preferred that evidence are reserved for the ‘Authority’s Findings’ section. Findings are made
on the balance of probabilities.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS
15.

In 2013, Sam Back was a teacher at Gisborne Intermediate School and Reiha McLelland was a
student in his class.

16.

During the 2014 school year, Mr Back was 41 and Reiha was 13 years old. Reiha had left
Gisborne Intermediate School and was a boarder at a college away from the Gisborne area.
When not at boarding school, Reiha lived at home with her family on a rural property
approximately 50 kilometres out of Gisborne.

Inappropriate contact observed
17.

In late March 2014, Reiha was admitted to Gisborne Hospital. While Reiha was a patient at the
hospital on 2 April 2014, she received a visit from Mr Back.

18.

On 3 April 2014, Child Youth and Family (CYF) recorded receiving a Report of Concern from a
paediatrician at Gisborne Hospital. The report stated that Reiha had recently been stood down
from boarding school due to behavioural issues, after which she ran away to a teacher’s house.
After noting that Reiha had been visited by her former teacher Mr Back and his partner while
on the ward, the report said:
“In the doctor’s opinion Sam and [his partner] are involved with Reiha over and
above what would be expected from a teacher and partner. Night nursing staff
observed Reiha going in and out of the ward with this couple against the
parents’ instructions for Reiha to remain on the ward. At 6.00pm [Sam’s
partner] left the ward and Sam remained. A nurse completed her rounds and
walked into the room where she observed Sam lying on the bed and Reiha
sitting cross- legged and they were holding hands. They quickly separated when
observed.”

19.

6 6

The report also noted that Reiha had recently been transferred to Kenepuru Hospital in
Porirua, Wellington, “and is safe there”.

 Child Protection Team – Initial response
20.

On 7 April 2014, the officer in charge of the Gisborne Police Child Protection Team (CPT),
Officer A (a detective sergeant),5 received a telephone call from Reiha’s mother, Hinemoa
McLelland. Mrs McLelland was concerned about text messages from Mr Back on Reiha’s cell
phone.

21.

On 8 April 2014, the Gisborne Police CPT was notified by CYF of the Report of Concern which
CYF had received on 3 April 2014. On the same day, Police also received a phone call from Ms
Z, Reiha’s hospital-based social worker at Kenepuru Hospital. Ms Z provided Police with the
name of the nurse who had witnessed the behaviour that generated the Report of Concern.
Ms Z also reported to Police that Reiha had told a trainee intern at Kenepuru Hospital that on
one occasion she had left home and gone to Mr Back’s house, without telling her mother.

22.

The following day, Officer A assigned the case to Officer B (a detective constable) for
investigation.6

23.

Officer A advised Officer B that he had a conflict of interest in the case and that he was unable
to assist or be involved with the investigation. The conflict arose because Officer A was the
Chairperson of the Board of Trustees for Gisborne Intermediate School, having served on the
board since 2002.

24.

On 10 April 2014, Officer A commenced a period of annual leave and travelled to Australia. He
was due to return to work on 30 April 2014.

25.

On 11 April 2014, Officer B rang Mrs McLelland and introduced himself to her as the officer in
charge of the investigation. Mrs McLelland was in Wellington with Reiha. He explained that
Police had received a Report of Concern from CYF regarding possible inappropriate behaviour
between Mr Back and Reiha. Mrs McLelland advised Officer B that she had seen some text
messages from Mr Back on Reiha’s phone that had caused her concern because, although the
text messages were not of a sexual nature, she felt that they had crossed the teacher-student
boundaries. Officer B asked Mrs McLelland to send Reiha’s cell phone to him for examination.

26.

The following day, Officer B received Reiha’s cell phone and attempted to extract the data
using equipment available to him locally. He was unable to do so because the volume of data
was too large, but he was able to view some of the text messaging.

27.

On Thursday 17 April 2014, while Reiha was still in Wellington, Officer B conducted a number
of further enquiries to progress the investigation.

28.

Officer B successfully applied for production orders to obtain the cell phone text messaging
data for cell phones used by Reiha, Mr Back and Mr Back’s partner.7 The production order

5

Officer A has since left Police.
Officer B has since left Police.
7
Text messaging data was obtained for the period between 1 November 2013 and 17 April 2014.
6

77

 requests were approved by the officer in charge of the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) in
Gisborne at that time.
29.

Officer B also rang Mr Back that day. He informed Mr Back that he had been advised by
hospital staff that any outside influences would affect Reiha’s rehabilitation and, at the
request of hospital staff and Reiha’s family, neither he nor his partner were to have any further
contact with Reiha. This would allow Reiha to reconnect with her parents without any external
distractions.

30.

Officer B did not tell Mr Back about the investigation or provide any further details. Mr Back
said he would do whatever was requested of him if it meant Reiha would get the help she
needed.

31.

Also on Thursday 17 April 2014, Officer B consulted CYF at the CYF office in Gisborne.8 Officer B
advised CYF that there was currently no evidence of a criminal offence and “separation
between Sam and Reiha will be the plan”. He advised that medical staff at the hospital would
“inform Reiha of the view that she should have no further contact with Sam … and support any
negative impact this has on her….”

32.

Officer B also informed CYF that Reiha’s family were aware of the Police and CYF involvement,
and that Police were accessing Reiha’s text messages due to concerns about the content of
some of the messages Reiha’s mother had already seen. He advised CYF that:
a)

text messages already viewed included messages where Mr Back referred to
Reiha as “darlin”, and other messages where he informed her of when his wife
was out of the home so she could visit;

b)

the phone contained photo evidence of Reiha at Mr Back’s home;

c)

Reiha’s family were waiting for updates about the criminal investigation;

d)

Police had requested further information about the text messaging and were
currently waiting for the further information; and

e)

Mr Back was not aware of the investigation and would not be advised until the
evidence had been evaluated.

33.

A strategy was agreed and recorded in an exchange of emails between Officer B and CYF staff.

34.

After meeting with CYF, Officer B met with the principal of Gisborne Intermediate School, Mr
Y, and advised him of the Report of Concern from Gisborne Hospital and Mrs McLelland’s
concerns regarding the text messages.

35.

Mr Y advised the Authority that Officer B told him he was carrying out an investigation into Mr
Back relating to a student who had left the school the previous year. Mr Y said:

8

Officer B advised the Authority that Police had already met with CYF for an initial consult at the time of receiving the
Report of Concern. However Officer A does not recall such a meeting and there is no record of it.

8 8

 “The issue for me was around ‘is it safe to leave that teacher continuing to
teach?’ On the basis of the information he gave me and subsequently the advice
I took from STA [the School Trustees Association] was to just let the situation lie
and part of that was around not causing any issue around the police
investigation … the issue was one child, no other child was involved and that
child had left the school.”
36.

Officer B asked Mr Y to keep the conversation confidential and not to inform Mr Back of their
discussion. Following this meeting, Mr Back remained teaching at the school.

37.

Later on 17 April 2014, Officer B reported back to CYF that he had now also advised Mr Y (the
school principal) of the concerns about the contact Mr Back was having with Reiha, and the
need to keep the information confidential.

38.

It was agreed that CYF would await direction from Police. CYF requested that Police keep them
in the ‘communication loop’ and Officer B was provided with the contact details of the
assigned Gisborne-based CYF social worker.

39.

CYF also confirmed with Police that, after some deliberating, it would not adopt its usual
practice of actively investigating, nor would it interview Reiha.

40.

Officer B was scheduled to be away from his office from Monday 21 April 2014 for a period of
two weeks, including a week of annual leave. Officer B advised CYF that during this two week
period he could be contacted by cell phone.

41.

Following the consultation with CYF, Officer B rang Kenepuru hospital and staff confirmed that
Reiha had been informed she was to have no further contact with Mr Back or his partner.
Officer B then rang Mrs McLelland and provided an update of the investigation.

42.

On Tuesday 22 April 2014, Officer B had a conversation with Ms Z, Reiha’s hospital-based
social worker at Kenepuru Hospital. Ms Z told him it was possible Reiha would be discharged
from hospital by the end of the week. After further discussion with Ms Z, Officer B decided that
Reiha should be advised of the Police investigation before she left the hospital, and asked Ms Z
to inform him of any disclosures made by Reiha relating to Mr Back.

43.

Officer B was of the opinion that if Reiha did decide to disclose anything further at that point,
she was “in the right place should this affect her…”. He was also aware that if Reiha did
disclose information about Mr Back and his partner, Ms Z would be able to arrange an
evidential interview at the Wellington Police District Child Protection multi-agency facility,
Koru House.

44.

The same day, Officer B received the phone data requested from the network provider for
Reiha’s cell phone. Officer B forwarded the information to an analyst for the information to be
extracted onto an excel spreadsheet for ease of reading.

45.

The following morning, 23 April 2014, Officer B couriered Reiha’s cell phone to the Electronic
Crime Laboratory (ECL) in Wellington and requested the extraction of photo, video and email
data and any hidden or deleted data.

99

 46.

Officers making a request to ECL are required to complete an internal police document entitled
“E-Crime Exhibit Examination Request”. The form accompanies the exhibit for examination and
must be authorised by a supervisor. The E-Crime request form was completed as required and,
although Officer A was on leave at this time, his signature appears on the form and is dated 23
April 2014. The form itself is dated 5 May 2014.

47.

The form includes the request that: “This analysis is required by 30/04/2014 … the phone
needs to be returned to the complainant before she is discharged from hospital.” The brief
circumstances of the allegation are described as: “Possible offence of sexual grooming between
a thirteen year old female student and a 40 year old male teacher.”

48.

Also on 23 April 2014, Officer B provided Mrs McLelland with another update on the
investigation. Mrs McLelland told Officer B that Reiha had confided in one of her sisters that
she had stayed over at Mr Back’s house. Mrs McLelland advised that she was not aware of this
visit prior to it happening and had never been informed by either Mr Back or his partner that
Reiha had stayed at their house.

49.

On the same day, Mrs McLelland sent an email to Officer B attaching further communications
between Mr Back and Reiha in the form of documents saved on the home computer and a
document located in Reiha’s school luggage.

Child Protection Team – Investigation following Reiha’s return to Gisborne
50.

On 24 April 2014, Reiha was discharged from Kenepuru Hospital. She returned home to
Gisborne and was enrolled at the local college.

51.

On 5 May 2014, Officer B returned to work and received a spreadsheet of Reiha’s
telecommunications data from 1 November 2013 to 17 April 2014. The spreadsheet consisted
of 190 pages of text data incorporating in excess of 3,500 messages. Officer B later said “the
data … was overwhelming.” Officer B was also given access to the computer in Reiha’s home,
which contained a large number of email exchanges between Mr Back and Reiha.

52.

Prior to returning to work, Officer B arranged to meet with Reiha’s parents on 7 May 2014 to
discuss the direction of the investigation.

53.

At that meeting, Mrs McLelland advised Officer B that Reiha was attending the local college
and doing well. They decided that Police should interview Reiha about the contact that had
occurred between her and Mr Back and Officer B immediately arranged for Reiha to attend an
evidential interview with Officer C (a sergeant).

54.

On 14 May 2014, Reiha met with Officer C at the Gisborne Police station for an evidential
interview.9 Reiha declined to engage in the interview and it did not get past the introduction
stage. Reiha did not disclose any criminal offences and told Police that Mr Back had not done

9

Officer B also attended to monitor the interview.

1010

 anything inappropriate. In an email dated 22 May 2014, Officer B recorded that Reiha had
been spoken to at the Gisborne Police station and confirmed that:
a)

her relationship with Mr Back was just a friendship;

b)

no sexual activity had taken place;

c)

she had stayed at his home address on 4-5 occasions (without her parents’
knowledge) and sometimes it was just her and Mr Back;

d)

they would often meet at the bus stop in Wainui;

e)

she had received gifts from him of a book and a guitar; and

f)

she had been texting and emailing Mr Back for a number of months.

55.

On the following day, 15 May 2014, Reiha went missing after school. Officer B was off duty
when he received a phone call late in the afternoon from Mrs McLelland. Mrs McLelland told
Officer B that Reiha had been missing for about two hours and was not answering her phone
or responding to text messages.

56.

Officer B drove to Mr Back’s house and asked Mr Back to send a text to Reiha. A short while
later Mr Back told him that Reiha had made contact and advised him of her location. Officer B
arranged for a patrol car to collect Reiha and return her to the Police station. He arranged for a
health assessment and sat with Reiha and her family during the assessment. Reiha was readmitted to hospital and Officer B left the Police station around 1am.

57.

On 22 May 2014, Officer B obtained further production orders for the cell phones of Reiha, Mr
Back and Mr Back’s partner. The purpose of the enquiry was to establish if Mr Back or his
partner had made contact with Reiha after being asked not to. The text data confirmed there
had been no further contact.

58.

On the same day, Officer B drafted a comprehensive and lengthy email about the
investigation. The email was sent to Mr Y (the principal of Gisborne Intermediate School) and
copied to Officer A at his Police email address.

59.

In the email Officer B described receiving 194 pages of text data between Mr Back and Reiha
and advised that he had not found “any sexually explicit messages”. However he believed the
content of the text messages were “clearly inappropriate”, including instances when Mr Back
and Reiha met secretly at night.

60.

Officer B provided examples of text messages between Reiha and Mr Back between 28
December 2013 and 31 December 2013 to show “how strong their relationship had become”
and provided an overview of the content of the documents he received from Mrs McLelland
on 23 April 2014. Officer B also described the information Reiha gave to Police when she was
at the Gisborne Police station for an evidential interview (see paragraph 54 above).

61.

Officer B concluded:

1111

 “It is clear within the text data that Sam has encouraged the staying over at his
house and has organised meeting points where he has told Reiha to ensure ‘her
bases are covered’ and that ‘she knows the deal’…
I have read an email dated November 2013 where Reiha pours out her feel[ing]s
of despair to Sam and talks of her not coping or seeing a future for her … as a
person in authority Sam should have been talking to the parents about it or at
the very least informing someone at school in order for Reiha to be spoken to …
to my knowledge Sam and [his partner] have instead tried to deal with this
themselves….”
62.

In the email Officer B offered to go through any of the text data with the school principal, Mr
Y.

63.

On the following day, Mr Y contacted an industrial adviser from the School Trustees
Association (STA), seeking advice. Officer A participated in the conversation in his role as
Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Mr Y told the Authority the advice was: “…regardless of the
actions of Police, the Board will have to open its own employment investigation [once] Police
have completed their inquiry.”

64.

On 27 May 2014, Officer A entered a review on the Police electronic record of the
investigation. The entry reads: “Case Investigation Plan reviewed with O/C case. Approved.”

65.

By 3 June 2014, Officer B had finished analysing the first set of text data requested. This
required a detailed read of more than 3500 text messages.

66.

The Authority has also reviewed the text messages and emails between Reiha and Mr Back.
Some examples are provided in the table below:
DATE

REIHA

29 December 2013

I thought what if I see my parents
here, but it’s alright they shop at Pak
n save

MR BACK

HOPEFULLY
wait in the car, I can get everything
1 January 2014 at
5.48am

Happy New Year Darlin! I’m just
watching the first sunrise of the year
and thinking of you! Bout to go surfin,
what you up to today? Oh and I think I
have an idea for one of my projects for
you …

2 January 2014

surf was small but fun enough. And of
course we can make this year amazing.
I dare you to find something we
couldn’t do. Mum’s gone so it’s just me
and bo [the dog]. Hmmm I wonder
what kind of mischief we’ll get up to.
Any ideas?
[Text messages between Mr Back and

1212

 his partner confirm Mr Back’s partner
was away on holiday from this day until
9 January 2014]
3 January 2014

Have fun today ... If you could be a little
guarded with what you share with your
sister and cousin that would be
appreciated.
I will be guarded with it but by how
much do you mean?

You remember what we talked about?
And there is no hurry, I know it feels
urgent sometimes but we have time.

Yup I remember. I’ll keep it brief and
you’re right no hurry I just want to be
like I’m going to stay at Sam’s then it
will be all sweet instead of the lying.
I’ve decided not to talk to my cousin.
4 January 2014

So if you want to come down for a bit
when would be best? Or when would it
be better for me to go do you think?
Ideas? Suggestions?
Well I can be dropped off at
Makarori any morning from Monday
– Friday. Because my sisters’ have
work so yea That’s all I’m saying tho
the rest is up to you, you chose! [sic]
Also I’m going down south next
Sunday. So yeah that’s all. Now your
decision time?

5 January 2014

Tuesday suits. What time?
Any time, If I’m not home I will just
leave the back door open, I’ll only be
surfing. Keep me posted on what’s up.

6 January 2014

I just need a way of getting … to
yours or I’m not sure how it will
work.
do you know anyone who can drive?
this cool dude, he’s a pretty amazing
friend as well.
Tell him what you need him to do.
I’m not sure what I need him to do
yet...
Don’t you have a training or sports trip
or somewhere you need to be or
something?
Na you already know the answer to
that … unless you were hinting at

1313

 something?
I may have been.
Oh yes I need to think on it I’ll get
back to you later.
So, Mon ami, would you be able to
pick me up apopo?

Sweet, what time suits you?

I imagine that’s possible, all is good?
I don’t know, how’s around 11? I’m
flexible, What do you think?

yup 11’s sweet, Just give me a text
once you’re here and I’ll come out
On my way in [my partner’s] blue car

7 January 2014

I’m here

8 January 2014

I’m a bit of a mixed bag emotionally at
the moment. Happy, because it’s
holidays … but super sad because I will
miss seeing you almost every day. I
guess what I really want to say is that
this last year was so special for me, in
large part, because of you

9 January 2014

I miss you something crazy
[My partner] just got back

24 January 2014

[Reiha sent an email to Mr Back
asking if she could come for dinner
the following day and stay the night]
I think dinner would be wonderful and
of course you can stay… I’m so
excited!!!!! Just keep me posted on
what your up to and when you think
you’ll be around. Do I need to pick up
anything special for diner. We can
make anything you want ... but it is
your last diner [sic] here before you are
off to high school and although every
diner with you (every minute for that
matter) is special, I would like to do
something nice for you. If you can, bring
the book down so maybe we can decide
on our holiday to celebrate and
anything else you might want to share
or discuss. Should I be this excited?

1414

 9 February 2014
at 7.33 am

I so badly want to climb in your window
right now. Just jump through and tell
you that I am so glad that you are here,
that you always, no matter what, you
bring a smile to my face and joy to my
life.

14 February 2014

It’s Valentine’s Day… a day for spending
time with and appreciating the ones
you hold dear, so no rules will keep me
from appreciating you today.

22 February 2014

…find out when your long weekend is,
because I think the time is coming soon
that I have to come down to the
budding metropolis of Napier to see you
(if you think that’s a good idea and still
want me to) If you don’t, that’s ok,
you’re not obliged to, I’d just like to.
…So be good my friend, remember how
much I miss you and how excited I will
be the next time I get to see you (cause
I will be so excited I may jump out of my
skin, wouldn’t that be a sight!). Take
care of yourself Darlin’

67.

On 9 June 2014, Officer B advised Mrs McLelland that Police did not have enough evidence to
charge Mr Back, but would still be speaking with him to inform him that his behaviour towards
Reiha was inappropriate. Officer B also informed Mrs McLelland that he had advised the school
of his findings and they were fully aware of all the circumstances.

68.

On 13 June 2014, Officer B met with Mr Back at the Gisborne Police Station to discuss the
investigation. The discussion took place in an interview room, was not electronically recorded
and lasted for just over an hour.

69.

Officer B informed Mr Back that there had been an investigation. He advised him he was not
under arrest and was free to leave at any point, and then asked Mr Back to explain his
relationship with Reiha.

70.

In relation to the text messages, Mr Back told Officer B that it is commonplace now for
teachers and students to communicate via email or text and that his cell phone number would
be available to anyone. He originally began communicating with Reiha by email and the
communication was related to school work. It was only after Reiha left Gisborne Intermediate
School that the conversations became more frequent. Regarding some of the language used in
the messaging, Mr Back told Officer B he called everyone ‘darling’ and everyone called him ‘big
boy’.

1515

 71.

Mr Back acknowledged that Reiha had visited him at home. He said that Reiha had told him
she had spoken to her parents and they were fine about it. Officer B later recalled:10
“When I informed him that her parents had no idea that Reiha stopped at his
house he was mortified…. He told me he loves his job and would do nothing
intentionally to jeopardise this … he feels like he’s been played by a 13 year old
... ‘I can’t believe I’ve been so naïve. All I ever wanted to do was help Reiha’.”

72.

Once Mr Back had left the Police station, Officer B immediately typed notes recording his
recollection of the discussion. A few days later he entered a copy of the notes onto the Police
electronic record of the investigation.

73.

After speaking to Mr Back, Officer B determined the investigation was complete with no
further enquiries to be made. Officer B concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
charge Mr Back with any criminal offence and the matter should be dealt with as an
employment matter by the school.

74.

On 16 June 2014, Officer B prepared a final report on the investigation, prior to forwarding the
file for filing. Officer B copied the final report into an email which he sent to Officer A. The
report concluded:
“Initially when I received this file my concern was that we were possibly dealing
with a teacher who was grooming a young girl for sex. As I read through the
text messages and emails this opinion didn’t change as the content within these
messages although never sexual were definitely inappropriate between a
teacher and student. The content, the gifts and the home visits were all very
concerning.11
…After carefully reviewing all the information to hand, I feel there is no
evidence to charge Sam with any criminal behaviour whether it be of a sexual
nature or one of neglect.”

75.

The final sentence of the report reads:
“In relation to Sam, I genuinely believe he had Reiha’s best interests at heart,
yes he has made some questionable decisions but when you look at the facts as
a whole it is easy to see how he quickly got sucked into a situation he had very
little chance of controlling.”

76.

On 16 June 2014, Officer A made the following entry on the electronic case file: “Case
reviewed with O/C. Investigation progressing in accordance with the Investigation Plan.”

77.

On 20 June 2014, Officer B met with Reiha’s parents and advised them of the outcome of the
Police investigation. Officer B made the following entry about the meeting on the electronic
case file:

10
11

In the email from Officer B to Officer A on 16 June 2014.
Mr Back gifted Reiha a book and guitar.

1616

 “They were advised that Police were not in a position to charge Sam as I had
found no evidence proving that their friendship had ever been more than that.
Over the 194 pages of text messages that I had read and numerous emails
between them, I never once found any content of a sexual nature.”
78.

On 23 June 2014, Mrs McLelland made a complaint to Gisborne Intermediate School about Mr
Back. The complaint was investigated by the School Board, which reported the matter to the
Teachers Council. Mr Back remained at the school teaching, but subject to a number of
conditions.

79.

On 30 July 2014, at 2.22pm, Officer A made the following entry on the electronic case file:
“Reviewed prior to filing. Known lines of enquiry have been completed. No
evidential statement of complaint forthcoming. Given the overall circumstances
no further investigative action required. There is insufficient evidence to provide
a reasonable prospect of conviction – Evidential Test. Submitted for filing.”

80.

On 31 July 2014 at 8.34am, the investigation file was assigned to Officer D (a detective senior
sergeant), the Eastern District Child Protection and Sexual Violence Coordinator, for review.

Police initial response to Reiha’s sudden death
81.

During the evening of Thursday 31 July 2014, Reiha was admitted to Gisborne Hospital, after
an incident at her home address.

82.

Officers E and F (both detectives) were on call that night and, at around midnight, were called
into work to investigate. The officers went to Gisborne Hospital and were briefed on the
circumstances by the local Tolaga Bay officer.

83.

While at the hospital the officers spoke to Reiha’s parents. Officer E spoke briefly to Mrs
McLelland. Officer F spoke to Mr McLelland and obtained a statement from him describing the
events leading up to Reiha being admitted to hospital. The officers left the hospital and spent
the remainder of the night completing enquiries at Reiha’s home address, returning to the
Police Station at 6.30am early the next morning, Friday 1 August.

84.

Reiha died in hospital on Friday 1 August 2014. The Duty Coroner was notified of the death by
hospital staff using the Hospital Record of Death form. The form recorded that Reiha’s family
had been advised that they were able to object to a post mortem if they wished to do so. The
family had already told hospital staff that they did not want a post mortem and when the
death was notified to the coroner, the Duty Coroner was aware that Reiha’s family objected to
a post mortem.

85.

On Saturday 2 August 2014, at 7am, Officer E returned to work and was advised that Reiha had
died.

86.

When a death is reported to the Coroner, Police act as agents for the Coroner and are required
to conduct initial enquiries into the circumstances surrounding the death and report that
information to the Coroner, within a few hours of the death. This initial information is

1717

 provided to the Coroner on a standard preformatted Police form entitled ‘Initial Report for
Coroner’.
87.

Soon after arriving at work on Saturday morning, Officer E emailed a copy of the Initial Report
to the Coroner and advised he would provide the Coroner with further statements and
documents later that morning.

88.

On the ‘Initial Report for Coroner’ form, in the space titled ‘Police Recommendations regarding
Post Mortem’, the report stated that a “post mortem is required to be carried out”. There are
areas of the form set aside to confirm if family members have been advised of the right to
object to a post mortem and if there is any objection to a post mortem, but neither of these
questions were answered.

89.

Officer E met with Mrs McLelland at the Gisborne Police station to obtain a statement from
her regarding the circumstances surrounding Reiha’s death.

90.

Officer E recorded in the statement that Mrs McLelland objected to a post mortem being
carried out. He then completed a further report setting out the reasons why he believed a post
mortem was not required, which he forwarded to the officer in charge of the CIB in Gisborne.
The report is dated 2 August 2014, and recorded that Reiha’s body had been at the mortuary
since 6am that morning awaiting a decision from the Coroner on whether there would be a
post mortem. The Coroner ultimately decided not to conduct a post mortem.

Officer D’s review of the investigation
91.

Meanwhile, on 1 August 2014 at 1.23pm, Officer D sent an email to both Officer A and Officer
B advising them he had reviewed the case. He noted that, while there may not be evidence to
support a criminal charge, “the extent and nature of the contact between MCCLELLAND and
BLACK [sic] has been completely inappropriate, especially in the context of a Teacher/Pupil
relationship.” He stated that this must be addressed and asked that the officers work with
legal services to draft letters addressed to the principal, the Board of Trustees and the
Teachers Council, to summarise the investigation and express Police concerns.

92.

Officer D requested that the officers attach copies of the letters to the file and re-submit the
file for filing. At 1.26pm Officer D recorded on the electronic file that he had reviewed the case
and returned it to Officer B for further action.

93.

On 4 August 2014, after Officer A told Officer D that the Board of Trustees and Teachers
Council had been advised of the investigation, Officer D filed the investigation file with an
entry on the electronic record that: “Known lines of enquiry have been completed. There is
insufficient evidence available to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction.”

1818

 Coroner’s inquest and Teachers Council
94.

On 4 August 2014, a Coronial Services Case Manager, Ms W, wrote to Reiha’s family to advise
that the Coroner had opened an enquiry into Reiha’s death and would be requesting reports
and evidence.

95.

Ms W also emailed the Police Eastern District Coronial Investigations Manager, Officer G (a
detective sergeant), to advise that the Coroner had reviewed the file and had requested Police
obtain a number of statements, including a statement from Officer B “outlining his
investigation of concerns about Reiha’s relationship with Mr Back, and the outcome of this”.

96.

Officer G forwarded the request from the Coroner to the relevant officers and assigned specific
tasks. Officer G made the following request to Officer A: “…can you review again the file in
relation to BACK and assist [Officer B] with what is required of him on this case.”

97.

At some point, responsibility for preparing the Police file for the Coroner was passed to Officer
H (a detective sergeant), also from Gisborne Police.

98.

Officer H sent an email to Officer A, copied to Officer B, which stated that the Coroner had
asked for a statement from Officer B outlining his investigation and the outcome. Officer H
asked Officer A: “Can you discuss this with [Officer B] as you know more about this matter than
I do and let me know the best way to finalise this part of the enquiry.”

99.

On 27 August 2014, Officer B completed a statement for the Coroner describing his
investigation into the Report of Concern relating to Reiha and Mr Back.

100. In his statement Officer B described his assessment of the text data and emails and stated:
“The content of the text and emails ranged from school, homework, friends,
Music and Reiha’s wellbeing. At no point did I find any content that was of a
sexual nature. My main concern was that their friendship had overstepped the
professionalism of what a student and teacher relationship should be. It had
become clear to me in reading the communication between Sam and Reiha that
Sam had become emotionally attached to Reiha as a friend and confidant. The
boundary had become blurred and what may have started as a teacher student
relationship was now more of a mentor/counsellor relationship.”
101. On 29 October 2014, Officer H was still completing statements to finalise the file and advised
Officer G that he expected to have the file ready the following week.
102. On 31 March 2015, the Coroner sent an email to Officer G enquiring about the file and asking
for the file to be forwarded as a matter of priority.
103. Officer H completed a report the same day outlining the enquiries made by Police. The report
and attached enquiry file were forwarded to the Coroner on 14 April 2015. Officer H’s report
concluded as follows:

1919

 “Issues in relation to Reiha’s relationship with Samual [sic] BACK ... are being
dealt with by the Teachers Council. There is no evidence of any criminal
offending by them in their relationship.”
104. Between April 2015 and April 2016 Police were not asked to make any further enquiries on
behalf of the Coroner. During this time, the Coroner attempted to engage with the family to
explore the possibility of interviewing Reiha’s friends.
105. Throughout, the Teachers Council disciplinary process was progressing.
106. On 5 May 2015, the Gisborne Intermediate School Board of Trustees wrote to the Teachers
Council in support of an application made by Mr Back for name suppression. The Board
advised the Teachers Council that, subject to the result of the Disciplinary Tribunal hearing, Mr
Back’s position at the school still existed and that he could potentially return to the school to
teach again. The letter was signed by Officer A in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of
Trustees.
107.

A Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal hearing was held from 17 to 19 February 2016. At the
end of the hearing, a complaint of serious misconduct for forming an inappropriate
relationship with a 13 year old student was upheld, and Mr Back’s teacher registration was
cancelled.

108. At a lunch break during the Disciplinary Tribunal hearing, a newspaper photographer took a
photograph of Officer A with Mr Back in circumstances which suggested they were having
lunch together.
109. The Gisborne Herald Newspaper covered the hearing and, on 5 March 2016 following the
lifting of name suppression, published an article which provided details of the misconduct and
included a quote from Mr Back that: “In hindsight, I can say that I lost my way and became too
involved in a student’s life.”
110. The article also reported the following paragraph regarding the Police investigation:
“The Police cleared him of any criminal wrongdoing. The investigating officer
wrote: ‘I genuinely believe he had [the girl’s] best interest at heart…. It’s easy to
see how he got sucked into a situation he had little chance of controlling.’”
111. The Coroner’s inquest into Reiha’s death was held in September 2016, and the findings were
published in June 2017.
2016 Police Review
112. In August 2016, the Police National Co-ordinator: Child Protection, Officer I (a detective senior
sergeant), conducted a review of the investigation at the request of the Eastern District Child
Protection and Sexual Violence Co-ordinator.

2020

 113. The review was requested following media reporting of the Teachers Council Disciplinary
Tribunal hearing regarding Mr Back. Officer I was asked to review the investigation against
current practice.
114. On 11 August 2016 Officer I reported the outcome of her review. In summary, the review
found that:
a)

The matter was deemed to be a Child Protection Protocol (CPP) investigation but
it appeared a joint investigation plan was not completed as required by Police
policy. This should have been completed regardless of whether or not Reiha made
a disclosure.12

b)

It appeared there was no consultation with CYF until an update in NIA made on 17
April 2014.

c)

It was unclear what discussions took place regarding the initial safety of Reiha and
any ongoing contact between her and Mr Back until 17 April 2014, when Officer B
advised Mr Back he was to have no further contact with her.

d)

There was no evidence that consideration was given to the safety of other
students that were still being taught by Mr Back. On 17 April 2014, the school was
advised of the complaint but no discussion was documented in relation to how
the safety of other students was being ensured. Mr Back continued to teach until
August 2014.

e)

One tasking and three supervisor reviews by Officer A were entered after the file
was assigned to Officer B. These appeared to be generic and did not record
appropriate oversight of the key points or decision making in relation to the file.

f)

The investigation plan was not endorsed by Officer A until 27 May 2014, some
seven weeks after the file was assigned to Officer B.

g)

All relevant inquiries for this investigation had not been considered or completed.
The investigation appeared to have been solely focussed on the
telecommunication data. A number of further statements ought to have been
obtained and further enquiries ought to have been completed.

h)

Some documentation had not been attached to the file, including a record of the
conversation between Officer B and the officer who located Reiha after she ran
away, a record of the preliminary interview of Reiha by Officer C, and a record of
the interview of Mr Back.

i)

Officer A, in his role as the Child Protection supervisor, should have been aware
that the Teachers Council was required to be advised of an investigation of this

12

The Authority found there was a lack of clarity regarding whether or not this matter was a CPP investigation, as there was
no record of that decision. Officer B (and CYF) told the Authority that it was not a CPP investigation, and therefore there
was no requirement to complete a joint investigation plan.

2121

 nature as soon as possible. It was not necessarily the Police’s role to make this
notification, but a discussion should have been held with the school and a
notification requested.
j)

There was a lack of supervisory oversight and guidance of Officer B throughout
the investigation.

k)

Officer A should have told Officer D that he (Officer A) had a conflict of interest
due to his role as Chair of the Gisborne Intermediate School Board of Trustees.
There was no evidence to suggest this was ever done.

Complaint made to the Authority
115. In April 2017, Reiha’s parents complained to the Authority, about the Police Child Protection
Team investigation and subsequent Police response to Reiha’s death, the Teachers Council
Disciplinary hearing and the Coroner’s inquest.
116. In summary, the complaint states that:

2222

a)

The outcome of the investigation was pre-determined by Officer A, the officer in
charge of the Child Protection Team, who had a conflict of interest in the
investigation.

b)

Officer A gave evidence that he did not supervise the investigation but the
information on the Police file suggests he did supervise the investigation. This
raises serious concerns in relation to his conflict of interest. Officer A was
photographed having lunch with Mr Back at the Teachers Council Disciplinary
Tribunal hearing, illustrating his support for Mr Back and the extent of his conflict
of interest.

c)

The investigation was assigned to an inexperienced constable who was not
provided with any guidance or supervision.

d)

The investigation was inadequate because Police failed to collect all the available
forensic evidence, Mr Back’s interview was unplanned, ad hoc and not recorded,
Reiha’s interview was not appropriately conducted or recorded and Police failed
to share valuable information with health professionals treating Reiha.

e)

The investigation file was reviewed by a detective senior sergeant at the same
time as Reiha was in hospital shortly before she died. The File Cover Sheet was
amended from version 1 to version 2 while Police were aware the matter could
lead to a Coroner’s inquest.

f)

After Reiha died, Police did not provide the family with any advice about the right
to object to a post mortem examination, and the timing and location of
statements obtained from Reiha’s parents immediately after Reiha’s death was
culturally inappropriate.

 g)

The information Police provided to the Coroner from the Child Protection file was
incomplete and not provided until after the family made submissions to the
Coroner, resulting in further direction from the Coroner.

h)

Officer B made an inappropriate comment in a report suggesting that Reiha, a 13
year old girl, could be responsible for ‘sucking’ a teacher into an inappropriate
relationship. The report containing the inappropriate comment was leaked by
Police to the media, resulting in the quote being reported in a newspaper. Reiha’s
parents read the comment for the first time when it appeared in the newspaper.

2323

 The Authority’s Investigation
THE AUTHORITY’S ROLE
117. Under the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, one of the Authority's functions is
to receive complaints alleging misconduct or neglect of duty by any Police employee, or
concerning any practice, policy or procedure of the Police affecting the person or body of
persons making the complaint.
118. The Authority's role on the completion of an investigation is to form an opinion about the
Police conduct, policy, practice or procedure which was the subject of the complaint.

THE AUTHORITY'S INVESTIGATION
119.

During the course of its investigation, the Authority interviewed six people, including Officer A
and Officer B.

120. The Authority has been provided with and has reviewed the Police file, including the
spreadsheet containing the text messages and some of the email correspondence between
Reiha and Mr Back.
121. The Authority has also obtained information from Child, Youth and Family (now called Oranga
Tamariki), the Education Council and the Gisborne Herald newspaper.

ISSUES CONSIDERED
122. The Authority's investigation considered the following issues:
1)

2)

2424

Was the initial response by the Child Protection Team to the Report of Concern
adequate and appropriate?
a)

Was the initial action and safety assessment adequate?

b)

Was the case appropriately assigned for investigation?

c)

Was there adequate supervision of the investigation?

d)

Was Officer A’s conflict of interest managed appropriately?

Was the investigation by Officer B thorough and robust?
a)

Was the investigation plan adequate and were appropriate enquiries conducted?

b)

Did Officer A provide ‘pre-authorisation’ for an application for a production order
before it was completed?

 c)

How was a request for analysis of Reiha’s cell phone dated with Officer A’s
signature on a day when he is known to have been overseas and why did he sign
the form after he had declared a conflict of interest?

d)

Was Reiha’s interview conducted in accordance with the Child Protection
Protocol?

e)

Was Reiha’s interview appropriately conducted and recorded?

f)

Was the interview of Mr Back conducted appropriately?

g)

Was the evidence adequately assessed and recorded?

h)

Was there an element of pre-determination in the investigation?

i)

Was the final covering report changed after Reiha’s death?

3)

Did the Child Protection Team effectively communicate with other agencies?

4)

Did Police provide the Gisborne Herald newspaper with an internal report?

5)

Was adequate support and advice provided to Mr and Mrs McLelland following Reiha’s
death?
a)

Was appropriate and timely advice provided regarding post mortems?

b)

Were requests for statements from family members appropriate?

c)

Was there adequate ongoing support provided for the family?

6)

Was timely and adequate disclosure provided by Police to the Coroner?

7)

Did submissions made to the Teachers Council by Officer A regarding name suppression
constitute an attempt to pervert the course of justice?

2525

 The Authority’s Findings
ISSUE 1: WAS THE INITIAL RESPONSE BY THE CHILD PROTECTION TEAM TO THE REPORT OF
CONCERN ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE?
1(a): Was the initial action and safety assessment adequate?
123. When Police received the Report of Concern from CYF, there were no immediate safety
concerns for Reiha. She was in Wellington with her mother and had no access to her cell
phone.
124. The initial information received by Police was that:


Mr Back had been Reiha’s Intermediate school teacher. He was 41 years old and she was
13 years old.



He had been seen holding Reiha’s hand at hospital in circumstances that prompted a
Report of Concern from a paediatrician.



On 8 April 2014, Reiha had reported to a staff member at Kenepuru hospital that she
had been at Mr Back’s house without her parents’ knowledge.



Reiha’s mother had seen text messages from Mr Back on Reiha’s cell phone which she
described as ‘over friendly’.

125. On receipt of the file, Officer B made immediate enquiries into the concerning text messages
from Mr Back on Reiha’s cell phone.
126. When Officer B consulted with CYF, Reiha was still in Wellington. The discussion with CYF
included agreeing that there should be no further contact between Mr Back and Reiha.
127. Officer B advised the principal of Gisborne Intermediate School, Mr Y, of the Report of
Concern, and asked him to keep the information confidential to avoid prejudicing the
investigation. Although there is no record of any discussion with Mr Y about how the safety of
other students (still being taught by Mr Back) was being ensured, Mr Y said he did give
consideration to that issue at the time.

FINDING
The initial response by the Child Protection Team to the Report of Concern about Reiha was
adequate.

2626

 1(b): Was the case appropriately assigned for investigation?
128. Officer B commenced working in the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) in May 2013 on the
Child Protection Team in Gisborne. Prior to this, his previous CIB experience had been a three
month secondment to the CIB, also in Gisborne. He completed the Child Protection
Investigation course in July 2013 and completed the CIB Selection and Induction course during
February and March 2014.13
129. Police policy provides that trainee CIB investigators who have completed the CIB Selection and
Induction course can be the officer in charge and/or lead investigator in child protection
investigations, provided they are under the direction or supervision of a Level 4 qualified
supervisor (or a Level 3 qualified investigator relieving in a Level 4 position).14
130. Officer B had completed the CIB Selection and Induction Course and therefore the case was
appropriately assigned to him, subject to adequate supervision being provided.
131. Officer A told the Authority that when assigning a file he would look at the staff capabilities
and the courses they had attended, together with file holdings and workload. Officer B was
given this file because Officer A thought him to be a capable investigator who could do the job.
132. The Authority is satisfied that assigning the investigation to Officer B complied with policy.

FINDING
The case was appropriately assigned for investigation.

1(c): Was there adequate supervision of the investigation?
133. Officer B told the Coroner’s inquest that there were no formal discussions with him about how
to manage the investigation.
134. In the Authority’s view, this placed Officer B in a difficult situation because he had been
advised that Officer A was unable to be involved in the investigation, but no alternative
arrangements for supervision were made.
135. Officer B told the Authority he was not concerned that Officer A was unable to supervise the
investigation, because two of his colleagues on the CPT were qualified detectives, also
qualified to sergeant level. The officers were experienced CPT investigators and had from time

13

The ‘Child Protection – Specialist accreditation, case management, and assurance’ policy provides guidelines for case
management to Child Protection investigators and details the roles and responsibilities of staff involved in child protection
work. The policy provides a tiered training and accreditation model to ensure families receive the appropriate standard of
service. There are four levels starting with recruit training through to CIB supervisors.
14
A Level 4 qualified supervisor includes a detective sergeant in a substantive position with operational ‘sign off’ to level 4
from the District Crime Manager. Before obtaining Level 4 sign off, supervisors must have attended an advanced child
protection course, which provides specialist training in the investigation of more complex child protection matters.

2727

 to time relieved as the CPT supervisor. The officers on the CPT would regularly discuss cases,
either in the open plan office or during breaks, to obtain guidance and advice.
136. Officer J, a senior detective on the Child Protection Team, told Police that she was aware of the
investigation. She was not personally involved and the specifics were never discussed with her,
but “the design of the Gisborne CPT office (open plan) often meant that general conversations
held in the office were overheard and/or participated in by everyone present at the time.”
137. Officer B also told the Authority that the investigation needed very little supervision as it was a
short investigation with limited inquiries and decisions to be made. While acknowledging the
level of experience and the supportive environment available to Officer B within the Gisborne
CPT, this investigation required the level of supervision provided for in the Police policy (that
is, supervision from a Level 4 qualified supervisor or a Level 3 qualified investigator relieving in
a Level 4 position).
138. The investigation related to a school teacher sending inappropriate text messages, both in
volume and content, to a 13 year old girl already receiving complex medical treatment, and
required careful analysis of a large and overwhelming amount of text data and emails. Officer
B had only been working in the CIB for about a year.
139. The review of the investigation conducted by Police in August 2016 noted:
“One tasking and three Supervisor reviews by [Officer A] have been entered
after the file was assigned to Officer B. These appear to be generic and do not
record appropriate oversight of the key points or decision making in relation to
this file.”
140. The Authority has determined that, while Officer A completed tasks on the file that give the
appearance of someone supervising the investigation, these were completed as administrative
functions and he did not influence or direct the course of the investigation. Officer A was not
providing guidance to Officer B and no other supervision arrangements were put in place.
141. Consequently, the level of supervision on this case did not comply with policy and was
inadequate.

FINDING
Contrary to Police policy, the investigation was not adequately supervised.

1(d): Was Officer A’s conflict of interest managed appropriately?
142. The officer in charge of the Gisborne Child Protection Team, Officer A, had a clear conflict of
interest in this investigation because he was the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
Gisborne Intermediate School.

2828

 143. The applicable policy at that time was the Police ‘Independence of Investigations (safe
processes)’ policy. The policy stated that all Police employees must ensure that at all times
when undertaking their duties they avoid any potential or actual conflicts of interest, including
any perceived conflicts. The policy further provides that:
“…a potential or actual conflict of interest needs to be managed appropriately
so as to ensure that the integrity of an investigation is maintained and able to
withstand external scrutiny. Every employee must know how to identify a
potential or actual conflict of interest and know what they are required to do ...
when undertaking an investigation.”
144. It was Officer A’s responsibility to report the conflict to his supervisor, Officer D, in writing.15
Once supervisors are notified of a conflict of interest, it becomes their responsibility to assess
the risk and manage the conflict of interest.16
145. Officer A told the Authority that he was aware that a conflict of interest should be recorded in
writing on a Police form because he had “done the odd internal enquiry before where these
forms were on the paperwork”, but in this case he “didn’t send anything in writing”. Officer A
said that he believed he had phoned Officer D before he went on leave, to advise him of the
conflict of interest in this case.
146. Regarding the appointment of an alternative supervisor, Officer A told the Authority that:
“It’s debatable whether I appoint that person, having the conflict of interest,
but it normally fell to the 2IC … the next person in the chain of command. I don’t
recall that I said to [the 2IC] or anybody else ‘you supervise him’. …I was
basically on my way out the door … there was an expectancy on my part that
that [Officer D] would take over that role or appoint or designate or whatever
needed to happen”.
147. However, Officer D told Police that Officer A did not advise him of the conflict of interest:
“I would have expected [Officer A] to recognise a conflict when there was one
and to raise it with me as he had raised previous conflicts with me … had it been
raised with me … I would have dealt with it. It was never raised with me by
[Officer B]. It was never raised with me by [Officer A]. I didn’t even become
aware of that until things hit the media…. [Officer A] shouldn’t have been
anywhere near the decision making around this case … [Officer A] never went
anywhere close to telling me there was a conflict for him with this case.”
148. The Authority is satisfied that when Officer A assigned the investigation to Officer B, he
advised Officer B of his conflict of interest and that he was unable to assist Officer B or be
involved with the investigation. However, the Authority is also satisfied that Officer A did not
advise Officer D of the conflict of interest and therefore the latter made no alternative
arrangements for supervision of Officer B.

15
16

Officer D, the Eastern District Child Protection and Sexual Violence Coordinator, was based in the Hawkes Bay.
Where a conflict of interest is identified, “the supervisor must decide on a course of action and document it.”

2929

 149. The complaint before the Authority is that Officer A’s conflict of interest was not adequately
managed, and that Officer A influenced the investigation, while at the same time supporting
Mr Back to continue teaching.
150. Having advised Officer B of his conflict of interest, Officer A failed to ensure he had no further
involvement with the investigation, because he completed a number of supervisory tasks on
the investigation file such as:


approving the investigation plan;



authorising the forensic examination of Reiha’s cell phone;



receiving updates and briefings from Officer B; and



recording supervisor reviews on the database and forwarding the file to Officer D for
filing with a recommendation that there was insufficient evidence to charge Mr Back.

151. In respect of the supervisor reviews, Officer A told the Authority that he had a number of
standard reviews he would copy and attach to a file. In this case, although he made an entry
that he had reviewed the file prior to filing, this entry was a copy and paste of one of his
standard reviews and is incorrect. He did not review the file because he knew he should not be
the reviewer.
152. Regarding the investigation plan, Officer A told the Authority that Officer B needed someone
to sign it off “as per required protocol”. He accepted that the plan should have been signed off
by Officer D or someone else, but said that although he signed it, he did not make any changes
and simply provided Officer B with the authority to carry on with the investigation.
153. Officer A told Police:
“…I accept that my name is on parts of the file but I still say that I didn’t make a
decision or influence a decision in any way to either negate him being charged
or the opposite to … try and get him charged.”
154. Officer B has also been very clear in the evidence he provided for the Coroner, and when
separately interviewed by both Police and the Authority, that Officer A did not supervise the
investigation in any practical sense.
155.

Officer B told the Authority that although Officer A signed the file and sent it off for review:
“... he was signing my investigation plan at the end, it doesn’t really constitute he’s had
anything to do with it.”

156. However it is clear to the Authority that Officer B provided Officer A with updates on and
received his opinion about the investigation. For example, on the investigation plan, under the
heading ‘Supervisor Review’, Officer B made the following entry: “[Officer A] has been fully
briefed in relation to this file and he supports the decision that there is not enough evidence to
charge Back.”

3030

 157. The Authority considers that, when Officer A was asked to perform tasks by Officer B (such as
authorising the forensic examination of Reiha’s cell phone), Officer A should have recognised
that alternative arrangements had not been made to oversee the investigation and he should
have taken steps to rectify the situation. Although he was not involved in guiding the
investigation or influencing decision making on a day to day basis, by completing some
administrative tasks he did not consider how those actions would be perceived by an external
observer and did not adequately manage his obvious conflict of interest.
158. Officer B was aware of the conflict of interest and, although he had been placed in a very
difficult situation, he also had a responsibility to identify how Officer A’s actions would be
perceived by an external observer and manage the conflict of interest. He failed to adequately
manage the conflict of interest by involving Officer A in some supervisory tasks, and by
providing updates about the investigation directly to Officer A in his capacity as Chairman of
the Gisborne Intermediate School Board of Trustees by sending updates directly to Officer A’s
Police email address.

FINDING
Officer A’s conflict of interest was not managed appropriately.

ISSUE 2: WAS THE INVESTIGATION BY OFFICER B THOROUGH AND ROBUST?
159. The Authority is satisfied that Officer B gave the investigation the appropriate priority. He was
at all times highly motivated to act in the best interests of Reiha and her family and was
committed to obtaining the best outcome he could. He completed work on the file when he
was off duty and at other times when he was on annual leave. He kept in regular contact with
Reiha’s family and proactively sought their views on aspects of the investigation when he
considered it might impact on Reiha’s wellbeing.
160. However, additional to the inadequately managed conflict of interest, the Authority has
identified deficiencies with the investigation relating to the recording of information and the
analysis of evidence.
2(a): Was the investigation plan adequate and were appropriate enquiries conducted?
161. The Child Protection investigation plan is a standard Police templated form which sets out
tasks to be considered during child protection investigations. The purpose of the investigation
plan is to ensure that a thorough investigation is carried out in accordance with Police policy
and good practice guidelines. The investigation plan template provides that the plan must be
reviewed regularly by supervisors; it is a living document and should be subject to regular
updates and reviews.
162. Officer B maintained that, because this investigation did not qualify as a Child Protection
Protocol (CPP) investigation, he only used the Child Protection plan template as an “aide
memoire” and was not required to complete all aspects of the template. The Authority has not
3131

 focused on the requirements of the form, but rather has examined whether the plan followed
was substantively adequate.
163. Although Officer B completed an investigation plan at the start of the investigation in April, it
was not approved until 27 May 2014, seven weeks after the investigation commenced and
when the investigation was nearly complete.
164. The plan was clearly deficient in a number of respects. In particular, it did not identify the need
for a number of enquiries that ought to have been made. As the 2016 Police review found,
these included obtaining statements from the medical staff who witnessed the initial
inappropriate contact, Reiha’s parents, Mr Back’s partner and a friend of Reiha. The Review’s
conclusion, with which the Authority agrees, was that “all relevant enquiries for this
investigation have not been considered or completed. The investigation appears to have been
solely focussed on telco data.”
165. Officer B told Police that he considered talking to Reiha’s sister but he was advised by Reiha’s
mother, Mrs McLelland, that she had spoken to Reiha’s sister and nothing had come out of it.
He also considered talking to Reiha’s friends and discussed this with the family, but the family
did not want to further embarrass or distress Reiha.
166. Officer B told the Authority that after reading text messages on Reiha’s cell phone:
“…there were a number of text messages on there I wasn’t happy with and that
… a production order would show there’s inappropriate behaviour and possibly
leading to a sexual grooming offence … I then received text messages from
Reiha’s, Sam’s and [Sam’s partner]’s phone. Once I started going through those
it’s not the case at this particular time so therefore all the evidential material I
thought I had with the inappropriate text messages that I first started reading,
started to get less and less. So by the time I got through I had no grounds then
to go and search his house because the evidence I formed my initial production
order on was now less.”
167. Officer B also said:
“…if you look at the ingredients of grooming, it’s about … meeting that person
for the purpose of a sexual contact. The difficulty I had right at the beginning
was I could never find any text messages to say ... there’s a sexual element. So I
was relying more on the fact that I needed to prove that the text messages
were more than inappropriate, they were of a sexual nature and that was my
stumbling block ... so for me it would be something … that actually shows
there’s been a physical contact of a sexual nature. That’s what I was looking
for.”
168. Officer B told the Authority that he did not need to seek advice from either Police Legal
Services or experts at Police National Headquarters because “what I need to prove for sexual
grooming is really clear, [that] there was a sexual contact or sexual conduct and there wasn’t
any.”

3232

 169. The Authority believes Officer B’s approach was too narrow. While no explicitly sexual
language was used, the messages had obvious sexual overtones.
170. The Authority notes that the deficiencies identified above went unnoticed and uncorrected
because of the inadequate supervision of Officer B, as discussed in Issue 1(c) of this report.
171. In addition to the further enquiries that ought to have been conducted relating to Mr Back’s
contact with Reiha, the Authority’s view is that, after the analysis of the text message and
email data had been completed, the evidence available to Police was sufficiently concerning
that Officer B should have sought further expert advice regarding Mr Back’s behaviour and
explored the possible need for further proactive enquires to establish if there had been any
contact of this nature by Mr Back with other children. Again, this may have occurred if there
had been adequate supervision of the investigation by a more experienced officer.

FINDINGS
The investigation plan was inadequate for the circumstances of this particular case and not all
appropriate enquiries were conducted.

2(b): Did Officer A provide ‘pre-authorisation’ for an application for a production order before it
was completed?
172. During the investigation, Officer B obtained production orders under the provisions of the
Search and Surveillance Act 2012, for the purpose of obtaining text data and content from
telecommunications companies.
173. In accordance with protocols agreed between Police and the telecommunications companies,
officers obtaining information from a telecommunications company pursuant to a production
order are required to have the application approved by a ‘District Approver’ to ensure that the
matter under investigation is sufficiently serious to justify the resource and the information
sought does not make unreasonable demands on the telecommunications provider.
174. Approval for all the production orders obtained for this investigation complied with policy and
was provided by the officer in charge of the Criminal Investigation Branch in Gisborne at that
time. The Authority is satisfied that Officer A did not ‘pre-authorise’ the application for a
production order before the grounds for the application had been determined.

FINDING
Officer A did not provide ‘pre-authorisation’ for an application for a production order before it
was completed.

3333

 2(c): How was a request for analysis of Reiha’s cell phone dated with Officer A’s signature on a day
when he is known to have been overseas and why did he sign the form after he had declared a
conflict of interest?
175.

In addition to requesting text data from the telecommunications companies, Officer B also
arranged for the Police Electronic Crime Laboratory (ECL) to download all the photo and video
data and emails, from Reiha’s cell phone.

176. Exhibits submitted to the ECL for analysis must be accompanied by the Police ‘E-Crime Exhibit
Examination Request’ form. The request for analysis must be authorised by a supervisor by
signing the applicable part of the form. The E-Crime Exhibit Examination Request form which
accompanied Reiha’s cell phone had three different dates recorded on it. The form itself is
dated 5 May 2014. Officer B signed the form on 23 April 2014. Authorisation for the analysis
was provided by Officer A and his signature is dated 23 April 2014, a date when Officer A was
overseas.
177. Officer B told the Authority that he would have completed the form online, printed the
document then presented it to Officer A for signing. Officer B was unable to explain why
Officer A’s signature is dated on a day he was not in the office and told the Authority: “I can’t
say much about the date. That could be a typo on my behalf, I don’t know.”
178. Officer B accepted that he probably did not give sufficient thought to whether or not Officer A
was the appropriate person to sign the form authorising analysis but did not consider it an
issue because Officer A was giving permission to get the phone analysed which is contrary to
any accusations that he tried to “dumb down” the investigation to protect Mr Back.
179. Officer A told the Authority that he does not recall signing the form and cannot explain why his
signature is dated on a day when he was overseas. He accepts that, due to his conflict of
interest, he should have advised Officer B to find someone else to authorise the analysis. He
said that although it was not good practice for him to sign the form, it would have been done
to expedite the matter.
180. Other than it being an error in the recorded date, the Authority is unable to explain how
Officer A appears to have signed the Police ‘E-Crime Exhibit Examination Request’ form on a
day when he was overseas. The E-Crime Exhibit Examination Request form is an example of
recurring deficiencies on the investigation file relating to an inadequately managed conflict of
interest and poor recording of information.

FINDINGS
The Authority has been unable to determine how a request for analysis of Reiha’s cell phone
was dated with Officer A’s signature on a day when he is known to have been overseas.
Officer A should not have signed the form, since he had declared a conflict of interest.

3434

 2(d): Was Reiha’s interview conducted in accordance with the Child Protection Protocol?
181. In 2014, the Child Protection Protocol (CPP) provided that all CPP cases will have an agreed
joint investigation plan which must consider the management of the initial interview of the
child.
182. While Officer B did consult with CYF at the start of the investigation, he told the Authority that
his reason for not involving CYF in Reiha’s interview was because:
“…there was no joint investigation between us and CYF at the time so we didn’t
need to involve CYF and … we would’ve spoken to mum. It’s that whole softly,
softly approach. I think the more people you bring in ... we didn’t need to bring
in CYF but the more people you bring, the more stress it was putting on Reiha so
we just tried to do things as softly as we could, but they didn’t need to be
involved anyway.”
183. There is no record on the file of whether or not this matter was accepted as a Child Protection
Protocol case. Both Officer B and CYF advised the Authority that the matter was not
investigated pursuant to the CPP. This means that there was no requirement under the CPP for
Officer B to consult with CYF regarding Reiha’s interview.

FINDING
Reiha’s interview was not required to be conducted in accordance with the CPP.

2(e): Was Reiha’s interview appropriately conducted and recorded?
184. The complaint received by the Authority was that prior to Reiha’s interview, Police should have
consulted with the medical professionals involved in Reiha’s care and that Reiha’s interview
should have been conducted or overseen by a psychologist.
185. A forensic interview is a recorded interview that complies with the Evidence Regulations 2007
and can be used as evidence in court.
186. Officer B arranged for the interview to be conducted by Officer C.17 Officer C was an
appropriately trained, qualified and experienced forensic evidential interviewer pursuant to
the Evidence Regulations.
187. The applicable Police policy in 2014 was the ‘Video recorded forensic interviews with at risk
children and young people’. The policy on preparing for a forensic interview, including the preinterview discussion with the child, included the following:
“Depending on the child’s age and level of maturity, the interviewer or monitor
will endeavour to explain to them about the interview procedure, its recording
and use. It is desirable that any discussion with the child is recorded in writing.
17

Officer C is no longer a Police employee.

3535

 It is useful if any discussion with the child is monitored. The child may need
some time to settle and familiarise herself with the surroundings before the
interview begins.”
188. There was no law or Police policy that required the interview to be conducted or overseen by a
psychologist. The Authority notes that the complaint also stated that a psychologist had
offered to attend the interview, but Reiha had refused.
189. Officer B told Police: “…the interview didn’t get past the introduction stage. Reiha just closed
down and neither of us could get her to open up.” The record of the interview on the Police
electronic file stated: "Prelim interview conducted with Reiha by [Officer C] on the 14th May
2014, no criminal disclosure made.”
190. The Authority has not seen any documentation recording Officer C’s interaction with Reiha.
The 2016 Police review of the investigation also noted that there was no report or notes
attached to the file regarding the pre-interview discussion with Officer C.
191. However, in an email sent by Officer B to Mr Y and Officer A on 22 May 2014, Officer B
reported what Reiha had confirmed to Police about her relationship with Mr Back (as outlined
in paragraph 54 above).
192. While Reiha declined to provide a formal evidential interview, she clearly did provide either
Officer C or Officer B with information that was relevant to the investigation. A report of the
preliminary interview with Reiha should have been prepared by either Officer B or Officer C
and attached to the file.
193. The poor recording of the preliminary interview is an example of deficiencies with the
recording of information during the investigation.

FINDINGS
It was appropriate for Officer C to conduct the interview.
The information from Reiha’s preliminary interview was not appropriately recorded.

2(f): Was the interview of Mr Back conducted appropriately?
194. In 2014 the Police ‘Investigative interviewing suspect guide’ provided that:18
“Investigators must attempt to gain as much information as possible to
establish the truth of the matter under investigation. Interviewing the suspect
may provide valuable information not obtained from other sources.”
195. Regarding the initial approach to a suspect, the guide stated:

18

The guide provided a definition of suspect as: “…‘suspect’ in relation to an offence, means any person whom it is believed
has or may have committed that offence, whether or not: (a) That person has been charged with that offence; or (b) There is
good cause to suspect that person of having committed that offence.”

3636

 “If required caution the suspect. …If they are not arrested or detained ask them
to accompany you to the police station for interview. Gain informed consent by
ensuring they understand they do not have to accompany you and are free to
leave at any time. Keep accurate records of all interactions with the suspect
using your notebook. If they make admissions or discuss the allegations, record
what is said and get them to expand on that. Get as much detail as possible.”
196. When Officer B spoke to Mr Back for just over an hour at the Gisborne Police Station, the
interview was not formally recorded.
197. Officer B told the Authority:
“…In the back of my mind, I’m thinking I need this for the family. I need to be
able to get his version of events. I don’t want to have to go back to them and
say well, I tried to talk to him and he gave us nothing. So the way I did it was I
wrote some notes on what I wanted to talk to him about. I had various number
of text messages that I was unhappy with on that spreadsheet ... and I just
wanted him to talk. So when he came to the station I took him to a front room
which was not a video room because I didn’t want him to feel ... uncomfortable.
I introduced myself. I explained to him there had been an investigation. I
explained to him he wasn’t under arrest and he was free to leave. I didn’t want
that to cloud anything. … He explained himself. I let him have his say. I then
asked him the hard questions. I then put emails and texts to him. I asked for
explanations. He [provided] self-serving explanations and got a bit emotional. I
put it on hard, he cried....“
198. Officer B advised the Authority that he did not record the actual questions asked and the
responses provided. He made notes but these were recorded on a notepad rather than in his
notebook. The Authority has not seen any record of the interview other than typed notes
made by Officer B immediately following the interview and subsequently placed onto the
Police electronic file.
199. Officer B told the Authority:
“I didn’t want to sit there officially writing things in a notebook because he’s a
teacher. My opinion was if I was to go in there … official sounding and official
looking … my fear was that he would just clam up and want a lawyer and not
speak. So what I tried to do was minimise the environment as best I could to
allow him to speak and that’s what I did.”
200. Mr Back gave evidence at the Coroner’s inquest. The Coroner told the Authority that she
thought that Mr Back would have been an incredibly difficult interviewee, even for an
experienced detective, because “his ability to prevaricate and minimise and deflect was
extraordinary.” The Coroner also stated in her findings: “He struck me as entirely concerned for
and focussed on his own needs and circumstances and lacking any insight into the impact of his
conduct on Reiha.”
201. Officer B made the following record of the interview in the Police electronic file:

3737

 “Advised him of the recent investigation and that I wished to speak to him
about his friendship with Reiha McLelland. BACK was open and upfront about
his friendship with Reiha stating that it was exactly that, a friendship.
The friendship had begun at the end of the school term prior to Reiha leaving. A
friend of Reiha’s had disclosed [confidential information about Reiha]. Over the
final few weeks of the school term BACK has been able to reach out to Reiha to
gain her trust, unfortunately this has occurred as school has finished for the
year.
Back has remained in contact with Reiha and has allowed her to visit his home
address on the understanding Reiha’s parents were informed. Unfortunately
Reiha has been able to convince BACK that her parents were aware and
approved of her visits, something her parents knew nothing about.”
202. The Authority considers that this is an inadequate record of an interview which lasted for more
than an hour. Furthermore, text messages sent by Mr Back to Reiha indicate that Mr Back was
fully aware that Reiha was keeping the visits a secret from her parents. Mr Back also sent
messages to Reiha asking her to be careful what she tells people about him, and arranged to
meet up with her while his partner was away on holiday in the South Island during the first
week of January 2014 (refer to examples above in paragraph 66).
203. There is no record of Mr Back being asked to provide an explanation for any of these
messages. The Authority is therefore unable to determine exactly what questions Officer B put
to Mr Back.
204. The Authority acknowledges that the investigation required time-consuming analysis of an
unusually large and significant amount of data. The Authority also agrees with Police that prior
to the interview there was insufficient evidence available to Police to charge Mr Back with a
criminal offence.
205. However, the text messages from Mr Back to Reiha were sufficiently concerning that the
Authority considers Officer B ought to have asked Mr Back to provide an explanation for the
content of some of the more concerning messages, and fully recorded any explanation
provided.

FINDING
The interview of Mr Back was not conducted appropriately.

2(g): Was the evidence adequately assessed and recorded?
206. Officer B made a number of statements to various people throughout the investigation about
the nature of Mr Back’s contact with Reiha.
207. For example, in his email dated 16 June 2014, which was sent to Officer A and provided to
Gisborne Intermediate School, Officer B stated:

3838

 “Once I had received all of the text and email data and I looked beyond my
initial fears I began to see that Reiha had indeed reached out to her teacher at
the time for help and support. He is the first to admit that he found himself
overwhelmed at times with the amount of contact he had with Reiha and that
both he and [his partner] had felt a sense of relief when the Police became
involved”.
208. In the same email Officer B also makes the comment, later reported by the media, that:
“In relation to Sam I genuinely believe he had Reiha’s best interests at heart, yes
he has made some questionable decisions but when you look at the facts as a
whole it is easy to see how he quickly got sucked into a situation he had very
little chance of controlling.”
209. Given the content of the text messages and emails sent by Mr Back to Reiha, it is difficult to
understand the rationale for these comments. It is unclear if the comments resulted from a
poor analysis of the evidence or a lack of experience, combined with no supervision. It is also
possible (given the comments of the Coroner), that Officer B was just fooled by Mr Back.
Whatever the reason, the Authority believes Officer B should have been far more circumspect
of Mr Back’s explanations when assessing them in the light of the other available evidence.
Nor has the Authority seen any documentation with detailed analysis by Officer B of the text
and email data.
210. Officer B provided evidence for the Coroner that on receipt of the text information from the
telecommunication companies, he sent the information to an analyst to be extracted onto an
excel spreadsheet for easier reading and received the excel spreadsheet on 5th May 2014. The
spreadsheet contained over 190 pages of text data content which he “then had to analyse”. He
further stated:
”By 15 May 2014, although I had received the text message data as a result of
the production order it had not yet been fully analysed by me. …The full analysis
of the text message and e-mail data was completed by 3 June 2014.”
211. The Authority has received copies of the excel spreadsheets but has not seen any document
recording any further analysis of the text message data Officer B refers to in his evidence.
212. In this context, ‘analysis’ required identifying any messages judged as being of obvious
concern, and any messages judged as being potentially of concern, and recording these in a
manner that allowed the messages to be evaluated and referred to without having to search
through 190 pages of data. If this analysis was done, it has not been provided to the Authority
and does not appear in written form on the Police file.

FINDING
Officer B did not adequately assess and record the evidence.

3939

 2(h): Was there an element of pre-determination in the investigation?
213. The complaint before the Authority is that the outcome of the investigation was predetermined and that at the start of the investigation, Officer B told Reiha’s family that Officer
A had said the investigation was unlikely to lead to anything.
214. Officer A denies saying this and told the Authority: “…that’s just a nonsense ... I’d been working
in the Police for 22 years at that stage so there’s no way that we’d be saying that….” Officer A
pointed out that: “…if I wanted to influence Mr Back getting off, why would I sign a form to
authorise him being investigated?”
215. Officer A also stated:
“…I wasn’t mates with the teacher … I wasn’t friendly with him ... I pride myself
on being objective and if it meant the guy went to prison, he went to prison. …
An investigation had to take place. If there was evidence to support a conviction
then so be it.”
216. One of the issues raised in the complaint is that Officer A supported Mr Back, evidenced by the
fact that they had lunch together during the Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal hearing.
217. However, Officer A told the Authority:
“I went to lunch. I had got my lunch, Mr Back turned up. I had my lunch, there
were other teachers who came with us so my guess is they probably texted him
something. I didn’t text him, I didn’t send a note to him, I didn’t want to really
see him, I was with the current principal at the time and I was eating my lunch.
He turned up….”
218. Mr X, the school principal at that time, accompanied Officer A to the hearing to represent the
school. Mr X told Police that two teachers from the school were also at the hearing, supporting
Mr Back. Mr X and Officer A went for lunch with the two teachers, not realising that one of the
teachers had been in contact with Mr Back, advising him where they were going for lunch. Mr
X and Officer A were completely unaware that Mr Back was going to turn up. Mr X was not
comfortable with the situation when Mr Back arrived, so he discreetly suggested to Officer A
that they leave, which they did.
219. The Authority found no other evidence to suggest that Officer A assisted or tried to protect Mr
Back. Therefore the Authority is satisfied that, although Officer A did not adequately manage
his conflict of interest, he did not support Mr Back through the investigation or have a predetermined view of the likely outcome.
220. The Authority has not found any evidence to suggest that Officer B conducted the
investigation in the expectation that no offences would be uncovered. On the contrary, when
he received the file for investigation he applied for production orders to obtain text data from

4040

 the telecommunications companies because he suspected that an offence may have been
committed.19
221. The Coroner who held the inquest into Reiha’s death told the Authority that her recollection of
Officer B was that he was “earnest and inexperienced. When he gave his evidence my
impression was that he ... had absolutely no guidance”. In her findings the Coroner describes
the investigation by Officer B as ‘comprehensive’ and considers that, having not been provided
with instructions regarding an alternate supervisor, it was to his credit that he ran a
comprehensive investigation in those circumstances.
222. Regarding the comments made by Officer B that Mr Back “got sucked into a situation”,20 the
Coroner told the Authority: “his email is incredibly poorly framed … but that was the worst of it
... I didn’t have a sense that that was the perspective he took … he didn’t approach his enquiries
in that way.”
223. Although the Authority has identified some deficiencies with the investigation, the Authority is
satisfied that the outcome was not pre-determined. Officer B was sincere in his investigation
into whether or not Mr Back had committed a criminal offence.

FINDING
The outcome of the investigation was not pre-determined.

2(i): Was the final covering report changed after Reiha’s death?
224. When a Police file is created, a Case Cover Sheet with a version number is printed. The Case
Cover Sheet is a computer generated report providing information about the file including the
file number, who the file is assigned to, where the incident occurred, details of the people
involved and case statistics. The cover sheet also includes the identity of the officer who prints
the report and the time and date it was printed. When a new Case Cover Sheet is printed, the
version number changes.
225. The Case Cover Sheet attached to this investigation file is labelled version 2. The cover sheet
was printed by Officer D on 1 August 2014, at 1.44pm, soon after Officer B was re-assigned the
file at 1.41pm.
226. The complaint before the Authority is: “Why was the report changed? And where is version 1?”
227. Officer D told the Authority that his usual practice when reviewing files and sending the file to
another District, or back to Gisborne, is to print off another cover sheet with the updated case
assignment, showing who the case is assigned to.

19
20

Ill treatment or neglect of a child pursuant to section 195 of the Crimes Act 1961.
Email to Officer A dated 16 June 2014.

4141

 228. Officer D’s file review was entered on the electronic file notes. He recorded that following a
review of the file, he was returning the file to Officer B for further action relating to notifying
the Teachers Council of the investigation and the Police’s concerns about the contact by Mr
Back with Reiha.
229. Version 2 of the Case Cover Sheet shows that the file was assigned to Officer D at 8.34am on
31 July 2014 then assigned back to Officer B at 1.41pm on 1 August 2014.
230. The Authority is satisfied that the version number of the Case Cover Sheet automatically
changed when Officer D printed a new coversheet when he assigned the file back to Officer B.
Although there was a new version number on the Case Cover Sheet, this does not mean that
the content of the investigation file was changed.

FINDING
Although the version number of the Case Cover Sheet changed, the content of the final covering
report did not change after Reiha’s death.

ISSUE 3: DID THE CHILD PROTECTION TEAM EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE WITH OTHER
AGENCIES?
231. Police ‘Child protection’ policy and investigation guidelines provide the principles that guide
Police in responding to child abuse, and apply to all cases where the victim is under the age of
17 at the time the complaint is made. The policy applicable in April 2014 included the Child
Protection Protocol (CPP), dated 18 October 2013.21
232. In October 2013, the CPP set out the way that CYF and New Zealand Police would work
together in situations of serious child abuse. In April 2014, ‘serious child abuse’ was defined as
sexual abuse, serious physical abuse and serious neglect.
233. The policy requires that CYF and Police staff at the local level share information about a
referral (Report of Concern) and discuss what approach is to be taken. The consultation is to
be clearly evidenced and recorded. In cases where the child or young person is at risk of harm,
but protected in the short term, the policy provides that the timeframe for consultation is two
working days. The CPP defines the roles of each organisation and the process for working
together. Where CYF and Police agree that the case is to be investigated under the CPP, there
must be an agreed joint investigation plan using an agreed national template.
234. The CPP also describes situations which do not require management using the processes
agreed in the CPP, but where routine engagement between CYF and Police will continue as
part of normal case work. The CPP notes that “any case may be referred under the CPP at any
time if new information means the case may meet the definition of serious child abuse.”

21

See paragraphs 299-307 below for more information on the CPP.

4242

 235. On the Gisborne Child Protection Team, it was Officer A’s responsibility to ensure that the
initial consultation occurred, and that the decision regarding whether or not the case was to
be investigated under the CPP was recorded on the Police file.
236. On 7 and 8 April 2014, Officer A received information from a number of sources (the Report of
Concern, Mrs McLelland and Ms Z) relating to Mr Back and Reiha. He assigned the
investigation file to Officer B on 9 April 2014. There is no record of Officer A consulting with
CYF prior to assigning the file for investigation. Officer A told the Authority he may have
consulted with CYF before he went on leave on 10 April 2014, but does not recall doing so.
237. Officer B consulted with CYF a week after receiving the investigation file, while Reiha was still
in Wellington. The consultation was fully recorded in an exchange of emails between Officer B
and the Gisborne CYF supervisor. However, there is no record on the Police file to indicate if
the matter was accepted as a CPP investigation or not.
238. Officer B told Police that, after consulting with CYF, he determined that there were no care and
protection issues for CYF to manage but he could not rule out that it was not a CPP matter and
“it remained a CPP file”.22 Officer B did not further consult with CYF during the investigation,
although CYF had requested that Officer B keep them updated with progress.
239. Following Reiha’s death, CYF completed an internal review of the case. The review found that
when the Report of Concern was made, it was discussed with Police and found not to meet the
CPP criteria. There was some confusion following this agreement, however, as subsequent CYF
case notes refer to CPP consultations with Police.
240. CYF advised the Authority that the internal review of the case determined that Police and CYF
discussed the case on a couple of occasions in May 2014 at the CPP monthly meetings (which
did not involve Officer B). The decision made was that CYF would remain available to the
family if needed, but, as Reiha had returned to her parents care, there was no need for any
follow up from CYF. CYF advised the Authority that it followed the direction of Police and
Health officials that CYF involvement was likely to cause Reiha further distress.
241. It is evident that during the investigation there was a lack of clarity regarding whether or not
the case was accepted as a CPP joint investigation. In the Authority’s view, the circumstances
of this case did not meet the criteria at that time for a CPP investigation.23 In light of that, the
Authority is satisfied that Police communication and consultation with CYF was adequate.
242. In 2014, the scope of the Child Protection Protocol (CPP) was narrower than it is currently and
made no reference to a multi-agency approach (where agencies such as schools and health
professionals, are included in the investigation process). The current CPP is broader in scope in
terms of cases that will be accepted as a CPP matter and, for cases that are accepted as CPP
matters, now requires that a multi-agency approach is considered.

22

During the investigation he formed the opinion that the issues raised would be more appropriately dealt with as
employment matters, as opposed to a CPP investigation, but that this did not alter the manner in which the criminal
investigation was conducted.
23
See paragraphs 299-307 below for relevant policy.

4343

 243. When Reiha returned to Gisborne, she was under the care of Health services. Officer B told the
Authority he did not consider a multi-agency approach to the investigation because CYF were
not involved (as there were no care and protection issues), and Reiha’s parents were in regular
contact with the health professionals and were advising him that Reiha was doing well and
there was no cause for concern.
244. Officer B was focussed on establishing whether a criminal offence had been committed by Mr
Back but did not consider the wider implications and how evidence, particularly the text
message and email data, might be relevant for other agencies. The Authority considers that
this reflects in part the ‘Child protection’ policy and practice at that time but may also be an
outcome of a lack of experienced supervision of the investigation.
245. Officer B did communicate with Gisborne Intermediate School throughout and kept the
principal informed of the progress of the investigation. Although communication with the
school was timely, the Authority considers that the information provided by Officer B about
the nature and content of the emails and text messages from Mr Back to Reiha was
inadequate. As a result, the school was not in a position to properly assess whether further
action needed to be taken to ensure the safety of other students.

FINDINGS
The Police’s initial consultation with CYF was delayed, and Police did not record a decision
regarding whether the investigation was to be conducted under the CPP.
Since this case did not meet the criteria for investigation under the CPP, the Police’s
communication with CYF was adequate.
Police policy at the time did not require a multi-agency approach. There was a lack of
consideration of how the information held by Police might be relevant for other agencies.

ISSUE 4: DID POLICE PROVIDE THE GISBORNE HERALD NEWSPAPER WITH AN INTERNAL
REPORT?
246. The quote attributed to the investigating officer in the Gisborne Herald Newspaper on 5 March
2016 (see paragraph 110 above), was taken from a lengthy internal report written by Officer B
and dated 16 June 2014. The report was emailed to Officer A, and is a summary of the
investigation with Officer B’s recommendation regarding charges.
247. The complaint received by the Authority is that the internal report was leaked to the media by
Police. The basis of this assertion is that the statement was never presented at the Teachers
Council Disciplinary Tribunal and the quote does not appear in any media release attributable
to the investigating officer. Officer A was quoted in the same article in relation to the Teachers
Council Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision, and the complaint suggests that the lifting of name
suppression and leaking of the report was an attempt to distance Gisborne Intermediate
School and Officer A, as Chairman of the Board, from the teacher.

4444

 248. In his evidence to the Coroner, Officer B stated that he did not know how the newspaper got
hold of the quote.
249. Officer A told the Authority he did not provide the Gisborne Herald Newspaper with a copy of
the internal report. He also told the Authority he received a copy of the report as a member of
the Board of Trustees, and the Teachers Council was provided with a copy of the report as part
of the information released by the school during the disciplinary hearing process. The Board of
Trustees sought legal advice before releasing information to the Teachers Council and the
report was released following that advice.
250. The Authority spoke to the Editor of the Gisborne Herald Newspaper. He advised that the
reporter who compiled the story cannot recall how the statement was obtained, but the story
was a hearing report and the reporter would not have introduced a statement from Police into
a hearing report. The Police reporter for the newspaper also advised he did not receive the
comment from Police.
251. The Authority obtained transcripts of evidence from the Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal
hearing. Mr Back was represented by legal counsel, Ms V. In her opening submissions to the
Tribunal, Ms V referred to the body of text messages and emails and said:
“… [Officer B] finished his [16 June 2014] report with ‘In relation to Sam, I
genuinely believe he had Miss [redacted]’s best interests at heart. Yes, he made
some questionable decisions but when you look at the facts as a whole, it is
easy to see how he got sucked into a situation he had very little chance of
controlling’.”
252. The Chair of the Disciplinary Tribunal has confirmed for the Authority that a representative of
the press was present for at least part of the hearing.
253. The Authority is satisfied that Police did not provide the Gisborne Herald Newspaper with a
copy of the internal report and considers it likely that the quote was obtained from the
opening submissions of Mr Back’s legal counsel.

FINDING
Police did not provide the Gisborne Herald newspaper with an internal report.

ISSUE 5: WAS ADEQUATE SUPPORT AND ADVICE PROVIDED TO MR AND MRS MCLELLAND
FOLLOWING REIHA’S DEATH?
5(a): Was appropriate and timely advice provided regarding post mortems?
254. Reiha’s parents complained that Police did not advise them they had the right to object to a
post mortem on cultural grounds.

4545

 255. Reiha died in hospital on Friday 1 August 2014. When a person dies in hospital, the hospital
reports the death in the first instance to the Coroner. The Coroner confirms if the matter falls
within the Coroner’s jurisdiction, and if the Coroner accepts jurisdiction the Police are involved
and act as agents for the Coroner to obtain the information required.
256. Reiha’s death was reported to the Coroner by hospital staff. Hospital staff knew the family
objected to a post mortem examination and advised the Duty Coroner accordingly.
257. Officer E met with Mrs McLelland on Saturday morning from around 8.40am. He obtained a
signed statement from Mrs McLelland and recorded on the statement that Mrs McLelland
objected to a post mortem. The statement, together with a report prepared by Officer E
supporting the family’s objection, was forwarded to the Duty Coroner later the same day.
258. The Authority is satisfied that when Police obtained statements from Reiha’s parents, they
were aware that the family objected to a post mortem and they communicated this fact to the
Coroner. It was not necessary for Police to provide advice when Reiha’s parents had already
taken the opportunity to raise their objection.

FINDING
There was no need for Police to provide advice regarding the family’s right to object to a post
mortem, because Police were aware that the family had raised their objection.

5(b): Were requests for statements from family members appropriate?
259. Reiha’s parents complained that it was inappropriate for Police to ask them to provide signed
statements at the Gisborne Police Station the day after Reiha had died.
260. Reiha was admitted to hospital late in the evening on Thursday 31 July 2014, following an
incident at her home address. Sometime around midnight, Officer E and another officer went
to Gisborne Hospital to obtain more detail about the incident prior to going to Reiha’s home to
complete further enquiries.
261. Officer E spoke to Reiha’s mother, Mrs McLelland, and obtained some brief information only.
The other detective, Officer F, spoke to Reiha’s father, Bruce McLelland, and obtained a full
statement.24
262. Reiha died in hospital on Friday 1 August 2014. After a death is reported to the Coroner, Police
provide the Coroner with information about the death provided on a standard Police template
form entitled ‘Initial Report for Coroner’.
263. The Police ‘Sudden Death’ policy advises officers to: “Refer to the report’s prompts and aides
and cover the circumstances of the death and events leading up to it in a way that will allow

24

Mr McLelland signed the statement at 10.50am on 2 August 2014 in the presence of Officer E.

4646

 the Coroner to have a clear understanding of events.” The policy requires that the report is
completed and forwarded as soon as practicable and before the end of the shift.
264. In relation to obtaining statements, the policy states: “If the death is not suspicious, obtain
statements as soon as practicable (notebook statements are not acceptable).”
265. On the Police ‘Initial Report for Coroner’ form, the prompt regarding statements sets out that:
“You are required to obtain statements, preferably written A4 statements, from
… relevant next of kin/witnesses who can comment on Deceased’s
background/any issues or evidence that may support the cause or
circumstances of death.”
266. Officer E was advised of the death when he arrived for work at 7am on Saturday 2 August
2014, and assumed responsibility for completing the initial Police file for the Coroner.
267. Soon after arriving at work, Officer E met Mrs McLelland at the Gisborne Police Station and
obtained a written statement. He started recording the statement at 8.41am and it was signed
by Mrs McLelland at 10.45am. The statement was forwarded to the Duty Coroner later that
day.
268. In 2017, Officer E told the Authority that he could not recall how the arrangement to meet Mrs
McLelland at the Police station was made. This is understandable given the time that has
passed. Officer E recalled that Mrs McLelland was understandably upset, but he did not recall
any objection to meeting at the Police station. In relation to the timing of the statement,
Officer E told the Authority that interviewing in such circumstances is an extremely difficult
time for everyone, but necessary.
269. Given the particular circumstances of this matter, the Authority is of the opinion that it was
reasonable in the circumstances to request early statements from Reiha’s parents. This was
done to inform the Coroner of the circumstances of the death, so that decisions could be made
regarding a post mortem and release of Reiha’s body.
270. It is unclear, however, why the statement was obtained at the Gisborne Police station. The
Authority makes the observation that in this situation, it would have been preferable for Police
to arrange for statements to be obtained from family at the hospital to enable family members
to remain as close as possible to Reiha and take account of their cultural practices.

FINDINGS
It was appropriate for Police to request statements from family members, but it would have
been preferable to obtain the statements at the hospital rather than the Police station.

4747

 5(c): Was there adequate ongoing support provided for the family?
271. The complaint before the Authority is that no support or advice was offered to the family
following Reiha’s death, Victim Support was not notified and advised to contact the family, and
a Police officer was not assigned to support the family during the inquest process.
272. Victim Support is an independent organisation utilising volunteers to support people impacted
by a crisis. The volunteers are managed by a paid coordinator who is located within a Police
building but entirely separate from them.
273. Victim Support has confirmed to Police that it was notified of the incident involving Reiha at
12.25am on 1 August 2014, on instruction from the Tolaga Bay Police officer. Victim Support
also advised Police that they had made contact with the family.
274. In terms of ongoing support for the family, the Coroner advised the Authority that
responsibility for this rests with the Coronial Services Office for both the period leading up to
an inquest and during an inquest. When a matter is going to an inquest, Police will often assist
the Coroner, for example by meeting family and going through the file with them, but only at
the request of the Coroner.
275. In this particular case, the Coroner confirmed for the Authority that she wrote to Reiha’s family
soon after Reiha’s death to advise that she had opened an enquiry and who to contact if the
family had any queries.
276. The Coroner also made the point to the Authority that it is a valid criticism of the system that
the Coronial Services Unit does not have the capability to be proactive about contacting
families to provide updates.
277. The Authority acknowledges that Reiha’s family have raised a valid issue regarding the support
available for families in circumstances such as this, and accepts that following Reiha’s death,
there was no proactive support provided for the family for the inquest process. However, the
Authority is satisfied that the lack of support is not attributable to any neglect of duty by
Police.

FINDINGS
There was a lack of ongoing support for the family during the inquest process, but this was not
due to any neglect of duty by Police.

ISSUE 6: WAS TIMELY AND ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE PROVIDED BY POLICE TO THE CORONER?
278. On 19 April 2016, the Coroner held a pre-inquest teleconference. Mr and Mrs McLelland were
represented by legal counsel, Ms U. During the teleconference Ms U advised the Coroner that,
while the evidence provided by Police to the Coroner included copies of written and electronic
communication between Reiha and Mr Back, she believed there were many more documents

4848

 of that kind that had not been copied to the Coroner by Police. The Coroner tasked an officer
to locate the documents and make them available to the inquiry no later than 29 April 2016.
279. On 21 June 2016, after receiving and reviewing all the emails and text messages exchanged
between Mr Back and Reiha, the Coroner issued a minute directing that the text and email
data obtained by Police in the course of the child protection investigation were to be included
in the bundle of evidence at the inquest. The Coroner considered that the information was
relevant to the circumstances of Reiha’s death and “provides significantly greater
insight/context than the Summary of Facts agreed for the Teachers Council Disciplinary
Tribunal.”
280. Reiha’s parents complained to the Authority that:


the Police disclosure of information was unsatisfactory;



Police argued they had provided all the relevant documentation, but the documents did
not include all the text messages and, had it not been for the Teachers Council
Disciplinary Tribunal hearing, the family would not have known about all of them; and



the text messages were so clearly relevant that either Police were attempting to cover
things up, or Police training is poor.

281. In addition to this, the family had some difficulty obtaining an email from Officer B to Officer A
dated 20 May 2014, which was not part of the child protection file and that Police claimed had
been deleted from the computer system.
282. In relation to the failure to disclose all of the text messages to the Coroner, the officer
obtaining the information for forwarding to the Coroner relied on the Child Protection Team to
provide him with the relevant information.
283. Officer B was tasked with forwarding the relevant information and provided a formal written
statement. The evidence he provided about the child protection investigation for the Coroner
accurately described the volume of data.
284. The Authority considers that the failure to provide all of the data is a consequence of the
inadequate analysis originally undertaken and the Police failure to recognise the significance of
the information they received. The Authority is satisfied it was not a deliberate attempt to
withhold information.
285. In relation to the email dated 20 May 2014, Officer B told the Authority that he did not know
why the email was missing from the original file and he was certain the file was complete
when it was sent for filing. Officer B was aware that the file had been pulled apart a number of
times and thought this might explain how the email was no longer attached to the file. For
some reason the email was also not stored on the electronic file. Officer B eventually retrieved
the email after the Police IT group was able to retrieve it from backup storage.

4949

 286. There is a recurring theme throughout the investigation of inadequate recording of
information. The Authority has also experienced difficulty obtaining verifiable accounts of the
content of various files and whereabouts of documentation.
287. The Authority is satisfied that the difficulty obtaining the email dated 20 May 2014 was a
consequence of and a further example of the inadequate record keeping on the file and not a
deliberate attempt to withhold information.

FINDINGS
Police initially failed to disclose all the relevant data to Coroner, but this was not a deliberate
attempt to withhold information.

ISSUE 7: DID SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE TEACHERS COUNCIL BY OFFICER A REGARDING
NAME SUPPRESSION CONSTITUTE AN ATTEMPT TO PERVERT THE COURSE OF JUSTICE?
288. On 5 May 2015, the Gisborne Intermediate School Board of Trustees sent a letter to the Chair
of the Teachers Council Complaints Assessment Committee in support of an application for
name suppression made to the Teachers Council by Mr Back. The letter was signed by Officer A
as Chair of the School Board of Trustees.
289. The school presented a number of reasons for its support of the application, including the
impact of publishing details of Mr Back or the school on Reiha’s family, Mr Back and his family,
Gisborne Intermediate School and the wider school community, and on the presumption of
innocence. The school also argued that publishing Mr Back’s name would undermine the
statutory functions and prerogatives of other government agencies by stating that:
“Criminal charges have not been laid in respect to the death of the student, nor
have any criminal charges been laid in respect of any alleged inappropriate
behaviour by Mr Back towards the student. Identification of Mr Back or
Gisborne Intermediate may prejudice the ability of the Crown to prosecute any
future criminal charges that may be laid against Mr Back or any other party in
relation to the death of the student.”
290. The letter was signed by Officer A under the final paragraph which states:
“If you require any further detail about the Board’s reasoning or would like to
discuss this matter in any more detail then please contact me at [Officer A’s
Police email address]. Furthermore if you require the contents of this letter
affirmed in an affidavit please let me know and I will do this for you on the
Board’s behalf.”
291. Reiha’s parents complained to the Authority that Officer A deliberately misled the Teachers
Council, because at the time of signing the letter he was fully aware that the file had been
closed and a decision had been made not to charge.

5050

 292. Officer A told the Authority that in sending the letter he did not intend to mislead anybody.
The letter was sent with the backing of the School Board of Trustees, and the Board had
consulted first and obtained advice on the matter from lawyers at the New Zealand School
Trustees Association.
293. Officer A said that the letter had been checked by lawyers. He acknowledged that it was
“dumb” to use the Police email system, but for him it was normal because he did not have
another address and it was his usual practice to put that email address on everything.
294. In relation to the comment that not granting name suppression may prejudice the ability of
the Crown to prosecute any future criminal charges, Officer A said:
“…the thinking there was around whether there was evidence to come forward
in relation to any of this … there was no information ... but in the event that
something else came forward ... because it wasn’t as if he was acquitted. … It’s
obviously on a Gisborne Intermediate letterhead. All that comment was about
was there potential because who knows, they might come up with something
else or keep the diaries or whatever.”
295. Officer A provided information about the status of the investigation that was patently wrong
and misleading. The investigation had been filed for nine months, there were no other
complainants, there had been a Police determination that there was insufficient evidence and
there were no other lines of enquiry to pursue. The fact that the Board obtained legal advice
before sending the letter is irrelevant to the Authority’s assessment in that regard. In any
event, the advice was presumably provided without knowledge of the status of the Police
investigation.
296. While Officer A signed the letter in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, his
position as a Police officer lent veracity to that information. There would otherwise be no
reason for a School Board of Trustees to have a view on whether or not declining an
application for name suppression was likely to prejudice a future Crown investigation or
prosecution.
297. The Authority notes that if Officer A had intended to mislead the Teachers Council, he would
have been guilty of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. However, it does
not think that such an intent can be proved. Officer A was clearly in breach of Police policy and
his behaviour constituted misconduct at the serious end of the spectrum, but his actions were
more likely the result of a foolish and unthinking attempt to protect the school than a
deliberate attempt to mislead the Teachers Council.

FINDINGS
The submissions to the Teachers Council regarding name suppression were patently wrong and
misleading.
However, there is insufficient evidence to prove that Officer A intended to mislead the Teachers
Council (and therefore attempt to pervert the course of justice).

5151

 Officer A’s actions were contrary to Police policy and amounted to misconduct at the serious
end of the spectrum.

5252

 Conclusions
298. The Authority has determined that:
1)

The initial response by the Child Protection Team to the Report of Concern about Reiha
was adequate.

2)

The case was appropriately assigned for investigation.

3)

Contrary to Police policy, the investigation was not adequately supervised.

4)

Officer A’s conflict of interest was not managed appropriately.

5)

The investigation plan was inadequate for the circumstances of this particular case and
not all appropriate enquiries were conducted.

6)

Officer A did not provide ‘pre-authorisation’ for an application for a production order
before it was completed.

7)

The Authority has been unable to determine how a request for analysis of Reiha’s cell
phone was dated with Officer A’s signature on a day when he is known to have been
overseas.

8)

Officer A should not have signed the form, since he had declared a conflict of interest.

9)

Reiha’s interview was not required to be conducted in accordance with the CPP.

10)

It was appropriate for Officer C to conduct the interview.

11)

The information from Reiha’s preliminary interview was not appropriately recorded

12)

The interview of Mr Back was not conducted appropriately.

13)

Officer B did not adequately assess and record the evidence.

14)

The outcome of the investigation was not pre-determined.

15)

Although the version number of the Case Cover Sheet changed, the content of the final
covering report did not change after Reiha’s death.

16)

The Police’s initial consultation with CYF was delayed, and Police did not record a
decision regarding whether the investigation was to be conducted under the CPP.

17)

Since this case did not meet the criteria for investigation under the CPP, the Police’s
communication with CYF was adequate.

18)

Police policy at the time did not require a multi-agency approach. There was a lack of
consideration of how the information held by Police might be relevant for other
agencies.

19)

Police did not provide the Gisborne Herald newspaper with an internal report.
5353

 20)

There was no need for Police to provide advice regarding the family’s right to object to a
post mortem, because Police were aware that the family had raised their objection.

21)

It was appropriate for Police to request statements from family members, but it would
have been preferable to obtain the statements at the hospital rather than the Police
station.

22)

There was a lack of ongoing support for the family during the inquest process, but this
was not due to any neglect of duty by Police.

23)

Police initially failed to disclose all the relevant data to Coroner, but this was not a
deliberate attempt to withhold information.

24)

The submissions to the Teachers Council regarding name suppression were patently
wrong and misleading.

25)

However, there is insufficient evidence to prove that Officer A intended to mislead the
Teachers Council (and therefore attempt to pervert the course of justice).

26)

Officer A’s actions were contrary to Police policy and amounted to misconduct at the
serious end of the spectrum.

Judge Colin Doherty
Chair
Independent Police Conduct Authority
11 December 2018
IPCA: 15-2207

5454

 Appendix A - Applicable Laws and Policies
CHILD PROTECTION PROTOCOL (CPP)
The CPP in 2014
299. In 2014, the scope of the CPP, as it related to the circumstances of this case, was as follows:
“This protocol applies to serious child abuse including:


Sexual abuse



Serious physical abuse



Serious neglect



Serious family violence where the child is a witness

This protocol does not apply to:


Any report of force on a child which is of a minor, trivial or
inconsequential nature and where there is no evidence of serious abuse
or neglect.”

300. The definition provided for “Sexual abuse” was: “An act involving circumstances of indecency
with, or sexual violation of, a child or using a child in the making of sexual imaging”.
301. Under the heading ‘Consultation on the case’, the protocol provided:
“The consultation or discussion should include:


Confirming that the case is a CPP case



Sharing information or intelligence about a particular case



Discussion of any immediate action that needs to take place

302. The protocol provided for allegations against teachers under the heading ‘Mass Allegation
Investigation’ as follows:
“Allegations of abuse involving an adult working in, or associated with, an
education setting will be manged under Schedule One Managing Abuse
allegations, Memorandum of Understanding between Child, Youth and Family
and the Ministry of Education 2012.
The parties to the agreement are Child, Youth and Family, the Ministry of
Education, New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Teachers Council.”
303. The schedule set out the process for managing allegations of abuse in an education setting and
provided that, when any party to the agreement receives information about alleged abuse,
they will notify agreed representatives of the other parties.

5555

 The current CPP
304. The scope of the current CPP, relating to the circumstances of this case, is as follows:25
“The CPP is the joint process that is followed when Child, Youth and Family and
Police are responding to actions or behaviour that may constitute a criminal
offence. These actions or types of behaviour fall into three categories:


Physical abuse



Sexual abuse



Neglect.”

305. The current CPP provides definitions and examples of behaviour that would be included in the
definition. The definition of sexual abuse is:
“Sexual abuse within the CPP context is an act involving circumstances of
indecency with, or sexual violation of a child, or using a child in the making of
sexual imaging.
For example:


Grooming a child in preparation for sexual abuse (this may be done via
the internet).”

306. The current CPP also sets out the process to be followed by Child, Youth and Family and Police
staff in CPP cases. Under CPP consultation, the current CPP provides:
“The consultation should:


Share information or intelligence about the particular case



Confirm if the referral meets the threshold of the CPP



Discuss any immediate action required to secure the immediate safety
of the child



Consider whether a multi-agency approach is required.”

307. The current CPP also provides guidance on other matters that should also be taken into
account when considering an investigation. These are provided under the heading ‘Further
investigation considerations’. This part of the protocol states as follows:
“Dependant on the circumstances of each case, there may be a need to take the
following guidance into account during an investigation.
Underage sexual conduct
During the CPP consultation, the factors to be considered include:

25

Is there predatory, exploitative or coercive conduct by the offender?

The CPP still refers to CYF rather than Oranga Tamariki because it was last updated in September 2016.

5656

 

What is the age difference between the victim and offender?



Are there power and control dynamics in the relationship?
….

Abuse within an educational setting
Any CPP case where the alleged abuse has occurred within an educational
setting and the alleged offender is a child, will require collaboration between
Child, Youth and Family, Police and the relevant education facility. It may be
that the school or educational facility is invited to be part of the CPP
investigation using a multi-agency approach.”

5757

 Appendix B – Index of Officers and Civilians Involved
Index of officers
Field Staff

Roles/Comment

Officer A

Detective sergeant - officer in charge of the Gisborne Police Child Protection Team

Officer B

Detective constable – assigned the investigation into Mr Back’s contact with Reiha

Officer C

Sergeant – assigned to interview Reiha

Officer D

Detective senior sergeant - the Eastern District Child Protection and Sexual
Violence Coordinator

Officer E

Detective – assigned to investigate Reiha’s death

Officer F

Detective - assigned to investigate Reiha’s death

Officer G

Detective sergeant - Eastern District Coronial Investigations Manager

Officer H

Detective sergeant - responsible for preparing the Police file for the Coroner

Officer I

Detective senior sergeant - Police National Co-ordinator: Child Protection

Officer J

Senior detective on the Gisborne Police Child Protection Team

Index of civilians
Field Staff

Roles/Comment

Ms Z

Reiha’s hospital-based social worker

Mr Y

The principal of Gisborne Intermediate School at the time of the Police
investigation into Mr Back’s contact with Reiha

Mr X

The principal of Gisborne Intermediate School at the time of the Teachers Council
Disciplinary Tribunal hearing

Ms W

Coronial Services Case Manager

Ms V

Mr Back’s legal counsel at the Teachers Council Disciplinary Tribunal hearing

Ms U

Mr and Mrs McLelland’s legal counsel at the Coroner’s pre-inquest teleconference

5858

 About the Authority
WHO IS THE INDEPENDENT POLICE CONDUCT AUTHORITY?
The Independent Police Conduct Authority is an independent body set up by Parliament to
provide civilian oversight of Police conduct.
It is not part of the Police – the law requires it to be fully independent. The Authority is
overseen by a Board, which is chaired by Judge Colin Doherty.
Being independent means that the Authority makes its own findings based on the facts and the
law. It does not answer to the Police, the Government or anyone else over those findings. In
this way, its independence is similar to that of a Court.
The Authority employs highly experienced staff who have worked in a range of law
enforcement and related roles in New Zealand and overseas.

WHAT ARE THE AUTHORITY’S FUNCTIONS?
Under the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, the Authority:


receives complaints alleging misconduct or neglect of duty by Police, or complaints
about Police practices, policies and procedures affecting the complainant in a personal
capacity;



investigates, where there are reasonable grounds in the public interest, incidents in
which Police actions have caused or appear to have caused death or serious bodily
harm.

On completion of an investigation, the Authority must form an opinion about the Police
conduct, policy, practice or procedure which was the subject of the complaint. The Authority
may make recommendations to the Commissioner.

THIS REPORT
This report is the result of the work of a multi-disciplinary team of investigators, report writers
and managers. At significant points in the investigation itself and in the preparation of the
report, the Authority conducted audits of both process and content.

5959

  

Independent Police
Conduct Authority

Whaia te pono. kia puawai ko te tika

PO Box 25221, Wellington 6146
Freephone 0800 503 728