Impact of Earthquakes on the Central USA Amr S. Elnashai Lisa J. Cleveland Theresa Jefferson John Harrald Mid-America Earthquake Center Report 08-02 Project funded by Federal Emergency Management Agency Managed by US Army Corps of Engineers ERDC-CERL Mid-America Earthquake Center New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake Response Planning Project Final Phase I Report Impact of Earthquakes on the Central USA MAE Center Report No. 08-02 September 2008 Principal Investigator, University of Illinois Co-Investigator; George Washington University Technical Project Manager, University of Illinois Administrative Project Manager, University of Illinois Amr S. Elnashai Theresa Jefferson Lisa Johanna Cleveland Timothy Gress Mid-America Earthquake Center Civil and Environmental Engineering Department University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA Tel.: +1 217 244 6302, aelnash@uiuc.edu Contributions Mid-America Earthquake Center at the University of Illinois Amr S. Elnashai, Project Principal Investigator Billie F. Spencer, Co-Principal Investigator Arif Masud, Co-Principal Investigator Tim Gress, Administration Manager Lisa Johanna Cleveland, Technical Manager Omar Pineda, Technical Investigator Rob Suarez, Analyst Liang Chang, Analyst Can Unen, Analyst Bora Gencturk, Analyst Thomas Frankie, Analyst Jong Sung Lee, GIS Analyst Dan Barbuto, Analyst Sarah Challand, Administrator Jessica Vlna, Administrator Sindhura Mekala, Finance Coordinator Nasiba Alrawi, Information Technology Coordinator Institute for Crisis, Disaster & Risk Management at George Washington University Theresa Jefferson, Principal Investigator (GW Sub-contract) John Harrald, Co-Principal Investigator Frank Fiedrich, Co-Principal Investigator Tay Johannes, Research Associate Ashutosh Madhukar, Research Associate Clinton Mexted-Freeman, Research Associate Sebnem Sener, Research Associate Project Partners Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium – Communication with Stakeholders Innovative Emergency Management (IEM) – Overall Project Coordination Army Corps of Engineers – Project Management Other Contributors Robert Bauer (Illinois State Geological Survey) – Hazard Douglass Bausch (FEMA Region VIII) – HAZUS Kirk Chesla (previously with IEM) – Inventory Eduardo Escalona (previously with FEMA Region VIII) – Inventory Image Acknowledgements The images used on the cover have been done so courtesy of the United States Air Force, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. i Project Funded by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Through a Grant from the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (Army W9132T-06-2) Disclaimer The assessments, comments and opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the US Army Corps of Engineers. ii Scenario Disclaimer The scenarios employed in this report have been selected following discussions with regional and local experts, and recommendations from the Scenario Development Workgroup formed in March 2007. These scenarios are intended to provide credible worst case impacts for individual states. They are not meant to negate or diminish the relevance of previous or future scenarios used in other studies. The Central United States is vulnerable to a number of possible credible scenarios, and it is likely that the damage and loss estimates presented in this report are different from other credible scenarios in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ) and the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ). Neither these scenarios, nor others, should be considered definitive. They represent only possible earthquakes and corresponding damage and loss for the eight states considered hereafter. Various models and methods of representing damage to infrastructure, shelter requirements, casualties, and economic losses are employed in the simulated earthquake impact process and lead to different results according to different modeling assumptions. Also, the social impact models used throughout this study have not been calibrated to observations from catastrophic events, but rather damaging earthquakes, solely in California. Furthermore, the availability of datasets to characterize state infrastructure changes with time. For example, population estimates and numbers of buildings are likely to be different based on the year in which the scenario is created and the access allowed by owners of datasets to the detailed inventory. The sensitivity (vulnerability) of assets to earthquake shaking may be evaluated in many different ways, and different methods are likely to lead to different levels of vulnerability. Finally, seismological (hazard) and geotechnical (site soil) effects, such as liquefaction, significantly affect the estimated impact. Characterizing seismological hazard and soil effects is non-unique; hence, assumptions concerning such effects made in other studies may lead to impact estimates that are different from those presented hereafter. When considering the above sources of uncertainty in the development of scenarios (inventory, vulnerability and hazard, respectively) no single scenario should be considered to be an exact depiction of impacts in a state but rather as a plausible estimate of a state’s damage and loss. Additional scenarios outside of the NMSZ are considered for the States of Alabama and Indiana. An ETSZ earthquake is employed for Alabama and a WVSZ event is employed for Indiana and Illinois. The ETSZ hazard was approved by the State of Alabama Geological Survey while the hazard data for the WVSZ scenario was provided by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). These additional scenarios represent possible events in the two seismic zones, and others may be investigated. Other scenarios are expected to provide different damage and loss estimates based on the aforementioned factors in seismic impact assessment modeling; i.e., inventory, vulnerability, and hazard. Finally, all numbers in this report should be viewed as indicative of the possible impact provided for the purposes of emergency response planning rather than as definitive figures of expected impact. The uncertainty associated with all numbers provided in this and other earthquake impact assessment reports is considerable. At the current state of knowledge of hazard, fragility, inventory and aggregation of losses, it is not possible to quantify the level of uncertainty associated with the impacts provided in this report. iii Executive Summary The region of potential impact due to earthquake activity in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is comprised of eight states: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee. Moreover, the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ) in southern Illinois and southeast Indiana and the East Tennessee Seismic Zone in eastern Tennessee and northeastern Alabama constitute significant risk of moderate-to-severe earthquakes throughout the central region of the USA. The investigation summarized in this report includes earthquake impact assessment scenarios completed using HAZUS-MH MR2 for several potential earthquake scenarios affecting the aforementioned eight-state region. The NMSZ includes eight scenarios - one for each state - whilst the WVSZ scenario in Indiana and the ETSZ scenario in Alabama complete the suite of ten total scenarios. These ten scenarios are designed to provide scientificallycredible, worst case damage and loss estimates for the purposes of emergency planning, response and recovery. The earthquake impact assessments presented in this report employ an analysis methodology comprising three major components; namely hazard, inventory and fragility (or vulnerability). The hazard characterizes not only the shaking of the ground but also the consequential transient and permanent deformation of the ground due to strong ground shaking. The inventory comprises all assets in a specified region, including the built environment and population data. Fragility or vulnerability functions relate the severity of shaking to the likelihood of reaching or exceeding damage states (light, moderate, extensive and near-collapse, for example). Social impact models are also included in the current assessment methodology and employ infrastructure damage results to estimate the effects on populations subjected to the earthquake. Whereas the modeling software used (HAZUS-MH MR2, FEMA-NIBS, 2006) provides default values for all of the above, most of these default values were replaced by components of traceable provenance and higher reliability than the default data, as described below. The hazard employed in this investigation includes ground shaking for three seismic zones and various events within those zones. The NMSZ consists of three fault segments: the northeast segment, the reelfoot thrust or central segment, and the southwest segment. Each segment comprises a deterministic, magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake caused by a rupture over the entire length of the segment. The employed magnitude was provided by US Geological Survey (USGS). The NMSZ represents the first of three hazard events utilized in this report. Two deterministic events are also included, namely a magnitude Mw7.1 in the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ) and a magnitude Mw5.9 in the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ) earthquakes. Permanent ground deformation is characterized by a liquefaction susceptibility map that provides data for part of the eight states. Full liquefaction susceptibility maps for the entire region are still under development and will be utilized in subsequent phases of the current project. Inventory is enhanced through the use of the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) 2007 Gold Dataset (NGA Office of America, 2007). This dataset contains various iv types of critical infrastructure that are key inventory components for earthquake impact assessment. Transportation and utility facility inventories are improved while regional natural gas and oil pipelines are added to the inventory, alongside some high potential loss facility inventories. Additional essential facilities data were used for the State of Illinois via another impact assessment project at the Mid-America Earthquake Center, funded by FEMA and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Existing HAZUSMH MR2 fragility functions are utilized in this study and default values are used to determine damage likelihoods for all infrastructure components. The results indicate that the State of Tennessee incurs the highest level of damage and social impacts. Over 250,000 buildings are moderately or more severely damaged, over 260,000 people are displaced and well over 60,000 casualties (injuries and fatalities) are expected. Total direct economic losses surpass $56 billion. The State of Missouri also incurs substantial damage and loss, though estimates are less than those in Tennessee. Well over 80,000 buildings are damaged leaving more than 120,000 people displaced and causing over 15,000 casualties. Total direct economic losses in Missouri reach nearly $40 billion. Kentucky and Illinois also incur significant losses with total direct economic losses reaching approximately $45 and $35 billion, respectively. The State of Arkansas incurs nearly $19 billion in direct economic loss while the State of Mississippi incurs $9.5 billion in direct economic losses. States such as Indiana and Alabama experience limited damage and loss from NMSZ events with approximately $1.5 and $1.0 billion, respectively. Noting that experience confirms that the indirect economic loss due to business interpretation and loss of market share, amongst other features, is at least as high if not much higher than the direct economic losses, the total economic impact of a series of NMSZ earthquakes is likely to constitute by far the highest economic loss due to a natural disaster in the USA. The contents of this report provide the various assumptions used to arrive at the impact estimates, detailed background to the above figures, and a breakdown of the figures per sector at the county and state levels. The main body of the report gives state-level impact assessments, whilst the Appendices give earthquake impact modeling results at the county level. The results are designed to provide emergency managers and agencies with information required to establish response plans based on likely impacts of plausible earthquakes in the central USA. v Table of Contents CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................................................................. i SCENARIO DISCLAIMER .............................................................................................. iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................... vi LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. ix INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 EARTHQUAKE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW ................................................ 1 Hazard......................................................................................................................... 2 Inventory ..................................................................................................................... 3 Fragility ...................................................................................................................... 4 Social Impacts............................................................................................................. 4 PHASE I EARTHQUAKE HAZARD................................................................................ 5 PHASE I INVENTORY ................................................................................................... 14 PHASE I FRAGILITY ..................................................................................................... 25 RESULTS OF THE EARTHQUAKE IMPACT ASSESSMENTS ................................. 25 State-Level Direct Damage & Functionality ............................................................ 26 Regional Direct Damage & Functionality................................................................ 57 Comparison with Other Published Studies ............................................................... 58 SOCIAL IMPACT AND DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSS.................................................. 60 State-Level Social Impact & Economic Loss ............................................................ 60 Regional Social Impact and Economic Loss............................................................. 85 Comparison with Other Published Studies ............................................................... 85 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................ 88 IMPLICATIONS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ......................................... 89 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................. 91 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 92 APPENDIX I: SHAKING MAPS....…………………………………………………….95 APPENDIX II: INVENTORY………………………………………………………….173 APPENDIX III: FRAGILITY RELATIONSHIPS……………………………………..183 APPENDIX IV: EARTHQUAKE IMPACT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY...….192 vi APPENDIX V: DETAILED EARTHQUAKE IMPACT ASSESSMENT RESULTS...205 APPENDIX VI: SOCIAL IMPACTS AND ECONOMIC LOSSES…………………..432 APPENDIX VII: GUIDE FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT TERMINOLOGY………...516 APPENDIX VIII: DAMAGE AND LOSS MAPS……………………………………..573 APPENDIX IX: COMPARISON WITH CUSEC EARTHQUAKE IMPACT ASSESSMENT………………………………………………………912 .. Appendices I through IX are in the accompanying DVD .. vii List of Figures FIGURE 1: NEW MADRID SEISMIC ZONE FAULT SEGMENTS ............................................................................ 7 FIGURE 2: NORTHEAST SEGMENT OF MIDDLE FAULT PGA (G) ....................................................................... 8 FIGURE 3: CENTRAL SEGMENT OF MIDDLE FAULT PGA (G) ........................................................................... 8 FIGURE 4: SOUTHWEST SEGMENT OF MIDDLE FAULT PGA (G)....................................................................... 9 FIGURE 5: WABASH VALLEY SEISMIC ZONE AND FAULT LOCATION ............................................................ 10 FIGURE 6: WABASH VALLEY SEISMIC ZONE PGA ........................................................................................ 10 FIGURE 7: EAST TENNESSEE SEISMIC ZONE EVENT, M5.9 ............................................................................ 11 FIGURE 8: EAST TENNESSEE SEISMIC ZONE PGA ......................................................................................... 12 FIGURE 9: LIQUEFACTION SUSCEPTIBILITY MAP ........................................................................................... 13 FIGURE 10: LIQUEFACTION SUSCEPTIBILITY FOR ETSZ SCENARIO ............................................................... 14 FIGURE 11: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........................................................ 15 FIGURE 12: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ....................................................... 16 FIGURE 13: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ........................................................... 17 FIGURE 14: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ........................................................... 18 FIGURE 15: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY....................................................... 19 FIGURE 16: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ...................................................... 20 FIGURE 17: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ......................................................... 21 FIGURE 18: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION FOR THE STATE OF TENESSEE......................................................... 22 FIGURE 19: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA .... 75 FIGURE 20: ETSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ...... 76 FIGURE 21: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ... 77 FIGURE 22: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ....... 78 FIGURE 23: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ....... 79 FIGURE 24: WVSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ....... 80 FIGURE 25: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ... 81 FIGURE 26: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ... 82 FIGURE 27: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ..... 83 FIGURE 28: NMSZ EVENT LOSS RATIO (% OF TOTAL BUILDING ASSETS) FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ... 84 viii List of Tables TABLE 1: LIQUEFACTION SUSCEPTIBILITY PROXY ........................................................................................ 12 TABLE 2: TOTAL POPULATION OF EIGHT-STATE REGION (YEAR 2000 CENSUS)........................................... 23 TABLE 3: INVENTORY VALUE IN EIGHT-STATE REGION ($ MILLIONS) .......................................................... 23 TABLE 4: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR STATE OF ALABAMA .................... 27 TABLE 5: NMSZ EVENT DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR STATE OF ALABAMA ......................................... 27 TABLE 6: ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE AND FUNCTIONALITY FOR NMSZ EVENT IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA ............................................................................................................................................ 27 TABLE 7: NMSZ EVENT DAMAGE TO HIGHWAY BRIDGES IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA ............................... 28 TABLE 8: NMSZ EVENT DAMAGE TO PIPELINES IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA .............................................. 28 TABLE 9: ETSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ............... 29 TABLE 10: ETSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ................. 30 TABLE 11: ETSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ............................ 30 TABLE 12: ETSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ................................... 31 TABLE 13: ETSZ EVENT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ................. 31 TABLE 14: ETSZ EVENT SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........................................ 31 TABLE 15: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS .......... 32 TABLE 16: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS .............. 33 TABLE 17: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS .......................... 33 TABLE 18: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ................................ 34 TABLE 19: NMSZ EVENT ELECTRIC POWER FACILITY DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.................. 34 TABLE 20: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ....................... 34 TABLE 21: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS .............. 36 TABLE 22: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS .................. 36 TABLE 23: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS .............................. 37 TABLE 24: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS .................................... 37 TABLE 25: NMSZ EVENT WASTE WATER FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ....................... 37 TABLE 26: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ........................... 38 TABLE 27: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY CLASS IN THE STATE OF INDIANA ............... 39 TABLE 28: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA .................. 39 TABLE 29: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA.............................. 40 TABLE 30: NMSZ EVENT PIPELINE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ................................................... 40 TABLE 31: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ........................... 40 TABLE 32: WVSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY CLASS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ............ 42 TABLE 33: WVSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA .................. 42 TABLE 34: WVSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ............................. 42 TABLE 35: WVSZ EVENT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA .................. 43 TABLE 36: WVSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ........................... 43 TABLE 37: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY .......... 44 TABLE 38: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY .............. 45 TABLE 39: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ......................... 45 TABLE 40: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ................................ 46 TABLE 41: NMSZ EVENT WASTE WATER FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY .................. 46 TABLE 42: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ....................... 47 TABLE 43: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ......... 48 TABLE 44: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI .............. 48 TABLE 45: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ......................... 49 TABLE 46: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ............................... 49 TABLE 47: NMSZ EVENT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI .............. 49 TABLE 48: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ...................... 50 TABLE 49: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ............ 51 TABLE 50: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ................ 51 TABLE 51: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ........................... 52 ix TABLE 52: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI .................................. 52 TABLE 53: NMSZ EVENT POTABLE WATER FACILITY DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI .................... 53 TABLE 54: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ......................... 53 TABLE 55: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY OCCUPANCY TYPE FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ......... 54 TABLE 56: NMSZ EVENT BUILDING DAMAGE BY BUILDING TYPE FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE .............. 54 TABLE 57: NMSZ EVENT ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ......................... 55 TABLE 58: NMSZ EVENT HIGHWAY BRIDGE DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ............................... 56 TABLE 59: NMSZ EVENT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES DAMAGE FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE .............. 57 TABLE 60: NMSZ EVENT UTILITY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ...................... 57 TABLE 61: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ..................................... 61 TABLE 62: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA .......................................................... 61 TABLE 63: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSS FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........................... 61 TABLE 64: ETSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ....................................... 62 TABLE 65: ETSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........................................................... 62 TABLE 66: ETSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA ........................ 63 TABLE 67: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS .................................... 63 TABLE 68: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ......................................................... 63 TABLE 69: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS ...................... 64 TABLE 70: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ........................................ 64 TABLE 71: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ............................................................. 65 TABLE 72: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS .......................... 65 TABLE 73: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ........................................ 66 TABLE 74: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ............................................................ 66 TABLE 75: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA .......................... 66 TABLE 76: WVSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ........................................ 67 TABLE 77: WVSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA ............................................................ 67 TABLE 78: WVSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA.......................... 68 TABLE 79: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY .................................... 68 TABLE 80: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ........................................................ 69 TABLE 81: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY...................... 69 TABLE 82: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI .................................... 70 TABLE 83: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ........................................................ 70 TABLE 84: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ..................... 71 TABLE 85: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ...................................... 71 TABLE 86: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI .......................................................... 71 TABLE 87: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI ........................ 72 TABLE 88: NMSZ EVENT SHELTER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE .................................... 73 TABLE 89: NMSZ EVENT CASUALTIES FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ........................................................ 73 TABLE 90: NMSZ EVENT TOTAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSSES FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ..................... 73 x Introduction Catastrophic event response planning assessments are underway, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The effort focuses on plausible natural disasters that could impact the nation. Examples of these catastrophic events include a significant earthquake in Los Angeles, California, a Category V hurricane in Miami, Florida, and a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). The Mid-America Earthquake Center (MAEC) at the University of Illinois and the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management (ICDRM) at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., were contracted by FEMA through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to study earthquake consequences in the Central USA. This project comprises a multi-phase investigation of possible earthquake scenarios, analytical earthquake impact assessments, and social impact estimates that will assist federal, state, and local governments to develop coordinated response plans for a catastrophic earthquake in Central USA. The primary objective of this multi-phase project is to provide scientifically defensible earthquake impact assessments with the most up-to-date hazard, inventory and fragility data in order to save lives and protect property. Current social impact modeling uses the earthquake impact assessment results to create the best available estimates of affected population and the various requirements for the care of displaced residents. The Project Team has concluded the first phase of the earthquake impact assessments which are the preliminary estimates of direct damage to infrastructure, social impacts and economic losses for the individual states (reference is made to the Scenario Disclaimer above). The results of this Phase were utilized in numerous earthquake response and recovery planning workshops at the local and state-level by the eight Central US Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) member states. The CUSEC member states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee. This report details components of impact for all analyses completed for response planning. The reported impact assessment estimates are compared with other limited impact assessment studies available for the NMSZ. Earthquake Impact Assessment Overview Analytical earthquake impact assessments require three fundamental components; namely hazard, inventory and fragility. The hazard includes a definition of ground motion and consequential ground effects, such as large permanent ground deformation. Inventory is a compilation of assets in a specific region of interest, and may include numerous types of infrastructure in the built environment as well as population demographic data. Fragility relationships relate a certain level of ground shaking to the likelihood of a specified degree of damage. These three parameters are integrated to determine direct damage, direct economic loss and functionality of infrastructure components. The results of this direct damage assessment are then used to determine social impacts such as displaced population and sheltering requirements. The three primary components and social impacts are explained in further detail in the following sections of the report. 1 Hazard The earthquake hazard experienced by a certain region of interest, such as a state, may be defined by several methods and with varying degrees of detail. A minimum definition of hazard requires the level of shaking be quantified over the entire region of interest, expressed as peak ground motion parameters (acceleration, velocity and displacement). The hazard may also be expressed as peak response of simple structures (peak spectral values: peak spectral acceleration, velocity and displacement). One method to estimate shaking is through the use of attenuation functions. Regionally appropriate attenuation functions are available, such as attenuations for Europe (Ambraseys and Bommer, 1991; Ambraseys and Bommer, 1992; Ambraseys and Simpson, 1996), Japan (Fukushima et al., 1995; Kamiyama, 1995), the Western U.S. (WUS) (Abrahamson and Silva,1997; Atkinson and Boore, 2002; Campbell and Bozorgnia, 2003), and the Central and Eastern U.S. (CEUS) (Atkinson and Boore, 1995; Toro et al., 1997; Sommerville et al., 2001). Attenuations relationships, by definition, illustrate the propagation of shaking from a point source, commonly referred to as an epicenter (or in some cases, hypocenter1). More comprehensive source modeling is available to better characterize the ground shaking that results from an earthquake. Line-source modeling involves the rupture of an entire fault segment and may account for directionality of fault rupture in the estimation of ground motion. By including more aspects of ground motion, line-source modeling is preferred over a more simplified point-source model. Area source models also exist, and require considerable knowledge of the tectonic environment and mapping of fault geometry and likely mechanisms of rupture. Numerous additional components are required for a complete definition of hazard. Soil amplification is used to adjust the ground motion for local soil conditions since different soil type affect the surface shaking nature. For example soft soil deposits are likely to filter short period vibrations and amplify long period shaking, thus increasing the likelihood of damage to long-period structures such as high-rise buildings and long-span bridges. Liquefaction susceptibility refers to the change in phase of partially saturated soil deposits that may completely lose cohesion during prolonged shaking. This results in permanent ground deformations such as lateral spreading and settlement, both of which increase the likelihood of damage to infrastructure. Landslide susceptibility is included in earthquake impact assessments to define the likelihood of inclined deposits sliding during or shortly after earthquakes. Additional forms of hazard definition include surface fault rupture, though this is not discussed here. Hazard characterization for this project is mainly based on the U.S. Geological Survey studies, supported and augmented by information from the state geological surveys in the eight affected states. For more information on hazard definition in earthquake impact assessment, please refer to Appendix IV. 1 The hypocenter is the location in the earth where the source of rupture is located. The epicenter is the projection of the hypocenter on the Earth’s surface. Conversely, the hypocenter is located beneath the epicenter at a specific distance, called the ‘focal depth.’ For further information please reference the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual, Chapter 4, Figure 4.3 for an illustration of this concept. 2 Inventory Inventory includes all components of the built environment as well as demographic data. Demographic data includes estimates of total population, and various group classifications within the general population, broken down by income, ethnicity, education and age. Inventory, or assets, in the built environment includes a wide variety of infrastructure with commonly used inventory types listed below:     Essential Facilities o Schools and Hospitals o Police and Fire Stations o Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) Transportation Lifelines o Highway Bridges and Roads o Railway Bridges, Tracks and Facilities o Airport, Port, Bus and Ferry Facilities Utility Lifelines o Potable Water Facilities and Networks o Waste Water Facilities and Networks o Natural Gas Facilities and Pipelines o Oil Facilities and Pipelines o Electric Power and Communication Facilities High Potential-Loss Facilities o Dams and Levees o Hazardous Materials Plants o Nuclear Power Plants Various types of information, or metadata, are required for a full assessment of these components. A description of building type, construction material, height, age, design level and soil condition is required to determine the response of the building to ground shaking. A replacement value must also be included if direct economic losses are to be determined. Many of the aforementioned infrastructure items are packaged with the impact assessment software, HAZUS-MH MR2, as default data. Updates to this baseline, or default, inventory will improve the accuracy of the impact assessment as more of the actual inventory is captured in the assessment. Additionally, new types of inventory may be added to address site-specific issues. Such inventory items can include high-rise buildings, long-span bridges, cell phone towers, arenas and stadiums, historical landmarks, and mass public transit such as subways and elevated rail systems, among others. The majority of the inventory data used for this project is taken primarily from the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) 2007 dataset, with additional inventory collected by the MAE Center for specific regions2. For more information on inventory for earthquake impact assessment, please refer to Appendix IV. 2 Many bridges are included in the default inventory provided by HAZUS-MH MR2, though these bridges do not include major river crossings, such as those over the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. These bridges have unique structural configurations that require structure-specific analyses 3 Fragility Fragility functions are used to relate the intensity of ground shaking to the likelihood of a particular level of damage occurring. Fragility functions, sometimes referred to as vulnerability functions, when represented graphically plot a shaking intensity (or hazard) parameter against a probability that a given damage level (e.g. light, moderate or severe) will occur. In other words, if a certain level of shaking is experienced by a structure, a fragility function will estimate how likely it is that this particular structure will incur various levels of damage. Numerous parameters are used to quantify the level of shaking and may include peak ground acceleration (PGA), velocity (PGV) or displacement (PGD). Also, the maximum response of a simple structure, referred to as the spectral response quantity, may be used in the form of spectral acceleration, velocity or displacement. The use of a particular hazard parameter is specific to the infrastructure element being assessed. For example, damage to buildings is often related to the spectral displacement, whereas peak ground velocity is commonly used for pipelines. Furthermore, fragility curves are generally organized in sets for a specific infrastructure component. HAZUS-MH MR2 requires four fragility curves per infrastructure item - one per damage limit state. Damage limit states included in HAZUS-MH MR2 are slight, moderate, extensive, and complete (Kircher et al, 1997). Many fragility relationships for types or classes of structures exist in the literature (a brief description is provided in Elnashai (2003)). In this report, the default fragility relationships of HAZUS-MH MR2 are employed. In future phases, uniform reliability fragility relationships based on advances simulations will be used (Nielson and DesRoches, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Gencturk et al, 2007). For further information on fragility relationships, reference is made to Appendices III and IV. Social Impacts Social impacts include a wide variety of requirements associated with a population in a post-disaster environment. HAZUS-MH MR2 encompasses several estimates including displaced households (residences and families), short-term shelter population, and casualties. The number of displaced households is estimated based on the extent of damage to residential buildings along with building classification (single family, multifamily dwelling). In some cases, the number of displaced households may also include factors for the loss of utility services. Estimates for the number of people seeking shelter are calculated as a percentage of the displaced population, taking into consideration demographic composition factors including ethnicity, age, and income level. These demographic factors influence the number of families seeking shelter in a region. For example, those families with limited financial means are more likely to seek public shelter and require short-term housing. Additional social impact models include more detailed predictions for the displaced population. Food, refrigeration, sleeping and water requirements are determined as well 4 as space requirements for housing the shelter seeking population. Furthermore, the percentage of the displaced population requiring medical attention for chronic illnesses is estimated and can be included in response plans. Casualty estimates are also a critical element of social impact assessments. HAZUS-MH MR2 classifies all injuries and fatalities as casualties when reporting a total number, though severity level estimates are also provided. Four levels of casualties are reported in HAZUS-MH MR2, ranging from minor injuries not requiring hospitalization to fatalities. Examination of the outputs for both displaced populations and shelter seeking populations led to the conclusion that the calculations being performed within HAZUSMH MR2 were incorrect due to errors in the software. This is currently being corrected in the next release of the software. To calculate these estimates for the scenarios discussed in this report, the project combined the damage estimates and population estimates from HAZUS-MH MR2 and utilized the HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology to derive the number of displaced people and the shelter seeking population. For further information on social impact methodology, please refer to Appendix III. Consequence Assessment Software In this phase of the project, use is made exclusively of HAZUS-MH MR2 (FEMA, 2007). Earlier work using other versions of HAZUS was repeated after careful comparisons with the newer version. HAZUS provides extensive libraries of models and data that can be used in a default mode. Most HAZUS models were retained whilst almost all HAZUS data was over-written by more comprehensive information. Significant changes were made to the social impact model in HAZUS, as elaborated upon in this report. In phase II of the project, which is currently underway, HAZUS analyses are augmented by specialized analysis using MAEviz release 3.0 (MAEviz, 2008). Special emphasis is paid in MAEviz to the utility and transportation network disruption, and the optimized allocation of temporary housing to the displaced population. The architecture and application of MAEviz are described in Elnashai et al (2008, a and b), while the temporary housing model features are presented in El-Anwar et al (2008). Phase I Earthquake Hazard The Central U.S. is not often thought of as a seismically active region, although the April, 2008 earthquake near Mt. Carmel, Illinois, brought a great deal of attention to this region and its potential seismic hazards. Though this particular event occurred on the Wabash Valley Fault in Southern Illinois, the larger and more active New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is only a short distance away. Stretching from southwest Illinois to northeast Arkansas, the NMSZ is located in portions of five states in the Central U.S.: Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansas. 5 This seismic region has produced some of the most major seismic events in U.S. history. During the winter of 1811 and 1812, a series of three earthquakes, with magnitudes of around 8, struck northeast Arkansas and southeast Missouri. These magnitudes were determined based on witness reports at the time of the events, liquefaction features dated to that period of time, and fault structure (Johnston & Schweig, 1996). At the time of these earthquakes, the Central U.S. was sparsely populated, with very few structures. Of the few buildings constructed in the region, many were likely for residential or agricultural use and of low quality. Currently, however, the Central U.S. is vastly populated with major population centers in Memphis, TN and St. Louis, MO. Both of these cities are likely to sustain damage from a NMSZ event, and particularly Memphis in particular could see severe damage. According to Hildenbrand et al. (1996), the chance of a magnitude 6 or 7 earthquake occurring within the next 50 years is roughly 90%. Additionally, more than 3,000 earthquakes have occurred in the NMSZ since 1974 (Johnston & Schweig, 1996). An earthquake of magnitude 7, as has been predicted, or a recurrence of the 1811-1812 series could have devastating impacts on the region, with considerable national repercussions, as transportation routes, natural gas and oil transmission pipelines are broken and services are interrupted. Preliminary estimates, including those completed by the MidAmerica Earthquake Center (MAEC), found that economic losses from a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) event in the NMSZ could reach $50-$80 billion dollars in direct losses alone. Additionally, there could be thousands of fatalities, tens of thousands of injured victims, and even hundreds of thousands left without homes. The first step in developing earthquake impact assessments is developing scientifically defensible ground motion for a NMSZ Mw7.7 event upon which earthquake impact assessment models are based. All ground motions employed in this study were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey. Three different events are considered, one for each presumed segment of the New Madrid Fault. Figure 1 illustrates the locations of each fault segment. The primary fault, shown in Figure 1, illustrates the three segments: northeast, central and southwest. The northeast and southwest segments are strike-slip faults while the central, or reelfoot segment, is a thrust fault. The presumed fault boundaries are not shown here, though they were used in the development of the national seismic hazard maps to account for the uncertainty of fault rupture (Frankel et al., 1996; Frankel et al., 2002). Figure 1 is similar to the single fault location shown in Johnston & Schweig (1996). The ground motion maps developed for the NMSZ are based on the rupture of a single segment, meaning the northeast, central and southwest segments are independent events which model the rupture of the entire fault segment length. Ground motion for each segment rupture is attenuated through rock and then propagated through the layer of soil on top of the bedrock layer. The specific procedure used to develop these three Mw7.7 deterministic events is similar to the method used for NMSZ probabilistic maps developed by the USGS. For further information on the method by which these maps were developed, please refer to Cramer (2006). Modeling in HAZUS-MH MR2 requires four ground shaking parameters to complete an earthquake impact assessment: peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), short-period spectral acceleration (Sa 0.3 sec.) and long-period spectral acceleration (Sa 1.0 sec.). Maps were developed for 6 each of these parameters. This means that each segment rupture requires a suite of four maps to fully define the ground motion for use in HAZUS-MH MR2. Figure 1: New Madrid Seismic Zone Fault Segments Earthquake impact assessments are completed for each of the eight states in the NMSZ. The maps developed by Cramer and the USGS did not cover the full extent of the eight state region, so shaking values are specified for the four shaking parameters. Parameters are specified in outlying areas as follows:     PGA = 0.05g PGV = 3 in./sec. Sa 0.3 sec. = 0.12g Sa 1.0 sec. = 0.11g Original ground motion maps for PGA are shown in Figure 2 for the northeast segment, Figure 3 for the central segment, and Figure 4 for the southwest segment. 7 Figure 2: Northeast Segment of Middle Fault PGA (g) Figure 3: Central Segment of Middle Fault PGA (g) 8 Figure 4: Southwest Segment of Middle Fault PGA (g) Additionally, maps developed for the middle fault are shifted to the fault zone boundaries to determine the worst case event for all states except Arkansas. The MAEC was advised by the Arkansas State Geologic Survey to use the middle fault for the earthquake impact assessment in the State of Arkansas. As a result, each state’s worst case event is described by a fault segment and shifting direction, such as east, west, or middle fault. The ground motion is shifted according to the follow descriptions for each state:         Alabama: Southwest segment of eastern fault boundary line Arkansas: Southwest segment of middle fault line Illinois: Northeast segment of western fault boundary line Indiana: Northeast segment of eastern fault boundary line Kentucky: Northeast segment of the eastern fault boundary line Mississippi: Southwest segment of the eastern fault boundary line Missouri: Central segment of the western fault boundary line Tennessee: Southwest segment of the eastern fault boundary line Two additional scenarios are considered for events outside the NMSZ. The first is a magnitude 7.1 (Mw7.1) earthquake in the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ) in Southern Illinois and Indiana. The ground motion maps for this event were also developed by the USGS and model the rupture of a length of fault. Figure 5 illustrates the location of the WVSZ and the Wabash Valley Fault. The PGA for the WVSZ event is illustrated in Figure 6. The procedure used to develop this map is similar to the method used to develop the NMSZ maps. Though a WVSZ event will impact the State of Illinois, 9 this scenario is only completed for the State of Indiana as the WVSZ produces greater damage than the NMSZ event. Figure 5: Wabash Valley Seismic Zone and Fault Location Figure 6: Wabash Valley Seismic Zone PGA 10 The final hazard scenario analyzed is a magnitude 5.9 (Mw5.9) event in the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ). The Alabama Geologic Survey provided data to define this event, including the location of the epicenter and the depth. In contrast to the other scenarios, this ETSZ scenario ground motion is defined using a suite of attenuations. These attenuations, five in all, comprise the Central and Eastern U.S. (CEUS) Characteristic Event as specified in HAZUS-MH MR2. The attenuations employed are listed below with the weighting factor used: Atkinson and Boore (1997) Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) Campbell (2002) Sommerville, Collins, Abrahamson et al. (2002) 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 Figure 7: East Tennessee Seismic Zone Event, M5.9 The location of the ETSZ event is illustrated in Figure 7. The PGA that results from the suite of attenuations is illustrated in Figure 8. This event generates substantial ground motion in the northeastern portion of the state while the NMSZ event will generate the most intense shaking in the northwestern portion of the state. Comparing the hazard maps for the two scenario ground motions in Alabama, the ETSZ event generates significantly higher ground motion, particularly near the source. For additional information on all scenario ground motion maps including shifting parameters, please reference Appendix I. 11 Figure 8: East Tennessee Seismic Zone PGA In this series of analyses, hazard characterization is also improved by the addition of liquefaction susceptibility which captures the effects of permanent ground deformation. All NMSZ scenarios, and the WVSZ scenario, utilized a liquefaction susceptibility map that was developed via a proxy that correlates a soil site class (based on National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program [NEHRP] specifications) to a relative level of liquefaction susceptibility. It should be known that this method is not the most accurate method; rather, it was the only data of this type available at the time these earthquake impact assessment scenarios were completed. The use of this form of liquefaction data will capture the regional effects of ground deformation, but should not be used for smaller-scale, site-specific studies. The correlation between soil site class and relative level of liquefaction susceptibility is detailed below in Table 1: Table 1: Liquefaction Susceptibility Proxy Soil Class Liquefaction Susceptibility Level Description of Soil A Hard Rock NONE B Rock NONE C Very Dense Soil & Soft Rock NONE D Stiff Soils LOW E Soil Soils MODERATE F Soils Requiring Site-Specific Evaluation VERY HIGH The map of liquefaction susceptibility developed based on proxy information is illustrated in Figure 9. It is evident that a large portion of the region is not covered by the 12 liquefaction susceptibility map. Since no liquefaction susceptibility information is specified in these areas, permanent ground deformation is not included in the direct damage model, meaning damage determinations do not account for permanent ground deformations. Common liquefaction susceptibility levels are ‘very high,’ ‘moderate’ and ‘low.’ The ETSZ scenario was completed several months after the NMSZ and WVSZ scenarios, and by that time a new liquefaction susceptibility map was completed for the State of Alabama. This new map is employed in the earthquake impact assessment for the ETSZ scenario. Figure 10 illustrates the new liquefaction susceptibility map, which covers the entire State of Alabama. Figure 9: Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 13 Figure 10: Liquefaction Susceptibility for ETSZ Scenario The hazard in this region of the U.S. is a matter of vigorous debate, largely due to the lack of information from significant seismic events. The ground motion and liquefaction information utilized was the best available at the time these analyses were completed. Improvement of ground motion and liquefaction characterizations in the Central U.S. is an on-going effort and future phases of this project will include updated information. The changes made to the hazard in this investigation, however, are a substantial improvement over the default settings in HAZUS-MH MR2 and go a long way to representing the regional hazard. Phase I Inventory The inventory used in this series of earthquake impact assessments is classified into two major categories; population and infrastructure. The population is divided into various demographics which include age, gender, income level and numerous others. Income level is a critical factor when determining the number of people seeking public shelter in a post-disaster environment. The eight states included in this investigation have a total population of roughly 44 million people. Over 25% of the eight-state population resides in Illinois, with the City of Chicago alone contributing several million people. Tennessee and Missouri also contribute nearly six million residents each. Population totals for each state as of the year 2000 census are illustrated in Table 2. Additionally, population distributions of the eight states are shown in Figure 11 through Figure 18. 14 Legend Total Population .1500 1,501 - epee 3,001 - 0,000 - 0,001 - 10,00] Major Cities In elem - repel: I ream - we pee I went? - =Critieel Hivere US Heutee =Interetetee 15 30 El] ED SE Miles Figure 11: Population Distribution for the State of Alabama 15 CLAY 13* HAHEIEI GREENE . Fay-I emlle' MADISDH mama I - I I tl . SEA MISSISSIPPIJ CHEW El CLEEUHHE - - o: Wat .. Air 1 1" Legend .11. Total Population ?fear o5} I'll-L l. 1.. - 3,oo1 5,o:1o 5,oo1 ?,o:1o ?,oo1 o,o:1o o,oo1 - 11 Major Cities Population in 2WD 11 I 4o,oo1 mom i r5,oo1 . ?it-I 315i Intoratato Highwaya EDL BIA a: LIE Houtoa Rivera a Critical Iilountiaa 15 a: oo A, Miles Figure 12: Population Distribution for the State of Arkansas 16 MA 33 win}: . r? no: EIEH nag nri RENE LT . LEAH RM "2le IZIEH 1w: a: LE ER 33 itHEP. It?: ?g .3 A LE Legend r' REE Ann Total Population HAzusmnn} JERS 2,501 -532": ?th 5,001 -mpuu d" 10,001 -15.:qu I I: A I ?15,uu1-34,055 ?Hiver*3 =Critical Countiea =Interstatea PE Aw TEI Eng} 2- Houtea Major Cities i Eamon?mama "3 I 100001 .20: non UNI if; I 2130.001 - 2:50.000 AL 3.35.. JFK Figure 13: Population Distribution for the State of Illinois 17 f- j? LAGHAHGE Hnmmon 52" SMHT DE a HEISEILIHD HDELE PDHTEH a 33? HALE HAL 1:21 I 331'}: FULTIZIH CASS JASPER PU LASHI ASH x211? HTIH WHWE AD WELLS MIAMI ?35 AHD EHFD if" Terr SHELBY FHAHHU GD UW EHIZIWH DEAR Blno Ii? 0 TH AH GREEN JEHMHG LHNHEHEE HHDK SHIHGT GRANGE Legend Total Population - 3,000 3,001 - - Ell] ,ElEl Major Citiea i 100nm - 200,000 .200 um - F53 = nter3tatea Routea FIZI =Critica Counties Rivera WAHHIFH PEHFW HARRISON VI SP 15 EU 93' Figure 14: Population Distribution for the State of Indiana 18 15 3] ED Legend Total Population - 2000} 0? 2,000 2,001 - 3,50: 3,331 - - - v.50?: - 15,400 Major Cities 25.000-40.000 . 40.001 50,000 . I I .00001 31,000 . ?03 Routes .0 ens Era = nteratatea 1"i?l Rivera DH ID =Criti0al C0untiea . I1 II 1' II ABS-LE .. - -- mania WIBERLA I, I MONROE me Ganveslea?owm Figure 15: Population Distribution for the State of Kentucky 19 Legend Tetel Pepuletien 2001]} e- 2pm - 35:31 - 5pm epee 8,001 - 12,000 US Heutee Interetetee ECr'rticel Hiwere Mejer Citiee elem?men: I were -4e,eI:e I 45pm -1e4me . Figure 16: Population Distribution for the State of Mississippi 20 Saint J0 BUB Kansas ?it}.I MEH Miles - Figure 17: Population Distribution for the State of Missouri 21 Legend T0ta Pepulatien A3 0 - 2,000 Ri?e 2,001 - 4,000 LIE Heutee 4,001 - =Interetatee - - 3.030 ECritieal 0,001 13,?50 Majer lCities at 50,000 - I 150,000 150,001 - 444,000 ai ?ee arissant HT LIZIUIS 0rr~r Saint Louis Legend 15 a: a: g: "Jr Total Population Major Cities HWEFS one of? ?ns 2mm]. 4r alone 0?1 5.3.3 1:30am -ajapaa '35 1.53% - 3,an I 213mm -mepoa Ema 3,001 - 5,001 - - 15.32?] Jewu? Chauanooga Figure 18: Population Distribution for the State of Tennessee 22 Table 2: Total Population of Eight-State Region (Year 2000 Census) State Alabama Arkansas Illinois Indiana Kentucky Mississippi Missouri Tennessee TOTAL Population 4,447,100 2,700,000 12,400,000 6,080,485 4,041,769 2,844,658 5,595,211 5,689,283 43,798,506 All infrastructure and built environment is classified into three categories: buildings, transportation and utilities. The total value of all inventory, or assets, is quantified in Table 3. The entire eight-state region has a value of more than $6.7 trillion. The State of Illinois accounts for approximately 30% of that inventory value, while Kentucky and Missouri contribute roughly 15% each. Furthermore, utility lifelines represent nearly half of all inventory value in the eight states at nearly $3.2 trillion. Buildings account for $2.7 trillion and transportation lifelines contribute approximately $846 billion. This equates to 40% and 13%, respectively, of total inventory value. Table 3: Inventory Value in Eight-State Region ($ millions) State Alabama Arkansas Illinois Indiana Kentucky Mississippi Missouri Tennessee TOTAL Building Value Transportation Value Utility Value Total Value $269,580 $157,602 $837,682 $380,969 $259,784 $131,314 $334,877 $329,827 $108,231 $67,940 $161,097 $107,793 $128,036 $69,176 $121,238 $82,456 $182,909 $47,659 $1,001,676 $142,909 $797,984 $266,440 $564,861 $173,425 $559,720 $273,201 $2,000,455 $631,671 $1,185,804 $466,930 $1,020,976 $585,708 $2,701,635 $845,967 $3,177,863 $6,724,465 There are numerous subsets of inventory within the broad category of infrastructure. As shown in Table 3, the built environment can be broken down into the three major subcategories: buildings, transportation lifelines and utility lifelines. HAZUS-MH MR2 provides basic inventory data for all three of these subcategories, though improving upon this default data is highly recommended for a high-quality earthquake impact assessment. Due to the time required to update all inventory over the entire eight-state region, only select infrastructure categories are updated. Building inventory is one of the most timeconsuming forms of data to update and as a result was not done in this investigation. The default building data is classified in two ways: by building/construction type and occupancy or building use type. There are 33 occupancy types, such as residential, commercial, industrial, government, educational, agricultural and religion. These are 23 considered general building types and within these general types are specific building types which can be found in Chapter 4 of the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual. There are 36 total building types which classify building by the type of structure and material used in construction. Such building types include wood frame, concrete, steel, precast concrete, unreinforced masonry, reinforced masonry and mobile homes. As with occupancy type, there are numerous specific building types which can also be found in Chapter 4 of the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual (FEMA-NIBS, 2006). Transportation and utility lifelines are updated with information from the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) 2007 Gold Dataset (NGA Office of America, 2007) for critical infrastructure. In order to capture the most complete datasets possible HSIP and HAZUS-MH MR2 default data were combined and the duplicate inventory items removed. The infrastructure compone nts that are supplemented with HSIP data are listed below:     Essential Facilities o Schools o Hospitals o Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) o Police Stations o Fire Stations Transportation Lifelines o Highway Bridges o Railway Bridges o Airport Facilities o Ferry Facilities o Bus Facilities o Port Facilities Utility Lifelines o Natural Gas Facilities o Oil Facilities o Electric Power Facilities o Communication Facilities o Water Treatment Facilities (typically considered Waste Water Facilities) o Natural Gas Major Transmission Pipelines o Oil Major Transmission Pipelines High Potential-Loss Facilities o Hazardous Material Facilities o Dams o Levees o Prisons Natural gas and oil major transmission pipelines are not part of the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory and are added as a new type of inventory. Adding these pipelines will not only supplement some local distribution networks already present in HAZUS-MH MR2, but will also provide information on the functionality of pipelines carrying critical 24 products to regions outside the NMSZ zone. For more information on the inventory used in this investigation please refer to Appendix II where infrastructure is quantified by state. Phase I Fragility The fragility curves provided in HAZUS-MH MR2 are intended for use throughout the USA. Using these provided—or default—fragilities for damage estimates means that building damage will not be determined for structural characteristics specific to the Central U.S., where the design and construction practice of all assets (e.g. bridges and buildings) are specific to the region. Additionally, in general, HAZUS-MH MR2 default fragilities are based on expert judgment and do not directly use observed or simulated structural responses. The published technical literature reports many different methods for the derivation of fragility relationships, based on observations, experimental testing, computer simulations, or combinations thereof. The advantage of using the HAZUS-MH MR2 default fragilities is that they provide relatively uniform and often conservative estimates of damage. They are therefore suitable for the regional assessment reported herein. Building fragilities in HAZUS-MH MR2, for example, rely on the Capacity Spectrum Method (CSM) with empirical pushover curves to determine the capacity of the structure, while the demand is characterized by a single smoothed design spectrum. The general building inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2 is divided into 36 building types, each with a different set of fragility curves, which are further distinguished on the basis of found seismic design level (none, low, moderate and high). Transportation and utility lifelines have individual sets of fragility curves which define their performance during a seismic event as well. HAZUS-MH MR2 employs 28 bridge types, for example, to categorize the performance of all bridges in a region’s inventory. Many of these transportation (NIBS, 1999) and utility fragility curves (O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993) are based on expert opinion, due largely to the lack of research in these areas. All HAZUS-MH MR2 default fragility curves are employed in the Phase I scenarios in this report. Updating fragilities will be undertaken in the next phase of the New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Planning project with a focus on buildings (Gencturk et al, 2007; Gencturk et al, 2008) and bridges (Nielson and DesRoches, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) using MAE Center derived fragility relationships that are specific to the Central USA. Results of the Earthquake Impact Assessments This section focuses on direct damage to infrastructure in the eight-state region around the NMSZ. Specifically, damage to buildings as well as damage and functionality of critical infrastructure (essential facilities, transportation and utility lifelines) are highlighted and presented by scenario. As mentioned earlier, there are ten total scenarios 25 completed in this phase of the NMSZ earthquake impact assessment project and brief discussions of impact assessment results are given here. At the conclusion of this section, general regional damage trends are identified and comparisons made with other published scenarios for a NMSZ event. In addition, each scenario identifies a set of counties that are expected to incur the greatest amount of damage. These counties are taken from a study completed at FEMA Region VIII. For more detailed explanations of results from each scenario, please refer to Appendix V. State-Level Direct Damage & Functionality Alabama New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Each scenario completed in this investigation focuses on the critical counties, which are identified as counties in each state where shaking is most intense. Though shaking is less intense in Alabama than most other states, there are 12 counties identified in northwest Alabama that are expected to experience the majority of the damage in the state. These counties are illustrated in Figure 11 and are listed below:  Colbert  Cullman  Fayette  Franklin  Lamar  Lauderdale  Lawrence  Limestone  Marion  Morgan  Walker  Winston The NMSZ Mw7.7 scenario for the State of Alabama generates the greatest amount of damage when the earthquake occurs in the southwest extension of the eastern fault. Building damage resulting from this event is detailed in Table 4 and Table 5. There are nearly 1.7 million buildings in the State of Alabama, most of which are not impacted by the NMSZ earthquake. “Moderate” damage is much more common at the low levels of shaking experienced across the majority of the state. Residential buildings, which include single family homes and other residential structures, incur nearly 98% of all building damage in Alabama. Commercial structures experience over 100 cases of moderate damage, though that pales in comparison with the number of residential structures damaged. Though the distribution of damage in the critical counties is not shown here, only 2,900 cases of damage occur in the critical counties. This is less than 50% of all building damage, indicating that a large portion of damage occurs in the north-central portion of Alabama. Damage to buildings is further classified by building type. The majority of moderate and extensive damage cases are incurred by mobile homes and unreinforced masonry buildings. Mobile homes and unreinforced masonry buildings are vulnerable to the moderate and low level of shaking (< 0.25g) in northern Alabama, hence the large percentage of damage cases occurring there. Two-thirds of the extensive damage and over 85% of moderate damage is experienced by mobile homes alone. Despite the large 26 proportion of damage incurred by mobile homes and unreinforced masonry buildings only 0.4% of Alabama buildings experience moderate and extensive damage, indicating that most of Alabama is undamaged by the earthquake. Table 4: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for State of Alabama General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 1,303,224 354,031 18,249 2,048 2,014 1,679,566 Complete Damage 539 5,581 119 20 9 6,268 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 5: NMSZ Event Damage by Building Type for State of Alabama Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 1,258,071 11,399 3,156 857 5,178 74,050 278,809 1,631,520 6,679 439 100 28 70 3,436 31,026 41,778 120 97 23 10 24 506 5,417 6,197 0 3 0 1 1 18 48 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 6: Essential Facilities Damage and Functionality for NMSZ Event in the State of Alabama3 Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality Total No. At Least Complete Total No. Facilities Moderate Damage Essential Facility Facilities Type (12 Critical Damage (Damage > (State) Counties) (Damage >50%) 50%) 137 19 0 0 Hospitals 1,870 270 0 0 Schools 27 3 0 0 EOCs 496 78 0 0 Police Stations 1,388 250 0 0 Fire Stations 3 Functionality >50% at Day 1 137 1,870 27 496 1,388 For Tables in this section the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged.’ Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged.’ 27 There are thousands of essential facilities in the State of Alabama and over 500 in the 12 critical counties alone. Table 6 highlights the damage and functionality of those facilities. Due to the low level of shaking and lack of liquefaction information employed in the NMSZ run for Alabama, no damage and loss of functionality is estimated, even in the critical counties. Continued functionality of all essential facilities will be critical as Alabama is likely to provide support for other states with more severe impacts from a NMSZ event. Highway bridges are very similar to essential facilities in that moderate or more severe damage is unlikely and the loss of functionality is minimal. All other transportation lifelines are similar as well, with all facilities operational the day after the earthquake. This will permit emergency vehicles and aircraft to access the State of Alabama easily, where many displaced people may be housed. Table 7: NMSZ Event Damage to Highway Bridges in the State of Alabama4 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Bridges (Damage > 50%) (Damage > 50%) 2,366 0 0 12,231 0 0 14,597 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,366 12,231 14,597 Table 8: NMSZ Event Damage to Pipelines in the State of Alabama System Potable Water – Local Waste Water – Local Natural Gas – Regional Natural Gas – Local Oil – Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 200,893 120,536 8,558 50,705 2,913 No. Leaks 722 571 3 610 1 No. Breaks 180 143 1 152 0 Damage to all utility facilities is similar to damage estimates shown for transportation and essential facilities, and is not shown here. All utility facilities are expected to remain functional in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Furthermore, no facilities are anticipated to incur moderate or more severe damage. Minor damage may occur in the critical counties, though occurrences would be infrequent. Pipeline damage in local distribution networks is likely, however. Table 8 illustrates the level of damage predicted for local and regional pipeline networks in the State of Alabama. Regional natural gas and oil pipelines are not expected to incur much damage with minimal breaks and leaks, as shown in Table 8. This is critical because these are major transmission lines that carry critical supplies to the east coast and northeast U.S. Local networks incur substantially more damage with several hundred leaks and breaks throughout the state. Despite the cases of damage to local pipeline networks, potable water service is expected to be 4 See footnote (3). 28 retained for all residences the day after the scenario earthquake. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. Though the number of leaks and breaks may appear to be large, they are spread across many miles of pipeline, resulting in no interruptions in service. For additional information on NMSZ Event damage in Alabama please refer to Appendix V. Alabama East Tennessee Seismic Zone Scenario The scenario for the East Tennessee Seismic Zone is located in northeastern Alabama and thus a new set of critical counties is required. There are 13 counties that experience the most intense shaking from the ETSZ event and though they are not highlighted in Figure 11, they are visible in the northeast corner of the state. These 13 critical counties are as follows:  Blount  Calhoun  Cherokee  Dekalb  Etowah  Jackson  Jefferson  Limestone  Madison  Marshall  Morgan  Saint Clair  Talladega Table 9: ETSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Alabama General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. At Least Moderate Buildings Damage 1,303,224 354,031 18,249 2,048 2,014 1,679,566 2,431 3,241 61 48 5 5,786 Complete Damage 410 127 5 2 0 544 The ETSZ event generates several thousand damaged structures, most of which occur in the 13 critical counties. Of the 544 “completely” damaged structures, all buildings are in the critical counties. Furthermore, all but 30 of the “at least moderately” damaged buildings are in the critical counties. Residential structures incur most of damage, with 98% of residential structures incurring at least moderate damage. Table 9 illustrates the distribution of damage by occupancy type for the ETSZ scenario event. The higher peak ground accelerations in northeast Alabama produce several thousand cases of damage to wood frame buildings, in addition to the damage incurred by unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes. The addition of new liquefaction information to this scenario for Alabama is a major factor contributing to the number of complete damage cases. Over 70% of all complete damage cases occur in wood frame 29 buildings with another 20% coming from mobile homes. Additional information on building type damage is shown in Table 10. The ESTZ event produces numerous cases of damage to critical facilities. Several fire stations, all near the epicenter in northeast Alabama, incur moderate or more severe damage. A total of 22 fire stations in that same region are not operational immediately after the earthquake and will inhibit the ability of those firefighters to respond to emergency calls. The same is true for non-operational police stations in northeast Alabama. Table 11 illustrates the damage and functionality loss expected for the ETSZ event in Alabama. Transportation lifeline damage to bridges is representative of all transportation infrastructure. Cases of damage and functionality loss are limited and located within miles of the epicenter. Table 12 highlights the damage and functionality estimates for the ETSZ event. Table 10: ETSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Alabama Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,255,446 7,365 1,596 11,814 64 42 3,247 16 11 879 8 5 5,234 19 14 76,394 1,127 371 305,185 6,983 2,676 1,658,199 15,582 4,715 Extensive 69 14 4 2 5 81 352 527 Complete 392 4 2 0 3 38 105 544 Table 11: ETSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Alabama5 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations 5 Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 137 1 0 136 1,870 8 0 1,856 27 0 0 27 496 6 0 485 1,388 12 0 1,366 See footnote (3). 30 Table 12: ETSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Alabama6 Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Damage Total No. of Damage (Damage >50%) Bridges (Damage >50%) 13 Critical Counties 4,014 1 0 Remaining Counties 10,583 0 0 14,597 1 0 Total State Functionality > 50% at Day 1 4,013 10,583 14,596 There are over 15,000 communication facilities in the State of Alabama and over 160 of those are expected to incur at least moderate damage from the ETSZ event (see Table 13). All damage is confined to the critical counties in northeast Alabama. Though no other utility facilities damage estimates are shown, other facility types follow the same distribution trends as communication facilities. For more detailed results on utility damage and functionality, please refer to Appendix V. Damage and functionality maps can be found in Appendix VIII. Table 13: ETSZ Event Communication Facilities Damage for the State of Alabama7 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Communication Damage Assessments Total No. At Least Moderate Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) 5,180 162 10,161 0 15,341 162 Complete Damage (Damage >50%) 0 0 0 Damage to pipelines is limited, with less than 500 total leaks and 200 total breaks throughout the state. All leaks and breaks occur along local distribution lines, which indicates that all major transmission lines remain intact and will continue transporting product in the days immediately after the earthquake. Service interruptions are shown in Table 14 for electric power facilities only, since no service interruptions are expected for potable water facilities. The day after the earthquake nearly 7,400 households are without power, with over 1,700 households still without power after one week. These service outages will prevent residents from remaining in their homes, resulting in some seeking temporary public shelter. Table 14: ETSZ Event Service Interruptions for the State of Alabama Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 1,737,080 7,389 4,367 1,715 349 Electric Power 6 7 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 31 Day 90 10 Arkansas New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The NMSZ event generates substantial shaking in northeastern Arkansas counties. There are 34 critical counties identified in this portion of the state that are expected to incur the majority of all damage. These critical counties are illustrated in Figure 12 and are also listed below:  Arkansas  Baxter  Clay  Cleburne  Cleveland  Craighead  Crittenden  Cross  Desha  Faulkner  Fulton  Grant  Greene  Independence  Izard  Jackson  Jefferson  Lawrence  Lee  Lincoln  Lonoke  Mississippi  Monroe  Phillips  Poinsett  Prairie  Pulaski  Randolph  St. Francis  Sharp  Stone  Van Buren  White  Woodruff Buildings in Arkansas are heavily damaged by the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. Complete damage cases total over 50,000 while moderate and severe damage levels contribute another 61,500 cases. Table 15 quantifies damage estimates for various occupancy types. Of the over 1.2 million buildings in the State of Arkansas, more than 95% are residential buildings. Over 98% of all complete damage occurs in residential buildings, and the same is true of moderate and severe damage. All cases of complete damage occur in the 34 critical counties and approximately 59,700, or 97%, of moderate and severe damage occurs in the critical counties. Wood frame buildings are a substantial portion of Arkansas’ buildings and as a result many of these structures are damaged, as shown in Table 16. The significant shaking and highlight liquefiable soils in the critical counties are major factors contributing to the tens of thousands of cases of complete damage to wood frame buildings. While over 55% of all complete damage occurs to wood frame structures, unreinforced masonry structures and mobile homes account for 19% and 24% of all complete damage, respectively. All other buildings types comprise a much smaller portion of the building inventory and represent very small percentages of damaged structures. Table 15: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Arkansas General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 936,609 195,818 8,078 1,461 1,169 1,143,135 38,644 21,792 796 155 102 61,489 32 Complete Damage 35,742 13,626 555 174 62 50,159 Table 16: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Arkansas Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 718,424 58,893 22,688 2,398 295 218 776 92 58 820 97 89 444 35 33 96,398 13,474 7,340 115,965 23,376 12,704 935,225 96,262 43,130 Extensive 6,744 152 47 53 28 4,011 7,324 18,359 Complete 28,425 332 81 100 65 9,334 11,822 50,159 Essential facilities in the State of Arkansas are also substantially damaged by the NMSZ event. Over 150 of the 1,330 fire stations in Arkansas are at least moderately damaged with 191 not operational the day after the earthquake. In addition, 94 schools are damaged with 117 not functioning immediately after the event, as shown in Table 17. The combination of non-operational fire and police services in the critical counties will severely inhibit the ability of emergency workers to respond to requests for assistance. Hospitals in the critical counties are also out of service. Forty of the 103 hospitals in Arkansas are not operational the day after the earthquake, meaning nearly all hospitals in the critical counties will not be able to care for those injured by the earthquake or maintain care for current patients. Counties in western Arkansas will likely need to provide support for those out-of-service facilities immediately after the earthquake. Table 17: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Arkansas8 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 103 18 10 1,254 188 106 11 1 1 515 94 43 1,330 151 63 Functionality >50% at Day 1 63 995 10 398 1,139 Transportation lifelines provide much-needed access to portions of the state that are severely damaged by the earthquake and damaged roads or airport runways will limit the assistance to these areas in the critical days after the event. Nearly 700 bridges, all in the critical counties, are damaged and not functioning (see Table 18) which limits the number of response workers, supplies and medical aid accessing northeast Arkansas. Though not shown here, several railway facilities, port facilities and airports are heavily damaged, further inhibiting the movement of people and supplies both into and out of the hardest hit areas. For more information on damage to the transportation infrastructure in Arkansas, please refer to Appendix V. 8 See footnote (3). 33 Table 18: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Arkansas9 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Bridges Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,883 688 290 2,751 0 0 5,634 688 290 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,197 2,751 4,948 The damage to electric power facilities shown in Table 19 is representative of all utility facility damage in the State of Arkansas. Of the 29 electric power facilities in the critical counties eight are at least moderately damaged with one being completely damaged. Furthermore, eleven facilities are not operational the day after the earthquake, which greatly reduces the number of customers receiving services. Additionally, 66 waste water and 59 communication facilities are at least moderately damaged in the critical counties. Nearly half of the 229 waste water facilities in the critical counties are not operational the day after the earthquake. Table 19: NMSZ Event Electric Power Facility Damage for the State of Arkansas10 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Electric Power (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) Facilities 29 8 1 27 0 0 56 8 1 Functionality >50% at Day 1 18 27 45 Table 20: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Arkansas Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 175,565 174,382 171,216 132,672 Potable Water 1,042,696 95,309 68,561 39,398 13,541 Electric Power Day 90 79,737 112 With extensive damage and functionality loss to critical utility facilities in the 34 critical counties, it then follows that utility service outages will be extensive. Table 20 illustrates the loss of utility service in the State of Arkansas. The day after the earthquake, over 175,000 of the one million households in the state are without potable water and over 95,000 households are without electric power. After one week some households see renewed service, though hundreds of thousands of people are still without service. With no utilities available in their homes, many residents that did not experience severe structural damage to their homes may be displaced, dramatically increasing the number of people requiring public shelter. For more information on damage estimates for the 9 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 10 34 State of Arkansas, please refer to Appendix V for detailed impact assessment results and see Appendix VIII for maps of damage and functionality losses. Illinois New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario A rupture on the northeast extension of the New Madrid Fault produces intense shaking in southern Illinois. Forty counties near the source of seismic activity are identified as critical counties and are expected to incur high levels of damage. These counties are highlighted in Figure 13 and are listed below:  Alexander  Bond  Calhoun  Clark  Clay  Clinton  Crawford  Edwards  Effingham  Fayette  Franklin  Gallatin  Greene  Hamilton  Hardin  Jackson  Jasper  Jefferson  Jersey  Johnson  Lawrence  Macoupin  Madison  Marion  Massac  Monroe  Montgomery  Perry  Pope  Pulaski  Randolph  Richland  Saint Clair  Saline  Union  Wabash  Washington  Wayne  White  Williamson There are roughly 3.3 million buildings in the State of Illinois; far more than the other states in the eight-state region. This is in large part due to the substantial number of buildings in Chicago, Illinois, located in the northeastern portion of the state. These buildings are not likely to be damaged from an earthquake, however, and may skew perceptions of damaged building estimates. There are nearly 17,000 cases of complete damage and nearly 30,000 cases of at least moderate damage. No buildings incur complete damage, which is the rare collapse of a structure. More commonly, complete damage includes critical damage to structural connections, significant lateral displacement of structural systems and other damage that renders a building uninhabitable. In some cases damage is severe enough to cause collapse during aftershocks even if it does not occur during the main event. When compared to the 3.3 million buildings in Illinois, this is roughly 1% of all buildings. Though when considering the 26,000 cases of at least moderate damage in the 40 critical counties, which includes only 500,000 buildings, this equates to over 5% of all buildings. As with many other states, residential buildings experience the majority of building damage. Single family homes and other residential buildings account for all but 200 cases of complete damage and 98% of all at least moderate damage throughout the state, as shown in Table 21. Damage is further classified by building type in Table 22. Wood frame structures account for over 35% of all moderate, extensive and complete damage cases, while over 45% of all complete damage occurs with this building type. Several thousand unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes experience complete damage, though extensive and moderate damage levels occur even more. 35 Table 21: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Illinois General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. At Least Moderate Buildings Damage 2,780,853 416,473 41,905 7,466 4,515 3,251,212 Complete Damage 16,999 12,046 352 40 46 29,483 11,586 5,087 140 11 36 16,860 Table 22: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Illinois Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 2,315,085 21,686 6,150 16,145 656 193 31,516 917 250 5,382 178 71 5,776 78 24 638,209 38,777 7,430 107,166 23,298 9,620 3,119,279 85,590 23,738 Extensive 2,750 15 44 8 2 1,176 1,750 5,745 Complete 7,819 60 215 26 15 4,117 4,608 16,860 Numerous essential facilities are damaged and are not operational in the days after the earthquake, all of which occurs in southern Illinois and the critical counties in particular. There are 83 at least moderately damaged schools with 60 of those being completely damaged. All of these schools are in the southernmost counties in Illinois, and since schools frequently function as shelters for displaced people, southern Illinois is likely to be without some of its sheltering facilities. Nearly 40 fire stations and 20 police stations are damaged while 80 fire stations and over 45 police stations are not operational the day after the earthquake, as shown in Table 23. This lack of functioning facilities will make the organization of immediate emergency response workers difficult, since there will be limited facilities available to coordinate these efforts. The functional capacity of most transportation lifelines is reduced, particularly in the critical counties. There are over 250 at least moderately damaged bridges that will not be functioning at full capacity, as shown in Table 24. With 71 bridges experiencing complete damage, and all of these bridges in the southernmost counties, this portion of the state will have very limited mobility when it comes to the movement of people and aid into and out of the region. Additionally, 30 airports, 20 ports and 10 railway facilities are at least moderately damaged and not operational the day after the earthquake. For further information on transportation damage and functionality, please refer to Appendix V. 36 Table 23: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Illinois11 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 249 3 1 5,722 83 60 149 2 2 1,044 21 15 1,725 38 32 Functionality >50% at Day 1 217 5,464 145 997 1,645 Table 24: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Illinois12 40 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Bridges (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 6,554 264 71 16,300 0 0 22,854 264 71 Functionality >50% at Day 1 6,293 16,300 22,593 Utility lifeline damage and functionality is exemplified by waste water facilities estimates in Table 25. There are thousands of waste water facilities in the State of Illinois and roughly 2,000 in the critical counties. Over 450 facilities are at least moderately damaged, which equates to 20% of all facilities in the critical counties. Nearly 1,000 facilities in this same area are not functioning the day after the earthquake which will substantially limit the service provided to customers in southern Illinois. Additionally, nearly 60 electric power facilities are damaged and approximately 130 non-operational at day 1. Communication facilities also show a high frequency of damage in the critical counties with 1,450 at least moderately damaged facilities, or which is roughly 20% of the 7,500 facilities in that area. Table 25: NMSZ Event Waste Water Facilities Damage for the State of Illinois13 Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 40 Critical Counties 2,221 461 8 Remaining Counties 7,168 0 0 9,389 461 8 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 1,246 7,168 8,414 In addition to the significant damage to facilities, utility distribution lines show thousands of breaks and leaks as well. The local potable water distribution network incurs nearly 11 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 13 See footnote (3). 12 37 5,500 breaks and leaks, over nearly 165,000 miles of pipe. Furthermore, regional pipelines that transmit natural gas and oil nationwide incur numerous leaks in southern Illinois and may inhibit the transport of these commodities to regions far outside the NMSZ. Damage to pipelines, especially in the local distribution networks, interrupts services for many customers, as shown in Table 26. The day after the earthquake, nearly 71,000 households are without potable water and nearly 70,000 households are left without electric power. Even after one week, 43,000 customers are without potable water and nearly 25,000 households without power. As mentioned earlier, this large number of households without critical services will increase the number of people seeking public shelter, even if their homes are not structurally damaged or condemned. For more information on direct damage and functionality of Illinois infrastructure, please refer to Appendix V for detailed impact assessment results and Appendix VIII for maps of damage and functionality. Table 26: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Illinois Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 70,781 56,532 43,091 26,770 Potable Water 4,591,779 69,641 48,139 24,340 6,678 Electric Power Day 90 0 83 Indiana New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The northeast segment of the New Madrid Fault produces a moderate level of shaking in the southwestern counties of Indiana. A total of 11 counties are identified in this southwest portion of the state and are considered critical in that they are likely to incur the majority of the damage experienced in the state. These counties are highlighted in Figure 14 and are listed on the following page:  Daviess  Dubois  Gibson  Greene  Knox  Pike  Posey  Spencer  Sullivan  Vanderburgh  Warrick There are over 1.9 million buildings in the State of Indiana and most remain undamaged by the NMSZ event. Table 27 shows that nearly 6,500 buildings, or roughly one-third of 1% of all Indiana buildings, incur at least moderate damage. Of the 160,000 buildings in the critical counties, only 3,500, or 2% of all buildings in the critical counties, incur at least moderate damage. This also indicates that damage from the NMSZ earthquake is not confined to the critical counties as is the case with some other scenarios. What is consistent with other scenarios, however, is that the majority of damage occurs in residential structures, as shown in Table 27. Building damage by building type is illustrated in Table 28. Most cases of moderate and extensive damage are incurred by unreinforced masonry and mobile homes, which is consistent with other scenarios that show only moderate levels of shaking, such as Alabama. In comparison with other states in the eight-state region, Indiana experiences very little damage to buildings. 38 Table 27: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Class in the State of Indiana General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 1,675,434 229,169 19,034 4,317 4,102 1,932,056 Complete Damage 2,814 3,189 154 37 266 6,460 2 0 0 0 0 2 Table 28: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Indiana Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 1,388,618 8,288 2,618 2,862 1,737 337,716 140,340 1,882,179 7,908 463 126 158 35 18,051 16,674 43,415 150 191 39 90 14 2,823 2,994 6,301 0 13 1 7 1 109 28 159 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 Damage to essential facilities and transportation lifelines show similar results, in so far as damage and functionality losses are very uncommon or nonexistent. As shown in Table 29, no facilities are expected to incur at least moderate damage, though less severe damage forms are possible. Such forms of damage may include minor cracking to concrete and masonry structures. There is some loss of functionality, all of which occurs in the 11 critical counties. Schools show the greatest loss of functionality, with 56 schools not operational the day after the earthquake. Another nine hospitals, 18 fire stations and six police stations are also not functioning at this same point in time. Transportation lifeline infrastructure items are similar in that there are no cases of moderate damage. In contrast to essential facilities functionality, transportation components show no loss of functionality. Utility facilities do not show any cases of moderate or more severe damage, as is the case with essential facilities and transportation lifelines. Furthermore, there is no loss of functionality, even immediately after the earthquake. While utility facilities show very little damage, utility pipelines show numerous cases of breaks and leaks, as shown in Table 30. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at 728 and 753, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.014 leaks/mile and breaks/mile (roughly 1 leak/break every 70 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural 39 gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 650 leaks and 652 breaks over the combined length of 54,746 miles of natural gas pipeline. Table 29: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Indiana14 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 175 0 0 2,686 0 0 51 0 0 474 0 0 1,210 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 166 2,630 50 468 1,192 Table 30: NMSZ Event Pipeline Damage for the State of Indiana System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 111,394 66,836 10,188 44,558 4,625 No. Leaks 753 596 13 637 17 No. Breaks 728 576 36 616 60 Table 31: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Indiana Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 44,115 34,798 11,075 0 Potable Water 2,336,306 0 0 0 0 Electric Power Day 90 0 0 The damage to local distribution networks cuts off service for tens of thousands of customers. Table 31 illustrates that over 44,000 households are without potable water service the day after the earthquake, while all electric power service is retained throughout the state. Electric power lines are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking, unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. As a result of the low level of shaking, electric power service is not likely to be interrupted for residences in Indiana, even in the first few days following the earthquake. For further information on the earthquake impact assessment results for direct damage in the State of Indiana, please refer to Appendix V. Additional maps showing the distribution of damage can be found in Appendix VIII. 14 See footnote (3). 40 Indiana Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Scenario The WVSZ scenario in the State of Indiana employs the same set of critical counties as the NMSZ scenario. The southwestern-most counties in Indiana experience the most intense shaking for both scenario events, thus the same set of counties is used. For more information on the shaking generated by these to events in the State of Indiana, please refer to Appendix I. The critical counties for the State of Indiana are illustrated in Figure 14 and are listed below:  Daviess  Dubois  Gibson  Greene  Knox  Pike  Posey  Spencer  Sullivan  Vanderburgh  Warrick The WVSZ event causes several thousand cases of complete damage, as well as moderate and severe damage, to the more than 1.9 million buildings in Indiana. Of the roughly 9,000 completely damaged structures, 96% are residential, with over 85% of these being single family homes. Table 32 illustrates the distribution of building damage by occupancy type. Furthermore, more than 8,600 completely damaged buildings are located in the 11 critical counties in southwest Indiana. Moderate and severe damage is incurred by another 8,000 structures, though only 1,500 of these damage cases occur in the critical counties. This indicates that damage is not confined to the southwestern tip of Indiana, but occurs in counties outside that area, such as Perry, Crawford, Orange, Lawrence, Martin, Monroe, Owen, Clay, Vigo and others. The WVSZ event produces higher levels of shaking than the NMSZ event, and as a result causes thousands of more cases of damage, particularly complete damage. The combination of liquefaction data and more intense shaking contributes significantly to the large number of wood frame building complete damage cases. Approximately 70% of all complete damage is experienced by wood frame structures, while another 20% can be attributed to unreinforced masonry buildings. Moderate and extensive damage states show large numbers of damaged unreinforced masonry structures and mobile homes, though very little wood frame damage is estimated. Of the more than 7,600 cases of moderate and extensive damage, greater than 6,600 cases, or 87%, of the damage, can be attributed to unreinforced masonry and mobile homes. Table 33 shows the distribution of building damage by building type. Though thousands of buildings are damaged by a WVSZ event, essential facilities incur very little damage. Table 34 shows that no essential facilities experience at least moderate damage, though it is likely that some of these facilities will incur some form of minor damage from the WVSZ event. This may include minor cracking of concrete and masonry or minor joint damage, though nothing severe enough to compromise the operational capabilities of the facilities. While estimates show no moderate damage, the functionality of some facilities, particularly in the critical counties, is reduced from this event. There are 20 schools, 15 fire stations, eight police stations and one hospital that are not functional the day after the earthquake. This is likely to limit the emergency response 41 capabilities of such services in the hours immediately after the event, especially in the extreme southwestern counties of Indiana. Table 32: WVSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Indiana General Occupancy Type General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 1,675,434 229,169 19,034 4,317 4,102 1,932,056 Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total Complete Damage 5,315 2,068 200 30 31 7,644 7,464 1,161 90 15 224 8,954 Table 33: WVSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Indiana Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate Extensive Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total 1,370,489 8,545 2,655 2,912 1,717 330,681 148,359 1,865,358 19,342 222 72 107 41 21,176 9,140 50,100 515 83 13 46 15 4,936 1,767 7,374 Complete 24 4 0 2 0 227 13 270 6,305 101 44 51 14 1,683 756 8,954 Table 34: WVSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Indiana15 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 175 0 0 2,686 0 0 51 0 0 474 0 0 1,210 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 174 2,666 49 466 1,195 Despite the moderate level of shaking in several southwestern Indiana counties, most transportation lifeline components remain largely undamaged by the WVSZ event. All highway bridges remain functional even in the days immediately after the earthquake and none of these bridges incur moderate or more severe damage. All railway bridges, as well as railway and port facilities, remain undamaged and operational. Five airports in southwestern Indiana, however, incur moderate damage, which leaves two airports non15 See footnote (3). 42 operational in the days immediately after the event. These estimates are not shown here but can be found in Appendix V. Numerous types of utility lifelines incur damage, including hundreds of communication facilities, as shown in Table 35. There are nearly 2,500 communication facilities in the 11 critical counties and 432 of these facilities experience at least moderate damage. Three facilities outside the area in Vigo County also incur at least moderate damage. Of these 435 damaged facilities, only 131 are not functioning the day after the event. In addition to communication facilities damage, 23 electric power facilities experience at least moderate damage, and 53 of these facilities are not operational the day after the event. Furthermore, 22 waste water facilities are not functioning immediately after the earthquake. Table 35: WVSZ Event Communication Facilities Damage for the State of Indiana16 Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 2,490 432 0 2,359 Remaining Counties 19,189 3 0 19,189 21,679 435 0 21,548 Total State This dramatic loss of functionality in the southwestern counties of Indiana will severely limit service to area customers. As illustrated in Table 36, tens of thousands of people are without critical utility services in the days and weeks following the WVSZ event. Over 42,000 households are without potable water the day after the earthquake, while nearly 27,000 are still without water after one week. Electric power is cut off for nearly 15,000 people immediately after the event with over 4,000 still without power after a week. A lack of these services will likely prevent residents from staying in their homes and increase the number of people seeking public shelter. For more information on WSVZ impact assessment results, please refer to Appendix V. Table 36: WVSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Indiana Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 42,022 31,248 26,786 18,504 Potable Water 2,336,306 14,994 9,419 4,185 1,169 Electric Power 16 See footnote (3). 43 Day 90 0 19 Kentucky New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The northeast fault segment generates substantial shaking in western Kentucky. As a result 25 counties are identified in that area and are expected to incur the majority of the damage from a NMSZ earthquake. These critical counties are highlighted in Figure 15 and are also listed below:  Ballard  Caldwell  Calloway  Carlisle  Christian  Crittenden  Daviess  Fulton  Graves  Hancock  Henderson  Hickman  Hopkins  Livingston  Logan  Lyon  McCracken  McLean  Marshall  Muhlenberg  Ohio  Todd  Trigg  Union  Webster The State of Kentucky experiences substantial damage to its building stock of nearly 1.5 million buildings, most of which is confined to the western half of the state. Table 37 illustrates the number of building damaged by the NMSZ event. Nearly 30,000 buildings are completely damaged and another 53,000 buildings experience moderate or severe damage. All but roughly 150 cases of complete damage occur in the critical counties and approximately 95% of all moderate and severe damage occurs in these counties. As with many other scenarios, residential structures comprise the majority of the damage. Nearly 98% of all complete damage and over 99% of all moderate and severe damage occurs to single family homes and other residential buildings. This percentage of damage is proportional to the inventory; however, roughly 98% of the building stock is residential construction. As mentioned earlier, other residential structures are most commonly multiunit dwellings. Table 37: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Kentucky General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 1,159,114 292,873 16,431 3,002 1,900 1,473,320 39,150 13,050 306 48 34 52,588 Complete Damage 18,768 9,673 475 53 60 29,029 Building damage by building type is shown in Table 38. Nearly half of all complete damage occurs in wood frame structures, with mobile homes comprising 30% of complete damage and unreinforced masonry (URM) representing slightly less than 30%. Though nearly 14,000 cases of complete damage occur to wood frame structures, this only represents 1.3% of all wood frame buildings in Kentucky. The roughly 6,200 URMs and 8,800 mobile homes that are completely damaged represent a much higher portion of 44 their respective inventories at 3.9% of all URMs and 3.6% of all mobile homes. When comparing these percentages, it is evident that URMs are more vulnerable to damage despite having fewer actual instances of complete damage. The same type of comparison can be done for moderate and extensive damage. In this case, the 11,800 instances of moderate and severe damage to mobile homes represents 4.8% of all mobile homes in Kentucky, which is the greatest proportion of inventory damaged at this level by far. Only 3.4% of wood frame buildings and 2.7% of URMs are damaged at these severity levels. Table 38: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Kentucky Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 992,135 18,737 24,772 6,430 264 93 1,782 51 22 1,907 74 42 1,109 20 13 137,881 8352 2,434 197,127 25935 7,952 1,338,371 53,433 35,328 Extensive 11,617 39 15 19 10 1,720 3,840 17,260 Complete 13,726 201 58 69 39 6,161 8,775 29,029 Essential facilities experience substantial damage, particularly in the westernmost counties in Kentucky. Nearly 100 schools are at least moderately damaged, with roughly 80 being completely damaged. This leaves nearly all schools in Fulton, Hickman, Carlisle, Ballard, McCracken, Graves, Calloway and Marshall Counties completely damaged and non functional for a significant period after the earthquake. Schools are often used as public shelters, though with so many damaged in western Kentucky displaced people will need to be housed elsewhere. Emergency services also suffer tremendous losses in western Kentucky. There are 77 at least moderately damaged fire stations and 23 police stations similarly damaged, as shown in Table 39. In addition, 107 fire stations and 34 police stations, all in the western Kentucky, are not operational the day after the event. With 17 hospitals in that same area not operational, all emergency response services will be impaired. Table 39: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Kentucky17 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations 17 Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 135 6 4 1,846 98 79 0 0 0 407 23 19 1,066 77 61 See footnote (3). 45 Functionality >50% at Day 1 118 1,713 0 373 959 Transportation lifelines in the critical counties incur substantial damage and are likely to make travel within the region and access to the region from the outside difficult. There are approximately 200 damaged bridges in western Kentucky and nearly 50 of those are completely damaged, indicating they will not regain functionality for a significant period of time (see Table 40). The majority of these completely damaged bridges are in Fulton, Hickman, Carlisle, Ballard, McCracken and Graves Counties. In addition, there are 14 completely damaged port facilities, with roughly half on the Mississippi and half on the Ohio Rivers. Also, 19 airports are moderately or more severely damaged with 13 non operational immediately after the earthquake. Table 40: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Kentucky18 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,173 197 46 4,632 0 0 6,805 197 46 Functionality >50% at Day 1 1,974 4,630 6,604 Table 41: NMSZ Event Waste Water Facilities Damage for the State of Kentucky19 Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 1,561 523 81 764 Remaining Counties 7,530 0 0 7,530 9,081 523 81 8,294 Total State In addition, numerous utility lifelines are damaged and not functioning in the critical counties. As shown in Table 41 more than 500 waste water facilities incur at least moderate damage and 81 of those facilities are completely damaged. In the days immediately after the earthquake, approximately 800 waste water facilities in the critical counties are not functioning, which will severely limit service to many residents in western Kentucky. Electric power facilities in the critical counties are also heavily damaged with 132 facilities incurring at least moderate damage and 232 of the 463 electric power facilities not operational immediately after the event. In addition, 850 communication facilities are out of service in the days after the earthquake. With such extensive functional losses in the critical counties, tens of thousands of households are without crucial services. Table 42 illustrates the numbers of households without potable water and electric power in the days and weeks after the NMSZ earthquake. The day after the event, nearly 109,000 households are without water and 77,000 are without electricity. A large portion of households regain service within the 18 19 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 46 first week, but there are still 67,000 households without water in the most heavily damaged areas. With such extended service losses in western Kentucky, some residents whose homes are not heavily damaged may be forced to leave due to a lack of drinking water and electricity. For more information on direct damage and functional losses in the State of Kentucky, please refer to Appendix V for detailed assessment results and to Appendix VIII for damage and functionality maps. Table 42: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Kentucky Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 108,556 92,742 66,608 38,964 Potable Water 1,590,647 77,263 60,273 36,450 11,464 Electric Power Day 90 0 86 Mississippi New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The NMSZ event on the southwest segment of the fault generates intense shaking in Mississippi’s northern counties. As a result, 25 counties are identified as critical and most of the damage incurred by the State of Mississippi is expected to occur in this set of counties. These 25 critical counties are highlighted in Figure 16 and are listed below:  Alcorn  Benton  Bolivar  Calhoun  Chickasaw  Coahoma  Desoto  Grenada  Itawamba  Lafayette  Lee  Marshall  Monroe  Panola  Pontotoc  Prentiss  Quitman  Sunflower  Tallahatchie  Tate  Tippah  Tishomingo  Tunica  Union  Yalobusha Buildings in Mississippi are expected to incur moderate damage in the northern portion of the state, with limited cases of complete damage which are limited to the critical counties. There are 7,300 buildings that are estimated to incur complete damage, all of which are in the 25 critical counties. Approximately 35,000 of the 39,000 moderate and severe damage cases occur in the critical counties. Table 43 illustrates the distribution of building damage by occupancy type. Nearly all complete and moderate/severe damage is experienced by residential construction, leaving 45,000 of the one million residential structures in Mississippi damaged. As with many other NMSZ states, wood frame buildings and mobile homes are the most common structural systems. What is uncommon, however, is the small percentage of building inventory belonging to URMs. In Mississippi, approximately 5% of the total building inventory is URM construction. Nearly half of all complete damage occurs in wood frame buildings even though only 25% of moderate damage is incurred by this type of construction. Approximately 60% of all moderate damage is attributed to mobile homes, as shown in Table 44. It is also relevant to note that while steel, concrete and 47 precast (concrete) structures are a much smaller portion of the building stock in Mississippi, approximately 15% of each of these building types experiences at least moderate damage, while only 1.4% of all wood frame buildings incurs at least moderate damage. Table 43: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Mississippi General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 793,953 212,185 8,062 1,657 1,478 1,017,335 Complete Damage 11,343 26,741 705 466 127 39,382 3,881 3,094 190 112 23 7,300 Table 44: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Mississippi Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 703,568 50807 7,092 2,512 297 296 906 102 84 955 104 113 494 39 36 44,187 6104 3,553 133,149 27429 16,731 885,771 84,882 27,905 Extensive 189 269 63 78 21 1,531 9,326 11,477 Complete 3,335 181 30 40 12 764 2,938 7,300 The northernmost counties in Mississippi are greatly affected by damage and functional losses to essential facilities. Over 100 schools experience at least moderate damage and over 150 are not functioning the day after the earthquake, as shown in Table 45. Nearly all of these damaged schools are located in Desoto, Tunica, Tate, Marshall and Benton Counties. Additionally, Lafayette, Union, Tippah, Alcorn, and Prentiss Counties experience substantial functional loss to schools immediately after the earthquake. There are 81 at least moderately damaged fire stations and nearly 130 not functioning the day after the earthquake. Hospitals in northwest Mississippi are not functioning as well, with 34 facilities in the critical counties along with Leflore, Montgomery, Webster, Lowndes and Oktibbeha Counties. Not only will this region be without medical care services for those injured by the earthquake, but care for current patients will likely require transport to fully functioning facilities outside the critical counties. Transportation lifelines experience damage primarily in northwestern Mississippi. Table 46 illustrates that over 70 highway bridges are damaged and 65 are not functioning the day after the earthquake. Most of these non-functioning bridges are in Desoto, Tunica, Tate and Marshall Counties. Five airports in northwest Mississippi incur at least 48 moderate damage, though they are expected to remain fully functional. In some cases damage to structures may not affect functionality of the facility. Using airports as an example, some portion of the facility may be damaged, though enough of the facility’s structure remains undamaged so that the facility can remain operational, despite some damage to one portion of the facility. Table 45: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Mississippi20 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 123 11 2 1,281 110 10 37 1 0 365 30 2 984 81 3 Functionality >50% at Day 1 89 1,130 35 322 856 Table 46: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Mississippi21 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 5,043 73 0 11,893 0 0 16,936 73 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 4,978 11,893 16,871 Table 47: NMSZ Event Communication Facilities Damage for the State of Mississippi22 Communication Damage Assessments Complete Total No. of At Least Moderate Damage Damage Communication (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) Facilities 25 Critical Counties 2,553 290 0 Remaining Counties 6,663 0 0 9,216 290 0 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,553 6,663 9,216 Utility lifelines experience substantial losses in the critical counties, especially in the northwestern-most critical counties. Damage to communication facilities is shown in Table 47, which illustrates that nearly 300 communication facilities, all in Desoto and Tate Counties, are at least moderately damaged. Damage to these facilities is not severe enough to cause a substantial loss of functionality, however. There are nearly 300 waste water facilities and 48 electric power facilities that are not operational immediately 20 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 22 See footnote (3). 21 49 following the earthquake. Most of these facilities are located in Desoto, Tate, Tunica and the surrounding counties. There are approximately one million households, or residences, in the State of Mississippi and nearly 42,000 of those are without potable water the day after the earthquake. In addition, 33,000 are without electricity. Only 2,000 households have potable water service restored after a week, though 26,000 have electricity restored in that same period of time. A lack of potable water service for an extended period of time, as shown in Table 48, may force some families to leave their homes, even if the home is not significantly damaged. For more information on direct damage and functional losses in the State of Mississippi, please refer to Appendix V for detailed assessment results and to Appendix VIII for damage and functionality maps. Table 48: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Mississippi Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 No. Households 41,790 40,256 39,752 28,749 Potable Water 1,046,434 32,601 18,416 6,452 1,276 Electric Power Day 90 0 44 Missouri New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The NMSZ event on the central thrust fault produces substantial shaking in southeast Missouri. The counties that experience the most significant shaking are designated as critical counties and much of the damage incurred is anticipated to occur in that set of counties. There are a total of 45 critical counties in addition to the City of St. Louis in Missouri, which are highlighted in Figure 17 and listed below:  Audrain  Bollinger  Boone  Butler  Callaway  Cape Girardeau  Carter  Cole  Crawford  Dent  Douglas  Dunklin  Oregon  Osage  Ozark  Pemiscot  Perry  Phelps  Pike  Pulaski  Reynolds  Ripley  St. Charles  Ste. Genevieve  Franklin  Gasconade  Howell  Iron  Jefferson  Lincoln  Madison  Maries  Miller  Mississippi  Montgomery  New Madrid  St. Francois  St. Louis  St. Louis City  Scott  Shannon  Stoddard  Texas  Warren  Washington  Wayne The City of St. Louis is considered independently of St. Louis County. This distinction means that there are only 45 critical counties in the State of Missouri and one critical city. For the purposes of this report, however, all critical areas will be referred to as critical counties, with St. Louis City as its own county for a total of 46, rather than 45, critical counties. 50 Missouri is one of the most heavily damaged states of all the states in the NMSZ region. Of the 1.9 million buildings in Missouri, nearly 122,000 buildings are at least moderately damaged, which equates to 6.5% of all buildings in Missouri. This is a much higher margin than the 1-2% estimated in many other states. Table 49 shows that nearly 98% of all cases of complete damage are experienced by residential structures. The same is true for the at least moderate damage level. In addition, all complete damage and 98% of at least moderate damage occur in the 46 critical counties. The low level of shaking outside the critical counties causes roughly 1,800 cases of moderate damage, though most is confined to the critical counties in southeast Missouri. Wood frame structures, URMs and mobile homes are the three building types which experience the most damage. Over 15,000 wood frame structures are completely damaged and nearly 34,000 are at least moderately damaged. This equates to 1.3% and 2.8% of all wood frame building in Missouri, respectively. The 9,600 mobile homes that are completely damaged comprise 5% of all of Missouri’s mobile homes, while the 22,500 at least moderately damaged mobile homes represent 11.7% of all mobile homes in the state. Table 50 also shows that 27,300 URMs experience at least moderate damage and comprise 7.2% of all URMs in Missouri. Table 49: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Missouri General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. At Least Moderate Buildings Damage 1,472,235 55,807 272,089 26,748 20,433 1,560 2,872 226 2,916 226 1,770,545 84,567 Complete Damage 23,860 12,179 651 80 121 36,891 Table 50: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Missouri Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,108,809 40,945 13,655 6,800 601 360 2,166 156 70 2,291 179 129 1,493 121 77 317,999 34,151 11,730 149,399 20,868 8,177 1,588,957 97,021 34,198 Extensive 4,808 109 27 41 20 3,929 4,544 13,478 Complete 15,090 298 84 97 69 11,686 9,567 36,891 Damage and functional losses to essential facilities in Missouri are most prominent in the extreme southeastern counties, where shaking is most intense. Nearly 200 schools and 51 over 100 fire stations are at least moderately damaged. In addition, numerous facilities are completely damaged and will not be operational for an extended period of time. The day after the earthquake, 37 hospitals, nearly 300 schools, 67 police stations and 135 fire stations are not functioning. The majority of these facilities are located in Dunklin, Pemiscot, New Madrid, Butler, Stoddard, Mississippi, Ripley, Wayne and Cape Girardeau Counties, as well as the St. Louis area. Much of southeast Missouri is without local emergency response services and medical care, since a majority of the essential facilities are non-operational in the days following the earthquake. The extensive damage to transportation lifelines makes traveling within southeast Missouri incredibly difficult. As shown in Table 52, over 650 highway bridges are completely damaged and over 1,350 bridges are not operational immediately after the earthquake. Most bridges are in the counties that experience substantial, essential facilities functional losses and these counties were listed previously. Numerous railway, port and airport facilities are also damaged. This level of damage leads to 26 airports, 25 ports and 16 railway facilities out of service in the days immediately following the event. With much of this damage and functional loss occurring in southeast Missouri, not only will it be difficult to travel within this area, but it will be much harder to get relief workers and aid into the area and injured or displaced families out of the area. Table 51: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Missouri23 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 160 8 3 2,817 185 85 33 7 4 654 61 32 1,399 116 48 Functionality >50% at Day 1 123 2,530 25 587 1,264 Table 52: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Missouri24 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 23 24 Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Total No. Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Of Bridges (Damage >50%) 7,803 1,363 659 6,447 13,962 0 0 13,962 21,765 1,363 659 20,409 See footnote (3). See footnote (3). 52 Table 53: NMSZ Event Potable Water Facility Damage for the State of Missouri25 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Total No. of Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 3,413 758 48 2,756 5,186 0 0 5,186 8,599 758 48 7,942 Utility lifelines are heavily damaged as well, particularly in southeast Missouri. Table 53 illustrates the damage and functional loss of potable water facilities. Approximately 50 potable water facilities are completely damaged and over 650 facilities are not operating the day after the event. Communication facilities also incur major damage, with nearly 1,600 at least moderately damaged facilities and 865 non-functioning facilities immediately after the earthquake. In addition, over 100 electric power facilities are down and 63 natural gas facilities are not operating. Most of southeast Missouri is so heavily damaged that nearly all utility services are down in the days after the event. This massive loss of functionality in utility lifelines leads to hundreds of thousands of service interruptions, as shown in Table 54. Nearly 150,000 households are without potable water and 100,000 without electricity immediately after the earthquake. After one week, many customers will see service restored, though 80,000 households are still without water and 40,000 without electricity. Even after one month, tens of thousands of customers are without water, electricity or both. Such major lapses in service will most likely prevent people from remaining in their homes causing them to seek temporary, or even long-term, shelter at public sheltering locations. For more information on direct damage and functional losses in the State of Missouri, please refer to Appendix V for detailed assessment results and to Appendix VIII for damage and functionality maps. Table 54: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Missouri Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 146,368 115,391 79,848 77,818 Potable Water 2,194,594 100,141 70,720 39,499 12,955 Electric Power Day 90 38,426 121 Tennessee New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario An event on the southwest segment of the eastern fault in the NMSZ produces significant shaking in western Tennessee. As a result, 37 critical counties in that region are identified as being are likely to incur the most damage of all counties throughout the state. These 37 critical counties are highlighted in Figure 18 and are also listed below: 25 See footnote (3). 53  Benton  Carroll  Cheatham  Chester  Crockett  Davidson  Decatur  Dickson  Dyer  Fayette  Gibson  Giles  Hardeman  Hardin  Haywood  Henderson  Henry  Hickman  Houston  Humphreys  Lake  Lauderdale  Lawrence  Lewis  McNairy  Madison  Maury  Montgomery  Obion  Perry  Robertson  Shelby  Stewart  Tipton  Wayne  Weakley  Williamson The State of Tennessee experiences the most damage of all of the states in the NMSZ region. There are nearly 82,000 completely damaged buildings and another 176,000 moderately or severely damaged buildings for a total of approximately 258,000 damaged buildings. This represents over 12% of all the buildings in the State of Tennessee and the largest percentage of damaged building stock by far, when compared to the other seven NMSZ states. As shown in Table 55, approximately 95% of complete damage occurs in residential buildings. Over 98% of all moderate and severe damage is experienced by residential buildings. It is also relevant to note that while damage to commercial structures comprises a very small portion of overall damage, the 5,300 at least moderately damaged commercial structures represent 25% of all commercial buildings in the State of Tennessee. Additionally, all complete damage occurs in the 37 critical counties and nearly 99% of moderate and severe damage occurs there as well. Table 55: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Occupancy Type for the State of Tennessee General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage Total No. Moderate to Buildings Severe Damage 1,720,196 330,518 20,582 3,553 2,337 2,077,186 Complete Damage 142,729 31,012 1,882 286 170 176,079 58,255 19,340 3,461 520 331 81,907 Table 56: NMSZ Event Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Tennessee Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,255,670 180,779 112,188 6,045 222 171 1,786 39 68 1,934 57 66 1,125 15 36 138,979 7,893 7,597 199,367 25,289 13,577 1,604,906 214,294 133,703 54 Extensive 19,319 353 135 139 84 11,117 11,229 42,376 Complete 34,888 1,610 417 497 312 29,385 14,797 81,907 Of the 2.1 million buildings in the State of Tennessee, 1.6 million, or 77%, are of wood frame construction. Mobile homes and URMs comprise 13% and 9%, respectively. The city of Memphis, TN, is a major urban center in the Central U.S., and includes many unreinforced masonry buildings. Memphis, TN, is near the course of seismic activity and is heavily damaged as a result. Many URMs in Memphis are damaged and contribute to the large number of URM damage cases. Approximately 25% of all URMs in the State of Tennessee are at least moderately damaged, while only 14% of mobile homes and 10% of wood frame buildings reach that same damage state. Nearly 50,000 URMs, 167,000 wood frame buildings and 37,000 mobile homes are at least moderately damaged in Tennessee, as shown in Table 56. This is the most building damage experienced by any state in the NMSZ region. Damage and functional losses to essential facilities substantially impact the ability to provide emergency services immediately after the earthquake. Table 57 shows that eight hospitals are completely damaged by the NMSZ event and nearly 50 are not operational the day after the earthquake. Of the 2,309 schools in Tennessee, 635 are not functioning the day after the earthquake and all are located in the critical counties. A total of nearly 300 fire stations and 150 police stations are also not operational. These massive functional losses indicate that nearly all essential facilities in Shelby, Tipton, Lauderdale, Dyer, Lake, Obion, Fayette, Haywood, Crockett, Gibson, Weakley, Hardeman, Madison, McNairy, Chester, Henderson, Carroll, Henry, Hardin, Decatur, and Benton Counties are not functioning. These 21 counties comprise the entire western portion of Tennessee, indicating that a large portion of the state will be without emergency services and medical care immediately after the earthquake. Table 57: NMSZ Event Essential Facilities Damage for the State of Tennessee26 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 180 43 8 2,309 602 404 0 0 0 423 124 78 1,110 256 117 Functionality >50% at Day 1 132 1,674 0 289 815 Transportation lifelines are also severely impacted by a NMSZ event and limit mobility into and out of western Tennessee in the aftermath of the earthquake. Nearly 900 bridges are at least moderately damaged, 330 completely damaged, and over 875 not functioning in the critical counties. Even if roads are passable, bridges are estimated to be damaged and will prevent displaced residents from leaving and response teams from entering western Tennessee. Railway facilities are also damaged, with 54 facilities experiencing at least moderate damage and over 50 not functioning the day after the event. Furthermore, 71 ports and 37 airports are non-operational immediately after the earthquake. The 26 See footnote (3). 55 majority of these facilities are in Shelby, Tipton, Lauderdale, Dyer, Haywood, Crockett, Obion, Weakley and Gibson Counties in western Tennessee. Table 58: NMSZ Event Highway Bridge Damage for the State of Tennessee27 37 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 3,815 877 330 3,400 1 0 7,215 878 330 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,937 3,400 6,337 The intense shaking from the southwest segment rupture affects the performance of utility lifelines significantly. Communication facilities, as illustrated in Table 59, indicate that nearly 3,500 structures are at least moderately damaged and nearly 2,000 are not functioning the day after the earthquake. With so many communication facilities down, it will be difficult to coordinate response efforts and determine which areas are heavily damaged and in need of assistance. Of the 153 electric power facilities in the 37 critical counties, 92 are not functioning the day after the earthquake. Half the oil facilities in the critical counties are shut down at day 1 (32 of 65) and nearly 500 of the 750 waste water facilities in the critical counties are not operating. This indicates that nearly all utility services in western Tennessee are moderately to substantially reduced for the first few days after the earthquake. The lack of utility service is evident in Table 60. Of the 2.2 million households in the State of Tennessee, nearly 450,000 are without potable water the day after the event. This equates to approximately 20% of all households in the State of Tennessee. Over 425,000 households are without power at this time as well. After one week, nearly 300,000 households will have their electricity restored though more than 400,000 households, all in western Tennessee, are still without water. With more than 350,000 households without potable water for a month or more, many will leave their homes and many may seek public shelter. For more information on direct damage and functional losses in the State of Tennessee, please refer to Appendix V for detailed assessment results and to Appendix VIII for damage and functionality maps. 27 See footnote (3). 56 Table 59: NMSZ Event Communication Facilities Damage for the State of Tennessee28 Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Damage Communication (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) Facilities 37 Critical Counties 6,969 3,468 48 5,018 Remaining Counties 9,161 0 0 9,161 16,130 3,468 48 14,179 Total State Table 60: NMSZ Event Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Tennessee Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90 No. Households 446,891 433,647 408,112 360,553 164,750 Potable Water 2,232,905 426,573 296,249 146,276 37,717 508 Electric Power Regional Direct Damage & Functionality Each of the ten earthquake impact assessments completed in this investigation is based on a different scenario event. Eight scenarios employ a NMSZ hazard event, one employs a WVSZ hazard event and the last scenario utilizes an ETSZ hazard event. Since each scenario is based on a different hazard, it is unrealistic to add damage estimates together for a regional damage total. Even the NMSZ scenarios employ events on differing fault segments and fault lines, meaning east or west fault lines in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Though damage and functionality estimates should not be added for a region, total general observations of regional impacts can be made. Building damage in all states, for all scenarios, indicate that residential buildings incur more damage than any other building use group/occupancy. In addition, wood frame structures are the most prevalent building type in the NMSZ and comprise a large portion of all building damage. Unreinforced masonry buildings comprise a much smaller portion of the regional building inventory, though damage estimates show a much higher percentage of these structures are damaged from moderate and severe shaking. The Tennessee earthquake impact assessment alone shows nearly 50,000 at least moderately damaged URMs, so it is reasonable to suggest that over 100,000 URMs could be damaged from a rupture of the southwest extension and several hundred thousand URMs could be damaged in the eight states if successive ruptures of the three segments occur, as in the 1811-1812 series of earthquakes. Estimates of transportation damage and functionality indicate that counties nearest the source of seismic activity are heavily damaged and do not function in the days and weeks after the earthquake. Several hundred highway bridges near the source of seismic activity will make travel in counties near the source fault very difficult. Many airports and ports 28 See footnote (3). 57 will not be operational making it more difficult to get supplies and rescue teams into the most heavily damaged areas. Utility lifelines show substantial damage, particularly to communication facilities. The improved communication facilities inventories for each state include thousands or tens of thousands of facilities in some states. The rupture of a single segment could damage 10,000 communication facilities, some of which service cell phones, severely reducing communication capabilities, even wireless communication. Electric power facilities also show hundreds of cases of damage and exhibit severely reduced functionality in the critical counties near the fault segments. The same is true of waste water facilities, as they have reduced functionality in the critical counties. Reduced functionality and extensive pipeline damage near the faults leads to hundreds of thousands of households with potable water and electricity immediately after the event. With nearly 450,000 households without potable water in Tennessee alone, a southwest segment event could cut off service for 750,000 households, or more, immediately after the event. Similar estimates of service outages for electricity may occur as well. Comparison with Other Published Studies There are few earthquake impact assessments to compare with as the NMSZ is a largely unstudied region. In recent years, however, at least one regionally comprehensive impact assessment has been completed. The Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) completed scenarios29 for each NMSZ state using the southwest segment ground motion produced by the USGS, referred to earlier in this report. The following discussion compares the results of this study with the results obtained by CUSEC. Each study utilized various impact assessment parameters, including the location of the rupture within the fault boundaries, liquefaction susceptibility, and seismic design level, among others. Many damage estimates are based on the HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology of averaging damage at the county level, though there are other methods of determining damage. Another common method of identifying levels of damage is highlighted in Appendix V and is compared with the method of averaging damage at the county level. Finally, all CUSEC analyses included only a portion of the counties in the state scenarios. The counties identified in this study as critical counties correspond to the counties in the CUSEC study. As a result all comparisons in this section are for the critical counties only. The State of Tennessee shows some of the greatest damage estimates of all the states in this investigation. Herein, nearly 82,000 buildings are expected to be completely damaged, though the CUSEC study predicts over 115,000 buildings in that same damage state. Estimates from CUSEC indicate that 67,000 buildings are moderately damaged while this investigation predicts over 131,000 moderately damaged buildings. This difference is likely due to the different liquefaction susceptibility maps used in each study. The CUSEC study utilized a liquefaction map with very high susceptibilities in Tennessee, leading to thousands more completely damaged buildings, as opposed to the 29 The study completed by CUSEC is also known as the SONS 07 study due to the conference where it was first presented. 58 less severe liquefaction susceptibility in this study that leads to fewer completely damaged buildings and more moderately damaged buildings. Utility lifelines frequently exhibit more damage and greatest services losses in the CUSEC study than in this study. The day after the earthquake, CUSEC estimates that nearly 534,000 households are without potable water while this investigation shows 446,000 without water. In addition, the CUSEC study reports more damaged facilities than this study. Again, this is likely due to the difference in liquefaction susceptibility data used. The State of Missouri, which utilized the central extension event in this investigation, reports much greater damage estimates than the CUSEC study. This investigation shows over 83,000 at least moderately damaged buildings while CUSEC predicts nearly 53,000 buildings. Utility lifelines also show substantially greater damage in this investigation with over 20,000 potable water pipeline breaks, while CUSEC reports only 17,000 breaks. Over 100,000 households are expected to be without power the day after the earthquake in this investigation, while CUSEC shows only 40,000 households without power at the same post-earthquake time period. The northernmost states in the NMSZ experience substantially more damage and service loss in this investigation, where the closest fault rupture is used in the impact assessments. In the State of Illinois, roughly 17,000 buildings are expected to incur complete damage based on the results of this investigation. The CUSEC study reports only 4,300 cases of complete damage. In addition, CUSEC reports nearly 16,000 at least moderately damaged buildings, which is far less than the 43,000 estimated in this study. This is due to the different scenario events employed in each investigation. Waste water facilities damage is not only impacted by the scenario event, but also by the vastly improved inventory. Of the 2,221 waste water facilities in the State of Illinois, over 640 are at least moderately damaged, according to this study. In contrast, the CUSEC study shows only 300 waste water facilities in Illinois and of those only 18 incur at least moderate damage. In addition, a study was completed for the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) for a major NMSZ event in the State of Illinois. Different ground shaking was used in this scenario, generating different results from those presented in this report. The IEMA Study shows that approximately 19,000 buildings are completely damaged, with roughly 75,000 buildings experiencing at least moderate damage. Conversely, this report shows nearly 17,000 completely damaged buildings and roughly 30,000 at least moderately damaged buildings. This difference is likely due to the difference in ground shaking and liquefaction susceptibility used in the IEMA study. This reports shows over 250 non-operational schools, while the IEMA study shows more than 320 nonoperational schools the day after the earthquake. Conversely, this report indicates more highway bridge damage than the IEMA study. This report estimates over 250 at least moderately damaged bridges, even though the IEMA study shows only 150 in that same damage state. Finally, utility damage estimates differ greatly for some inventory items. This vast difference is likely due to the increased number of facilities in this study which are not present in the IEMA study. The IEMA study includes 153 electric power facilities 59 and 518 communication facilities of which three and 17 facilities experience at least moderate damage, respectively. This report includes nearly 2,200 electric power facilities and nearly 35,000 communication facilities and those facilities experience roughly 60 and 1,450 cases of at least moderate damage, respectively. The IEMA study and this report show different results, though both represent plausible earthquakes and corresponding damage to the State of Illinois. For more information on the IEMA study, please refer to Mid-America Earthquake Center (2007). There are numerous parameters that affect the results of earthquake impact assessments, and as a result input variables must be carefully and accurately determined to obtain the best possible results. For more information on the comparison of this study with the CUSEC study, please refer to Appendix IX. Social Impact and Direct Economic Loss This section provides social impacts and direct economic losses for the ten scenarios completed in this phase of the New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Event Planning project. Induced damage is also included in this section and is quantified by various types of debris resulting from infrastructure damage. Social impacts include displaced residents, temporary shelter population, various food, medical and housing requirements for sheltered populations and casualties. Lastly, direct economic losses include estimates of building, transportation and utility losses plus building loss ratios. As with the earthquake impact assessment results, social impact and economic losses are presented by scenario. At the conclusion of this section is a series of maps illustrating building loss ratios for each scenario. For more information on social impacts and economic losses, please refer to Appendix VI. State-Level Social Impact & Economic Loss Alabama New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Damage to infrastructure generates 112,000 tons of debris, which is the only form of induced damage provided in this investigation. Debris estimates are divided into two categories: steel and concrete debris and wood, masonry and building contents. This differentiation of debris is based on the type of equipment required to clear the debris. Steel and concrete require heavy lifting equipment while wood, bricks and building contents require much lighter and smaller equipment. The NMSZ scenario in Alabama generates 25,000 tons of steel and concrete debris while the remaining 87,000 tons is attributed to wood, bricks and building contents. There are very few people displaced by the NMSZ event in the southwest segment. Table 61 details both displaced and shelter-seeking populations. Of the 4.4 million people in Alabama only 27 are displaced with the majority of those people residing in the 12 critical counties. Only five people seek temporary shelter and it requires 2,400 square feet 60 of space to house these people with 300 square feet reserved for sleeping. This sheltered population also requires beds, meals and water while they are in the temporary shelter. It is also estimated that there will be 17 cases of chronic health conditions within the displaced population. More detailed estimates of these needs are detailed in Appendix VI. Table 61: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Alabama Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 624, 368 3,822,732 4,447,100 Shelter Seeking Population 24 3 27 5 0 5 Table 62: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Alabama Severity Level 12 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (5:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 29 3 1 39 6 8 68 9 9 Level 4 (Black) 0 2 2 Total 32 56 88 Numerous casualties occur due to this event, though most are minor injuries. Of the 88 total casualties, 68 are minor injuries not requiring hospitalization. Two fatalities are expected and these do not occur in the critical counties. Of the three times of day considered in the social impact assessment, an event at 5:00 PM generates the greatest number of casualties, as shown in Table 62. Direct economic losses are determined for buildings, transportation lifelines and utility lifelines. Utility losses account for over 50% of all direct economic loses. Table 63 illustrates that building losses and transportation losses contribute less, with 38% and 9%, respectively. Total direct economic losses are approximately $1 billion which is roughly 0.2% of all assets in the State of Alabama. Additionally, building loss ratios for the State of Alabama shown in Figure 19 at the conclusion of this section illustrate loss ratios for the NMSZ scenario. Ratios are less than 5% of total assets in any given census tract and are spread randomly across the state. This is likely due to the low levels of ground shaking and minor damage that is possible throughout the state. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 63: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Loss for the State of Alabama System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $269,580,000,000 $403,930,000 $108,231,000,000 $95,700,000 $182,908,800,000 $568,770,000 $559,819,800,000 $1,068,400,000 61 Alabama East Tennessee Seismic Zone Scenario The ETSZ scenario generates 146,000 tons of debris in the State of Alabama. The majority of the debris, 85,000 tons, is comprised of brick, wood and building contents. The remaining 61,000 tons of debris is attributed to concrete and steel. The higher levels of shaking from the ETSZ event result in far more displaced people than the NMSZ scenario. All 1,625 displaced people reside in the 13 critical counties in eastern Alabama. Roughly 450 people will seek temporary shelter, as shown in Table 64. Over 200,000 square feet of space are required to house the shelter-seeking population and nearly 6,200 meals ready to eat (MREs) are needed to feed the sheltered population in the first week after the event. Table 64: ETSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Alabama Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,751,879 2,695,221 4,447,100 Shelter Seeking Population 1,625 0 1,625 440 0 440 Casualty estimates show that an event at 2:00 AM generates the most casualties. Table 65 shows that a total of 193 casualties are expected from the ETSZ event. All but one casualty occurs in the critical counties, with 80% of all casualties being minor injuries. Four fatalities are expected from this event as well as three serious injuries requiring immediate medical attention. The ETSZ scenario generates more than twice as many casualties as the NMSZ scenario. Table 65: ETSZ Event Casualties for the State of Alabama Severity Level 13 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 153 32 3 1 0 0 154 32 3 Level 4 (Black) 4 0 4 Total 192 1 193 The ETSZ shows much fewer economic losses than the NMSZ event. In this scenario, buildings represent the largest portion of the total direct economic losses, at nearly 60% of all losses. Utilities show a much lower percentage at 36%, with transportation losses making up the remainder. Direct economic losses total nearly $700 million, as shown in Table 66. Building loss ratios are illustrated in Figure 20 at the conclusion of this section. The maximum loss ratio occurs near the epicenter and it is less than 10% of all building value in that area. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. 62 Table 66: ETSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Alabama Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $269,580,000,000 $404,030,000 $108,231,020,000 $39,980,000 $182,908,800,000 $254,400,000 $560,719,820,000 $698,410,000 System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Arkansas New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The intense shaking in the State of Arkansas from the southwest segment rupture generates 7,000,000 tons of debris. Approximately 3,400,000 tons are attributed to wood, bricks and building contents while the remaining debris, 3,600,000 tons, is steel and concrete. When a 25-ton capacity truck is used for debris removal, a total of 280,000 truckloads are required to remove all the debris. The structural damage in Arkansas leaves nearly 127,000 people displaced. Of the 1.3 million people that reside in the 34 critical counties, approximately 10% cannot stay in their homes. Roughly 30% of the displaced population seeks temporary public shelter. This equates to over 37,000 people, as shown in Table 67. This estimate does not include those displaced due to a lack of utility services. Estimates shown here may increase significantly if those displaced from lack of utility services are included. The southwest rupture in the State of Arkansas causes approximately 14,000 casualties which are illustrated in Table 68. Of the three times of day considered, an event at 2:00 AM generates the greatest number of casualties. Nearly 75% of all casualties are minor injuries (Level 1), though nearly 600 fatalities are expected. Though not shown here all casualties occur in the critical counties. Table 67: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Arkansas Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,330,090 1,334,739 2,664,829 Shelter Seeking Population 126,987 1 126,988 37,244 0 37,244 Table 68: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Arkansas Severity Level 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties State Total Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 10,275 2,796 306 21 1 4 10,296 2,797 310 63 Level 4 (Black) 574 0 574 Total 13,951 26 13,977 Direct economic losses for the State of Arkansas total approximately $19 billion. Table 69 shows the distribution of economic losses by major inventory group. Regional buildings account for the majority of losses at $12.6 billion in building losses. This is approximately two-thirds of all direct economic losses. Utility and transportation losses comprise the remaining losses, representing roughly 20% and 10% of the total loss, respectively. Additionally, building loss ratios are shown in Figure 21 for the State of Arkansas. The greatest loss ratios are between 50% and 83% of total building assets lost, and this occurs in portions of Mississippi, Poinsett, Craighead and Crittenden Counties. Many other counties in northeast Arkansas also experience significant loss ratios of between 25% and 50%. Loss ratios throughout the remainder of the state are typically less than 10%, which is far less severe than the counties nearest the rupture zone. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 69: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Arkansas System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $157,602,000,000 $12,597,230,000 $67,940,310,000 $2,154,660,000 $47,658,900,000 $4,126,730,000 $273,201,210,000 $18,878,620,000 Illinois New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The damage incurred by buildings in the State of Illinois generates roughly 2,570,000 tons of debris. Bricks, wood and building contents account for 1,400,000 tons while the remaining 1,170,000 tons is attributed to steel and concrete. It requires approximately 103,000 truckloads using 25-ton capacity trucks to remove all the debris generated by this event. Table 70: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Illinois Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 40 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,347,307 11,071,996 12,419,293 51,426 43 51,469 Shelter Seeking Population 14,716 10 14,726 The extensive damage to buildings in southern Illinois displaces tens of thousands of people, as shown in Table 70. Nearly 51,500 people are displaced with most residing in the critical counties. Approximately 15,000 people seek temporary shelter, and the remainder of the displaced population likely seeks shelter with family or friends outside the region that is critically impacted. Over seven million square feet of space is required 64 to house the shelter-seeking population. In addition, over 160,000 gallons of water and nearly 325,000 MREs are required to feed this population for one week. The northeast segment rupture causes over 6,200 casualties in the State of Illinois. Over 98% of those casualties occur in the critical counties, though over 100 minor injuries occur outside this region. As illustrated in Table 71, 276 fatalities are expected and roughly 1,400 people will require medical attention (Levels 2 & 3). However, many of the casualties, around 70% are minor (Level 1) and will not require advanced medical care. Table 71: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Illinois Severity Level 40 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 4,478 1,236 146 109 5 0 4,587 1,241 146 Level 4 (Black) 276 0 276 Total 6,136 114 6,250 . Direct economic losses in the State of Illinois are among some of the greatest losses incurred by any state in this investigation. Table 72 shows that total direct economic losses exceed $34 billion, with nearly 80% of that amount attributed to utility losses alone. This is likely due to the large number of utility facilities in the state’s inventory, particularly communication and electric power facilities. Building losses and transportation losses comprise much smaller portions of the total loss, at 15% and 5%, respectively. Building loss ratios for the State of Illinois are shown in Figure 22 and help illustrate the impact on specific portions of southern Illinois. Portions of Alexander, Massac, and Union Counties experience the greatest loss ratios of 40% or more. Numerous other counties in southern Illinois show loss ratios greater than 10%, which is also critical. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 72: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Illinois System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $837,682,000,000 $5,451,220,000 $161,097,310,000 $1,883,180,000 $1,001,675,900,000 $26,779,240,000 $2,000,455,210,000 $34,113,640,000 Indiana New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The northeast segment rupture generates 282,000 tons of debris in the State of Indiana as a result of damage to infrastructure. Brick, wood and building contents account for 73%, or 205,000 tons of debris. Steel and concrete comprise the remaining 77,000 tons. Damage to residential structures displaces roughly 60 people with 14 seeking temporary 65 public shelter. Table 73 shows that most of the displaced individuals reside in the critical counties. The same pertains to the majority of the shelter-seeking population. Of the three times of day considered in the analysis of casualties, an event at 5PM generates the greatest number of casualties. Table 74 illustrates the various types of casualties expected and it is evident most of the injuries, approximately 75%, are minor (Level 1) casualties. Only three fatalities (Level 4) are expected. Additionally, less than 60% of all casualties are expected to occur within the 11 critical counties, indicating that shaking and damage are not confined to this portion of southwestern Indiana. Table 73: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Indiana Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 480,752 5,599,733 6,080,485 Shelter Seeking Population 52 6 58 13 1 14 Table 74: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Indiana Severity Level 11 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (5:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 57 12 12 53 4 4 110 16 16 Level 4 (Black) 2 1 3 Total 83 62 145 Direct economic losses for the State of Indiana are minor in comparison with the total value of inventory in state. Approximately $1.4 billion is lost as the result of damage to buildings, transportation and utility systems. This is roughly 0.2% of the total value of assets in Indiana. Table 75 shows that buildings and utility systems contribute roughly the same value of loss, while transportation lifelines account for far less. Additionally, building loss ratios for the NMSZ scenario in Indiana are illustrated in Figure 23. All loss ratios are less than 2% and are very small in comparison with other loss ratios near the source of rupture. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 75: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Indiana System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $380,969,000,000 $612,750,000 $107,793,100,000 $158,100,000 $142,908,890,000 $647,880,000 $631,670,990,000 $1,418,730,000 66 Indiana Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Scenario The WVSZ event in the State of Indiana generates approximately 1.8 million tons of debris as a result of structural damage. Nearly 830,000 tons of debris is attributed to bricks, wood and other building contents. The remaining 930,000 tons of debris are comprised of steel and concrete. A total of 70,000 truckloads are required to remove all the debris when a 25-ton truck is used. The more intense shaking in southwestern Indiana due to the WVSZ event displaces far more people than the NMSZ event. As shown in Table 76, nearly 28,000 people are displaced with a majority of those people residing in the critical counties. Approximately 7,000 people that are displaced will seek temporary public shelter. Nearly 3.4 million square feet of space is required to house this shelter-seeking population. In addition, 98,000 MREs and 246,000 gallons of water are required to feed this population. Table 76: WVSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Indiana Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 480,752 5,599,733 6,080,485 Shelter Seeking Population 26,721 899 27,620 6,815 212 7,027 Table 77: WVSZ Event Casualties for the State of Indiana Severity Level 11 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 2,012 572 64 193 24 1 2,205 596 65 Level 4 (Black) 118 3 121 Total 2,766 221 2,987 Casualty estimates are also greater with this WVSZ scenario than with the NMSZ scenario. This difference is attributed to the higher level of damage to buildings― particularly residential buildings. The greatest number of casualties occurs at 2:00 AM as shown in Table 77. Nearly 3,000 casualties are expected, with over 2,200 being minor injuries. Approximately 120 fatalities are expected as well. This equates to roughly 4% of all casualties. Nearly all casualties occur in the 11 critical counties, with only 7% occurring outside that region. Total direct economic losses for the State of Indiana illustrate the greater economic impact of the WVSZ event. Direct economic losses total roughly $7.2 billion, with $3.9 billion attributed to building losses, as shown in Table 78. Utility and transportation losses comprise the remainder with 40% and 5% of total losses, respectively. In addition, loss ratios for the WVSZ in the State of Indiana are illustrated in Figure 24. Building loss ratios compare the value of building assets lost to that total value of buildings in a 67 specified region and are excellent indicators for the effort required to rebuild an area. The greatest loss ratios, between 15% and 27%, occur in Gibson and Knox Counties. The majority of Indiana, however, shows relatively low loss ratios, less than 2%. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 78: WVSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Indiana System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $380,969,000,000 $3,927,530,000 $107,793,100,000 $385,100,000 $142,908,890,000 $2,936,550,000 $631,670,990,000 $7,249,180,000 Kentucky New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The thousands of damaged buildings in the State of Kentucky, particularly western Kentucky, generate a substantial amount of debris. A total of 4,000,000 tons of debris is produced with 2,100,000 tons attributed to steel and concrete. Brick, wood and building contents comprise the remaining 1,900,000 tons. Approximately 160,000 truckloads are required to remove the entirety of debris when a 25-ton truck is used. The extensive damage to the critical counties leaves tens of thousands displaced, with thousands more displaced outside this region. Nearly 53,000, or over 65% of all displaced people, reside in the critical counties with another 25,000 displaced in central Kentucky. These estimates indicate that 2% of the entire population is displaced, though when considering the critical counties only, more than 8% of the population is displaced, which is a far more significant portion. Table 79 shows the distribution of the shelter-seeking population in and out of the 25 critical counties. Approximately 20,700 people seek public shelter and roughly 13,900 are in the critical counties alone. Nearly ten million square feet of space are required to house the entire displaced population. In addition, 1.2 million pounds of ice and 300,000 MREs are required to feed this group of people for one week. Table 79: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Kentucky Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 655,184 3,386,585 4,041,769 52,964 25,225 78,189 Shelter Seeking Population 13,904 6,759 20,663 Damage to infrastructure leads to nearly 10,000 casualties throughout the state of Kentucky. Table 80 illustrates the various types of casualties estimated should the event occur at 2:00 PM. Approximately 6,800 minor injuries are expected (Level 1) while 68 nearly 600 fatalities are expected. Very few casualties, mostly injuries, are expected to occur outside the 25 critical counties. The severity of damage to infrastructure, especially in western Kentucky, leads to substantial direct economic losses. The majority of losses, roughly 75% of all direct losses, are attributed to utility lifelines. This is due to the significantly improved inventory and thousands of new facilities. Buildings and transportation lifelines incur much smaller proportions of direct losses with roughly 20% and 3% of all direct loss, respectively. Kentucky is one of the few states in the NMSZ to incur this amount of direct economic loss. Furthermore, building loss ratios are illustrated in Figure 25 at the conclusion of this section. Several counties in western Kentucky show substantial loss ratios between 40% and 75%. These counties include Fulton, Hickman, Carlisle, Ballard, Graves, and McCracken Counties. Loss ratios as high as reported indicate that a majority of the building stock is lost and many buildings must be replaced completely or will require significant repairs are required. Portions of Graves, Marshall, Union, and Hopkins Counties also show loss ratios between 10% and 20% which are significant, but not as critical as those in the western counties near the rupture zone. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Table 80: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Kentucky Severity Level 25 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 6,722 2,051 318 49 5 1 6,771 2,056 319 Level 4 (Black) 593 0 593 Total 9,684 56 9,740 Table 81: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Kentucky System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $259,784,000,000 $9,442,940,000 $128,035,860,000 $1,291,480,000 $797,983,900,000 $35,291,800,000 $1,185,803,760,000 $46,026,220,000 Mississippi New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Damage to infrastructure in Mississippi creates two million tons of debris. The majority of this debris, 1.2 million tons, is steel and concrete, while the remaining 0.8 tons is brick, wood and buildings contents. A total of 80,000 truckloads with a 25-ton capacity truck are required to remove all the debris generated by this southwest segment rupture. 69 Tens of thousands of people are forced to leave their homes due to structural damage. Approximately 21,000 people are displaced with nearly all of those people residing in the critical counties. Nearly 5,600 of those displaced seek public shelter, as shown in Table 82. To care for this sheltered population, 2.7 million square feet of space are required, with 334,000 square feet reserved just for sleeping. Nearly 40,000 gallons of water and 78,000 MREs are required to feed this population for the first week after the event. Table 82: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Mississippi Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 748,030 2,096,628 2,844,658 Shelter Seeking Population 20,832 34 20,866 5,555 11 5,566 Structural damage to buildings and lifelines leads to nearly 4,000 casualties throughout the State of Mississippi. Over 70% of all casualties are minor injuries (Level 1) and 20% require immediate or delayed medical attention (Levels 3 & 2, respectively). Table 83 shows that only 200 fatalities are expected throughout the state. The level of direct economic losses incurred by the State of Mississippi is less severe than the losses incurred by other states in the NMSZ, though this is expected due to the lower level of shaking throughout the majority of the State. Nearly 60% of all direct economic losses are attributed to utility lifelines. Buildings show a total loss of approximately $3.8 billion and transportation lifelines contribute significantly less with only 3% of all direct economic losses. This is likely due to the smaller set of inventory when compared to the total number of utility facilities and network components, for example. Table 83: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Mississippi Severity Level 25 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 2,036 474 45 855 294 65 2,891 768 110 Level 4 (Black) 86 122 208 Total 2,641 1,336 3,977 The greatest building loss ratios occur in portions of Tunica and Desoto counties in northwestern Mississippi. Ratios of 20% to 33% indicate that a significant portion of the building stock is damaged and require repair. Loss ratios less than 5% are more common throughout the majority of the state, however. Building loss ratios for the State of Mississippi are illustrated in Figure 26. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. 70 Table 84: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Mississippi System Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss Buildings Transportation Utility Total $131,314,000,000 $69,176,250,000 $266,440,450,000 $466,930,700,000 $3,769,990,000 $279,730,000 $5,441,930,000 $9,491,650,000 Missouri New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The central segment event generates six million tons of debris in the State of Missouri. Steel and concrete buildings account for 3.1 millions tons of debris, while brick, wood and building contents comprise the remaining 2.9 million tons. A total of 240,000 truckloads with a 25-ton truck are required to remove all the debris created by this earthquake. Missouri is one of the most catastrophically impacted states in the NMSZ zone with regard to social impacts and economic losses. As illustrated in Table 85, nearly 122,000 people are displaced, which is far more than any other scenario discussed previously. Nearly all displaced residents reside in the critical counties in southeastern Missouri. Approximately 36,700 people seek temporary public shelter after the NMSZ event. Substantial amounts of space are required to house all those displaced. Nearly 18 million square feet of space is required, while 1.3 million gallons of water and over 500,000 MREs are needed in the first week to care for the sheltered population. Table 85: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Missouri Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 3,043,805 2,551,406 5,595,211 Shelter Seeking Population 121,927 2 121,929 36,702 2 36,704 Table 86: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Missouri Severity Level 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 11,267 3,177 401 33 1 0 11,300 3,178 401 Level 4 (Black) 760 0 760 Total 15,605 34 15,639 The tens of thousands of damaged buildings cause nearly 16,000 casualties, with most occurring in the 46 critical counties. Well over 11,000 minor injuries are expected, though injuries requiring medical attention are far less than that. This equates to 3,600 71 people requiring delayed or immediate medical attention, which will be difficult when most hospitals in the critical counties are not operational. In addition, transportation lifelines may be damaged and routes to the functioning care facilities impassible. Table 86 shows nearly 800 expected fatalities, which is much higher than any other scenario estimate. Despite the very high social impact estimates, direct economic losses are not as high other states. Nearly $39 billion in total direct economic loss is expected for the State of Missouri. Approximately 65% of all direct economic losses can be attributed to utility lifelines. Buildings account for $11.8 billion, or 30%, of all losses and transportation lifelines comprise the remaining 5%. These values are illustrated in Table 87. Table 87: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Missouri System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $334,877,000,000 $11,811,430,000 $121,237,610,000 $1,772,590,000 $564,861,000,000 $25,138,310,000 $1,020,975,610,000 $38,722,330,000 Building loss ratios also show the catastrophic level of damage in some areas of southeastern Missouri. Figure 27 illustrates the very high loss ratios in Pemiscot, Dunklin, New Madrid, and Stoddard Counties. Between 70% and 91% of building value is lost in these areas, indicating that a significant portion of those counties needs to be repaired or rebuilt after a NMSZ earthquake. Several other counties in southeast Missouri show loss ratios greater than 20% which is less critical, but still significant. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. Tennessee New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario The southwest segment rupture zones runs along the western edge of Tennessee, generating substantial damage and significant amounts of debris. Over 20 million tons of debris is expected with 8.8 million tons attributed to brick, wood and building contents. The remaining 11.9 million tons is comprised of steel and concrete. A total of 800,000 truckloads with 25-ton trucks are required to remove all the debris from this event. Social impacts are more severe in the State of Tennessee than in any other state. Nearly 263,000 people are displaced, which is likely due to the major population center of Memphis, TN, incurring significant damage. Of the hundreds of thousands displaced, over 73,000 will seek public shelter. Table 88 details the sheltering estimates and shows that nearly all displaced people reside in the 37 critical counties in western Tennessee. It requires over 35 million square feet to house these 73,000 people. Additionally, over 500,000 gallons of water, four million pounds of ice and over one million MREs are required to feed this group of people in the first week alone. 72 Extensive structural damage leads to tens of thousands of casualties as detailed in Table 89. A total of 63,000 casualties are expected if the event occurs at 2:00 PM. If the event were to occur at other times of day, casualty estimates will be less than 63,000. Nearly 70% of all casualties are minor injuries, though nearly 4,100 fatalities are expected. Approximately 15,500 people require immediate or delayed medical attention (Level 3 & 2, respectively), though with many hospitals not functioning in the harder hit areas medical services will be scarce. Roughly 75% of all casualties occur in the 37 critical counties in western Tennessee, indicating that 17,000 casualties will occur outside this region. Medical facilities outside the critical counties are more likely to be operational immediately after the event and thus able to care of those that are injured. In addition, the operational facilities closest to the heavily damaged counties will likely need to care for victims evacuated from the critical counties in the first hours and days after the earthquake. Table 88: NMSZ Event Shelter Requirements for the State of Tennessee Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 37 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 2,699,993 2,989,290 5,689,283 Shelter Seeking Population 262,907 2 262,909 73,293 0 73,293 Table 89: NMSZ Event Casualties for the State of Tennessee Severity Level 37 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 31,913 9,706 1,544 11,419 3,759 609 43,332 13,465 2,153 Level 4 (Black) 2,904 1,184 4,088 Total 46,067 16,971 63,038 Direct economic losses in the State of Tennessee are the greatest of any state in the NMSZ. A total of $56.6 billion is lost in combined building, transportation and utility infrastructure value. Table 90 illustrates the losses in each of these three categories. Building losses are the greatest portion of total loss with $40.3 billion in losses, representing 70% of all losses. Utility and transportation lifelines contribute lesser proportions with 25% and 3% of all direct economic losses, respectively. Table 90: NMSZ Event Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Tennessee System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $329,827,000,000 $40,316,300,000 $82,455,530,000 $1,746,230,000 $173,425,200,000 $14,576,340,000 $585,707,730,000 $56,638,870,000 73 Building loss ratios for the State of Tennessee are illustrated in Figure 28. Though building losses are very high, the greatest loss ratios are confined to several small regions. Portions of Tipton and Crockett Counties show loss ratios of 40% to 62%, which is roughly half of all building value lost in those areas. Additionally, the City of Memphis shows loss ratios of 20% to 40% in some areas. This may be due to the large number of URMs in the city that are expected to incur sever damage. The majority of the rest of Tennessee shows much lesser loss ratios of 2% or less. For more information on social impacts and economic losses for this scenario, please refer to Appendix VI. 74 Wang A Legend Retie e% 1% 2% - 5.3% Mejer Cities in amen?repel: I ream -wepee I weem - zeepee ECr'rtieel Iileun?tiee Hivere US Heutee =Interetetee 4r Figure 19: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Alabama 75 DE 5 2 111115451 1 .. Vi ecat E11 - "1:333 FRCI ?:1th [.1ng 1H 11 1 {We - NE ever 1? If a; 51, Lift 15 1 1% 5,1003-] ?t a 29 Legend 0 311 15? LL Lees Retie FL i .. 1137i? 0.- 33Mejer Cltlee 0:1 1:1 101 50000?15000 1113 1 a E11 1 . I 15.001-115.000 1 3? I 115001 - 205,000 311'1 Hwere Reutee ECr'rtieel I130L1r1?1iee 33?? 1) =Interetetee 15 e0 00 . a Miles Figure 20: ETSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Alabama 76 15?. EEHTEIH ., 22?? FULTIZI HugerHEIIE I $34 emf?l -5 wieHIH 2, will?" I F, i' HIP. DIS en mee- EIEHEE 1 SEP. - ?r Lit- EUHE eenw If": FHA NHLIH JIZIHHSIZIH ELEEUHHE - HEEL -- -- ml 3n SEHSTIAH . 4 TELL Wat Memphis 33"- SEEM Legend memeemew Lees Retie tee?5% see?10% wee?25% Mejer Citiee Pepuletien in zepee 40,000 I 40,001 II ream DCritieel Iileuniiee Interstate HighwayMILLER 1.. '2 - Fiw ee Heutee Hivere 15 e: Miles Figure 21: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Arkansas 77 em as "m ULH sen! - 7- rm LE BE en: Chicago "my. 3 PE '3 we EIF"2le HA nee LE 33 en FAA: EH - PIA . '33 :3me REA um J3 I Legend 0 Lees Retie 1 JEHS E'Fif Hq 2%-10DCr'rtieeICeun?ee =Interetetee PE ILTIZI US Heutee '3 ml -1 MejerCitiee Eileen-100,000 1 I 1ee,ee1 I 2130.001 2.50.000 em PEI A 1e e: e: Miles Figure 22: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Illinois 78 Hemmen If? ?in PDHTEH EEFELE 33:1, 1; JeePEe 3-1 FULTIZIH ASH CASS WHITE HTIH ?ll x-x I MIAMI WEL LS 35 CHFIZI ELIHTIZIH AR I30 Legend Retie matinee? HAHHLI 0.25% - 0.5% meme nee?1% I eeuwn TH - DEAR AH GREEN Bl?? a? LAWRENCE ?Emu Mejer HHIZIK E. memes en. 1ee,ee1 SHIHGT . 2130.001 - GRANGE =Interetatee US eutee E. =Cr'rtieel Cemtiee Hie-ere HAHHISDH 1e e: JL Miles Figure 23: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Indiana 79 g- .33 AHGE Hammen SAINT HljemLIi-m 3] I a' I: new crime LE 3'3 I eei, "u ?121 I CASE 3. I JASPER PU LASHI eeH WHITE HTIH f- 2? I WELLS MIAMI HT _35 EHFEI El ELIHTIZIH ee HAND 35? Legend Retie tee?2% gee?see aura?wee Meier Cities [3 elem 100,001 Terr MEIR BAH SHELBY AT DEAR Blee JAEHSEI TH GREEN JEHHIHG LAWRENCE .553 SHIHET . - 3315 DeeHeE =Interetetee Em FD Reutee E. =Critieel Cemtiee River?s WAHRFH PERRY Heemeun anew SPEH 15 e: JL EUHEH I'uiiles Figure 24: WVSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Indiana 80 Cl 3 Legend Loss Ratlo Majnr Cltles mug Tr ma 2% I 25,000 40.00:: RULES 2% ?10% . 413,001 - =Ir?3rdm33 .- 10% - 20% HIV-9P3 33% - 4.3% 33,001 =Cr'rtical Counties Owensigro IDGE [m q. L-WLAJ GRMSUH 3. 1m E: F: Gr lu'l?HR?E '5 LI . Figure 25: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Kentucky 81 e1 . I. RSHA 1} A DBUSHI 513i" IE {2 I 0Ll1ur GHE ABA 50 . 40" II 300% GFEEIWE . 32;, I: - . - ,AnneL ?510: wee JDLME j? ATTALA 5- Will 310"; Stri? Hm A lee?ee '55 ?l LEAHE HEMPE I LIEL- Nguyen . . IIEWTDII enur '15 :10- SMTH . COP ?lmpe Meriflinn EJEF RSDII - A AMS 154.: JEF 030" 5 male". attieehilrg PEHHVL I Legend Retie 0% 2% e% -10% 10% -20% 20% - 33% Mejer Cities 0: 30000?40000 I 40001 -45000 I 45001 - 104,000 US H0utee =Cr'rti0el C0untiee Interetetee Hie-ere 1e :30 e2: 00 d, Miles 1" Figure 26: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Mississippi 82 Kansas cit}:r MEH Legend l?u1iles Less Retie Major Cities tee - 1 use I: seem - vanes 10% - 20% I - 133,000 33% - 50% 150,001 - 444,000 50% - WEI-E. . . . ECrrtIeel Counties - mes - 91% =Interstetes US Routes River?s HES erissant HT LEILIIs Saint Louis PPI Figure 27: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Missouri 83 Legend Loss Ratio Major Cities Home tree 2% a] Noon 1o] one '?ter?ateg 15 ea 2% -1oee I 1oo,?oo1 zoo Emma? ME JP 10% 40% I 213% - 40% (34.53.t CHE . m] 5' Chattanooga Figure 28: NMSZ Event Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) for the State of Tennessee 84 Regional Social Impact and Economic Loss As stated for the direct damage estimates, social losses and economic impacts should not be combined over all scenarios for regional totals. Since each scenario is based on a different hazard, adding impacts together will not reflect one regional scenario. It is possible, however, to discuss qualitatively the impact on this eight state region. Some states are more likely than others to incur substantial casualties and economic loss based on their location in relation to the source of rupture. Southern states such as Alabama and southern Mississippi show very few casualties, if any, and minimal economic losses. As a result, these areas will be more likely to provide supporting services to heavily impacted areas after the earthquake. Such services may include sheltering displaced populations, providing medical services at functioning hospitals and providing staging areas for rescue and aid workers. The same is true for northern Illinois and most of Indiana. These states, or portions of states, see very few casualties or displaced residents. Such areas will be able to provide similar services to more northern areas that are heavily damaged from a NMSZ event. Should a WVSZ event occur, however, these areas are likely to experience substantial impacts and will require outside assistance. Areas nearest the NMSZ are likely to see wide-spread and catastrophic social impacts and economic losses. Southeast Missouri, western Kentucky and Tennessee, northeast Arkansas and southern Illinois show the most significant social impacts. A southwest event affects the major population center of Memphis, TN, and leaves nearly 265,000 people displaced and over 63,000 people injured or killed. A southwest segment event could leave up to 500,000 people without homes and could injure 150,000 people across the entire NMSZ area. Up to 100,000 people may need temporary public shelter, which would require several million MREs for the first week alone. In addition, over one million gallons of water and as many as ten million pounds of ice may be needed for a NMSZ event. It is very likely that an event on the southwest segment will produce the greatest social impacts and thus present the largest requirements for food, water, ice, and shelter space. Substantial losses in Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, northwestern Mississippi and southeastern Missouri would likely generate over $100 billion in direct economic losses. A large portion of these losses would be due to utility lifeline losses with building losses contributing a significant portion as well. A northeast segment event, however, would impact southern Illinois as well as parts of Missouri and Kentucky. Economic losses caused by a northeast segment effect, while likely to be less than a southwest segment event, would result in total losses possibly reaching $75 billion in direct economic losses. Comparison with Other Published Studies As mentioned earlier, the earthquake impact assessment carried out by CUSEC provides the only regionally comprehensive study by which to compare results. The following 85 discussion compares the results of this study with those of the CUSEC study. It is also critical to note that the CUSEC study does not provide advanced social impact modeling, which details additional housing and medical requirements. New information that is only available in this study includes space requirements, number of beds, amount of food, water and ice needed, as well as estimates of medical assistance requirements for the displaced population. Since these impacts are not available in the CUSEC study they are not compared herein. Other estimates such as displaced population, casualties, debris and direct economic loss are compared in this section. In addition, the CUSEC study only includes those counties identified as critical counties in this study; thus, all comparisons are for the critical counties in each scenario only. It should also be noted that the displaced residences/households model and temporary shelter model were implemented incorrectly in the version of HAZUS-MH MR2 utilized in the CUSEC study. This investigation used the HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology but conducted those calculations externally to ensure the model for those particular social losses was used properly. In Alabama, the CUSEC study estimates over three times as many displaced residences and temporary shelter needs as compared with this study. Alabama casualties show similar trends as CUSEC estimates 72 total casualties, while this investigation shows only 30. Though the hazard is shifted closer to the State of Alabama, in the scenario utilized in this investigation the shaking experienced throughout the state is minor and does not affect social impact assessments substantially. Finally, this investigation estimates greater direct economic loss by roughly $300 million, which is likely due to the additional utility inventory and the shifting of the hazard closer to the State of Alabama. The scenario for the State of Arkansas is not shifted and utilizes the same scenario ground motion as the CUSEC scenario. Estimates of debris generation are roughly the same though sheltering estimates vary greatly. This investigation estimates that nearly 127,000 households are displaced and over 37,000 people will seek temporary shelter though CUSEC reports only 48,000 and 14,000 for these categories, respectively. This is likely due to the incorrect internal calculation of these values in HAZUS-MH MR2. When calculated externally, according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 model, estimates are substantially greater. CUSEC predicts roughly 15% more total casualties, though that is likely due to the large number of minor injuries. This investigation shows 130 more fatalities and several serious injuries (Level 3), which is likely due to the lowering of the seismic design level (moderate to low seismic design) in northeastern Arkansas. Though this investigation and the CUSEC study show total direct economic losses are roughly the same, buildings losses illustrate a sizeable difference of approximately $850 million. This is attributed to the lower seismic design specification in this investigation that makes buildings more vulnerable to earthquake damage. Kentucky shows similar trends to those seen in Arkansas. Estimates of social impacts and induced damage are much greater in this investigation than in the CUSEC study. Debris estimates are roughly twice as much in this investigation, while displaced household and temporary housing estimates in this investigation are nearly three times those shown in the CUSEC study. Furthermore, casualty estimates are substantially more in this investigation, with over 12,500 total casualties, while CUSEC estimates are nearly 4,700. 86 Such differences in social impacts and induced damage are likely due to the location of the hazard. In this investigation the fault rupture is shifted closer to Kentucky and generates more intense shaking in the western portion of the state. The shifting of hazard, adjustment of seismic design class and addition of utility inventory produced the nearly $28 billion difference in total direct economic loss. This investigation estimates roughly $33.5 billion in losses while the CUSEC study shows only $5.8 billion. A more accurate representation of regional inventory in conjunction with the nearest fault rupture generates a substantial difference in economic loss. As with many other southern states that experience significant impacts from a NMSZ earthquake, social impact estimates in Tennessee are far greater in this investigation than in the CUSEC study. Debris estimates are roughly 33% greater while sheltering and displaced household estimates are doubled. A total of 10,000 more casualties are expected in this investigation, with nearly 800 more fatalities estimated. This investigation produces estimates for social impacts that are far greater in many central and northern NMSZ states. As mentioned earlier, the CUSEC study only employed the southwest event so central and northern states will experience less intense shaking in the CUSEC study than in this investigation. In the State of Missouri, CUSEC estimates approximately 25,000 displaced households, while this investigation anticipates nearly 122,000. In addition, CUSEC expects roughly 8,000 total casualties, while this investigation reports over 15,600 casualties. The same is true in Illinois where the northeast event is likely to generate the most catastrophic impacts. The CUSEC study reports roughly 5,000 displaced households and nearly 1,400 requirements for temporary housing. This investigation, on the other hand, estimates over 51,000 displaced households and 14,700 requirements for temporary housing. Furthermore, total direct economic losses in the State of Illinois are estimated at $2.2 billion in the CUSEC study, while this investigation estimates losses of around $31 billion. It is clear that the difference in source rupture makes a substantial difference in the social impacts and direct economic losses experienced by a state: thus, choosing the appropriate event is critical in determining the worst case impacts in a specified region. For additional comparison data, please refer to Appendix IX. Additionally, the IEMA study provides a different, yet plausible set of social and economic losses than those presented in this report. This report estimates nearly 15,000 people will seek temporary shelter while the IEMA report estimates only 6,500 people seek temporary shelter. Conversely, this report estimates approximately 6,300 total casualties and the IEMA study estimates roughly 7,600 total casualties. Direct economic losses also differ, particularly utility lifeline losses. The substantially larger utility lifeline inventory utilized in this report generates nearly $27 billion in utility lifeline losses while the IEMA study shows only $2 billion in losses. For more information on the social and economic losses in the IEMA study, please refer to Mid-America Earthquake Center (2007) report. 87 Discussion and Conclusions This investigation employs ten scenarios designed to identify the effects of plausible earthquakes on eight states in the Central USA. Eight of the ten scenarios focused on the New Madrid fault system while two scenarios represent the risk from the Wabash Valley and the East Tennessee seismic zones. In several cases, the fault rupture was moved to the boundaries of the NMSZ in an effort to capture the worst case impacts for each individual state. In addition, liquefaction susceptibility characterization, inventory updates and advanced social impact modeling were incorporated to provide the most reliable impact assessment possible. Though numerous scenarios have been completed, it is important to emphasize that impacts from each scenario should not be combined for regional assessment. With each scenario employing a different earthquake (hazard), even within the NMSZ, adding all impacts together represents an event that could not take place. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 1811-1812 earthquakes were three consecutive and potentially damaging events that current modeling tools are incapable of representing. Emergency planning, response and recovery decision-makers should weigh these factors in their efforts to balance the potentially conservative and non-conservative assumptions that are inevitable in a large regional study of earthquake impacts such as that described in the current report. For further discussion of the background of the scenarios used in this study, reference is made to the Scenario Disclaimer in page iv of this report. The counties nearest to the source of seismic activity are likely to experience substantial damage to buildings as well as loss of critical services. This means that tens of thousands of homes will be damaged and residents will be displaced. For an earthquake nucleating in the northern portion of the NMSZ zone, thousands of buildings in southern Illinois and portions of Missouri and Kentucky will be damaged and tens of thousands will be without homes. The same is true for a southern NMSZ event, though in this case the heavily damaged areas will be northeast Arkansas, northwest Mississippi, western Tennessee and portions of western Kentucky. In addition, Memphis, TN, will be heavily damaged and its large number of highly vulnerable unreinforced masonry buildings will be significantly affected. This southern segment earthquake is likely to damage the greatest number of homes and affect the largest number of people when considering each individual segment rupture in the NMSZ. Critical infrastructure and lifelines will also be heavily damaged and will be out of service after the earthquake for a considerable period of time. Such mass outages are likely to affect a region much larger than the 8 states studied above. Many hospitals nearest to the rupture zone will not be able to care for patients, indicating that those injured during the event will have to be transported outside of the region for medical care. Moreover, pre-earthquake patients will have to be moved out of the area to fullyfunctioning hospitals. It is doubtful that the transportation system will be functioning to a level that allows such mass evacuation. Police and fire services will be severely impaired due to damage to stations throughout the impacted region. Many schools that serve as public shelter will be damaged and unusable after the earthquake. Transportation into and 88 out of the areas near the fault rupture will be difficult if not impossible. Many bridges will be damaged and not passable, airports will be damaged and some ferry facilities and ports will be out of service. The massive loss of functionality of transportation systems and facilities will prevent displaced residents from leaving the region and also make it difficult for ground-transported aid workers and relief supplies to access the most heavily damaged areas. Utility services will be severely disrupted for hundreds of thousands of customers due to extensive facility and pipeline damage. Extended service outages will be highly likely for tens of thousands of customers, making it difficult for them to remain in their homes, even if they are structurally sound after the earthquake. Damage to major natural gas and oil transmission lines will lead to service interruptions that will affect areas as far away as the east coast and New England. Social impact estimates show that hundreds of thousands of people will be displaced and tens of thousands of people will seek temporary public shelter after a major earthquake on the New Madrid fault. Three successive earthquakes, as in 1811-1812, will generate even more catastrophic impacts. Casualties in the tens of thousands are likely, especially with a southwest segment rupture. Most of these will be minor injuries, though several thousand serious injuries and fatalities are also predicted. In addition, debris generated from this event may reach several hundred thousands tons, which will have to be removed prior to repair and reconstruction efforts. Areas nearest to the rupture will be heavily damaged and many transportation and utility lifelines will not function for an extended period of time. The parts of each state that are farthest from the rupture will remain largely undamaged and functioning. Expectations are that these undamaged regions will support the response and recovery of the severely damaged areas. In addition, Indiana and Alabama are not likely to experience significant damage from a NMSZ event and may also function as host states in the aftermath of a NMSZ earthquake. Should an ETSZ or WVSZ event occur however, these states will require assistance from neighboring states. Implications on Research and Development The detailed study presented in this report has highlighted several areas where significant effort is called for, in order that more realistic and reliable earthquake consequence assessment results may be available in the foreseeable future. The most pressing of these research and development products are listed below, in the sequence of Hazard, Fragility, Inventory and Social and Economic Consequences:  Several major assumptions were made on the hazard side to account for the multiple earthquake potential of the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Fundamental research in earthquake geophysics and engineering seismology is needed to assess the relative probabilities of occurrence of earthquake occurrence on the three identified segments of the NMSZ and the implications of one earthquake on the probabilities of the second and third earthquakes happening. This is a complex problem that pushes the 89        boundaries of time-dependent hazard and multiple source modeling, amongst other challenges. Detailed liquefaction characterization that uses state-of-the-art liquefaction metrics is sorely needed. The difficult problem of characterizing liquefaction is compounded by the multiple earthquake occurrences which require new approaches to account for the cumulative effect of multiple earthquakes. The above two research issues lead to a third important point, which is the effect of multiple earthquakes on site response that may effectively alter the site class in such a manner so as to annul the strong-motion (attenuation) models in current use. Research is required to address this problem and provide reliable ground motion parameters. Significant improvements in inventory are still urgently required. There are many systems that are critical for response and recovery for which inventory is either sparse or lacking. Examples are utilities distribution networks that are not in the public domain and cell phone towers. It is clear that without accurate inventory, modeling efforts will continue to be relatively uncertain. There are several important built environment components for which no fragility relationships exist, such as different configurations of gravity and earth dams, large and complex river crossings, special structural configurations used for power and chemical plants and their components, communications and electricity towers, amongst others. Such fragilities are urgently required. For all fragilities used in assessment in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, the effect of degradation in stiffness and strength due to multiple earthquakes poses a fundamental and intricate research challenges that should be addressed urgently. The current approach is grossly inaccurate, and it is not possible to ascertain if it is conservative or otherwise, since the interaction between input motion and structural frequencies is highly nonlinear. The sheltering model employed was developed based upon behavior exhibited in the San Francisco bay area following the Loma Prieta earthquake and in the Los Angeles area after the Northridge earthquake. The model has not been tested or validated outside of California. There is a large amount of uncertainty regarding the factors that influence the reasons for shelter-seeking. This model assumes that people will only seek shelter if their homes have been damaged. It neglects other factors that make it difficult to sustain themselves in their own homes such as loss of power or water, safety factors, damage to surrounding hazardous materials facilities and long term recovery. During the response phase of the disaster management cycle, the prioritization of service needs will change. Over time focus will move from life-saving to lifesustaining and finally life-supporting. The uncertainty regarding the length of time that will be required to deliver services during a catastrophic event is very high. The transition from response to recovery takes much longer during a catastrophe. Midterm economic effects are prolonged due to factors such as loss of infrastructure, loss of jobs, etc. More research is needed on speed-of-recovery factors of the socioeconomic systems. The response models currently focus on immediate responses and are not validated for longer time frames. Consideration of long term commodity distribution, medical services, and repair of cascading infrastructure failures is required. 90   Current preparedness goals are based on establishing adequate response system capabilities. The objective of response should be to successfully achieve observable and measurable goals. In order to do this, response managers must achieve critical success factors and avoid critical failures. The outcome-based metrics required to establish goals and to manage for success do not exist. The modeling and estimation of disaster caused needs conducted in this project can provide the basis for establishing these metrics and for developing outcome-based response strategies. Comprehensive and theoretically sound measures of reliability of the loss assessment, taking into account uncertainties in all components, are urgently needed. Attaching a reliability measure to the impact estimate is essential for informed decision-making. In general, disasters that lead to catastrophic consequences produce cascading infrastructure failures which may result in unanticipated response requirements. Infrastructure failures not only influence the demands for service but also the mobility and capabilities of response organizations attempting to provide these services. There is a dearth of information on the manner in which people and systems behave following a catastrophe. There is a pressing need for collection and assimilation of such information possibly from other regions in the world with social and economic characteristics similar to the Central USA. Acknowledgements This report summarizes a considerable amount of work that includes various subdisciplines. As such, it has benefited from the contributions of many individuals and organizations. It is impossible to include a comprehensive list; every attempt was made to list individuals and organizations under the heading of ‘Contributions’ in the opening part of this report, and below. Financial support was provided by FEMA through the US Army Corps of Engineers Civil Engineering Research Laboratory at Urbana, Illinois. Additional supporting resources were made available by the Mid-America Earthquake Center through its Emergency Management Agencies test bed project, funded by the National Science Foundation. The Project Team wishes to thank Mr. Michel S. Pawlowski for leading the FEMA oversight effort, Dr. Ilker Adiguzel and Dr. James Wilcoski (USACE), the IEM group, Mr. James Wilkinson (CUSEC), Mr. Douglas Bausch (FEMA Region VIII) and Mr. Robert Bauer (Illinois State Geological Survey). Thanks are also due to state emergency management offices, state geological surveys, the four relevant FEMA regions, PBS&J Corporation, and administration and finance personnel at the University of Illinois, both at the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department and the Campus. 91 References Abrahamson, N.A. & W.J. Silva (1997). Empirical response spectral attenuation relationships for shallow crustal earthquakes. Seismological Research Letters, 68 (1), 94-127. Ambraseys, N.N. & J.J. Bommer. (1991). The attenuation of ground accelerations in Europe. Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, 20 (12), 1179-1202. Ambraseys, N.N. & J.J. Bommer (1992). On the attenuation of ground accelerations in Europe. Proceedings of the 10th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, v 2, 675-678. July 19-24. Madrid, Spain. Ambraseys, N.N. & K.A. Simpson (1996). Prediction of vertical response spectra in Europe. Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, 25 (4), 401-412. Atkinson G.M. & D.M. Boore (2003). Empirical ground-motion relationships for subduction zone earthquake and their application to Cascadia and other regions. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 93 (4), 1703-1729. Atkinson G.M. & D.M. Boore. (1995). Ground-motion relations for eastern north America. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 85 (1), 17-30. Campbell, K.W. & Y. Bozorgnia (2003). Updated near-source ground-motion (attenuation) relations for the horizontal and vertical components of peak ground acceleration and acceleration response spectra. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 93 (1), 314-331. Cramer, C. (2006). Quantifying the uncertainty in site amplification modeling and its effects on site-specific seismic-hazard estimation in the Upper Mississippi Embayment and adjacent areas. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. 96 (6), 2008-2020. Elnashai, A.S. (2003). Next Generation Vulnerability Functions for RC Structures. Response of Structures to Extreme Loading Conference. Toronto, Canada. August 3-6. Elnashai, A., Hampton, S., Karaman, H., Lee, J.S., McLaren, T., Myers, J., Navarro, C., Sahin, M., Spencer, B., and Tolbert, N. (2008) (a). Overview and Applications of Maeviz-HAZTURK 2007, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 12 (2), 100-108. Elnashai, A., Hampton, S., Lee, J.S., McLaren, T., Myers, J., Navarro, C., Spencer, B., and Tolbert, N. (2008) (b). Architectural Overview of MAEviz-HAZTURK, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 12 (2), 92-99. 92 FEMA (2006), HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual. Washington, D.C. FEMA. Frankel, A., C. Mueller, T. Bernard, D. Perkins, E. V. Leyendecker, N. Dickman, S. Hanson, and M. Hopper (1996). National seismic-hazard maps: documentation June, 1996, U.S. Geol. Surv. Open-File Rept. 96-532. Frankel, A. D., M. D. Petersen, C. S. Mueller, K. M. Haller, R. L. Wheeler, E. V. Leyendecker, R. L. Wesson, S. C. Harmsen, C. H. Cramer, D. M. Perkins, and K. S. Rukstales (2002b). Documentation for the 2002 update of the national seismic hazard maps, U.S. Geol. Surv. Open-File Rept. 02-420. Fukushima, Y., J.C. Gariel & R. Tanaka (1995). Site-Dependent attenuation relations of seismic motion parameters at depth using borehole data. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 85 (6), 1790-1804. Gencturk, B, A.S. Elnashai and J. Song (2008). Fragility relationships for populations of woodframe structures based on inelastic response. Journal of Earthquake Engineering. 12 (2), 119-128. Gencturk, B., A.S. Elnashai, and J. Song (2007). Fragility relationships for populations of woodframe structures based on inelastic response. Proc. International Symposium on Earthquake Loss Estimation for Turkey, HAZTURK2007, September 24-26, Istanbul, Turkey. Hildenbrand, T.G., Griscom, A., Van Schmus, W.R., and Stuart, W.D. (1996). Quantitative investigations of the Missouri gravity low: A possible expression of a large, Late Precambrian batholith intersecting the New Madrid seismic zone. Journal of Geophysical Research B: Solid Earth 101 (B10), 21921-21942. Jeong, S-H., Elnashai, A.S. (2006). Fragility Analysis of Buildings with Plan Irregularities. 4th International Conference on Earthquake Engineering (4ICEE), Paper No. 145, Taipei, Taiwan, October 12-13. Johnston, A. C. and Schweig E. S. (1996). The Enigma of the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811-1812. Ann. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci., 24, 339-384. Kamiyama, M. (1995). An attenuation model for the peak values of strong ground motions with emphasis on local soil effects. Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Earthquake Geotechnical Engineering, v 1, 579-585. Kircher, C. A., Nassar, A, Kustu, O., Holmes, W. T. (1997). Development of building damage functions for loss estimation. Earthquake Spectra. 13 (4), 663-682. MAEviz (2008). “MAEviz Software.” Mid-America Earthquake Center. , Febraury 12. 93 Mid-America Earthquake Center (2007). Comprehensive seismic loss modeling for the State of Illinois: Final Report. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL. June. NGA Office of Americas/North America and Homeland Security Division (PMH) (2007). Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold Dataset 2007. Bethesda, MD 20816-5003. May. National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) (1999). Enhancement of the highway transportation lifeline module in HAZUS. Prepared by Nesrin Basoz and John Mander, January. Nielson, B. G. and R. DesRoches (2004). Improved Methodology for Generation of Analytical Fragility Curves for Highway Bridges, 9th ASCE Specialty Conference on Probabilistic Mechanics and Structural Reliability, ASCE, Albuquerque, NM, July. Nielson, B. and R. DesRoches (2006a). Effect of using PGA versus Sa on the uncertainty in probabilistic seismic demand models of highway bridges., 8th National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, San Francisco, 18-21 April. Nielson, B. G. and R. DesRoches (2006b). Influence of modeling assumptions on the seismic response of multi-span simply supported steel girder bridges in moderate seismic zones, Engineering Structures, 28 (8), 1083-1092. O'Rourke M.J and Ayala G. (1993). Pipeline damage due to wave propagation. Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, ASCE. 119 (9), 1490-1498. Somerville, P., N. Collins, R. Abrahamson, and C. Saikia (2001). Ground-motion attenuation relationships for the Central and Eastern United States. Final report to the U.S. Geological Survey. Toro, G. R., N.A. Abrahamson, & J.F. Schneider (1997). Engineering model of strong ground motions from earthquakes in the Central and Eastern United States. Seismological Research Letters, v 68, 41-57. 94 Appendix I: Shaking Maps This appendix details the development of shaking maps for all scenarios employed in the MAEC-GWU State reports for earthquake planning workshops in New Madrid Seismic Zone States. A total of ten scenarios have been completed and the sets of shaking maps used for these scenarios are included. HAZUS-MH MR2, the analytical loss assessment software used, requires four shaking parameters to perform an analysis. These parameters are peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), short-period spectral acceleration (Sa 0.3 sec.) and long-period spectral acceleration (Sa 1.0 sec.). Each set of shaking maps is explained separately in following discussion. Most shaking maps were created by the USGS and modified by the MAEC. These modifications are quantified in this appendix. Shaking maps that were developed by the MAEC are also discussed and the creation process detailed. At the conclusion of this appendix is a series of maps. Original USGS and MAEC adjusted maps are shown, for those scenarios that relied on USGS maps. All shaking maps created by the MAEC are also included. Alabama – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Alabama employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along the southwest segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments: northeast, central and southwest. The worst case scenario for the State of Alabama, and the critical counties in particular, is an event on the eastern fault line in the southwest segment. The USGS southwest extension map is shifted from the middle fault to the eastern fault line according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Southwest Segment – Eastern Fault Line Central Meridian: -92.7 Scale Factor: 1.005 Portions of Alabama are not covered by the shifted maps and require the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second 95 • • Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Original USGS shaking maps for the southwest extension event in the State of Alabama are illustrated in this appendix. Maps shifted to the eastern fault are also illustrated in this appendix. Alabama – East Tennessee Seismic Zone Event This earthquake impact assessment for the State of Alabama employs one scenario event in Dekalb County. The scenario consists of a M5.9 earthquake in the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ). The epicenter location and all soil and liquefaction data are provided by the Geologic Survey of Alabama (GSA). The epicenter chosen for this scenario is located at 34.446N, 85.617W. A set of five attenuation functions is used to generate ground motion. The attenuations and weighting factors are listed below: Atkinson and Boore (1997) Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) Campbell (2002) Sommerville, Collins, Abrahamson et al. (2002) 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 It is relevant to note that the attenuation from Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) cannot be computed for a magnitude of 5.9. The attenuation only applies to earthquakes with magnitudes of 6.0 or greater. In order to determine regional ground shaking with this attenuation, a magnitude of 6.0 was used. The four remaining attenuations employed a magnitude 5.9, as prescribed by GSA. This change does not impact the intensity of regional shaking significantly and is acceptable for the purposes of this assessment. Shaking maps for this scenario are illustrated in this appendix. Arkansas – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Arkansas employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along the southwest extension of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. Based on the recommendation of the Arkansas State Geologic Survey, the southwest segment of the middle fault is taken to be the worst case scenario for the State of Arkansas, and no shifting of shaking maps is undertaken. Shaking maps for this scenario are illustrated in this appendix. Portions of Arkansas are not covered by the USGSmaps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by 96 these maps, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUSMH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Illinois – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Illinois employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along the northern segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. The worst case scenario for the State of Illinois, for the critical counties in particular, is an event on the western fault line in the northern segment. The USGS northeast extension shaking maps are shifted from the middle fault to the western fault line according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Northeast Segment – Western Fault Line Central Meridian: -93.189 Scale Factor: 0.994 Portions of Illinois are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Shaking maps for this scenario are illustrated in this appendix. Indiana – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event This scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along the northeast segment of the NMSZ. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. The NMSZ scenario for the State of Indiana employs an event in the northeast segment of the eastern fault. Original USGS shaking maps are illustrated in this appendix, while shifted shaking maps are also illustrated in 97 this appendix. Shaking maps are shifted from the middle fault to the eastern fault according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Northeast Segment – Eastern Fault Line Central Meridian: -92.7 Scale Factor: 1.003 Portions of Indiana are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Indiana – Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Event This scenario consists of a M7.1 earthquake along the Wabash Valley Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS. The maps developed by the USGS cover the entire State of Indiana, and there is no need to assign shaking values as is carried out for other states. Wabash Valley Event shaking maps are illustrated in this appendix. Kentucky – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event This earthquake impact assessment for the State of Kentucky employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along one segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The worst case scenario for the entire State of Kentucky is an event on the eastern fault line in the northeast segment. All USGS shaking maps for Kentucky are illustrated in this appendix and shifted maps are shown in this appendix. The USGS shaking maps are shifted from the middle fault to the eastern fault according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Northeast Segment – Eastern Fault Line Central Meridian: -92.7 Scale Factor: 1.003 98 Portions of Kentucky are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Mississippi – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along one segment of the NMSZ. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. The NMSZ worst case scenario for the State of Mississippi employs an event in the southwest segment of the eastern fault. Shaking maps created by the USGS are illustrated in this appendix, while shifted maps for Mississippi are also depicted in this appendix. The original USGS maps are shifted to the eastern fault line according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Southwest Segment – Eastern Fault Line Central Meridian: -92.7 Scale Factor: 1.005 Portions of Mississippi are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Missouri – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Missouri employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along the central segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS for the middle fault in the proposed NMSZ. The worst case scenario for the State of Missouri is an event on the western fault line in the central segment. USGS maps for the middle fault are shown in 99 this appendix, and shifted maps are also shown in this appendix. Original USGS shaking maps are shifted to the western fault according to the following parameters. • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Central Segment – Western Fault Line Central Meridian: -93.53 Scale Factor: 0.994 Portions of Missouri are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity Tennessee – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Tennessee employs one scenario event along the NMSZ. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the USGS. The scenario consists of a M7.7 earthquake along one segment of the NMSZ. The worst case scenario for the State of Tennessee is an event on an eastern fault line associated with the southern segment. The USGS maps for the middle fault are illustrated in this appendix, while the shifted maps are also shown in this appendix. Original USGS maps are shifted to the eastern fault according to the following parameters: • • • • Geographic coordinate system: GCS_North_America_1983 Southwest Segment – Eastern Fault Line Central Meridian: -92.7 Scale Factor: 1.005 Portions of Tennessee are not covered by the shifted maps and required the assignment of shaking values. Due to the low level of shaking experienced in the areas not covered by the shifted USGS map, the following values are applied to shaking parameters required by HAZUS-MH MR2: • • • • PGA: 5% of gravity PGV: 3 inches per second Spectral Acceleration @ 1 sec frequency: Set to 11% of gravity Spectral Acceleration @ 0.3 sec frequency: Set to 12% of gravity 100 Alabama PGA frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ap ril EDDB Jib: 5-5? usuille .3305 5.. Legend LISGS SW PEA I Fault End F'einte I12 -?Fil::titieue Fault Linea I12 - I13 Majer Cities EF -0-3-0-4 Ir sauna-tannin FFEE we .2. a4 me I - 115mlmarinate Ham-:- '15 =Critiea Ceuntiee De a: I33 entrain ?1.n?1.1 H- 0-33-43 1.1 - 1.23 Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at LIE-P. .nm re. Ellatilal. PrdeetF nicpai "tempt-r FIJI. Frllepal Alabama PGA frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC SW PEA I Fault End Paints I12 -?Fil:titieue Fault Lines I12 - I13 Majer Cities EF -0-3-0-4 - sauna-Fauna FFEE acme; Ham-:- '15 =Critiea Cauntiee me a: I33 ?1.n?1.1 H- 0-33-43 1.1 - 1.23 Mid-America Earthquake Center UI yearn-numb: at LIE-P. .nm re. Elnanat PrdeetF ?lepal hamper FIJI. Frllepal Alabama PGV USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDB Isuilla Ill?i?. .3 Ti; LEE E'll-' i Legend USES SW [in.!5ac.) End F'E'int? pure _3 -13 ?Fil:titiaua Fault Lines EF- -15 Majar Cities IE - 15 - ED - sauna - mat - =Critica Cauntiaa - 35 - ill12:2: -74rail-25 Mid-hmariaa Earthquake Canter UI at LIE-P. .nm ra. Ellanal. PrdeatF ?lapal lluu?gat-r FIJI. Alabama PGV fram MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC SW PGV [in.!sec.} Fault End Paints ?3 -13 ?Fil:titinua Fault Lines EF- 15 Majar Cities in la I - 25 I M-I-EILE =Critica Cnuntiea - Mid-hmarica Earthquake Canter UI at LIE-P. .nm ra. Ellanal. PrdectF ?lapal lluu?gat-r FIJI. Alabama Sa I13 Sac. fram USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ap ril EDGE 3C- Isuilla Ti; Lil. Jil- LEE Legend USES SW 33 .13 sec. (51} I Fault End Paints 1'31 . RBI-UP ?FiI::titiI:ILIa FaultLinaa .- .30 . - U3 - ELI-15 Majar CitiEE I-FFEE D45 EH5 .. mt I15 - DEE I wanna ELF-E - I19 I pm 4551300 '19 1-135 =Critica Cauntiaa - 1.2 1.35 ?1.35 - 1.51 -- Mid-America Earlhquaka Canter UI at USP. Fm ra. Ellanal. PrcieatF mapEII lluu?gat-r FIJI. Alabama Sa Sec. MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ap ril EDGE '15- mutt-pH I ll 5 . I BEE 5.3.3? .3 Ti: LL31 in." Legend MAEC SW 33 55.; (Q) I Fault End Paints - I112 - I13 ?Fil:titiI:ILI3 Fault Linea I13 - I145 Major Cities - H.315 DE I15 - 5.?5 I - '19 255 mu '19 =Critica Cnuntiaa - 1.2 1.2 - 1.35 ?1.35 - 1.51 Mid-America Earlhqualta Canter UI at USP. Fm ra. Ellanal. PrdectF mapal lluu?gat-r FIJI. Alabama Sa 1.0 See. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Ap ril EDDB Isuille Ti: A LEE E'll-' i Legend USGS SW Sa 1.13 sec. 1' Fault End Paints I12 ?Fil:titieue Fault Linea EF- _n.2 I135 Majer Cities MHMH IE I135 - Ir sauna - - - EH35 - 75,001 - 1.75.333 - WE DEVI - 255 '15 - '195 =Critiea Ceuntiee - - 1.1 -1.1-1.25 . a: 12:: ?q . -1.25 - 1 .313 - - 7% l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at LIE-P. .nm rS. Ellanal. Pr-zleetF ?lepal hamper FIJI. Frllepal Alabama Sa 1.1] See. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC SW Sa 1.121 sec. Fault End Paints I12 ?Fil:titieue Fault Linea I12 - ELSE Maj-er Cities IE I135 - [1:15 - WE DEI1 - 255 '15 - I195 =Critiea Cnuntiee - DEE - 1.1 1.1 - 1.25 . -1.25 - 1.43 - - Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at LIE-P. .nm re. Ellanal. PrdeetF ?lepal Inuesupt-r FIJI. 1013 Alabama PGA - East Tennessee Seismic: Zane: M53 Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC PEA - ELEH - DDS - - Elfl I11 - ELEIZIE - - Epicenter M53 Event Majnr Cities Mgr? =Critinal Miles . Mid-hmeriea Earthquake Center UI at LIE-P. .nm rs. Ellanial. mnpal lluns?gat-r FIJI. Alabama PG'ii?r - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: [915.9 Event Ap ril EDDB Legend w? MAEC PGUiianea3.0 3.Epicenter M53 Event Majar Cities I slam] mean I want": I seamen =Critieal Iiluzuul'lties 1a a: an a2: 94% Miles Mid-America Earthquake Canter UI at LIE-P. .nm rs. Ellasial. PrdeetF ?lepal hamper FIJI. Alabama Sa 0.3 see. - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC Sa?? see. 0.3-0.4 ISM-DE Epicenter M53 Event Majar Cities I: swam - same I vanm - name I wanm seamen 1'3 212' 4: a: 91% =Critieal Iiluzuul'lties Miles Mid-America Earthquake Canter UI at LIE-P. .nm rs. Ellanal. PrdeetF ?lepal hamper FIJI. 111 Alabama Sa 1.0 see. - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Event Ap ril EDDB Legend MAEC Sa1.l] see. - - I105 - 0.15-0.25 I125 - U35 - I135 - Epicenter M53 Event Majer Cities I: swam - rant": I - name I seamen 1'3 212' 4: a: -74? =Critieal Iiluzuul'lties Miles Mid-hmeriea Earthquake Center UI at LIE-P. .nm rs. Ellanal. PrdeetF ?lepal llues?gat-r FIJI. 112 Arkansas PGA frem USGS - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Mil? Event Ap ril EDDE EECAHE .ECILL 'nlliFIiZIi? WE NEWTON C?Ii?i Legend uses I15 I15 IELL a? IlEi 3m? - Mi I E15. 1.1 - 1 .23 Fauit End Peirte ?Fietitieua Fauit Linea 3 U-IEF- 1m Majer Cities in I - - I 443,001 - HILLEF: . I ream impel: ?Hm - .4HLEI .. . . - - - . 15 a: a: a: Ceuntlee DJLUMH l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake U51 Fm re. Ellarial. FrdeetF nlepal lluer?ptur TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 113 Arkansas PGA frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDE Legend MAEC 5w P613Ln, 11:3 5'35" ?Mam .. - - 1 .1 ?Fietitieue Feuit Linee - I 113.0131 MILLER . 115?0.? ?1.1 -123 Feuit End Peirte I Mejer Citiee u. . I ?Hm - emsCeuntlee DJLUMH l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake U51 Fm re. EI-anat FrdeetF nlcpal lluemptur TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 111 Arkansas PGV frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Legend USES SW {ianea} 3-1IZI -15 - 213-?Fietitieus Faurt Lires Fauit End Peirts Majer Cities Fleatim in 2mm I sauna?menu I 40,001 . ream =Critiea Ceunties EE-ICAHE . El A I EUEEH I r- ILE RIVER MILLEF: - - LINE-II F?n'El'l' i Elli. l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center USA Fm rs. Ellasial. FrdeetF nlcpal lluenjgatur TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 115 Arkansas PGV frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Legend SW {ian ee.) 3-1IZI -15 - 213-?Fietitieus Faurt Lines Fauit End Peirts Majer Cities Fleatim in 2mm I game?angel: I 40,001 . ranm =Critiea Ceunties semen Emmi Fun-5r . l? a'le-l'IFaye-ulle male-an ?ewes-H Inseam: I a r- HMFLI JL l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center USA Fm rs. Ellanal. FrdeetF nlcpal lluenjgatur TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 11E Arkansas Sa 0.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDIE Legend USES SW Sa l].3 - 5.12 - I13 - - Ill-15 - EH15 - - - 1.35 - 1 .51 I Fauit E001 P0irta ?Fi0titi0LIa Fauit Linea Majer Cities lelatim in 1 03,000 40,000 I 40001 $5,000 I 5.001 =Criti0a C000tiee ELIIHE MEDP 11 SCOT E15. I .nr-tLIIrIe F: . fume-HEW I I Ll ILE RIVER - DREW - .- J- I MILLER 'l 3? - 15 30 EIZI a] ?a 0mm: @241 Mid-America Earthquake Center re. Freq-am Inn-2:11pm TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 11?r Arkansas Se [1.3 see. frem MAEC - Newr Madrid Seismic: Zene: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDE ELI-HE 00- Legend - SW 53 SEC. LI Jim-?ma? 0.12 - 0.3 0.3 0.45 I145 llEi seemm Lean - 0.05 - 0.0 -: 0.0 -105 -1.2 bitumen-CF -1.2 -1.35 fume-HEW - 1.35 - 1 .51 I Feuit End P0irte ?Fi0titieue Feuit Linee ?13.0; Mejer Citiee Population in 2000 443,001 - I MILLER . . I 05001 - 100,000 UH DH .. - '.F?tl C0untlee l'01ilee @241 Mid-America Earthquake Center re. EI-anal. FrcteetF 0:01:00 Inn-2:11pm TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 11E Arkansas 3a 1.1] see. fren'I USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event Ap ril EDDIE ELI-HE Imam I a FUPEJ Legend we? . USES SW 53 11] SEC. mum JC-Hriec-rl II EUREH -I111-I1.2 .. '12 D35 - I135 - I15 - I15-I155 I155 - I1EI 5-1-1" I15 - I155 - I155 - 1 .1 'f 1.1 -1.25 ?Tee-mew - 1.25 - 1 .43 FaLIit End F'eirts mm?m .?FiI:titiI:ILIs FaLIit Lines 5 "15% Major Cities Pupljatim in 2mm LI LE - . .HEL-IKEL: - case II 40,001 James . Imam - . - I:eun?nes l'u1iles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Fm rs. FrdeetF Illepal TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 11E Arkansas Sa 1.0 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event April EDDE ELI-HE M. new-en Legend SW 53 1.l] SEC. ?mm JC-Hrieerl .. '12 D35 Lesa? - I135 - I15 - - ass as 51.1.. - ELEIS mil? -1.1 - 1 .25 ?Tee-mew - 1.25 - 1 .43 Fauit End F'eirts ?Fietitieus Fauit Lines 5 1; Major Cities in 20m] LI LE I: seem - . ham: - I 443,001 - . . =Critieal Ceunties mm l'u1iles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake .Im rs. Ellanal. FrdeetF nlepal lluemgatur TI FIJI. PHIGFIHI 12D Illineis PGA frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event 4-: BIT-HERE: Hess-3:: HDHEHRTLAH HEIDI I Id In ease-3L HAIE . LEE - I'El?hll l? HRH 3TH. Rh Fees: MEIR llul'IHlEl?TCI ?ees? menu-:13 Fun on Lieu "A?gm??em leueH tau-elm ?h me mm: 3H GREEN ems Heel-.1 Elt'n' {Ii ail Legend NE PEP-.119) - 0.15 - - [1115 0.45-0.13 - -1.2 1.2 - 1.33 i Fault End F'Izlints ?Fil:titinus Fault Lines Mejer Cities lI I - . - =Critise Cnunties 21:: s: 12:: 3' Miles 1 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII ummrmunms at LlrtuaIa-Eiampagl. ?um. um. Fm rs. Eluanal. PrcleetP ?lepal lluu?gat-r 'I'Ieremde?a- FIJI. 121 Illineie PGA frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event Legend MAEC NE PEA -0.013 - D15 -D.15 - - 0.45 0.45-0.13 T4125 - - 1125 - 1125 - 1.2 1.2 -1.33 i Fault End F'einte ?Fietitieue Fault Lines Mejer Cities lI I - . - 2,250 =Critiee Ceuntiee "53,13: Lm: AP I1 I EDIE-IE lac-en 35"" men-nu nexme Chluge a ?55 .EHMLL pa- BUREAU lama:- Nu mule mum?J? MERGER Emu ner- Fenian Hum: umeerel wane MEIER Pat-n: I Imeuue ??713" HAIGIIGHH lumen new HEIARD ADAM: emwn net-L33 Lee-u '1 tau-elm HHE new. :23 Fan-2::- a? an new; entrant. 3H ElB?n' ween-m CLARE 21:: e: 12:: Miles 11: Mid-America Earthquake Center LII ummrmunm: at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. Hum. use. Fm re. Eluanal. PrcleetP ?lepal lluewgat-r Tiernade?a- FIJI. 122 Illineie PGV frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event Ap ril 4-: Dir-new ?535.193. HDHEHRTLAHE I lac-ens DEHALBI In HME Milt"; LEE - reumu mm?: mule anunm wu Hex w-mp Funeu Emma-I mm: eummcn tau-awe Hl-iE me eHmnM mm: GREEN mum l?l? CLARE Hem-law we? EFHI HAEI I Legend USES NE - 3 - - 15 11.Fault End F'uinte ?Fil:titinue Fault Lines Majer E'Jitiee I DEVI - EDD . DEVI - EFED =Critice Cnuntiee 21:: e: 12:: Miles Mid-Amgyiea EEFIJJHHEIE Center LII at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 123 Illineie PGV frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event E3 3 "E?m April I Eat-en IE 7 meat-LL - - yum-3E Ef?cage BUREAU . Am: Fez-H1 Hue-t . mm mar-ten met-Fem:- DERSII Paerla Imeuele Helen I Ill-3.30! DEAF, Heme:- Anal-.1 3 . me: eHm Been I FIATT HE ca If? tau-am: . mm on mac enmmu mLEg 3H I I GREEN- Amum . clam? Legend MAEC NE PGV amen Ell-25 25-30 -35-4EI i Fault End F'einte ?Fil:titinue Fault Lines Majer E'Jitiee lI I DEVI - . DEVI - =Critiee Cnuntiee 21:: e: 12:: . 3' Miles 1 Mid-Amgyiea EEFIJJHHEIE Center LII at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 124 Se 0.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event Legend NE Se 0.3 Seem) 1.2-1.4 I Fault End Peinte ?FiI::titiI:ILIe Fault Lines Mejer Cities I DEVI - . DEVI - =Critiee Ceuntiee Ap ril EDGE Je tun-new nee-1:3:- lac-en I: In men-3L '3'31'5 DEHAL HAIE . Milt"; Dz": LEE - reumu lemme Nu mule annulm- rum-.1 3mm. Penn: Hex . wane mement- en Lieu "Mgm??emneum mm: men men a WHEN-.3 me mm: GREEN enter. Hem-lem- EFHH my ,4 2D 12D . Miles 1 Mid-America LII ammonium: at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. Pm re. Eluanal. Pr-zieetP ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 125 Se 0.3 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Ml? Event Ap ril EDGE JEI "Em HCH BARREL FM 39': pa- a EHDAL ISLE-JD I'i HAFEE I MR I HAHGEGIHH El HEHAREI LDC-til 1:43.33 GHFIM FIATT rename Hi. CH F1 3T IAN IZEIZILEG 3H El Legend MAEC NE Se [1.3 see. (9) EELEI- 1.2-1.4 1.5 i Fault End F'einte ?Fietitieue Fault Lines Mejer Cities lI I DEVI - . DEVI - =Critiee Ceuntiee 21:: e: 12:: 3' Miles 1 Mid-America Center 1 LII ammonium: at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. Pm re. Eluanal. Pr-zieetP ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 125 Se 1.131 sec. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event Legend USES NE 321113 see. - I111 - I12 - [135 u- I135 - I15 - - - I113 - ELSE I195 - 1.1 - 1.1 - 1.213 I Fault End F'einte ?Fietitinue Fault Lines Mejer Cities I - . - =Critiee Cnuntiee Ap ril EDGE 4-: ?535.193. I lac-ens I: In men-3L '3'31'5 DEHAL HAIE . 3:195 Chlcage LEE - renmu lemme Nu mule annulm- HERGER rum-.1 3mm. Penn: Hex . wane meme-PI:- en Lieu "Mgm??emneum and!? men men me ELe-r GREEN enter. dense-i EFHI HAEI 2D 43 12D Miles Mid-America LII ammonium: at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 1 127-r Illineie Se 1.13 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene Ml? Event Legend MAEC NE Se 1.121 see. I111 - I12 - I12 - E135 14- - I15 - - I113 - ELSE I195 - 1.1 1.1 - 1.28 i Fault End F'einte ?Fietitieue Fault Lines Mejer Cities 1' I - . - =Critiee Ceuntiee JD E33 NEE-3. HGH HM HAN EHDAL HEPGEF: FEIIFEI HGI. Eh. I HAHGEGHM MEI-1RD I3 LTFI ril EDGE ll F316 Chln: age El e: 12:: 3' Miles Ti: Mid-America Center 1 LII ammonium: at Llrtuala-Eiampagl. ?um. um. ?lepal Iwu?gatur FIJI. 1213 Indiana PGA fer USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event A ril EDDB South Bend Hamm Ga . .. I Ins-mun: 35 EHE meeHnLL man: _i can Hurnme - ?end mull: eFariT ppm": FEW-ARE EEI .In'r' MFREH . .1 Handle-1m .- mute-Lei HTGCIHF - . . uEeulLia-H 9415:ij EUEH Terre -- - J: mm . JRGAH 'At-il-let-l ?l .diIL? Legend uses NE PEA - D15 - - I145 - DE -1.2- 1.313 1* Fault End Paints ?Fil:titieue Fault Linea Majer Cities I .I - a a: a: 12:. 7?1; i pm manna ?1 Miles DCritieal Ceuntiee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake u: at umaia-mampagi. Hum. uan Pm re. Elianai FrdeetP illepal limugaar Theresadetle FIJI. PFIIGPHI 129 Indiana PGA fer MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April EDDB Seuth Bend pH Aenmee STELIEEH Has-duel: Irma MEQHAL . - cuss earner [i31? Hurnm: 'lL-ti nan M3 Em?tmeumm GRANT - ELLCIEFCFIEI .un' uni-ran LAME else .- "'le . .. HEHFZ I THE 3? i :erriEE RUEH mTi?lF? Hum: Terre Ha .. remnant DFH GREEN - - I JEFFEFIS emblem 5'35 Ci. . am:- a Legend - CLUE - [I145 1.33 1* Fault End Paints ?Fil:titieue Fault Linea Majer Cities I .I - a a: a: 12:. 3% . zuu um i'u1ile5 DCritieal Ceuntiee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake u: at umaia-mampagi. Hum. uan Pm re. Elianai FrdeetP lumugaar FIJI. PFIIGPHI 13D Indiana USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Ea uth and Apr? H?lnnr AGEAHGE . . rraLE mum-J. mam-[ML . HEmur F-LILMM -. RR-JLL ulnar aim-c." amLTc-r EDI-HE - HTGCIME 1 aim-E Terra . - JII-H r15 01 HTIFIG a a: -. F: HI-I Ill EN EFJLH GREEN Legend USES NE -3 Ell-25 25-Fault End Paints ?Fil:titiaua Fault Lines Majar Cities EUDUU . - EDD a: 12.: D01 F53 pun E?ritical Cauntiaa 1 H. La? f' Mid-America Ea rlhguaka Canter LII at USP. Pm ra. Ellailal. Frd-e-atP Iluenlgatur FIJI. PFIIGPEII 131 Indiana MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Sn uth and April EUUB Halnm '3 EH RANGE El'iE human JETE ITE HU M3 L5 .EI FIEI '3 Eli"'Ij HTGCIME MIL Elf-l F?iFil-E HE Dana-:5 LITHIL EUSH Terra lH ?5 CI I HE TLIF: I: . EFJLH IRH J?LCil-i LILLWA BREE IHI H3 EFFEE CL Legend MAEC NE PGV -3 Ell-25 25-Fault End Paints ?Fil:titinua Fault Lines Majur Cities EUDUU . DEVI - an a: 12Mil-ea E?ritical Cnunties 1 H. La? f' Mid-America Earlhguaka Canter LII at Llrtala-Elampagl. Inn-3:. Llan. Pm ra. Ellailal. Frd-e-ctP Iluenlgatur FIJI. PFIIGPEII 132 Indiana Sa [1.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event - Seutlt Bend Apr? Hallun" It;a . ?ma?a? .mermriee Linlu'E tee-dun: I'll-1R5 . newer -. Minter F-Pemrx-E 'm - REH CLINTON 'lli l'ull 2H 1 9.1ng Terre . - HTIFIGMI - -- . Lin 4 . LLr-mrl 'r [emit Legend uses NE Sa 0.3 See. [51} 203- 1.2-1.4 ?14- 1E -1.E- Fault End Paints ?Fil:titieue Fault Linea Major Ditiee Mid-Ameriea Earth ualte Center (g1; .. 1' LII at U39. Pm re. Ellatial. FrdeetP nicpal Iluentgatur FIJI. 133 Indiana Sa 0.3 sec. MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Sn- uth and April EUUB Hamm GRAN-3E LIIHE lama ?Fa Wayne F25 HQ ITLE TD LLEH ITE I?l 551$ M5 MEI. MED Fil- HT C1. INT-SIM 1] HE i Eli? LTEI HTGCIME Elf-l Fi?. F: HIE-MCI: . .US "r Terra I :1 ELEM- HE LEI ..I5I. HI-Z TLIFM5. ??le I EFFEE ILL El? Legend MAEC NE Sa I13 sec. 1: 1.2-1.4 lid-?IE -2.D-2.24 i Fault End Painta ?Fil:titinua Fault Linea Majur Cities 1 manna I - 2d] . um $531300 an a: 12D .. . "'39 r1 . ll- La? f' Mid-America Earlhguaka Canter LII at Llrtala-Elampagl. Inn-3:. Llan. Pm ra. Ellailal. Frd-e-ctP Iluenlgatur FIJI. PFIIGPEII 134 Indiana 5a 1.0 sec. USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event - Sauth Bend Apr? Hallun" It;a . ?ma?a? AGEAHGE thu'E mam-n: mam-mu . HEm-ar -. ulnar - REH -. . EDI-HE - HTGCIME 1 Terra - ?Hm? I - LLwan GREEN - EN Legend USES NE sec. - I111 - I12 - I12 - ELSE - ELSE - I15 - I155 - - - - DEE - 1.1 - 1.1 - I Fault End Painta ?Fil:titiaua Fault Lines Major Cities 1 sauna-manna - 20mm42' El] 12'] .. . - - Mid-America Earth uaka Canter (g1; .. 1' LII at Pm ra. Ellarlal. Frd-e-ctP Iluer?gatur FIJI. PFIIGPEII 135 Indiana Sa 1.0 see. MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event April EDIEIB 12:2: l'u1ile5 Sn uth end . - Imam-ML L. Wayne ?To? MEMH IIH ALLEN HLIHTIHSTIIJH i?l El hunt?. riTeaHE v' I In LI. ISLIHTIZIH Fli?l-CE I I5 Legend MAEC NE Sa 1.0 sec. - I111 - - I12 - I135 - I135 - I15 I15 - I155 - - - I195 - I195 - 1.1 - 1.1 - Fault End F'ainta ?Fil:titiaua Fault Lines Major Cities F53 pun E?ritical Cauntiea @h EL. Mid-America Canter LII mama-mullahs at Llrtala-Clampagl. Hum. Llan. Pm ra. Ellaiial. Frd-e-etP ill-:pal Iluenigatur FIJI. PFIIGPEII 13Ei Indiana PGA - Wabash Valley Seismic Zene: Event April EDUB egen- USES Wabash FGA Maj-er Cities - II IIZIIZI IIZIIZIIZI - I125 - IIZIIZI I-ZIIZII - '3-"15 E3 5 IIZIIZII- TEE: IIZIIZIIZI DEE - I:ll. DEED-1 - - '1 .25 -'1.25 -1.Ei5 #5 at II. PJTI r3. IIUE $113312? 1:3 FIJI. Indiana PGV - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: Event April EDDIE Legend USES Wabash PGV Majer Cities {ilL-"S eaEIZIIZI - 5 - . LID-1 - FEELII har-1. El't FIEIQI. PJTI r3. IIUE $113312? 1:3 FIJI. Indiana 3a 0.3 see. - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: Event April EDDIE egen- USES Wabash Sa I13 see. (9) Majer Cities - I11 - II IIZIIZIIZI - 1 - - .5 . - EIZIIZI - '15 ['35 EIZIIZI '1 - FEE: 1_ '9 ISIS: auntie LII MEI-T- El't FIEIQI. PJTI r3. IIUE $113312? 1:3 FIJI. Indiana 3a 1.0 sec. - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: Event April EDUB BQ?Q??abash Sa 1J3 sec. (9) Majnr Cities - I11 - ELIE I IIZIIZIIZI - I135 - '15 .. - REE: IIZIIZIIZI iti I: a I I: ie E: Mid-America Earlhquaka Eaniar her-f. marlin-cut: Elt LII-ZIP. PJTI r3. $113312? Kentuckyr PGA frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event Legend USES NE PGA - D15 - 0.45 I113 - DEE .. .. - I19 - 1135 - 1.2 1 Fault End F'einte ?Fil::ti1ieue Fault Linee M?erCMee I - 40,000 i 40,001 - pm -Critil:a Ceuntiee (?51 Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Eenier 33?- U301. Pm re. Ellanal. PrdeetP nlcpal Inuewgaer FIJI. 141 Kentucky PGA MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Mil-E ?14! i7 Legend MAEC NE PEA - 0.15 - 0.1.Fault End F'Dinta ?Fil::titinus Fault Linea M?ur??es I - 40,000 i 40,001 - .50 m1 2N -Critil:a Cuuntiea Mid-Amariqa Earlhquaka Eaniar if EItLln'JaIa-Eiampagl. um Pm r5. Pr?ectP uestlgat-r 142 Kentucky frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event 25 e: we ?ll id; Legend USES Fault End F'einte ?Fin:titieue Feult Linee Mejer Cities I - 4mm enema .elem -Critin:e Ceuntiee Ln ma r: I'lr' or Inn-:- ismun uen. Pm re. Elnanal. PrdeetP nlcpal Iluee??tur FIJI. 143 Kentucky PGV frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April EDUB Legend MAEC NE PGV [in.i.eec.] -3 - -1EI - Fault End F'einte ?Fietitieue Feult Linee Mejer Cities I - 0 40,001 enema - 2N 25 e: we 15D -r:riti.:al Eeuntiee Ln ma r: I'lr' or Inn-:- ismun uen. Pm re. Elnanal. PrdeetP rllepal Iluee?gatur FIJI. 144 Kentucky 53 0.3 sec. frum USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April 213133 USES NE SE: {1.3 32:19} - I14 - I15 - ELE: - - 1.2 1.2 - 1.4 ?1.14 - 1.13 -15 - 1.3 -1.13 - - 2.24 I Fault End F'ninta ?Fil::titinu3 Fault Linea Majnr Cities I 251212?) - I 40,001 ?0,000 25 51:: 15B - -Critica Cuun?tiea Hid-Amariqa Earlhqualia Eamar Ln at leala-Eiampagl. Inn-3:. USP. Pm rs. Elmial. PrciectP nlcpal Inuesugahr FIJI. 145 Kentucky Sa I13 sec. frurn MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event 15B April EDUE MAEC NE 33 {1.3 sec. - [Lil -1.E . 2.24 Fault End Paints ?Fil:titiuu3 Fault Linea Majnr Cities I 25mm 4mm -Critin:al Cnunties Hid-Amariqa Earlhqualia Eamar Ln Henry-annuals at leala-Eiampagl. Inn-3:. USP. Inuesugahr FIJI. 14E Kentucky 53 1.0 sec. frum USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDUE USES NE 331D sec. - - I135 - I15 I15 - I155 - - I195 - 1.1 ?1.1 - ?Fil::titinu3 Fault Linea Fault End F'ninta Majnr Cities I - I 40,001 ?0,000 25 51:: 15B - 2F1 -Critica Gauntiea Hid-Amariqa Earlhqualia Eamar Ln at leala-Eiampagl. Inn-3:. USP. Pm rs. Elmial. PrciectP nlcpal Inuesugahr FIJI. 14? Kentucky Sa 1.0 sec. frurn MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDUE MAEC NE 3a 1D sec. - I12 - ELSE 1-035 - I15 I15 - EH35 - - ELSE -035 - 1.1 ?1.1 - 1.23 ?Fil::titinu3 Fault Linea Fault End F'ninta Majnr Cities I - I 40,001 ?0,000 25 51:: 15B - 2F1 Mina -Critica Gauntiea Hid-Amariqa Earlhqualia Eani?ar Ln Henry-annuals at leala-Eiampagl. Inn-3:. USP. Pm rs. Elmial. PrciectP nlcpal Inuesugahr FIJI. 14E Mississippi PGA frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event April EDUB Legend USES 3w PEA .- 14.3-5 - 111:1? - [1.2 . - - I13 - '13 '14 [Lil - I15 . maple-:4 LEM-IE DIE - Jacki, 3; - 3: Faun? 5mm JMPEF - 1.1.1 -1.23 tram emu Fault End Paints -, I E's-Hg ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines -.- Majer Cities I EUDUU - I 40,001 - 45 . 115,001-194,000 =Critiea Ceunties Miles sEc-Fte ., 3" . . 5:3. I Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center PmrS.Ella$Ial. FrdeetP ?lepal Iluewgat-r FIJI. FTIIGFIEII MEI Mississippi PGA frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April EDUB Legend I Fault End F'eints ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines Majer Cities I - I :15 . - =Critiee Ceunties MAEC SW PGA - Ill[Lil - I15 - DE DE - ELF ll? - I113 - I15I - - - 1.1 - 1.1 - 1.23 "team I'anm -i?u Jan-mm LEEHE 1ESHDEA HEHPEH I HEWHDH LAUDEHDA I En - ELHRHE iainrg WLHIHEDH PER GREENE RH EEDHEE JHEHSDH Earlhqualie Center 1L UI at UrIJaIa-Eiarnpagl. Hum. usa. Pm rs. FrdeetP ?lepal Iluewgat-r Tili'l'E?iaJETE FIJI. FTIIGFIEII Mississippi PGV frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event April ?El-5 J- - Legend uses sw PGV (in.isec.] me If ?rm HUI: LIEE - 3 -10 15 I: ?sendsu _15 20 rams-:4 LEIELI- 25 Jacks-_35 4'10 'Il-?Ffl-E - 45Fault End F'eints - I igsurg _Fil:titieus Fault Lines WEE . mm: 5 Majer Cities - ?10,001 - 45 I000 HEM-teen 494,000 - - -. 21: 4: a: 12:: Miles =Critiee Ceunties Mid-Arryriee Earlhqualie Center UI at Hum. use. Pm rs. Eluanal. FrdeetP ?lepal Iluewgat-r Tili'l'E?iaJETE FIJI. FTIIGFIEII 151 Mississippi PGV frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event April EDUE Legend .- .anm' . ms? 1 MAEC sw PGV (In.isee.} -W mm was 3 I. LEIIHE HEMPEH I _15 muse 3.3.317 LELLIEIEHETE 2D - 25 Jacks. Hews? I, 25 HIHEIS HAHHIH rise isn - 35 . lees - 35 41'] If til] - 1'15 1.. WAYNE - ?45 52 . lat: rg 1' Fault End F'emts PERWEHEEHE ?Fil:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines AME mine Me'er Cities in men an pun PEARL 43' 12D =Critiee Ceunties Miles Earlhqualie Center UI at Hum. use. Pm rs. FrdeetP ?lepal "mu-3am FIJI. FTIIGFIEII ilHEitEEtlf 152 Mississippi Sa [1.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event April 20133 Legend USGS SW Sa [1.3 see. - - I145 - IlEi -1.3 -1.3 - 1.35 1.35 - 1.51 I Fault End Paints ?Fil:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines Majer Cities In - I ?13,331 - :15 . ?15,331 =I3ritiea Ceunties Ei- Inc-H SEW-1 a: - m5 M'mm musTc-u LEM-IE mammal 5.3.311- Jackal . mess? SMITH .- . . - tram RAIN-LIN '11. 'l -. ia'burg 1-1. ?lm-r5 F'll- 1 WEE HARRISII-H l'u1iles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at LIrIJaIa-Ciampagl. Hum. usq Am rs. Ellailal. FrdeetP ?lepal "mu-3am Tili'l'E?iaJETE FIJI. FTIIGFIHI 153 Mississippi Sa I13 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event April 20133 Legend mm - MAEC SW Sa I13 see. we - D12 - I13 wusmu - I145 I ? j_45 Lem-2E HEHPER - searr DEE - ian - 1.05 1'2 WITH ESPEH :ilg?1i321-EH El: mm - JEF HSEIH n-m- JDHES MWE Fault End F'emts - LINEDL MAHIEIH iab-Fg ?Fil:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines WLHIHSDH AME PIHE Majer Cities mm? . sauna an PEARL NEH smHE EEDHGE elf - 1:35.330 MERISDHMEHSDH ED 43 a: 12s =Critiea Ceunties Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at LIrIJaIa-Ciampagl. Hum. usq Am rs. Ellailal. FrdeetP ?lepal "mu-3am TieresaJ-a?a FIJI. FTIIGFIHI 154 Mississippi Sa 1.0 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event April EDUB Legend . u' USES SW Sa 1J3 see. m- M'an - UH - - '3 maple-:4 LEM-IE ?Emma" - I155 33.17 ?Emu? 41:3 isn - I195 .. ['35 5MITH 23/ -1.1 . . .- - 1.25 - 1.113 tram Ham Fault End Paints igsurg _Fil:titieus Fault Lines Fin-E. mm: 1 GREENE Majer Cities :1me 45 pan Him . 115,001-194,000 '3 =Critiea Ceunties l'u1iles CL Am rs. Ellanal. FrdeetP ?lepal Iluewgat-r Tili'l'E?iaJETE FIJI. FTIIGFIEII Li": Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center USA. 155 Mississippi Se 1.0 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Mil? Event April 201313 Legend mm MAEC SW 3211.0 see. we - - WINSTIJH - I135 - D35 - I15 HE HEHPER - sum-r MUDEHELIJL - rise ien - I195 - 1.1 SHITH sum-:5 1.1 - 1.25 -1.25 -1.113 mmHE . JEF u-m- I Fault End F'emts - ?mm? iEb-Fg ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines WLHIHSDH AME PIHE Mejer Cities mm? swan?4 ] pun PEARL NEH smue EEDHEE I 4mm 415 pun mum? . 115,001-194,000 =Critiee Ceunties Miles Earlhqualie Center 1L UI at umaua-mampagu. Hum. usa. Pm rs. FrdeetP ?lepal Iluu?gat-r Tili'l'E?iaJETE FIJI. FTIIGFIEII 155 Misseuri PGA USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zdne: Event Seirl Kansas Legend USGS Central PGA - 5.2 -5.2 - 5.35 ?5.35 - 5.55 5.55 - 5.?5 5.?5 - 5.55 - 5.5'5 - 1.15 1.15 -1.35 -1.35 -1.54 Fault End Paints ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines Mejer Cities I 55 ,555 - F5555 I I150 13m 444 Dan =5ritiee Ceunties 21:: s2: 12:: l'u1iles Mill-I'll EEI 3HELEI: [.12 . eure: i F'13-? E. MI: LE- ?g Mid-America Earlhquslre Center El't USA Pm rs. Elnanai PrdeetF rllepal lluemgatnr 157'r April 2555 PGA frern MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event crew Mill-I'll EEI Seirt [.12 . CLIE I i F'l: -.I ill I ISO CEDLF E. Legend MAEC Central PGA PEF - Ill]? - ?Elm? mum. - U2 - U35 ear-?1.15 1.15 - 1.35 - 1.35 - 1.5411 Fault End F'einte ?Fil:titieue Fault Lines Mejer Cities I - I - I150 13m 444 Dan =Critiee Ceuntiee 21:: e2: 12:: Miles 1 April EDDIE ?g Mid-Ameriea Earlhqueke Center El't USA Pm re. Elnanai Pr-zieetF rllepal lluemgatnr Misseuri PGV frern USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event Sent Legend USES Central PGV {inJ'see} ?3 Ell-25 25-Fault End F'einte ?Fil:titieue Fault Linee Mejer Cities 5mm - I - 15mm .150 mm 444 Dan =Critiee Ceuntiee 21:: e2: Miles LII-LIP Milli-ll -HreesH 3HELE: Mi Fil'I-Il . ELI-L maneye i F'l: Inf-I.- 3H ISO HIP-ELI EEHFEH CEDLF MI: [II-ll; LE- April Mid-America Earlhquake Center El't LISA Pm re. Ellanal. PrdeetP nmpal lluemgatnr TleremJeTE 159 Misseuri PGV frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event I an amp Milli-ll I EEI LILIEH Saint Mi Fil'I-Il . ELI-L aura: i F'l: Hansas L3 EVE ISO Legend MAEC Central Pew Eli {ian ea.) I - 3 - ?ElanFault End Paints ?FiI::titiaLIs Fault Lines Majer Cities I - I - I 15mm 444 am =Critiea Caunties ED 4] 123 Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center El't LISA Pm rs. Ellatial. PrcieetP rllepal lluemgat-r ?Emilia-1E"! Misseuri Se 0.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April EDDIE r-z-z-T a. I It.- .- iLlLLi-sill Leer?: .. ah Sent JD - LE - tlz- IleJ-I-Hll'i-I-ll mi:? HEHFI eye-m :1 LilF'l .: Eli. . LE Legend I m. USES Central Se 0.3 see. ?mi gem. 1305.3 ?Exit.? - - TLIIE. llEi - 1.1 1.1 - 1.11 - 1.3Fault End F'eints -?Fil:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines Mejer Cities I - I - .150 mm 444 Dan =Critiee Ceunties ED 4] l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center USE Fm rs. Ellatlal. PrdeetF nlcpal Inn-at?gat-r 1E1 Sa frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event April EDDIE E11 r-z-z-T FiF'l3-I-l 1LlLLi-s?ll II .. ?ll? Sent .10 - LE - Li.- . . e. I ?lJEf-?ill . a. I .- HaneaeC .I J-I-Hll?-I-ll I. i; -. EFli'll HICIEI Elf-E ML: Legend MAEC Central Sa 0.3 see. PW a I112 - I13 ?Fm aw. - - llEi 1311"? ENE, U341 1Fault End F'einte ?Fietitieue Fault Lines Majer Cities I - I I150 em 444 Dan =Critiea Ceuntiee a: a: 12:2: l'uiiles . Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center Ln. at LIrtena-mampagI. Fm r3. Ellaiial. PrdeetF rilepal llue?igatlr IIZII. 152 Missnuri 3a 1.0 sec. frum USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event I II. A- "f Hi .- LIME LE Erl': IE3: Minx.? ML . - I i ?5-354 sucriu Kansas - I-I J'Z'Hll?'Z'll c; 39 ETE: HI 5- LEgEnd Elli-E Lin: LE USGS Central SE 1.13 sec. ?n.11 - I125 [ELI-1 - - THIEI - 11] 11] - 1.2 -1.2 - 1.4 - 1.Ei 1E - 1.34 I Fault End F'ninta Fault Linea Majur Cities I - I - .150 mm 444 Dan =Critica Cuunties ED 4] Miles {a Mid-America Earlhquaka Canter - Pm r3. Ellanal. Pr-ziectF nmpal Inn-ai?gat-r ?Emilia-1E"! 153 Se frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event F'Il'll Aprll 21:11:13 iULLiz-ill .- . - .. Sent .10 LE n1; F'l'I-ll . F. LU in i 1534 Jeane-3n Ci; 3-.- a i .- . . LEgEnd 93'? ELL Elli-E MAEC Central Sa 1.0 see[1.3-1 ELI-1 - - earn - - llEi llEi - - 1.2 -1.2 - 1.4 - 1.5 -1.5 - 1.34 I Fault End Painta ?Fietitiaua Fault Linea Majer Cities I - I - I1aa am 444 Dan =Critiea Cauntiea ED 4] Miles gs: Mid-America Earlhquake Center - Hum. Llan. Pm re. Ellanal. Pr-zieetF rllepal lluemgat-r There-:aJeTe 1E4 Tennessee PGA fren'l USGS - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event 21:: an s2: 12:: Mil-E 1' April 26133 Gila-Enee pa Legend USES SW PISA 1' Fault End F'eints - Ill]? I12 ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines - I12 - [Ia Majer Cities - U3 - I14 1' [Lil - I15 I 11:11] - I15 I113 I 21]] pm s15 '15 - -Critise Cuunties - I113 I I113 - 9 -IZI.E 1 - 1 1 -1.1 - 1 23 ?id-Amerjea Earihquelge Eenier_ 52$. LII at Hum. use. Pm rs. Preamp illepal FIJI. Ffll?l?lal 155 Tennessee PGA frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April EUUE .H Legend MAEC 3w PEA (Q) Fault End F'einis - ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines - I12 - I13 Mejer Cities - 0-Critin:e Ceunties - I13 I - I19 12:: - - - 1.1 Mile - 1.1 - 1.23 Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center $71 UI Elt umaisclampagi. USP. Pm rs. Enanal. PreteetP nlcpal Inuesnganr FIJI. Tennessee PGV frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event April EGUE Gila-Enee pa Legend USES SW PS?wr [ianeeJ Fault End P?int? -3 -13 ?Fil:titieus Fault Lines -15 - 15 Mejer Eities >??ritieel Ceunties a i. :55 Mile- -45 - 52 Mid-Amerisa Earlhqualgsjigjter UI Elt umaiaclampagi. USP. Pm rs. Enanal. Preamp nlcpal Inuesnganr FIJI. Tennessee PGV from MAEC - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event April EGUE ?IaEneE-ua Legend MAEC SW {ianeeJ - Fault End Paints -3 ?FiI:titiI:II_Is Fault Lines -15 Majer Cities -15-EU 1' - 25 I - 25-33 pm - 35 =Critiee Ceunties 21:: an s: 12D xix :igjg TF- -45 - 52 UI untrue-Tunnel: Elt umaisclampagi. USP. Pm rs. Enanal. Preamp nlcpal Inuesnganr FIJI. Tennessee Se 0.3 see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April EUUE Ella-Enee pa Legend USGS SW 33 I13 sec. End F'Dint? ?FiI::titiI:ILIs Feult Line - I145 Mejer Cities - II - - I DEVI - DEIEI DEE-ISIS gm - E15 1 "'19 ?1-35 =Critice Ceunties 21:: in e: 12:: . 4% 1.35 Mlle -1.35 -1.51 LU Mid-America Earthquake Center USP. Pm rs. Enanal. PrcjeetF nlcpal "Hunger Tennessee Se [1.3 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event April EUUE m1; w?hw? Gila-Ener- pa Legend MAEC 3w 33113 53?; 1: Fault End Paints ?FiI:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines - I145 Mejer Cities - - - DEE I DEVI - ms - De I 21]] pm - E15 ?'19 =Critiee Ceunties 21:: an s2: 12:: . -1.2?1.35 mus -1.35 -1.51 Mid-America Earthquake Center USP. Pm rs. Enanal. PrcjeetF nlcpal "Hunger Tennessee Se 1.1] see. frem USGS - New Madrid Seismie Zene: MIT Event April EUUE Gila-Enee pa Legend USES SW Se 1.13 sec. Fault End F'Dini? - I12 ?FiI:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines - I135 Maj-er Cities - - - I15 - I DEVI - - De I 21]] pm - E15 '13 - 3-95 =Critiee Ceunties - a: a: xi; $555.12; Mile ?1.25 - 1.43 Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center -- LII Elt umaiaclampagi. USP. Pm rs. Enanal. PrcieetP nlcpal Inuesnganr FIJI. Tennessee Se 1.0 see. frem MAEC - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April EUUE Jill. .I.-. *9 Mil-E Gila-Enee pa Legend MAEC 3311] 53.; Fault End Paints ?FiI:titiI:ILIs Fault Lines - I135 Mejer Cities - I15 3-95 =Critiee Ceunties - 1.1 ?1.1 - 1.25 ?1.25 - 1.43 Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at umaua?slampagl. use. Pm rs. Enanal. PreteetP nlcpal Inuesnganr FIJI. Appendix II: Inventory This appendix details the inventory employed in all State Reports. Inventory data used in state workshop scenarios is a combination of HAZUS-MH MR2 default data and 2007 Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) datasets with additional inventory collected by the MAE Center for specific regions. The inventory required for a HAZUS-MH MR2 analysis is divided into numerous categories, some of which have been updated for the impact assessment provided for state workshops. The ‘general building stock’ defines all buildings in a state that are not related to transportation and utilities services. This dataset includes residential, commercial, industrial, government, education, religious, and agricultural buildings. These buildings are aggregated at the census tract level, meaning all buildings are summed by construction type and occupancy type independently for a given census tract. The general building stock was not updated for state workshop analyses due to a lack of refined data for the areas requiring assessment, so HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory was used here. ‘Essential facilities’ is a dataset that is broken out from the general building stock. These facilities include schools, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, and emergency operation centers and are separated from the general building stock due to their critical importance in rescue efforts following a natural disaster. Essential facilities information was updated with HSIP data for each facility type. Additional hospitals from HSIP data were added and classified by size (based on number of beds). Primary and secondary schools, as well as colleges and universities, were added to HAZUS-MH MR2 inventory and classified accordingly. Fire and police station datasets were supplemented with HSIP data as well. All new essential facilities taken from HSIP datasets were assigned the HAZUS-MH MR2 default structure type associated with that particular facility type. For example, HAZUS-MH MR2 classifies all fire stations as unreinforced masonry, low-rise (URML) construction. Since structure type is not defined within the HSIP datasets, all fire stations added from that data were assigned the HAZUS-MH MR2 default structure type URML. The same is true for all other essential facility types as follows: • • Schools, police stations, EOCs structure type: URML Hospital structure type: PC1 Additionally, replacement cost data was updated to reflect more current cost data. Eduardo Escalona, at the time working with FEMA VII, assisted the MAE Center with updates to essential facilities. For more detailed information on the updates to essential facilities, reference is made to Escalona.1 The State of Illinois impact assessment also drew inventory data from a previous MAE Center project, SE-1, with Professors Steven French of the Georgia Institute of Technology and Robert Olshansky of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This report includes essential 1 Eduardo Escalona. (Formerly of FEMA Region VII) currently PBS&J. 173 facilities data for 23 counties in southern Illinois. For further information on the essential facilities data included in the State of Illinois impact assessment, please contact the MAE Center2. Transportation, utility, and high potential-loss facility (HPLF) datasets were also updated with HSIP data. The only exception to this is the potable water facility dataset. The HSIP critical infrastructure data does not include information on potable water facilities, and thus no updates to HAZUS-MH MR2 inventory were completed. Transportation, utility and HPLF inventory datasets were appended to include HSIP data. HAZUS-MH MR2 inventory was compared with HSIP data for each facility type and when the HSIP dataset reported more facilities than HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, those additional facilities from the HSIP dataset were added to the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory. This means that no facilities were deleted from HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, but rather facilities were added to create the most comprehensive dataset available. Kirk Chesla of Innovative Emergency Management (IEM) assisted the MAE Center with inventory updates for transportation, utility, and HPLF facilities. More specifically datasets updated with HSIP data include: • • • Transportation Systems o Highway Bridges o Railway Bridges o Ferry Facilities o Bus Stations o Airports o Light Rail Facilities and Bridges Utility Systems o Waste Water Facilities o Natural Gas Facilities o Major Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines o Oil Facilities o Major Oil Transmission Pipelines o Electric Power Facilities o Major Electric Transmission Lines o Communication Facilities High Potential-Loss Facilities o Dams o Nuclear Power Facilities o Military Installations o Hazardous Materials Facilities In addition, regional transmission lines for natural gas and oil were added from the HSIP 2007 data. Replacement costs were also added to these major natural gas and oil transmission lines. Pipeline inventory updates were also assisted by Eduardo Escalona (contact information above). The following tables illustrate differences between HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory and the inventory updates completed for the State Reports. Infrastructure categories are listed by state. 2 Mid-America Earthquake Center, SE-1 “Inventory of Essential Facilities in Mid-America.” Contact Person: Timothy Gress, Phone: 217-244-6302, Email: tgress@uiuc.edu 174 Table 1: Alabama Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 122 1,857 729 470 27 137 1,870 1,388 496 27 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 11,857 0 88 104 0 16 274 0 180 0 0 14,597 0 118 109 9 24 274 6 469 0 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 418 78 81 17 30 299 15,341 1,425 368 112 30 410 2,101 2,199 0 3 2,220 3,360 0 3 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 175 Table 2: Arkansas Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 93 1,059 435 378 11 103 1,254 1,330 515 11 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 5,634 2 48 68 0 16 99 1 216 0 0 5,634 2 48 68 0 16 99 1 314 0 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 310 31 97 10 69 411 625 56 97 10 69 411 1,173 1,475 0 1 1,173 1,475 0 1 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 176 Table 3: Illinois Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 227 5,283 1,007 866 149 249 5,722 1,725 1,044 149 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 22,854 0 963 285 0 101 438 2 624 0 38 22,854 0 1,030 285 4 119 514 11 929 401 38 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 518 153 62 39 242 876 34,833 2,172 1,333 275 242 9,389 1,255 4,870 0 7 1,511 7,249 0 7 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 177 Table 4: Indiana Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 128 2,630 605 502 51 175 2,686 1,210 474 51 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 16,505 0 80 91 0 32 84 0 496 0 0 16,505 0 92 91 8 46 91 0 496 13 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 386 54 29 11 96 446 21,679 792 29 170 96 446 1,026 3,793 0 0 1,163 3,793 0 0 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 178 Table 5: Kentucky Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 121 1,666 625 381 9 135 1,846 1,066 407 0 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 6,443 4 143 117 1 21 277 1 142 0 0 6,805 4 166 117 18 26 301 16 219 0 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 374 68 75 20 179 335 16,357 1,693 337 88 179 9,080 1,134 2,060 0 0 1,188 2,830 0 0 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 179 Table 6: Mississippi Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 105 1,124 430 368 37 123 1,281 984 365 37 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 13,692 0 56 71 1 27 205 0 192 0 0 16,936 0 63 76 1 40 222 2 256 0 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 299 32 55 10 17 335 9,216 748 415 105 17 3,080 3,307 1,154 0 1 3,514 1,939 0 1 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 180 Table 7: Missouri Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 143 2,863 636 592 33 160 2,817 1,399 654 33 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 21,765 0 163 125 0 62 193 1 401 0 0 21,765 0 200 125 12 72 230 8 558 17 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 397 79 9 10 187 1,312 20,872 1,406 354 119 8,599 1,312 High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 4,108 2,113 0 1 5,265 2,833 0 1 Infrastructure Category 181 Table 8: Tennessee Inventory Comparison HAZUS MR2 Default Inventory Updated Inventory Essential Facilities Hospitals Schools Fire Stations Police Stations Emergency Operation Centers 135 1,973 565 425 36 180 2,309 1,110 423 0 Transportation Facilities Highway Bridges Highway Tunnels Railway Bridges Railway Facilities Railway Tunnel Bus Facilities Port Facilities Ferry Facilities Airports Light Rail Facilities Light Rail Bridges 5,298 5 122 129 0 35 168 1 184 0 0 7,215 5 151 129 15 51 200 6 315 25 0 Utility Facilities Communication Facilities Electric Power Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Oil Facilities Potable Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities 458 59 56 21 98 504 16,130 428 183 121 98 1,946 994 2,489 0 2 1,204 4,006 0 2 Infrastructure Category High Potential Loss Facilities Dams Hazardous Materials Facilities Levees Nuclear Power Facilities 182 Appendix III: Fragility Relationships1 Overview Fragility relationships are a critical component of seismic impact assessment. The fragility, or vulnerability, functions relate the severity of shaking to the probability of reaching a level of damage (e.g. light, medium, extensive, near-collapse) to various infrastructure items. The level of shaking can be quantified using numerous shaking parameters, including peak ground acceleration, velocity, displacement, spectral acceleration, spectral velocity or spectral displacement. Each infrastructure item requires a corresponding set of fragilities to determine damage level likelihoods (probability). For example, medium span RC bridges will have 3 fragility relationships that yield the likelihood that a bridge will be lightly damaged, incur medium damage or be near collapse. All inventory categories provided in HAZUS-MH MR2 also include fragilities, termed ‘default’ fragilities as they are the default values used by the program. It is possible to improve these fragilities for more accurate impact assessments. Due to the tight time line for the emergency response planning workshops for the 8 states, the HAZUS default fragilities were used throughout this study. Phase II of the current project will employ advanced fragilities based on analytical and physical simulations. Each infrastructure type has a set of fragility functions—one for each damage level. HAZUSMH MR2 specifies four damage levels: slight, moderate, extensive, and complete. Complete damage is most simply defined as being damaged beyond any state of repair. All other damage states vary between no damage up to complete damage, though descriptions for each infrastructure type differ based on the type of construction. When fragility functions are updated, the parameters for each of the four damage levels must be updated. Many default fragilities are based on expert opinion, and updating these with fragilities developed using analytical models will improve the accuracy of damage estimations. Since inventory and hazard improvements were the primary components of this series of Phase I analyses, fragility functions were not updated. Default fragilities are considered conservative since very little analytical work was done to generate most of them. As a result, improving fragilities does not always increase damage, as shown by Elnashai and Cleveland (2007). Fragility Definition and Applications In general, fragility functions relate a level of shaking, or system demand, to the conditional probability of a specific system reaching or exceeding a limit state response. Figure 1 illustrates typical fragility functions. A deterministic response, or the vertical line, indicates a lack of uncertainty in the system response. Fragility curves close to vertical indicate a low level of uncertainty (P1), while those with a much higher uncertainty are spread over a much wider range of shaking values (P2). 1 This appendix heavily references the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Report (Mid-America Earthquake Center, 2007). 183 Derivation of useful functions requires the definition of limit states that are meaningful in the context of loss assessment. Selection and quantitative definition of limit states are central to the derivation of system vulnerability. With the limit states already defined, the limit state probability is given by: (1) P[ LS ] = ΣP[ LS D = d ]P[ D = d ] Here D defines the random variable representing the demand of the system; P[LS D=d] is the conditional limit state probability, given that D=d, and the summation taken over all values of D. The probability P[D=d] defines the hazard. The variable d is the control or interface variable. Figure 1: Typical Fragility Function The conditional probability, P[LS D=d] = V(x), is the measure of vulnerability (Wen et al, 2003). The previous equation indicates a coupled probabilistic approach, meaning coupled with regard to the system resistance or limit states and demand imposed on the system. Conversely, uncoupled vulnerability analysis, indicating that relationships are derived which are independent of the site hazard, offer a number of attractive features, such as simplification of the derivations and avoidance of the need to define very low probability events (Wen et al, 2003). Default HAZUS-MH MR2 Fragilities for Buildings HAZUS-MH MR2 classifies buildings into 36 different types based on the building material and structural system employed in the building’s construction. A summary of building types is illustrated in Table 1, while more detailed descriptions are provided the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual (FEMA-NIBS, 2006). The inventory in the regions considered in the NMSZ analysis only includes 16 of these 36 building types. Mid-rise and high-rise buildings are not part of the HAZUS-MH MR2 building inventory in the central and eastern US (CEUS). 184 The 16 building types that comprise the eight state regions investigated in this study include: • • • • • • • • W1 W2 S1L S2L S3 S4L S5L C1L • • • • C2L C3L PC1 PC2L • • • • RM1L RM2L URML MH Building fragilities are based on the spectral displacement shaking parameter. A typical set of fragility curves for buildings is displayed in Figure 2. Each of the four damage states utilized in HAZUS-MH MR2 is represented in the figure. Figure 2: Example Set of Fragility Curves for Buildings Fragility curves are developed using the equation below:  1  S  P[ Exceedancei S d ] = Φ  ln d   β TOTi  LS i  Where: Φ βTOTi Sd LSi (2) = Standard Normal Cumulative Distribution function; = Total uncertainty associated with damage state, I; = Spectral displacement (variable); = Median value of spectral displacement at which the building reaches the threshold of damage state, i In order to utilize the fragility relationships which provide the damage probabilities as a function of the structural response, the latter must first be determined using a capacity spectrum approach. This requires the definition of building capacity curves for the four seismic design levels; pre-, low-, moderate-, and high-code; of the 36 building types (36x4 curves). 185 Table 1: Model Building Types Pushover curves are generally obtained from experimental results in published literature or through analytical models of specific structure types. Pushover curves are often represented as a roof displacement versus a total base shear. These units are not compatible with the units of HAZUS-MH MR2 building fragilities (in units of spectral displacement, Sd) and must be converted according to the following: V Sa = W α1 186 (3) 2  N wiφi1  ∑ g  i =1  α1 = N  wi   N wiφi1 2  ∑ g  ∑ g   i =1   i =1 ( Sd = ∆ roof (5) PF1φ roof ,1  N (wiφ i1 ) ∑ g PF1 =  Ni =1 2  wiφ i1 ∑  g  i =1 ( (4) ) )       (6) Equation (3) converts base shear into spectral acceleration while equation (5) converts roof displacement into spectral displacement. Parameters α1 and PF1 are provided in equations (4) and (6), respectively. In these equations, wi denotes the weight of a single story, and φi1 denotes the value of the fundamental mode shape at story i. Please refer to the Applied Technology Council Report, ATC-40, from 1996 for further information on this procedure. The HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for constructing capacity curves does not rely on analytical models, but rather uses the following parameters: • • • • • • Cs is the design strength coefficient (fraction of building’s weight) Te is the expected ‘elastic’ fundamental-mode period of the building (seconds) α1 is the fraction of building weight effective against the pushover mode γ is the ‘over-strength’ factor relating ‘true’ yield strength to design strength λ is the ‘over-strength’ factor relating ultimate strength to yield strength µ is the ‘ductility’ ratio relating ultimate displacement to λ times the yield displacement The first two parameters are determined using 1994 NEHRP Provisions, while the remaining parameters rely on the best estimates of typical design properties. These parameters can be found in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual, Chapter 5. The control points, or yield and ultimate points, can be determined using the equations provided in Figure 3, and capacity curves can be constructed from these points. The relationship between spectral acceleration and displacement is constant until the yield point. After the ultimate point, spectral acceleration is constant, and this region is connected to the linear portion with a nonlinear relationship between spectral values. 187 Figure 3: Derivation of Capacity Curves Threshold values for each of the damage states are determined using the capacity curves and the NEHRP Guidelines in FEMA 273 (1997). The following engineering criteria are established for different design levels and heights of the same construction type: • • Values of the drift ratio that define Complete damage to Moderate-Code buildings are assumed to be 75% of the drift ratio that define Complete damage to HighCode buildings, and values of the drift ratio that define Complete damage to LowCode buildings are assumed to be 63% of the drift ratios that define Complete damage to High-Code buildings. Values of drift ratio that define Slight damage were assumed to be the same for High-Moderate-Low-Code buildings, given that this damage state typically does not exceed the building’s elastic capacity. For each damage state, the drift ratio of a Pre-Code building is of the same building type. For all damage states, drift ratios for mid-rise buildings are assumed to be 67% of those for low-code buildings of the same type, and drift ratios for high-rise buildings are assumed to be 50% of those of low-rise buildings of the same type. Drift values can be converted to spectral displacement values using equation (5). An example showing the locations of damage state thresholds on the capacity curves is shown in Figure 4. 188 Figure 4: Capacity Curves and Damage State Thresholds for the Building Type W1 The total uncertainty, βTOT, is required to draw the fragility curves for each building type. This parameter is required for each damage state and is given by the following equation: β TOT = Where βC βD βLS (CONV [β , β D ] + (β LS ) 2 C 2 ) (7) = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the total variability of the capacity curve = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the variability of the demand spectrum = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the uncertainty in the estimate of the median value of the threshold of the associated structural damage state The βC term is set to 0.25 for all code-level buildings and 0.3 for pre-code buildings. The βLS term is set to 0.4 of all structural damage states and building types. The βD term is set to 0.45 for short periods and 0.5 for long periods. The term CONV[βC, βD] indicates the convolution of the uncertainty associated with the capacity and demand terms. This process is required to combine the uncertainty in capacity and demand as they are not independent of each other. This means that a change in capacity affects the demand imposed, and the demand imposed on the structure affects the capacity (for non-linear analysis). The convolution process permits the determination of building performance when subjected to ground motion. This is accomplished with the capacity spectrum method (CSM), a non-linear static analysis procedure. The documentation of this procedure can be found in Freeman et al (1975), Freeman (1978), and later in ATC-40 (1996) and FEMA 274 (1997). HAZUS-MH MR2 189 uses an iterative process with capacity and demand curves to find the performance point. As an example, fragility curves for W1 (including the seismic design level) are shown in Figure 5. Figure 5: Fragility Curves for W1 Buildings Though not explained herein, the remaining inventory types utilize the default fragilities in HAZUS-MH MR2. All fragility parameters for the remaining inventory types can be found in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual. Updating fragilities will be a major component of all Regional level analyses, particularly focusing on wood frame building fragilities and bridge fragilities. References Applied Technology Council (1996). ATC-40: Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Concrete Buildings, Volume 1. Redwood City, CA. Elnashai, A.S. & L.J. Cleveland (2007). “Importance and Challenges of Earthquake Impact Assessment in the Central and Eastern United States.” Proceedings of the Asian Pacific Network of Centers for Earthquake Engineering Research (ANCER) Conference. Hong Kong, China. May 29-30. FEMA-NIBS, HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual (2006). Chapter 5. Washington, D.C. FEMA. 5-8. 190 FEMA (1997). FEMA 273: NEHRP Guidelines for Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. FEMA (1997). FEMA 274: NEHRP Commentary on the Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. Mid-America Earthquake Center (2007). “Comprehensive Seismic Loss Modeling for the State of Illinois” Report: Appendix III, Fragility Functions. June. Wen, Y.K, B.E. Ellingwood and J. Bracci (2003). “Vulnerability Function Derivation for Consequence-Based Engineering.” Mid-America Earthquake Center Report. 191 Appendix IV: Earthquake Impact Assessment Methodology The earthquake impact assessment completed by the Mid-America Earthquake Center and the George Washington University exclusively uses HAZUS-MH MR2 (future analyses will employ HAZUS and MAEviz, the MAE Center advanced impact assessment, management and decisionmaking software package). HAZUS-MH MR2 was developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS). Originally designed for mitigation purposes, the software is now used for response planning, emergency managers, building officials, local governments, insurance agencies, and research institutions. There are numerous methods of refining an analysis in HAZUS-MH MR2, and each user must determine the level of refinement and accuracy that is required for the analysis undertaken. In general, an analysis requires three primary components: hazard, inventory, and fragility. Hazard definition consists not only of ground shaking but also ground deformation. Inventory includes all relevant infrastructure types, their locations, building types, and replacement costs. Finally, fragility relates the level of ground shaking to a likelihood of specific severity levels of damage. Each of these components is detailed in other appendices in this report. Please consult these appendices for more information on hazard, inventory, and fragility. This comprises the direct infrastructure damage in a region of interest. The direct damage calculations are then used to determine both direct and indirect induced damage, social impacts, and economic losses. Level of Analysis in HAZUS-MH MR2 A Level I analysis is the most basic form of analysis in HAZUS-MH MR2. This type of analysis can be run without any improvements to the program itself or improvements to the inventory included with the program. Once a region of interest is chosen, the definition of hazard is chosen from the options provided in the program. A hazard may be deterministic or probabilistic. A deterministic hazard refers to a single event from which damage estimates are generated. A probabilistic hazard requires a return period and magnitude for the desired earthquake. Results are provided in terms of annualized losses instead of total losses from an event. The deterministic hazard is utilized exclusively in this report. There are several methods available in HAZUS-MH MR2 for a Level 1 hazard definition, including an arbitrary event in which magnitude and depth to the epicenter are specified and a historical event from the database is provided in the program. This level of analysis does not consider the effects of soil amplification and ground deformation. Neither inventory updates nor improvements to fragility relationships are required. Various improvements are required to run a Level II analysis. Some improvement to the hazard is one critical facet of a Level II analysis. This includes such steps as improving the method of defining ground motion, the addition of soil amplification, the addition of liquefaction susceptibility to model ground deformation, and landslide susceptibility. Inventory improvements are also required and may include updates to critical facilities such as schools, hospitals, bridges, and utility facilities and networks, or the updating of demographic data. Updates to fragility functions are also classified as Level II improvements. It would be difficult 192 to update all fragilities to all infrastructure types, due to the general lack of research in some areas. Buildings, bridges, and certain utility networks are common in the literature and may be the easiest to locate and update in HAZUS-MH MR2. The most advanced analysis in HAZUS-MH MR2 is a Level II analysis. This type of analysis requires more time and effort to complete. Detailed engineering and economic loss studies may be completed. Site-specific investigations are also recommended at this stage of refinement. The use of the Advanced Engineering Building Module (AEBM) is available to import and assess damage for new types of buildings. Very few earthquake impact assessments reach this level of analysis, due to the time required. An example of an AEBM analysis was undertaken by Erberik and Elnashai (2006) for flat slab structures, a system that is not featured in the HAZUS building types. HAZUS-MH MR2 Modules The earthquake impact assessment in HAZUS-MH MR2 is carried out in numerous steps, or modules. Each type of damage, loss, or impact calculation generally has its own module. Many of the modules used in HAZUS-MH MR2 are detailed in the following discussion. It is possible for a user to select only certain modules in a specific analysis. For a comprehensive assessment, however, all modules are recommended. This includes all damage and losses for buildings, transportation and utility systems, as well as induced damage and social impacts. Figure 1: HAZUS-MH MR2 Earthquake Impact Assessment Methodology 193 Potential Earth Science Hazard Module The potential earth science hazard module includes the estimation of ground motion and ground failure, including liquefaction, landslides, and surface fault rupture. A minimum definition of hazard requires that the level of shaking be quantified over the entire region of interest, expressed as peak ground motion parameters (acceleration, velocity, and displacement). The hazard may also be expressed as peak response of simple structures (peak spectral values: peak spectral acceleration, velocity, and displacement). Attenuation relationships are the simplest method for determining ground motion and modeling a point-source event. Line-source modeling involves the rupture of an entire fault segment and may account for directionality of fault rupture in the estimation of ground motion. By including more aspects of ground motion, line-source modeling is preferred to a more simplified point-source model. Area source models also exist, and require considerable knowledge of the tectonic environment and mapping of fault geometry and likely mechanisms of rupture. For user-supplied ground motion, the internal ground motion calculation is not considered. Ground failure parameters, such as liquefaction susceptibility, are culled from maps. Soil amplification is used to adjust the ground motion for local soil conditions. For example, soft soil deposits are likely to filter short period vibrations and amplify long period shaking, thus increasing the likelihood of damage to long period structures, such as high-rise buildings and long-span bridges. Liquefaction susceptibility refers to the change in phase of partially saturated soil deposits that may completely lose cohesion during prolonged shaking. This results in permanent ground deformations such as lateral spreading and settlement, both of which increase the likelihood of damage to infrastructure. Landslide susceptibility is included in earthquake impact assessments in order to define the likelihood of inclined deposits sliding during or shortly after earthquakes. Inventory Module The inventory utilized in HAZUS-MH MR2 includes the general building stock, essential facilities, transportation lifelines, utility lifelines, and high potential-loss facilities. The general building stock is not a collection of individual buildings but rather an estimated value of buildings in a given census tract. These estimates are based on population demographics, which factor into estimates of building counts and building uses. Building occupancy classes are used to categorize buildings by use. There are 33 occupancy classes in HAZUS-MH MR2 and 36 building types that categorize the structural system used in buildings. For more information on building types and occupancy classes, please refer to the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual, Chapter 5. In addition, square footage estimates are provided at the census tract level for the general building stock. Critical facilities are included in the inventory module as individual data items. Critical facilities include essential facilities such as schools, emergency operation centers, hospitals, police stations and fire stations. Transportation lifelines include highway bridges and roads, railway bridges, facilities and tracks, airports, bus terminals, ports, and ferry facilities. Utility lifelines include waste water facilities and local distribution networks, potable water facilities and local distribution networks, natural gas facilities and local networks, as well as oil, electric power, and 194 communication facilities. For some levels of analysis, regional distribution networks may be added. Direct Damage Module The direct damage module uses the inventory and the potential earth science hazard to estimate damage for each inventory component. The damage results are given as a probability of reaching each of the four damage states: slight, moderate, extensive, and complete. The damage for each inventory item is described by a fragility (or vulnerability) function, which indicates the probability of damage based on an input ground motion hazard parameter. Both structural and nonstructural damage are approximated for the general building stock. Induced Damage Module The induced damage modules available in HAZUS-MH MR2 include debris generation, fire following earthquake, and inundation from dam failure. Dam failure and inundation are not included in this report due to the lack of inundation maps available. The fire following earthquake (FFE) estimates are not reported since the model for FFE is not regionally appropriate. The model was developed for an urban area, which is dissimilar to much of the NMSZ. Additionally, the module tends to produce fire ignitions in areas of high building density even if shaking and damage are non-existent and considered erroneous. The debris generation module is the only induced damage module utilized in this report and is determined based on building square footage in a census tract. Direct Social Loss Module This module includes estimates of casualties, displaced households, and temporary shelter requirements. Casualty estimates are generated for three times of day: 2:00 AM, 2:00 PM and 5:00 PM. These times of day are designed to represent various population locations, meaning when people are at home sleeping, at work, and commuting. Casualty estimates are divided into four severity levels as follows, along with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) classifications: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake Casualties estimated are based on structural and nonstructural damage to buildings and do not consider induced damage caused by fire, car accidents, or other medical problems such as heart attacks related to stress. Casualties from secondary hazards are not considered and may include landslides, tsunamis, and dam failures. The HAZUS-MH MR2 casualty model classifies three different types of data: 195 • • • Scenario Time Definition Data Supplied by Other Modules Data Specific to the Casualty Module The first item accounts for the distribution of the population at the three different times of day: 2:00 AM, 2:00 PM, and 5:00 PM. In general, casualties are expected to be greatest when an earthquake occurs during the night, when people are home in bed. This is not always the case, however, as is shown in some state analyses in this report. The data supplied by other modules includes population distribution data, building stock inventory, and damage probabilities. The population distribution data is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau and from Dun and Bradstreet business data. The population is then divided into six categories, in which population percentages vary throughout the day: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) Residential Population Commercial Population Educational Population Industrial Population Commuting Population Hotel Population Additionally, casualties are divided into categories for indoor and outdoor casualties. The basic framework for indoor casualties is shown in Figure 2. This model integrates various casualty severity levels with the occupancy types in HAZUS-MH MR2. A similar framework exists for outdoor casualties, though it is not shown here. Indoor and outdoor casualties are combined for a total estimate of casualties. Figure 2: Indoor Casualty Event Tree 196 1 Displaced Households The estimation of displaced households takes into consideration occupancy classes for residential buildings. While HAZUS-MH MR2 classifies residential buildings by the occupancy classes shown in Table 1, only RES1 and RES3 classes are considered in the calculation of displaced households. Table 1: HAZUS-MH MR2 Residential Building Types RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES3C RES3D RES3E RES3F RES4 RES5 RES6 Single Family Dwelling Mobile Home Multi Family Dwelling – Duplex Multi Family Dwelling – 3-4 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 5-9 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 10-19 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 20-49 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 50+ Units Temporary Lodging Institutional Dormitory Nursing Home The HAZUS-MH MR2 technical manual provides the following formulas for the calculation of Displaced Households. Table 2 provides the definition of the variables used in the formulas. SF% = wSFM SFM % + wSFE SFE% + SFC% MF% = wMFM MFM % + wMFE MFE% + MFC%  HH #  DH # = ( SF# SF% + MF# MF% )    SF# + MF#  1 Examination of the outputs for displaced population found that the calculations being performed within HAZUSMH MR2 were incorrect due to errors in the software. This is currently being corrected in the next release of the software. To calculate these estimates for the scenarios discussed in this report, we combined the damage estimates and population estimates from HAZUS-MH MR2 and utilized the HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology to derive the number of displaced people. 197 Table 2: Definition of Variables Used in Displaced Household Calculations SFU# MFU# HH# SFM% SF% SFC% MFM% MFE% MFC% Total Number of Single-Family Dwelling Units Total Number of Multi-Family Dwelling Units Total Number of Households Damage state probability for moderate structural damage in the single-family residential occupancy class Damage state probability for extensive structural damage state in the single-family residential occupancy class Damage state probability for complete structural damage state in the single-family residential occupancy class Damage state probability for moderate structural damage state in the multi- family residential occupancy class Damage state probability for extensive structural damage state in the multi- family residential occupancy class Damage state probability for complete structural damage state in the multi- family residential occupancy class HAZUS-MH MR2 calculates the damage probabilities based on structural building type and not occupancy class. HAZUS-MH MR2 then uses these structural damage probabilities, along with occupancy mapping (which structural building types are used for specific occupancy classes, including percentage), to calculate the number of damaged buildings per occupancy class. These in turn can be used to calculate the damage probabilities for the occupancy classes. For multifamily housing there is no data on average occupancy rates available. The classification of the RES3 classes provides ranges for the units in a dwelling; therefore the mappings in Table 3 were used in the calculations. Table 3: Mapping of Residential Building Type to Number of Units Type RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES3C RES3D RES3E RES3F Description Single Family Dwelling Mobile Home Multi Family Dwelling – Duplex Multi Family Dwelling – 3-4 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 5-9 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 10-19 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 20-49 Units Multi Family Dwelling – 50+ Units 198 Units 1 1 2 4 7 15 35 75 The following damage weight factors provided by HAZUS-MH MR2 were also utilized. • 100% of the households living in completely damaged RES1 and RES2 buildings are considered displaced • 100% of the households living in completely damaged RES3 buildings are considered displaced • 90% of the households living in extensively damaged RES3 buildings are considered displaced • All other households will not seek shelter 2 Shelter Requirements The HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology is based on the following formula:    DH # POP  STP# = ∑∑∑∑  α ijkl   HI i HE j HOk HAl  i =1 j =1 k =1 l =1   HH #   5 5 2 3 α ijkl = ( IW ∗ IM i ) + ( EW ∗ EM j ) + ( OW ∗ OM k ) + ( AW ∗ AM l ) 3 2 Examination of the outputs for shelter seeking population found that the calculations being performed within HAZUS-MH MR2 were incorrect due to errors in the software. This is currently being corrected in the next release of the software. To calculate these estimates for the scenarios discussed in this report, we combined the damage estimates and population estimates from HAZUS-MH MR2 and utilized the HAZUS-MH MR2 methodology to derive the number of shelter seeking people. 3 All weights relevant for the α ijkl calculations are given in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual and are also listed in this appendix. 199 Table 4 provides a definition of the variables used in the above formula. Table 4: Definition of Variables Used in Shelter Seeking Population Calculations POP HH# HI1 HI2 HI3 HI4 HI5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 HO1 HO2 HA1 HA2 HA3 HIi HEj HOk HAl STP% Number of people in census tract Number of Households Percentage of households whose income is under $10,000 Percentage of households whose income is $10,001 to $15,000 Percentage of households whose income is $15,001 to $25,000 Percentage of households whose income is $25,001 to $35,000 Percentage of households whose income is over $35,000 Percentage of white households Percentage of black households Percentage of Hispanic households Percentage of Native American households Percentage of Asian households Percentage of households owned by householder Percentage of households rented by householder Percentage of population under 16 years old Percentage of population between 16 and 65 years old Percentage of population over 65 years old Percentage of population in the ith income class Percentage of population in the jth ethnic class Percentage of population in the kth ownership class Percentage of population in the lth age class Number of people requiring short term housing The number of shelter seeking population is solely based on displaced persons due to structural damage. Severe damage to lifeline systems such as water and electricity might also add to the shelter population. In addition, the consecutive planning numbers do not consider severe damage to lifeline systems. All calculations are performed on census tract level using the Census 2000 data provided by HAZUS-MH MR2. Once calculated on the tract level, the results are aggregated on county level. The calculation of the shelter seeking population takes into consideration – among other factors – ethnicity, income, and age. The corresponding factors from the shelter algorithm are then used along with census data to calculate the ethnic, income, and age distribution for the calculated number of shelter seeking people. This may drive different planning assumptions. For example, planners might want to plan differently if 90% of the shelter seeking population is of low income. 200 HAZUS-MH MR2 Parameters for Calculating Shelter Requirements and Displaced Households Table 5: Demographic Weight Factors Weight Factor Description Importance Factor AW Age Weighting Factor 0 EW Ethnic Weighting Factor 0.27 IW Income Weighting Factor 0.73 OW Ownership Weighting Factor 0 Table 6: Demographic Modification Factors Class Description Factor AM1 Population Under 16 Years Old 0.4 AM2 Population Between 16 and 65 Years Old 0.4 AM3 Population Over 65 Years Old 0.4 EM1 White 0.24 EM2 Black 0.48 EM3 Hispanic 0.47 EM4 Asian 0.26 EM5 Native American 0.26 IM1 Household Income < $10000 0.62 IM2 $10000 < Household Income < $15000 0.42 IM3 $15000 < Household Income < $25000 0.29 IM4 $25000 < Household Income < $35000 0.22 IM5 $35000 < Household Income 0.13 OM1 Owner Occupied Dwelling 0.4 OM2 Renter Occupied Dwelling 0.4 201 Table 7: Damage State Factors Class Description Value wMFC Weight for Multi-Family Dwelling - Complete Damage 1 wMFE Weight for Multi-Family Dwelling - Extensive Damage 0.9 wMFM Weight for Multi-Family Dwelling - Moderate Damage 0 wSFC Weight for Single Family Dwelling - Complete Damage 1 wSFE Weight for Single Family Dwelling - Extensive Damage 0 wSFM Weight for Single Family Dwelling - Moderate Damage 0 Needs Assessments for Shelter Planning The estimated shelter seeking population is used to calculate the hazard generated demand for shelter planning. Again, these numbers consider only shelter seeking population due to structural damage. Needs assessments are provided for the following three planning periods: day 1, days 13, and days 1-7. The peak shelter population estimate is used to calculate the assessments for all three periods. The following sections explain the calculation parameters. Table 8 provides the default requirements, values, and source of the value used in the calculations. Note: The default values can be changed for comparison purposes. 202 Table 8: Needs Assessments for Shelter Seeking Population Shelter space total • • 480 square foot per person (this includes space for all shelter related infrastructure) Source: The Sphere Project (2004) Sleeping space • • 60 square foot per person Source: The Sphere Project (2004), Abou-Samra Cots and Blankets • • 1 per person Source: The Sphere Project (2004), Abou-Samra Toilets Toilets • 1 toilet per 40 persons • Source: The Sphere Project (2004) Sinks • • 1 per 80 persons Source: The Sphere Project (2004) Garbage Refuse Containers (30 gallon containers) • 1 for every 50 persons • Source: Abou-Samra, The Sphere Project (2004) Ice Water Drinking water: • 1 gallon per person per day • Source: Sphere, Abou-Samra, USACE (2005) Water for washing and personal hygiene: • 2 gallon per person per day • Source: The Sphere Project (2004) Other water requirements (e.g. cooking, etc.): • 2 gallon per person per day • Source: The Sphere Project (2004) Calculation of truck loads • 4750 gallons per truck load • Source: USACE (2005) Food Estimated Calories • 2,000 Calories per person day • Source: National Research Council (1989) Fresh Food (if calories are provided by fresh food) • 3 pounds per person per day • Source: The Sphere Project (2004) MRE: • 2 MRE per person per day • Source: USACE (2005) Truck loads for MRE • 21744 MRE per truck load • Source: USACE (2005) • 8 pounds of ice per person (1 bag) • Source: USACE (2005) Calculation of truck loads • 5,000 bags / 40,000 pounds per truck • Source: USACE (2005) Shelter staffing requirements are highly dependent on the size of the shelters and other planning numbers. For these calculations, we assume an average shelter size of 200 people. The ARC uses detailed staffing algorithms to estimate personnel needs. Here, we simply use averaged numbers based on the ARC calculations for a 200 person shelter. The calculated number includes personnel on different levels (from management to manual labor). • • • Staff to run shelters: 10 people Staff to feed people: 4 people Staff for bulk distribution: 8 people An estimation of the number of displaced people with the seven most prevalent chronic illnesses is also calculated. By combining estimates of the displaced population and the prevalence of 203 chronic conditions within a state (DeVol & Bedroussian, 2007), an estimation of the chronic cases of cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, stroke, mental disorders, and pulmonary conditions was calculated. This estimate gives planners an approximation of the chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Direct Economic Loss Module Direct economic losses are the economic impacts that result form direct damage to infrastructure. Each of the three main infrastructure categories has direct economic loss estimates: buildings, transportation lifelines, and utility lifelines. Building losses include structural and nonstructural losses, contents losses, and various other capital and business interruption losses. Transportation and utility lifelines include losses of infrastructure value only. No capital stock or business interruption losses are considered. There is a module for indirect economic losses that results from a lack of service and operational capabilities of businesses, in terms of employment and dollar value, though this is not included in this report. References Abou-Samra, Omar. Personal Conversation. Senior Associate, Mass Care, ARC. Erberik, M.A. and Elnashai, A.S. (2006). Loss estimation analysis of flat-slab structures, American Society of Civil Engineers – Natural Hazards Review, 7 (1), 26-37. DeVol, R., & Bedroussian, A. (2007). An unhealthy America: the economic burden of chronic disease -- charting a new course to save lives and increase productivity and economic growth. Santa Monica, CA: Milken Institute. National Research Council (1989). Subcommittee on the Tenth Edition of the Recommended Dietary Allowances, Food and Nutrition Board, Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC. Sphere Project, The (2004): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Response, The Sphere Project, Geneva, Switzerland. USACE: Logistics Technical Bulletin (2005): Vol. 1 (1), State of Florida, Unified Logistics Section, State Emergency Response Team, Tallahassee, FL. 204 Appendix V: Detailed Earthquake Impact Assessment Results The results presented in this appendix are a more comprehensive account of the information contained in the main body of this report. Each state is discussed individually and results are not summed over all states because different scenarios are employed for each. Only damage and functionality losses experienced by infrastructure are explained herein. All social and economic losses caused by damage to infrastructure are dealt with in appendix VI. Damage and loss of functionality are shown for both critical counties and statewide totals. Building damage is detailed by occupancy class. Essential facilities damage and functionality loss are shown for all facility types. Transportation lifeline impacts are illustrated for bridges primarily, though other critical transportation infrastructure types are included. Utility lifelines damage is illustrated with facility and network damage figures. Maps of damage and functionality of various infrastructure components are not illustrated here, though are presented in another appendix. Numerous tables are provided to illustrate damage and functionality levels of various infrastructure items in each state. Additionally, damage and functionality results for both scenarios in Alabama and Indiana are presented herein. 205 Alabama – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 67 counties in the State of Alabama. Alabama is approximately 51,700 square miles and is bordered by Tennessee to the north, Florida and the Gulf of Mexico to the south, Georgia to the east and Mississippi to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 12 critical counties have been identified in the northwestern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These critical counties are listed and are a primary focus in this impact assessment: • • • • Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin • • • • Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone • • • • Marion Morgan Walker Winston The New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario for the State of Alabama is comprised of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) event along the southwest segment on the middle fault in the New Madrid fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northeast, central and southwest. The worst-case scenario for the state of Alabama, the critical counties in particular, is an event on the eastern fault line in the southwest segment. The location of this scenario event is illustrated in Figure 1. For more information on the hazard employed in this scenario please reference Appendix I. Figure 1: Presumed Seismic Zone Boundaries 206 Buildings in Alabama are classified in two separate ways for damage estimates; by building use, termed “occupancy,” and structure type/material, termed “building type.” Damage to Alabama buildings is illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2 for the state and the critical counties, respectively, by occupancy. Residential structures are the most prevalent occupancy type in the State of Alabama and also incur the most cases of damage. Nearly 98% of all moderate and severe damage occurs in single family home and ‘other residential’ occupancy categories. There are no cases of complete damage which is defined by damage to critical structural connections and significant lateral displacements of structural systems. Cases of partial or complete collapse are rare, though in most cases result in uninhabitable structures. Shaking from a New Madrid event is not as intense as in other states closer to the fault and damage in Alabama, and even the critical counties, is not as catastrophic as a result. For definitions of each damage level please refer Appendix VII. Table 1: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Alabama General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Buildings Severe Damage 1,303,224 354,031 18,249 2,048 2,014 1,679,566 539 5,581 119 20 9 6,268 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 2: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 12 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (12 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage 183,790 358 0 Single Family 57,508 2,490 0 Other Residential 1,630 57 0 Commercial 293 13 0 Industrial 198 5 0 Other 243,419 2,923 0 Total Building damage is also described by building type, and in Alabama the most common building type is wood construction. Typically wood construction shows damage in proportion to the quantity of wood buildings, though due to the low level of shaking and relative flexibility of wood frame structures a very small proportion of Alabama wood frame buildings incur moderate or severe damage. Roughly 120 of the nearly 6,300 moderate and severe damage cases are wood frame. Mobile homes, which represent a much smaller portion of Alabama buildings, less than 20%, represent over 85% of the moderate and severe damage cases. This equates to 5,465 moderately or severely damaged mobile homes. Unreinforced masonry (URM) structures are also vulnerable to 207 the moderate levels of shaking Alabama’s critical counties, in particular. Though URMs comprise only 5% of all Alabama buildings they account for roughly 550 moderately or severely damaged structures. Concrete, steel and reinforced masonry construction types represent considerably fewer cases of damage. Many cases of damage occur in the 12 critical counties, though other northern Alabama counties also experience instances of moderate damage. Table 3: Building Damage by Building Type for State of Alabama Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 1,258,071 11,399 3,156 857 5,178 74,050 278,809 1,631,520 6,679 439 100 28 70 3,436 31,026 41,778 120 97 23 10 24 506 5,417 6,197 0 3 0 1 1 18 48 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Even the most intense shaking in northwestern Alabama counties is not severe enough to generate many cases of damage to essential facilities. This damage state is identified by significant cracking to unreinforced masonry walls as well as some connection damage to column/beam joints in unreinforced masonry building. Liquefaction susceptibility data was not available when this scenario was completed and thus damage estimates may be slightly lower than if this liquefaction data were incorporated. Critical facilities remain largely unaffected by the New Madrid event with no cases of moderate or more severe damage and very limited loss of functionality the day after the earthquake, as shown in Table 4. These facilities will be equipped to treat injured persons and provide emergency services in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Most transportation facilities remain undamaged for this NMSZ event. Highway bridges and roadways show no moderate or severe damage and no considerable loss of functionality immediately after the event. The same is true for railway facilities and rail lines as well as airports and their respective runways. Port facilities show that 38 facilities will not be operational immediately after the earthquake and are likely to remain as such for at least a week. 208 Table 4: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality1 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality Total No. At Least Complete Total No. Facilities Moderate Damage Facilities (12 Critical Damage (Damage > (State) Counties) (Damage >50%) 50%) 137 19 0 0 1,870 270 0 0 27 3 0 0 496 78 0 0 1,388 250 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 137 1,870 27 496 1,388 Table 5: Damage to Highway Bridges 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Bridges (Damage > 50%) (Damage > 50%) 2,366 0 0 12,231 0 0 14,597 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,366 12,231 14,597 Table 6: Damage to Airports 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Airports (Damage > 50%) (Damage > 50%) 55 0 0 414 0 0 469 0 0 1 Functionality >50% at Day 1 55 414 469 For Tables 4-13 in this appendix the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 209 Table 7: Transportation System Damage for the State of Alabama Transportatio n System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Type Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Tunnels Facilities Facilities Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Quantity Damage (Damage> (Damage>50%) 50%) 4,897 0 0 14,597 0 0 0 0 0 2,678 0 0 118 0 0 9 0 0 109 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 321 0 0 469 0 0 292 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 4,897 14,597 0 2,678 118 9 109 24 0 0 0 0 274 469 292 As with transportation lifelines, utility lifelines remain largely unaffected by a NMSZ event. All utility facilities are operational the day after the earthquake and do not show any form of significant damage. While there is no appreciable damage to utility facilities, utility networks do experience some damage. Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not part of the default inventory, or local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added from HSIP 2007 to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are comprised of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 180 and 722, respectively, as shown in Table 14. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.01 leaks/mile (1 leak every 100 miles) and 0.003 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 333 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 613 leaks and 153 breaks over the combined length of 59,263 miles of natural gas pipeline. Table 8: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage > 50%) (Damage > 50%) 12 Critical Counties 7 0 0 Remaining Counties 23 0 0 30 0 0 Total State 210 Functionality >50% at Day 1 7 23 30 Table 9: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Water Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 12 Critical Counties 63 0 0 63 Remaining Counties 347 0 0 347 410 0 0 410 Total State Table 10: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality Natural Gas Damage Damage >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 60 0 0 60 308 0 0 308 368 0 0 368 Table 11: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Oil Functionality Damage Damage Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 12 Critical Counties 5 0 0 5 Remaining Counties 107 0 0 107 112 0 0 112 Total State Table 12: Damage to Electric Power Facilities 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality Electric Power Damage Damage >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 98 0 0 98 1,327 0 0 1,327 1,425 0 0 1,425 Table 13: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 12 Critical Counties 2,207 0 0 2,207 Remaining Counties 13,134 0 0 13,134 15,341 0 0 15,341 Total State 211 Potable water service is expected to be retained for all residences the day after the scenario earthquake. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. Though the number of leaks and breaks may appear to be a large number, they are spread across many miles of pipeline, resulting in no interruptions in service as shown in Table 15. These damage estimates are very low compared to damage sustained by the same types of pipe in other states exposed to the NMSZ event. Without liquefaction information incorporated for the majority of the state it is difficult to calculate damage to underground pipelines. The permanent ground deformation calculated from liquefaction susceptibility is a critical factor in determining breaks and leaks to pipelines. For improved estimates of utility service outages, more liquefaction susceptibility information must be used. Table 14: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 200,893 120,536 8,558 50,705 2,913 No. Leaks 722 571 3 610 1 No. Breaks 180 143 1 152 0 Table 15: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 0 0 0 0 Potable Water 1,737,080 0 0 0 0 Electric Power Day 90 0 0 A NOTE ON THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE: The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. The following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for the same infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (1) and employed in damage estimates for 212 the preceding tables. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Colbert County, Alabama – 10 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 1: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 0 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 1 at least moderately damaged waste water facility In the case of Colbert County, Alabama, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a higher estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (1). Though not illustrated here, it is possible to have a case where the point-by-point damage estimation procedure in footnote (1) predicts greater damage than the estimation procedure employed in the topic damage tables in this appendix. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 12 critical counties in Alabama shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 3 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 0 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces greater damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this section of the appendix for the NMSZ scenario in Alabama. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Alabama. These tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 213 Table 16: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Colbert Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Cullman Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Fayette Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Franklin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lamar Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lauderdale Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lawrence Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 16,434 2,873 129 41 17 1,135 460 30 6 4 77 140 12 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,649 3,476 172 50 23 22,631 7,743 214 15 24 79 743 6 0 1 3 91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22,713 8,577 221 15 25 4,794 1,121 18 12 2 448 514 7 5 1 31 262 3 2 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,274 1,903 28 19 3 8,161 1,974 50 15 3 303 484 6 1 0 20 207 2 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,485 2,670 58 16 3 3,916 878 12 8 3 444 665 5 3 1 30 365 2 2 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,391 1,917 19 13 4 26,861 3,799 206 22 26 1,814 1,009 60 6 4 123 427 24 3 1 4 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,802 5,245 292 31 31 9,354 3,938 32 4 6 33 387 1 0 0 1 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,388 4,373 33 4 6 214 Total Counties Limestone Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Marion Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Morgan Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Walker Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Winston Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 19,418 4,219 103 2 23 68 391 3 0 1 3 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19,489 4,658 106 2 24 7,618 2,735 40 13 7 411 795 8 3 1 28 357 3 1 1 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,058 3,895 51 17 9 33,621 6,412 356 75 41 117 552 10 2 1 5 67 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,743 7,031 367 77 42 18,950 8,565 226 8 20 66 832 6 0 0 3 102 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19,019 9,499 233 8 20 6,430 3,146 38 34 6 325 782 9 4 0 22 327 4 1 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,778 4,262 51 39 6 215 Total Table 17: Hospital Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Total # of Beds 313 215 183 133 0 372 98 101 128 715 267 99 Day 1 # of % Beds 212 67.70 196 91.10 124 67.70 106 79.40 N/A N/A 251.84 67.7 89.278 91.1 92.011 91.1 102 79.40 651 91.10 243 91.10 67 67.70 Day 3 # of % Beds 213 68.20 196 91.30 125 68.20 106 79.75 N/A N/A 253.7 68.2 89.474 91.3 92.213 91.3 102 79.75 653 91.30 244 91.30 68 68.20 Day 7 # of % Beds 282 90.10 212 98.40 165 90.10 125 94.25 N/A N/A 335.17 90.1 96.432 98.4 99.384 98.4 121 94.25 704 98.40 263 98.40 89 90.10 Day 30 # of % Beds 312 99.70 215 99.90 182 99.70 133 99.80 N/A N/A 370.88 99.7 97.902 99.9 100.9 99.9 128 99.80 714 99.90 267 99.90 99 99.70 Day 90 # of % Beds 312 99.80 215 99.90 183 99.80 133 99.85 N/A N/A 371.26 99.8 97.902 99.9 100.9 99.9 128 99.85 714 99.90 267 99.90 99 99.80 * Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentage of beds may occur due to rounding. Table 18: Police Station Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Count 9 5 3 5 5 9 6 5 8 9 9 5 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 61.28 94.10 65.97 77.22 51.90 75.34 94.10 94.10 73.00 94.10 94.10 85.66 216 Table 19: School Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Count 26 37 7 13 7 28 16 26 18 46 33 13 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 70.47 94.10 65.97 80.03 51.90 64.88 94.10 94.10 76.72 94.10 94.10 77.87 Table 20: Fire Station Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Count 20 53 13 14 10 23 11 20 12 34 26 14 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 75.11 94.10 61.64 73.00 51.90 70.25 94.10 94.10 73.00 94.10 94.10 79.03 Table 21: Communication Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Facilities 315 272 52 107 50 217 107 184 131 442 245 85 At day 1 (%) 94.44 99.50 98.89 97.67 94.33 95.23 99.50 99.50 95.27 99.50 99.50 99.50 At day 3 (%) 99.10 99.90 99.80 99.61 99.08 99.22 99.90 99.90 99.23 99.90 99.90 99.90 217 At day 7 (%) 99.50 99.90 99.85 99.76 99.49 99.56 99.90 99.90 99.56 99.90 99.90 99.90 At day 30 (%) 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 At day 90 (%) 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 Table 22: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Households 22,461 30,706 7,493 12,259 6,468 36,088 13,538 24,688 12,697 43,602 28,364 10,107 At day 1 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 3 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 7 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 30 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 23: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Facilities 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 None (%) 50.0% 89.8% 89.8% N/A N/A N/A 89.8% 89.8% N/A N/A N/A N/A Slight (%) 37.6% 9.4% 9.4% N/A N/A N/A 9.4% 9.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A 218 Moderate (%) 11.4% 0.7% 0.7% N/A N/A N/A 0.7% 0.7% N/A N/A N/A N/A Extensive (%) 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% N/A N/A N/A 0.0% 0.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A Complete (%) 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% N/A N/A N/A 0.0% 0.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 24: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Length (miles) 1,510 2,412 1,359 1,491 1,412 2,088 1,454 1,591 1,857 1,752 2,235 1,468 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 8 2 13 3 7 2 16 4 22 5 11 3 8 2 9 2 28 7 10 2 12 3 8 2 Table 25: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Households 22,461 30,706 7,493 12,259 6,468 36,088 13,538 24,688 12,697 43,602 28,364 10,107 At day 1 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 3 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 219 At day 7 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 30 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 26: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Facilities 10 9 2 5 5 2 4 5 5 8 7 1 None (%) 54.0% 89.8% 89.8% 65.9% 65.9% 50.0% 89.8% 89.8% 65.9% 89.8% 89.8% 89.8% Slight (%) 34.8% 9.4% 9.4% 26.3% 26.3% 37.6% 9.4% 9.4% 26.3% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% Moderate (%) 10.3% 0.7% 0.7% 7.1% 7.1% 11.4% 0.7% 0.7% 7.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% Extensive (%) 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Complete (%) 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Table 27: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Length (miles) 906 1,447 816 895 847 1,253 872 955 1,114 1,051 1,341 881 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 7 2 10 3 6 1 13 3 17 4 9 2 6 2 7 2 22 5 8 2 10 2 6 2 220 Table 28: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Bridges 131 230 162 182 172 227 211 299 232 239 196 85 None (%) 97.19% 98.28% 97.66% 97.18% 98.68% 96.76% 98.33% 97.10% 98.12% 97.81% 96.28% 97.74% Slight (%) 1.93% 1.15% 1.72% 2.00% 0.99% 2.28% 1.08% 1.96% 1.32% 1.37% 2.50% 1.62% Moderate (%) 0.54% 0.35% 0.38% 0.51% 0.19% 0.60% 0.36% 0.59% 0.34% 0.50% 0.77% 0.40% Extensive (%) 0.28% 0.18% 0.19% 0.26% 0.11% 0.30% 0.19% 0.30% 0.18% 0.27% 0.38% 0.20% Complete (%) 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.05% 0.03% Table 29: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston # of Bridges 131 230 162 182 172 227 211 299 232 239 196 85 At day 1 (%) 98.75 99.20 99.02 98.78 99.43 98.60 99.19 98.69 99.17 98.94 98.33 99.02 At day 3 (%) 99.39 99.58 99.55 99.42 99.72 99.34 99.56 99.35 99.58 99.42 99.19 99.53 221 At day 7 (%) 99.61 99.72 99.70 99.63 99.80 99.58 99.70 99.59 99.72 99.62 99.49 99.69 At day 30 (%) 99.64 99.74 99.72 99.66 99.81 99.62 99.73 99.63 99.74 99.65 99.54 99.72 At day 90 (%) 99.78 99.82 99.81 99.78 99.86 99.76 99.82 99.76 99.82 99.78 99.72 99.81 Alabama – East Tennessee Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 67 counties in the State of Alabama. For the purposes of this analysis, 13 critical counties have been identified in the northeastern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 13 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document, though it is possible for damage to occur outside these 13 counties. The critical counties are listed below: • Blount • Calhoun • Cherokee • Dekalb • Etowah • Jackson • Jefferson • Limestone • Madison • Marshall • Morgan • Saint Clair • Talladega Please note, the critical counties chosen for the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ) scenario are different then those used in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) scenario. Counties closest to the seismic source are considered critical, thus the ETSZ critical counties are located in the northeastern portion of Alabama, while NMSZ critical counties are located in the northwestern portion of Alabama. For names and locations of critical counties in each scenario event please reference the main section of this report and the damage and functionality maps in another appendix. The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Alabama employs one scenario event in Dekalb County. The scenario consists of a Mw5.9 earthquake in the East Tennessee Seismic Zone (ETSZ). The epicenter location as well as all soil and liquefaction data were provided by the Geologic Survey of Alabama (GSA) and shown in Figure 2. A set of five attenuation functions was used to generate ground motion. The attenuations and weighting factors are listed below: Atkinson and Boore (1997) Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) Campbell (2002) Sommerville, Collins, Abrahamson et al. (2002) 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 It is relevant to note that the attenuation from Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) can not be computed for a magnitude of 5.9. The attenuation only applies to earthquakes with magnitudes of 6.0 or greater. In order to determine regional ground shaking with this attenuation a magnitude of 6.0 was used. The four remaining attenuations employed a magnitude 5.9, as prescribed by GSA. This change does not impact the intensity of regional shaking significantly and is acceptable for the purposes of this assessment. 222 Figure 2: Location of Mw5.9 Earthquake The East Tennessee Seismic Zone scenario generates nearly 550 cases of complete damage, unlike the New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario. All of these cases of complete damage occur nearest the epicenter in DeKalb, Etowah and Jackson Counties. Table 30 and Table 31 report at least moderate damage which includes moderate to severe damage and complete damage. All of the damage estimates for the at least moderate damage case include complete damage. Since there are no cases of complete damage in the NMSZ scenario for Alabama the moderate to severe damage level can be considered at least moderate and compared to the building damage shown here for the ETSZ scenario. Table 30: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Alabama General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 1,303,224 354,031 18,249 2,048 2,014 1,679,566 2,431 3,241 61 48 5 5,786 410 127 5 2 0 544 The ETSZ scenario generates nearly 5,800 cases of at least moderate damage across the entire state. This is approximately 500 fewer cases than the NMSZ scenario. Nearly all damaged structures are located in the 13 critical counties, though less than half of the structural damage in the NMSZ scenario is confined to the critical counties. As with the previous scenario for Alabama, nearly all damage, roughly 98%, is incurred by 223 residential structures. The remaining 2% is attributed to commercial, industrial and other buildings which include government, educational, religious and agricultural buildings. Wood construction accounts for 45% of all building damage in this earthquake scenario. Additionally, mobile homes (MH) consist of 47 % of the damages cases, while unreinforced masonry (URM) account for 8% of all building damage. Concrete, steel and reinforced masonry construction types represent considerably fewer cases of damage. Table 31: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 13 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (13 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 535,829 106,769 10,454 815 777 654,644 2,427 3,216 60 48 5 5,756 410 127 5 2 0 544 Table 32: Building Damage by Building Type for State of Alabama Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 1,255,446 11,814 3,247 879 5,234 76,394 305,185 1,658,199 7,365 64 16 8 19 1,127 6,983 15,582 1,596 42 11 5 14 371 2,675 4,714 69 14 4 2 5 81 352 527 394 4 2 0 3 38 105 546 Numerous essential facilities experience moderate or significant damage from the scenario earthquake. There are 12 fire stations in northeastern Alabama that incur at least moderate damage and 22 facilities are not operational the day after the event. Several police stations and schools are damaged and not functional immediately after the event which is likely to inhibit the emergency response in these heavily damaged areas of northeastern Alabama. Table 33 illustrates essential facilities damage throughout the state, while Table 34 shows damage for the 13 critical counties only. 224 Table 33: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Alabama2 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 137 1 0 136 1,870 8 0 1,856 27 0 0 27 496 6 0 485 1,388 12 0 1,366 Table 34: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for 13 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (13 Critical Counties) At Least Moderate Essential Facility Total No. Complete Damage Functionality Damage Type Facilities (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) 48 1 0 47 Hospitals 698 8 0 690 Schools 8 0 0 7 EOCs 161 6 0 150 Police Stations 419 12 0 397 Fire Stations Damage to transportation facilities and networks is very limited even though the ETSZ scenario produces more intense shaking in portions of northeastern Alabama. Only one highway bridge incurs moderate damage and only one bridge is not operational the day after the earthquake. All airports are undamaged and remain operational immediately after the earthquake, as do all railway and bus facilities. Numerous ports show reduced functionality the day after the earthquake as 47 ports are not operational. The same inventory used in the Alabama NMSZ scenario was employed in this scenario and thus the same updates from HSIP 2007 apply. Table 35: Damage to Highway Bridges Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Damage Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 13 Critical Counties 4,014 1 0 Remaining Counties 10,583 0 0 14,597 1 0 Total State 2 Functionality > 50% at Day 1 4,013 10,583 14,596 For Tables 33-43 in this appendix the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 225 Table 36: Damage to Airports Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Damage Airports (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 13 Critical Counties 115 0 0 Remaining Counties 354 0 0 469 0 0 Total State Functionality > 50% at Day 1 115 354 469 Table 37: Transportation System Damage for State of Alabama Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Type Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Tunnels Facilities Facilities Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage >50%) >50%) 4,897 0 0 14,597 1 0 0 0 0 2,678 0 0 118 0 0 9 0 0 109 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 321 0 0 469 0 0 292 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 4,897 14,596 0 2,678 118 9 109 24 0 0 0 0 274 469 292 Utility lifelines show more substantial damage to networks than their facility counterparts. Very few facilities are moderately damaged. Potable water, waste water and electric power facilities incur a total of four moderately damaged facilities nearest the epicenter. Communication facilities incur numerous cases of damage in northeastern Alabama. Over 162 facilities are moderately damaged though this only equates to 3% of all facilities in the critical counties and roughly 1% of all communication facilities in the State of Alabama. The functionality of utility facilities in Alabama is largely unchanged by the earthquake in the ETSZ. Several facilities nearest the epicenter are not operational the day after the earthquake, though the majority of the state retains its services. 226 Table 38: Damage to Potable Water Facilities 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality > Potable Water Damage Damage 50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 14 1 0 13 16 0 0 16 30 1 0 29 Table 39: Damage to Waste Water Facilities 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality > Potable Water Damage Damage 50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage > 50%) 130 2 0 125 280 0 0 280 410 2 0 405 Table 40: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 13 Critical Counties 100 0 0 100 Remaining Counties 268 0 0 268 368 0 0 368 Total State Table 41: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 13 Critical Counties 38 0 0 38 Remaining Counties 74 0 0 74 112 0 0 112 Total State Table 42: Damage to Electric Power Facilities 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality > Electric Power Damage Damage 50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 395 1 0 394 1,030 0 0 1,030 1,425 1 0 1,424 227 Table 43: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Functionality > Communication Damage Damage 50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 13 Critical Counties 5,180 162 0 5,149 Remaining Counties 10,161 0 0 10,161 15,341 162 0 15,310 Total State Pipelines incur several hundred leaks and breaks throughout the state. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 71 and 188, respectively. In addition, waste water lines show an estimated 149 leaks and 56 breaks, over nearly 75,000 miles of pipe. Regional natural gas and oil pipelines show no breaks and leaks. The lack of damage to regional pipelines is likely due to the low levels of shaking throughout the majority of the state. In addition, regions with more intense shaking near the epicenter are also comprised of very stable soils that are unlikely to liquefy. Without substantial ground deformation pipelines are unlikely to break. With very little damage to potable water lines the number of households without water, even immediately after the event, is very low. Electric power, however, is out for nearly 7,400 households in northeastern Alabama. Numerous households have service restored within a week, though roughly 1,700 households are still without power. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. Table 44: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 124,755 74,853 5,306 4,990 1,809 No. Leaks 188 149 0 159 0 No. Breaks 71 56 0 60 0 Table 45: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 7,389 4,367 1,715 349 Electric Power 1,737,080 0 0 0 0 Potable Water Day 90 10 0 A NOTE ON THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE: The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify 228 damage based on the likelihood of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. The following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (2) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Dekalb County, Alabama – 7 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 2: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 1 at least moderately damaged waste water facility o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 2 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities In the case of Dekalb County, Alabama, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a higher estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (2). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Alabama are estimated to incur greater damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 13 critical counties in Alabama shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 5 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 2 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities 229 Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces greater damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix for the ETSZ scenario in Alabama. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the ETSZ scenario critical counties in Alabama. These tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 230 Table 46: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Blount Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Calhoun Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Cherokee Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dekalb Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Etowah Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jackson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jefferson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 13,876 5,988 4,401 10 31 25 126 41 0 0 1 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,902 6,121 4,445 10 31 33,821 9,256 345 71 37 112 352 4 1 0 4 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,937 9,634 349 72 37 5,611 2,422 32 2 10 1,417 1,311 5 0 2 242 912 2 0 1 10 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,280 4,714 39 2 13 10,799 3,405 58 20 10 4,909 2,074 40 19 5 1,562 1,440 36 31 3 123 299 9 15 1 10 37 1 2 0 17,403 7,255 144 87 19 31,942 6,136 290 22 31 403 513 10 0 1 18 60 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 262 33 2 0 0 32,625 6,742 303 22 32 14,666 5,067 96 9 14 664 959 8 1 1 35 187 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 138 57 2 0 0 15,504 6,271 108 10 15 206,275 17,315 2,940 216 310 86 82 6 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 206,364 17,400 2,946 216 311 231 Counties Limestone Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Madison Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Marshall Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Morgan Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Clair Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Talladega Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 19,471 4,611 106 2 24 17 45 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19,489 4,658 106 2 24 93,692 10,713 1,112 204 185 193 206 9 1 1 7 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93,892 10,932 1,122 205 186 24,265 6,561 230 54 21 193 456 7 1 1 7 46 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24,465 7,063 238 55 22 33,701 6,918 365 78 42 40 107 2 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,742 7,031 367 78 42 16,709 9,044 112 38 28 42 214 1 0 0 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16,752 9,271 113 38 28 20,454 9,559 173 18 17 19 113 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,474 9,677 174 18 17 *Note: The summation of the individual buildings damage at different damage levels may not sum to the total amount of buildings damaged; this is due to rounding discrepancies. 232 Table 47: Hospital Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Total # of Beds 40 745 60 134 735 170 5,788 101 991 240 715 82 298 Day 1 Day 3 # of # of % % Beds Beds 40 100.00 40 100.00 744 99.87 744 99.87 52 86.67 52 86.67 22 16.42 23 17.16 689 93.74 690 93.88 164 96.47 165 97.06 5,787 99.98 5,787 99.98 101 100.00 101 100.00 990 99.90 990 99.90 237 98.75 237 98.75 714 99.86 714 99.86 82 100.00 82 100.00 298 100.00 298 100.00 Day 7 # of % Beds 40 100.00 744 99.87 58 96.67 59 44.03 707 96.19 169 99.41 5,787 99.98 101 100.00 990 99.90 240 100.00 714 99.86 82 100.00 298 100.00 Day 30 Day 90 # of # of % % Beds Beds 40 100.00 40 100.00 744 99.87 744 99.87 60 100.00 60 100.00 121 90.30 127 94.78 710 96.60 713 97.01 170 100.00 170 100.00 5,787 99.98 5,787 99.98 101 100.00 101 100.00 990 99.90 990 99.90 240 100.00 240 100.00 714 99.86 714 99.86 82 100.00 82 100.00 298 100.00 298 100.00 * Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentage of beds may occur due to rounding. Table 48: Communication Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 161 357 85 266 293 229 1,681 184 649 255 442 310 268 99.86 99.68 87.88 69.04 98.54 96.44 99.90 99.90 99.82 99.12 99.89 99.86 99.90 99.90 99.90 96.69 85.51 99.78 99.44 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.87 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 97.81 89.44 99.86 99.69 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.56 97.40 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.85 99.49 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 233 Table 49: Police Station Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Count 7 10 4 14 12 10 46 5 16 9 9 12 7 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 96.43 94.79 41.90 34.67 91.47 79.31 98.89 98.14 96.30 91.06 97.52 96.89 98.20 Table 50: School Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Count 18 45 8 18 46 30 253 26 107 36 46 29 36 234 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 96.92 95.11 45.43 33.26 87.60 79.06 98.95 98.14 96.49 91.83 97.61 96.76 98.05 Table 51: Fire Station Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Count 22 23 13 29 32 27 106 20 46 23 34 23 21 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 96.91 94.54 53.02 35.97 86.42 80.11 98.94 98.26 96.34 91.51 97.48 96.56 98.23 Table 52: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 19,265 45,307 9,719 25,113 41,615 21,615 263,265 24,688 109,955 32,547 43,602 24,143 30,674 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 235 Table 53: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Facilities 3 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 None (%) 95.8% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 82.2% 70.3% 99.7% 99.4% 0.0% 86.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Slight (%) 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.8% 15.9% 24.6% 0.3% 0.6% 0.0% 12.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Moderate (%) 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 43.5% 1.8% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Extensive (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Complete (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Extensive (%) 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 5.7% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Complete (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Table 54: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Facilities 3 6 3 7 9 12 20 5 16 16 8 8 17 None (%) 96.1% 90.9% 27.5% 29.7% 79.7% 68.9% 99.5% 98.6% 96.1% 87.4% 97.6% 96.4% 98.7% Slight (%) 3.7% 8.3% 40.1% 38.8% 17.4% 24.7% 0.5% 1.4% 3.7% 11.4% 2.3% 3.4% 1.3% 236 Moderate (%) 0.2% 0.7% 25.6% 25.1% 2.8% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% Table 55: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Bridges 178 288 159 287 209 270 958 299 567 165 239 163 232 None (%) 99.91% 99.56% 90.66% 89.23% 98.34% 96.41% 99.99% 99.96% 99.84% 99.32% 99.95% 99.88% 99.96% Slight (%) 0.08% 0.42% 6.78% 8.04% 1.48% 3.32% 0.01% 0.03% 0.15% 0.65% 0.05% 0.11% 0.03% Moderate (%) 0.00% 0.01% 0.91% 1.23% 0.04% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Extensive (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.82% 1.07% 0.09% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Complete (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.82% 0.41% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Table 56: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 178 288 159 287 209 270 958 299 567 165 239 163 232 99.96 99.86 95.97 95.59 99.42 98.88 99.97 99.97 99.94 99.78 99.97 99.95 99.98 99.98 99.97 97.95 97.97 99.80 99.75 99.97 99.97 99.97 99.95 99.98 99.97 99.98 99.98 99.97 98.29 98.44 99.82 99.80 99.97 99.97 99.97 99.95 99.98 99.97 99.98 99.98 99.97 98.41 98.60 99.83 99.82 99.97 99.97 99.97 99.95 99.98 99.97 99.98 99.98 99.97 98.88 99.17 99.88 99.88 99.97 99.97 99.97 99.95 99.98 99.97 99.98 237 Table 57: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Length (miles) 1,905 2,344 1,517 2,588 2,052 2,151 5,801 1,591 2,876 1,964 1,752 1,961 2,399 Total Number of Leaks 2 3 32 98 7 14 2 1 3 4 1 2 1 Total Number of Breaks 0 1 8 24 8 21 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 Table 58: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega # of Households 19,265 45,307 9,719 25,113 41,615 21,615 263,265 24,688 109,955 32,547 43,602 24,143 30,674 At day 1 (%) 0.00 0.00 19.31 21.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 3 (%) 0.00 0.00 9.41 13.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 238 At day 7 (%) 0.00 0.00 2.41 5.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 30 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 59: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Length (miles) 1,143 1,407 910 1,553 1,231 1,290 3,480 954 1,726 1,179 1,051 1,177 1,439 Total Number of Leaks 1 2 25 77 5 11 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 239 Total Number of Breaks 0 1 6 19 6 17 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Arkansas – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 75 counties in the State of Arkansas. Arkansas is approximately 53,200 square miles and is bordered by Missouri to the north, Louisiana to the south, Tennessee and Mississippi to the east and Oklahoma to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 34 critical counties have been identified in the northeastern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 34 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. The critical counties are listed below: • • • • • • • • • Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha • • • • • • • • • Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence • • • • • • • • • Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski • • • • • • • Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Figure 3: Scenario Fault Location for the State of Arkansas The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Arkansas employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a Mw7.7 earthquake along the southwest extension of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey 240 (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northern, central and southern. Based on the recommendation of the Arkansas State Geologic Survey the southwest segment of the middle fault is taken as the worst case scenario for the State of Arkansas. As with Alabama, residential structures and wood construction are the most prevalent types on buildings in Arkansas. Of the roughly 50,000 completely damaged buildings 98% are residential structures. Over 70% of all completely damaged buildings are single family homes. An additional 61,500 buildings incur moderate or severe damage. Approximately 60,000 of these buildings are residential structures, which contributes to over 110,000 residential buildings with moderate or more severe damage. All cases of complete damage occur in the 34 critical counties and nearly all moderate and severe damage occurs there as well. With this much damage concentrated in the northeast corner of Arkansas many residents will be displaced. Table 60: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Arkansas General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 936,609 195,818 8,078 1,461 1,169 1,143,135 38,644 21,792 796 155 102 61,489 35,742 13,626 555 174 62 50,159 Table 61: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 34 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (34 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 462,154 93,812 4,406 815 706 561,893 38,342 20,287 781 153 96 59,659 35,742 13,626 555 174 62 50,159 Wood buildings comprise a much greater proportion of total building damage in Arkansas than they did in Alabama. Nearly 60% of all complete damage occurs in wood buildings and over 50% of all moderate and more severe damage cases. Mobile homes and unreinforced masonry contribute almost entirely to the remaining damage. Roughly 30,000 cases of at least moderate damage are attributed to mobile homes and another 20,000 attributed to unreinforced masonry buildings. Steel, concrete, precast concrete and reinforced masonry contribute only a small portion of damage cases at each severity level, largely due to the lack of inventory. 241 Table 62: Building Damage by Building Type for State of Arkansas Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 718,424 2,398 776 820 444 96,398 115,965 935,225 58,893 295 92 97 35 13,474 23,376 96,262 22,688 218 58 89 33 7,340 12,704 43,130 6,744 152 47 53 28 4,011 7,324 18,359 28,425 332 81 100 65 9,334 11,822 50,159 Essential facilities include hospitals, schools, emergency operation centers (EOCs), police stations and fire stations. The severe shaking in eastern Arkansas counties generates numerous cases of damage to essential facilities. Of the 1,330 fire stations in the State of Arkansas, 151 are at least moderately damaged with 63 of those being completely damaged. All of these damaged facilities are located in the 34 critical counties in the northeast portion of the state. Nearly 200 school and 100 police stations are at least moderately damage. This equates to roughly 15% of all schools and 20% of all police stations in Arkansas. The operational capabilities of essential facilities are also reduced, particularly in the 34 critical counties. Within northeastern Arkansas alone, nearly 200 fire stations and 250 schools are not functioning the day after the earthquake. Additionally, over 100 police stations are not operational. Limited functionality of facilities will likely limit the emergency services provided by firefighters and law enforcement officers in the chaotic aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake. Furthermore, schools that are frequently used as public shelters will not be available in some of the heavily damaged areas. Table 63: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Arkansas 3 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (State) At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Facilities Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 103 18 10 1,254 188 106 11 1 1 515 94 43 1,330 151 63 3 Functionality >50% at Day 1 63 995 10 398 1,139 For Tables 63-73 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 242 Table 64: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 34 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (34 Critical Counties) At Least Complete Essential Facility Total No. Moderate Functionality Damage Type Facilities >50% at Day 1 Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 49 18 10 10 Hospitals 613 188 106 353 Schools 5 1 1 4 EOCs 267 94 43 150 Police Stations 575 151 63 384 Fire Stations Damage to transportation lifelines is most substantial in northeast Arkansas and the 34 critical counties. Nearly 700 bridges incur at least moderate damage while nearly 300 of those are completely damaged. Nearly 700 bridges are not functioning at full capacity immediately after the earthquake due to the extensive structural damage to bridges in the areas of most intense shaking. The remaining bridges are largely unaffected. Airport damage follows a trend similar to that of bridges. All damaged airport facilities are located in the critical counties, with 36 at least moderately damaged airports. In addition, numerous ports and railway facilities in the northeast portion of the state are damaged and not functioning in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Table 65: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Bridges Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,883 688 290 2,751 0 0 5,634 688 290 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,197 2,751 4,948 Table 66: Airport Damage Assessments 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Airports Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 172 36 5 142 0 0 314 36 5 243 Functionality >50% at Day 1 156 142 298 Table 67: Transportation System Damage for State of Arkansas Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage >50%) >50%) Segments 2,808 0 0 Bridges 5,634 688 290 Tunnels 2 0 0 Segments 3,460 0 0 Bridges 48 4 0 Tunnels 0 0 0 Facilities 68 14 0 Facilities 16 1 0 Segments 0 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 0 0 0 Facilities 1 1 1 Facilities 99 17 7 Facilities 314 36 5 Runways 238 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 2,808 4,948 2 3,460 44 0 58 16 0 0 0 0 88 298 238 Communication and waste water facilities incur the most cases of damage with approximately 60 at least moderately damaged facilities each. All cases of damage occur in the critical counties, severely inhibiting the operation of these facilities and other utility facilities in the same area. Nearly 125 waste water facilities are not operating the day after the earthquake. Another 30 communication facilities and 10 electric power facilities are not functioning over the same period of time. This loss of functionality will inhibit the services provided to residents in the areas with the most sever damage. Table 68: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 34 Critical Counties 31 2 1 Remaining Counties 38 0 0 69 2 1 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 29 38 67 Table 69: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Waste Damage Damage Water Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 34 Critical Counties 229 66 6 Remaining Counties 182 0 0 411 66 6 Total State 244 Functionality >50% at Day 1 105 182 287 Table 70: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 34 Critical Counties 18 2 0 16 Remaining Counties 79 0 0 79 97 2 0 95 Total State Table 71: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 34 Critical Counties 5 2 0 2 Remaining Counties 5 0 0 5 10 2 0 7 Total State Table 72: Damage to Electric Power Facilities 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Electric Power Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 29 8 1 27 0 0 56 8 1 Functionality >50% at Day 1 18 27 45 Table 73: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Communication Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 34 Critical Counties 284 59 5 Remaining Counties 341 0 0 625 59 5 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 253 341 594 There are several hundred thousand miles of local distribution lines in the State of Arkansas and many networks in the critical counties are severely impacted. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at over 29,500 and 19,500, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however; show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.22 leaks/mile (1 leak every 4.6 miles) or 0.32 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 3.1 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 16,756 leaks and 26,481 breaks over the combined length of 86,153 miles of natural gas pipeline. 245 Potable water service is cut off for over 175,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to 171,200 residences within a week and nearly 80,000 customers are still without service after three months. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. This period of time without water prevents tens of thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with about 95,000 service outages the day after the earthquake, or over 9% of all state residences. Even a month after the earthquake over 13,500 residences are still without power. Electric power lines are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. Table 74: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 191,084 114,650 9,719 76,434 2,171 No. Leaks 19,677 15,563 393 16,636 89 No. Breaks 29,763 23,540 1,317 25,164 335 Table 75: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 175,565 174,382 171,216 132,672 Potable Water 1,042,696 95,309 68,561 39,398 13,541 Electric Power Day 90 79,737 112 A NOTE ON THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE: The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in the report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (3) and employed for the preceding damage tables. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: 246 • Mississippi County, Arkansas – 147 Highway Bridges o Estimation procedure according to footnote 3: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 147 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 133 at least moderately damaged highway bridges In the case of Mississippi County, Arkansas, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a lower estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (3). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Arkansas are estimated to incur greater damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges for the 34 critical counties in Arkansas shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 774 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 688 at least moderately damaged highway bridges Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces greater damage when summed for the 34 critical counties. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix for the NMSZ scenario in Arkansas. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Arkansas. These tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of the four damage levels for a county. 247 Table 76: Building Damage by General Occupancy Green (None) Green (Slight) Arkansas Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 6,984 288 14 2 3 950 266 15 2 2 119 322 13 2 3 5 489 9 2 2 0 90 3 0 0 8,058 1,455 54 8 10 Baxter Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 16,077 3,391 119 28 15 102 317 3 1 0 7 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16,186 3,747 122 29 15 Clay Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,726 15 0 0 0 2,883 83 3 1 0 1,356 281 9 2 1 296 306 8 2 1 1,225 234 6 2 0 7,486 919 26 7 2 Cleburne Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 10,485 2,588 80 21 9 227 492 3 1 0 25 182 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,738 3,266 83 22 9 Cleveland Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,615 434 2 1 2 356 367 1 0 0 44 205 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,017 1,011 3 1 2 Craighead Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,179 91 0 0 0 9,693 432 6 2 2 8,301 907 68 12 4 1,726 1,193 135 27 9 6,021 1,974 212 56 18 27,920 4,597 421 97 33 Crittenden Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 3,680 148 1 0 1 5,062 182 4 0 2 1,995 240 21 1 3 434 559 32 3 3 4,371 1,812 74 19 10 15,542 2,941 132 23 19 Counties Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 248 Total Green (None) Green (Slight) Cross Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,647 37 0 0 1 1,994 51 2 0 1 717 215 9 0 2 175 528 12 1 4 1,327 1,169 19 4 7 5,860 2,000 42 5 15 Desha Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 4,565 621 28 8 9 466 323 10 2 3 58 169 4 1 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,092 1,117 42 11 13 Faulkner Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 25,441 6,920 230 83 55 162 599 6 2 1 11 73 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,614 7,592 237 85 56 Fulton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 4,834 1,162 25 13 4 31 113 1 0 0 2 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,867 1,289 26 13 4 Grant Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 4,954 1,668 16 3 2 174 405 0 0 0 20 169 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,149 2,246 16 3 2 Greene Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,181 32 1 0 0 5,117 214 9 0 1 4,281 727 30 2 2 839 828 28 4 2 1,961 760 26 7 1 13,379 2,561 94 13 6 Independence Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 10,526 1,341 61 3 5 1,432 1,079 26 2 2 179 599 11 1 1 8 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,145 3,033 99 6 8 Counties Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 249 Total Green (None) Green (Slight) Izard Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 5,057 1,336 45 5 7 32 131 1 0 0 2 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,091 1,483 46 5 7 Jackson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,218 75 1 0 0 2,082 135 6 0 0 580 312 17 0 1 179 298 13 0 2 1,542 256 17 0 1 6,601 1,076 54 0 4 Jefferson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 24,397 2,288 120 19 25 3,319 1,647 51 9 9 414 895 21 4 3 19 22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,149 4,852 193 32 37 Lawrence Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 3,696 304 2 1 0 1,725 272 4 0 0 427 209 8 1 1 120 74 6 1 1 1,149 79 7 1 1 7,117 938 27 4 3 Lee Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,132 42 0 0 0 1,062 90 1 0 0 296 241 3 0 1 91 233 2 0 0 885 253 3 0 1 3,466 859 9 0 2 Lincoln Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,950 713 9 2 4 401 583 4 1 1 50 325 1 1 1 2 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,403 1,629 14 4 6 Lonoke Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 14,602 1,871 38 8 9 2,531 1,470 20 4 4 307 864 10 4 1 14 176 4 3 0 130 88 1 1 0 17,584 4,469 73 20 14 Counties Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 250 Total Green (None) Green (Slight) Mississippi Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 89 3 0 0 0 636 29 0 0 0 3,231 196 0 0 0 4,251 408 2 0 0 8,327 3,517 108 19 14 16,534 4,153 110 19 14 Monroe Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,565 163 3 1 1 838 194 4 1 1 192 300 7 1 2 50 370 5 1 1 10 66 1 0 0 3,655 1,093 20 4 5 Phillips Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 5,494 394 9 1 2 1,198 247 10 1 2 231 254 12 1 2 52 345 8 1 2 1,417 325 9 2 1 8,392 1,565 48 6 9 Poinsett Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 521 6 0 0 0 1,658 43 0 0 0 1,996 128 2 0 1 1,110 284 5 1 1 3,458 1,433 44 46 5 8,743 1,894 51 47 7 Prairie Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 3,237 187 4 0 3 440 201 4 0 2 55 250 3 1 2 3 382 2 1 2 0 71 1 0 0 3,735 1,091 14 2 9 Pulaski Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 115,814 9,898 1,338 153 238 12,843 3,781 418 61 71 1,564 1,792 171 33 26 71 45 12 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 130,294 15,516 1,939 250 336 Randolph Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 4,493 419 3 1 1 1,661 369 4 1 0 381 224 9 5 1 100 43 6 6 1 470 112 2 2 0 7,105 1,167 24 15 3 Counties Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 251 Total Green (None) Green (Slight) Saint Francis Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 3,129 127 1 0 1 2,936 252 6 3 1 818 674 17 9 1 254 714 12 9 0 1,019 496 8 10 0 8,156 2,263 44 31 3 Sharp Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 7,318 864 39 3 7 720 312 15 1 2 89 151 6 1 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,131 1,330 60 5 10 Stone Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 4,328 1,275 46 7 10 28 125 1 0 0 2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,358 1,415 47 7 10 Van Buren Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 6,875 1,859 41 9 16 44 179 1 0 0 3 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,922 2,060 42 9 16 White Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 16,279 2,723 117 14 9 2,172 1,543 37 7 2 363 1,102 17 4 1 61 427 3 1 0 1,618 681 11 4 1 20,493 6,476 185 30 13 Woodruff Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,035 24 0 0 0 972 66 1 0 0 271 206 3 0 1 84 203 2 1 1 810 210 3 1 2 3,172 709 9 2 4 Counties Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 252 Total Table 77: Hospital Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Day 1 Total # # of of Beds % Beds 74 268 25 25 0 594 152 15 60 149 25 0 129 185 25 133 446 25 0 0 0 193 0 155 0 0 3,888 50 118 0 25 25 438 0 13 258 0 24 0 0 0 0 43 144 24 0 0 88 24 0 213 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 1993 0 0 0 24 24 209 0 17.00 96.40 0.40 96.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.05 96.40 96.40 0.00 0.00 47.70 96.40 0.30 47.70 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.70 0.00 0.00 51.26 0.40 0.40 0.00 96.40 96.40 47.70 0.00 Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds 13 259 0 24 0 0 0 0 43 144 24 0 0 89 24 0 215 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 2015 0 0 0 24 24 212 0 29 266 1 25 0 0 0 0 52 148 25 0 0 136 25 3 328 1 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 0 2934 1 3 0 25 25 322 0 64 268 7 25 0 12 2 0 59 149 25 0 3 181 25 30 435 6 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 0 3801 15 34 0 25 25 427 0 69 268 14 25 0 82 17 2 60 149 25 0 18 183 25 58 441 11 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 3845 29 66 0 25 25 433 0 17.50 96.50 0.40 96.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.40 96.50 96.50 0.00 0.00 48.30 96.50 0.30 48.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.10 0.00 0.00 51.82 0.50 0.40 0.00 96.50 96.50 48.30 0.00 253 39.80 99.30 2.60 99.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.45 99.30 99.30 0.00 0.00 73.60 99.30 2.00 73.60 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.80 0.00 0.00 75.47 2.70 2.60 0.00 99.30 99.30 73.60 0.00 86.60 99.90 28.80 99.90 0.00 2.00 1.60 1.60 98.75 99.90 99.90 0.00 2.00 97.60 99.90 22.60 97.60 22.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.00 0.00 0.00 97.77 30.20 29.10 0.00 99.90 99.90 97.60 0.00 93.20 99.90 55.20 99.90 0.00 13.80 10.90 10.90 99.35 99.90 99.90 0.00 13.80 98.80 99.90 43.60 98.80 43.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 69.90 0.00 0.00 98.88 58.10 56.10 0.00 99.90 99.90 98.80 0.00 Table 78: Police Station Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Count 8 6 5 6 3 13 14 4 10 10 4 2 4 2 3 8 12 5 2 4 9 12 6 6 7 4 57 3 8 7 2 3 12 6 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 51.90 94.10 0.56 80.03 51.90 0.09 0.14 0.25 56.12 94.10 94.10 94.10 0.50 51.90 94.10 0.60 51.90 21.12 0.60 51.90 49.58 0.00 34.90 36.85 0.07 51.90 53.74 0.70 0.65 63.96 94.10 94.10 47.08 0.60 254 Table 79: School Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Count 13 10 7 12 5 39 27 7 10 38 5 6 17 20 9 7 40 14 7 3 22 30 5 15 14 5 142 10 13 8 6 8 34 5 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 51.90 94.10 0.43 83.55 51.90 0.06 0.30 0.29 68.78 94.10 94.10 94.10 0.20 51.90 94.10 0.60 51.90 29.39 6.07 51.90 48.72 0.00 31.50 39.86 0.07 51.90 57.37 22.10 0.62 73.00 94.10 94.10 52.38 0.60 255 Table 80: Fire Station Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Count 13 25 11 19 10 24 17 7 9 28 13 11 11 19 12 12 23 14 6 11 23 19 7 12 9 14 68 11 8 17 22 24 40 6 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 51.90 94.10 0.49 82.99 51.90 0.19 0.24 0.21 65.97 94.10 94.10 82.59 0.38 51.22 94.10 0.60 51.90 25.20 0.60 51.90 49.23 0.00 44.61 42.21 0.17 50.04 62.35 32.99 0.61 66.79 94.10 94.10 44.16 0.60 256 Table 81: Communication Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 8 12 5 4 0 18 9 4 4 8 2 9 4 29 2 2 23 8 2 1 6 12 2 7 5 2 62 4 4 3 8 3 11 1 93.20 98.15 59.10 93.20 0.00 50.37 48.64 51.13 98.15 98.15 93.20 95.40 53.30 91.12 93.20 76.25 93.20 74.10 74.10 93.20 93.20 24.63 78.40 77.17 29.56 74.10 96.61 77.33 63.23 93.20 93.20 99.80 83.00 74.10 98.90 99.65 77.26 98.90 0.00 72.41 66.72 71.65 99.65 99.65 98.90 99.23 76.30 98.18 98.90 91.35 98.90 88.70 88.70 98.90 98.90 35.57 94.00 92.49 43.90 88.70 99.42 92.68 83.53 98.90 98.90 99.90 94.82 88.70 99.40 99.78 81.76 99.40 0.00 79.09 72.39 77.68 99.78 99.78 99.40 99.57 82.80 98.90 99.40 93.45 99.40 90.80 90.80 99.40 99.40 44.74 96.10 94.59 53.12 90.80 99.66 94.78 87.68 99.40 99.40 99.90 96.34 90.80 99.90 99.90 92.10 99.90 0.00 93.68 86.64 91.45 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 96.30 99.81 99.90 97.45 99.90 95.40 95.40 99.90 99.90 71.48 99.50 98.33 78.08 95.40 99.90 98.48 96.13 99.90 99.90 99.90 98.90 95.40 99.90 99.90 98.54 99.90 0.00 98.83 97.59 98.45 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.30 99.89 99.90 99.50 99.90 99.10 99.10 99.90 99.90 94.92 99.90 99.67 96.10 99.10 99.90 99.70 99.28 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.75 99.10 257 Table 82: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 8,457 17,052 7,417 10,190 3,273 32,301 18,471 7,391 5,922 31,882 4,810 6,241 14,750 13,467 5,440 6,971 30,555 7,108 4,182 4,265 19,262 19,349 4,105 9,711 10,026 3,894 147,942 7,265 10,043 7,211 4,768 6,825 25,148 3,531 0.00 0.00 97.90 0.00 0.00 99.78 99.87 99.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.81 0.00 0.00 97.04 0.00 90.49 98.18 0.00 0.00 99.94 0.00 86.58 99.90 0.00 0.00 81.36 98.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 84.76 98.19 0.00 0.00 97.64 0.00 0.00 99.77 99.86 99.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.69 0.00 0.00 96.61 0.00 88.51 97.92 0.00 0.00 99.94 0.00 84.23 99.89 0.00 0.00 77.14 98.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 83.16 97.93 0.00 0.00 96.98 0.00 0.00 99.75 99.84 99.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.41 0.00 0.00 95.50 0.00 82.75 97.25 0.00 0.00 99.93 0.00 77.84 99.88 0.00 0.00 64.69 98.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 79.30 97.28 0.00 0.00 83.43 0.00 0.00 99.54 99.68 99.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.14 0.00 0.00 63.29 0.00 0.00 78.12 0.00 0.00 99.90 0.00 0.00 99.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.29 79.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.69 95.50 23.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.61 0.00 0.00 98.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 258 Table 83: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Facilities 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 None (%) 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 73.3% 0.0% 49.6% 50.0% 18.4% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.3% 19.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% Slight (%) 37.6% 37.6% 0.0% 37.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.6% 0.0% 20.4% 0.0% 37.3% 37.6% 39.3% 37.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.6% 4.5% 42.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.6% 0.0% 39.7% 0.0% 259 Moderate (%) 11.4% 11.4% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 5.8% 0.0% 11.3% 11.4% 28.7% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 19.9% 30.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 23.6% 0.0% Extensive (%) 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 6.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 33.2% 6.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% Complete (%) 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 7.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 42.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% Table 84: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 2,019 1,634 1,342 1,390 995 2,085 1,552 1,212 1,266 1,828 1,345 1,453 1,472 1,567 1,267 1,234 2,429 1,143 1,122 1,102 1,993 2,082 1,069 1,446 1,716 1,297 3,414 1,233 1,633 1,387 1,104 1,543 2,388 1,141 87 9 541 8 24 2,094 1,828 1,033 48 10 7 8 669 22 7 411 90 225 418 47 74 6,307 123 280 3,179 56 38 139 754 8 6 8 326 425 260 22 2 1,244 2 6 3,852 3,306 2,355 12 2 2 2 1,648 5 2 1,015 23 586 1,100 12 34 5,503 31 622 3,944 14 10 449 1,798 2 2 2 945 1,119 Table 85: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 8,457 17,052 7,417 10,190 3,273 32,301 18,471 7,391 5,922 31,882 4,810 6,241 14,750 13,467 5,440 6,971 30,555 7,108 4,182 4,265 19,262 19,349 4,105 9,711 10,026 3,894 147,942 7,265 10,043 7,211 4,768 6,825 25,148 3,531 0.00 0.00 49.79 0.00 0.00 83.37 81.20 76.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.93 0.00 0.00 91.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.24 0.00 0.00 56.82 55.59 48.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 84.98 0.00 0.00 75.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.00 0.00 0.00 28.43 30.85 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 63.88 0.00 0.00 51.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.74 0.00 0.00 8.55 11.14 8.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.83 0.00 0.00 19.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 261 Table 86: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Facilities 6 4 10 2 3 11 9 5 6 8 2 2 4 4 6 8 9 9 4 3 8 15 3 7 9 5 28 5 8 3 1 6 12 4 None (%) 50.0% 71.6% 8.5% 50.0% 89.8% 2.4% 3.5% 4.3% 57.8% 85.0% 50.0% 96.6% 3.2% 18.7% 50.0% 18.4% 50.0% 18.7% 18.4% 50.0% 50.0% 0.2% 19.7% 22.9% 2.6% 43.9% 51.7% 18.9% 10.2% 50.0% 50.0% 57.8% 26.5% 18.4% Slight (%) 37.6% 22.0% 26.6% 37.6% 9.4% 15.4% 17.7% 20.8% 31.9% 11.8% 37.6% 3.2% 19.5% 40.0% 37.6% 39.3% 37.6% 39.9% 39.3% 37.6% 37.6% 2.8% 42.2% 39.0% 11.6% 38.5% 36.4% 40.4% 31.0% 37.6% 37.6% 31.9% 39.3% 39.3% 262 Moderate (%) 11.4% 5.9% 33.4% 11.4% 0.7% 33.8% 33.3% 34.7% 9.5% 3.0% 11.4% 0.2% 37.7% 29.2% 11.4% 28.7% 11.4% 29.2% 28.7% 11.4% 11.3% 16.7% 30.8% 26.2% 23.1% 15.2% 11.0% 29.5% 33.2% 11.4% 11.4% 9.5% 24.7% 28.7% Extensive (%) 1.0% 0.5% 14.6% 1.0% 0.0% 24.6% 22.1% 18.8% 0.8% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 21.5% 6.2% 1.0% 6.1% 1.0% 6.2% 6.1% 1.0% 1.0% 35.0% 6.6% 5.4% 26.7% 2.1% 0.9% 6.3% 11.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 4.9% 6.1% Complete (%) 0.1% 0.0% 17.0% 0.1% 0.0% 23.8% 23.5% 21.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 18.1% 5.9% 0.1% 7.6% 0.1% 6.1% 7.6% 0.1% 0.2% 45.3% 0.7% 6.5% 36.0% 0.2% 0.1% 4.8% 14.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 4.6% 7.6% Table 87: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Length (km) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 1,212 981 805 834 597 1,251 931 727 759 1,097 807 872 883 941 760 740 1,457 686 673 661 1,196 1,249 641 868 1,030 778 2,049 740 979 832 662 926 1,433 685 69 7 428 6 19 1,656 1,445 817 38 8 6 6 529 17 5 325 71 178 330 37 58 4,988 97 222 2,514 44 30 110 596 6 5 7 257 336 263 17 2 984 2 5 3,046 2,615 1,863 10 2 1 2 1,303 4 1 803 18 463 870 9 27 4,352 24 492 3,119 11 8 355 1,422 1 1 2 748 885 Table 88: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Bridge 61 24 70 31 61 124 147 83 37 90 55 74 79 130 60 71 92 68 43 40 117 147 73 45 95 64 332 67 120 63 40 48 181 51 None (%) 71.92% 96.36% 52.33% 96.72% 95.95% 34.90% 21.10% 31.83% 95.41% 94.23% 94.50% 95.35% 48.01% 92.68% 96.23% 51.41% 96.42% 66.34% 55.49% 95.48% 78.18% 6.01% 67.39% 66.86% 12.90% 66.55% 92.14% 71.11% 34.20% 95.36% 93.77% 96.19% 80.05% 55.05% Slight (%) 10.31% 2.34% 9.30% 2.18% 3.05% 6.42% 7.78% 7.41% 2.95% 3.67% 3.54% 3.25% 9.84% 2.76% 2.48% 8.70% 2.56% 8.25% 8.02% 3.39% 10.08% 3.20% 11.33% 8.12% 4.00% 10.08% 6.34% 10.93% 10.32% 3.27% 3.70% 2.46% 4.05% 7.61% 264 Moderate (%) 6.58% 0.81% 6.24% 0.68% 0.63% 6.67% 7.27% 6.83% 1.02% 1.32% 1.24% 0.89% 6.18% 0.64% 0.82% 6.06% 0.63% 3.05% 5.39% 0.71% 4.21% 4.21% 7.60% 5.38% 4.99% 7.04% 0.93% 2.45% 8.90% 0.87% 1.58% 0.85% 1.60% 5.23% Extensive (%) 7.72% 0.42% 7.99% 0.35% 0.31% 12.56% 15.33% 13.12% 0.54% 0.67% 0.62% 0.44% 8.51% 0.53% 0.41% 6.79% 0.33% 3.54% 6.74% 0.35% 5.08% 11.50% 9.42% 6.30% 12.79% 8.20% 0.50% 3.63% 13.74% 0.43% 0.82% 0.43% 3.22% 6.12% Complete (%) 3.44% 0.06% 24.12% 0.05% 0.04% 39.42% 48.49% 40.79% 0.08% 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% 27.43% 3.37% 0.05% 27.01% 0.05% 18.79% 24.34% 0.05% 2.44% 75.05% 4.23% 13.32% 65.30% 8.11% 0.07% 11.86% 32.82% 0.06% 0.12% 0.06% 11.07% 25.96% Table 89: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 61 24 70 31 61 124 147 83 37 90 55 74 79 128 60 71 92 68 43 40 117 147 73 45 95 64 332 67 119 63 40 48 180 51 81.82 98.31 61.81 98.51 98.39 42.82 30.48 40.59 97.89 97.34 97.48 98.00 57.96 94.97 98.28 60.41 98.48 73.85 63.73 98.20 87.12 11.42 78.43 74.92 19.01 76.53 97.14 80.31 45.59 98.03 96.98 98.24 83.83 62.95 86.35 99.14 65.98 99.25 99.32 46.41 34.61 44.45 98.91 98.64 98.73 99.07 62.25 95.84 99.13 64.37 99.30 76.82 67.33 99.24 90.88 13.54 83.51 78.54 21.53 81.13 99.00 83.79 50.80 99.10 98.37 99.10 85.32 66.39 88.94 99.46 68.46 99.53 99.58 49.13 37.61 47.25 99.31 99.17 99.22 99.42 64.73 96.10 99.46 66.77 99.55 78.04 69.47 99.53 92.53 15.39 86.50 80.68 23.68 83.90 99.36 84.77 54.37 99.44 98.98 99.43 85.97 68.48 89.99 99.51 69.80 99.57 99.61 51.09 39.96 49.29 99.39 99.26 99.31 99.48 66.14 96.21 99.51 68.02 99.59 78.75 70.66 99.57 93.21 17.60 87.77 81.67 25.92 85.08 99.44 85.37 56.45 99.50 99.11 99.49 86.48 69.61 94.04 99.71 75.38 99.75 99.76 59.99 50.85 58.56 99.65 99.59 99.61 99.69 72.22 96.70 99.71 73.20 99.75 81.76 75.63 99.74 95.89 28.36 92.72 85.68 36.66 89.67 99.68 87.97 65.49 99.70 99.52 99.70 88.82 74.38 265 Illinois – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 102 counties in the State of Illinois. Illinois is approximately 56,000 square miles and is bordered by Wisconsin to the north, Iowa and Missouri to the west, Kentucky to the southeast, and Indiana to the east. For the purposes of this analysis, 40 critical counties have been identified in the southern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 40 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. The critical counties are listed below: ƒ Alexander ƒ Bond ƒ Calhoun ƒ Clark ƒ Clay ƒ Clinton ƒ Crawford ƒ Edwards ƒ Effingham ƒ Fayette ƒ Lawrence ƒ Macoupin ƒ Madison ƒ Marion ƒ Massac ƒ Monroe ƒ Montgomery ƒ Perry ƒ Pope ƒ Pulaski ƒ Franklin ƒ Gallatin ƒ Greene ƒ Hamilton ƒ Hardin ƒ Jackson ƒ Jasper ƒ Jefferson ƒ Jersey ƒ Johnson ƒ Randolph ƒ Richland ƒ Saint Clair ƒ Saline ƒ Union ƒ Wabash ƒ Washington ƒ Wayne ƒ White ƒ Williamson Figure 4: Location of Fault Rupture for NMSZ Scenario in the State of Illinois The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Illinois employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a Mw7.7 earthquake along the northern segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for 266 the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northern, central and southern. The worstcase scenario for the State of Illinois, the critical counties in particular, is an event on the western fault line in the northern segment, as shown in Figure 4. For more information on the hazard utilized in this scenario please reference Appendix I. The NMSZ scenario produces thousands of damaged buildings in the State of Illinois. There are nearly 17,000 cases of complete damage which are included in the nearly 30,000 at least moderately damaged buildings. As with previous state scenarios, residential buildings experience the greatest amount of damage. Nearly 99% of all complete damage occurs with residential buildings. This occupancy type also accounts for nearly 99% of at least moderate damage throughout the state. All but three completely damaged buildings are located in the 40 critical counties in southern Illinois. Additionally, 90% of all at least moderate damage occurs in these 40 critical counties. Table 90: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Illinois General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 2,780,853 416,473 41,905 7,466 4,515 3,251,212 16,999 12,046 352 40 46 29,483 11,586 5,087 140 11 36 16,860 Table 91: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 40 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (40 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 365,291 73,465 3,311 359 646 443,072 14,975 10,752 240 20 45 26,032 11,586 5,087 138 10 36 16,857 Wood frame construction is the most common type of building in the State of Illinois and also generates the most cases of complete damage. Nearly half of all complete damage, 7,800 buildings, is experienced by wood frame structures. Unreinforced masonry and mobile homes are estimated to incur the most cases of moderate damage with over 70% moderate damage attributed to these building types. This damage state is identified by significant cracking to unreinforced masonry walls as well as some connection damage to column/beam joints in unreinforced masonry building. The remaining building types 267 show far less inventory throughout the state and thus experience a far lesser proportion of damage. Table 92: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Illinois Building Damage by Building Type Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 2,315,085 16,145 31,516 5,382 5,776 638,209 107,166 3,119,279 21,686 656 917 178 78 38,777 23,298 85,590 6,150 193 250 71 24 7,430 9,620 23,738 2,750 15 44 8 2 1,176 1,750 5,745 7,819 60 215 26 15 4,117 4,608 16,860 Of the 1,725 fire stations in the state, 38 (more than 2%) are estimated to experience at least moderate damage. 60 schools are completely damaged while another 23 experience moderate or severe damage. Additionally, over 20 police stations are damaged from the NMSZ event. Two emergency operation centers are expected to sustain this level of damage since they are located in the portion of the state which experiences the most severe shaking. All damage is confined to the 40 critical counties in southern Illinois. Not only are numerous facilities damaged but a large number of facilities are also not functional in the days immediately after the earthquake. Over 250 schools, 80 fire stations and 50 police stations are not fully functional in the days after the event. This will likely inhibit the ability of law enforcement, fire fighters and medical personnel to assist those in heavily impacted areas. Table 93: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for State of Illinois4 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Facilities Damage Damage (State) (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 249 3 1 5,722 83 60 149 2 2 1,044 21 15 1,725 38 32 4 Functionality >50% at Day 1 217 5,464 145 997 1,645 For Tables 93-103 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 268 Table 94: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for Critical Counties Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Facilities Functionality Damage Damage (40 Critical Counties) >50% at Day 1 (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 52 3 1 20 1,167 83 60 909 31 2 2 27 267 21 15 220 366 38 32 286 Table 95: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 40 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Bridges (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 6,554 264 71 16,300 0 0 22,854 264 71 Functionality >50% at Day 1 6,293 16,300 22,593 Table 96: Airport Damage Assessments 40 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. of Damage Damage Airports (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 195 30 9 734 0 0 929 30 9 Functionality >50% at Day 1 173 734 907 Transportation lifelines, particularly in southern Illinois, are significantly impacted by this NMSZ event. Over 70 bridges are expected to incur complete damage while over 250 experience moderate or more severe damage. Highway road segments connecting these damaged bridges are expected to incur slightly less damage than the bridges themselves, even in these counties with the most severe shaking. Highway segments are most generally defined as a section of highway between two end nodes. These end nodes are frequently highway bridges. At least moderate damage to highway bridges is characterized by moderate shear (diagonal) cracking of columns, spalling of cover concrete and shear keys, abutment movement less than two-inches, extensive cracking to shear keys, bent connection bolts and moderate settlement of the bridge approaches. Many airports, ports and railway facilities in southern Illinois incur moderate damage, greatly impeding the operation of these facilities. At least moderate damage to port facilities includes considerable ground settlement, derailment of port equipment and damage to structural members. For airports, at least moderate damage is defined in the same manner as damage to other building types discussed previously. The lack of functionality of many transportation lifelines in southern Illinois will make the movement of people and supplies difficult in the days immediately following the earthquake. 269 Table 97: Transportation System Damage for the State of Illinois Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage>50%) >50%) Segments 4,333 0 0 Bridges 22,854 264 71 Tunnels 0 0 0 Segments 8,441 0 0 Bridges 1,030 6 0 Tunnels 4 0 0 Facilities 285 10 0 Facilities 119 1 0 Segments 900 0 0 Bridges 38 0 0 Facilities 401 401 401 Facilities 11 11 11 Facilities 514 20 0 Facilities 929 30 9 Runways 705 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 4,269 22,591 0 8,441 1,024 4 275 119 899 38 0 0 497 907 705 Table 98: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 40 Critical Counties 74 11 1 Remaining Counties 168 0 0 242 11 1 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 63 168 231 Table 99: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 40 Critical Counties 2,221 461 8 Remaining Counties 7,168 0 0 9,389 461 8 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 1,246 7,168 8,414 Utility lifelines are significantly impacted by the NMSZ scenario event with hundreds of facilities moderately or completely damaged. Over 450 waste water facilities are moderately or more severely damaged while 8 incur complete damage. All facilities experiencing complete damage are located in the extreme southern counties in Illinois. Approximately 20% of all natural gas and electric power facilities in the critical counties incur at least moderate damage. Communication facilities are the most prominent utility 270 inventory type in Illinois and also report the most damage with 1,450 moderately or more severely damaged facilities. Table 100: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 40 Critical Counties 388 79 4 309 Remaining Counties 945 0 0 945 1,333 79 4 1,254 Total State Table 101: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 40 Critical Counties 109 3 0 106 Remaining Counties 166 0 0 166 275 3 0 272 Total State Table 102: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Electric Power Damage Damage Facilities (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 40 Critical Counties 334 59 3 Remaining Counties 1,838 0 0 2,172 59 3 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 205 1,838 2,043 Table 103: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Communication Damage Damage Facilities (Damage>50%) (Damage>50%) 40 Critical Counties 7,464 1,450 66 Remaining Counties 27,369 0 0 34,833 1,450 66 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 6,577 27,369 33,946 Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not included in the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, called local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are composed of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks 271 are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 5,500 and 5,400, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however; show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.070 leaks/mile (1 leak every 14.3 miles) or 0.069 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 14.5 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 4,666 leaks and 4,572 breaks over the combined length of 80,969 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off for over 70,700 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to roughly 43,000 residences within a week and no customers will be without service after three months. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. This period of time without water prevents thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with over 69,600 residential service outages the day after the earthquake, or nearly 1.5% of all state residences without power. Even a month after the earthquake nearly 6,700 residences are still without power. All electric power lines in Illinois are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. Table 104: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Local Natural Gas - Regional Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 164,911 98,946 65,964 15,005 8,379 No. Leaks 5,448 4,340 4,640 26 17 No. Breaks 5,401 4,272 4,566 6 4 Table 105: Utility Service Interruptions for Critical Counties Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 70,781 56,532 43,091 26,770 Potable Water 4,591,779 69,641 48,139 24,340 6,678 Electric Power Day 90 0 83 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage 272 state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (4) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Jackson County, Illinois – 194 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 4: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 194 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 144 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities In the case of Jackson County, Illinois, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a lower estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (4). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Illinois are estimated to incur greater damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 40 critical counties in Illinois shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 642 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 461 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces less damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix for the NMSZ scenario in the State of Illinois. 273 The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Illinois. There tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 274 Table 106: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Alexander Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Bond Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Calhoun Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Clark Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Clay Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Clinton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Crawford Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 1 0 0 0 0 56 2 0 0 0 530 17 0 0 0 680 40 1 0 1 1,191 764 7 0 7 2458 823 8 0 8 4,250 1,095 23 4 6 44 117 1 0 0 4 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4298 1227 24 4 6 1,804 359 19 0 5 19 40 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1824 404 19 0 5 5,158 896 26 17 7 54 93 1 0 0 4 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5216 1001 27 17 7 3,577 718 25 12 12 361 268 6 6 1 65 134 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4006 1123 34 21 13 8,681 1,419 58 14 11 267 298 8 1 1 41 118 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 259 102 3 1 0 9250 1940 72 16 12 5,978 746 42 5 5 62 78 1 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6045 834 43 5 5 275 Counties Edwards Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Effingham Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Fayette Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Franklin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Gallatin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Greene Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hamilton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 1,744 388 8 14 4 186 174 3 3 1 34 91 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1966 655 12 19 5 9,289 1,176 178 60 27 97 115 5 2 1 8 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9394 1305 184 62 28 5,541 1,596 48 3 20 58 175 1 0 1 5 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5604 1793 49 3 21 9,670 959 41 6 7 1,634 756 18 3 3 302 438 7 2 1 17 11 1 0 0 123 20 1 0 0 11746 2184 68 11 11 1,438 294 2 0 1 243 263 1 0 0 45 156 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 8 2 0 0 0 1737 719 3 0 1 4,273 676 22 2 14 45 69 1 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4322 754 23 2 14 1,976 290 9 1 8 334 257 4 0 3 62 152 1 0 1 6 5 0 0 0 21 6 0 0 0 2399 710 14 1 12 276 Counties Hardin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jackson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jasper Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jefferson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jersey Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Johnson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lawrence Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 1,178 205 1 0 1 199 178 1 0 0 37 105 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1416 491 2 0 1 8,652 2,520 97 4 23 1,967 1,820 43 2 9 349 1,012 18 1 4 20 27 1 0 0 975 333 8 0 2 11963 5712 167 7 38 2,901 481 10 4 5 30 52 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2933 539 10 4 5 8,275 1,353 91 15 12 1,398 1,122 38 7 4 259 655 16 3 2 18 18 1 0 0 42 16 1 0 0 9992 3164 147 25 18 6,203 894 34 5 16 65 89 1 0 0 5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6273 994 35 5 16 164 8 0 0 0 887 74 0 0 0 1,225 396 3 0 1 382 576 6 0 3 185 324 7 0 3 2843 1378 16 0 7 3,421 444 22 4 7 578 382 9 2 3 107 225 4 1 1 5 6 0 0 0 201 30 3 1 1 4312 1087 38 8 12 277 Counties Macoupin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Madison Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Marion Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Massac Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Monroe Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Montgomery Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Perry Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 14,351 2,088 121 10 31 150 214 3 0 1 12 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14513 2329 124 10 32 68,175 5,945 595 37 77 2,994 1,014 61 2 7 494 420 21 1 2 24 10 1 0 0 2,083 322 15 1 1 73770 7711 693 41 87 10,367 2,200 66 18 6 738 570 14 2 1 129 248 5 1 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11240 3024 85 21 7 48 1 0 0 0 745 16 0 0 0 1,633 175 4 0 1 530 418 9 1 2 1,176 774 18 3 4 4132 1384 31 4 7 6,985 335 64 2 3 871 153 14 0 1 154 82 5 0 0 11 2 0 0 0 24 2 0 0 0 8045 574 83 2 4 8,490 1,014 70 2 10 88 104 2 0 0 7 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8585 1131 72 2 10 4,884 668 29 4 16 825 520 12 2 6 153 301 5 1 2 10 8 0 0 0 59 28 1 0 0 5931 1525 47 7 24 278 Counties Pope Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Pulaski Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Randolph Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Richland Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Clair Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saline Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Union Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 712 110 0 0 0 375 125 1 0 0 212 157 2 0 1 50 112 1 0 1 10 19 0 0 0 1359 523 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 71 1 0 0 0 649 31 0 0 0 468 142 2 0 1 616 633 11 1 9 1805 807 13 1 10 6,737 891 42 5 19 1,139 736 18 2 7 211 430 7 1 3 16 12 1 0 0 473 89 6 0 1 8576 2158 74 8 30 4,992 753 40 5 4 52 77 1 0 0 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5048 840 41 5 4 52,947 5,979 381 14 76 8,358 2,869 139 3 24 1,518 1,501 56 1 9 97 42 4 0 1 2,390 410 14 2 3 65310 10801 594 20 113 6,524 733 42 1 6 1,102 646 18 1 2 204 381 7 0 1 14 10 1 0 0 30 7 1 0 0 7874 1777 69 2 9 19 0 0 0 0 390 9 0 0 0 1,780 127 1 0 1 1,410 338 6 0 1 1,137 1,003 35 1 4 4736 1477 42 1 6 279 Counties Wabash Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Washington Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Wayne Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other White Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Williamson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 2,913 366 16 0 4 492 301 7 0 1 91 176 3 0 1 5 4 0 0 0 102 12 2 0 0 3603 859 28 0 6 3,898 271 25 1 5 659 246 11 1 2 122 146 4 0 1 8 4 0 0 0 12 2 0 0 0 4699 669 40 2 8 4,568 1,429 46 9 11 157 298 3 1 1 25 112 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4751 1841 50 10 12 3,546 487 19 1 3 854 425 9 1 1 152 251 4 0 0 12 7 0 0 0 32 7 0 0 0 4596 1177 32 2 4 12,946 1,789 115 6 16 2,809 1,304 51 3 6 502 727 21 2 3 27 19 2 0 0 437 182 5 0 1 16721 4021 194 11 26 280 Table 107: Hospital Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Day 1 Total # # of of Beds % Beds Day 3 # of % Beds N/A N/A N/A N/A 189 182 96.40 182 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 22 10 47.70 11 197 142 72.05 143 93 90 96.40 90 N/A N/A N/A N/A 146 141 96.40 141 48 46 96.40 46 158 75 47.20 76 N/A N/A N/A N/A 73 70 96.40 70 101 48 47.20 48 48 17 35.80 17 209 94 45.00 95 N/A N/A N/A N/A 207 98 47.45 99 67 65 96.40 65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 58 28 47.70 28 82 79 96.40 79 1,294 1,122 86.70 1,124 322 232 72.05 233 57 0 0.00 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 197 190 96.40 190 125 59 47.45 60 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 542 257 47.45 260 122 118 96.40 118 1,153 571 49.54 577 131 62 47.45 63 508 0 0.00 0 56 27 47.70 27 61 29 47.70 29 185 178 96.40 179 N/A N/A N/A N/A 363 172 47.30 174 N/A 96.50 N/A N/A 48.30 72.40 96.50 N/A 96.50 96.50 47.80 N/A 96.50 47.80 36.20 45.50 N/A 48.05 96.50 N/A 48.30 96.50 86.87 72.40 0.00 N/A 96.50 48.05 N/A N/A 48.05 96.50 50.04 48.05 0.00 48.30 48.30 96.50 N/A 47.90 Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds N/A 188 N/A N/A 16 170 92 N/A 145 48 115 N/A 72 74 26 146 N/A 152 67 N/A 43 81 1,208 278 0 N/A 196 92 N/A N/A 397 121 826 96 1 41 45 184 N/A 266 N/A 189 N/A N/A 21 195 93 N/A 146 48 153 N/A 73 98 35 194 N/A 201 67 N/A 57 82 1,266 318 1 N/A 197 121 N/A N/A 526 122 1,061 127 68 55 60 185 N/A 354 N/A 189 N/A N/A 22 196 93 N/A 146 48 155 N/A 73 99 36 196 N/A 203 67 N/A 57 82 1,269 320 8 N/A 197 123 N/A N/A 533 122 1,072 129 218 55 60 185 N/A 359 N/A 99.30 N/A N/A 73.60 86.45 99.30 N/A 99.30 99.30 72.90 N/A 99.30 72.90 55.20 69.70 N/A 73.25 99.30 N/A 73.60 99.30 93.37 86.45 0.00 N/A 99.30 73.25 N/A N/A 73.25 99.30 71.68 73.25 0.20 73.60 73.60 99.30 N/A 73.30 N/A 99.90 N/A N/A 97.60 98.75 99.90 N/A 99.90 99.90 96.60 N/A 99.90 96.60 73.20 92.70 N/A 97.10 99.90 N/A 97.60 99.90 97.87 98.75 2.00 N/A 99.90 97.10 N/A N/A 97.10 99.90 91.98 97.10 13.40 97.60 97.60 99.90 N/A 97.60 N/A 99.90 N/A N/A 98.80 99.35 99.90 N/A 99.90 99.90 97.80 N/A 99.90 97.80 74.10 93.80 N/A 98.30 99.90 N/A 98.80 99.90 98.07 99.35 13.80 N/A 99.90 98.30 N/A N/A 98.30 99.90 92.98 98.30 42.90 98.80 98.80 99.90 N/A 98.80 * Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentage of beds may occur due to rounding. 281 Table 108: Communication Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 112 97 41 156 111 254 174 77 237 168 194 59 95 91 30 338 97 237 78 125 109 285 781 239 128 129 240 155 105 85 248 118 811 167 177 104 161 161 187 303 25.25 98.98 99.80 99.80 93.62 93.17 99.80 93.20 99.80 99.80 74.10 77.02 99.80 78.40 77.83 49.06 99.80 85.28 99.80 35.90 93.14 99.80 95.65 93.20 39.88 88.08 99.80 78.34 64.84 26.00 78.90 93.20 89.50 77.20 23.81 93.15 89.80 93.20 78.24 53.12 36.96 99.78 99.90 99.90 98.96 98.87 99.90 98.90 99.90 99.90 91.38 92.29 99.90 94.00 93.29 70.46 99.90 96.27 99.90 55.36 98.84 99.90 99.14 98.90 60.05 97.04 99.90 93.93 85.76 38.62 93.63 98.90 97.54 93.27 34.65 98.85 97.77 98.90 93.80 75.23 46.58 99.84 99.90 99.90 99.43 99.37 99.90 99.40 99.90 99.90 94.15 94.39 99.90 96.10 95.39 77.57 99.90 97.63 99.90 65.39 99.34 99.90 99.45 99.40 68.70 98.08 99.90 96.03 90.03 48.64 95.61 99.40 98.41 95.58 44.87 99.35 98.64 99.40 95.90 81.85 73.81 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.87 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.02 98.18 99.90 99.50 98.95 93.32 99.90 99.69 99.90 89.22 99.85 99.90 99.77 99.90 89.12 99.59 99.90 99.45 98.05 76.06 98.96 99.90 99.64 99.41 73.65 99.86 99.81 99.90 99.35 95.84 95.33 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.89 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.80 99.64 99.90 99.90 99.79 98.75 99.90 99.90 99.90 98.01 99.89 99.90 99.87 99.90 98.03 99.87 99.90 99.89 99.60 95.72 99.79 99.90 99.87 99.88 95.27 99.89 99.90 99.90 99.87 99.18 282 Table 109: Police Station Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Count 2 3 2 5 2 8 5 3 5 6 7 6 5 1 3 6 2 2 4 1 5 14 39 6 8 6 11 7 4 6 9 2 36 4 3 2 11 4 7 5 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 73.00 84.83 94.10 65.97 94.10 94.10 71.53 68.82 94.10 71.30 66.07 66.00 94.10 71.30 94.10 0.00 51.90 94.10 80.69 95.80 0.00 50.13 94.10 51.76 39.13 0.00 50.18 94.10 58.30 56.18 0.00 51.90 52.31 84.73 46.71 61.26 283 Table 110: School Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Count 15 8 7 9 11 26 12 3 25 13 28 1 9 6 5 80 7 19 11 8 8 32 320 30 33 25 20 15 31 9 22 7 212 17 12 8 22 13 12 16 284 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 59.57 80.03 94.10 65.97 94.10 94.10 71.64 71.30 94.10 71.30 68.48 67.40 94.10 59.89 94.10 0.20 51.05 94.10 87.98 79.18 0.00 53.94 94.10 51.77 42.01 0.00 49.85 94.10 58.26 46.42 0.00 51.90 46.63 81.02 46.70 67.06 Table 111: Fire Station Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Count 7 8 5 4 5 6 5 4 11 6 14 6 8 3 3 12 3 12 4 6 5 16 64 4 7 7 12 7 4 8 6 5 43 4 8 5 7 6 6 10 285 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 68.78 84.68 94.10 73.00 94.10 94.10 71.69 62.78 94.10 71.30 66.07 67.23 94.10 61.30 94.10 0.13 50.54 94.10 78.96 81.63 0.00 62.74 94.10 51.83 26.35 0.00 51.57 94.10 55.92 30.23 0.00 51.90 36.56 82.03 46.73 57.59 Table 112: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 3,808 6,155 2,046 6,971 5,839 12,754 7,842 2,905 13,001 8,146 16,408 2,726 5,757 3,462 1,987 24,215 3,930 15,374 8,096 4,183 6,309 19,253 101,953 16,619 6,261 10,275 11,507 8,504 1,769 2,893 12,084 6,660 96,810 10,992 7,290 5,192 5,848 7,143 6,534 25,358 94.40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29.20 0 0 0 0 83.10 0 0 0 89.70 0 0 0 0 86.90 0 0 0 70.40 94.30 0 0 0 7.60 95.20 0 0 0 0 79.70 82.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.90 0 0 0 0 55.50 0 0 0 67.80 0 0 0 0 63.70 0 0 0 35.80 82.00 0 0 0 3.90 85.70 0 0 0 0 49.70 59.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.10 0 0 0 0 25.10 0 0 0 35.50 0 0 0 0 35.40 0 0 0 9.80 57.50 0 0 0 1.10 63.40 0 0 0 0 19.90 21.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.50 0 0 0 0 5.70 0 0 0 8.20 0 0 0 0 11.30 0 0 0 1.20 20.30 0 0 0 0.10 23.20 0 0 0 0 4.00 0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0.10 0.10 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0 0.10 286 Table 113: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Facilities N/A 1 3 3 1 2 N/A 1 3 2 1 3 4 N/A N/A 2 1 N/A N/A 3 2 4 8 2 N/A 1 4 N/A N/A 1 4 N/A 6 N/A 2 1 2 3 1 3 None (%) N/A 96.63 96.63 96.63 50.00 50.00 N/A 50.00 96.63 96.63 19.73 19.27 96.63 N/A N/A 2.45 96.63 N/A N/A 0.74 49.81 96.63 61.46 50.00 N/A 18.35 96.63 N/A N/A 0.16 19.39 N/A 39.78 N/A 0.03 50.00 50.00 50.00 19.73 1.74 Slight (%) N/A 3.21 3.21 3.21 37.59 37.59 N/A 37.59 3.21 3.21 42.20 41.22 3.21 N/A N/A 17.06 3.21 N/A N/A 8.99 37.45 3.21 28.85 37.59 N/A 39.26 3.21 N/A N/A 3.24 41.47 N/A 39.03 N/A 0.69 37.59 37.59 37.59 42.20 13.81 287 Moderate (%) N/A 0.15 0.15 0.15 11.35 11.35 N/A 11.35 0.15 0.15 30.82 30.11 0.15 N/A N/A 38.32 0.15 N/A N/A 33.30 11.31 0.15 8.51 11.35 N/A 28.68 0.15 N/A N/A 19.73 30.29 N/A 17.81 N/A 8.94 11.35 11.35 11.35 30.82 37.89 Extensive (%) N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.98 N/A 0.98 0.00 0.00 6.56 6.41 0.00 N/A N/A 26.39 0.00 N/A N/A 36.82 0.98 0.00 0.73 0.98 N/A 6.10 0.00 N/A N/A 36.47 6.45 N/A 2.84 N/A 37.31 0.98 0.98 0.98 6.56 34.13 Complete (%) N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 N/A 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.67 2.98 0.00 N/A N/A 15.76 0.00 N/A N/A 20.13 0.45 0.00 0.43 0.06 N/A 7.59 0.00 N/A N/A 40.38 2.40 N/A 0.52 N/A 53.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.67 12.40 Table 114: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Households 3,808 6,155 2,046 6,971 5,839 12,754 7,842 2,905 13,001 8,146 16,408 2,726 5,757 3,462 1,987 24,215 3,930 15,374 8,096 4,183 6,309 19,253 101,953 16,619 6,261 10,275 11,507 8,504 1,769 2,893 12,084 6,660 96,810 10,992 7,290 5,192 5,848 7,143 6,534 25,358 At day 1 (%) 99.7 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.9 0 0 0 4.6 0 0 2.9 0 99.5 0 0 0 0 99.4 31.2 0 7.8 0 85.3 0 0 0 0 48.6 At day 3 (%) 99.7 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 99.4 0 0 0 0 99.3 16.3 0 2.7 0 80.9 0 0 0 0 36.9 288 At day 7 (%) 99.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 98.8 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 8.8 At day 30 (%) 83.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 At day 90 (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 115: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Facilities 22 24 5 34 20 77 31 16 67 29 59 67 30 7 27 194 20 58 27 23 35 79 273 67 31 43 87 73 14 26 70 18 243 84 25 22 43 24 23 104 None (%) 0.12 81.09 96.63 96.63 50.00 49.96 96.63 50.00 96.63 96.63 15.57 19.58 96.63 19.73 19.42 4.46 96.63 28.08 96.63 0.65 49.83 96.63 74.83 50.00 1.14 33.67 96.63 19.73 8.63 0.15 21.48 50.00 42.48 19.73 0.05 49.95 45.07 50.00 19.67 4.91 Slight (%) 2.39 14.67 3.21 3.21 37.59 37.56 3.21 37.59 3.21 3.21 38.71 41.89 3.21 42.20 41.55 21.53 3.21 40.93 3.21 8.31 37.47 3.21 19.13 37.59 11.00 39.82 3.21 42.20 33.09 3.11 40.99 37.59 38.55 42.20 1.40 37.55 38.34 37.59 42.07 23.32 289 Moderate (%) 16.28 3.88 0.15 0.15 11.35 11.34 0.15 11.35 0.15 0.15 34.52 30.59 0.15 30.82 30.34 38.52 0.15 25.45 0.15 32.94 11.31 0.15 5.34 11.35 34.84 21.60 0.15 30.82 41.05 19.94 28.79 11.35 16.01 30.82 12.99 11.34 14.52 11.35 30.73 40.15 Extensive (%) 37.72 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 9.63 6.51 0.00 6.56 6.46 24.77 0.00 5.02 0.00 39.67 0.98 0.00 0.45 0.98 34.60 3.93 0.00 6.56 14.92 39.66 6.02 0.98 2.32 6.56 39.83 0.98 1.89 0.98 6.54 24.13 Complete (%) 43.46 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.55 1.40 0.00 0.67 2.21 10.70 0.00 0.50 0.00 18.41 0.39 0.00 0.23 0.06 18.40 0.96 0.00 0.68 2.29 37.13 2.70 0.06 0.61 0.68 45.71 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.97 7.47 Table 116: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Bridges 91 150 58 180 152 175 170 80 217 320 238 71 140 167 44 177 151 213 90 103 148 206 396 247 118 102 212 124 71 93 136 131 383 164 178 76 202 234 197 149 None (%) 13.75 98.53 99.18 99.28 98.72 97.27 99.31 98.75 98.62 98.87 95.63 88.63 98.25 98.54 96.01 82.61 98.25 97.49 97.35 68.28 92.09 98.21 94.79 98.30 63.62 87.44 97.90 91.66 85.89 34.52 87.70 98.68 92.11 97.65 47.38 97.48 98.34 98.42 92.45 90.53 Slight (%) 6.74 0.92 0.46 0.47 0.83 0.79 0.45 0.82 0.90 0.69 0.81 1.09 1.11 0.95 2.08 4.22 1.15 1.12 1.65 8.69 1.74 1.19 1.10 1.14 6.39 3.78 1.31 1.60 3.99 8.45 1.73 0.89 1.25 1.54 10.27 0.70 0.83 1.04 3.45 2.47 290 Moderate (%) 7.48 0.27 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.39 0.18 0.42 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.62 5.32 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.34 4.34 0.28 0.49 0.36 2.03 7.53 0.36 0.26 0.31 0.34 8.12 0.32 0.19 0.32 0.31 0.24 Extensive (%) 16.78 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.15 1.51 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.53 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.59 0.19 0.27 0.32 9.54 4.38 0.19 3.18 0.18 7.87 3.03 0.26 0.43 2.25 14.99 0.58 0.14 4.83 0.41 14.32 1.42 0.53 0.18 0.31 0.85 Complete (%) 55.22 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.84 9.88 0.03 0.05 1.17 12.28 0.02 0.86 0.04 8.15 1.36 0.02 0.54 0.02 17.75 5.45 0.04 5.93 5.82 34.49 9.61 0.02 1.48 0.05 19.89 0.06 0.10 0.02 3.45 5.88 Table 117: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 91 150 58 180 152 175 170 80 217 320 238 71 140 167 44 177 151 213 90 103 148 206 396 247 118 102 212 124 71 93 136 131 383 164 178 76 202 234 197 149 22.60 99.25 99.53 99.62 99.37 97.95 99.63 99.39 99.33 99.41 96.31 89.66 99.15 99.27 97.67 86.05 99.17 98.37 98.72 76.78 93.66 99.16 95.80 99.20 70.26 90.52 98.97 93.04 89.60 44.20 89.25 99.36 93.30 98.87 58.29 98.09 98.98 99.25 95.14 92.56 26.54 99.56 99.69 99.77 99.65 98.22 99.78 99.66 99.63 99.65 96.55 89.99 99.53 99.56 98.31 87.19 99.56 98.72 99.31 80.54 94.21 99.56 96.20 99.58 73.12 91.56 99.43 93.54 91.20 48.56 89.80 99.66 93.72 99.34 63.27 98.36 99.24 99.59 96.11 93.25 29.64 99.66 99.78 99.83 99.75 98.33 99.83 99.76 99.74 99.75 96.63 90.10 99.68 99.63 98.48 87.34 99.70 98.82 99.55 82.66 94.43 99.70 96.37 99.71 74.89 91.72 99.62 93.70 92.01 51.62 89.97 99.76 93.89 99.48 66.51 98.49 99.32 99.72 96.23 93.36 32.22 99.69 99.79 99.84 99.77 98.47 99.84 99.78 99.76 99.77 96.73 90.26 99.71 99.67 98.53 87.56 99.73 98.87 99.60 83.87 94.84 99.73 96.67 99.74 76.03 92.07 99.66 93.83 92.38 53.77 90.16 99.78 94.35 99.53 68.45 98.63 99.37 99.74 96.33 93.53 44.26 99.80 99.85 99.87 99.84 99.22 99.87 99.84 99.84 99.84 97.18 91.00 99.81 99.78 98.76 88.69 99.82 99.06 99.75 89.16 97.11 99.82 98.28 99.82 81.15 93.94 99.79 94.44 93.88 63.54 91.09 99.84 96.85 99.73 76.89 99.34 99.63 99.83 96.71 94.34 291 Table 118: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Length (miles) 539 979 524 1,305 1,300 1,384 1,303 587 1,444 2,004 1,332 656 1,088 1,026 372 1,677 1,291 1,685 873 725 1,162 2,193 2,998 1,743 588 827 1,813 1,062 546 463 1,381 1,060 2,949 1,025 912 603 1,262 1,893 1,461 1,426 Total Number of Leaks 1,457 5 3 7 7 33 7 3 8 11 11 4 6 8 2 394 7 11 5 211 12 12 46 10 454 6 10 9 30 685 50 6 57 7 1,122 5 8 10 10 107 292 Total Number of Breaks 949 1 1 2 2 104 2 1 2 3 17 4 1 12 1 1,348 2 11 1 53 22 3 121 2 861 6 2 16 7 681 172 1 167 5 384 7 7 3 12 248 Table 119: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Length (miles) 323 587 315 783 780 830 782 352 867 1,202 799 394 653 616 223 1,006 774 1,011 524 435 697 1,316 1,799 1,046 353 496 1,088 637 328 278 829 636 1,769 615 547 362 757 1,136 877 855 Total Number of Leaks 1,153 4 2 6 6 26 6 3 6 9 9 4 5 6 2 312 6 9 4 167 9 9 36 8 359 4 8 7 24 542 40 5 45 5 888 4 6 8 8 85 293 Total Number of Breaks 751 1 1 1 1 82 1 1 2 2 13 4 1 9 0 1,066 1 9 1 42 18 2 96 2 681 5 2 13 6 538 136 1 132 4 303 6 5 2 9 196 Indiana – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 92 counties in the State of Indiana. Indiana is approximately 36,100 square miles and is bordered by Michigan to the north, Kentucky to the south, Ohio to the east, and Illinois to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 11 critical counties have been identified in the southwestern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 11 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. The critical counties are listed below: • • • • Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene • • • • Knox Pike Posey Spencer • • • Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Please note critical counties for Indiana are the same for both scenarios. Both hazards are located in the southwestern portion of the state and thus the same set of critical counties is sufficient for both Indiana scenarios. The NMSZ scenario for the State of Indiana consists of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake along one segment of the New Madrid Fault. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone. Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northeastern, central, and southwestern. This scenario, the worst case event for Indiana, employs an event in the northeast segment of the eastern fault. For more information on the ground motion used in this scenario please reference Appendix I. The Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ does not generate catastrophic damage as it does in other central U.S. states. Shaking is less intense even in southwestern Indiana which is closest to the fault. Complete damage to buildings is extremely limited, though moderate damage is likely in southwestern counties such as Posey, Gibson and Vanderburgh. Most damaged structures are residential and either single family homes or other residential buildings which are often multi-resident buildings. Approximately 93% of all damage occurs in these two types of residential structures. The critical counties in southwestern Indiana experience just over half of all building damage. This indicates that damage occurs in locations with minor shaking though soft soils in outlying areas may contribute to the extent of moderate damage outside the 11 critical counties. 294 Figure 5: Location of Fault Rupture for Indiana NMSZ Scenario Table 120: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Indiana General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Buildings Severe Damage 1,675,434 229,169 19,034 4,317 4,102 1,932,056 2,814 3,189 154 37 266 6,460 2 0 0 0 0 2 Table 121: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 11 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (11 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 133,792 21,966 1,410 279 1,967 159,414 1,652 1,386 100 21 261 3,420 295 2 0 0 0 0 2 Table 122: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Indiana Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,388,618 7,908 150 8,288 463 191 2,618 126 39 2,862 158 90 1,737 35 14 337,716 18,051 2,823 140,340 16,674 2,994 1,882,179 43,415 6,301 Extensive 0 13 1 7 1 109 28 159 Complete 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 Unlike the previous state scenarios, the NMSZ event for Indiana generates relatively little damage to wood frame structures. At the low levels of shaking experienced in southern Indiana the relatively flexibly nature of wood frame construction lets these buildings move with the imposed motion and bend without breaking. More brittle structures, such as unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings are more likely to crack at mortar joints and through the bricks themselves even during minor to moderate shaking. Mobile homes are likely to be shaken partially off of their foundations leading which defines moderate damage for this building type. Over 90% of all moderate and more severe damage is experienced by these URMs and mobile homes, making them some of the most vulnerable construction types in the State of Indiana. Table 123: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for Indiana5 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 175 0 0 2,686 0 0 51 0 0 474 0 0 1,210 0 0 5 Functionality >50% at Day 1 166 2,630 50 468 1,192 For Tables 123-133 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 296 Table 124: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the Critical Counties Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 16 0 0 223 0 0 6 0 0 44 0 0 146 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 16 223 6 44 146 Damage to essential facilities and transportation lifelines is minimal even in the 11 critical counties. No facilities are estimated in incur moderate or more severe damage. Impacts to infrastructure functionality are limited as well. It is likely that emergency services will not be greatly impacted and will be able to travel through the more affected areas of southern Indiana without many complications since all airports and bridges are estimated to remain operational in the days immediately after the earthquake. Table 125: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Bridges Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,220 0 0 14,285 0 0 16,505 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,220 14,285 16,505 Table 126: Airport Damage Assessments 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Airports Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 49 0 0 447 0 0 496 0 0 297 Functionality >50% at Day 1 49 447 496 Table 127: Transportation System Damage for the State of Indiana Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage>50%) >50%) Segments 2,844 0 0 Bridges 16,505 0 0 Tunnels 0 0 0 Segments 4,988 0 0 Bridges 92 0 0 Tunnels 8 0 0 Facilities 91 0 0 Facilities 46 0 0 Segments 15 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 13 13 13 Facilities 0 0 0 Facilities 91 0 0 Facilities 496 0 0 Runways 538 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 2,844 16,505 0 4,988 92 8 91 46 15 0 0 0 91 496 538 Utility lifelines show limited damage in the 11 critical counties and throughout the State of Indiana. Low levels of shaking are not likely to generate moderate damage to facilities and impair functionality immediately after the earthquake. Very minor damage to some of the facilities in the critical counties is more likely though this would amount to minor cracking of structural components and other forms of damage that do not reduce the operational capabilities of these lifelines. Table 128: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Potable Water Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 16 0 0 16 Remaining Counties 80 0 0 80 96 0 0 96 Total State Table 129: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 52 0 0 52 Remaining Counties 394 0 0 394 446 0 0 446 Total State 298 Table 130: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 11 Critical Counties 7 0 0 7 Remaining Counties 22 0 0 22 29 0 0 29 Total State Table 131: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 11 Critical Counties 35 0 0 35 Remaining Counties 135 0 0 135 170 0 0 170 Total State Table 132: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 97 0 0 97 Remaining Counties 695 0 0 695 792 0 0 792 Total State Table 133: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 2,490 0 0 2,490 Remaining Counties 19,189 0 0 19,189 21,679 0 0 21,679 Total State Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not present in the default inventory, or local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional, or major transmission, oil pipelines are added from HSIP 2007 data to provide estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are comprised of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at 728 and 753, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe 299 at roughly 0.014 leaks/mile and breaks/mile (roughly 1 leak/break every 70 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 650 leaks and 652 breaks over the combined length of 54,746 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off to over 44,100 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to 11,100 residences within a week, and all service is restored after one month. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. This period of time without water prevents people from remaining in their homes in the weeks immediately following the earthquake. Electric power lines are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking, unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. As a result of the low level of shaking, electric power service is not likely to be interrupted for residences in Indiana, even in the first few days following the earthquake. Table 134: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 111,394 66,836 10,188 44,558 4,625 No. Leaks 753 596 13 637 17 No. Breaks 728 576 36 616 60 Table 135: Utility Service Interruptions in Critical Counties Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 (Critical Counties) 44,115 34,798 11,075 0 Potable Water 188,251 0 0 0 0 Electric Power Day 90 0 0 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage level available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate HAZUS-MH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (5) and employed in the preceding tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they 300 generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Gibson County, Indiana – 293 highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to footnote 5: ƒ Summation of individual bridges after that bridge is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 0 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of highway bridges in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of bridges in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the bridges in the county provides an estimate of 18 at least moderately damaged highway bridges Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure in the topic damage tables produces more damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Indiana. These tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage level for a county. 301 Table 136: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Daviess Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dubois Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Gibson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Greene Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Knox Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Pike Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Posey Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 7,768 1,040 73 9 16 289 229 4 2 3 43 95 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,102 1,366 78 12 20 10,692 1,311 127 89 17 101 100 3 2 0 8 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,801 1,423 130 91 17 9,132 1,506 60 8 20 303 264 3 0 1 45 89 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,482 1,861 64 8 21 9,007 3,113 76 9 19 85 320 2 0 1 7 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,099 3,473 78 9 20 10,946 1,567 111 16 26 103 117 3 0 1 8 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,057 1,698 114 16 27 3,203 898 12 3 4 251 245 4 1 1 41 108 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,497 1,253 17 4 5 7,717 984 30 9 10 272 166 1 0 0 40 54 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,031 1,205 31 9 10 302 Counties Spencer Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Sullivan Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Vanderburgh Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Warrick Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 5,809 1,026 45 6 25 55 101 1 0 1 4 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,868 1,139 46 6 26 5,673 1,230 22 1 3 53 125 1 0 0 4 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,730 1,370 23 1 3 39,632 3,274 455 60 1,055 6,258 1,283 192 27 487 1,053 592 79 15 240 53 17 6 1 18 1 0 0 0 0 46,997 5,166 732 103 1,800 12,874 1,078 61 11 10 1,913 604 25 4 3 322 323 10 2 1 16 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,125 2,013 97 18 14 Table 137: Hospital Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Total # of Beds 85 218 109 75 260 N/A N/A N/A 35 1,319 0 Day 1 # of % Beds Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds 82 210 105 72 251 N/A N/A N/A 34 546 47 82 210 105 72 251 N/A N/A N/A 34 553 47 84 216 108 74 258 N/A N/A N/A 35 843 72 85 218 109 75 260 N/A N/A N/A 35 1117 96 85 218 109 75 260 N/A N/A N/A 35 1130 97 96.40 96.40 96.40 96.40 96.40 N/A N/A N/A 96.40 41.40 44.55 96.50 96.50 96.50 96.50 96.50 N/A N/A N/A 96.50 41.90 45.10 99.30 99.30 99.30 99.30 99.30 N/A N/A N/A 99.30 63.90 68.75 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 N/A N/A N/A 99.90 84.70 91.15 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 N/A N/A N/A 99.90 85.70 92.25 * Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentage of beds may occur due to rounding. 303 Table 138: Police Station Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 3 5 3 5 3 4 5 2 3 7 4 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 94.10 94.10 80.03 94.10 94.10 73.00 86.60 94.10 94.10 46.07 51.90 Table 139: School Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 21 21 20 14 18 5 14 13 10 66 21 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 88.07 94.10 84.86 94.10 94.10 85.66 81.82 93.06 94.10 46.64 53.41 Table 140: Fire Station Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 12 14 13 14 19 8 10 7 12 26 11 304 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 87.07 94.10 81.12 94.10 94.10 78.28 82.38 90.53 94.10 46.82 63.41 Table 141: Communication Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 167 274 235 155 301 127 200 127 184 507 213 99.70 99.70 93.08 99.80 99.70 93.11 92.99 96.74 99.80 91.47 93.09 99.90 99.90 98.78 99.90 99.90 98.81 98.69 99.37 99.90 97.91 98.79 99.90 99.90 99.28 99.90 99.90 99.31 99.19 99.59 99.90 98.55 99.29 99.90 99.90 99.80 99.90 99.90 99.83 99.73 99.83 99.90 99.42 99.81 99.90 99.90 99.88 99.90 99.90 99.89 99.87 99.89 99.90 99.81 99.88 Table 142: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 10,894 14,813 12,847 13,372 15,552 5,119 10,205 7,569 7,819 70,623 19,438 0.00 0.00 57.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 143: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 None (%) 93.7% 93.7% 49.6% 96.6% 93.7% 49.8% 49.6% 49.6% 96.6% 49.6% 50.0% Slight (%) 6.0% 6.0% 37.3% 3.2% 6.0% 37.4% 37.3% 37.3% 3.2% 37.3% 37.6% 305 Moderate (%) 0.4% 0.4% 11.3% 0.2% 0.4% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 0.2% 11.3% 11.4% Extensive (%) 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% Complete (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% Table 144: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Length (miles) 1,178 1,230 1,515 1,430 1,487 935 1,296 1,182 1,250 1,353 1,211 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 6 2 7 2 86 314 8 2 8 2 5 1 11 16 6 2 7 2 70 252 7 2 Table 145: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 10,894 14,813 12,847 13,372 15,552 5,119 10,205 7,569 7,819 70,623 19,438 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 146: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities 5 6 5 6 3 3 3 7 6 3 5 None (%) 93.7% 93.7% 49.9% 96.6% 93.7% 50.0% 49.7% 68.7% 96.6% 49.7% 49.7% Slight (%) 6.0% 6.0% 37.5% 3.2% 6.0% 37.6% 37.4% 24.0% 3.2% 37.4% 37.4% 306 Moderate (%) 0.4% 0.4% 11.3% 0.2% 0.4% 11.4% 11.3% 6.6% 0.2% 11.3% 11.3% Extensive (%) 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.6% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% Complete (%) 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% Table 147: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Length (miles) 707 738 909 858 892 561 777 710 750 812 727 Total Number of Leaks 5 5 68 6 6 4 8 5 5 55 5 Total Number of Breaks 1 1 248 2 2 1 12 1 1 199 1 Table 148: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Bridges 136 192 293 201 288 136 191 212 204 188 173 None (%) 98.62% 99.55% 92.32% 99.41% 99.35% 94.36% 96.06% 94.24% 99.11% 90.87% 94.17% Slight (%) 0.96% 0.29% 0.22% 0.38% 0.40% 0.19% 0.31% 0.16% 0.60% 0.54% 0.29% Moderate (%) 0.25% 0.08% 0.06% 0.12% 0.14% 0.04% 0.17% 0.11% 0.17% 0.09% 0.09% Extensive (%) 0.13% 0.05% 6.31% 0.07% 0.09% 5.02% 2.84% 5.09% 0.09% 5.04% 4.48% Complete (%) 0.02% 0.01% 1.06% 0.01% 0.01% 0.36% 0.60% 0.37% 0.01% 3.43% 0.95% Table 149: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 136 192 293 201 288 136 191 212 204 188 173 99.36 99.75 92.73 99.67 99.63 94.67 96.41 94.55 99.55 91.51 94.56 99.67 99.83 92.80 99.79 99.76 94.72 96.54 94.62 99.74 91.68 94.66 99.76 99.86 92.92 99.84 99.82 94.81 96.64 94.74 99.81 91.79 94.76 99.78 99.87 93.47 99.85 99.83 95.25 96.90 95.18 99.82 92.27 95.16 99.84 99.88 96.69 99.87 99.87 97.77 98.35 97.74 99.86 95.01 97.45 307 Indiana – Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Scenario This scenario for the State of Indiana includes the same set of 11 critical counties as listed in the NMSZ scenario discussion. As mentioned earlier, both scenarios produce the most substantial shaking in southwestern Indiana and thus the same set of counties is used. For a comparison of ground shaking values for the two Indiana scenarios please reference Appendix I. The scenario consists of a Mw7.1 earthquake along the Wabash Valley Fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Though the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ) covers significant area in southern Illinois, the actual fault modeled by the USGS is much shorter than the NMSZ faults. Figure 6 illustrates the location of the Wabash Valley fault utilized in the creation of USGS shaking maps for this seismic zone. Figure 6: Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Fault for the State of Indiana The WVSZ scenario generates thousands of cases of complete damage which is much greater than the level of complete damage from the NMSZ scenario. The fault rupture is much closer to the State of Indiana and thus the shaking is far more intense, particularly in the critical counties. Again, residential structures incur the majority of damage, both moderate and complete. Residential structures account for over 95% of all complete damage with single family homes contributing over 85% of complete damage cases. Moderate and severe dame shows similar estimates with single family homes incurring 70% of all moderate damage. 308 Nearly all complete damage, nearly 97%, occurs in the 11 critical counties in southwestern Indiana. Only 20% of all moderate and severe building damage occurs in this area, indicating that the moderate level of shaking outside the critical counties is enough to cause significant cracking of concrete and unreinforced masonry. With this many extreme damage cases in the critical counties and moderate damage extending to the north and west of that area, numerous people will be displaced over a much larger set of counties in Indiana. Table 150: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Indiana General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 1,675,434 229,169 19,034 4,317 4,102 1,932,056 5,315 2,068 200 30 31 7,644 7,464 1,161 90 15 224 8,954 Table 151: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 11 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (11 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 133,792 21,966 1,410 279 1,967 159,414 926 540 24 7 6 1,503 7,228 1,085 90 15 224 8,642 Table 152: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Indiana Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate Extensive 1,370,489 19,342 515 24 8,545 222 83 4 2,655 72 13 0 2,912 107 46 2 1,717 41 15 0 330,681 21,176 4,936 227 148,359 9,140 1,767 13 1,865,358 50,100 7,374 270 Complete 6,305 101 44 51 14 1,683 756 8,954 Building damage by building type is illustrated in Table 152 for the entire State of Indiana. The WVSZ scenario shows a substantial number of wood frame collapses though very few occurrences of damage in the less severe damage states. This is likely 309 due to liquefaction in the critical counties causing substantial settlements that damage structures severely. Roughly 70% of all complete damage is experienced by wood frame structures and nearly another 20% is attributed to URMs. Moderate damage is more common in URMs and mobile homes than any other type of construction. Table 153: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Indiana6 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 175 0 0 2,686 0 0 51 0 0 474 0 0 1,210 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 174 2,666 49 466 1,195 Table 154: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 11 Critical Counties Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 16 0 0 223 0 0 6 0 0 44 0 0 146 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 15 203 4 36 131 Most essential facilities are not likely to incur moderate damage due to the WVSZ event, though lese severe damage levels are possible. While no essential facilities are expected to experience substantial damage some will have reduced functionality. Schools report the greatest loss of functionality with 20 schools not operating in Knox and Posey Counties. In addition, 15 fire stations 8 police stations and a hospital are not operating immediately after the earthquake. Most of these facilities are located in Know, Gibson, Posey and Dubois Counties. All facilities outside of the critical counties are fully operational the day after the earthquake. 6 For Tables 153-163 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 310 Table 155: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Bridges Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,220 0 0 14,285 0 0 16,505 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,220 14,285 16,505 Table 156: Airport Damage Assessments 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Complete Total No. Moderate Damage Of Airports Damage (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 49 0 0 447 0 0 496 0 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 47 447 494 Table 157: Transportation System Damage for the State of Indiana Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage>50%) >50%) Segments 2,844 0 0 Bridges 16,505 0 0 Tunnels 0 0 0 Segments 4,988 0 0 Bridges 92 0 0 Tunnels 8 0 0 Facilities 91 0 0 Facilities 46 1 0 Segments 15 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 13 13 13 Facilities 0 0 0 Facilities 91 0 0 Facilities 496 5 0 Runways 538 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 2,844 16,505 0 4,988 92 8 91 46 15 0 0 0 91 494 538 Transportation facilities and networks are similar to essential facilities in so far as facilities are not damaged significantly but there is some reduced functionality. Functionalities differ from damage states in that functionalities indicate the operational capabilities of various infrastructure components and do not indicate the level of damage sustained by that particular component. Damage state calculations are separate from 311 functionality calculations in impact assessment modeling. For example, a highway bridge may sustain minor damage, but still remain operational. Conversely, a bridge suffering severe structural damage and substantial settlement is likely not able to be used. The WVSZ scenario only impairs the functionality of several airports and those are located within the critical counties. All transportation lifelines outside the critical counties are fully operational the day after the earthquake. There are no instances of complete damage to any utility facilities in the 11 critical counties or the remainder of the state. Numerous types of facilities, however, show cases of moderate or severe damage. Electric power and communication facilities show the most cases of damage with 23 and 435 moderately or severely damaged facilities, respectively. This level of damage impairs the functionality of all utility facilities, particularly in southwestern Indiana. Over 20 waste water facilities are estimated to be non-functional the day after the event in the 11 critical counties alone. Ten oil facilities will not be operational, which may impede the transport of oil through the central U.S. to other portions of the country. Over half, or 53, of all electric power facilities in southwestern Indiana are not operational meaning they can not provide power to customers. Those customers that did not experience substantial structural damage to their homes may be displaced due to lack of power, or even potable water. Furthermore, emergency response efforts may be impeded by the lack of electric power. Communication facilities report the greatest loss of functionality with over 130 facilities non-operational in the days immediately following the event. Without communication facilities functioning properly it may be difficult to coordinate emergency response and aid efforts. Table 158: Damage to Potable Water Facilities 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Potable Water Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 16 4 0 12 80 0 0 80 96 4 0 92 Table 159: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Waste Complete Damage Functionality Damage Water Facilities (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 52 4 0 30 Remaining Counties 394 0 0 394 446 4 0 424 Total State 312 Table 160: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 11 Critical Counties 7 0 0 7 Remaining Counties 22 0 0 22 29 0 0 29 Total State Table 161: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 11 Critical Counties 35 3 0 25 Remaining Counties 135 0 0 135 170 3 0 160 Total State Table 162: Damage to Electric Power Facilities 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 97 23 0 44 695 0 0 695 792 23 0 739 Table 163: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 11 Critical Counties 2,490 432 0 2,359 Remaining Counties 19,189 3 0 19,189 21,679 435 0 21,548 Total State Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not present in the default inventory, or local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional, or major transmission, oil pipelines are added from HSIP 2007 data to provide estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are comprised of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at 2,613 and 1,032, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe 313 at roughly 0.023 leaks/mile (roughly 1 leak every 43 miles) or 0.051 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 20 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of approximately 1,100 leaks and 2,400 breaks over the combined length of 54,746 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off to over 42,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to 26,800 residences within a week, and all service is restored after three months. This period of time without water prevents people from remaining in their homes in the weeks immediately following the earthquake. As a result of the moderate level of shaking, electric power service is interrupted to nearly 15,000 residences in Indiana the day after the earthquake. Over 4,000 residences are still without power after one week. Almost all disruptions in potable water service and electrical power service occur in the 11 critical counties. Table 164: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 111,394 66,836 10,188 44,558 4,625 No. Leaks 1,032 816 31 1,046 56 No. Breaks 2,613 2,067 111 2,252 219 Table 165: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 (Critical Counties) 42,022* 31,248 26,786 18,504 Potable Water 188,251 14,994 9,419 4,185 1,169 Electric Power Day 90 0 19 NOTE: All disruptions to potable water service and electrical power service occur in the 11 critical counties with the exception of 441 households that lose potable water service in Day 1. The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage level available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as 314 discussed in footnote (6) and employed in the preceding table for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Dubois County, Indiana – 192 highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to footnote 6: ƒ Summation of individual bridges after that bridges is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 0 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of highway bridges in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of bridges in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the bridges in the county provides an estimate of 8 at least moderately damaged highway bridges In the case of Dubois County, Indiana, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a higher estimate of damage as opposed to the waste water facility damage summation detailed in footnote (6). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Indiana are estimated to incur lesser damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges for the 11 critical counties in Indiana shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 146 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 0 at least moderately damaged highway bridges Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces more damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix for the WVSZ scenario in Indiana. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the WVSZ scenario critical counties in Indiana. These tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage level for a county. 315 Table 166: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Daviess Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dubois Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Gibson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Greene Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Knox Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Pike Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Posey Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 7,267 1,099 62 11 18 694 207 11 1 2 103 55 3 0 0 12 1 0 0 0 28 4 0 0 0 8,104 1,366 76 12 20 9,659 1,176 102 77 15 990 199 22 11 2 146 47 7 4 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,801 1,423 131 92 18 7,121 1,101 44 6 15 829 339 10 1 3 123 95 3 1 1 10 1 0 0 0 1,398 324 6 1 3 9,481 1,860 63 9 22 9,051 3,376 77 9 20 45 92 1 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,099 3,473 78 9 20 7,753 965 69 10 16 1,321 346 17 2 4 188 92 5 1 1 12 2 0 0 0 1,784 294 22 4 5 11,058 1,699 113 17 26 3,366 1,055 16 4 4 115 157 1 0 0 16 41 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,498 1,253 17 4 5 6,589 745 21 6 8 1,001 327 5 2 2 151 95 2 1 1 15 2 0 0 0 276 36 2 1 1 8,032 1,205 30 10 12 316 Counties Spencer Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Sullivan Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Vanderburgh Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Warrick Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 5,837 1,108 46 6 26 29 29 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,868 1,139 46 6 26 4,931 948 17 1 2 672 325 4 0 1 98 92 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 25 5 0 0 0 5,730 1,371 22 1 3 42,962 4,663 666 93 1,565 287 75 7 1 17 26 5 1 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 3,718 422 59 9 216 46,998 5,165 733 103 1,800 15,045 1,960 96 18 15 75 49 1 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,125 2,013 97 18 15 Table 167: Hospital Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Total # of Beds 85 218 109 75 260 N/A N/A N/A 35 1,319 0 Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90 # of # of # of # of # of % % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds Beds 56 65.50 56 66.00 73 85.60 84 98.40 84 98.80 144 66.10 145 66.60 189 86.50 216 99.20 217 99.60 71 65.50 72 66.00 93 85.60 107 98.40 108 98.80 74 98.10 74 98.10 75 99.60 75 99.90 75 99.90 129 49.60 130 49.90 168 64.80 193 74.40 194 74.70 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 23 66.10 23 66.60 30 86.50 35 99.20 35 99.60 1137 86.20 1137 86.20 1155 87.60 1158 87.80 1159 87.90 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 *Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentages of beds may occur due to rounding. 317 Table 168: Police Station Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 3 5 3 5 3 4 5 2 3 7 4 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 69.47 63.08 69.47 96.60 45.83 96.60 49.20 96.60 69.80 80.83 96.60 Table 169: School Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 21 21 20 14 18 5 14 13 10 66 21 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 71.40 73.30 65.99 96.60 46.83 88.56 58.04 92.28 68.27 86.25 95.37 Table 170: Fire Station Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Count 12 14 13 14 19 8 10 7 12 26 11 318 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 75.08 82.24 71.55 96.60 50.94 91.58 50.71 91.59 62.54 86.95 96.60 Table 171: Communication Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 167 274 235 155 301 127 200 127 184 507 213 84.05 93.17 78.26 88.98 56.36 91.76 86.39 93.11 65.64 93.13 93.14 95.77 98.87 92.40 97.48 77.04 98.39 96.46 98.81 85.20 98.71 98.84 97.25 99.37 94.50 98.44 82.38 99.05 97.67 99.31 89.51 99.21 99.34 99.55 99.88 98.31 99.77 93.90 99.83 99.53 99.84 97.92 99.77 99.86 99.88 99.90 99.67 99.90 98.88 99.90 99.87 99.90 99.61 99.90 99.90 Table 172: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 10,894 14,813 12,847 13,372 15,552 5,119 10,205 7,569 7,819 70,623 19,438 0.00 0.00 94.15 0.00 97.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.34 0.00 97.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 91.29 0.00 96.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.71 0.00 85.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 173: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 None (%) 19.7% 49.9% 6.8% 50.0% 7.9% 49.9% 49.8% 49.8% 2.0% 49.8% 50.0% Slight (%) 42.2% 37.5% 27.3% 37.6% 31.9% 37.5% 37.4% 37.4% 15.3% 37.4% 37.6% 319 Moderate (%) 30.8% 11.3% 35.7% 11.4% 41.6% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 39.0% 11.3% 11.4% Extensive (%) 6.6% 1.0% 13.6% 1.0% 15.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 32.6% 1.0% 1.0% Complete (%) 0.7% 0.2% 16.6% 0.1% 2.6% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 11.0% 0.5% 0.1% Table 174: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Length (miles) 1,178 1,230 1,515 1,430 1,487 935 1,296 1,182 1,250 1,353 1,211 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 5 4 4 1 243 950 5 1 339 1,335 3 1 9 20 4 1 8 17 38 132 4 1 Table 175: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 10,894 14,813 12,847 13,372 15,552 5,119 10,205 7,569 7,819 70,623 19,438 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 73.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 Table 176: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Facilities 5 6 5 6 3 3 3 7 6 3 5 None (%) 31.5% 50.0% 25.6% 45.0% 10.2% 50.0% 29.4% 50.0% 15.8% 49.9% 49.8% Slight (%) 39.5% 37.6% 40.9% 38.4% 30.8% 37.6% 39.9% 37.6% 38.8% 37.5% 37.5% 320 Moderate (%) 22.4% 11.3% 26.6% 14.6% 36.4% 11.4% 23.8% 11.3% 34.4% 11.3% 11.3% Extensive (%) 4.2% 1.0% 5.4% 1.9% 14.8% 1.0% 4.6% 1.0% 9.7% 1.0% 1.0% Complete (%) 2.4% 0.1% 1.5% 0.2% 7.8% 0.1% 2.2% 0.1% 1.3% 0.3% 0.4% Table 177: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Length (miles) 707 738 909 858 892 561 777 710 750 812 727 Total Number of Leaks 4 4 192 4 268 3 7 3 7 30 3 Total Number of Breaks 3 1 751 1 1,056 1 16 1 13 105 1 Table 178: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Bridges 136 192 293 201 288 136 191 212 204 188 173 None (%) 93.72% 94.87% 88.58% 97.81% 86.16% 93.77% 93.96% 94.13% 95.13% 92.83% 94.82% Slight (%) 0.95% 0.25% 0.25% 0.30% 1.90% 0.14% 0.36% 0.12% 1.76% 0.23% 0.18% Moderate (%) 0.18% 0.12% 0.05% 0.20% 0.10% 0.04% 0.19% 0.13% 0.13% 0.07% 0.07% Extensive (%) 1.24% 4.28% 2.57% 1.26% 1.89% 3.73% 1.05% 5.36% 0.41% 5.82% 4.49% Complete (%) 3.90% 0.45% 8.52% 0.41% 9.93% 2.31% 4.42% 0.25% 2.56% 1.02% 0.42% Table 179: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 136 192 293 201 288 136 191 212 204 188 173 94.54 95.22 89.00 98.09 87.81 94.02 94.35 94.42 96.48 93.23 95.11 94.83 95.32 89.07 98.21 88.35 94.07 94.49 94.49 96.96 93.32 95.18 94.91 95.40 89.14 98.30 88.42 94.12 94.58 94.58 97.02 93.39 95.24 95.08 95.80 89.48 98.43 88.72 94.49 94.74 95.08 97.09 93.94 95.66 95.97 97.97 91.35 99.08 90.34 96.50 95.57 97.77 97.47 96.91 97.92 321 Kentucky – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 120 counties in the State of Kentucky. Kentucky is approximately 40,400 square miles and is bordered by Indiana and Ohio to the north, Tennessee to the south, West Virginia and Virginia to the east and Illinois and Missouri to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 25 critical counties have been identified in the western portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 25 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. The critical counties are listed below: • • • • • • • Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon McCracken McLean Marshall Muhlenberg Ohio • • • • Todd Trigg Union Webster The NMSZ scenario for the State of Kentucky consists of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake along the northeast extension of the presumed eastern fault line in the New Madrid fault system. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northeastern, central, and southwestern. This scenario, the worst case event for Kentucky, employs an event in the northeast segment of the eastern fault. The location of this scenario event is illustrated in Figure 7. For more information on the ground motion used in this scenario please reference Appendix I. Figure 7: Scenario Fault Location for the State of Kentucky 322 Within the State of Kentucky, nearly 29,000 buildings experience complete damage, which are included in the nearly 53,000 at least moderately damaged buildings. While this is roughly 2% of all Kentucky buildings, many of these collapsed structures are concentrated in the western counties. As with previous state scenarios, residential buildings experience the greatest amount of damage. Nearly 98% of all building collapses occur to residential structures. In addition, about 94% of all at least moderate damage occurs in the 25 critical counties for Kentucky. Table 180: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Kentucky General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 1,159,114 292,873 16,431 3,002 1,900 1,473,320 39,150 13,050 306 48 34 52,588 18,768 9,673 475 53 60 29,029 Table 181: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 25 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (25 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 189,655 50,493 1,682 265 242 242,337 38,707 10,619 259 37 29 49,651 18,652 9,619 475 53 60 28,859 Wood frame construction is the most common type of building in the State of Kentucky and also generates the most cases of complete damage. Over 47% of all collapses, 13,700 buildings, is experienced by wood frame structures. Unreinforced masonry (URM) construction and mobile homes (MH) also show high frequencies of collapse and account for nearly all non-wood construction building collapses. This damage state is identified by significant cracking to unreinforced masonry walls as well as some connection damage to column/beam joints in unreinforced masonry building. The remaining building types show far less inventory throughout the state and thus experience a far lesser proportion of damage. 324 Table 182: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Kentucky Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 992,135 18,737 24,772 6,430 264 93 1,782 51 22 1,907 74 42 1,109 20 13 137,881 8352 2,434 197,127 25935 7,952 1,338,371 53,433 35,328 Extensive 11,617 39 15 19 10 1,720 3,840 17,260 Complete 13,726 201 58 69 39 6,161 8,775 29,029 Of the 1,066 fire stations in the state, 77 (more than 7%) are estimated to experience at least moderate damage. Approximately 5-7% of most other essential facility types (schools, hospitals, and police stations) each sustain at least moderate damage. In addition, 79 of the 1,846 schools and 61 fire stations are estimated to collapse. All of these facilities are in the most western counties in Kentucky. The Kentucky inventory does not specify any locations for emergency operations centers, thus no damage can be determined for this type of essential facility. Not only are numerous facilities damaged but many facilities located in the western portion of Kentucky are not functional in the days immediately after the earthquake. All of the non-functional facilities are located in the western portion of the state. Of Kentucky’s 135 hospitals, 118 are considered functional the day after the earthquake and after one week that number increases to 129 functional facilities. Roughly 90% of all fire stations and police stations in Kentucky are estimated to remain functional the day after the earthquake, though all of these functioning facilities are located in the central and eastern portions of the state. Most of Kentucky’s western counties are left without functioning facilities and will likely experience diminished services in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. Transportation lifelines, particularly in western Kentucky counties incur the most severe damage. Roughly 200 of the 6,800, or approximately 3% of all bridges, are estimated to incur at least moderate damage. Of the nearly 200 damaged bridges, almost 50 are expected to collapse. These collapses are shown to occur in counties along the western border of Kentucky. Highway road segments connecting these damaged bridges are expected to incur slightly less damage than the bridges themselves, even in the counties with the most severe shaking. Highway segments are most generally defined as a section of highway between two end nodes. These end nodes are frequently highway bridges. At least moderate damage to highway bridges is characterized by moderate shear (diagonal) cracking of columns, spalling of cover concrete and shear keys, abutment movement less than two-inches, extensive cracking to shear keys, bent connection bolts, and moderate settlement of the bridge approaches. 325 Table 183: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Kentucky7 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (State) At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 135 6 4 1,846 98 79 0 0 0 407 23 19 1,066 77 61 Functionality >50% at Day 1 118 1,713 0 373 959 Table 184: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 25 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (25 Critical Counties) At Least Moderate Complete Essential Facility Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Type Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 21 6 4 5 Hospitals 301 98 79 168 Schools 0 0 0 0 EOCs 77 23 19 44 Police Stations 238 77 61 133 Fire Stations Table 185: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 2,173 197 46 4,632 0 0 6,805 197 46 Functionality >50% at Day 1 1,974 4,630 6604 Table 186: Airport Damage Assessments Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Airports (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 53 19 1 Remaining Counties 166 0 0 219 19 1 Total State 7 Functionality >50% at Day 1 40 166 206 For Tables 183-193 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 326 Furthermore, 86 ports, 23 railway facilities and 19 airports reach at least moderate damage state and follow roughly the same damage distribution throughout the state as highway bridges. At least moderate damage to port facilities includes considerable ground settlement, derailment of port equipment and damage to structural members. For airports, at least moderate damage is defined in the same manner as damage to other building types discussed previously. The lack of functionality of many transportation lifelines in western Kentucky will make the movement of people and supplies difficult in the days immediately following the earthquake. Table 187: Transportation System Damage for the State of Kentucky Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage >50%) >50%) Segments 9,481 0 0 Bridges 6,805 197 46 Tunnels 4 0 0 Segments 2,761 0 0 Bridges 166 3 0 Tunnels 18 0 0 Facilities 117 23 0 Facilities 26 2 0 Segments 0 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 0 0 0 Facilities 16 16 16 Facilities 301 86 14 Facilities 219 19 1 Runways 155 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 9,481 6,604 4 2,761 163 18 96 25 0 0 0 0 221 206 155 Table 188: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Potable Water Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 36 11 0 27 Remaining Counties 143 0 0 143 179 11 0 170 Total State Utility lifelines’ damage and functionality are similar to those found for the transportation systems. Over 500 waste water facilities are moderately or more severely damaged while 81 incur complete damage. Approximately 1,050 communication facilities incur at least moderate damage, while 133 experience complete damage. Additionally, 8% of all electric power facilities reach at least moderate damage state. 327 Table 189: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 1,561 523 81 764 Remaining Counties 7,530 0 0 7,530 9,081 523 81 8,294 Total State Table 190: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 25 Critical Counties 24 6 4 0 Remaining Counties 313 0 0 313 337 6 4 313 Total State Table 191: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 25 Critical Counties 31 6 1 23 Remaining Counties 57 0 0 57 88 6 1 80 Total State Table 192: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 463 132 40 231 Remaining Counties 1,230 0 0 1,230 1,693 132 40 1,461 Total State Table 193: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 3,262 1,044 133 2,410 Remaining Counties 13,095 0 0 13,095 16,357 1,044 133 15,505 Total State 328 Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not included in the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, called local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are composed of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 7,283 and 7,804, respectively. Local natural gas lines experience the greatest leak and break rates per length of pipe, at roughly 0.16 leaks/mile (1 leak every 6.2 miles) and approximately 0.15 breaks/mile (1 break every 6.7 miles), respectively. In addition, estimates for local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 6,702 leaks and 6,457 breaks over the combined length of 48,499 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off to nearly 109,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This number is reduced to roughly 67,000 residences within a week. After three months, potable water service is restored for all residences, as shown in Table 195. These estimates are calculated employing a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the rate of repair. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. This period of time without water prevents thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with over 77,000 residences without electric power the day after the earthquake, or nearly 5% of all State residences. Even a month after the earthquake, over 36,000 residences are still without power. All electric power lines in Kentucky are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking, unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. Table 194: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 102,749 61,650 7,399 41,100 1,165 No. Leaks 7,804 6,173 104 6,598 43 No. Breaks 7,283 5,760 300 6,157 116 Table 195: Utility Service Interruptions for the State of Kentucky Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 108,556 92,742 66,608 38,694 Potable Water 1,590,647 77,263 60,273 36,450 11,464 Electric Power 329 Day 90 0 86 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (7) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Lyon County, Kentucky – 33 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 7: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 24 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 18 at least moderately damages waste water facilities In the case of Lyon County, Kentucky, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a lower estimate of damage as oppose to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (7). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Kentucky are estimated to incur greater damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 25 critical counties in Kentucky shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 663 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 523 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities 330 Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces greater damage. This trend holds true for other infrastructure types including highway bridges. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Kentucky. There tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 331 Table 196: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Ballard Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Caldwell Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Calloway Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Carlisle Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Christian Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Crittenden Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Daviess Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 5 0 0 0 0 172 1 0 0 0 1,038 40 0 0 0 722 158 2 0 0 749 562 13 6 4 2,686 761 15 6 4 3,696 440 22 3 2 495 327 9 2 0 61 180 4 1 0 4 5 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 4,262 954 35 6 2 2,030 412 3 0 0 4,143 748 16 0 32 2,463 1,192 47 2 5 368 910 35 2 54 615 381 17 1 2 9,619 3,643 118 5 93 1 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 455 1 0 0 0 633 23 0 0 0 607 471 12 2 5 1,741 495 12 2 5 14,778 2,235 99 17 15 1,980 1,265 42 8 5 242 654 17 5 2 11 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,011 4,171 159 30 22 2,321 486 7 2 2 311 399 3 1 0 38 224 1 1 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,672 1,114 11 4 2 24,709 3,095 256 21 23 545 364 8 1 0 59 123 1 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 2,850 335 39 3 3 28,166 3,919 304 25 26 332 Counties Fulton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Graves Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hancock Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Henderson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hickman Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hopkins Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Livingston Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 24 2 0 0 0 364 22 0 0 0 819 50 0 0 0 509 47 1 0 0 681 227 15 3 4 2,397 348 16 3 4 76 1 0 0 0 1,499 37 0 0 0 5,201 308 8 1 1 2,202 688 21 3 2 2,326 1,741 49 19 10 11,304 2,775 78 23 13 2,314 844 8 10 1 14 85 0 0 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,329 939 8 10 1 9,907 1,473 74 23 10 1,452 892 31 11 3 176 469 13 6 1 9 12 1 1 0 1,294 272 22 3 4 12,838 3,118 141 44 18 2 0 0 0 0 118 0 0 0 0 862 4 0 0 0 414 33 0 0 0 307 424 5 1 4 1,703 461 5 1 4 11,326 1,647 81 14 16 1,518 1,219 34 7 6 186 670 14 4 2 11 17 1 0 0 818 190 5 0 1 13,859 3,743 135 25 25 1,078 206 3 1 2 1,067 255 5 0 1 583 453 10 1 2 85 368 7 1 1 109 106 3 0 0 2,922 1,388 28 3 6 333 Counties Logan Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lyon Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Marshall Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other McCracken Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other McLean Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Muhlenberg Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Ohio Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 8,039 1,987 63 18 11 50 187 2 1 0 3 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,092 2,197 65 19 11 2,175 492 14 0 4 386 394 6 0 2 46 219 2 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 59 34 1 0 0 2,668 1,144 23 0 6 164 2 0 0 0 2,569 42 1 0 0 5,461 495 8 1 1 1,244 1,072 20 2 2 1,115 1,350 39 5 5 10,553 2,961 68 8 8 11 0 0 0 0 705 26 0 0 0 7,951 371 5 0 2 6,619 873 32 1 3 5,431 3,032 241 8 16 20,717 4,302 278 9 21 2,351 868 11 0 3 130 225 2 0 0 15 96 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 113 53 1 0 0 2,610 1,244 15 0 3 8,250 2,791 47 4 18 52 272 1 0 0 3 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 256 78 4 1 2 8,561 3,175 52 5 20 6,020 2,357 33 6 6 38 230 1 0 0 3 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,061 2,615 34 6 6 334 Counties Todd Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Trigg Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Union Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Webster Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 3,359 986 9 5 11 21 99 0 0 0 1 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,381 1,097 9 5 11 4,171 637 14 9 3 559 514 6 4 1 68 287 2 3 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,801 1,445 22 16 4 2,664 414 16 3 0 547 334 7 1 0 64 186 3 1 0 4 5 0 0 0 1,092 313 8 1 0 4,371 1,252 34 6 0 3,567 494 10 2 4 478 417 4 1 1 59 235 2 1 0 3 6 0 0 0 224 80 1 0 0 4,331 1,232 17 4 5 335 Table 197: Hospital Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Total # of Beds 0 15 378 0 592 48 469 70 106 0 205 0 401 26 92 0 563 0 84 135 49 0 25 54 0 Day 1 # of % Beds Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds 0 7 2 0 282 23 422 0 0 0 73 0 191 12 89 0 0 0 0 130 47 0 12 24 0 0 7 2 0 286 23 423 0 0 0 74 0 194 12 89 0 0 0 0 130 47 0 12 24 0 0 11 10 0 436 35 435 2 0 0 113 0 295 19 91 0 0 0 0 134 49 0 18 37 0 0 15 110 0 578 47 438 28 0 0 150 0 391 25 92 0 0 0 0 135 49 0 24 49 0 0 15 212 0 585 47 438 45 2 0 152 0 396 26 92 0 1 0 1 135 49 0 25 50 0 N/A 46.67 0.53 N/A 47.64 47.92 89.98 0.00 0.00 N/A 35.61 N/A 47.63 46.15 96.74 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 96.30 95.92 N/A 48.00 44.44 N/A N/A 46.67 0.53 N/A 48.31 47.92 90.19 0.00 0.00 N/A 36.10 N/A 48.38 46.15 96.74 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 96.30 95.92 N/A 48.00 44.44 N/A 336 N/A 73.33 2.65 N/A 73.65 72.92 92.75 2.86 0.00 N/A 55.12 N/A 73.57 73.08 98.91 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 99.26 100.00 N/A 72.00 68.52 N/A N/A 100.00 29.10 N/A 97.64 97.92 93.39 40.00 0.00 N/A 73.17 N/A 97.51 96.15 100.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 100.00 100.00 N/A 96.00 90.74 N/A N/A 100.00 56.08 N/A 98.82 97.92 93.39 64.29 1.89 N/A 74.15 N/A 98.75 100.00 100.00 N/A 0.18 N/A 1.19 100.00 100.00 N/A 100.00 92.59 N/A Table 198: Police Station Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Count 2 2 3 2 6 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 7 1 5 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 4 4 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 0.00 51.90 0.73 0.00 51.90 51.90 81.60 0.00 0.00 94.10 45.30 0.00 51.90 0.80 94.10 47.00 0.00 0.00 51.90 94.10 89.93 94.10 51.90 39.65 49.38 337 Table 199: School Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Count 7 6 13 4 27 3 45 9 18 4 16 3 23 5 15 5 13 28 6 12 12 7 5 7 8 338 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 0.00 51.90 0.80 0.00 51.90 51.90 80.67 0.00 0.00 94.10 44.00 0.00 51.59 14.60 94.10 47.00 0.00 0.00 64.83 94.10 89.93 94.10 51.90 42.76 51.08 Table 200: Fire Station Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Count 10 3 11 6 23 7 17 3 18 4 14 5 18 8 6 4 12 9 8 8 9 7 11 8 9 339 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 0.00 51.90 12.91 0.00 51.90 51.90 78.29 0.00 0.00 94.10 46.19 0.00 51.52 12.30 94.10 47.00 0.00 0.00 76.71 92.54 91.32 94.10 51.90 40.40 51.17 Table 201: Communication Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Facilities 92 70 111 42 265 61 338 63 158 85 320 43 255 82 125 62 146 251 53 177 127 63 71 113 89 At day 1 (%) 22.21 78.28 54.85 25.33 89.51 77.69 92.83 31.29 33.29 99.70 86.22 28.77 89.92 43.75 93.20 66.78 38.80 24.67 93.00 93.16 93.10 93.20 78.40 77.54 85.36 At day 3 (%) 31.44 93.85 76.56 37.56 97.68 93.40 98.53 47.21 50.54 99.90 95.32 43.93 97.75 64.76 98.90 87.10 57.97 36.00 98.70 98.86 98.80 98.90 94.00 92.90 96.00 340 At day 7 (%) 41.11 95.95 82.38 47.96 98.58 95.58 99.03 56.97 60.26 99.90 96.42 54.51 98.59 72.93 99.40 91.10 66.24 45.71 99.20 99.36 99.30 99.40 96.10 95.00 97.30 At day 30 (%) 69.63 99.38 94.77 76.44 99.80 99.20 99.59 82.15 84.62 99.90 98.40 81.69 99.74 91.61 99.90 98.48 86.48 73.31 99.73 99.87 99.81 99.90 99.50 98.67 99.37 At day 90 (%) 94.55 99.88 99.03 95.79 99.90 99.84 99.84 96.82 97.23 99.90 99.63 96.68 99.88 98.45 99.90 99.68 97.54 95.23 99.87 99.89 99.88 99.90 99.90 99.69 99.82 Table 202: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Households 3,395 5,431 13,862 2,208 24,857 3,829 36,033 3,237 14,841 3,215 18,095 2,188 18,820 3,996 10,506 2,898 27,152 12,412 6,847 12,357 8,899 4,569 5,215 5,710 5,560 At day 1 (%) 99.41 0.00 55.34 98.19 0.00 0.00 34.44 98.33 99.34 0.00 38.88 97.71 61.06 22.15 0.00 0.10 0.00 69.05 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.93 27.09 At day 3 (%) 99.26 0.00 42.19 97.24 0.00 0.00 20.03 97.62 99.28 0.00 22.65 96.66 51.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 58.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.48 2.55 341 At day 7 (%) 98.76 0.00 7.59 92.71 0.00 0.00 0.02 94.84 99.12 0.00 0.00 92.37 23.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.09 0.00 At day 30 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 203: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Facilities N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 1 2 N/A N/A 2 1 N/A 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 1 N/A 3 None (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.50 0.20 0.50 N/A N/A 0.94 0.50 N/A 0.35 0.02 0.50 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.20 N/A 0.29 Slight (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.38 0.42 0.37 N/A N/A 0.06 0.37 N/A 0.40 0.13 0.38 0.35 0.13 0.03 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.42 N/A 0.40 342 Moderate (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.11 0.31 0.11 N/A N/A 0.00 0.11 N/A 0.21 0.36 0.11 0.37 0.35 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.31 N/A 0.24 Extensive (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.01 0.07 0.01 N/A N/A 0.00 0.01 N/A 0.04 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.32 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 N/A 0.05 Complete (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.01 0.01 N/A N/A 0.00 0.01 N/A 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 N/A 0.03 Table 204: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Length (miles) 500 708 1,129 376 1,615 694 1,399 442 1,318 474 1,203 446 1,267 571 1,271 597 981 997 519 1,193 1,289 712 1,044 773 767 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 675 718 4 3 143 229 968 384 9 2 4 1 53 185 941 459 1,200 1,780 3 1 50 177 996 417 78 284 65 73 7 2 26 32 418 266 1,447 1,180 14 45 17 43 7 2 4 1 6 1 187 732 29 99 343 Table 205: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Households 3,395 5,431 13,862 2,208 24,857 3,829 36,033 3,237 14,841 3,215 18,095 2,188 18,820 3,996 10,506 2,898 27,152 12,412 6,847 12,357 8,899 4,569 5,215 5,710 5,560 At day 1 (%) 95.58 0.00 79.17 94.47 0.00 13.76 0.00 91.75 90.93 0.00 0.00 93.19 0.00 86.26 0.00 56.04 0.00 85.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 3 (%) 87.22 0.00 48.43 82.47 0.00 7.00 0.00 74.51 72.19 0.00 0.00 78.02 0.00 61.11 0.00 28.54 0.00 60.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 344 At day 7 (%) 67.01 0.00 18.66 57.38 0.00 1.91 0.00 46.18 43.30 0.00 0.00 49.82 0.00 29.40 0.00 7.94 0.00 28.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 30 (%) 26.10 0.00 3.64 19.43 0.00 0.24 0.00 14.15 13.11 0.00 0.00 15.08 0.00 6.58 0.00 1.04 0.00 6.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Table 206: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Facilities 22 16 40 16 83 11 162 15 57 82 165 24 99 51 45 33 125 147 19 89 102 20 28 51 59 None (%) 0.00 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.18 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.36 0.00 0.40 0.02 0.50 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.19 0.36 Slight (%) 0.01 0.42 0.19 0.02 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.39 0.13 0.38 0.35 0.10 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.39 345 Moderate (%) 0.11 0.31 0.38 0.18 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.25 0.28 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.37 0.32 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.30 0.20 Extensive (%) 0.37 0.07 0.23 0.41 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.41 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.31 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.03 Complete (%) 0.51 0.01 0.16 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 Table 207: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Length (miles) 300 425 678 225 969 417 840 265 791 284 722 268 760 343 763 358 589 598 311 716 773 427 627 464 460 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 534 568 4 3 113 181 765 303 7 2 3 1 42 147 744 363 949 1,408 2 1 40 140 788 330 61 225 52 58 5 1 20 25 330 211 1,145 934 11 36 13 34 6 1 3 1 5 1 148 579 23 78 346 Table 208: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Bridges 25 84 36 15 202 19 233 18 122 64 171 22 207 30 33 49 90 80 64 127 190 22 38 114 118 None (%) 0.33 0.93 0.75 0.16 0.97 0.98 0.86 0.17 0.40 0.98 0.82 0.23 0.89 0.84 0.97 0.94 0.46 0.32 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.71 0.81 Slight (%) 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 347 Moderate (%) 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Extensive (%) 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 Complete (%) 0.38 0.04 0.14 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.36 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.12 Table 209: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster # of Bridges 25 84 36 15 202 19 233 18 122 64 171 22 207 30 33 49 90 80 64 127 190 22 38 114 118 At day 1 (%) 43.66 94.87 80.56 27.03 98.60 98.09 87.79 29.21 51.79 99.11 83.86 35.71 92.05 87.43 98.76 97.83 55.47 41.12 86.98 92.91 92.99 99.00 98.06 76.04 83.04 At day 3 (%) 48.30 95.56 82.69 31.97 99.32 98.33 88.35 34.68 56.95 99.51 84.50 41.92 93.13 88.78 99.38 99.09 59.77 45.08 87.66 93.79 93.50 99.44 98.34 77.63 83.59 348 At day 7 (%) 51.16 95.75 83.59 35.49 99.53 98.43 88.68 38.51 60.06 99.67 84.75 46.60 93.49 89.31 99.60 99.24 62.42 47.83 88.03 94.19 93.75 99.63 98.42 77.82 83.83 At day 30 (%) 53.08 95.87 84.11 38.07 99.58 98.47 89.62 41.17 61.86 99.70 85.37 49.32 93.84 89.72 99.64 99.32 64.12 50.12 89.04 94.72 94.28 99.66 98.46 78.15 84.39 At day 90 (%) 61.64 96.34 86.38 49.69 99.75 98.67 94.92 53.23 69.57 99.81 88.80 61.11 95.61 91.57 99.77 99.66 71.63 60.88 94.75 97.58 97.17 99.79 98.63 79.80 87.47 Mississippi – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes all 82 counties in the State of Mississippi. Mississippi is approximately 47,700 square miles and is bordered by Tennessee to the north, the Gulf of Mexico to the south, Alabama to the east, and Arkansas and Louisiana to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 25 critical counties have been identified in the northern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 25 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. • • • • • • • Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah • • • • Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha The scenario consists of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake along one segment of the NMSZ. The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone. Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northeastern, central, and southwestern. The worst-case NMSZ scenario for the State of Mississippi employs an event in the southwest segment of the eastern fault. The location of this scenario event is illustrated in Figure 8 .For more information on the hazard utilized in this scenario please reference Appendix I. Figure 8: Scenario Fault Location for the State of Mississippi 349 The buildings in Mississippi are classified in two separate ways for damage estimates; by building use, termed “occupancy,” and by structure type/material, termed “building type.” The damage estimates shown indicate that less than 1% of the building stock in Mississippi experiences complete damage. This equates to roughly 7,300 completely damaged buildings in Mississippi. These completely damaged buildings are included in the roughly 39,000 at least moderately damaged buildings. Nearly 95% of all building collapses occurring to residential structures. In addition, about 89% of all at least moderate damage occurs in the 25 critical counties for Mississippi. Table 210: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Mississippi General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Buildings Severe Damage 793,953 212,185 8,062 1,657 1,478 1,017,335 11,343 26,741 705 466 127 39,382 3,881 3,094 190 112 23 7,300 Table 211: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 25 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (25 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 213,381 55,294 2,060 944 349 272,028 10,858 23,214 627 445 99 35,243 3,881 3,094 190 112 23 7,300 Wood construction is the most prevalent building type in Mississippi and sustains the most cases of complete damage. Nearly 46% of all instances of all complete damage, which is roughly 3,300 buildings, are experienced by wood frame structures. Unreinforced masonry (URM) construction and mobile homes (MH) also show high frequencies of complete damage and account for nearly all non-wood construction damage of this type. Concrete, steel, and reinforced masonry construction types represent considerably fewer cases of complete damage. Of the 984 fire stations in the state, 81 (more than 8%) are estimated to experience at least moderate damage. Approximately 8-9% of most other essential facility types (schools, hospitals, and police stations) each sustain at least moderate damage. The only emergency operation center expected to sustain this level of damage is located in Desoto County. 350 Table 212: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Mississippi Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 703,568 50807 7,092 2,512 297 296 906 102 84 955 104 113 494 39 36 44,187 6104 3,553 133,149 27429 16,731 885,771 84,882 27,905 Extensive 189 269 63 78 21 1,531 9,326 11,477 Complete 3,335 181 30 40 12 764 2,938 7,300 All non-functional facilities are located in the northern portion of the state. Of Mississippi’s 123 hospitals, 89 are considered functional the day after the earthquake, and that number increases to 112 functional facilities after one week. Over 90% of all fire stations and police stations in Mississippi are estimated to remain functional the day after the earthquake, though all these functioning facilities are in the southern portion of the state. Most of Mississippi’s northern counties are left without functioning facilities, and will likely experience diminished services in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. Table 213: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Mississippi8 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (State) At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 123 11 2 1,281 110 10 37 1 0 365 30 2 984 81 3 8 Functionality >50% at Day 1 89 1,130 35 322 856 For Tables 213-223 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 351 Table 214: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 25 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (25 Critical Counties) At Least Moderate Complete Essential Facility Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Type Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 27 11 2 0 Hospitals 353 110 10 202 Schools 10 1 0 8 EOCs 121 30 2 78 Police Stations 294 81 3 166 Fire Stations Table 215: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 5,043 73 0 11,893 0 0 16,936 73 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 4,978 11,893 16,871 Table 216: Airport Damage Assessments 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Airport (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 80 5 0 176 0 0 256 5 0 Functionality >50% at Day 1 80 176 256 As is the case with essential facilities, transportation lifelines also incur the most severe damage in northern Mississippi counties Roughly 75 of the 16,900 bridges, or less than 1% of all bridges, are estimated to incur at least moderate damage. Highway road segments connecting these damaged bridges are expected to incur slightly less damage than the bridges themselves, even in the counties with the most severe shaking. Highway segments are most generally defined as a section of highway between two end nodes. These end nodes are frequently highway bridges. At least moderate damage to highway bridges is characterized by moderate shear (diagonal) cracking of columns, spalling of cover concrete and shear keys, abutment movement less than two-inches, extensive cracking to shear keys, bent connection bolts, and moderate settlement of the bridge approaches. Furthermore, one port and five airports reach the at least moderate damage state and follow roughly the same damage distribution throughout the state as highway bridges. At least moderate damage to port facilities includes considerable ground settlement, derailment of port equipment, and damage to structural members. For airports, at least moderate damage is defined in the same manner as damage to other building types discussed previously. 352 Table 217: Transportation System Damage for the State of Mississippi Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage >50%) >50%) Segments 2,425 0 0 Bridges 16,936 73 0 Tunnels 0 0 0 Segments 2,376 0 0 Bridges 63 0 0 Tunnels 1 0 0 Facilities 76 0 0 Facilities 40 0 0 Segments 0 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 0 0 0 Facilities 2 2 2 Facilities 222 1 0 Facilities 256 5 0 Runways 205 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 2,425 16,871 0 2,376 63 1 76 40 0 0 0 0 222 256 205 Table 218: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Potable Water Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 3 0 0 3 Remaining Counties 14 0 0 14 17 0 0 17 Total State Table 219: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 630 102 0 347 Remaining Counties 2,450 0 0 2,450 3,080 102 0 2,797 Total State Utility lifelines show similar damage and functionality estimates to those of the transportation systems. Over 100 waste water and nearly 300 communication facilities incur at least moderate damage, while 24 electric power facilities reach the same damage state. There are no potable water facilities in the counties with the most intense shaking, and as a result, no potable water facilities are expected to reach the at least moderate damage. About 12% of all natural gas facilities in the critical counties incur at least moderate damage. 353 Table 220: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 25 Critical Counties 98 12 0 86 Remaining Counties 317 0 0 317 415 12 0 403 Total State Table 221: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 25 Critical Counties 6 1 0 5 Remaining Counties 99 0 0 99 105 1 0 104 Total State Table 222: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 128 24 0 80 Remaining Counties 620 0 0 620 748 24 0 700 Total State Table 223: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Communication Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 25 Critical Counties 2,553 290 0 Remaining Counties 6,663 0 0 9,216 290 0 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,553 6,663 9,216 Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not included in the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, called local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are composed of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 2,700 and 2,985, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however; show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at 354 roughly 0.059 leaks/mile (1 leak every 17 miles) or 0.054 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 18.5 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 2,583 leaks and 2,444 breaks over the combined length of 52,653 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off to nearly 42,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to roughly 40,000 residences within a week, with all service restored after three months. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. This period of time without water prevents thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with over 32,600 residences without electric power the day after the earthquake, or over 3% of all state residences. Even a month after the earthquake, nearly 1,300 residences are still without power. All electric power lines in Mississippi are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking, unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation Table 224: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 106,188 63,698 10,188 42,465 3,488 No. Leaks 2,985 2,361 59 2,524 8 No. Breaks 2,700 2,136 161 2,283 16 Table 225: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 No. Households 41,790 40,256 39,752 28,749 Potable Water 1,046,434 32,601 18,416 6,452 1,276 Electric Power Day 90 0 44 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as 355 discussed in footnote (8) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Desoto County, Mississippi – 204 Highway Bridges o Estimation procedure according to footnote 8: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 25 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 56 at least moderately damaged highway bridges In the case of Desoto County, Mississippi, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a higher estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (8). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Mississippi are estimated to incur less damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges for the 25 critical counties in Mississippi shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 300 at least moderately damaged highway bridges o Total number of at least moderately damaged highway bridges according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 73 at least moderately damaged highway bridges Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces greater damage when summed for the 25 critical counties. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Mississippi. There tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 356 Table 226: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Alcorn Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Benton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Bolivar Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Calhoun Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Chickasaw Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Coahoma Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Desoto Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 8,816 962 66 14 4 2,152 763 29 7 2 247 613 12 5 1 28 243 1 1 0 5 38 0 0 0 11,248 2,619 108 27 7 1,120 8 0 0 0 1,023 67 1 0 0 209 278 3 0 0 41 285 2 0 0 30 53 1 0 0 2,423 691 7 0 0 8,309 907 68 3 10 968 606 32 1 4 75 393 15 1 2 3 195 4 0 1 0 35 1 0 0 9,355 2,136 120 5 17 4,301 532 16 14 3 501 425 7 6 1 39 237 3 3 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,842 1,200 26 23 4 4,295 939 28 11 8 500 758 12 5 3 39 424 5 3 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,835 2,131 45 19 12 6,613 436 20 1 3 770 221 20 1 2 60 231 18 2 1 2 342 13 3 1 0 63 4 1 0 7,445 1,293 75 8 7 13,432 128 1 0 4 15,658 240 10 2 5 4,780 649 67 12 8 743 1,091 107 28 10 2,713 1,320 130 49 13 37,326 3,428 315 91 40 357 Counties Grenada Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Itawamba Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lafayette Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lee Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Marshall Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Monroe Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Panola Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 6,070 629 49 17 4 707 449 22 9 2 55 315 10 6 1 2 204 2 2 0 0 37 1 0 0 6,834 1,634 84 34 7 6,357 906 15 2 17 740 761 6 1 6 58 428 3 0 2 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,157 2,105 24 3 25 5,322 784 4 5 2 3,135 850 20 20 3 581 1,123 52 111 8 103 854 37 155 6 21 141 9 46 1 9,162 3,752 122 337 20 20,288 2,671 312 99 40 2,363 1,805 134 46 14 184 974 56 25 5 7 24 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 22,842 5,474 506 172 59 3,915 72 1 0 2 3,575 374 6 1 4 728 1,437 16 4 6 142 1,466 12 6 5 158 295 4 2 1 8,518 3,644 39 13 18 10,075 1,522 37 11 7 1,174 1,190 16 5 2 91 661 6 3 1 3 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,343 3,389 59 19 10 5,081 301 18 2 4 2,231 552 21 2 3 409 1,583 24 5 4 72 1,746 17 6 3 15 293 5 2 1 7,808 4,475 85 17 15 358 Counties Pontotoc Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Prentiss Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Quitman Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Sunflower Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Tallahatchie Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Tate Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Tippah Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 6,784 1,059 27 18 5 864 860 12 8 2 67 481 5 4 1 2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,717 2,412 44 30 8 6,380 812 27 7 9 1,072 626 12 3 4 84 345 5 2 1 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,539 1,791 44 12 14 2,250 112 2 0 2 262 112 2 0 1 20 141 2 0 1 1 219 1 0 1 0 40 0 0 0 2,533 624 7 0 5 6,748 383 45 6 9 618 185 16 2 4 48 120 7 1 3 2 70 1 0 2 0 13 0 0 0 7,416 771 69 9 18 3,022 221 5 0 5 352 244 5 0 3 27 312 5 1 3 1 485 3 0 2 0 90 1 0 1 3,402 1,352 19 1 14 3,050 87 1 0 1 2,785 257 7 2 2 567 831 20 8 5 110 837 14 8 4 443 238 10 7 3 6,955 2,250 52 25 15 3,025 36 1 1 1 2,762 179 4 4 1 561 681 11 14 2 104 693 8 15 2 22 113 2 4 0 6,474 1,702 26 38 6 359 Counties Tishomingo Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Tunica Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Union Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Yalobusha Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 5,900 745 25 9 9 948 596 11 4 3 74 332 5 2 1 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,925 1,681 41 15 13 630 25 1 0 0 576 78 9 0 1 117 257 23 0 2 22 259 17 1 2 454 263 22 1 3 1,799 882 72 2 8 5,647 605 34 26 4 1,757 514 16 12 2 262 575 8 6 1 41 357 2 0 0 20 62 0 0 0 7,727 2,113 60 44 7 3,260 770 7 0 0 459 622 3 0 0 36 345 1 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,756 1,745 11 0 0 360 Table 227: Hospital Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Total # of Beds 165 0 155 30 84 195 246 156 0 204 50 40 144 182 102 114 36 160 77 76 110 48 0 200 85 Day 1 # of % Beds Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds 78 N/A 74 14 40 33 0 74 N/A 1 24 0 69 16 49 54 6 76 13 0 0 23 N/A 95 40 79 N/A 75 14 41 34 0 75 N/A 1 24 0 70 16 49 55 6 77 13 0 1 23 N/A 96 41 121 N/A 114 22 62 78 0 115 N/A 6 37 1 106 39 75 84 14 118 31 2 3 35 N/A 147 62 161 N/A 151 29 82 169 4.92 152 N/A 62 49 12 141 106 100 111 31 156 67 17 33 47 N/A 195 83 47.30 N/A 47.70 47.70 47.70 17.00 0 47.70 N/A 0.40 47.70 0.40 47.70 8.70 47.70 47.30 17.00 47.70 17.00 0.30 0.40 47.30 N/A 47.30 47.30 47.90 N/A 48.30 48.30 48.30 17.50 0 48.30 N/A 0.50 48.30 0.50 48.30 9.00 48.30 47.90 17.50 48.30 17.50 0.30 0.50 47.90 N/A 47.90 47.90 73.30 N/A 73.60 73.60 73.60 39.80 0 73.60 N/A 2.70 73.60 2.70 73.60 21.25 73.60 73.30 39.80 73.60 39.80 2.00 2.70 73.30 N/A 73.30 73.30 Day 90 # of % Beds 97.60 163 98.80 N/A N/A N/A 97.60 153 98.80 97.60 30 98.80 97.60 83 98.80 86.60 182 93.20 2 34.194 13.9 97.60 154 98.80 N/A N/A N/A 30.20 119 58.10 97.60 49 98.80 29.90 23 57.60 97.60 142 98.80 58.40 138 75.65 97.60 101 98.80 97.60 113 98.80 86.60 34 93.20 97.60 158 98.80 86.60 72 93.20 22.60 33 43.60 30.20 64 58.10 97.60 47 98.80 N/A N/A N/A 97.60 198 98.80 97.60 84 98.80 * Note: Discrepancies between the number of hospital beds and the percentage of beds may occur due to rounding. 361 Table 228: Police Station Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Count 2 2 13 5 4 7 6 2 4 3 7 4 5 6 3 4 5 8 7 4 4 6 2 4 4 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 47.00 0.80 51.90 51.90 51.90 51.90 0.47 51.90 51.90 0.90 51.90 0.80 51.90 9.33 51.90 49.45 51.90 67.73 51.90 0.80 0.88 49.45 0.60 47.00 49.45 362 Table 229: School Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Count 17 5 25 8 9 23 35 7 9 15 32 16 19 15 13 15 5 24 7 13 12 9 6 9 5 363 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 38.86 0.80 51.90 51.90 51.90 51.90 0.43 51.90 51.90 17.36 51.90 0.80 51.90 28.08 51.90 48.75 51.90 61.07 51.90 0.75 0.89 49.72 0.60 32.12 48.96 Table 230: Fire Station Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Count 15 6 14 8 7 11 19 10 12 16 22 9 22 12 12 14 5 7 14 12 9 16 2 13 7 364 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 37.78 0.80 51.90 51.90 51.90 51.90 0.53 51.90 51.90 18.18 51.90 0.80 51.90 13.62 50.68 48.05 51.90 63.96 51.90 0.78 0.88 49.14 0.60 42.13 51.20 Table 231: Communication Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 172 23 207 66 78 121 250 74 55 99 219 114 186 112 70 45 60 128 60 69 55 65 117 73 35 81.93 78.40 93.20 93.20 93.20 91.45 61.43 93.20 93.20 78.40 93.22 75.16 93.21 78.36 93.20 93.20 88.27 95.62 93.20 75.31 78.47 93.22 74.39 85.09 89.39 95.17 94.00 98.90 98.90 98.90 98.29 82.88 98.90 98.90 94.00 98.90 92.04 98.90 93.95 98.90 98.90 97.27 99.27 98.90 91.77 94.00 98.90 89.06 96.22 97.64 96.89 96.10 99.40 99.40 99.40 98.97 87.71 99.40 99.40 96.10 99.40 94.63 99.40 96.05 99.40 99.40 98.30 99.58 99.40 94.26 96.10 99.40 91.16 97.59 98.55 99.60 99.50 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.82 97.35 99.90 99.90 99.50 99.90 99.16 99.90 99.46 99.90 99.90 99.77 99.90 99.90 98.68 99.50 99.90 95.68 99.68 99.80 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.89 99.49 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.83 99.90 99.89 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.74 99.90 99.90 99.15 99.90 99.90 365 Table 232: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Households 14,224 2,999 13,776 6,019 7,253 10,553 38,792 8,820 8,773 14,373 29,200 12,163 14,603 12,232 10,097 9,821 3,565 9,637 5,263 8,850 8,108 7,917 3,258 9,786 5,260 At day 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,257 0 0 0 0 151 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1,178 0 0 3,199 0 0 At day 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3,189 0 0 366 At day 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 36,588 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,164 0 0 At day 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 26,460 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,289 0 0 At day 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 233: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Facilities 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 None (%) 19.73% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50.00% N/A N/A N/A Slight (%) 42.20% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37.59% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37.59% N/A N/A N/A 367 Moderate (%) 30.82% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 11.35% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 11.35% N/A N/A N/A Extensive (%) 6.56% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.98% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.98% N/A N/A N/A Complete (%) 0.67% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.06% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.06% N/A N/A N/A Table 234: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Length (miles) 1,071 789 2,273 994 891 1,724 1,523 972 1,174 1,230 1,472 1,396 1,651 1,584 1,025 997 690 2,010 1,661 888 975 1,122 1,032 908 1,001 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 39 10 36 16 98 24 43 11 38 10 131 33 671 1,117 42 10 6 2 53 13 49 12 142 58 36 9 156 39 44 11 19 5 59 15 66 16 71 18 92 81 42 10 48 12 384 1,011 40 12 43 11 368 Table 235: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Households 14,224 2,999 13,776 6,019 7,253 10,553 38,792 8,820 8,773 14,373 29,200 12,163 14,603 12,232 10,097 9,821 3,565 9,637 5,263 8,850 8,108 7,917 3,258 9,786 5,260 At day 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,217 0 0 0 0 1,930 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,454 0 0 0 0 0 At day 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 16,692 0 0 0 0 983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 741 0 0 0 0 0 369 At day 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,972 0 0 0 0 274 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 206 0 0 0 0 0 At day 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,213 0 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 At day 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Table 236: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Facilities 21 8 37 13 29 28 90 31 18 26 49 24 31 38 25 13 6 24 12 27 17 25 16 12 10 None (%) 21.17% 19.73% 50.00% 50.00% 50.0% 44.59% 7.48% 50.00% 50.00% 19.73% 50.00% 17.4% 50.00% 19.73% 50.0% 50.00% 24.78% 59.7% 50.00% 16.03% 19.73% 50.00% 18.35% 39.91% 40.92% Slight (%) 41.98% 42.20% 37.59% 37.59% 37.6% 38.41% 30.20% 37.59% 37.59% 42.20% 37.59% 40.2% 37.59% 42.20% 37.6% 37.59% 41.43% 30.4% 37.59% 38.17% 42.20% 37.59% 39.26% 39.13% 38.97% 370 Moderate (%) 29.89% 30.82% 11.35% 11.35% 11.4% 14.83% 40.69% 11.35% 11.35% 30.82% 11.35% 32.8% 11.35% 30.82% 11.4% 11.35% 27.58% 9.0% 11.35% 32.36% 30.82% 11.35% 28.68% 17.84% 17.19% Extensive (%) 6.29% 6.56% 0.98% 0.98% 1.0% 1.98% 16.73% 0.98% 0.98% 6.56% 0.98% 8.3% 0.98% 6.56% 1.0% 0.98% 5.63% 0.8% 0.98% 8.53% 6.56% 0.98% 6.10% 2.84% 2.65% Complete (%) 0.64% 0.67% 0.06% 0.06% 0.1% 0.17% 4.88% 0.06% 0.06% 0.67% 0.06% 1.3% 0.06% 0.67% 0.1% 0.06% 0.57% 0.0% 0.06% 4.89% 0.67% 0.06% 7.59% 0.26% 0.24% Table 237: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Length (miles) 1,035 763 2,196 960 861 1,666 1,472 939 1,134 1,189 1,422 1,349 1,596 1,531 991 963 667 1,942 1,604 858 943 1,085 997 877 967 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 31 8 28 13 77 19 34 8 30 8 104 26 531 883 33 8 5 1 42 10 39 10 112 46 28 7 124 31 35 9 15 4 47 12 52 13 56 14 72 64 33 8 38 10 304 800 31 9 34 9 371 Table 238: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Bridges 234 120 286 224 231 112 204 171 240 263 377 256 289 251 164 206 117 189 155 157 175 138 63 242 179 None (%) 90.34% 85.82% 97.01% 97.30% 97.41% 85.66% 62.86% 88.68% 97.32% 89.19% 97.32% 79.93% 98.79% 82.63% 96.21% 94.14% 70.15% 94.24% 79.79% 72.14% 88.18% 95.24% 65.80% 89.20% 96.68% Slight (%) 7.05% 5.20% 1.57% 2.03% 1.94% 6.16% 9.83% 4.57% 1.99% 6.00% 1.95% 6.96% 0.90% 7.29% 3.24% 5.16% 11.43% 2.78% 7.92% 8.03% 5.26% 4.22% 4.52% 5.94% 2.53% 372 Moderate (%) 1.24% 3.03% 0.67% 0.42% 0.40% 3.39% 6.02% 2.63% 0.43% 1.74% 0.45% 3.78% 0.19% 4.01% 0.34% 0.43% 7.01% 1.28% 4.77% 4.43% 2.77% 0.33% 2.60% 1.88% 0.49% Extensive (%) 1.00% 3.40% 0.55% 0.21% 0.20% 3.33% 8.30% 2.84% 0.22% 1.61% 0.23% 4.36% 0.10% 4.17% 0.17% 0.22% 7.73% 1.20% 5.23% 5.62% 2.71% 0.17% 2.57% 1.81% 0.25% Complete (%) 0.36% 2.53% 0.18% 0.03% 0.03% 1.43% 12.97% 1.26% 0.03% 1.43% 0.03% 4.95% 0.01% 1.87% 0.02% 0.03% 3.66% 0.47% 2.27% 9.75% 1.06% 0.02% 24.48% 1.14% 0.03% Table 239: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 234 120 286 224 231 112 204 171 240 263 377 256 289 251 164 206 117 189 155 157 175 138 63 242 179 95.97 90.70 98.33 98.90 98.94 91.32 72.46 92.93 98.90 94.23 98.87 86.43 99.46 89.36 98.69 98.10 81.01 96.69 87.25 79.78 92.95 98.47 70.46 94.23 98.68 98.09 92.91 98.92 99.52 99.53 93.88 76.68 94.84 99.51 96.23 99.48 89.30 99.73 92.39 99.59 99.50 85.94 97.76 90.65 83.10 95.11 99.60 72.36 96.27 99.44 98.56 94.12 99.20 99.68 99.69 95.23 79.08 95.88 99.68 96.91 99.65 90.80 99.80 93.97 99.72 99.66 88.69 98.27 92.54 84.87 96.21 99.72 73.42 97.00 99.64 98.72 94.57 99.27 99.71 99.71 95.69 80.27 96.27 99.70 97.15 99.69 91.41 99.81 94.55 99.74 99.70 89.77 98.43 93.25 85.70 96.57 99.75 74.09 97.26 99.67 99.23 96.43 99.54 99.80 99.81 97.42 85.28 97.75 99.80 98.04 99.80 93.90 99.86 96.73 99.82 99.80 93.84 99.05 95.98 89.13 97.97 99.83 77.00 98.23 99.79 373 Missouri – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario This earthquake impact assessment includes the City of St. Louis and all 114 counties in the State of Missouri. Missouri is approximately 70,000 square miles and is bordered by Iowa to the north; Arkansas to the south; Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee to the east; and Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma to the west. For the purposes of this analysis, 46 critical counties have been identified in the southeastern portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 46 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. • • • • • • • • • • • • Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin • • • • • • • • • • • • Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid • • • • • • • • • • • • Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley St. Charles Ste. Genevieve • • • • • • • • • • St. Francois St. Louis St. Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Figure 9: Scenario Fault Location for the State of Missouri The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Missouri employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Fault. The scenario consists of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake event along the central segment of the presumed New Madrid Fault system. 374 The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the middle fault in the proposed New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northern, central and southern. The worst-case scenario for the State of Missouri, the critical counties in particular, is an event on the western fault line in the central segment. The location of this scenario event is illustrated in Figure 9 . For more information on the hazard utilized in this scenario please reference Appendix I. The NMSZ scenario produces thousands of damaged buildings in the State of Missouri. The damage estimates shown indicate that nearly 85,000 buildings in Missouri experience at least moderate damage, of which 37,000 of these buildings experience complete damage. Nearly 98% of all at least moderate damage and complete damage occurs to residential structures. Additionally, about 98% of all at least moderate damage occurs in the 46 critical counties. Table 240: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Missouri General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage 1,472,235 55,807 23,860 Single Family 272,089 26,748 12,179 Other Residential 20,433 1,560 651 Commercial 2,872 226 80 Industrial 2,916 226 121 Other 1,770,545 84,567 36,891 Total Table 241: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 46 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (46 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. At Least Moderate Complete Damage Type Buildings Damage 23,860 781,203 55,195 Single Family 12,179 148,667 25,859 Other Residential 651 11,156 1,533 Commercial 80 1,678 218 Industrial 121 1,536 215 Other 36,891 944,240 83,020 Total Wood construction, the most prevalent building type in Missouri, sustains the most cases of complete damage. Approximately 15,000 wood frame buildings will experience complete damage, this equates to about 40% of all complete damage cases. Unreinforced masonry (URM) construction and mobile homes (MH) also show high frequencies of complete damage and account for about 58% of all complete damage cases. This damage state is identified by significant cracking to unreinforced masonry walls as well as some connection damage to column/beam joints in unreinforced masonry building. The 376 remaining building types show far less inventory throughout the state and thus experience a far lesser proportion of damage. Table 242: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Missouri Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,108,809 40,945 13,655 6,800 601 360 2,166 156 70 2,291 179 129 1,493 121 77 317,999 34,151 11,730 149,399 20,868 8,177 1,588,957 97,021 34,198 Extensive 4,808 109 27 41 20 3,929 4,544 13,478 Complete 15,090 298 84 97 69 11,686 9,567 36,891 Table 243: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Missouri9 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (State) At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 160 8 3 2,817 185 85 33 7 4 654 61 32 1,399 116 48 Functionality >50% at Day 1 123 2,530 25 587 1,264 Table 244: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 46 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (46 Critical Counties) At Least Moderate Complete Essential Facility Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Type Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 79 8 3 42 Hospitals 1,435 185 85 1,148 Schools 17 7 4 9 EOCs 326 61 32 259 Police Stations 647 116 48 512 Fire Stations Of the 1,399 fire stations in the state, 116 (more than 8%) are estimated to experience at least moderate damage. Approximately 8-10% of most other essential facility types 9 For Tables 243-253 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 377 (schools, hospitals and police stations) each sustain at least moderate damage. Several emergency operation centers are expected to sustain this level of damage since they are located in the portion of the state which experiences the most severe shaking. All at least moderated damage of essential facilities is confined to the 46 critical counties. All non-functional facilities are located in the southeastern portion of the state. Additionally, numerous hospitals in the St. Louis metropolitan area are not functional the first week after the earthquake. Of Missouri’s 160 hospitals, 123 are considered functional the day after the earthquake and that number increases to 152 functional facilities after one week. Roughly 90% of all fire stations and police stations in Missouri are estimated to remain functional the day after the earthquake, though all these functioning facilities are in the northern and western portions of the state. Most of Missouri’s southeastern counties are left without functioning facilities and will likely experience diminished services in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. Table 245: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 7,803 1,363 659 13,962 0 0 21,765 1,363 659 Functionality >50% at Day 1 6,447 13,962 20,409 Table 246: Airport Damage Assessments 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Airports (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 208 33 5 350 0 0 558 33 5 Functionality >50% at Day 1 182 350 532 As is the case with essential facilities, transportation lifelines located in southeastern Missouri Counties incur the most severe damage. Roughly 1,360 of the 21,800 bridges, or 6% of all bridges, are estimated to incur at least moderate damage. Of the 1,360 damaged bridges, 659 are expected to experience complete damage. Highway road segments connecting these damaged bridges are expected to incur slightly less damage than the bridges themselves, even in these counties with the most severe shaking. Highway segments are most generally defined as a section of highway between two end nodes. These end nodes are frequently highway bridges. At least moderate damage to highway bridges is characterized by moderate shear (diagonal) cracking of columns, spalling of cover concrete and shear keys, abutment movement less than two-inches, extensive cracking to shear keys, bent connection bolts and moderate settlement of the bridge approaches. 378 Furthermore, 27% of all ports and 16% of all airports reach the at least moderate damage state and follow roughly the same damage distribution throughout the state as highway bridges. At least moderate damage to port facilities includes considerable ground settlement, derailment of port equipment and damage to structural members. For airports, at least moderate damage is defined in the same manner as damage to other building types discussed previously. The lack of functionality of many transportation lifelines in southeastern Missouri will make the movement of people and supplies difficult in the days immediately following the earthquake. Table 247: Transportation System Damage for the State of Missouri Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Type Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage>50%) >50%) Segments 4,186 0 0 Bridges 21,765 1,363 659 Tunnels 0 0 0 Segments 3,487 0 0 Bridges 200 2 0 Tunnels 12 0 0 Facilities 125 24 0 Facilities 72 5 1 Segments 2 0 0 Bridges 0 0 0 Facilities 17 17 17 Facilities 8 8 8 Facilities 230 49 0 Facilities 558 33 5 Runways 440 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 4,185 20,409 0 3,487 198 12 109 69 2 0 0 0 205 532 440 Table 248: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Potable Water Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 46 Critical Counties 3,413 758 48 2,756 Remaining Counties 5,186 0 0 5,186 8,599 758 48 7,942 Total State Utility lifelines show similar damage and functionality estimates to those of the transportation systems. Over 750 of all potable water facilities are moderately or more severely damaged while 48 incur complete damage. Additionally 88 waste water facilities, 1,573 communication facilities, and 96 electric power facilities incur at least moderate damage. Additionally, 65 natural gas facilities, or about 54% of all natural gas facilities located in the critical counties, experience at least moderate damage. 379 Table 249: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 46 Critical Counties 626 88 8 505 Remaining Counties 686 0 0 686 1,312 88 8 1,191 Total State Table 250: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 46 Critical Counties 117 63 6 54 Remaining Counties 237 0 0 237 354 63 9 291 Total State Table 251: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 46 Critical Counties 52 8 0 44 Remaining Counties 67 0 0 67 119 8 0 111 Total State Table 252: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 46 Critical Counties 426 96 7 309 Remaining Counties 980 0 0 980 1,406 96 7 1,289 Total State Table 253: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 46 Critical Counties 9,232 1,573 104 8,367 Remaining Counties 11,640 0 0 11,640 20,872 1,573 104 20,007 Total State 380 Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not included in the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, called local inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are composed of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of both breaks and leaks at roughly 20,400 and 15,000, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest break and leak rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.19 leaks/mile (1 leak every 5.2 miles) or 0.26 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 3.8 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of approximately 12,950 leaks and 18,000 breaks over the combined length of 70,400 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off for over 146,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to roughly 80,000 residences within a week and nearly 38,000 customers are still without service after three months. Additionally, all service interruptions occur in the 46 critical counties. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. This period of time without water prevents thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with over 100,000 service outages the day after the earthquake, or nearly 5% of all state residences without power. Even a month after the earthquake nearly 13,000 residences are still without power. All electric power lines are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. Table 254: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water – Local Waste Water – Local Natural Gas – Regional Natural Gas – Local Oil – Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 165,831 99,499 4,087 66,312 6,413 No. Leaks 15,052 11,905 223 12,726 60 No. Breaks 20,409 16,142 754 17,255 163 Table 255: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 146,368 115,391 79,848 77,818 Potable Water 2,194,594 100,141 70,720 39,499 12,955 Electric Power 381 Day 90 38,426 121 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (9) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Jefferson County, Missouri – 91 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 9: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 0 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 11 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities In the case of Jefferson County, Missouri, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a higher estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (9). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Missouri are estimated to incur less damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 46 critical counties in Missouri shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 108 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 88 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities 382 Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces more damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Missouri. There tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 383 Table 256: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Audrain Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Bollinger Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Boone Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Butler Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Callaway Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Cape Girardeau Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Carter Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green (Moderate) Yellow (Extensive) Red (Complete) Total 7,077 1,056 65 17 18 77 90 2 0 1 6 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,160 1,157 67 17 19 1,385 191 6 0 2 972 200 4 0 1 427 287 4 0 2 165 291 2 0 1 227 239 1 0 0 3,176 1,208 17 0 6 28,969 8,202 582 46 75 317 504 15 1 2 26 61 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,312 8,767 599 47 77 952 35 0 0 0 3,811 135 0 0 2 2,412 147 7 0 2 492 507 38 3 4 2,951 2,101 159 20 26 10,618 2,925 204 23 34 9,316 3,465 57 4 9 102 332 1 0 0 8 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,426 3,838 58 4 9 8,056 771 24 2 7 5,565 812 50 3 5 2,142 942 118 9 8 906 729 84 9 6 887 271 35 4 2 17,556 3,525 311 27 28 974 102 8 2 3 387 129 4 1 1 133 252 3 1 1 50 224 2 0 0 37 56 1 0 0 1,581 763 18 4 5 384 Cole Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Crawford Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dent Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Douglas Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dunklin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Franklin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Gasconade Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Howell Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 17,752 2,630 264 22 186 194 140 7 1 5 16 17 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,962 2,787 272 23 192 6,392 1,757 53 2 6 70 180 1 0 0 6 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,468 1,959 54 2 6 3,785 1,337 45 8 12 41 131 1 0 0 3 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,829 1,484 46 8 12 3,344 1,070 24 0 2 37 109 1 0 0 3 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,384 1,192 25 0 2 124 2 0 0 0 782 13 0 0 0 1,630 58 0 0 0 1,292 123 1 0 0 4,677 1,737 73 9 7 8,505 1,933 74 9 7 24,800 5,489 231 63 28 271 521 6 2 1 22 64 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,093 6,074 238 65 29 4,596 1,229 32 12 7 50 121 1 0 0 4 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,650 1,365 33 12 7 8,520 3,058 112 11 11 93 304 3 0 0 8 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,621 3,400 115 11 11 385 Iron Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Jefferson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lincoln Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Madison Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Maries Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Miller Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Mississippi Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Montgomery Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 2,290 437 13 3 5 393 369 6 1 2 73 211 2 1 1 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,760 1,022 21 5 8 44,179 9,447 297 45 36 4,922 2,807 83 8 8 899 1,274 33 4 3 46 29 2 0 0 124 62 1 0 0 50,170 13,619 416 57 47 9,452 3,483 55 5 3 103 356 1 0 0 8 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,563 3,883 56 5 3 2,564 444 19 6 5 498 358 8 3 2 92 204 3 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 37 12 0 0 0 3,196 1,023 30 10 8 2,321 844 15 2 6 25 85 0 0 0 2 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,348 940 15 2 6 6,238 1,877 54 9 8 68 185 1 0 0 5 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,311 2,085 55 9 8 310 18 0 0 0 1,191 86 2 0 1 874 187 7 1 2 224 171 5 1 2 925 192 7 1 2 3,524 654 21 3 7 3,684 851 31 7 9 40 86 1 0 0 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,727 948 32 7 9 386 New Madrid Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Oregon Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Osage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Ozark Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Pemiscot Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Perry Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Phelps Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Pike Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 26 2 0 0 0 424 31 0 0 0 1,226 161 4 0 0 854 295 10 1 1 2,154 1,040 33 4 7 4,684 1,529 47 5 8 2,311 607 22 3 7 255 284 3 0 1 46 150 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 13 6 0 0 0 2,629 1,051 26 3 8 3,962 637 20 30 12 43 63 1 1 0 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,008 708 21 31 12 2,803 1,147 18 2 5 31 121 0 0 0 2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,836 1,283 18 2 5 21 0 0 0 0 352 9 0 0 0 1,259 59 1 0 1 938 128 4 0 3 2,214 1,007 37 3 39 4,784 1,203 42 3 43 4,122 479 46 10 13 784 376 20 5 5 145 213 8 2 2 12 6 1 0 0 33 6 1 0 0 5,096 1,080 76 17 20 9,106 2,887 109 5 23 100 254 3 0 1 8 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,214 3,172 112 5 24 4,424 1,076 64 2 14 48 107 2 0 0 4 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,476 1,196 66 2 14 387 Pulaski Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Reynolds Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Ripley Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Charles Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Francois Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Louis City Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Saint Louis Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Sainte Genevieve Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 7,902 3,063 111 6 34 86 267 3 0 1 7 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,995 3,363 114 6 35 1,823 294 7 3 3 313 257 3 2 1 59 148 1 1 0 5 4 0 0 0 20 6 0 0 0 2,220 709 11 6 4 483 9 1 0 0 1,200 78 3 1 1 956 421 11 3 1 317 636 9 5 1 309 497 6 4 1 3,265 1,641 30 13 4 76,484 6,599 762 94 97 836 524 19 3 3 67 64 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77,388 7,187 783 97 100 11,667 2,305 100 9 9 1,388 1,010 36 3 3 255 516 14 2 1 13 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,323 3,843 151 14 13 47,742 19,113 910 138 310 8,032 3,372 386 63 63 1,498 696 159 34 23 78 35 12 3 1 2,350 1,821 157 21 13 59,700 25,037 1,624 259 410 269,941 10,908 3,963 663 147 20,609 1,163 626 85 41 3,660 273 235 40 15 184 12 16 3 1 344 37 4 2 9 294,738 12,393 4,844 793 213 4,183 565 29 10 3 717 481 12 5 1 134 276 5 3 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,041 1,329 46 18 4 388 Scott Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Shannon Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Stoddard Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Texas Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Warren Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Washington Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Wayne Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other 1,593 49 1 0 0 3,205 192 5 1 2 2,111 557 22 3 3 805 757 32 5 5 2,483 1,010 56 7 10 10,197 2,565 116 16 20 1,667 298 6 1 2 286 261 3 1 1 53 151 1 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,009 714 10 2 3 95 1 0 0 0 615 6 0 0 0 1,910 69 1 0 0 1,632 207 5 0 0 3,790 1,490 79 5 2 8,042 1,773 85 5 2 5,488 2,123 57 14 17 60 214 1 0 0 5 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,553 2,363 58 14 17 7,136 1,902 44 7 12 78 193 1 0 0 6 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,220 2,119 45 7 12 3,834 2,364 18 3 13 383 750 6 1 3 69 350 2 1 1 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,290 3,472 26 5 17 1,014 239 11 2 2 1,247 280 6 1 2 782 576 5 1 1 228 704 3 1 1 284 587 3 0 2 3,555 2,386 28 5 8 389 Table 257: Hospital Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Sainte Genevieve Saint Francois Saint Louis County & Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Total # of Beds Day 1 # of % Beds Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds 201 N/A 1,227 483 557 194 N/A 1,183 23 537 96.5 N/A 96.4 4.8 96.4 194 N/A 1,184 26 538 96.5 N/A 96.5 5.4 96.6 200 N/A 1,218 116 553 99.5 N/A 99.3 24.0 99.3 201 N/A 1,226 372 556 100.0 N/A 99.9 77.0 99.8 201 N/A 1,226 403 556 100.0 N/A 99.9 83.4 99.8 545 N/A 302 75 59 N/A 118 187 44 162 N/A 236 72 159 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 209 64 240 45 75 159 30 185 N/A 291 72 57 N/A 0 180 42 156 N/A 113 69 131 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 30 231 43 72 75 3 33.9 N/A 96.4 96.0 96.6 N/A 0.0 96.3 95.5 96.3 N/A 47.9 95.8 82.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 46.9 96.3 95.6 96.0 47.2 10.0 190 N/A 291 72 57 N/A 0 180 42 156 N/A 114 69 131 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 31 232 43 72 76 3 34.9 N/A 96.4 96.0 96.6 N/A 0.0 96.3 95.5 96.3 N/A 48.3 95.8 82.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 48.4 96.7 95.6 96.0 47.8 10.0 379 N/A 300 74 59 N/A 0 186 44 161 N/A 174 71 153 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 47 238 45 74 116 11 69.5 N/A 99.3 98.7 100.0 N/A 0.0 99.5 100.0 99.4 N/A 73.7 98.6 96.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 73.4 99.2 100.0 98.7 73.0 36.7 528 N/A 302 75 59 N/A 1 187 44 162 N/A 230 72 159 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 62 240 45 75 154 26 96.9 N/A 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 0.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 97.5 100.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.9 96.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.9 86.7 531 N/A 302 75 59 N/A 14 187 44 162 N/A 233 72 159 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 42 63 240 45 75 156 27 97.4 N/A 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 11.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 98.7 100.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 20.1 98.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.1 90.0 743 716 96.4 717 96.5 738 99.3 742 99.9 742 99.9 47 22 46.8 23 48.9 35 74.5 46 97.9 46 97.9 464 297 64.0 299 64.4 381 82.1 456 98.3 460 99.1 8,176 188 N/A 5,062 8 N/A 61.9 4.3 N/A 5,095 8 N/A 62.3 4.3 N/A 6,479 38 N/A 79.2 20.2 N/A 7,734 121 N/A 94.6 64.4 N/A 7,795 130 N/A 95.3 69.1 N/A 390 Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne 50 66 N/A 40 N/A 0 64 N/A 19 N/A 0.0 97.0 N/A 47.5 N/A 0 64 N/A 19 N/A 0.0 97.0 N/A 47.5 N/A 391 0 66 N/A 29 N/A 0.0 100.0 N/A 72.5 N/A 2 66 N/A 39 N/A 4.0 100.0 N/A 97.5 N/A 13 66 N/A 40 N/A 26.0 100.0 N/A 100.0 N/A Table 258: Police Station Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis City Saint Louis Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Count 4 2 8 3 5 5 2 8 5 2 2 10 7 4 5 3 14 7 2 3 4 4 7 11 3 2 2 8 2 6 4 7 2 2 9 11 3 7 95 8 4 8 5 5 3 3 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 94.10 7.00 94.10 0.00 94.10 29.08 51.40 94.10 94.10 94.10 94.10 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.90 57.93 94.10 69.80 94.10 94.10 2.28 94.10 0.00 65.63 94.10 94.10 0.00 51.40 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.40 2.90 94.10 63.41 49.63 48.01 67.82 2.28 51.90 0.00 94.10 94.10 51.90 23.70 392 Table 259: School Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis City Saint Louis Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Count 15 8 57 20 23 37 6 34 13 9 3 21 58 11 19 9 71 20 5 5 14 10 8 15 8 11 4 19 10 21 13 23 8 10 98 27 9 159 421 31 4 20 14 11 14 7 393 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 94.10 19.25 94.10 0.00 94.10 24.13 26.15 94.10 94.10 94.10 94.10 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.90 64.38 94.10 68.90 94.10 94.10 2.26 94.10 0.00 60.33 94.10 94.10 0.00 51.45 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.53 2.76 94.10 58.12 51.14 47.97 72.95 2.19 51.90 0.00 94.10 94.10 69.99 38.54 Table 260: Fire Station Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Count 7 10 27 19 19 18 7 19 10 5 9 12 26 11 18 7 32 10 3 5 19 5 8 10 8 7 14 5 6 9 8 12 7 12 33 16 9 85 27 14 5 9 12 10 11 12 394 Functionality at Day 1 (%) 94.10 27.30 94.10 0.00 94.10 30.06 22.51 94.10 94.10 94.10 94.10 0.00 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.90 69.04 94.10 68.30 94.10 94.10 2.28 94.10 0.00 65.61 94.10 94.10 0.00 50.60 94.10 94.10 94.10 51.47 3.73 94.10 67.73 51.14 75.01 48.63 1.26 51.90 0.00 94.10 94.10 74.92 17.57 Table 261: Communication Facility Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne # of Facilities 208 81 499 189 231 325 40 284 121 63 48 160 300 94 171 77 541 150 61 55 128 64 131 161 55 100 44 125 111 172 137 136 63 64 566 198 At Day 1 (%) 99.80 62.33 99.80 42.34 99.75 66.04 76.75 99.78 93.20 93.20 99.80 25.87 96.44 99.50 93.20 82.82 93.18 99.80 71.94 99.50 99.80 56.33 99.80 29.09 84.32 99.50 99.80 25.40 77.74 93.82 99.80 99.69 78.40 54.48 99.59 87.59 At Day 3 (%) 99.90 83.83 99.90 62.62 99.90 86.11 93.04 99.90 98.90 98.90 99.90 37.51 99.41 99.90 98.90 95.46 98.88 99.90 90.24 99.90 99.90 74.37 99.90 42.43 95.96 99.90 99.90 37.18 93.19 99.00 99.90 99.90 94.00 76.79 99.90 97.04 At Day 7 (%) 99.90 88.57 99.90 70.66 99.90 90.03 95.40 99.90 99.40 99.40 99.90 46.56 99.66 99.90 99.40 97.09 99.38 99.90 93.41 99.90 99.90 78.54 99.90 51.05 97.42 99.90 99.90 46.48 95.29 99.45 99.90 99.90 96.10 82.98 99.90 98.15 At Day 30 (%) 99.90 97.87 99.90 89.57 99.90 97.66 99.38 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 72.65 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.62 99.89 99.90 99.04 99.90 99.90 88.78 99.90 75.38 99.66 99.90 99.90 73.08 98.87 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.50 95.91 99.90 99.75 At Day 90 (%) 99.90 99.59 99.90 98.11 99.90 99.55 99.88 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 95.12 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.80 99.90 99.90 97.96 99.90 95.60 99.90 99.90 99.90 95.22 99.78 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.23 99.90 99.90 107 1,614 755 187 48 162 134 125 82 65 91.89 95.34 92.74 54.64 93.20 32.74 93.20 99.59 93.20 53.15 98.43 99.22 98.40 74.31 98.90 48.84 98.90 99.90 98.90 74.95 99.06 99.55 98.89 79.38 99.40 58.23 99.40 99.90 99.40 81.58 99.81 99.88 99.47 91.07 99.90 82.37 99.90 99.90 99.90 95.64 99.89 99.90 99.81 98.38 99.90 96.83 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.16 395 Table 262: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne 9,844 4,576 53,094 16,718 14,416 26,980 2,378 27,040 8,858 5,982 5,201 13,411 34,945 6,171 14,762 4,197 71,499 13,851 4,711 3,519 9,284 5,383 4,775 7,824 4,263 4,922 3,950 7,855 6,904 15,683 6,451 13,433 2,721 5,416 101,663 6,586 At day 1 (%) 0.00 22.68 0.00 98.79 0.00 40.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 99.83 0.00 99.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.27 0.00 0.00 At day 3 (%) 0.00 4.63 0.00 98.68 0.00 28.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.81 0.00 99.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.00 0.00 At day 7 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.44 0.00 4.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.76 0.00 99.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 30 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 95.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.77 0.00 99.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 At day 90 (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 58.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20,793 404,312 147,076 15,626 3,319 12,064 9,378 9,185 8,406 5,551 0.00 0.00 35.84 99.85 0.00 99.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.97 0.00 0.00 18.51 99.83 0.00 99.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.81 0.00 99.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.43 0.00 99.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.15 0.00 98.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 # of Households 396 Table 263: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne # Facilities 40 23 137 86 91 119 28 92 87 36 33 63 212 42 81 51 277 126 33 27 116 43 49 78 28 41 66 68 40 94 45 88 50 32 140 117 None 0.97 0.08 0.97 0.02 0.95 0.10 0.15 0.96 0.50 0.50 0.97 0.00 0.65 0.90 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.97 0.16 0.90 0.97 0.06 0.97 0.01 0.35 0.90 0.97 0.00 0.20 0.53 0.97 0.95 0.20 0.08 0.94 0.38 Slight 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.34 0.39 0.04 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.03 0.39 0.09 0.03 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.40 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.42 0.35 0.03 0.05 0.42 0.27 0.05 0.39 Moderate 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.35 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.39 0.00 0.19 Extensive 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.03 Complete 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 54 0.43 0.38 0.16 0.02 0.01 87 2 84 33 90 62 72 73 77 0.67 0.90 0.05 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.92 0.50 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.23 0.38 0.05 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.36 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 397 Table 264: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Length (miles) 1,468 1,072 2,080 1,717 1,866 1,628 812 1,217 1,732 1,412 1,574 1,543 2,927 1,107 2,116 832 2,821 1,586 789 967 1,471 821 1,187 1,394 1,308 1,090 1,465 1,195 1,111 1,661 1,231 1,426 1,239 1,112 2,372 1,468 1,022 4,989 1,160 1,123 1,637 1,922 2,389 1,116 1,632 1,362 Total Number of Leaks 8 103 11 847 10 379 11 7 9 8 9 1,383 16 6 12 5 17 9 12 5 8 929 6 2,078 10 6 8 923 20 9 7 8 10 75 13 8 6 30 46 2,908 9 3,417 13 6 9 72 398 Total Number of Breaks 2 116 3 1,905 3 238 26 2 2 2 2 3,254 4 2 3 1 12 2 30 1 2 1,647 2 3,149 12 1 2 2,483 12 2 2 2 14 100 3 2 1 19 162 2,314 2 4,260 3 2 2 210 Table 265: Households without Electric Service Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne # of Households 9,844 4,576 53,094 16,718 14,416 26,980 2,378 27,040 8,858 5,982 5,201 13,411 34,945 6,171 14,762 4,197 71,499 13,851 4,711 3,519 9,284 5,383 4,775 7,824 4,263 4,922 3,950 7,855 6,904 15,683 6,451 13,433 2,721 5,416 101,663 6,586 20,793 404,312 147,076 15,626 3,319 12,064 9,378 9,185 8,406 5,551 At Day 1 (%) 0.00 72.95 0.00 86.54 0.00 65.41 40.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.21 0.00 0.00 77.30 0.00 91.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 78.90 0.00 92.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 79.64 At Day 3 (%) 0.00 39.27 0.00 62.17 0.00 33.59 20.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 82.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.80 0.00 0.00 49.21 0.00 76.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 82.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.65 0.00 78.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.58 399 At Day 7 (%) 0.00 12.08 0.00 31.94 0.00 9.76 5.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.01 0.00 0.00 25.82 0.00 52.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 59.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.07 0.00 54.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.62 At Day 30 (%) 0.00 1.75 0.00 8.63 0.00 1.50 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 9.77 0.00 19.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.40 0.00 20.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.68 At Day 90 (%) 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 Table 266: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne # of Facilities 12 1 71 9 37 19 3 23 8 5 1 9 55 9 4 6 91 19 5 2 16 6 10 11 2 4 1 5 5 19 7 13 6 4 19 13 6 6 2 9 4 11 6 18 7 6 None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 0.97 0.09 0.97 0.02 0.94 0.11 0.12 0.95 0.50 0.50 0.97 0.00 0.69 0.90 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.97 0.15 0.90 0.97 0.07 0.97 0.00 0.35 0.90 0.97 0.00 0.19 0.56 0.97 0.93 0.20 0.07 0.95 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.07 0.50 0.01 0.50 0.94 0.50 0.04 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.36 0.04 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.09 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.03 0.39 0.09 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.05 0.40 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.42 0.33 0.03 0.06 0.42 0.26 0.05 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.06 0.38 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.19 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.38 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.37 0.11 0.24 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.41 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 400 Table 267: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Length (miles) 881 643 1,248 1,030 1,119 977 487 730 1,039 847 945 926 1,756 664 1,270 499 1,692 951 473 580 882 492 712 837 785 654 879 717 667 996 739 856 743 667 1,423 881 613 2,994 696 674 982 1,153 1,433 670 979 817 Total Number of Leaks 6 82 9 670 8 299 8 5 7 6 7 1,093 13 5 9 4 14 7 9 4 6 735 5 1,643 8 5 6 730 16 7 5 6 8 59 10 6 4 24 37 2,300 7 2,703 10 5 7 57 401 Total Number of Breaks 2 92 2 1,507 2 188 20 1 2 2 2 2,574 3 1 2 1 9 2 24 1 2 1,303 1 2,490 10 1 2 1,964 10 2 1 2 11 79 3 2 1 15 128 1,830 2 3,369 3 1 2 166 Table 268: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne # Bridges 287 117 256 251 273 323 30 154 101 73 67 206 273 127 145 105 330 161 103 64 113 91 162 274 76 83 81 192 118 117 181 74 72 114 216 143 79 705 240 172 50 412 148 110 146 188 None 0.99 0.73 0.97 0.25 0.99 0.80 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.11 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.54 0.99 0.14 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.17 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.54 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.49 0.97 0.20 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.61 Slight 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 402 Moderate 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 Extensive 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 Complete 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 Table 269: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne No. Bridges At Day 1 (%) At Day 3 (%) At Day 7 (%) At Day 30 (%) At Day 90 (%) 287 117 256 251 273 323 30 154 101 73 67 206 273 127 145 105 330 161 103 64 113 91 162 274 76 83 81 192 118 117 181 74 72 114 216 143 79 705 240 172 50 412 148 110 146 188 99.42 78.86 98.69 34.96 99.45 86.33 91.40 99.49 99.27 99.06 98.73 18.36 99.26 98.98 99.17 99.14 99.23 99.41 97.54 98.29 98.64 61.77 99.57 21.48 97.01 98.85 98.99 24.87 96.49 98.58 99.16 99.31 98.93 64.57 99.48 98.59 98.41 98.94 91.37 56.48 98.94 28.59 99.07 99.56 99.24 73.88 99.67 81.66 99.31 39.40 99.66 88.87 93.22 99.71 99.60 99.50 99.35 21.28 99.59 99.44 99.53 99.56 99.52 99.67 98.84 99.08 99.29 65.00 99.74 24.48 99.11 99.36 99.48 28.35 97.10 99.17 99.54 99.56 99.29 69.37 99.70 99.31 98.80 99.23 91.63 59.76 99.52 32.54 99.51 99.74 99.61 79.29 99.77 83.35 99.55 42.64 99.75 90.09 94.20 99.79 99.72 99.67 99.58 23.59 99.71 99.63 99.68 99.69 99.64 99.76 99.00 99.41 99.54 66.93 99.81 26.76 99.30 99.58 99.66 30.98 97.25 99.43 99.69 99.70 99.41 72.43 99.78 99.55 98.93 99.34 91.86 62.05 99.68 35.42 99.67 99.81 99.73 81.79 99.78 84.35 99.60 45.00 99.78 90.72 94.67 99.80 99.75 99.70 99.63 25.92 99.74 99.66 99.71 99.72 99.67 99.78 99.08 99.48 99.59 68.05 99.82 28.95 99.38 99.63 99.69 33.30 97.34 99.49 99.72 99.73 99.46 74.07 99.80 99.60 99.01 99.39 92.34 63.61 99.71 37.73 99.70 99.82 99.75 83.03 99.84 88.72 99.76 55.82 99.84 93.40 96.53 99.85 99.83 99.80 99.77 37.06 99.82 99.79 99.81 99.82 99.78 99.84 99.34 99.70 99.75 72.84 99.86 39.44 99.63 99.77 99.80 44.24 97.66 99.69 99.81 99.81 99.68 81.06 99.85 99.75 99.38 99.64 95.00 70.63 99.81 48.36 99.81 99.86 99.83 88.18 403 Tennessee – New Madrid Seismic Zone Event This earthquake impact assessment includes all 95 counties in the State of Tennessee. Tennessee is approximately 42,100 square miles and is bordered by Kentucky and Virginia to the north, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia to the south, Missouri and Arkansas to the west, and North Carolina to the east. For the purposes of this analysis, 37 critical counties have been identified in the western portion of the state where shaking is anticipated to be most intense. These 37 counties are the focus of much of the damage assessment included within this document. ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis McNairy Madison Maury Montgomery Obion Perry ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Figure 10: Scenario Fault Location for the State of Tennessee The earthquake impact assessment for the State of Tennessee employs one scenario event along the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). The ground motions used to represent this seismic event were developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The scenario 404 consists of a magnitude 7.7 (Mw7.7) earthquake along one segment of the NMSZ. Each fault line is presumed to consist of three fault segments; northern, central and southern. The worst-case scenario for the State of Tennessee, and the critical counties in particular, is an event on an eastern fault line associated with the southern segment. The location of this scenario event is illustrated in Figure 10. For more information on the hazard utilized in this scenario please reference Appendix I. The NMSZ scenario produces thousands of damaged buildings in the State of Tennessee. The damage estimates shown indicate that more than 8% of the building stock, roughly 176,000 buildings, experience at least moderate damage. This includes complete damages, which equate to about 4% of the building stock, or roughly 82,000 buildings in Tennessee. Nearly 95% of all cases of complete damage occur with residential buildings. This occupancy type also accounts for nearly 99% of at least moderate damage throughout the state. All of the complete damage cases are contained in the 37 critical counties for the State of Tennessee. Table 270: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the State of Tennessee General Occupancy Type Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total General Occupancy Type Damage (State level) Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Buildings Severe Damage 1,720,196 330,518 20,582 3,553 2,337 2,077,186 142,729 31,012 1,882 286 170 176,079 58,255 19,340 3,461 520 331 81,907 Table 271: Damage by General Occupancy Type for the 37 Critical Counties General Occupancy Type Damage (37 Critical Counties) General Occupancy Total No. Moderate to Complete Damage Type Buildings Severe Damage Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Total 811,843 117,912 11,113 1,467 1,245 943,580 142,431 28,995 1,853 278 167 173,724 58,255 19,340 3,461 520 331 81,907 Wood construction, the most prevalent building type in Tennessee, sustains the most cases of complete damage. Nearly 43% of all instances of complete damage, roughly 34,900 buildings, occur with wood frame structures for the State of Tennessee. Unreinforced masonry (URM) construction and mobile homes (MH) also show high frequencies of collapse and account for nearly 54% of all building collapses. The remaining building types show far less inventory throughout the state and thus experience a far lesser proportion of damage. 405 Table 272: Building Damage by Building Type for the State of Tennessee Building Type Wood Steel Concrete Precast Reinforced Masonry Unreinforced Masonry Mobile Home Total Building Damage by Building Type None Slight Moderate 1,255,670 180,779 112,188 6,045 222 171 1,786 39 68 1,934 57 66 1,125 15 36 138,979 7,893 7,597 199,367 25,289 13,577 1,604,906 214,294 133,703 Extensive 19,319 353 135 139 84 11,117 11,229 42,376 Complete 34,888 1,610 417 497 312 29,385 14,797 81,907 Of the 1,110 fire stations in the state, 256 (more than 23%) are estimated to experience at least moderate damage. Approximately 25-30% of most other essential facility types (schools, hospitals and police stations) each sustain at least moderate damage. In addition, 404 of the 2,309 schools and 117 fire stations are estimated to collapse. The Tennessee inventory does not specify any locations for emergency operations centers and thus no damage can be determined for this type of essential facility. All non-functional facilities are located in the western portion of the state. Of Tennessee’s 180 hospitals, 132 are considered functional the day after the earthquake and that number increases to 137 functional facilities after one week. Roughly 70% of all fire stations and police stations in Tennessee are estimated to remain functional the day after the earthquake, though all these functioning facilities are in the central and eastern portions of the state. Most of Tennessee’s western counties are left without functioning facilities and will likely experience diminished services in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. Table 273: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the State of Tennessee10 Essential Facility Type Hospitals Schools EOCs Police Stations Fire Stations Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (State) At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 180 43 8 2,309 602 404 0 0 0 423 124 78 1,110 256 117 10 Functionality >50% at Day 1 132 1,674 0 289 815 For Tables 273-283 the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage category. HAZUS-MH MR2 assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, complete, etc.). In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as ‘damaged’. Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are deemed ‘undamaged’. 406 Table 274: Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality for the 37 Critical Counties Essential Facilities Damage & Functionality (37 Critical Counties) At Least Moderate Complete Essential Facility Total No. Functionality Damage Damage Type Facilities >50% at Day 1 (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 81 43 8 33 Hospitals 1,106 602 404 471 Schools 0 0 0 0 EOCs 209 124 78 75 Police Stations 482 256 117 186 Fire Stations Table 275: Highway Bridge Damage Assessments 37 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State Highway Bridge Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Bridges (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 3,815 877 330 3,400 1 0 7,215 878 330 Functionality >50% at Day 1 2,937 3,400 6,337 Table 276: Airport Damage Assessments Airport Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Complete Total No. Damage Damage Of Airports (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 37 Critical Counties 141 50 2 Remaining Counties 174 0 0 315 50 2 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 104 174 278 As is the case with essential facilities, western Tennessee counties incur the most severe damage. Roughly 900 of the 7,200, or more than 12% of all bridges, are estimated to incur at least moderate damage. Of the nearly 900 damaged bridges, 330 are expected to collapse. Highway road segments connecting these damaged bridges are expected to incur slightly less damage than the bridges themselves, even in the counties with the most severe shaking. Highway segments are most generally defined as a section of highway between two end nodes. These end nodes are frequently highway bridges. At least moderate damage to highway bridges is characterized by moderate shear (diagonal) cracking of columns, spalling of cover concrete and shear keys, abutment movement less than two-inches, extensive cracking to shear keys, bent connection bolts, and moderate settlement of the bridge approaches. Furthermore, 81 ports, 54 railway facilities, and 50 airports reach at least moderate damage state and follow roughly the same damage distribution throughout the state as highway bridges. At least moderate damage to port facilities includes considerable ground settlement, derailment of port equipment, and damage to structural members. For airports, at least moderate damage is defined in the same manner as damage to other 407 building types discussed previously. The lack of functionality of many transportation lifelines in western Tennessee will make the movement of people and supplies difficult in the days immediately following the earthquake. Table 277: Transportation System Damage for the State of Tennessee Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Type Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Tunnels Facilities Facilities Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways Transportation System Damage At Least Complete Moderate Damage Quantity Damage (Damage (Damage>50%) >50%) 4,682 0 0 7,215 878 330 5 0 0 2,936 0 0 151 4 0 15 0 0 129 54 1 51 7 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 25 6 6 6 200 81 7 315 50 2 206 0 0 Functionality at Day 1 < 50% 4,682 6,337 5 2,936 147 15 78 46 35 0 0 0 129 278 206 Table 278: Damage to Potable Water Facilities Potable Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Potable Water Damage Damage Facilities (Damage >50%) (Damage >50%) 37 Critical Counties 30 9 1 Remaining Counties 68 0 0 98 9 1 Total State Functionality >50% at Day 1 21 68 89 Table 279: Damage to Waste Water Facilities Waste Water Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Waste Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Water Facilities (Damage >50%) 37 Critical Counties 742 375 14 246 Remaining Counties 1,204 0 0 1,204 1,946 375 14 1,450 Total State Utility lifelines show similar damage and functionality estimates to those of the transportation systems. Approximately 380 waste water facilities, 3,500 communication facilities and 65 electric power facilities incur at least moderate damage. Furthermore, 14 408 waste water facilities and 48 communication facilities are expected to experience complete damage. At least moderated damage to potable water, waste water, communication, electric power, natural gas, and oil facilities are contained within the 37 critical counties. Approximately 49% of all natural gas facilities in the critical counties incur at least moderate damage. Table 280: Damage to Natural Gas Facilities Natural Gas Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Natural Gas Damage (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage > 50%) 37 Critical Counties 121 59 1 62 Remaining Counties 62 0 0 62 183 59 1 124 Total State Table 281: Damage to Oil Facilities Oil Facilities Damage Assessments At Least Moderate Total No. of Complete Damage Functionality Damage Oil Facilities (Damage > 50%) >50% at Day 1 (Damage > 50%) 37 Critical Counties 65 32 0 33 Remaining Counties 56 0 0 56 121 32 0 89 Total State Table 282: Damage to Electric Power Facilities Electric Power Facilities Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Electric Power Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 37 Critical Counties 153 63 0 61 Remaining Counties 275 0 0 275 428 63 0 336 Total State Table 283: Damage to Communication Facilities Communication Damage Assessments Total No. of At Least Moderate Complete Damage Functionality Communication Damage (Damage >50%) >50% at Day 1 Facilities (Damage >50%) 37 Critical Counties 6,969 3,468 48 5,018 Remaining Counties 9,161 0 0 9,161 16,130 3,468 48 14,179 Total State Pipeline damage is estimated for local potable water, waste water and natural gas systems. Major transmission pipelines for natural gas are added from HSIP 2007 data. Oil pipelines are not included in the HAZUS-MH MR2 default inventory, called local 409 inventory in HAZUS-MH MR2, though regional oil pipelines are added to provide damage estimates for these major oil transmission lines. These oil pipelines are composed of major crude oil and refined product lines only. Regional and local natural gas networks are represented separately and damage is estimated for each. Potable water lines show the greatest amount of leaks and breaks at 18,910 and 12,334, respectively. Local natural gas lines, however, show the greatest leak and break rates per length of pipe at roughly 0.34 leaks/mile (1 leak every 3 miles) and roughly 0.22 breaks/mile (roughly 1 break every 4.5 miles). In addition, local and regional damage to natural gas lines can be combined for a total state damage estimate of 16,219 leaks and 11,015 breaks over the combined length of 51,582 miles of natural gas pipeline. Potable water service is cut off for nearly 447,000 residences the day after the scenario earthquake. This is reduced to roughly 408,000 residences within a week. Even after three months, service has not been restored for nearly 165,000 residences. These estimates are calculated from a formula that uses the damage to the distribution system to determine the repair rate. Additional information on this formula is available in the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual that accompanies the program. This period of time without water prevents thousands of people from remaining in their homes in the weeks and months following the earthquake. Electric power service shows similar trends, with over 426,000, or nearly 20%, of all residences without electric power the day after the earthquake. Even a month after the earthquake, nearly 38,000 residences are still without power. All electric power lines in Tennessee are presumed to be above ground and less likely to incur damage from moderate ground shaking, unlike buried pipelines that are vulnerable to damage from liquefaction and ground deformation. Table 284: Pipeline Damage System Potable Water - Local Waste Water - Local Natural Gas - Regional Natural Gas - Local Oil - Regional Pipeline Damage Total Pipelines (mi) 117,443 70,466 4,605 46,977 1,018 No. Leaks 18,910 14,956 232 15,987 53 No. Breaks 12,334 9,755 587 10,428 127 Table 285: Utility Service Interruptions Utility Service Interruptions Number of Households without Service No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 446,891 433,647 408,112 360,553 Potable Water 2,232,905 426,573 296,249 146,276 37,717 Electric Power Day 90 164,750 508 The infrastructure damage in HAZUS-MH MR2 is evaluated based on a percentage of reaching a specified damage level. There are various methods available to quantify damage based on the likelihoods of reaching the four damage levels available in HAZUSMH MR2. Two different methods are employed in this report and are discussed herein. 410 Some of the following damage tables depict damage at the county level for essential, transportation, and utility facilities. This is the format employed to generate the HAZUSMH MR2 summary reports for various types of infrastructure and networks. The damage state likelihoods (shown as percentages) represent the average damage state likelihoods for all facilities of a given type in a specific county. The damage estimates shown previously for corresponding infrastructure types are based on a different set of criteria as discussed in footnote (10) and employed in the preceding damage tables for this scenario. Both methods are employed in HAZUS-MH MR2 and are valid estimation methodologies, though they generate different estimations of county damage for a specific facility type. Consider the following comparison: • Shelby County, Tennessee – 117 waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to footnote 10: ƒ Summation of individual facilities after that facility is deemed ‘damaged’ or ‘undamaged’ based on 50% or greater damage likelihood requirement estimates 117 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Estimation procedure according to topic damage tables in this appendix: ƒ To determine the percentage of waste water facilities in the at least moderate damage category, add the percentages for moderate, extensive and complete damage for the county then multiply by the number of facilities in that county ƒ Using these damage state probabilities averaged over all the facilities in the county provides an estimate of 97 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities In the case of Shelby County, Tennessee, the topic damage tables in this appendix provide a lower estimate of damage as opposed to the facility-by-facility damage summation detailed in footnote (10). Though not illustrated here, other counties in Tennessee are estimated to incur greater damage when this averaging estimation procedure is used. Comparing the total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities for the 37 critical counties in Tennessee shows the following: o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the HAZUS-MH MR2 procedure for averaging damage at the county level ƒ 366 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities o Total number of at least moderately damaged waste water facilities according to the other HAZUS-MH MR2 method of assessing facilityby-facility damage ƒ 375 at least moderately damaged waste water facilities Comparing damage estimates for these two methods clearly shows that the averaging procedure produces less damage. Other infrastructure categories may or may not follow 411 this trend thus requiring an investigation of each infrastructure type separately. This is not undertaken here, though it can be done with the information provided in this appendix. The following tables provide damage and functionality estimates for the NMSZ scenario critical counties in Tennessee. There tables employ the HAZUS-MH MR2 damage methodology of averaging each of four damage levels for a county. 412 Table 286: Building Damage by General Occupancy Counties Benton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Carroll Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Cheatham Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Chester Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Crockett Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Davidson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Decatur Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 4,161 1,078 14 0 1 826 904 6 0 0 85 504 3 0 0 5 13 0 0 0 9 7 0 0 0 5,086 2,506 23 0 1 1,824 54 1 0 0 4,233 340 8 1 1 2,239 1,099 24 7 1 319 1,035 18 9 1 310 241 6 3 0 8,925 2,769 57 20 3 11,305 2,156 34 4 6 60 204 1 0 0 4 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,369 2,385 35 4 6 1,843 52 1 0 1 1,710 169 3 0 2 421 556 9 1 3 114 540 7 2 2 60 100 2 1 0 4,148 1,417 22 4 8 483 6 0 0 0 1,898 28 0 0 0 1,358 96 2 0 0 295 229 7 1 0 527 502 24 6 7 4,561 861 33 7 7 159,343 16,555 3,658 356 412 844 494 93 10 10 52 55 11 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160,240 17,104 3,762 367 423 2,629 384 9 2 2 1,081 377 4 1 1 212 450 3 1 0 47 278 1 0 0 10 44 0 0 0 3,980 1,533 17 4 3 413 Total Counties Dickson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Dyer Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Fayette Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Gibson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Giles Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hardeman Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hardin Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 13,021 2,971 138 17 13 69 264 4 0 0 4 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,094 3,268 142 17 13 3 0 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 1,264 46 0 0 0 4,513 213 2 0 1 5,910 1,653 119 29 18 11,748 1,912 121 29 19 1,793 16 1 0 0 3,844 130 4 2 1 2,210 586 13 10 1 388 746 11 14 1 534 504 7 8 0 8,769 1,982 36 34 3 476 20 1 0 0 3,246 139 4 0 1 6,603 520 22 3 3 2,557 760 35 6 3 2,140 1,218 62 18 9 15,022 2,657 124 27 16 9,569 2,167 70 11 5 51 188 2 0 0 3 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,623 2,378 72 11 5 2,820 74 1 0 1 2,882 283 8 0 2 835 970 21 1 4 194 942 15 1 4 180 202 5 0 1 6,911 2,471 50 2 12 6,835 1,120 27 9 5 1,257 898 12 4 2 130 495 5 3 0 9 13 0 0 0 381 80 4 2 0 8,612 2,606 48 18 7 414 Total Counties Haywood Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Henderson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Henry Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Hickman Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Houston Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Humphreys Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lake Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 86 4 0 0 0 1,324 63 1 0 0 2,758 244 8 1 0 590 333 16 7 2 487 433 23 30 2 5,245 1,077 47 38 4 3,125 94 2 0 1 2,898 355 11 1 2 713 1,229 31 4 6 192 1,197 23 5 5 450 419 7 1 1 7,378 3,294 74 11 15 4,828 806 3 0 1 3,418 896 12 1 1 909 1,285 34 5 2 211 932 25 5 1 262 256 9 2 1 9,628 4,175 83 13 6 5,695 2,073 22 3 10 30 201 1 0 0 2 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,727 2,299 23 3 10 2,238 718 10 0 4 115 235 0 0 0 12 110 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,366 1,065 10 0 4 5,261 1,249 26 1 4 559 536 10 1 1 58 267 4 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,880 2,058 40 2 5 711 112 3 0 0 359 22 0 0 0 208 40 0 0 0 38 65 1 0 2 271 133 1 0 3 1,587 372 5 0 5 415 Total Counties Lauderdale Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lawrence Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Lewis Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Madison Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Maury Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other McNairy Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Montgomery Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 13 0 0 0 0 267 12 0 0 0 1,608 91 0 0 1 2,390 138 1 0 1 2,565 1,604 39 10 12 6,843 1,845 40 10 14 12,171 2,219 75 16 18 64 196 2 0 0 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,239 2,439 77 16 18 3,103 1,132 14 0 2 16 107 0 0 0 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,120 1,252 14 0 2 4,298 224 10 1 2 13,057 993 63 5 8 7,493 1,563 182 23 15 997 1,137 134 28 12 1,693 420 67 11 7 27,538 4,337 456 68 43 21,758 3,959 209 46 31 115 317 5 1 1 7 39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21,880 4,315 215 47 32 4,382 373 11 17 2 2,510 427 9 9 2 558 709 15 8 2 144 549 9 5 2 97 107 3 1 0 7,691 2,165 47 40 8 38,659 4,971 363 18 36 205 341 9 0 1 13 41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,877 5,353 373 18 37 416 Total Counties Obion Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Perry Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Robertson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Shelby Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Stewart Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Tipton Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Wayne Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 2,043 81 0 0 0 3,911 146 2 0 1 1,951 276 15 1 2 315 648 30 2 4 1,452 1,411 57 6 11 9,672 2,562 104 9 18 1,953 549 13 3 2 387 461 6 2 1 40 258 3 1 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,382 1,274 22 6 3 16,944 2,729 121 37 8 90 234 3 1 0 6 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,040 2,992 124 38 8 32,859 1,236 1 0 9 118,257 4,779 12 1 37 72,880 3,075 232 22 33 10,924 1,643 836 92 43 36,411 6,558 2,921 348 233 271,331 17,291 4,002 463 354 3,383 779 8 2 2 518 236 3 1 0 108 299 2 1 0 25 223 1 0 0 5 36 0 0 0 4,039 1,573 14 4 2 136 1 0 0 0 1,827 18 0 0 0 6,431 112 0 0 2 3,230 241 3 0 2 3,793 2,763 81 34 24 15,417 3,135 84 34 28 3,672 1,527 31 21 10 98 266 1 1 0 10 90 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,780 1,885 32 22 10 417 Total Counties Weakley Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Williamson Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Other Green (None) Green (Slight) Green Yellow Red (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 982 63 0 0 0 4,117 332 3 0 1 3,176 849 14 2 3 546 959 21 6 3 708 649 24 10 2 9,529 2,852 62 18 8 50,285 2,265 605 61 82 266 169 15 2 2 16 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50,567 2,454 622 63 84 418 Total Table 287: Hospital Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Day 1 Total # of Beds # of % Beds 93 135 29 N/A N/A 5,307 N/A 150 225 50 235 95 308 131 62 52 317 84 40 52 N/A 70 107 N/A 876 255 86 314 173 53 100 5,323 N/A 110 80 140 299 44 1 28 N/A N/A 5116 N/A 145 0 0 0 92 1 62 0 0 1 81 39 25 N/A 0 103 N/A 4 246 0 303 9 25 96 232 N/A 0 77 0 288 47.30 0.40 96.40 N/A N/A 96.40 N/A 96.40 0.00 0.40 0.13 96.40 0.40 47.30 0.00 0.40 0.40 96.40 96.40 47.70 N/A 0.00 96.40 N/A 0.40 96.40 0.40 96.40 5.10 47.30 96.40 4.36 N/A 0.00 96.40 0.00 96.40 Day 3 # of % Beds Day 7 # of % Beds Day 30 # of % Beds Day 90 # of % Beds 45 1 28 N/A N/A 5121 N/A 145 0 0 0 92 1 63 0 0 2 81 39 25 N/A 0 103 N/A 4 246 0 303 10 25 97 256 N/A 0 77 0 289 68 4 29 N/A N/A 5270 N/A 149 0 1 2 94 8 96 0 1 9 83 40 38 N/A 0 106 N/A 23 253 2 312 44 39 99 1165 N/A 0 79 0 297 91 39 29 N/A N/A 5302 N/A 150 2 15 24 95 90 128 1 16 95 84 40 51 N/A 1 107 N/A 255 255 26 314 141 52 100 3935 N/A 1 80 3 299 92 76 29 N/A N/A 5302 N/A 150 35 28 56 95 173 129 9 30 183 84 40 51 N/A 11 107 N/A 489 255 50 314 152 52 100 4377 N/A 17 80 19 299 47.90 0.40 96.50 N/A N/A 96.50 N/A 96.50 0.00 0.40 0.13 96.50 0.40 47.90 0.00 0.50 0.50 96.50 96.50 48.30 N/A 0.00 96.50 N/A 0.40 96.50 0.50 96.50 5.60 47.90 96.50 4.80 N/A 0.00 96.50 0.00 96.50 419 73.30 2.60 99.30 N/A N/A 99.30 N/A 99.30 0.00 2.60 0.87 99.30 2.60 73.30 0.00 2.70 2.70 99.30 99.30 73.60 N/A 0.00 99.30 N/A 2.60 99.30 2.70 99.30 25.30 73.30 99.30 21.88 N/A 0.00 99.30 0.00 99.30 97.60 29.20 99.90 N/A N/A 99.90 N/A 99.90 1.10 29.20 10.30 99.90 29.10 97.60 2.00 29.90 29.90 99.90 99.90 97.60 N/A 1.10 99.90 N/A 29.10 99.90 29.90 99.90 81.40 97.60 99.90 73.92 N/A 1.20 99.90 2.00 99.90 98.80 56.10 99.90 N/A N/A 99.90 N/A 99.90 15.50 56.10 23.73 99.90 56.10 98.80 13.80 57.60 57.60 99.90 99.90 98.80 N/A 15.50 99.90 N/A 55.88 99.90 57.60 99.90 88.00 98.80 99.90 82.23 N/A 15.50 99.90 13.80 99.90 Table 288: Police Station Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Count 3 6 3 2 4 23 3 4 7 7 9 5 5 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 5 6 2 3 4 4 5 7 1 5 39 3 6 4 7 4 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 47.00 0.80 94.10 0.80 0.00 94.10 16.27 94.10 0.00 0.54 0.18 94.10 0.80 46.87 0.00 0.80 0.80 94.10 94.10 61.23 0.00 0.00 94.10 94.10 0.80 94.10 12.25 94.10 1.00 47.00 94.10 0.18 51.90 0.00 83.55 0.34 94.10 420 Table 289: School Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Count 10 18 15 11 7 205 4 19 17 14 21 11 14 13 8 13 10 10 5 10 3 10 19 7 44 26 12 50 11 5 22 361 4 14 10 16 57 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 47.00 0.80 94.10 0.78 0.00 94.10 23.95 94.10 0.00 0.56 0.08 94.10 0.79 47.97 0.00 0.80 4.25 94.10 85.66 68.29 0.00 0.00 94.10 94.10 0.79 94.10 16.05 94.10 1.27 47.00 94.10 0.12 60.25 0.00 85.66 0.32 94.10 421 Table 290: Fire Station Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Count 10 11 11 10 7 37 8 12 6 13 12 12 12 3 5 14 17 7 2 9 2 7 18 1 22 12 22 18 10 7 13 73 5 10 10 12 22 Functionality At Day 1 (%) 46.92 0.80 94.10 0.80 0.00 94.10 29.71 94.10 0.00 0.54 0.20 94.10 0.78 46.87 0.00 0.80 19.73 94.10 73.00 60.73 0.00 0.00 94.10 94.10 0.77 94.10 13.27 94.10 1.40 47.00 94.10 0.29 67.02 0.00 81.44 0.38 94.10 422 Table 291: Communication Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Facilities At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 64 96 71 35 75 1,205 35 138 159 129 245 104 94 107 99 101 120 76 24 83 35 110 143 38 394 163 95 252 192 56 151 1,596 51 121 63 139 310 78.20 66.91 93.55 77.66 44.15 99.50 78.40 93.27 23.46 59.33 36.00 99.50 71.99 78.32 38.99 74.52 75.63 93.20 86.42 86.78 47.15 23.51 96.11 93.20 60.11 97.76 78.26 93.20 49.36 87.08 99.50 45.45 87.40 26.80 93.20 48.80 98.73 93.75 86.89 98.96 93.09 65.74 99.90 94.00 98.91 34.01 80.37 54.25 99.90 89.86 93.90 59.50 91.68 92.19 98.90 96.65 96.77 66.55 34.10 99.36 98.90 81.55 99.62 93.83 98.90 69.89 96.84 99.90 66.56 96.98 39.96 98.90 70.86 99.78 95.85 90.73 99.43 95.19 74.02 99.90 96.10 99.40 43.96 85.62 63.66 99.90 92.90 96.00 68.79 94.38 94.69 99.40 97.89 97.97 72.46 44.15 99.63 99.40 86.61 99.76 95.93 99.40 76.57 98.00 99.90 74.34 98.11 50.13 99.40 78.13 99.84 99.31 98.07 99.90 98.80 92.65 99.90 99.50 99.90 72.48 96.47 86.70 99.90 98.48 99.42 90.38 99.13 99.04 99.90 99.72 99.73 86.93 72.81 99.90 99.90 96.85 99.90 99.37 99.90 91.79 99.70 99.90 92.01 99.74 77.58 99.90 94.04 99.90 99.86 99.63 99.90 99.76 98.64 99.90 99.90 99.90 95.08 99.33 97.60 99.90 99.70 99.89 98.26 99.83 99.80 99.90 99.90 99.90 97.64 95.12 99.90 99.90 99.39 99.90 99.87 99.90 98.50 99.89 99.90 98.54 99.90 96.00 99.90 98.89 99.90 423 Table 292: Households without Potable Water Service Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 6,863 11,779 12,878 5,660 5,632 237,405 4,908 16,473 14,751 10,467 19,518 11,713 9,412 10,426 7,558 10,306 13,019 8,081 3,216 7,238 2,410 9,567 15,480 4,381 35,552 26444 9,980 48,330 13,182 3,023 19,906 338,366 4,930 18,106 5,936 13,599 44,725 0.00 10.61 0.00 0.00 86.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.69 43.50 96.66 0.00 2.08 4.99 77.84 63.78 13.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.84 99.70 0.00 0.00 51.73 0 0.00 0 95.06 0 0 94.49 0 99.2 0 52.53 0 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 80.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.67 31.31 96.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.03 53.90 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.56 99.66 0.00 0.00 40.35 0 0.00 0 94.25 0 0 94.27 0 99.1 0 40.87 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.59 4.80 95.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.02 24.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.71 99.57 0.00 0.00 11.61 0 0.00 0 92.1 0 0 93.8 0 98.9 0 11.1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.46 0.00 71.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 14.72 0 0 89.77 0 93.71 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 48.7 0 0 0 0 0 424 Table 293: Potable Water Facility Damage Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Facilities 1 N/A 1 N/A N/A 5 2 1 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 N/A 2 N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A 1 N/A N/A N/A 2 1 1 N/A 1 N/A 4 1 2 N/A N/A 1 None (%) 18.35% N/A 50.00% N/A N/A 89.79% 19.73% 50.00% 0.05% N/A N/A N/A N/A 19.73% N/A 19.73% N/A 50.00% N/A N/A N/A 0.04% N/A N/A N/A 69.90% 19.73% 50.00% N/A 50.00% N/A 0.03 0.50 0.00 N/A N/A 50.0% Slight (%) 39.26% N/A 37.59% N/A N/A 9.43% 42.20% 37.59% 1.38% N/A N/A N/A N/A 42.20% N/A 42.20% N/A 37.59% N/A N/A N/A 1.22% N/A N/A N/A 23.51% 42.20% 37.59% N/A 37.59% N/A 0.20 0.38 0.02 N/A N/A 37.6% 425 Moderate (%) 28.68% N/A 11.35% N/A N/A 0.74% 30.82% 11.35% 12.78% N/A N/A N/A N/A 30.82% N/A 30.82% N/A 11.35% N/A N/A N/A 12.47% N/A N/A N/A 6.05% 30.82% 11.35% N/A 11.35% N/A 0.42 0.11 0.15 N/A N/A 11.4% Extensive (%) 6.10% N/A 0.98% N/A N/A 0.02% 6.56% 0.98% 37.11% N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.56% N/A 6.56% N/A 0.98% N/A N/A N/A 39.93% N/A N/A N/A 0.50% 6.56% 0.98% N/A 0.98% N/A 0.27 0.01 0.40 N/A N/A 1.0% Complete (%) 7.59% N/A 0.06% N/A N/A 0.00% 0.67% 0.06% 48.66% N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.67% N/A 0.67% N/A 0.06% N/A N/A N/A 46.32% N/A N/A N/A 0.03% 0.67% 0.06% N/A 0.06% N/A 0.07 0.00 0.43 N/A N/A 0.1% Table 294: Potable Water Pipeline Damage Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Length (miles) 903 1,288 823 639 624 3,244 794 1,372 1,097 1,485 1,443 1,576 1,285 1,363 1,123 1,182 1,309 1,379 536 1,114 350 925 1,501 578 1,379 1,843 1,249 1,976 1,230 807 1,382 4,734 1,096 1,097 1,352 1,329 1,873 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 39 12 154 97 5 1 29 13 620 283 18 4 34 9 8 2 3,239 1,859 305 233 1,283 1,130 9 2 81 62 52 79 550 372 118 282 115 109 8 2 10 2 6 2 129 341 2,941 1,572 8 2 3 1 227 255 10 3 57 26 11 3 987 831 4 1 8 2 4,547 2,991 14 4 2,561 1,399 7 2 332 251 10 3 426 Table 295: Households without Electric Power Service Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Households At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 6,863 11,779 12,878 5,660 5,632 237,405 4,908 16,473 14,751 10,467 19,518 11,713 9,412 10,426 7,558 10,306 13,019 8,081 3,216 7,238 2,410 9,567 15,480 4,381 35,552 26,444 9,980 48,330 13,182 3,023 19,906 338,366 4,930 18,106 5,936 13,599 44,725 0.00 53.43 0.00 0.00 86.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 95.20 77.80 89.17 0.00 36.68 0.00 88.67 9.34 17.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 58.71 94.91 0.00 0.00 75.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.76 0.00 0.00 84.64 0.00 93.78 0.00 82.35 0.00 0.00 27.21 0.00 0.00 60.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.55 47.24 67.98 0.00 18.68 0.00 65.71 4.75 9.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.46 84.37 0.00 0.00 42.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.02 0.00 0.00 58.32 0.00 80.59 0.00 53.59 0.00 0.00 7.58 0.00 0.00 29.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 63.54 18.42 38.01 0.00 5.21 0.00 33.77 1.33 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.99 61.23 0.00 0.00 14.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.12 0.00 0.00 27.66 0.00 55.11 0.00 22.44 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 6.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.70 3.50 10.57 0.00 0.68 0.00 8.02 0.17 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.84 22.09 0.00 0.00 2.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.93 0.00 0.00 6.63 0.00 18.73 0.00 4.38 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 427 Table 296: Waste Water Facility Damage Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Facilities 18 22 10 6 5 64 12 16 20 18 20 15 18 18 23 13 28 9 N/A 20 3 15 9 5 29 28 10 22 21 7 15 117 11 26 7 38 24 None (%) 19.50% 9.57% 53.98% 18.81% 2.0% 89.79% 19.73% 50.00% 0.05% 6.39% 1.04% 89.8% 13.84% 19.27% 0.8% 18.88% 15.76% 50.0% N/A 30.32% 3.01% 0.05% 63.26% 50.00% 5.51% 74.16% 19.73% 50.00% 2.08% 45.68% 89.79% 2.16% 44.50% 0.16% 50.00% 3.17% 84.82% Slight (%) 41.71% 33.63% 34.77% 40.24% 14.8% 9.43% 42.20% 37.59% 1.33% 26.38% 10.01% 9.4% 36.73% 41.22% 9.4% 41.50% 38.91% 37.6% N/A 40.59% 18.55% 1.35% 28.20% 37.59% 25.24% 20.49% 42.20% 37.59% 13.53% 38.25% 9.43% 14.88% 38.43% 2.92% 37.59% 19.94% 12.95% 428 Moderate (%) 30.46% 39.76% 10.29% 29.39% 36.5% 0.74% 30.82% 11.35% 12.62% 38.27% 32.40% 0.7% 35.06% 30.11% 33.2% 31.60% 34.43% 11.4% N/A 24.01% 35.90% 12.78% 7.81% 11.35% 39.13% 4.91% 30.82% 11.35% 33.21% 14.13% 0.74% 35.41% 14.89% 18.50% 11.35% 40.49% 2.07% Extensive (%) 6.48% 14.03% 0.88% 6.25% 30.7% 0.02% 6.56% 0.98% 37.68% 19.31% 35.28% 0.0% 10.48% 6.41% 36.5% 7.20% 9.53% 1.0% N/A 4.61% 20.47% 38.85% 0.66% 0.98% 18.94% 0.40% 6.56% 0.98% 29.40% 1.78% 0.02% 28.68% 1.99% 39.70% 0.98% 25.12% 0.14% Complete (%) 1.82% 3.00% 0.05% 5.28% 16.0% 0.00% 0.67% 0.06% 48.30% 9.63% 21.26% 0.0% 3.88% 2.98% 20.1% 0.81% 1.36% 0.1% N/A 0.46% 22.06% 46.94% 0.04% 0.06% 11.16% 0.02% 0.67% 0.06% 21.75% 0.15% 0.00% 18.84% 0.17% 38.70% 0.06% 11.26% 0.01% Table 297: Waste Water Pipeline Damage Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Length (miles) 542 773 494 384 374 1,947 476 823 658 891 866 946 771 818 674 709 785 827 322 668 210 555 900 347 827 1,106 750 1,186 738 484 829 2,840 658 658 811 797 1,124 Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 31 10 122 77 4 1 23 11 491 224 14 4 27 7 6 1 2,562 1,471 241 184 1,014 894 7 2 64 49 41 63 435 294 93 223 91 86 6 1 8 2 5 1 102 269 2,326 1,243 6 2 3 1 180 202 8 2 45 21 9 2 781 657 3 1 6 1 3,596 2,366 11 3 2,025 1,107 6 1 262 198 8 2 429 Table 298: Highway Bridge Damage Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Bridge 52 122 38 41 56 521 39 68 121 129 141 117 90 58 133 89 86 71 22 66 14 94 43 21 145 147 90 80 144 36 79 436 70 54 44 131 127 None (%) 90.39% 73.88% 96.77% 69.63% 37.99% 98.52% 87.00% 97.41% 11.92% 66.43% 46.26% 98.01% 65.65% 82.72% 40.32% 76.47% 74.02% 98.55% 96.33% 96.42% 48.79% 12.95% 97.96% 97.49% 62.58% 98.40% 80.69% 98.38% 40.99% 91.69% 98.77% 28.61% 94.51% 23.71% 97.70% 60.46% 96.84% Slight (%) 5.23% 5.76% 1.97% 7.37% 10.99% 0.82% 6.26% 1.45% 8.81% 5.31% 9.07% 1.26% 7.59% 10.12% 10.85% 7.33% 8.36% 0.93% 2.37% 2.77% 8.68% 8.94% 1.26% 1.65% 9.18% 1.00% 7.33% 1.06% 9.80% 6.83% 0.82% 8.86% 2.61% 7.95% 1.57% 6.77% 1.94% 430 Moderate (%) 0.30% 3.74% 0.78% 5.16% 8.89% 0.37% 2.15% 0.69% 7.76% 4.79% 7.84% 0.45% 5.33% 0.67% 8.24% 4.51% 4.06% 0.31% 0.82% 0.50% 5.30% 8.23% 0.48% 0.54% 6.15% 0.36% 2.80% 0.34% 7.13% 0.45% 0.24% 7.74% 1.06% 8.91% 0.45% 5.63% 0.76% Extensive (%) 0.19% 4.70% 0.41% 6.75% 13.26% 0.23% 2.31% 0.37% 15.10% 7.81% 11.62% 0.23% 7.13% 0.39% 12.89% 5.76% 5.17% 0.17% 0.41% 0.26% 6.68% 16.49% 0.25% 0.27% 7.99% 0.20% 3.24% 0.18% 12.34% 0.97% 0.13% 16.26% 1.02% 17.31% 0.23% 8.00% 0.40% Complete (%) 3.87% 11.89% 0.06% 11.07% 28.85% 0.03% 2.25% 0.05% 56.39% 15.65% 25.19% 0.03% 14.28% 6.08% 27.68% 5.90% 8.35% 0.02% 0.06% 0.03% 30.52% 53.36% 0.03% 0.03% 14.08% 0.03% 5.92% 0.02% 29.71% 0.05% 0.02% 38.50% 0.77% 42.10% 0.03% 19.11% 0.05% Table 299: Highway Bridge Functionality Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson # of Bridges At day 1 (%) At day 3 (%) At day 7 (%) At day 30 (%) At day 90 (%) 52 122 38 41 56 521 39 68 121 129 141 117 90 58 133 89 86 71 22 66 14 94 43 21 145 147 90 80 144 36 79 436 70 54 44 131 127 94.43 79.63 98.43 77.06 49.78 99.21 92.38 98.66 22.35 72.33 56.18 99.03 73.36 90.57 51.79 83.54 81.76 99.30 98.30 98.60 57.61 23.61 98.99 98.83 71.75 99.21 87.16 99.23 51.37 96.94 99.42 38.78 96.77 33.65 98.96 67.78 98.47 95.82 82.18 99.16 80.43 55.16 99.51 94.58 99.21 26.89 75.08 60.77 99.47 76.83 93.31 56.93 86.71 85.05 99.61 99.13 99.43 61.30 28.33 99.44 99.40 75.86 99.55 89.83 99.59 55.94 98.76 99.68 43.31 97.73 38.28 99.48 71.13 99.17 95.94 83.66 99.46 82.45 58.72 99.65 95.43 99.48 30.08 76.99 63.89 99.65 78.94 93.57 60.23 88.50 86.66 99.73 99.45 99.63 63.46 31.69 99.63 99.61 78.29 99.69 90.94 99.72 58.82 98.94 99.77 46.47 98.15 41.91 99.65 73.37 99.46 96.02 84.42 99.51 83.45 60.71 99.69 95.76 99.55 32.53 78.13 65.64 99.69 80.03 93.72 62.14 89.30 87.43 99.75 99.51 99.66 64.74 34.27 99.67 99.65 79.49 99.72 91.44 99.74 60.65 99.04 99.79 48.80 98.29 44.44 99.68 74.63 99.52 96.38 87.54 99.72 87.55 69.23 99.80 97.05 99.73 43.83 83.05 73.11 99.80 84.52 94.32 70.42 92.54 90.55 99.83 99.72 99.79 70.11 46.05 99.79 99.78 84.39 99.82 93.44 99.82 68.79 99.52 99.85 59.48 98.85 55.87 99.80 79.87 99.72 431 Appendix VI: Social Impacts and Economic Losses The results presented in this appendix are a more comprehensive representation of the information presented in the main section of this report. Each state is discussed individually and results are not summed over all States since different scenarios are employed for each. Only social impacts, induced damage and economic losses are explained herein. All damage to infrastructure is dealt with in another appendix. Social impacts and economic losses are shown for both critical counties and statewide totals. Social impacts include displaced population and short-term shelter estimates as well as feeding and space requirements for the temporary shelter population. Economic losses are shown for buildings, transportation lifelines and utility lifelines. The only form of induced damage included here is debris generation. Maps of social impacts and economic losses are not illustrated here, though are presented in another appendix. Numerous tables are provided, however, to illustrate social impacts and economic losses in each State. Additionally, social impacts and economic loss results both scenarios in Alabama and Indiana are presented herein. Alabama – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate 112 thousand tons of debris, which will require 4,480 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity, to remove. Of the debris, 78% (87 thousand tons) will be bricks, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (25 thousand tons). There are roughly 4.4 million people that reside in the State of Alabama. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 27 people with the majority of those people living in the 12 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Alabama it is estimated that 5 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 2,400 square feet will be required, with 300 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 5 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 35 gallons of water, 380 pounds of ice, and 70 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 12 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. 432 Table 1: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 12 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 624, 368 3,822,732 4,447,100 Shelter Seeking Population 24 3 27 5 0 5 Table 2: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 5:00 PM Severity Level 12 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (5:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 29 3 1 39 6 8 68 9 9 Level 4 (Black) 0 2 2 Total 32 56 88 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Alabama results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 5:00 PM. A total of 88 casualties are expected from this event. There are two estimated fatalities and those occur outside the critical counties, though it is very unlikely that these fatalities occur. The value estimated is likely due to the addition of very small casualty likelihoods over a large area. Roughly 70 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. 433 Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 10 8 6 4 2 0 Cancers Heart Disease Stroke Pulmonary Conditions Figure 1: Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (27 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Alabama (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 17 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 2 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire State of Alabama. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 5%, and appear to occur randomly throughout the state. This is due to the constant and low level of shaking throughout nearly the entire state. Though any damage that occurs will be minor, there is still a replacement cost associated with the damage. In counties where the value of buildings is not high, the ratio of the cost associated with minor repairs to buildings will be greater than in areas where the value of the built environment is greater. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total over $210 million, or over 50% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 10% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach nearly $1.1 billion for the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to utility losses; $569 million, or nearly 55% of total direct losses (see Table 6). The large amount of loss to the utility systems is due to slight damage to a 434 very large inventory of utility components. Transportation and building losses contribute far less, with roughly 9% and 38% of the total losses, respectively. Table 3: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Single Family Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 CapitalRelated 0.00 Rental 0.76 Relocation 0.07 Subtotal 0.83 Capital Stock Loses Structural 6.70 Non-Structural 73.10 Content 40.39 Inventory 0.00 Subtotal 120.19 Total 121.01 Others Total 0.35 10.45 0.45 0.67 11.92 0.16 2.23 0.12 2.86 7.47 8.05 0.42 26.39 0.28 0.12 0.01 0.86 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.95 8.06 11.23 0.66 31.88 12.39 43.25 11.49 0.00 67.14 70.00 17.68 80.14 50.23 4.27 152.32 178.71 1.83 10.14 6.87 1.91 20.75 21.61 1.17 6.33 4.09 0.06 11.65 12.60 39.77 212.96 113.07 6.25 372.05 403.93 Table 4: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Total Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio (%) Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 80,718.01 11,932.03 0.00 4,228.50 10.27 213.86 23.54 0.00 0.00 6.74 629.80 2,300.45 8,167.82 108,231.00 0.00 22.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.52 0.58 0.00 0.00 6.74 11.80 50.51 0.00 95.70 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.48 0.00 0.00 100.00 1.87 2.20 0.00 435 Table 5: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Potable Water Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Facilities 899.10 5.43 Distribution Lines 4,017.90 3.25 Facilities 24,575.40 116.18 Distribution Lines 2,410.75 2.57 Facilities 361.00 1.87 Local Pipelines 1,607.10 2.75 Regional Pipelines 4,926.40 0.02 Facilities 10.10 0.04 Regional Pipelines 1,645.40 0.00 Facilities 141,075.00 430.50 Facilities 1,380.70 6.18 182,908.80 568.77 Loss Ratio (%) 0.60 0.08 0.47 0.11 0.52 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.45 Table 6: Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Direct Economic Losses Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $269,580,000,000 $403,930,000 $108,231,000,000 $95,700,000 $182,908,800,000 $568,770,000 $559,819,800,000 $1,068,400,000 436 LAUDERDALE LIMESTONE MADISON COLBERT (Huntsville 72 ! t u ( ! t u 43 t u MARION 278 t u LAWRENCE MORGAN MARSHALLDEKALB WINSTON 65 431 t u CULLMAN 231 BLOUNT t u t u 78 ! ( JEFFERSON TUSCALOOSA ( ! 65 80 t u DALLAS AUTAUGA ! ( BUTLER MONROE t u WASHINGTON t u 45 t u MOBILE 98 t u ! ( ESCAMBIA Critical Counties Rivers US Routes Interstates 431 t u 85 29 t u LEE RUSSELL 431 t u BULLOCK 82 t u BARBOUR 331 t u PIKE 231 t u HENRY COFFEE DALE CONECUH 31 175,001 - 265,000 RANDOLPH MACON MONTGOMERY 65 84 75,001 - 175,000 t u Montgomery WILCOX CLARKE ! ( CHAMBERS 280 TALLAPOOSA 231 t u ELMORE LOWNDES 43 t u ( 50,000 - 75,000 ! ( ! CLEBURNE CLAY COOSA PERRY SUMTER 20 Hoover TALLADEGA CHILTON CHOCTAW MARENGO Major Cities Gadsden SHELBY 20 Tuscaloosa BIBB 59 82 t u HALE 59 CHEROKEE ETOWAH Birmingham LAMAR GREENE 0% - 1% 1% - 2% 2% - 5.3% SAINT CLAIRCALHOUN FAYETTE WALKER PICKENS Loss Ratio Decatur31 FRANKLIN 82 t u Legend JACKSON 84 t u COVINGTON 84 t u GENEVA ( ! Dothan HOUSTON Mobile 10 0 98BALDWIN t u 12.5 25 50 Miles Figure 2: Loss Ratio (% of Total Building Assets) 437 75 ® Additional information on social impacts for the 12 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 7: Time-of-Day Casualties, 5:00 PM Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 5 1 2 2 2 9 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 2 2 2 10 0 1 3 1 1 2 Table 8: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Population 54,984 77,483 18,495 31,223 15,904 87,966 34,803 65,676 31,214 111,064 70,713 24,843 Displaced Population 5 0 1 1 1 13 0 0 2 0 0 1 438 Shelter Seeking Population 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 9: Shelter Requirements Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Total Space Required (sq. ft.) Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) Water Required Week 1 (gallons) Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 480 0 0 0 0 1,920 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 240 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 0 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 224 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 10: Debris Summary Report Counties Colbert Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone Marion Morgan Walker Winston Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) 6.06 0.85 2.61 1.72 2.78 10.36 0.34 0.57 2.96 1.14 0.83 2.51 Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) 2.48 0.16 1.10 0.58 1.04 4.16 0.05 0.09 1.16 0.22 0.15 1.00 439 Total (Thousand Tons) 8.54 1.01 3.71 2.30 3.82 14.52 0.40 0.67 4.13 1.36 0.98 3.51 Alabama – East Tennessee Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate 146 thousand tons of debris, which will require 5,840 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity, to remove. Of the debris, 58% (85 thousand tons) will be bricks, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (61 thousand tons). There are roughly 4.4 million people that reside in the State of Alabama. A Mw5.9 event in the ETSZ displaces 1,625 people all of whom reside in the 13 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Alabama it is estimated that 440 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 211,200 square feet will be required, with 26,400 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 440 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 15,400 gallons of water, 24,640 pounds of ice, and approximately 6,160 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 13 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 11: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 13 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,751,879 2,695,221 4,447,100 Shelter Seeking Population 1,625 0 1,625 440 0 440 Table 12: Worst Case Casualties – Event Occurs at 2:00 AM Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Severity Level (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 13 Critical Counties 153 32 3 Other Remaining Counties 1 0 0 Total for State of Alabama 154 32 3 440 Level 4 (Black) 4 0 4 Total 192 1 193 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The ETSZ event in Alabama results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 AM. A total of 193 casualties are expected from this event. There are 4 estimated fatalities and those occur within the critical counties. It is very unlikely that fatalities occur outside the critical counties. The value estimated for casualties is likely due to the addition of very small casualty likelihoods over a large area. Roughly 154 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least sever and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. • • • • Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 500 400 300 200 100 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 3: Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (1,625 441 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Alabama (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 1,050 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 4 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire State of Alabama. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratio is estimated at nearly 10% and occurs in the northeastern portion of the state. Though any damage that occurs will not be complete damage there is still a replacement cost associated with the damage. In counties where the value of buildings is not high the ratio of the cost associated with minor repairs to buildings will be greater than in areas where the value of the built environment is greater. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total over $216 million or over 50% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 11% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural and business interruption losses. Table 13: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.0 CapitalRelated 0.0 Rental 4.85 Relocation 0.53 Subtotal 5.38 Capital Stock Loses Structural 22.14 Non-Structural 117.8 Content 49.74 Inventory 0.0 Subtotal 189.68 Total 195.06 Others Total 0.62 6.66 1.73 0.29 9.30 0.27 3.90 0.14 4.93 5.02 4.18 0.24 16.10 1.05 0.57 0.01 3.36 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.51 6.42 13.60 0.96 30.28 8.79 36.95 9.69 0.0 55.43 60.36 9.24 41.95 31.12 2.82 85.13 101.23 4.77 15.76 11.97 4.22 36.72 40.08 0.92 3.49 2.34 0.06 6.81 7.32 45.86 215.95 104.86 7.10 373.77 404.05 Total direct economic losses for the state reach nearly $700 million from the ETSZ M5.9 event. The majority of losses are attributed to building losses, $404 million, or nearly 442 60% of total direct losses (see Table 16). Furthermore, utility losses contribute to 36% of the total losses while transportation contributes far less, with roughly 6% of the total losses. Table 14: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 80,718.01 11,932.03 0.00 4,228.50 10.27 213.86 23.54 6.74 629.80 2,300.45 8,167.82 108,231.02 0.09 2.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.12 6.74 2.31 26.66 0.00 39.98 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.52 100.00 0.37 1.16 0.00 Table 15: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 899.10 4,017.90 24,575.40 2,410.70 361.00 1,607.10 4,926.40 10.10 1,645.40 141,075.00 1,380.70 182,908.80 10.30 1.09 100.76 0.86 0.23 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 133.62 6.62 254.40 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 1.15 0.03 0.41 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.48 Table 16: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $269,580,000,000 $108,231,020,000 $182,908,800,000 $560,719,820,000 $404,030,000 $39,980,000 $254,400,000 $698,410,000 443 r; Dec?! E31 [5 lg .UDERQAW .Legend 1.1135 Ratin -2 2 -5 5 - 1n Majcu' Cities I 5mm I mum 4.15pm I ?mam 435nm Hm: Rumbas -Eri1ilr.id Cmn?es =Inter5tates 12.5 :5 an F5 HIEE . Figure 4: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 444 Additional information on social impacts for the 13 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 17: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 AM Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 0 1 9 54 51 36 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 14 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 64 58 47 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Table 18: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Population 51,024 112,249 23,988 64,452 103,459 53,926 662,047 65,676 276,700 82,231 111,064 64,742 80,321 Displaced Population 0 0 4 263 803 555 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 445 Shelter Seeking Population 0 0 1 75 225 139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 19: Shelter Requirements Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Total Space Required (sq. ft.) Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) Water Required Week 1 (gallons) Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 0 0 480 36,000 108,000 66,720 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 4,500 13,500 8,340 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 2,625 7,875 4,865 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 4,200 12,600 7,784 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1,050 3,150 1,946 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 20: Debris Summary Report Counties Blount Calhoun Cherokee Dekalb Etowah Jackson Jefferson Limestone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint Clair Talladega Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 7.74 0.77 6.82 40.74 13.37 10.66 0.83 0.12 1.42 1.23 0.32 0.30 0.16 0.92 0.07 2.23 36.04 12.21 9.23 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.01 8.66 0.84 9.05 76.78 25.58 19.89 0.87 0.12 1.52 1.39 0.34 0.32 0.17 446 Arkansas – New Madrid Seismic Zone Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate approximately 7 million tons of debris, which will require 280,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity. Of the debris, 48% (3.4 million tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (3.6 million tons). There are roughly 2.7 million people that reside in the State of Arkansas. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 127,000 people with the majority of those people living in the 34 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Arkansas it is estimated that 37,250 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 17,877,000 square feet of shelter space will be required, with 2,234,600 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 37,250 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 1,303,540 gallons of water, 2,085,700 pounds of ice, and 24 truckloads of 521,400 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 34 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 21: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,330,090 1,334,739 2,664,829 Shelter Seeking Population 126,987 1 126,988 37,244 0 37,244 Table 22: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 AM Severity Level 34 Critical Counties Remaining Counties State Total Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 10,275 2,796 306 21 1 4 10,296 2,797 310 447 Level 4 (Black) 574 0 574 Total 13,951 26 13,977 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Arkansas results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 AM. A total of 13,977 casualties are expected from this event. There are 574 estimated fatalities of which most occur inside the critical counties. Roughly 10,300 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake • • • • Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 5: Estimates Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (126,988 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Arkansas (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 79,241 chronic cases that need to 448 be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 6 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 75% or more, and occur in the northeastern counties where shaking is most intense. Some eastern counties show loss ratios between 25% and 50% where shaking is moderate. These loss ratios should be considered a concern since 25% to 50% of the total building value in a given census tract is lost. It is more common to see ratios between 0% and 10% in the remainder of the state which is not as critical although still warrants consideration. Also of particular interest is the level of non-structural damage which totals nearly $7.0 billion or over 55% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute 15% of all building loses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach nearly $18.9 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to building losses, $12.6 billion, or nearly two-thirds of total direct losses (see Table 26). Transportation and utility losses contribute far less, with roughly 11% and 22% of the total losses, respectively. Table 23: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 24.71 CapitalRelated 0.00 10.93 Rental 263.72 169.05 Relocation 29.18 4.67 Subtotal 292.9 209.36 Capital Stock Loses Structural 1,193.05 302.12 Non-Structural 4,135.98 1,270.27 Content 1,105.22 283.69 Inventory 0.00 0.00 Subtotal 6,434.25 1,856.08 Total 6,727.15 2,065.44 Others Total 324.48 17.88 15.74 382.81 249.94 126.88 8.63 709.93 10.87 6.93 0.52 36.2 5.23 6.3 2.16 29.43 276.97 572.88 45.16 1,277.82 355.73 1,046.41 510.33 27.58 1,940.05 2,649.98 82.57 349.41 229.04 64.75 725.77 761.97 77.41 183.68 96.34 5.83 363.26 392.69 2,010.88 6,985.75 2,224.62 98.16 11,319.41 12,597.23 449 Table 24: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 49,994.91 6,308.93 9.60 3,365.10 4.67 128.97 15.17 0.00 0.00 0.95 187.76 1,488.83 6,435.42 67,940.31 1,266.31 364.63 0.00 87.12 0.35 25.07 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.95 37.22 185.08 186.51 2,154.66 Total Loss Ratio (%) 2.53 5.78 0.00 2.59 7.40 19.44 9.33 0.00 0.00 100.00 19.82 12.43 2.90 Table 25: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 1,999.00 3,821.70 23,814.20 2,293.00 92.00 1528.70 7,308.30 0.90 1387.50 5,359.20 54.40 47,658.90 90.05 336.99 2,650.81 266.52 2.49 284.91 13.96 0.09 3.63 474.00 3.28 4,126.73 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 4.50 8.82 11.13 11.62 2.70 18.64 0.19 10.31 0.26 8.84 6.03 Table 26: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $157,602,000,000 $67,940,310,000 $47,658,900,000 $273,201,210,000 $12,597.230,000 $2,154,660,000 $4,126,730,000 $18,878,620,000 450 I BEHTUH J?ee IZIHE I LMAHIIZIH 4* b-Fer . 1meH_Iy_ :1 l. l? i l? STIP. LDGAH .I a? EPHA-IHIEMEHHD rJe th- LIZIHIZIHE 3 Legend Lees Ratio 10% 45% - 25% - 50% 513% - 33% =Crr?eaII3eu11ee rem Hulwm?e U3 Flow: Elle n: re_, CALI-II UH . I . . EETL RIUEFXHEE a. Ivy-'1? MILLE 22 Miles Figure 6: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 451 Additional information on social impacts for the 34 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 27: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 AM Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 21 1 260 2 2 1,884 1,311 448 3 1 0 2 588 7 0 343 17 226 255 4 49 2,414 26 325 970 14 52 105 353 2 0 0 419 171 4 0 69 0 0 526 364 121 0 0 0 0 155 1 0 92 1 61 69 0 11 673 5 88 273 2 4 27 91 0 0 0 113 46 0 0 7 0 0 64 40 12 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 9 0 6 7 0 1 76 0 8 31 0 0 3 9 0 0 0 11 4 0 0 13 0 0 122 74 22 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 17 0 12 13 0 2 141 1 15 59 0 0 5 17 0 0 0 20 8 25 1 349 2 2 2,596 1,789 603 3 1 0 2 794 8 0 461 18 305 344 4 63 3,304 32 436 1,333 16 56 140 470 2 0 0 563 229 452 Table 28: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Population 20,749 38,386 17,609 24,046 8,571 82,148 50,866 19,526 15,341 86,014 11,642 16,464 37,331 34,233 13,249 18,418 84,278 17,774 12,580 14,492 52,828 51,979 10,254 26,445 25,614 9,539 361,474 18,195 29,329 17,119 11,499 16,192 67,165 8,741 Displaced Population 182 0 3,051 0 0 20,510 17,210 6,204 1 0 0 0 6,651 1 0 4,413 6 2,907 3,356 0 522 30,911 198 4,574 12,249 139 55 1,305 4,484 0 0 0 5,745 2,313 453 Shelter Seeking Population 52 0 891 0 0 5,345 5,180 1,810 0 0 0 0 1,776 0 0 1,331 2 825 1,154 0 129 9,365 67 1,527 3,555 40 15 374 1,419 0 0 0 1,621 766 Table 29: Shelter Requirements Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Total Space Required (sq. ft.) Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) Water Required Week 1 (gallons) Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 24,960 0 427,680 0 0 2,565,600 2,486,400 868,800 0 0 0 0 852,480 0 0 638,880 960 396,000 553,920 0 61,920 4,495,200 32,160 732,960 1,706,400 19,200 7,200 179,520 681,120 0 0 0 778,080 367,680 3,120 0 53,460 0 0 320,700 310,800 108,600 0 0 0 0 106,560 0 0 79,860 120 49,500 69,240 0 7,740 561,900 4,020 91,620 213,300 2,400 900 22,440 85,140 0 0 0 97,260 45,960 1,820 0 31,185 0 0 187,075 181,300 63,350 0 0 0 0 62,160 0 0 46,585 70 28,875 40,390 0 4,515 327,775 2,345 53,445 124,425 1,400 525 13,090 49,665 0 0 0 56,735 26,810 2,912 0 49,896 0 0 299,320 290,080 101,360 0 0 0 0 99,456 0 0 74,536 112 46,200 64,624 0 7,224 524,440 3,752 85,512 199,080 2,240 840 20,944 79,464 0 0 0 90,776 42,896 728 0 12,474 0 0 74,830 72,520 25,340 0 0 0 0 24,864 0 0 18,634 28 11,550 16,156 0 1,806 131,110 938 21,378 49,770 560 210 5,236 19,866 0 0 0 22,694 10,724 454 Table 30: Debris Summary Report Counties Arkansas Baxter Clay Cleburne Cleveland Craighead Crittenden Cross Desha Faulkner Fulton Grant Greene Independence Izard Jackson Jefferson Lawrence Lee Lincoln Lonoke Mississippi Monroe Phillips Poinsett Prairie Pulaski Randolph St. Francis Sharp Stone Van Buren White Woodruff Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 27.10 0.11 91.99 0.37 0.42 884.90 419.89 149.01 1.46 0.23 0.03 0.24 220.95 3.29 0.03 114.11 7.24 73.44 60.25 1.06 20.64 715.07 19.59 92.42 411.49 12.84 38.70 41.17 126.44 1.28 0.03 0.04 121.16 51.04 43.03 0.87 189.14 1.94 2.27 1,549.58 785.42 284.01 4.83 1.68 0.25 1.34 435.83 12.35 0.27 223.33 27.80 145.51 123.07 4.01 44.33 1,415.48 37.57 179.44 726.76 22.45 128.24 81.83 244.67 5.21 0.26 0.37 241.03 104.65 15.93 0.77 97.15 1.57 1.85 664.68 365.53 135.00 3.38 1.45 0.22 1.11 214.87 9.06 0.24 109.22 20.57 72.07 62.82 2.96 23.68 700.41 17.98 87.02 315.27 9.61 89.54 40.66 118.23 3.93 0.23 0.33 119.86 53.61 455 Illinois – New Madrid Seismic Zone Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate 2.57 million tons of debris, which will require 102,800 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity. Of the debris, 54 percent (1.4 million tons) will be bricks, wood, and building contents, with the balance (1.17 million tons) comprising steel and concrete. There are roughly 12.4 million people that reside in the State of Illinois. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 51,500 people with the majority of those people living in the 40 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Illinois it is estimated that roughly 14,700 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 7,063,680 square feet will be required, with 882,960 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for over 14,700 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 161,900 gallons of water, 1,295,000 pounds of ice, and fifteen truckloads of 323,750 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 40 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 31: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 40 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 1,347,307 11,071,996 12,419,293 Shelter Seeking Population 51,426 43 51,469 14,716 10 14,726 Table 32: Worst Case Casualties – Event Occurs at 2:00 AM Severity Level 40 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total for State of Illinois Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 4,478 1,236 146 109 5 0 4,587 1,241 146 456 Level 4 (Black) 276 0 276 Total 6,136 114 6,250 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Illinois results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 AM. A total of 6,250 casualties are expected from this event. There are 276 estimated fatalities and those occur within the critical counties. Roughly 4,600 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 7: Displaced People with Chronic Illness In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (51,500 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Illinois (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 27,499 chronic cases that need to be cared 457 for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 8 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 81%, and occur in the southwestern most counties where shaking is most intense. Some areas along the Mississippi River show loss ratios between 25% and 40% where shaking is moderate. These loss ratios should be considered a concern since 25% to 40% of the total building value in a given census tract is lost. Ratios between 0% and 10% are expected in the remainder of the state. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total nearly $3.1 billion or over 56% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 14% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach $34.1 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to utility losses, $26.8 billion, or nearly threefourths of total direct losses. Transportation and building losses contribute far less, with roughly 5% and 16% of the total losses, respectively. Table 33: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 10.70 CapitalRelated 0.00 4.86 Rental 91.92 61.26 Relocation 10.11 1.73 Subtotal 102.04 78.54 Capital Stock Loses Structural 471.83 152.16 Non-Structural 1,735.84 735.71 Content 556.99 197.94 Inventory 0.00 0.00 Subtotal 2,764.66 1,085.81 Total 2,866.70 1,164.35 Others Total 96.28 2.46 8.26 117.70 76.42 36.49 2.35 211.54 1.57 0.66 0.09 4.77 2.40 3.46 1.11 15.23 85.25 193.79 15.39 412.13 112.95 422.62 246.40 9.35 791.32 1,002.86 16.15 85.06 57.69 11.72 170.61 175.38 33.74 121.35 70.15 1.46 226.69 241.93 786.83 3,100.57 1,129.17 22.53 5,039.09 5,451.22 458 Table 34: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 95,066.33 21,107.01 0.00 11,844.99 110.98 689.64 143.98 124.88 900.41 13.31 1,154.14 5,619.99 24,321.65 161,097.31 233.74 276.59 0.00 34.31 0.81 30.28 5.70 0.01 900.41 13.31 69.54 277.47 41.01 1,883.18 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.25 1.31 0.00 0.29 1.31 4.39 3.96 0.01 100.00 100.00 6.03 4.94 0.17 Table 35: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 8,945.00 5,308.00 694,091.20 3,184.80 1,612.80 2,123.20 11,623.00 30.50 5,689.70 265,201.20 3,866.50 1,001,675.90 315.31 64.99 20,681.05 51.40 57.78 54.94 0.10 0.57 0.08 5,447.65 105.37 26,779.24 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 3.52 1.22 2.98 1.61 3.58 2.59 0.00 1.87 0.00 2.05 2.73 Table 36: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $837,682,000,000 $161,097,310,000 $1,001,675,900,000 $2,000,455,210,000 $5,451,220,000 $1,883,180,000 $26,779,240,000 $34,113,640,000 459 Legend L055 Meier Cities i 1912 I I - Where =Inter5?et? US Fluttes 15 an e: I h'llee Figure 8: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 460 Additional information on social impacts for the 40 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 37: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 AM Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Level II Level I (Moderate Injury (Minor) Delayed Attention) 490 0 0 0 2 69 0 1 0 0 39 4 0 8 1 327 0 26 0 169 61 1 577 5 485 10 0 26 14 314 138 0 832 15 673 28 7 1 13 142 Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 18 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 5 2 0 18 0 17 0 0 1 0 11 4 0 25 0 27 1 0 0 0 4 33 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 19 0 1 0 10 4 0 33 0 31 0 0 1 1 22 8 0 46 0 53 1 0 0 0 7 682 0 0 0 2 94 0 1 0 0 51 5 0 10 1 447 0 32 0 226 84 1 790 5 668 12 0 34 18 436 188 0 1,131 18 948 37 8 1 16 190 141 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 2 0 91 0 5 0 42 17 0 162 0 135 2 0 6 3 89 38 0 228 3 195 7 1 0 3 37 461 Table 38: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Population Displaced Population Shelter Seeking Population 9,590 17,633 5,084 17,008 14,560 35,535 20,452 6,971 34,264 21,802 39,018 6,445 14,761 8,621 4,800 59,612 10,117 40,045 21,668 12,878 15,452 49,019 258,941 41,691 15,161 27,619 30,652 23,094 4,413 7,348 33,893 16,149 256,082 26,733 18,293 12,937 15,148 17,151 15,371 61,296 5,633 0 0 0 1 1,016 0 0 0 0 417 25 0 77 0 4,090 0 188 0 1,689 763 0 7,706 2 5,412 81 0 290 81 3,562 1,819 0 9,696 107 6,445 329 38 0 110 1,804 462 1,743 0 0 0 0 211 0 0 0 0 114 7 0 20 0 1,133 0 53 0 378 201 0 1,914 0 1,418 17 0 76 22 1,166 404 0 3,507 29 1,693 82 9 0 29 480 Table 39: Shelter Requirements Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Total Space Required (sq. ft.) 104,580 0 0 0 0 12,660 0 0 0 0 6,840 420 0 1,200 0 67,980 0 3,180 0 22,680 12,060 0 114,840 0 85,080 1,020 0 4,560 1,320 69,960 24,240 0 210,420 1,740 101,580 4,920 540 0 1,740 28,800 Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) 836,640 0 0 0 0 101,280 0 0 0 0 54,720 3,360 0 9,600 0 543,840 0 25,440 0 181,440 96,480 0 918,720 0 680,640 8,160 0 36,480 10,560 559,680 193,920 0 1,683,360 13,920 812,640 39,360 4,320 0 13,920 230,400 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 61,005 0 0 0 0 7,385 0 0 0 0 3,990 245 0 700 0 39,655 0 1,855 0 13,230 7,035 0 66,990 0 49,630 595 0 2,660 770 40,810 14,140 0 122,745 1,015 59,255 2,870 315 0 1,015 16,800 463 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 97,608 0 0 0 0 11,816 0 0 0 0 6,384 392 0 1,120 0 63,448 0 2,968 0 21,168 11,256 0 107,184 0 79,408 952 0 4,256 1,232 65,296 22,624 0 196,392 1,624 94,808 4,592 504 0 1,624 26,880 24,402 0 0 0 0 2,954 0 0 0 0 1,596 98 0 280 0 15,862 0 742 0 5,292 2,814 0 26,796 0 19,852 238 0 1,064 308 16,324 5,656 0 49,098 406 23,702 1,148 126 0 406 6,720 Table 40: Debris Summary Report Counties Alexander Bond Calhoun Clark Clay Clinton Crawford Edwards Effingham Fayette Franklin Gallatin Greene Hamilton Hardin Jackson Jasper Jefferson Jersey Johnson Lawrence Macoupin Madison Marion Massac Monroe Montgomery Perry Pope Pulaski Randolph Richland Saint Clair Saline Union Wabash Washington Wayne White Williamson Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 114.90 0.30 0.12 0.33 3.28 18.42 0.37 1.76 0.75 0.41 17.42 2.29 0.27 3.93 1.39 83.57 0.18 15.59 0.40 58.09 17.90 0.91 133.31 5.62 132.86 6.19 0.55 10.95 8.54 81.32 37.57 0.32 192.04 10.24 181.59 9.16 5.08 1.24 7.45 47.88 117.62 0.04 0.01 0.05 1.50 18.47 0.04 0.95 0.12 0.06 10.23 1.00 0.03 2.38 0.35 76.94 0.02 8.87 0.05 57.11 19.31 0.11 122.96 1.82 143.30 2.35 0.06 7.42 6.82 88.54 36.80 0.04 155.48 5.14 210.01 7.54 2.13 0.36 3.74 33.57 232.52 0.34 0.13 0.38 4.78 36.89 0.41 2.71 0.87 0.47 27.65 3.29 0.30 6.31 1.74 160.51 0.20 24.46 0.45 115.20 37.21 1.02 256.27 7.44 276.16 8.54 0.61 18.37 15.36 169.86 74.37 0.36 347.52 15.38 391.60 16.70 7.21 1.60 11.19 81.45 464 Indiana – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate approximately 282 thousand tons of debris, which will require 11,280 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity, to remove the debris. Of the debris, 73 percent (205 thousand tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (77 thousand tons). There are roughly 6.1 million people that reside in the State of Indiana. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 60 people with the majority of those people living in the 11 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Indiana it is estimated that 14 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 6,720 square feet of shelter space will be required, with 840 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 14 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 98 gallons of water, 784 pounds of ice, and 196 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 11 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 41: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 480,752 5,599,733 6,080,485 Shelter Seeking Population 52 6 58 13 1 14 Table 42: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 5:00 PM Severity Level 11 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (5:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 57 12 12 53 4 4 110 16 16 465 Level 4 (Black) 2 1 3 Total 83 62 145 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Indiana results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 5:00 PM. A total of 145 casualties are expected from this event. There are 3 estimated fatalities while roughly 110 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 15 12 9 6 3 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 9: Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (60 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Indiana (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 8 chronic cases that need to be cared for within 466 the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation, and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 10 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state due to a Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratio is estimated at roughly 2%, and occurs in the southern Vanderburgh County where shaking is most intense. Additional southwestern counties show loss ratios between 1% and 2% where shaking is moderate. Loss ratios this low are not considered significant since only a small portion of the building value is lost. Also of particular interest is the level of non-structural damage, which totals nearly $300 million, or nearly 50%, of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 16% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural contents and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach approximately $1.4 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. A large portion of losses, $613 million, or 43% of total direct losses, are attributed to building losses (see Table 46). Utility losses also contribute significantly to total losses, with $648 million in utility losses alone, or 46% of all direct economic losses. Transportation losses contribute far less, with roughly 11% of the total losses. Table 43: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 CapitalRelated 0.00 Rental 3.65 Relocation 0.35 Subtotal 4.00 Capital Stock Loses Structural 28.74 Non-Structural 133.94 Content 68.73 Inventory 0.00 Subtotal 231.42 Total 235.42 Others Total 0.30 15.38 0.78 0.99 17.44 0.13 3.52 0.12 4.07 12.37 6.56 0.42 34.73 0.51 0.23 0.03 1.54 0.78 0.29 0.16 2.22 13.78 14.26 1.08 46.57 12.27 57.21 18.67 0.00 88.14 92.21 15.50 53.07 35.47 1.36 105.40 140.13 3.91 17.96 12.82 3.06 37.75 39.29 38.32 33.33 27.23 4.60 103.48 105.70 98.74 295.51 162.92 9.02 566.19 612.75 467 Table 44: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 70,249.58 10,749.46 0.00 6,475.16 10.40 204.33 51.64 0.00 196.40 2,784.30 17,222.67 107,973.10 19.83 23.35 0.00 1.84 0.00 7.85 1.09 0.00 9.97 60.57 4.44 158.10 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.03 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.00 3.84 2.11 0.00 5.08 2.18 0.03 Table 45: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities ALL Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 3,292.70 3,587.60 30,594.70 2,152.50 32.60 8,592.60 17.50 2,672.20 89,733.60 2,232.90 142,809.89 17.78 8.79 127.60 6.95 0.15 7.74 0.18 0.31 467.67 10.71 647.88 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.54 0.24 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.09 1.05 0.01 0.52 0.48 Table 46: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $380,969,000,000 $107,793,100,000 $142,908,890,000 $631,670,990,000 $612,750,000 $158,100,000 $647,880,000 $1,418,730,000 468 South Bend ELKHART u t u STEUBEN t 94 LA PORTE LAGRANGE SAINT JOSEPH Gary u t u t u t u t NOBLE PORTER KOSCIUKO LAKE DE KALB u t STARKE MARSHALL u u t u t t u t u t WHITLEY Fort Waynet u t JASPER u t u FULTON PULASKI 12 Hammondt u 80 90 20 20 6 30 6 6 33 231 30 41 24 421 31 35 30 NEWTON ALLEN WABASH u t BENTON CASS WHITE u t 24 24 65 HUNTINGTON u t 224 ADAMS GRANT u t TIPPECANOE HOWARD t u BLACKFORD u t t u 69 JAY CLINTON DELAWARE TIPTON WARREN u t FOUNTAIN t u RANDOLPH u HAMILTON MADISON t t u 74 BOONE uHENRY t MONTGOMERY WAYNE u t VERMILLION 70 HENDRICKS MARION u t u t HANCOCK u t PARKE PUTNAM RUSH Indianapolis FAYETTEt u JOHNSON u t UNION Terre Hautet 70 u MORGAN u SHELBY t CLAY FRANKLIN 74 DECATUR VIGO OWEN MONROE u RIPLEY DEARBORN t BROWN u t u t BARTHOLOMEW Bloomington SULLIVAN GREENE JENNINGS u t JACKSON OHIO LAWRENCE 65 KNOX u t SWITZERLAND 52 CARROLL WELLS MIAMI 27 35 41 231 52 421 35 Legend 36 67 36 Loss Ratio 40 36 0% - 0.25% 0.25% - 0.5% 0.5% - 1% 1% - 1.5% 1.5% - 1.8% 27 52 40 31 421 41 231 Major Cities 50 50,000 - 100,000 100,001 - 200,000 50 JEFFERSON DAVIESS MARTIN u ut t 50 u t WASHINGTON u t 231 41 PIKE DUBOIS GIBSON ORANGE u t POSEY Evansville Interstates CLARK 150 US Routes CRAWFORD Critical Counties FLOYD 64 WARRICK 200,001 - 753,000 SCOTT 150 PERRY Rivers HARRISON 0 SPENCER VANDERBURGH 10 20 40 Miles Figure 10: Loss Ratio (% of Total Building Assets) 469 60 ® Additional information on social impacts for the 11 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 47: Time-of-Day Casualties, 5:00 PM Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 42 9 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 0 2 3 0 0 61 12 Table 48: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Population 29,820 39,674 32,500 33,157 39,256 12,837 27,061 20,391 21,751 171,922 52,383 Displaced Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 4 470 Shelter Seeking Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 Table 49: Shelter Requirements Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Total Space Required (sq. ft.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,760 480 Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 720 60 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 420 35 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 672 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 168 14 Table 50: Debris Summary Report Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 2.16 0.78 2.08 0.62 0.72 1.97 1.45 0.39 0.34 84.73 12.01 0.75 0.13 0.53 0.08 0.10 0.65 0.21 0.05 0.04 58.73 3.45 2.91 0.91 2.61 0.70 0.82 2.62 1.65 0.43 0.38 143.47 15.45 471 Indiana – Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate approximately 1.76 million tons of debris, which will require 70,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity to remove. Of the debris, 47% (826 thousand tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (933 thousand tons). There are roughly 6.1 million people that reside in the State of Indiana. A Mw7.1 event in the WVSZ displaces over 27,600 people with the majority of those people living in the 11 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Indiana it is estimated that approximately 7,000 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 3,372,960 square feet of shelter space will be required, with 421,620 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 7,000 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 245,945 gallons of water, 393,512 pounds of ice, and 5 truckloads of 98,378 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 11 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 51: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 11 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 480,752 5,599,733 6,080,485 Shelter Seeking Population 26,721 899 27,620 6,815 212 7,027 Table 52: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 AM Severity Level 11 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 2,012 572 64 193 24 1 2,205 596 65 472 Level 4 (Black) 118 3 121 Total 2,766 221 2,987 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The WVSZ event in Indiana results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 AM. A total of 2,987 casualties are expected from this event. There are 121 estimated fatalities and roughly 2,200 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. • • • • Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses (IN) Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Figure 11: Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (27,620 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Indiana (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 16,130 chronic cases that need to be cared 473 for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Figure 12 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state due to the Mw7.1 event on the Wabash Valley Fault. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratio is estimated at roughly 27%, and occurs in western Knox County. Additionally, Gibson County, where shaking is slightly less severe, shows loss ratios between 10% and 20%. More common loss ratios are below 2%, and are not considered significant since only a small portion of the building value is lost. Also of particular interest is the level of non-structural damage, which totals over $2.1 billion, or over 50% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 16% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural contents and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state are greater than $7.2 billion from the Wabash Valley Mw7.1 event. The building losses total $3.9 billion, or 54% of total direct losses. Utility losses also contribute a significant portion to total losses as well, with $2.94 billion in losses, or 41% of all direct economic losses. Transportation losses contribute far less, with roughly 5% of the total losses. Table 53: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 CapitalRelated 0.00 Rental 49.78 Relocation 5.40 Subtotal 55.19 Capital Stock Losses Structural 286.32 Non-Structural 1,087.65 Content 367.17 Inventory 0.00 Subtotal 1,741.13 Total 1,796.32 Others Total 6.84 62.61 1.98 5.77 77.20 3.10 41.77 0.89 52.59 48.71 20.64 1.64 133.60 1.20 0.61 0.05 3.85 9.32 1.62 0.74 17.45 62.34 114.43 8.72 262.68 69.38 412.33 112.13 0.00 593.84 646.44 66.47 275.95 164.83 5.78 513.03 646.63 10.68 64.10 43.53 10.74 129.04 132.89 201.97 266.43 185.63 33.78 687.81 705.26 634.82 2,106.45 873.28 50.30 3,664.85 3,927.53 474 Table 54: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 70,249.58 10,749.46 0.00 6,475.16 10.40 204.33 51.64 0.00 196.40 2,784.30 17,222.67 107,973.10 107.98 49.12 0.00 9.07 0.00 8.77 3.78 0.00 10.34 136.23 30.58 385.10 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.15 0.46 0.00 0.14 0.00 4.29 7.32 0.00 5.26 4.89 0.18 Table 55: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities ALL Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 3,292.70 3,587.60 30,594.70 2,152.50 32.60 8,592.60 17.50 2,672.20 89,733.60 2,232.90 142,809.89 102.84 28.19 573.33 22.30 0.64 24.33 0.51 1.09 2,138.72 44.30 2,936.55 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 3.12 0.79 1.87 1.04 1.96 0.28 2.89 0.04 2.38 1.98 Table 56: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $380,969,000,000 $107,793,100,000 $142,908,890,000 $631,670,990,000 $3,927,530,000 $385,100,000 $2,936,550,000 $7,249,180,000 475 South Bend ELKHART t u t u STEUBEN 94 LA PORTE LAGRANGE SAINT JOSEPH t u Gary t u t u t u NOBLE PORTER KOSCIUKO LAKE DE KALB t u STARKE t MARSHALL u t u t u t t u u WHITLEY t Fort Wayne u t JASPER u t u FULTON PULASKI 12 Hammondt u 80 90 20 20 6 30 6 6 33 231 30 41 24 421 31 35 30 NEWTON ALLEN WABASH t u BENTON t u CASS WHITE 24 24 HUNTINGTON t u 224 ADAMS 65 CARROLL MIAMI WELLS GRANT t u 27 t TIPPECANOE HOWARD BLACKFORD t u t u u 69 DELAWARE JAY CLINTON TIPTON WARREN u t FOUNTAIN t u RANDOLPH t u HAMILTON MADISON t u 74 BOONE t uHENRY MONTGOMERY t WAYNE u VERMILLION 70 HENDRICKS MARION t u t u HANCOCK t u PARKE PUTNAM RUSH Indianapolis FAYETTEt u t JOHNSON u UNION Terre Hautet 70 u MORGAN t u SHELBY CLAY FRANKLIN 74 DECATUR VIGO OWEN MONROE t u RIPLEY DEARBORN BROWN t t u u BARTHOLOMEW Bloomington SULLIVAN GREENE JENNINGS t u JACKSON OHIO LAWRENCE 65 t KNOX u SWITZERLAND 52 35 41 231 52 421 35 36 Legend 67 36 Loss Ratio 40 36 0% - 2% 2% - 5% 5% - 10% 10% - 15% 15% - 27% 27 52 40 31 421 41 231 Major Cities 50 50,000 - 100,000 50 t u ut 50 t u PIKE WASHINGTON t u ORANGE DUBOIS GIBSON t u POSEY Evansville Interstates CLARK 150 US Routes CRAWFORD FLOYD 64 WARRICK 200,001 - 753,000 SCOTT 150 231 41 100,001 - 200,000 JEFFERSON DAVIESS MARTIN PERRY Critical Counties HARRISON SPENCER Rivers 0 VANDERBURGH 10 20 40 Miles Figure 12: Loss Ratio (% of Total Building Assets) 476 60 ® Additional information on social impacts for the 11 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 57: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 AM Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 11 5 338 0 504 1 75 0 15 1,063 0 2 0 94 0 145 0 20 0 4 306 0 0 0 10 0 16 0 2 0 0 35 0 0 0 18 0 31 0 4 0 1 65 0 13 5 460 0 696 1 101 0 20 1,469 0 Table 58: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Population Displaced Population Shelter Seeking Population 29,820 39,674 32,500 33,157 39,256 12,837 27,061 20,391 21,751 171,922 52,383 109 3 4,621 0 6,646 0 1,030 0 86 14,226 0 26 1 1,037 0 1,854 0 240 0 39 3,618 0 477 Table 59: Shelter Requirements Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Total Space Required (sq. ft.) 12,480 480 497,760 0 889,920 0 115,200 0 18,720 1,736,640 0 Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) 1,560 60 62,220 0 111,240 0 14,400 0 2,340 217,080 0 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 910 35 36,295 0 64,890 0 8,400 0 1,365 126,630 0 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 1,456 56 58,072 0 103,824 0 13,440 0 2,184 202,608 0 364 14 14,518 0 25,956 0 3,360 0 546 50,652 0 Table 60: Debris Summary Report Counties Daviess Dubois Gibson Greene Knox Pike Posey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh Warrick Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 6.00 7.56 77.77 0.28 119.54 0.69 21.08 0.18 5.10 364.06 0.39 2.79 2.01 75.35 0.02 139.15 0.11 18.24 0.01 2.07 644.76 0.02 8.79 9.57 153.12 0.30 258.69 0.80 39.33 0.20 7.17 1,008.82 0.41 478 Kentucky – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate 4 million tons of debris, which will require 160,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity, to remove. Of the debris, 48% (1.92 million tons) will be bricks, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (2.08 million tons). There are roughly 4.0 million people that reside in the State of Kentucky. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces nearly 78,200 people with the majority of those people living in the 25 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Kentucky it is estimated that nearly 20,700 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 9,918,240 square feet will be required, with 1,239,780 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 20,663 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 723,205 gallons of water, 1,157,128 pounds of ice, and approximately 14 truckloads of MREs (meals ready to eat), 289,282 in total. Quantities are displayed for the 25 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 61: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 655,184 3,386,585 4,041,769 Shelter Seeking Population 52,964 25,225 78,189 13,904 6,759 20,663 Table 62: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 PM Severity Level 25 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties State Total Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 6,722 2,051 318 49 5 1 6,771 2,056 319 479 Level 4 (Black) 593 0 593 Total 9,684 56 9,740 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2AM, the majority of the population is working at 2PM, and many people are commuting at 5PM. The NMSZ event in Kentucky results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2PM. A total of 9,740 casualties are expected from this event. There are 593 estimated fatalities and those occur within the critical counties. It is very unlikely that fatalities occur outside the critical counties. Roughly 6,771 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. • • • • Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 20,000 16,000 12,000 8,000 4,000 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 13: Estimates Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (78,189 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Kentucky (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 52,387 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from 480 more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation, and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 14 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost, which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 75%, and occur in the western Fulton and southern Ballard Counties where shaking is most intense. Additionally, portions of Carlisle, Graves, Marshall, and McCracken Counties show loss ratios between 40% and 60% where shaking is moderate. These loss ratios should be considered a concern since 40% to 60% of the total building value in a given census tract is lost. Ratios between 0% and 10% are expected in most of the remainder of the state. Nonstructural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total over $5.34 billion or more 55% of total building losses. Structural losses only comprise 15% of all building economic losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to content and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach over $46.0 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to utility losses, $35.3 billion, or over 75% of total direct losses (see Table 66). Transportation and building losses contribute far less, with roughly 3% and 20% of the total losses, respectively. Table 63: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 21.89 CapitalRelated 0.00 9.61 Rental 170.92 111.60 Relocation 19.15 3.03 Subtotal 190.06 146.14 Capital Stock Loses Structural 838.67 232.37 Non-Structural 3,028.44 1,017.46 Content 774.46 231.38 Inventory 0.00 0.00 Subtotal 4,641.57 1,481.22 Total 4,831.64 1,627,36 Others Total 252.48 6.52 9.08 289.97 192.28 87.94 6.20 538.90 4.06 2.03 0.21 12.81 3.05 4.65 1.46 18.23 208.99 377.14 30.04 906.14 301.35 979.86 502.70 23.66 1,807.57 2,346.47 36.78 168.45 107.30 24.53 337.06 349.87 52.19 141.34 72.63 3.22 269.38 287.61 1,461.37 5,335.55 1,688.47 51.41 8,536.80 9,442.94 481 Table 64: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 111,008.12 6,216.70 18.54 4,004.74 18.21 249.96 27.77 0.00 0.00 17.09 584.00 1,169.68 4,721.05 128,035.86 774.46 146.58 0.00 33.77 0.21 43.76 1.83 0.00 0.00 17.09 138.25 98.28 39.25 1,291.48 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.70 2.36 0.00 0.84 1.15 17.51 6.60 0.00 0.00 100.00 23.67 8.40 0.83 Table 65: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 5,841.50 3,309.20 592,633.40 1,985.50 360.00 1,323.70 7,495.50 8.60 918.10 182,505.40 1,603.00 797,983.90 220.82 88.44 24,220.98 69.95 19.88 74.77 5.61 0.55 1.86 10,516.63 72.31 35,291.80 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 3.78 2.67 4.09 3.52 5.52 5.65 0.07 6.42 0.20 5.76 4.51 Table 66: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $259,784,000,000 $128,035,860,000 $797,983,900,000 $1,185,803,760,000 $9,442,940,000 $1,291,480,000 $35,291,800,000 $46,026,220,000 482 Legend 2 1n 3: an 5: Lass Ratio Maj?r Cities US acute: mic-ea TP 3?3: - 2?5: II ESL-ill] - mun: 22"" ?31 - - Emma :nunlies. . - rear. L1: In. r; any?ti. MEEH l' WAT Figure 14: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 483 Additional information on social impacts for the 25 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 67: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 PM Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Marshall McCracken McLean Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Level I (Minor) 223 3 266 141 13 2 507 300 781 0 245 122 94 53 0 14 664 3,022 12 56 0 0 2 177 25 Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) 69 1 70 43 1 0 157 94 236 0 73 38 26 13 0 4 200 945 3 17 0 0 0 54 7 484 Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) 11 0 10 7 0 0 23 15 37 0 11 6 4 2 0 0 32 149 0 2 0 0 0 8 1 Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 20 0 19 12 0 0 43 28 67 0 19 11 6 3 0 1 59 283 1 4 0 0 0 15 2 3223 4 365 203 14 2 730 437 1,121 0 348 177 130 71 0 19 955 4,399 16 79 0 0 2 254 35 Table 68: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Population 8,286 13,060 34,177 5,351 72,265 9,384 91,545 7,752 37,028 8,392 44,829 5,262 46,519 9,804 26,573 8,080 70,872 30,125 16,800 31,839 22,916 11,971 12,597 15,637 14,120 Displaced Population 3,113 20 3,064 2,548 15 0 9,697 2,769 10,745 0 4,864 1,779 2,453 504 0 212 0 5,553 0 975 0 0 1 3,907 745 485 Shelter Seeking Population 805 5 845 674 5 0 2,362 897 2,883 0 1,304 498 584 126 0 60 0 1,360 0 294 0 0 0 1,010 192 Table 69: Shelter Requirements Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Total Space Required (sq. ft.) 386,400 2,400 405,600 323,520 2,400 0 1,133,760 430,560 1,383,840 0 625,920 239,040 280,320 60,480 0 28,800 0 652,800 0 141,120 0 0 0 484,800 92,160 Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) 48,300 300 50,700 40,440 300 0 141,720 53,820 172,980 0 78,240 29,880 35,040 7,560 0 3,600 0 81,600 0 17,640 0 0 0 60,600 11,520 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 28,175 175 29,575 23,590 175 0 82,670 31,395 100,905 0 45,640 17,430 20,440 4,410 0 2,100 0 47,600 0 10,290 0 0 0 35,350 6,720 486 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 45,080 280 47,320 37,744 280 0 132,272 50,232 161,448 0 73,024 27,888 32,704 7,056 0 3,360 0 76,160 0 16,464 0 0 0 56,560 10,752 11,270 70 11,830 9,436 70 0 33,068 12,558 40,362 0 18,256 6,972 8,176 1,764 0 840 0 19,040 0 4,116 0 0 0 14,140 2,688 Table 70: Debris Summary Report Counties Ballard Caldwell Calloway Carlisle Christian Crittenden Daviess Fulton Graves Hancock Henderson Hickman Hopkins Livingston Logan Lyon Madison Marshall Mason Muhlenberg Ohio Todd Trigg Union Webster Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) 86.9 3.3 122.0 66.0 16.5 2.1 158.0 78.1 306.8 0.1 87.3 50.5 49.1 23.9 0.4 6.3 215.2 756.3 7.1 16.2 0.3 0.2 3.4 65.6 14.4 487 Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) 96.2 1.4 128.5 68.8 7.6 0.8 175.4 90.8 340.4 0.0 93.1 51.3 40.5 20.6 0.1 4.8 227.1 879.5 6.0 18.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 71.6 12.6 Total (Thousand Tons) 183.1 4.7 250.5 134.8 24.1 2.9 333.4 168.9 647.1 0.1 180.3 101.8 89.6 44.5 0.5 11.1 442.3 1,635.8 13.1 34.8 0.4 0.2 4.8 137.1 27.1 Mississippi – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate approximately 2 million tons of debris, which will require 80,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity. Of the debris, 42% (840 thousand tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (1,160 thousand tons). There are roughly 2.8 million people that reside in the State of Mississippi. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 21,000 people with the majority of those people living in the 25 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Mississippi it is estimated that 5,550 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 2,671,680 square feet will be required, with 333,960 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 5,550 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 39,000 gallons of water, 312,000 pounds of ice, and four truckloads of 78,000 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 25 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 71: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 25 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 748,030 2,096,628 2,844,658 Shelter Seeking Population 20,832 34 20,866 5,555 11 5,566 Table 72: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 PM Severity Level 25 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 2,036 474 45 855 294 65 2,891 768 110 488 Level 4 (Black) 86 122 208 Total 2,641 1,336 3,977 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Mississippi results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 PM. A total of 3,977 casualties are expected from this event. There are 208 estimated fatalities and roughly 2,891 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses 4000 3000 2000 1000 Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 0 Figure 15: Displaced People with Chronic Illness In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (21,000 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Mississippi (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 13,251 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from 489 more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation, and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 16 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 33%, and occur in the northwestern Mississippi counties (Desoto, Tate, and Tunica) where shaking is most intense. Additionally, portions of Marshall and Lafayette Counties, where shaking is moderate, show loss ratios between 10% and 20%. These loss ratios should be considered a concern since 10% to 20% of the total building value in a given census tract is lost. It is more common to see ratios between 0% and 10% in the remainder of the state which is not as critical although still warrant consideration. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total nearly $1.9 billion, or roughly half of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute to 15% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural contents damage and business interruption losses. Table 73: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 CapitalRelated 0.00 Rental 38.08 Relocation 4.09 Subtotal 42.17 Capital Stock Loses Structural 191.79 Non-Structural 793.46 Content 282.15 Inventory 0.00 Subtotal 1,267.40 Total 1,309.57 Others Total 28.23 166.29 25.07 11.27 230.86 12.18 52.80 1.54 94.76 129.50 63.56 4.40 363.75 15.13 9.02 0.37 49.59 3.26 4.23 1.50 20.26 160.07 167.68 11.91 570.53 114.39 375.21 74.81 0.00 564.41 659.17 149.87 383.84 179.88 9.65 723.23 1,086.98 78.50 222.06 141.77 47.64 489.96 539.55 33.16 80.76 39.33 1.20 154.45 174.72 567.70 1,855.33 717.94 58.49 3,199.46 3,769.99 Total direct economic losses for the state reach over $9.2 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of these losses are attributed to utility losses, in the amount of $5.44 billion, or nearly 60% of total direct losses (see Table 76). Transportation and building losses contribute far less, with roughly 3% and 41% of the total losses, respectively. 490 Table 74: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 48,744.44 10,003.59 0.00 3,114.15 6.09 140.83 37.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 498.48 1,185.92 5,415.69 69,176.25 84.84 81.01 0.00 4.32 0.01 4.78 1.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.94 71.54 14.45 279.73 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.17 0.81 0.00 0.14 0.19 3.39 4.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.40 6.03 0.27 Table 75: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 481.20 3,419.10 174,358.80 2,051.50 384.50 1,367.60 10,593.50 8.90 3,053.90 69,938.00 783.40 266,440.45 6.45 32.97 3,855.10 26.08 9.04 27.88 2.85 0.07 0.26 1,460.34 20.89 5,441.93 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 1.34 0.96 2.21 1.27 2.35 2.04 0.03 0.73 0.01 2.09 2.67 Table 76: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $131,314,000,000 $69,176,250,000 $266,440,450,000 $466,930,700,000 $3,769,990,000 $279,730,000 $5,441,930,000 $9,491,650,000 491 J. . IIA ETTE ?lleAI?ll - I IHIE 0le r. GHEIADA . . - I - If Egan Loss Ratio IESHDB . I 1 SCOTT I LAUD ?EggMen Il?l'l COP rH - l JACHSDII ?0,000 - 40,000 I 40,001 - 45,000 I 45,qu - 194,:qu US =Cr'rtical Countiea Interstatea Rivera Figure 16: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 492 Additional information on social impacts for the 25 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 77: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 PM Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 19 26 18 3 5 25 926 12 4 123 15 147 7 103 5 5 12 15 26 195 58 4 252 28 3 3 5 3 0 0 4 240 2 0 26 1 30 1 18 0 0 2 3 4 48 11 0 68 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 3 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 46 0 0 6 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 13 1 0 23 33 21 3 5 30 1,237 14 5 158 16 184 8 124 6 6 15 18 31 257 71 4 340 34 3 493 Table 78: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Population 34,558 8,026 40,633 15,069 19,440 30,622 107,199 23,263 22,770 38,744 75,755 34,993 38,014 34,274 26,726 25,556 10,117 34,369 14,903 25,370 20,826 19,163 9,227 25,362 13,051 Displaced Population 101 211 125 1 1 205 11,438 93 0 844 9 1,318 2 851 1 2 130 50 278 2,114 359 1 2,494 203 1 494 Shelter Seeking Population 28 68 49 0 0 75 2,556 27 0 283 2 391 1 271 0 1 48 28 96 606 102 0 869 54 0 Table 79: Shelter Requirements Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Total Space Required (sq. ft.) 13,440 32,640 23,520 0 0 36,000 1,226,880 12,960 0 135,840 960 187,680 480 130,080 0 480 23,040 13,440 46,080 290,880 48,960 0 417,120 25,920 0 Sleeping Space Required (sq. ft.) 1,680 4,080 2,940 0 0 4,500 153,360 1,620 0 16,980 120 23,460 60 16,260 0 60 2,880 1,680 5,760 36,360 6,120 0 52,140 3,240 0 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 980 2,380 1,715 0 0 2,625 89,460 945 0 9,905 70 13,685 35 9,485 0 35 1,680 980 3,360 21,210 3,570 0 30,415 1,890 0 495 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) MREs Required Week 1 1,568 3,808 2,744 0 0 4,200 143,136 1,512 0 15,848 112 21,896 56 15,176 0 56 2,688 1,568 5,376 33,936 5,712 0 48,664 3,024 0 392 952 686 0 0 1,050 35,784 378 0 3,962 28 5,474 14 3,794 0 14 672 392 1,344 8,484 1,428 0 12,166 756 0 Table 80: Debris Summary Report Counties Alcorn Benton Bolivar Calhoun Chickasaw Coahoma Desoto Grenada Itawamba Lafayette Lee Marshall Monroe Panola Pontotoc Prentiss Quitman Sunflower Tallahatchie Tate Tippah Tishomingo Tunica Union Yalobusha Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 14.62 12.68 10.42 3.06 4.19 13.66 360.68 8.97 4.36 102.37 22.78 64.19 6.56 49.73 4.94 5.23 5.24 5.57 11.03 72.97 39.79 4.34 58.03 17.17 2.40 8.88 11.47 9.63 1.61 2.25 32.85 533.81 9.81 1.68 278.90 15.97 64.34 2.64 60.55 2.29 2.17 6.62 7.70 15.15 90.66 50.79 1.84 64.04 12.04 0.77 23.50 24.15 20.04 4.67 6.44 46.51 894.49 18.78 6.03 381.27 38.75 128.53 9.19 110.28 7.24 7.40 11.86 13.27 26.18 163.63 90.58 6.18 122.07 29.21 3.17 496 Missouri – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate approximately 6 million tons of debris, which will require 240,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity. Of the debris, 48 percent (2.9 million tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (3.1 million tons). There are roughly 5.6 million people that reside in the State of Missouri. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces 122,000 people with the majority of those people living in the 46 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Missouri it is estimated that 36,700 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 17,617,000 square feet of shelter space will be required, with 2,202,000 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for 36,700 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week post-event, the temporary shelter population will require 1,284,570 gallons of water, 2,055,312 pounds of ice, and 24 truckloads for a total of 513,828 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 46 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 81: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 3,043,805 2,551,406 5,595,211 Shelter Seeking Population 121,927 2 121,929 36,702 2 36,704 Table 82: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 AM Severity Level 46 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total Worst Case Casualties (2:00 AM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 11,267 3,177 401 33 1 0 11,300 3,178 401 497 Level 4 (Black) 760 0 760 Total 15,605 34 15,639 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Missouri results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 AM. A total of 15,639 casualties are expected from this event. There are 760 estimated fatalities which occur within the critical counties. Additionally, about 11,300 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: • • • • Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 Figure 17: Estimated Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (121,928 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Missouri (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 72,181 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from more than 498 one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 18 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratio is estimated at 91%, and occurs in western New Madrid and central Dunklin Counties where shaking is most intense. Other portions of these two counties also experience very high loss ratios. Additionally, Pemiscot, Stoddard, Butler and Scott Counties show significant loss ratios of 50% or more. Other counties in the southeastern portion of Missouri experience loss ratios greater than 20%, though ratios between 0% and 10% are expected in the remainder of the state. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces, total nearly $6.5 billion or over 55% of total building losses. Structural losses only contribute 15% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to content and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the State reach nearly $38.7 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to utility losses, $25.1 billion, or nearly two-thirds of total direct losses (see Table 86). Transportation and building losses contribute far less, with roughly 5% and 31% of the total losses, respectively. Table 83: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses 0.00 Wage Capital0.00 Related 185.37 Rental 20.49 Relocation 205.87 Subtotal Capital Stock Loses 818.20 Structural 2,807.49 Non-Structural 795.24 Content 0.00 Inventory 4,420.92 Subtotal 4,626.80 Total Others Total 39.70 338.40 11.53 19.36 408.99 17.57 267.94 7.08 7.20 299.79 219.57 5.23 282.07 131.29 8.48 746.12 3.76 0.29 22.67 7.47 2.67 36.69 547.47 37.18 1,293.42 365.10 1,777.17 418.25 0.00 2,560.51 2,842.59 412.30 1,322.23 672.28 28.49 2,435.31 3,181.43 59.66 259.97 168.21 41.02 528.87 551.54 116.84 288.66 157.53 9.36 572.40 609.08 1,772.10 6,455.52 2,211.50 78.89 10,518.00 11,811.43 499 Table 84: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways $82,631.70 $14,588.52 $0.00 $5,851.51 $24.79 $280.68 $80.83 $18.26 $38.17 $8.98 $496.38 $3,132.34 $14,085.45 $121,237.61 $832.06 $327.51 $0.00 $70.29 $0.35 $39.13 $8.03 $0.05 $38.17 $7.86 $86.68 $223.34 $138.00 $1,772.59 Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.10 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.07 0.01 Table 85: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities $294,937.10 $5,340.80 $90,000.50 $3,204.50 $397.50 $2,136.30 $3,220.20 $12.30 $4,162.20 $159,299.80 $2,149.80 $564,861.00 $14,585.64 $234.20 $3,624.10 $185.23 $36.27 $198.01 $7.94 $1.96 $0.33 $6,170.69 $93.94 $25,138.31 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 Table 86: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $334,877,000,000 $121,237,610,000 $564,861,000,000 $1,020,975,610,000 $11,811,430,000 $1,772,590,000 $25,138,310,000 $38,722,330,000 500 Legend LoesRatio Ere-m Inn-en; . '3 W. I -ee: - TL -T :5 we ISIZI ?an 753352i I Teml-Iaemn SaIntJe - #315,} . ID IeJIJm-Iupm l?al .. . EILII: ALDWE '5 ?y 21 CeuntIee cal. a" "l =Interetetee LA 33 A J. River?s i? [Mid - LH Hansas??t: ?m ME 3] a?es ED PER WA WAFI EH IOrissant ?3 3' INT LIZIUIS CASE A '3 5? Salnt Leuls BE I: j? 33 5 CAMDE - AIR . H?r? I VE i?l?jE?? 5 I. - \eA II QEHTH ?EIIZILI FII IA: *Hqumw ET 5 pr?i a 15 EIZI 4L Miles Fa Figure 18: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 501 Additional information on social impacts for the 46 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 87: Time-of-Day Casualties, 2:00 AM Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Sainte Genevieve Saint Francois St. Louis City & St. Louis County Scott Shannon Level I (Minor) Level II (Moderate InjuryDelayed Attention) Level III (Severe InjuryImmediate Attention) Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 0 118 2 1,558 1 0 31 0 468 0 0 4 0 66 0 0 7 0 128 0 0 160 2 2,220 1 490 121 15 28 654 28 1 0 0 0 1,786 2 0 1 3 72 1 12 0 0 314 0 893 6 0 0 984 14 1 0 1 7 215 3 6 0 0 0 0 521 0 0 0 0 14 0 3 0 0 85 0 254 2 0 0 285 3 0 0 0 2 55 0 1 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 10 0 31 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 18 0 59 0 0 0 70 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 36 1 0 0 0 2,498 2 0 1 3 90 1 16 0 0 427 0 1,237 8 0 0 1,376 18 1 0 1 9 288 3 5 0 0 0 5 12 1 0 0 13 2,026 556 65 122 2,769 1,058 3 296 0 37 0 69 0 1,460 3 502 Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne 1,490 1 0 5 154 435 0 0 0 39 57 0 0 0 4 503 109 0 0 0 8 2,091 1 0 5 205 Table 88: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley St. Charles Ste. Genevieve St. Francois St. Louis Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne St. Louis City Population 25,853 12,029 135,454 40,867 40,766 68,693 5,941 71,397 22,804 14,927 13,084 33,155 93,807 15,342 37,238 10,,697 198,099 38,944 11,800 8,903 23,564 13,427 12,136 19,760 10,344 13,062 9,542 20,047 18,132 39,825 18,351 41,165 6,689 13,509 283,883 17,842 55,641 1,016,315 40,422 8,324 29,705 23,003 24,525 23,344 13,259 348,189 Displaced Population 0 1,213 1 15,116 0 4,562 236 0 0 0 0 20,574 0 0 0 1 625 0 120 0 0 3,651 0 10,341 54 0 0 10,911 123 0 0 0 60 2,182 0 1 5 1,866 11,221 0 16,226 0 0 1 1,714 21,123 504 Shelter-Seeking Population 0 0 0 0 127 0 34 0 0 1,160 0 3,097 17 0 0 3,566 30 0 0 0 18 655 0 0 1 510 3,085 0 4,483 0 0 0 482 7,316 0 0 0 0 127 0 34 0 0 1,160 0 3,097 Table 89: Shelter Requirements Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley St. Charles Ste. Genevieve St. Francois St. Louis Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne St. Louis City Total Space Required ( ft.2) 0 157,920 0 2,055,360 0 560,160 36,480 0 0 0 0 3,008,160 0 0 0 0 60,960 0 16,320 0 0 556,800 0 1,486,560 8,160 0 0 1,711,680 14,400 0 0 0 8,640 314,400 0 0 480 244,800 1,480,800 0 2,151,840 0 0 0 231,360 3,511,680 Sleeping Space Required (ft.2) 0 0 0 0 7,620 0 2,040 0 0 69,600 0 185,820 1,020 0 0 213,960 1,800 0 0 0 1,080 39,300 0 0 60 30,600 185,100 0 268,980 0 0 0 28,920 438,960 0 0 0 0 7,620 0 2,040 0 0 69,600 0 185,820 505 Water Required Week 1 (gallons) 0 0 0 0 889 0 238 0 0 8120 0 21,679 119 0 0 24,962 210 0 0 0 126 4,585 0 0 7 3,570 21,595 0 31,381 0 0 0 3,374 51,212 0 0 0 0 889 0 238 0 0 8,120 0 21,679 Ice Required Week 1 (lbs.) 0 0 0 0 7,112 0 1,904 0 0 64,960 0 173,432 952 0 0 199,696 1,680 0 0 0 1,008 36,680 0 0 56 28,560 172,760 0 251,048 0 0 0 26,992 409,696 0 0 0 0 7,112 0 1,904 0 0 64,960 0 173,432 MREs Required Week 1 0 0 0 0 1,778 0 476 0 0 16,240 0 43,358 238 0 0 49,924 420 0 0 0 252 9,170 0 0 14 7,140 43,190 0 62,762 0 0 0 6,748 102,424 0 0 0 0 1,778 0 476 0 0 16,240 0 43,358 Table 90: Total Debris Counties Audrain Bollinger Boone Butler Callaway Cape Girardeau Carter Cole Crawford Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade Howell Iron Jefferson Lincoln Madison Maries Miller Mississippi Montgomery New Madrid Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Phelps Pike Pulaski Reynolds Ripley Saint Charles Saint Francois Sainte Genevieve Saint Louis Saint Louis City Scott Shannon Stoddard Texas Warren Washington Wayne Brick, Wood & Others (Thousands of Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousands of Tons) Total (Thousands of Tons) 1 39 3 418 1 207 12 1 0 0 0 397 2 0 1 3 43 1 6 0 0 77 0 218 3 0 0 235 9 1 0 1 4 70 5 12 6 184 513 285 2 344 0 0 4 63 0 34 0 554 0 218 9 0 0 0 0 444 0 0 0 1 18 0 3 0 0 73 0 246 1 0 0 290 5 0 0 0 2 74 0 4 2 79 564 335 1 377 0 0 1 51 1 73 3 971 1 425 22 2 1 0 0 841 2 0 1 4 61 1 9 0 1 151 0 464 4 0 0 525 14 1 0 1 6 145 5 17 8 263 1,077 620 3 721 1 1 5 114 506 Tennessee – New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario Social and economic losses, as well as induced damage, result from direct damage to infrastructure. The social impacts included in this seismic impact assessment include displaced population estimates, food, ice, lodging and medical requirements for the shelter-seeking population, and casualty estimates. Damage to the built environment will generate over 20.0 million tons of debris, which will require 800,000 truckloads, each with 25-ton capacity. Of the debris, 43% (8.8 million tons) will be brick, wood, and building contents, with steel and concrete comprising the balance (11.9 million tons). There are roughly 5.7 million people that reside in the State of Tennessee. A Mw7.7 event in the NMSZ displaces nearly 263,000 people with the majority of those people living in the 37 critical counties. This estimate is only based on structural damage. If utility service interruptions are considered, the estimates of displaced people will be substantially greater. Based on the demographic makeup of Tennessee it is estimated that nearly 73,300 of the displaced residents will seek public shelter. The remainder of the displaced population will seek shelter with family or friends. To accommodate these people, a total area of 35,180,640 square feet of shelter space will be required, with 4,397,580 square feet utilized exclusively for sleeping. The balance of the area is reserved for supporting services. Space would be provided for approximately 73,300 beds or cots. For more detailed estimates of displaced population and the requirements of that population, please see the tables at the conclusion of this scenario discussion. During the first week postevent, the temporary shelter population will require 513,051 gallons of water, 4,104,408 pounds of ice, and 48 truckloads of 1,026,102 MRE’s (meals ready to eat) in total. Quantities are displayed for the 37 critical counties for feeding, ice, and sleeping space requirements. Table 91: Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced and Shelter Seeking Population Displaced Total Population Population 37 Critical Counties Remaining Counties Total State 2,699,993 2,989,290 5,689,283 Shelter Seeking Population 262,907 2 262,909 73,293 0 73,293 Table 92: Worst Case Casualties - Event Occurs at 2:00 PM Severity Level 37 Critical Counties Other Remaining Counties Total State Worst Case Casualties (2:00 PM) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (Green) (Yellow) (Red) 31,913 9,706 1,544 11,419 3,759 609 43,332 13,465 2,153 507 Level 4 (Black) 2,904 1,184 4,088 Total 46,067 16,971 63,038 Casualty estimates are determined for three times of day, which were chosen to represent three distributions of population. People are expected to be home and sleeping at 2:00 AM, the majority of the population is working at 2:00 PM, and many people are commuting at 5:00 PM. The NMSZ event in Tennessee results in the greatest number of casualties if the event occurs at 2:00 PM. A total of 63,038 casualties are expected from this event. There are 4,088 estimated fatalities and roughly 43,332 people are expected to experience minor injuries, termed a ‘Level 1’ casualty. The descriptions of each casualty severity level are listed below. Casualties are reported with Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) terminology. Severity levels are indicated by color, green for least severe, and black for a fatality. Listed below are HAZUS-MH MR2 “Severity Levels” and START classifications (colors) defined with descriptions of typical injuries for each severity level: Severity Level 1 (Green): Injuries will require rudimentary medical attention but hospitalization is not needed; injuries should be rechecked frequently. Severity Level 2 (Yellow): Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening. Severity Level 3 (Red): Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life threatening if not promptly treated. Severity Level 4 (Black): Victims are killed as a result of the earthquake. • • • • Estimated number of displaced people with chronic illnesses Pulmonary Conditions Mental Disorders Stroke Hypertension Heart Disease Diabetes Cancers 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 Figure 19: Estimates Number of Displaced People with Chronic Illnesses In addition to acute illness, typically as a result of the disaster, the needs of the chronically ill are of critical importance to prevent an increase in the vulnerability of the population post-event. By combining estimates of the displaced population (262,909 people) and the prevalence of chronic conditions within Tennessee (Milken Institute, 2007), it is estimated that there will be approximately 170,365 chronic cases that need to be cared for within the displaced population. It is possible that a person may suffer from 508 more than one condition. Furthermore, medical needs such as eyeglasses, walkers, hearing aids, and dental care will also be required post-event. Direct economic losses are determined for the three primary infrastructure groups; buildings, transportation, and utilities. Residential occupancy represents the largest portion of direct economic building loss in comparison to all other occupancy types. Figure 20 illustrates the building loss ratios for the entire state. Loss ratios indicate the percentage of building dollar value lost due to seismic activity. This percentage indicates the structural and non-structural building value lost in comparison to the total value of all buildings prior to damage. Loss ratios are an excellent indicator of relative economic loss because the value lost is correlated to the total value of buildings, as opposed to an absolute scale of dollar value lost which can be skewed by greater building values in a census tract. The greatest loss ratios are estimated at 62% and occur in the western Tipton County where shaking is most intense. Additionally, portions of Crockett and Weakley Counties show loss ratios between 30% and 40% where shaking is moderate. These loss ratios should be considered a concern since 30% to 40% of the total building value in a given census tract is lost. Ratios between 0% and 10% are expected in the remainder of the state. Non-structural damage, including damage to finishes, drywall, and flooring surfaces total over $21.5 billion, or more than half, of total building losses. Structural losses contribute to nearly 20% of all building losses. The remaining building losses are attributed to non-structural and business interruption losses. Total direct economic losses for the state reach over $56.6 billion from the NMSZ Mw7.7 event. The majority of losses are attributed to building losses, $40.3 billion, or over 70% of total direct losses (see Table 96). Transportation and utility losses contribute far less, with roughly 3% and 26% of the total losses, respectively. Table 93: Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Single Family Direct Building Losses ($ millions) Other Commercial Industrial Residential Business Interruption Loses Wage 0.00 120.87 CapitalRelated 0.00 52.98 Rental 553.08 554.54 Relocation 59.55 12.11 Subtotal 592.63 740.50 Capital Stock Loses Structural 2,641.50 827.90 Non-Structural 9,662.90 4,071.83 Content 2,736.12 934.58 Inventory 0.00 0.00 Subtotal 5,040.51 5,834.32 Total 5,633.14 6,574.82 Others Total 1,574.04 52.16 52.44 1,799.51 1,267.54 571.93 39.59 3,453.10 31.72 17.92 1.56 103.36 17.40 27.46 9.29 106.60 1,369.64 1,704.92 122.11 4,996.18 1,882.52 5,883.14 2,858.46 129.36 10,753.49 14,206.58 272.00 1147.00 727.76 178.90 2,325.66 2,429.02 233.92 758.21 366.32 7.69 1,366.15 1,472.74 5,758.84 21,523.08 7,623.24 315.95 35,320.12 40,316.30 509 Table 94: Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Direct Transportation Losses ($ millions) Transportation System Highway Railways Bus Light Rail Ferry Port Airport Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Segments Bridges Tunnels Segments Bridges Facilities Facilities Segments Facilities Facilities Facilities Facilities Runways 63,750.02 7,319.62 12.86 3,516.79 18.04 247.47 48.92 3.09 0.00 5.76 388.04 1,510.74 5,634.18 82,455.53 663.40 561.51 0.00 48.91 0.65 64.96 5.39 0.03 0.00 5.76 111.75 208.52 75.62 1,746.23 Total Loss Ratio (%) 1.04 7.67 0.00 1.39 3.62 26.25 11.02 1.01 0.00 100.00 28.80 13.80 1.34 Table 95: Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Direct Utility Losses ($ millions) Utility System Component Inventory Value Economic Loss Potable Water Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Distribution Lines Facilities Local Pipelines Regional Pipelines Facilities Regional Pipelines Facilities Facilities 2,871.80 3,782.40 114,051.20 2,269.40 175.50 1,513.00 5,081.50 10.60 820.00 41,430.40 1,419.40 173,425.20 181.50 161.16 10,671.34 127.46 28.89 136.25 9.91 1.27 2.62 3,123.57 132.37 14,576.34 Waste Water Natural Gas Oil Systems Electrical Power Communication Total Loss Ratio (%) 6.32 4.26 9.36 5.62 16.46 9.01 0.20 11.94 0.32 7.54 9.33 Table 96: Total Direct Economic Losses Total Direct Economic Losses System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Inventory Value Total Direct Economic Loss $329,827,000,000 $82,455,530,000 $173,425,200,000 $585,707,730,000 $40,316,300,000 $1,746,230,000 $14,576,340,000 $56,638,870,000 510 a SW L41 I I ?ns T50 SUMNE MACON GEE DBIDN HE Fur T9 STEWART GNTGOME 1' usc- FEM ATH 1 ACKSO DVERTON ORE 51 HOUSTON DICKSD . DYER KALB Fees in .3 iff- 1 . wiLLiA?i ON NM I HICKMAN UTH UDE A R50 -3. FERRY AU 0 0" ?1 i WARREN LE 0 5" Anisom 45 ECAFER Wis BED RD 55 v? 2 HELBY - HARD-IN 31 mphi 53M '34 ?14 WAYNE 54 3 ?r FAVEWE HARDEMA ?c ?1 - GILES LING LN FRANKLIN Legend Loss Ratio Rivers Major Cities Cha?amc??a Loss?mio Ir 50.09:: 2% -Critii'ra CuuntiF-S I 2% 10% RENEE I 21mm? 124-356 52% I. Figure 20: Loss Ratio of Total Building Assets) 511 Additional information on social impacts for the 37 critical counties is illustrated in the following tables. Table 97: Worst-Case Casualties 2:00 PM Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Level I (Minor) 4 144 0 49 320 8 18 0 1,487 267 979 0 167 74 378 134 150 0 0 2 95 713 0 0 922 1 70 1 423 1 0 23,870 7 1,116 1 510 2 Level II (Moderate Injury Delayed Attention) 1 35 0 11 100 0 4 0 469 74 295 0 40 22 113 32 37 0 0 0 28 223 0 0 238 0 16 0 126 0 0 7,339 1 350 0 152 0 Level III (Severe Injury Immediate Attention) 0 5 0 2 16 0 0 0 77 11 47 0 6 3 18 4 5 0 0 0 4 37 0 0 34 0 2 0 20 0 0 1,171 0 57 0 25 0 512 Level IV (Fatality) Total Casualties 0 8 0 3 30 0 1 0 142 21 86 0 10 6 33 7 9 0 0 0 7 66 0 0 62 0 4 0 35 0 0 2,225 0 104 0 45 0 5 192 0 65 466 8 23 0 2,175 373 1,407 0 223 105 542 177 201 0 0 2 134 1,039 0 0 1,256 1 92 1 604 1 0 34,605 8 1,627 1 732 2 Table 98: Displaced/Shelter Seeking Population Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Population 16,537 29,475 35,912 15,540 14,532 569,891 11,731 43,156 37,279 28,806 48,152 29,447 28,105 25,578 19,797 25,522 31,115 22,295 8,088 17,929 7,954 27,101 39,926 11,367 91,837 69,498 24,653 134,768 32,450 7,631 54,433 897,472 12,370 51,271 16,842 34,895 126,638 Displaced Population 31 1,475 0 475 2,798 2 106 0 21,942 2,776 9,593 0 1,206 1,370 3,181 2,063 1,334 0 0 1 1,642 13,243 0 0 7,636 0 522 0 7,798 0 0 161,189 83 18,244 0 4,197 0 513 Shelter Seeking Population 8 395 0 122 786 1 30 0 5,899 730 2,576 0 388 412 992 536 387 0 0 0 614 3,975 0 0 2,169 0 145 0 2,071 0 0 45,466 22 4,390 0 1,179 0 Table 99: Shelter Requirements Counties Total Space Required (sq. ft.) Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson 3,840 189,600 0 58,560 377,280 480 14,400 0 2,831,520 350,400 1,236,480 0 186,240 197,760 476,160 257,280 185,760 0 0 0 294,720 1,908,000 0 0 1,041,120 0 69,600 0 994,080 0 0 21,823,680 10,560 2,107,200 0 565,920 0 Sleeping Space Water Required Ice Required MREs Required Required Week 1 Week 1 (lbs.) Week 1 (sq. ft.) (gallons) 480 23,700 0 7,320 47,160 60 1,800 0 353,940 43,800 154,560 0 23,280 24,720 59,520 32,160 23,220 0 0 0 36,840 238,500 0 0 130,140 0 8,700 0 124,260 0 0 2,727,960 1,320 263,400 0 70,740 0 280 13,825 0 4,270 27,510 35 1,050 0 206,465 25,550 90,160 0 13,580 14,420 34,720 18,760 13,545 0 0 0 21,490 139,125 0 0 75,915 0 5,075 0 72,485 0 0 1,591,310 770 153,650 0 41,265 0 514 448 22,120 0 6,832 44,016 56 1,680 0 330,344 40,880 144,256 0 21,728 23,072 55,552 30,016 21,672 0 0 0 34,384 222,600 0 0 121,464 0 8,120 0 115,976 0 0 2,546,096 1,232 245,840 0 66,024 0 112 5,530 0 1,708 11,004 14 420 0 82,586 10,220 36,064 0 5,432 5,768 13,888 7,504 5,418 0 0 0 8,596 55,650 0 0 30,366 0 2,030 0 28,994 0 0 636,524 308 61,460 0 16,506 0 Table 100: Debris Summary Report Counties Benton Carroll Cheatham Chester Crockett Davidson Decatur Dickson Dyer Fayette Gibson Giles Hardeman Hardin Haywood Henderson Henry Hickman Houston Humphreys Lake Lauderdale Lawrence Lewis Madison Maury McNairy Montgomery Obion Perry Robertson Shelby Stewart Tipton Wayne Weakley Williamson Brick, Wood & Others (Thousand Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousand Tons) Total (Thousand Tons) 4.78 81.25 0.38 31.72 92.23 9.96 12.69 0.56 502.53 94.33 312.88 0.40 58.71 29.31 116.97 77.20 70.22 0.26 0.69 3.23 28.54 266.04 0.50 0.14 310.18 0.92 39.13 1.59 209.15 2.25 0.64 5,799.18 7.54 440.31 0.76 158.36 1.83 1.72 84.17 0.05 31.27 120.11 1.72 8.60 0.09 557.54 103.90 346.09 0.06 56.19 30.89 163.20 73.68 72.53 0.04 0.15 1.08 35.58 279.41 0.07 0.02 361.05 0.15 38.63 0.23 270.65 0.95 0.10 8,511.16 4.54 490.81 0.27 198.73 0.27 6.50 165.41 0.42 62.99 212.33 11.68 21.29 0.65 1,060.07 198.23 658.97 0.46 114.90 60.20 280.17 150.88 142.75 0.30 0.83 4.31 64.11 545.45 0.57 0.16 671.23 1.07 77.75 1.82 479.79 3.19 0.74 14,310.34 12.08 931.13 1.04 357.08 2.11 515 Appendix VII: Guide for Impact Assessment Terminology Abstract This terminology guide was developed by the Mid-America Earthquake Center with the objective of providing a summary of definitions that aid in understanding the impact assessment report by non-experts. The information included in this document has been taken and adapted from the manuals of the Loss Assessment Program HAZUS-MH MR2. The scope of this document includes the description of each component of inventory, definition of damage states and functionality after the occurrence of an earthquake. The four infrastructure systems included in this terminology guide are: General Building Stock, Essential Facilities, Transportation, and Utility Systems. Also, the definition of casualties is included in the second part of the guide. 516 Table of Contents Part I Appendix VII: Guide for Impact Assessment Terminology ..................................... 517 Abstract.......................................................................................................................... 517 1. General Building Stock............................................................................................. 519 1.1. Description of Model Building Types ................................................................. 519 1.2. Description of Structural Systems ....................................................................... 520 1.3. Description of Nonstructural Components .......................................................... 523 1.4. Description of Building Damage States............................................................... 524 1.4.1 Structural Damage ......................................................................................... 525 1.4.2 Nonstructural Damage ................................................................................... 534 2. Essential Facilities..................................................................................................... 536 2.1. Description of Essential Facilities ....................................................................... 536 2.2. Description of Building Damage States for Essential Facilities .......................... 536 3. Transportation Systems............................................................................................ 536 3.1. Highways Transportation System:....................................................................... 536 3.1.1. Description of Highway Components........................................................... 537 3.1.2. Definition of Damage States of Highway Components................................ 537 3.1.3. Functionality of Highway Components ........................................................ 538 3.2. Railway Transportation System:.......................................................................... 539 3.2.1. Description of Railway System Components ............................................... 539 3.2.2. Definitions of Damage States of Railway System Components................... 540 3.2.3. Functionality of Railway System Components............................................. 543 3.3. Light Rail Transportation System........................................................................ 543 3.3.1. Description of Light Rail Systems................................................................ 543 3.3.2 Definitions of Damage States of Light Rail Systems .................................... 543 3.3.3. Functionality of Light Rail Systems ............................................................. 545 3.4. Bus Transportation System .................................................................................. 545 3.4.1. Description of Bus System Components ...................................................... 545 3.4.2 Definitions of Damage States of Bus System Components........................... 546 3.4.4. Functionality of Bus Transportation Systems............................................... 547 3.5. Port Transportation Systems ................................................................................ 547 3.5.1. Description of Port Transportation Systems ................................................. 547 3.5.2. Definition of Damage States of Port Transportation Systems ...................... 548 3.5.3. Functionality of Port Transportation Systems .............................................. 549 3.6. Ferry Transportation System................................................................................ 549 3.6.1. Description of Ferry System Components.................................................... 549 3.6.3. Functionality of Ferry System Components ................................................. 551 3.7. Airport Transportation System ............................................................................ 552 3.7.1. Description of Airport Components.............................................................. 552 3.7.2. Definitions of Damage States ....................................................................... 553 3.7.3. Definition of Functionality of Highway Components .................................. 554 4. Utility Systems........................................................................................................... 554 4.1. Potable Water Systems ........................................................................................ 555 517 4.1.1 Description of Potable Water System Components....................................... 555 4.1.2 Definition of Damage States of Potable Water System Components............ 557 4.1.3 Functionality of Potable Water System Pipelines.......................................... 559 4.2. Waste Water Systems .......................................................................................... 560 4.2.1 Description of Waste Water System Components......................................... 560 4.2.2 Definitions of Damage States of Waste Water System Components ............ 561 4.3. Oil Systems .......................................................................................................... 562 4.3.1. Description of Oil System Components ....................................................... 562 4.3.2. Definitions of Damage States of Oil System Components........................... 563 4.4. Natural Gas Systems ............................................................................................ 564 4.4.1. Description of Natural Gas System Components ......................................... 564 4.4.2 Definitions of Damage States of Natural Gas System Components.............. 565 4.5. Electric Power Systems........................................................................................ 566 4.5.1. Description of Electric Power System Components..................................... 566 4.5.2. Definitions of Damage States of Electric Power Systems ............................ 567 4.6. Communication Systems ..................................................................................... 569 4.6.1. Description of Communication System Components................................... 569 4.6.2. Definitions of Damage States ....................................................................... 569 5. Casualties ................................................................................................................... 571 5.1. Injury Severity Level I......................................................................................... 571 5.2. Injury Severity Level II........................................................................................ 571 5.3. Injury Severity Level III ...................................................................................... 571 5.4. Injury Severity Level IV ...................................................................................... 571 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 572 518 Part I 1. General Building Stock 1.1. Description of Model Building Types Table 1 lists the 36 model building types employed in the earthquake loss assessment methodology. Table 1. Model Building Types 519 1.2. Description of Structural Systems A general description of each of the 16 structural systems of model building types is given in the following sections. Wood, Light Frame (W1) These are typically single-family or small, multiple-family dwellings of not more than 5,000 square feet of floor area. The essential structural feature of these buildings is repetitive framing by wood rafters or joists on wood stud walls. Loads are light and spans are small. These buildings may have relatively heavy masonry chimneys and may be partially or fully covered with masonry veneer. Most of these buildings, especially the single-family residences, are not engineered but constructed in accordance with “conventional construction” provisions of building codes. Hence, they usually have the components of a lateral-force-resisting system even though it may be incomplete. Lateral loads are transferred by diaphragms to shear walls. The diaphragms are roof panels and floors that may be sheathed with sawn lumber, plywood or fiberboard sheathing. Shear walls are sheathed with boards, stucco, plaster, plywood, gypsum board, particle board, or fiberboard, or interior partition walls sheathed with plaster or gypsum board. Wood, Greater than 5,000 Sq. Ft. (W2) These buildings are typically commercial or industrial buildings, or multi-family residential buildings with a floor area greater than 5,000 square feet. These buildings include structural systems framed by beams or major horizontally spanning members over columns. These horizontal members may be glue-laminated (glu-lam) wood, solidsawn wood beams, or wood trusses, or steel beams or trusses. Lateral loads usually are resisted by wood diaphragms and exterior walls sheathed with plywood, stucco, plaster, or other paneling. The walls may have diagonal rod bracing. Large openings for stores and garages often require post-and-beam framing. Lateral load resistance on those lines may be achieved with steel rigid frames (moment frames) or diagonal bracing. Steel Moment Frame (S1) These buildings have a frame of steel columns and beams. In some cases, the beamcolumn connections have very small moment resisting capacity but, in other cases, some of the beams and columns are fully developed as moment frames to resist lateral forces. Usually the structure is concealed on the outside by exterior nonstructural walls, which can be of almost any material (curtain walls, brick masonry, or precast concrete panels), and on the inside by ceilings and column furring. Diaphragms transfer lateral loads to moment-resisting frames. The diaphragms can be almost any material. The frames develop their stiffness by full or partial moment connections. The frames can be located almost anywhere in the building. Usually the columns have their strong directions oriented so that some columns act primarily in one direction while the others act in the other direction. Steel moment frame buildings are typically more flexible than shear wall 520 buildings. This low stiffness can result in large interstory drifts that may lead to relatively greater nonstructural damage. Steel Braced Frame (S2) These buildings are similar to steel moment frame buildings except that the vertical components of the lateral-force-resisting system are braced frames rather than moment frames. Steel Light Frame (S3) These buildings are pre-engineered and prefabricated with transverse rigid frames. The roof and walls consist of lightweight panels, usually corrugated metal. The frames are designed for maximum efficiency, often with tapered beam and column sections built up of light steel plates. The frames are built in segments and assembled in the field with bolted joints. Lateral loads in the transverse direction are resisted by the rigid frames with loads distributed to them by diaphragm elements, typically rod-braced steel roof framing bays. Tension rod bracing typically resists loads in the longitudinal direction. Steel Frame with Cast-In-Place Concrete Shear Walls (S4) The shear walls in these buildings are cast-in-place concrete and may be bearing walls. The steel frame is designed for vertical loads only. Diaphragms of almost any material transfer lateral loads to the shear walls. The steel frame may provide a secondary lateralforce-resisting system depending on the stiffness of the frame and the moment capacity of the beam-column connections. In modern “dual” systems, the steel moment frames are designed to work together with the concrete shear walls. Steel Frame with Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls (S5) This is one of the older types of buildings. The infill walls usually are offset from the exterior frame members, wrap around them, and present a smooth masonry exterior with no indication of the frame. Solidly infilled masonry panels, when they fully engage the surrounding frame members (i.e. lie in the same plane), may provide stiffness and lateral load resistance to the structure. Reinforced Concrete Moment Resisting Frames (C1) These buildings are similar to steel moment frame buildings except that the frames are reinforced concrete. There are a large variety of frame systems. Some older concrete frames may be proportioned and detailed such that brittle failure of the frame members can occur in earthquakes leading to partial or full collapse of the buildings. Modern frames in zones of high seismicity are proportioned and detailed for ductile behavior and are likely to undergo large deformations during an earthquake without brittle failure of frame members and collapse. 521 Concrete Shear Walls (C2) The vertical components of the lateral-force-resisting system in these buildings are concrete shear walls that are usually bearing walls. In older buildings, the walls often are quite extensive and the wall stresses are low but reinforcing is light. In newer buildings, the shear walls often are limited in extent, generating concerns about boundary members and overturning forces. Concrete Frame Buildings with Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls (C3) These buildings are similar to steel frame buildings with unreinforced masonry infill walls except that the frame is of reinforced concrete. In these buildings, the shear strength of the columns, after cracking of the infill, may limit the semi-ductile behavior of the system. Precast Concrete Tilt-Up Walls (PC1) These buildings have a wood or metal deck roof diaphragm, which often is very large, that distributes lateral forces to precast concrete shear walls. The walls are thin but relatively heavy while the roofs are relatively light. Older or non-seismic-code buildings often have inadequate connections for anchorage of the walls to the roof for out-of-plane forces, and the panel connections often are brittle. Tilt-up buildings usually are one or two stories in height. Walls can have numerous openings for doors and windows of such size that the wall looks more like a frame than a shear wall. Precast Concrete Frames with Concrete Shear Walls (PC2) These buildings contain floor and roof diaphragms typically composed of precast concrete elements with or without cast-in-place concrete topping slabs. Precast concrete girders and columns support the diaphragms. The girders often bear on column corbels. Closure strips between precast floor elements and beam-column joints usually are cast-inplace concrete. Welded steel inserts often are used to interconnect precast elements. Precast or cast-in-place concrete shear walls resist lateral loads. For buildings with precast frames and concrete shear walls to perform well, the details used to connect the structural elements must have sufficient strength and displacement capacity; however, in some cases, the connection entails between the precast elements have negligible ductility. Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Wood or Metal Deck Diaphragms (RM1) These buildings have perimeter bearing walls of reinforced brick or concrete-block masonry. These walls are the vertical elements in the lateral-force-resisting system. The floors and roofs are framed with wood joists and beams, either with plywood or braced sheathing, the latter either straight or diagonally sheathed, or with steel beams with metal deck with or without concrete fill. Interior wood posts or steel columns support wood floor framing; steel columns support steel beams. 522 Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Precast Concrete Diaphragms (RM2) These buildings have bearing walls similar to those of reinforced masonry bearing wall structures with wood or metal deck diaphragms, but the roof and floors are composed of precast concrete elements such as planks or tee-beams and the precast roof and floor elements are supported on interior beams and columns of steel or concrete (cast-in-place or precast). The precast horizontal elements often have a cast-in-place topping. Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls (URM) These buildings include structural elements that vary depending on the building’s age and, to a lesser extent, its geographic location. In buildings built before 1900, the majority of floor and roof construction consists of wood sheathing supported by wood framing. In large multistory buildings, the floors are cast-in-place concrete supported by the unreinforced masonry walls and/or steel or concrete interior framing. In unreinforced masonry constructed after 1950 (outside California) wood floors usually have plywood rather than board sheathing. In regions of lower seismicity, buildings of this type constructed more recently can include floor and roof framing that consists of metal deck and concrete fill supported by steel framing elements. The perimeter walls, and possibly some interior walls, are unreinforced masonry. The walls may or may not be anchored to the diaphragms. Ties between the walls and diaphragms are more common for the bearing walls than for walls that are parallel to the floor framing. Roof ties usually are less common and more erratically spaced than those at the floor levels. Interior partitions that interconnect the floors and roof can reduce diaphragm displacements. Mobile Homes (MH) These are prefabricated housing units that are trucked to the site and then placed on isolated piers, jack stands, or masonry block foundations (usually without any positive anchorage). Floors and roofs of mobile homes usually are constructed with plywood and outside surfaces are covered with sheet metal. 1.3. Description of Nonstructural Components Nonstructural components include a large variety of different architectural, mechanical and electrical components. Contents of the buildings are treated as a separate category. Nonstructural components are grouped as either "drift-sensitive" or "accelerationsensitive" components, in order to assess their damage due to an earthquake. Damage to drift-sensitive nonstructural components is primarily a function of interstory drift; damage to acceleration-sensitive nonstructural components and building contents is primarily a function of floor acceleration. Table 2 lists typical nonstructural components and building contents, and identifies each item as drift-sensitive or acceleration sensitive. Anchorage/bracing of nonstructural components improves earthquake performance of most components although routine or typical anchorage/bracing provides only limited 523 damage protection. It is assumed that typical nonstructural components and building contents have limited anchorage/bracing. Nonstructural damage evaluation is dependent upon the response and performance of structural components, as well as being influenced by characteristics of nonstructural components themselves. Table 2. List of Typical Nonstructural Components and Contents of Buildings 1.4. Description of Building Damage States The results of damage estimation methods described in this chapter (i.e., damage predictions for model building types for a given level of ground shaking) are used in other modules of the methodology to estimate: (1) casualties due to structural damage, including fatalities, (2) monetary losses due to building damage (i.e. cost of repairing or replacing damaged buildings and their contents); (3) monetary losses resulting from building damage and closure (e.g., losses due to business interruption); (4) social impacts (e.g., loss of shelter); and, (5) other economic and social impacts. The building damage predictions may also be used to study expected damage patterns in a given region for different scenario earthquakes (e.g., to identify the most vulnerable building types, or the areas expected to have the most damaged buildings). In order to meet the needs of such broad purposes, damage predictions must allow the user to glean the nature and extent of the physical damage to a building type from the damage 524 prediction output so that life-safety, societal functional and monetary losses which result from the damage can be estimated. Building damage can best be described in terms of its components (beams, columns, walls, ceilings, piping, HVAC equipment, etc.). For example, such component damage descriptions as “shear walls are cracked”, “ceiling tiles fell”, “diagonal bracing buckled”, “wall panels fell out”, etc. used together with such terms as “some” and “most” would be sufficient to describe the nature and extent of overall building damage. Damage to nonstructural components of buildings (i.e., architectural components, such as partition walls and ceilings, and building mechanical/electrical systems) primarily affects monetary and societal functional losses and generates numerous casualties of mostly light-to moderate severity. Hazard mitigation measures are different for nonstructural and structural building components (i.e., the gravity and lateral-load-resisting systems) as well. Hence, it is desirable to separately estimate structural and nonstructural damage. Building damage varies from “none” to “complete” as a continuous function of building deformations (building response). Wall cracks may vary from invisible or “hairline cracks” to cracks of several inches wide. Generalized “ranges” of damage are used by the Methodology to describe structural and nonstructural damage, since it is not practical to describe building damage as a continuous function. The Methodology predicts a structural and nonstructural damage state in terms of one of four ranges of damage or “damage states”: Slight, Moderate, Extensive, and Complete. For example, the Slight damage state extends from the threshold of Slight damage up to the threshold of Moderate damage. General descriptions of these damage states are provided for all model building types with reference to observable damage incurred by structural (Section 5.3.1) and nonstructural building components (Section 5.3.2). Damage predictions resulting from this physical damage estimation method are then expressed in terms of the probability of a building being in any of these four damage states. 1.4.1 Structural Damage Descriptions for Slight, Moderate, Extensive, and Complete structural damage states for the 16 basic model building types are provided below. For estimating casualties, the descriptions of Complete damage include the fraction of the total floor area of each model building type that is likely to collapse. Collapse fractions are based on judgment and limited earthquake data considering the material and construction of different model building types. It is noted that in some cases the structural damage is not directly observable because the structural elements are inaccessible or not visible due to architectural finishes or fireproofing. Hence, these structural damage states are described, when necessary, with reference to certain effects on nonstructural elements that may be indicative of the structural damage state of concern. Small cracks are assumed, throughout this section, to be visible cracks with a maximum width of less than 1/8”. Cracks wider than 1/8” are referred to as “large” cracks. 525 Wood, Light Frame (W1): Slight Structural Damage: Small plaster or gypsum-board cracks at corners of door and window openings and wall-ceiling intersections; small cracks in masonry chimneys and masonry veneer. Moderate Structural Damage: Large plaster or gypsum-board cracks at corners of door and window openings; small diagonal cracks across shear wall panels exhibited by small cracks in stucco and gypsum wall panels; large cracks in brick chimneys; toppling of tall masonry chimneys. Extensive Structural Damage: Large diagonal cracks across shear wall panels or large cracks at plywood joints; permanent lateral movement of floors and roof; toppling of most brick chimneys; cracks in foundations; splitting of wood sill plates and/or slippage of structure over foundations; partial collapse of “room-over-garage” or other “soft-story” configurations; small foundations cracks. Complete Structural Damage: Structure may have large permanent lateral displacement, may collapse, or be in imminent danger of collapse due to cripple wall failure or the failure of the lateral load resisting system; some structures may slip and fall off the foundations; large foundation cracks. Approximately 3% of the total area of W1 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Wood, Commercial and Industrial (W2): Slight Structural Damage: Small cracks at corners of door and window openings and wall-ceiling intersections; small cracks on stucco and plaster walls. Some slippage may be observed at bolted connections. Moderate Structural Damage: Larger cracks at corners of door and window openings; small diagonal cracks across shear wall panels exhibited by cracks in stucco and gypsum wall panels; minor slack (less than 1/8” extension) in diagonal rod bracing requiring retightening; minor lateral set at store fronts and other large openings; small cracks or wood splitting may be observed at bolted connections. Extensive Structural Damage: Large diagonal cracks across shear wall panels; large slack in diagonal rod braces and/or broken braces; permanent lateral movement of floors and roof; cracks in foundations; splitting of wood sill plates and/or slippage of structure over foundations; partial collapse of “soft-story” configurations; bolt slippage and wood splitting at bolted connections. Complete Structural Damage: Structure may have large permanent lateral displacement, may collapse or be in imminent danger of collapse due to failed shear walls, broken brace rods or failed framing connections; it may fall its foundations; large cracks in the 526 foundations. Approximately 3% of the total area of W2 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Steel Moment Frame (S1): Slight Structural Damage: Minor deformations in connections or hairline cracks in few welds. Moderate Structural Damage: Some steel members have yielded exhibiting observable permanent rotations at connections; few welded connections may exhibit major cracks through welds or few bolted connections may exhibit broken bolts or enlarged bolt holes. Extensive Structural Damage: Most steel members have exceeded their yield capacity, resulting in significant permanent lateral deformation of the structure. Some of the structural members or connections may have exceeded their ultimate capacity exhibited by major permanent member rotations at connections, buckled flanges and failed connections. Partial collapse of portions of structure is possible due to failed critical elements and/or connections. Complete Structural Damage: Significant portion of the structural elements have exceeded their ultimate capacities or some critical structural elements or connections have failed resulting in dangerous permanent lateral displacement, partial collapse or collapse of the building. Approximately 8 % (low-rise), 5% (mid-rise) or 3% (high-rise) of the total area of S1 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Steel Braced Frame (S2): Slight Structural Damage: Few steel braces have yielded which may be indicated by minor stretching and/or buckling of slender brace members; minor cracks in welded connections; minor deformations in bolted brace connections. Moderate Structural Damage: Some steel braces have yielded exhibiting observable stretching and/or buckling of braces; few braces, other members or connections have indications of reaching their ultimate capacity exhibited by buckled braces, cracked welds, or failed bolted connections. Extensive Structural Damage: Most steel brace and other members have exceeded their yield capacity, resulting in significant permanent lateral deformation of the structure. Some structural members or connections have exceeded their ultimate capacity exhibited by buckled or broken braces, flange buckling, broken welds, or failed bolted connections. Anchor bolts at columns may be stretched. Partial collapse of portions of structure is possible due to failure of critical elements or connections. Complete Structural Damage: Most the structural elements have reached their ultimate capacities or some critical members or connections have failed resulting in dangerous permanent lateral deflection, partial collapse or collapse of the building. Approximately 527 8% (low-rise), 5% (mid-rise) or 3% (high-rise) of the total area of S2 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Steel Light Frame (S3): These structures are mostly single story structures combining rod-braced frames in one direction and moment frames in the other. Due to repetitive nature of the structural systems, the type of damage to structural members is expected to be rather uniform throughout the structure. Slight Structural Damage: Few steel rod braces have yielded which may be indicated by minor sagging of rod braces. Minor cracking at welded connections or minor deformations at bolted connections of moment frames may be observed. Moderate Structural Damage: Most steel braces have yielded exhibiting observable significantly sagging rod braces; few brace connections may be broken. Some weld cracking may be observed in the moment frame connections. Extensive Structural Damage: Significant permanent lateral deformation of the structure due to broken brace rods, stretched anchor bolts and permanent deformations at moment frame members. Some screw or welded attachments of roof and wall siding to steel framing may be broken. Some purlin and girt connections may be broken. Complete Structural Damage: Structure is collapsed or in imminent danger of collapse due to broken rod bracing, failed anchor bolts or failed structural members or connections. Approximately 3% of the total area of S3 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Steel Frame with Cast-In-Place Concrete Shear Walls (S4): This is a “composite” structural system where primary lateral-force-resisting system is the concrete shear walls. Hence, Slight, Moderate and Extensive damage states are likely to be determined by the shear walls while the collapse damage state would be determined by the failure of the structural frame. Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on most concrete shear wall surfaces; minor concrete spalling at few locations. Moderate Structural Damage: Most shear wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some of the shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities exhibited by larger diagonal cracks and concrete spalling at wall ends. Extensive Structural Damage: Most concrete shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities; few walls have reached or exceeded their ultimate capacity exhibited by large through-the wall diagonal cracks, extensive spalling around the cracks and visibly 528 buckled wall reinforcement. Partial collapse may occur due to failed connections of steel framing to concrete walls. Some damage may be observed in steel frame connections. Complete Structural Damage: Structure may be in danger of collapse or collapse due to total failure of shear walls and loss of stability of the steel frames. Approximately 8% (low-rise), 5% (mid-rise) or 3% (high-rise) of the total area of S4 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Steel Frame with Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls (S5): This is a “composite” structural system where the initial lateral resistance is provided by the infill walls. Upon cracking of the infills, further lateral resistance is provided by the steel frames “braced” by the infill walls acting as diagonal compression struts. Collapse of the structure results when the infill walls disintegrate (due to compression failure of the masonry “struts”) and the steel frame loses its stability. Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal (sometimes horizontal) hairline cracks on most infill walls; cracks at frame-infill interfaces. Moderate Structural Damage: Most infill wall surfaces exhibit larger diagonal or horizontal cracks; some walls exhibit crushing of brick around beam-column connections. Extensive Structural Damage: Most infill walls exhibit large cracks; some bricks may be dislodged and fall; some infill walls may bulge out-of-plane; few walls may fall off partially or fully; some steel frame connections may have failed. Structure may exhibit permanent lateral deformation or partial collapse due to failure of some critical members. Complete Structural Damage: Structure is collapsed or in danger of imminent collapse due to total failure of many infill walls and loss of stability of the steel frames. . Approximately 8% (low-rise), 5% (mid-rise) or 3% (high-rise) of the total area of S5 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Reinforced Concrete Moment Resisting Frames (C1): Slight Structural Damage: Flexural or shear type hairline cracks in some beams and columns near joints or within joints. Moderate Structural Damage: Most beams and columns exhibit hairline cracks. In ductile frames some of the frame elements have reached yield capacity indicated by larger flexural cracks and some concrete spalling. Nonductile frames may exhibit larger shear cracks and spalling. Extensive Structural Damage: Some of the frame elements have reached their ultimate capacity indicated in ductile frames by large flexural cracks, spalled concrete and buckled main reinforcement; nonductile frame elements may have suffered shear failures or bond 529 failures at reinforcement splices, or broken ties or buckled main reinforcement in columns which may result in partial collapse. Complete Structural Damage: Structure is collapsed or in imminent danger of collapse due to brittle failure of nonductile frame elements or loss of frame stability. Approximately 13% (low-rise), 10% (mid-rise) or 5% (high-rise) of the total area of C1 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Concrete Shear Walls (C2): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on most concrete shear wall surfaces; minor concrete spalling at few locations. Moderate Structural Damage: Most shear wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some shear walls have exceeded yield capacity indicated by larger diagonal cracks and concrete spalling at wall ends. Extensive Structural Damage: Most concrete shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities; some walls have exceeded their ultimate capacities indicated by large, through-the-wall diagonal cracks, extensive spalling around the cracks and visibly buckled wall reinforcement or rotation of narrow walls with inadequate foundations. Partial collapse may occur due to failure of nonductile columns not designed to resist lateral loads. Complete Structural Damage: Structure has collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to failure of most of the shear walls and failure of some critical beams or columns. Approximately 13% (low-rise), 10% (mid-rise) or 5% (high-rise) of the total area of C2 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Concrete Frame Buildings with Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls (C3): This is a “composite” structural system where the initial lateral resistance is provided by the infill walls. Upon cracking of the infills, further lateral resistance is provided by the concrete frame “braced” by the infill acting as diagonal compression struts. Collapse of the structure results when the infill walls disintegrate (due to compression failure of the masonry “struts”) and the frame loses stability, or when the concrete columns suffer shear failures due to reduced effective height and the high shear forces imposed on them by the masonry compression struts. Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal (sometimes horizontal) hairline cracks on most infill walls; cracks at frame-infill interfaces. Moderate Structural Damage: Most infill wall surfaces exhibit larger diagonal or horizontal cracks; some walls exhibit crushing of brick around beam-column connections. Diagonal shear cracks may be observed in concrete beams or columns. 530 Extensive Structural Damage: Most infill walls exhibit large cracks; some bricks may dislodge and fall; some infill walls may bulge out-of-plane; few walls may fall partially or fully; few concrete columns or beams may fail in shear resulting in partial collapse. Structure may exhibit permanent lateral deformation. Complete Structural Damage: Structure has collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to a combination of total failure of the infill walls and nonductile failure of the concrete beams and columns. Approximately 15% (low-rise), 13% (mid-rise) or 5% (high-rise) of the total area of C3 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Precast Concrete Tilt-Up Walls (PC1): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on concrete shear wall surfaces; larger cracks around door and window openings in walls with large proportion of openings; minor concrete spalling at few locations; minor separation of walls from the floor and roof diaphragms; hairline cracks around metal connectors between wall panels and at connections of beams to walls. Moderate Structural Damage: Most wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; larger cracks in walls with door or window openings; few shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities indicated by larger diagonal cracks and concrete spalling. Cracks may appear at top of walls near panel intersections indicating “chord” yielding. Some walls may have visibly pulled away from the roof. Some welded panel connections may have been broken, indicated by spalled concrete around connections. Some spalling may be observed at the connections of beams to walls. Extensive Structural Damage: In buildings with relatively large area of wall openings most concrete shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities and some have exceeded their ultimate capacities indicated by large, through-the-wall diagonal cracks, extensive spalling around the cracks and visibly buckled wall reinforcement. The plywood diaphragms may exhibit cracking and separation along plywood joints. Partial collapse of the roof may result from the failure of the wall-to-diaphragm anchorages sometimes with falling of wall panels. Complete Structural Damage: Structure is collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to failure of the wall-to-roof anchorages, splitting of ledgers, or failure of plywood-to-ledger nailing; failure of beams connections at walls; failure of roof or floor diaphragms; or, failure of the wall panels. Approximately 15% of the total area of PC1 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Precast Concrete Frames with Concrete Shear Walls (PC2): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on most shear wall surfaces; minor concrete spalling at few connections of precast members. 531 Moderate Structural Damage: Most shear wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities indicated by larger cracks and concrete spalling at wall ends; observable distress or movement at connections of precast frame connections, some failures at metal inserts and welded connections. Extensive Structural Damage: Most concrete shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities; some walls may have reached their ultimate capacities indicated by large, through-the wall diagonal cracks, extensive spalling around the cracks and visibly buckled wall reinforcement. Some critical precast frame connections may have failed resulting partial collapse. Complete Structural Damage: Structure has collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to failure of the shear walls and/or failures at precast frame connections. Approximately 15% (low-rise), 13% (mid-rise) or 10% (high-rise) of the total area of PC2 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Wood or Metal Deck Diaphragms (RM1): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on masonry wall surfaces; larger cracks around door and window openings in walls with large proportion of openings; minor separation of walls from the floor and roof diaphragms. Moderate Structural Damage: Most wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some of the shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities indicated by larger diagonal cracks. Some walls may have visibly pulled away from the roof. Extensive Structural Damage: In buildings with relatively large area of wall openings most shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities and some of the walls have exceeded their ultimate capacities indicated by large, through-the-wall diagonal cracks and visibly buckled wall reinforcement. The plywood diaphragms may exhibit cracking and separation along plywood joints. Partial collapse of the roof may result from failure of the wall-to-diaphragm anchorages or the connections of beams to walls. Complete Structural Damage: Structure has collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to failure of the wall anchorages or due to failure of the wall panels. Approximately 13% (low-rise) or 10% (mid-rise) of the total area of RM1 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Precast Concrete Diaphragms (RM2): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal hairline cracks on masonry wall surfaces; larger cracks around door and window openings in walls with large proportion of openings. Moderate Structural Damage: Most wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some of the shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities indicated by larger cracks. 532 Extensive Structural Damage: In buildings with relatively large area of wall openings most shear walls have exceeded their yield capacities and some of the walls have exceeded their ultimate capacities exhibited by large, through-the wall diagonal cracks and visibly buckled wall reinforcement. The diaphragms may also exhibit cracking. Complete Structural Damage: Structure is collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to failure of the walls. Approximately 13% (low-rise), 10% (mid-rise) or 5% (high-rise) of the total area of RM2 buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Unreinforced Masonry Bearing Walls (URM): Slight Structural Damage: Diagonal, stair-step hairline cracks on masonry wall surfaces; larger cracks around door and window openings in walls with large proportion of openings; movements of lintels; cracks at the base of parapets. Moderate Structural Damage: Most wall surfaces exhibit diagonal cracks; some of the walls exhibit larger diagonal cracks; masonry walls may have visible separation from diaphragms; significant cracking of parapets; some masonry may fall from walls or parapets. Extensive Structural Damage: In buildings with relatively large area of wall openings most walls have suffered extensive cracking. Some parapets and gable end walls have fallen. Beams or trusses may have moved relative to their supports. Complete Structural Damage: Structure has collapsed or is in imminent danger of collapse due to in-plane or out-of-plane failure of the walls. Approximately 15% of the total area of URM buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. Mobile Homes (MH): Slight Structural Damage: Damage to some porches, stairs or other attached components. Moderate Structural Damage: Major movement of the mobile home over its supports resulting in some damage to metal siding and stairs and requiring resetting of the mobile home on its supports. Extensive Structural Damage: Mobile home has fallen partially off its supports, often severing utility lines. Complete Structural Damage: Mobile home has totally fallen off its supports; usually severing utility lines, with steep jack stands penetrating through the floor. Approximately 3% of the total area of MH buildings with Complete damage is expected to be collapsed. 533 1.4.2 Nonstructural Damage Four damage states are used to describe nonstructural damage: Slight, Moderate, Extensive and Complete nonstructural damage. Nonstructural damage is considered to be independent of the structural model building type (i.e. partitions, ceilings, cladding, etc. are assumed to incur the same damage when subjected to the same interstory drift or floor acceleration whether they are in a steel frame building or in a concrete shear wall building), consequently, building-specific damage state descriptions are not meaningful. Instead, general descriptions of nonstructural damage states are provided for common nonstructural systems. Damage to drift-sensitive nonstructural components is primarily a function of interstory drift (e.g. full-height drywall partitions) while for acceleration-sensitive components (e.g. mechanical equipment) damage is a function of the floor acceleration. Developing fragility curves for each possible nonstructural component is not practicable for the purposes of regional loss estimation and there is insufficient data to develop such fragility curves. Hence, in this methodology nonstructural building components are grouped into drift-sensitive and acceleration-sensitive component groups, and the damage functions estimated for each group are assumed to be "typical" of it sub-components. Note, however, that damage depends on the anchorage/bracing provided to the nonstructural components. Damageability characteristics of each group are described by a set of fragility curves (see Subsection 5.4.3.3). The type of nonstructural components in a given building is a function of the building occupancy-use classification. For example, single-family residences would not have curtain wall panels, suspended ceilings, elevators, etc. while these items would be found in an office building. Hence, the relative values of nonstructural components in relation to the overall building replacement value vary with type of occupancy. In Chapter 15, estimates of replacement cost breakdown between structural building components for different occupancy/use related classifications are provided; further breakdowns are provided by drift- and acceleration-sensitive nonstructural components. In the following, general descriptions of the four nonstructural damage states are described for common nonstructural building components: Partitions Walls Slight Nonstructural Damage: A few cracks are observed at intersections of walls and ceilings and at corners of door openings. Moderate Nonstructural Damage: Larger and more extensive cracks requiring repair and repainting; some partitions may require replacement of gypsum board or other finishes. 534 Extensive Nonstructural Damage: Most of the partitions are cracked and a significant portion may require replacement of finishes; some door frames in the partitions are also damaged and require re-setting. Complete Nonstructural Damage: Most partition finish materials and framing may have to be removed and replaced; damaged studs repaired, and walls refinished. Most door frames may also have to be repaired and replaced. Suspended Ceilings Slight Nonstructural Damage: A few ceiling tiles have moved or fallen down. Moderate Nonstructural Damage: Falling of tiles is more extensive; in addition the ceiling support framing (T-bars) has disconnected and/or buckled at few locations; lenses have fallen off of some light fixtures and a few fixtures have fallen; localized repairs are necessary. Extensive Nonstructural Damage: The ceiling system exhibits extensive buckling, disconnected t-bars and falling ceiling tiles; ceiling partially collapses at few locations and some light fixtures fall; repair typically involves removal of most or all ceiling tiles. Complete Nonstructural Damage: The ceiling system is buckled throughout and/or fallen and requires complete replacement; many light fixtures fall. Exterior Wall Panels Slight Nonstructural Damage: Slight movement of the panels, requiring realignment. Moderate Nonstructural Damage: The movements are more extensive; connections of panels to structural frame are damaged requiring further inspection and repairs; some window frames may need realignment. Extensive Nonstructural Damage: Most of the panels are cracked or otherwise damaged and misaligned, and most panel connections to the structural frame are damaged requiring thorough review and repairs; few panels fall or are in imminent danger of falling; some window panes are broken and some pieces of glass have fallen. Complete Nonstructural Damage: Most panels are severely damaged, most connections are broken or severely damaged, some panels have fallen and most are in imminent danger of falling; extensive glass breakage and falling. Electrical-Mechanical Equipment, Piping, Ducts Slight Nonstructural Damage: The most vulnerable equipment (e.g. unanchored or on spring isolators) moves and damages attached piping or ducts. 535 Moderate Nonstructural Damage: Movements are larger and damage is more extensive; piping leaks at few locations; elevator machinery and rails may require realignment. Extensive Nonstructural Damage: Equipment on spring isolators topples and falls; other unanchored equipment slides or falls breaking connections to piping and ducts; leaks develop at many locations; anchored equipment indicate stretched bolts or strain at anchorages. Complete Nonstructural Damage: Equipment is damaged by sliding, overturning or failure of their supports and is not operable; piping is leaking at many locations; some pipe and duct supports have failed causing pipes and ducts to fall or hang down; elevator rails are buckled or have broken supports and/or counterweights have derailed. 2. Essential Facilities 2.1. Description of Essential Facilities Essential facilities are those facilities that provide services to the community and should be functional after an earthquake. Essential facilities include hospitals, police stations, fire stations and schools. The damage state probabilities for essential facilities are determined on a site-specific basis (i.e., the ground motion parameters are computed at the location of the facility). 2.2. Description of Building Damage States for Essential Facilities Building damage states for structural and nonstructural components of essential facilities are the same as those described in Chapter 1 for general building stock. 3. Transportation Systems Transportation systems include the following seven systems: Highways, Railways, Light Rails, Bus Facilities, Ports, Ferry and Airports 3.1. Highways Transportation System: This system consists of roadways, bridges and tunnels. 536 3.1.1. Description of Highway Components In this section, a brief description of each highway component is given. Roadways Roadways are classified as major roads and urban roads. Major roads include interstate and state highways and other roads with four lanes or more. Parkways are also classified as major roads. Urban roads include intercity roads and other roads with two lanes. Bridges Bridges are classified based on the following structural characteristics: • Seismic Design • Number of spans: single vs. multiple span bridges • Structure type: concrete, steel, others • Pier type: multiple column bents, single column bents and pier walls • Abutment type and bearing type: monolithic vs. non-monolithic; high rocker bearings, low steel bearings and neoprene rubber bearings • Span continuity: continuous, discontinuous (in-span hinges), and simply supported. Tunnels Tunnels are classified as bored/drilled or cut & cover. 3.1.2. Definition of Damage States of Highway Components A total of five damage states are defined for highway system components. These are none, slight/minor, moderate, extensive and complete. Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For roadways, DS2 is defined by slight settlement (few inches) or offset of the ground. • For bridges, DS2 is defined by minor cracking and spalling to the abutment, cracks in shear keys at abutments, minor spalling and cracks at hinges, minor spalling at the column (damage requires no more than cosmetic repair) or minor cracking to the deck. • For tunnels, DS2 is defined by minor cracking of the tunnel liner (damage requires no more than cosmetic repair) and some rock falling, or by slight settlement of the ground at a tunnel portal. 537 Moderate Damage (DS3) • For roadways, DS3 is defined by moderate settlement (several inches) or offset of the ground. • For bridges, DS3 is defined by any column experiencing moderate (shear cracks) cracking and spalling (column structurally still sound), moderate movement of the abutment (<2"), extensive cracking and spalling of shear keys, any connection having cracked shear keys or bent bolts, keeper bar failure without unseating, rocker bearing failure or moderate settlement of the approach. • For tunnels, DS3 is defined by moderate cracking of the tunnel liner and rock falling. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For roadways, DS4 is defined by major settlement of the ground (few feet). • For bridges, DS4 is defined by any column degrading without collapse – shear failure – (column structurally unsafe), significant residual movement at connections, or major settlement approach, vertical offset of the abutment, differential settlement at connections, shear key failure at abutments. • For tunnels, DS4 is characterized by major ground settlement at a tunnel portal and extensive cracking of the tunnel liner. Complete Damage (DS5) • For roadways, DS5 is defined by major settlement of the ground (i.e., same as DS4). • For bridges, DS5 is defined by any column collapsing and connection losing all bearing support, which may lead to imminent deck collapse, tilting of substructure due to foundation failure. • For tunnels, DS5 is characterized by major cracking of the tunnel liner, which may include possible collapse. 3.1.3. Functionality of Highway Components Component functionality is described by the probability of damage state (immediately following the earthquake) and by the associated fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be functional after a specified period of time. For example, a roadway link might be found to have a 0.50 probability of extensive damage and on this basis would have a 0.50 probability that the road would be: (1) closed immediately, (2) partially open after a 3-day restoration period and (3) fully open after a 1-month restoration period. 538 3.2. Railway Transportation System: This system consists of tracks/roadbeds, bridges, tunnels, urban stations, maintenance facilities, fuel facilities, and dispatch facilities. 3.2.1. Description of Railway System Components A railway system consists of four components: tracks/roadbeds, bridges, tunnels, and facilities. Tracks/Roadbeds Tracks/roadbeds refers to the assembly of rails, ties, and fastenings, and the ground on which they rest. Only one classification is adopted for these components. This classification is analogous to that of urban roads in highway systems. Bridges Railway bridges are classified similar to highway steel and concrete bridges. Tunnels Railway tunnels follow the same classification as highway tunnels. That is, they are classified either as bored/drilled tunnels or cut & cover tunnels. Railway System Facilities Railway system facilities include urban and suburban stations, maintenance facilities, fuel facilities, and dispatch facilities. Urban and Suburban stations are generally key connecting hubs that are important for system functionality. In western US, these buildings are mostly made of reinforced concrete shear walls or moment resisting steel frames, while in the eastern US, the small stations are mostly wood and the large ones are mostly masonry or braced steel frames. Maintenance facilities are housed in large structures that are not usually critical for system functionality as maintenance activities can be delayed or performed elsewhere. These building structures are often made of steel braced frames. Fuel facilities include buildings, tanks (anchored, unanchored, or buried), backup power systems (if available, anchored or unanchored diesel generators), pumps, and other equipment (anchored or unanchored). It should be mentioned that anchored equipment in general refers to equipment designed with special seismic tiedowns or tiebacks, while unanchored equipment refers to equipment designed with no special considerations other than the manufacturer's normal requirements. While some vibrating components, such as 539 pumps, are bolted down regardless of concern for earthquakes, as used here “anchored” means all components have been engineered to meet seismic criteria which may include bracing (e.g., pipe or stack bracing) or flexibility requirements (e.g., flexible connections across separation joints) as well as anchorage. These definitions of anchored and unanchored apply to all lifeline components. The fuel facility functionality is determined with a fault tree analysis considering redundancies and subcomponent behavior. Note that generic building damage functions are used in this fault tree analysis for developing the overall fragility curve of fuel facilities. Above ground tanks are typically made of steel with roofs also made of steel. Buried tanks are typically concrete wall construction with concrete roofs. In total, five types of fuel facilities are considered. These are: fuel facilities with or without anchored equipment and with or without backup power (all combinations), and fuel facilities with buried tanks. Dispatch facilities consist of buildings, backup power supplies (if available, anchored or unanchored diesel generators), and electrical equipment (anchored or unanchored). Generic reinforced concrete building with shear walls damage functions, are used in this fault tree analysis for developing the overall fragility curves for dispatch facilities. In total, four types of dispatch facilities are considered. These are dispatch facilities with or without anchored equipment and with or without backup power (all combinations). 3.2.2. Definitions of Damage States of Railway System Components A total of five damage states are defined for railway system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For tracks and roadbeds, DS2 is defined by minor (localized) derailment due to slight differential settlement of embankment or offset of the ground. • For railway bridges, DS2 is defined similar to highway bridges. • For railway tunnels, DS2 is defined similar to highway tunnels. • For railway system facilities: • For urban stations and maintenance facilities, DS2 is defined by slight building damage (check chapter 1 for full description of potential damage). • For fuel facilities with anchored equipment, DS2 is defined by slight damage to pump building, minor damage to anchor of tanks, or loss of off-site power (check electric power systems for more on this) for a very short period and minor damage to backup power (i.e. to diesel generators, if available). 540 • For fuel facilities with unanchored equipment, DS2 is defined by elephant foot buckling of tanks with no leakage or loss of contents, slight damage to pump building, or loss of commercial power for a very short period and minor damage to backup power (i.e. to diesel generators, if available). • For fuel facilities with buried tanks (PGD related damage), DS2 is defined by minor uplift (few inches) of the buried tanks or minor cracking of concrete walls. • For dispatch facilities with anchored equipment, DS2 is defined by minor anchor damage, slight damage to building, or loss of commercial power for a very short period and minor damage to backup power (i.e. diesel generators, if available). • For dispatch facilities with unanchored equipment, DS2 is defined by loss of offsite power for a very short period and minor damage to backup power (i.e. to diesel generators, if available), or slight damage to building. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For railway tracks and roadbeds, DS3 is defined by considerable derailment due to differential settlement or offset of the ground. Rail repair is required. • For railway bridges, DS3 is defined as for highway bridges. • For railway tunnels, DS3 is defined as for highway tunnels. • For railway system facilities: • For urban stations and maintenance facilities, DS3 is defined by moderate building damage (check Chapter 1 for description of potential damage). • For fuel facilities with anchored equipment, DS3 is defined by elephant foot buckling of tanks with no leakage or loss of contents, considerable damage to equipment, moderate damage to pump building, or loss of commercial power for few days and malfunction of backup power (i.e., diesel generators, if available). • For fuel facilities with unanchored equipment, DS3 is defined by elephant foot buckling of tanks with partial loss of contents, moderate damage to pump building, loss of commercial power for few days and malfunction of backup power (i.e., diesel generators, if available). • For fuel facilities with buried tanks, DS3 is defined by damage to roof supporting columns, and considerable cracking of walls. • For dispatch facilities with anchored equipment, DS3 is defined by considerable anchor damage, moderate damage to building, or loss of commercial power for few days and malfunction of backup power (i.e., diesel generators, if available). 541 • For dispatch facilities with unanchored equipment, DS3 is defined by moderate damage to building, or loss of off-site power for few days and malfunction of backup power (i.e., diesel generators, if available). Extensive Damage (DS4) • For railway tracks/roadbeds, DS4 is defined by major differential settlement of the ground resulting in potential derailment over extended length. • For railway bridges, DS4 is defined the same as it is for highway bridges. • For railway tunnels, DS4 is defined the same as it is for highway tunnels. • For railway system facilities: • For urban stations and maintenance facilities, DS4 is defined by extensive building damage (check Chapter 1 for description of potential damage). • For fuel facilities with anchored equipment, DS4 is defined by elephant foot buckling of tanks with loss of contents, extensive damage to pumps (cracked/sheared shafts), or extensive damage to pump building. • For fuel facilities with unanchored equipment, DS4 is defined by weld failure at base of tank with loss of contents, extensive damage to pump building, or extensive damage to pumps (cracked/sheared shafts). • For fuel facilities with buried tanks, DS4 is defined by considerable uplift (more than a foot) of the tanks and rupture of the attached piping. • For dispatch facilities with unanchored or anchored equipment, DS4 is defined by extensive building damage. Complete Damage (DS5) • For railway tracks/roadbeds, DS5 is the same as DS4. • For railway bridges, DS5 is defined the same as it is for highway bridges. • For railway tunnels, DS5 is defined the same as it is for highway tunnels. • For railway system facilities: • For urban stations and maintenance facilities, DS5 is defined by extensive to complete building damage (check Chapter 1 for description of potential damage). 542 • For fuel facilities with anchored equipment, DS5 is defined by weld failure at base of tank with loss of contents, or extensive to complete damage to pump building. • For fuel facilities with unanchored equipment, DS5 is defined by tearing of tank wall or implosion of tank (with total loss of content), or extensive/complete damage to pump building. • For fuel facilities with buried tanks, DS5 is same as DS4. • For dispatch facilities with unanchored or anchored equipment, DS5 is defined by complete damage to building. 3.2.3. Functionality of Railway System Components Component functionality is described similar to highway system components, that is, by the probability of being in a damage state (immediately following the earthquake) and by the associated fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be functional after a specified period of time. 3.3. Light Rail Transportation System 3.3.1. Description of Light Rail Systems Like railway systems, light rail systems consist of railway tracks/roadbeds, bridges, tunnels, maintenance facilities, dispatch facilities and DC power substations. The first five are the same as for railway systems and are already described in Section 3.2.1. Therefore, only DC substations will be described in this subsection. DC Power Substations Light rail systems use electric power and have low voltage DC power substations. DC power is used by the light rail system's electrical distribution system. The DC power substations consist of electrical equipment, which convert the local electric utility AC power to DC power. Two types of DC power stations are considered. These are: (1) DC power stations with anchored (seismically designed) components and (2) DC power stations with unanchored (which are not seismically designed) components. 3.3.2 Definitions of Damage States of Light Rail Systems A total of five damage states are defined for light rail system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). 543 Slight or Minor Damage (DS2) • For tracks/roadbeds, DS2 is defined similar to railway tracks. • For light rail bridges, DS2 is defined similar to railway bridges. • For light rail tunnels, DS2 is defined similar to highway tunnels. • For light rail system facilities: • For maintenance facilities, DS2 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS2 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. • For DC power substations with anchored or unanchored components, DS2 is defined by loss of off-site power for a very short period, or slight damage to building. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For tracks/roadbeds, DS3 is defined similar to railway tracks. • For light rail bridges, DS3 is defined similar to railway bridges. • For light rail tunnels, DS3 is defined similar to highway tunnels. • For light rail system facilities: • For maintenance facilities, DS3 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS3 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. • For DC power substations with anchored or unanchored components, DS3 is defined by loss of off-site power for few days, considerable damage to equipment, or moderate damage to building. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For tracks/roadbeds, DS4 is defined similar to railway tracks. • For light rail bridges, DS4 is defined similar to railway bridges. • For light rail tunnels, DS4 is defined similar to highway tunnels. • For light rail system facilities: • For maintenance facilities, DS4 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. 544 • For dispatch facilities, DS4 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. • For DC power substations with anchored or unanchored components, DS4 is defined by extensive building damage. Complete Damage (DS5) • For tracks/roadbeds, DS5 is defined similar to railway tracks. • For light rail bridges, DS5 is defined similar to railway bridges. • For light rail tunnels, DS5 is defined similar to highway tunnels. • For light rail system facilities: • For maintenance facilities, DS5 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS5 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. • For DC power substations with anchored or unanchored components, DS5 is defined by complete building damage. 3.3.3. Functionality of Light Rail Systems Component functionality is described by the probability of damage state (immediately following the earthquake) and by the associated fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be functional after a specified period of time. 3.4. Bus Transportation System 3.4.1. Description of Bus System Components A bus system consists mainly of four components: urban stations, fuel facilities, maintenance facilities, and dispatch facilities. Major losses can occur if bus maintenance buildings collapse and operational problems may arise if a dispatch facility is damaged. This section provides a brief description of each component. Urban Stations These are mainly buildings structures. 545 Bus System Fuel Facilities Fuel facility consists of fuel storage tanks, buildings, pump equipment and buried pipe, and, sometimes, backup power. The fuel facility functionality is determined with a fault tree analysis considering redundancies and sub-component behavior. The same classes assumed for railway fuel facilities are assumed here. Bus System Maintenance Facilities Maintenance facilities for bus systems are mostly made of steel braced frames. The same classes assumed for railway maintenance facilities are assumed here. Bus System Dispatch Facilities The same classes assumed for railway dispatch facilities are assumed here. 3.4.2 Definitions of Damage States of Bus System Components Damage states describing the level of damage to each of the bus system components are defined (i.e. slight, moderate, extensive or complete). Damage states are related to damage ratio (defined as ratio of repair to replacement cost) for evaluation of direct economic loss. For bus systems, the restoration is dependent upon the extent of damage to the fuel, maintenance, and dispatch facilities. 3.4.3 Definitions of Damage States of Bus System Components A total of five damage states are defined for bus system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight Damage (DS2) • For urban stations, DS2 is defined similar to railway urban stations. • For fuel facilities, DS2 is defined similar to railway fuel facilities. • For maintenance facilities, DS2 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS2 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For urban stations, DS3 is defined similar to railway urban stations. • For fuel facilities, DS3 is defined similar to railway fuel facilities. 546 • For maintenance facilities, DS3 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS3 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For urban stations, DS4 is defined similar to railway urban stations. • For fuel facilities, DS4 is defined similar to railway fuel facilities. • For maintenance facilities, DS4 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS4 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. Complete Damage (DS5) • For urban stations, DS5 is defined similar to railway urban stations. • For fuel facilities, DS5 is defined similar to railway fuel facilities. • For maintenance facilities, DS5 is defined similar to railway maintenance facilities. • For dispatch facilities, DS5 is defined similar to railway dispatch facilities. 3.4.4. Functionality of Bus Transportation Systems Component functionality is described by the probability of being in a damage state (immediately following the earthquake) and by the associated fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be functional after a specified period of time. 3.5. Port Transportation Systems 3.5.1. Description of Port Transportation Systems A port system consists of four components: waterfront structures, cranes/cargo handling equipment, fuel facilities, and warehouses. In many cases, these facilities were constructed prior to widespread use of engineered fills; consequently, the wharf, pier, and seawall structures are prone to damage due to soil failures such as liquefaction. This section provides a brief description of each. 547 Waterfront Structures This component includes wharves (port embankments), seawalls (protective walls from erosion), and piers (break-water structures which form harbors) that exist in the port system. Waterfront structures typically are supported by wood, steel or concrete piles. Many also have batter piles to resist lateral loads from wave action and impact of vessels. Seawalls are caisson walls retaining earth fill material. Cranes and Cargo Handling Equipment These are large equipment items used to load and unload freight from vessels. These are can be stationary or mounted on rails. Port Fuel Facilities The fuel facility consists mainly of fuel storage tanks, buildings, pump equipment, piping, and, sometimes, backup power. These are the same as those for railway systems presented in Section 3.2.1. Warehouses Warehouses are large buildings usually constructed of structural steel. In some cases, warehouses may be several hundred feet from the shoreline, while in other instances; they may be located on the wharf itself. 3.5.2. Definition of Damage States of Port Transportation Systems A total of five damage states are defined for port system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For waterfront structures, DS2 is defined by minor ground settlement resulting in few piles (for piers/seawalls) getting broken and damaged. Cracks are formed on the surface of the wharf. Repair may be needed. • For cranes/cargo handling equipment, DS2 is defined by slight damage to structural members with no loss of function for the stationary equipment, while for the unanchored or rail mounted equipment, DS1 is defined as minor derailment or misalignment without any major structural damage to the rail mount. Minor repair and adjustments may be required before the crane becomes operable. • For fuel facilities, DS2 is defined the same as it is for railway facilities. • For warehouses, DS2 is defined by slight damage to the warehouse building. 548 Moderate Damage (DS3) • For waterfront structures, DS3 is defined as considerable ground settlement with several piles (for piers/seawalls) getting broken and damaged. • For cranes/cargo handling equipment, DS3 is defined as derailment due to differential displacement of parallel track. Rail repair and some repair to structural members is required. • For fuel facilities, DS3 is defined the same as it is for railway facilities. • For warehouses, DS3 is defined by moderate damage to the warehouse building. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For waterfront structures, DS4 is defined by failure of many piles, extensive sliding of piers, and significant ground settlement causing extensive cracking of pavements. • For cranes/cargo handling equipment, DS4 is defined by considerable damage to equipment. Toppled or totally derailed cranes are likely to occur. Replacement of structural members is required. • For fuel facilities, DS4 is defined same as for railway facilities. • For warehouses, DS4 is defined by extensive damage to warehouse building. 3.5.3. Functionality of Port Transportation Systems For ports the restoration is dependent upon the extent of damage to the waterfront structures, cranes/cargo handling equipment, fuel facilities, and warehouses. From the standpoint of functionality of the port, the user should consider the restoration of only the waterfront structures and cranes since the fuel facilities and warehouses are not as critical to the functionality of the port. 3.6. Ferry Transportation System 3.6.1. Description of Ferry System Components A ferry system consists of five components: waterfront structures, fuel facilities, maintenance facilities, dispatch facilities, and passenger terminals. This section provides a brief description of each. 549 Waterfront Structures The waterfront structures are located at the points of embarkation or disembarkation, and they are similar to, although not as extensive as, those of the port transportation system described in Section 3.5.1. Fuel Facilities These facilities are usually located at one of the two points of embarkation and they are similar to those for port system mentioned in Section 3.5.1. Maintenance Facilities These facilities are usually located at one of the two points of embarkation and they are often steel braced frame structures, but other building types are possible. Dispatch Facilities These facilities are usually located at one of the two points of embarkation and they are similar to those defined for railway system in Section 3.2.1. Passenger Terminals These facilities are usually located at one of the two points of embarkation and they are often moment resisting steel frames, but other building types are possible. 3.6.2. Definitions of Ferry System Components A total of five damage states are defined for ferry system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For waterfront structures, DS2 is the same as that for waterfront structures in the port module. • For fuel facilities, DS2 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the port module. • For maintenance facilities, DS2 is defined by slight damage to building. • For dispatch facilities, DS2 is the same as that for dispatch facilities in the railway module. • For passenger terminals, DS2 is defined by slight damage to building. 550 Moderate Damage (DS3) • For waterfront structures, DS3 is the same as that for waterfront structures in the port module. • For fuel facilities, DS3 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the port module. • For maintenance facilities, DS3 is defined by moderate damage to building. • For dispatch facilities, DS3 is the same as that for dispatch facilities in the railway module. • For passenger terminals, DS3 is defined by moderate damage to building. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For waterfront structures, DS4 is the same as that for waterfront structures in the port module. • For fuel facilities, DS4 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the port module. • For maintenance facilities, DS4 is defined by extensive damage to building. • • For dispatch facilities, DS4 is the same as that for dispatch facilities in the railway module. • For passenger terminals, DS4 is defined by extensive damage to building. Complete Damage (DS5) • For waterfront structures, DS5 is the same as that for waterfront structures in the port module. • For fuel facilities, DS5 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the port module. • For maintenance facilities, DS5 is defined by complete damage to building. • For dispatch facilities, DS5 is the same as that for dispatch facilities in the railway module. • For passenger terminals, DS5 is defined as complete damage to building. 3.6.3. Functionality of Ferry System Components 551 Restoration curves describe the fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be open or operational as a function of time following the earthquake. For ferries the restoration is dependent upon the extent of damage to the waterfront structures; fuel, maintenance, and dispatch facilities; and passenger terminals. Interdependence of components on overall system functionality is not addressed by the methodology. Such considerations require a system (network) analysis that would be performed separately by a transportation system expert as an advanced study. 3.7. Airport Transportation System 3.7.1. Description of Airport Components An airport system consists of the six components mentioned above: runways, control tower, fuel facilities, maintenance facilities, and parking structures. For airports, control towers are often constructed of reinforced concrete, while terminal buildings and maintenance facilities are often constructed of structural steel or reinforced concrete. This section provides a brief description of each. Runways This component consists of well-paved "flat and wide surfaces". Control Tower Control tower consists of a building and the necessary equipment of air control and monitoring. Fuel Facilities These have been previously defined in Section 3.2.1. of railway systems. Terminal Buildings These are similar to urban stations of railway systems from the classification standpoint (as well as services provided to passengers). Maintenance Facilities, Hangar Facilities, and Parking Structures Classification of maintenance facilities is the same as for those in railway systems. Hangar facilities and parking structures are mainly composed of buildings. 552 3.7.2. Definitions of Damage States A total of five damage states are defined for airport system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For runways, DS2 is defined as minor ground settlement or heaving of runway surface. • For control tower, DS2 is defined as slight damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For fuel facilities, DS2 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the railway module. • For terminal buildings, DS2 is defined as slight damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For maintenance and hangar facilities, DS2 is defined as slight damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. For parking structures, DS2 is defined as slight damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • Moderate Damage (DS3) • For runways, DS3 is defined same as DS2. • For control tower, DS3 is defined as moderate damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For fuel facilities, DS3 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the railway module. • For terminal buildings, DS3 is defined as moderate damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For maintenance and hangar facilities, DS3 is defined as moderate damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For parking structures, DS3 is defined as moderate damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For runways, DS4 is defined as considerable ground settlement or considerable heaving of runway surface. 553 • For control tower, DS4 is defined as extensive damage to the building as given in section 5.3. • For fuel facilities, DS4 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the railway module. • For terminal buildings, DS4 is defined as extensive damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For maintenance and hangar facilities, DS4 is defined as extensive damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For parking structures, DS4 is defined as extensive damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. Complete Damage (DS5) • For runways, DS5 is defined as extensive ground settlement or excessive heaving of runway surface. • For control tower, DS5 is defined as complete damage to the building as given in section 5.3. • For fuel facilities, DS5 is the same as that for fuel facilities in the railway module. • For terminal buildings, DS5 is defined as complete damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For maintenance and hangar facilities, DS5 is defined as complete damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. • For parking structures, DS5 is defined as complete damage to the building as given in Section 1.4. 3.7.3. Definition of Functionality of Highway Components Component restoration curves are provided for each damage state to evaluate loss of function. Restoration curves describe the fraction or percentage of the component that is expected to be open or operational as a function of time following the earthquake. For airports, the restoration is dependent upon the extent of damage to the airport terminals, buildings, storage tanks (for fuel facilities), control tower, and runways. 4. Utility Systems The Utility Module is composed of the following six systems: 554 • • • • • • Potable Water Waste Water Oil (crude and refined) Natural Gas Electric Power Communication 4.1. Potable Water Systems This system consists of supply, storage, transmission, and distribution components. All of these components are vulnerable to damage during earthquakes, which may result in a significant disruption to the water utility network. 4.1.1 Description of Potable Water System Components A potable water system typically consists of terminal reservoirs, water treatment plants, wells, pumping plants, storage tanks and transmission and distribution pipelines. In this subsection, a brief description of each of these components is presented. Terminal Reservoirs Terminal reservoirs are typically lakes (man made or natural) and are usually located nearby and upstream of the water treatment plant. Vulnerability of terminal reservoirs and associated dams is marginally assessed in the loss estimation methodology. Therefore, even though reservoirs are an essential part of a potable water system, it is assumed in the analysis of water systems that the amount of water flowing into water treatment plants from reservoirs right after an earthquake is essentially the same as before the earthquake. Transmission Aqueducts These transmission conduits are typically large size pipes (more than 20 inches in diameter) or channels (canals) that convey water from its source (reservoirs, lakes, rivers) to the treatment plant. Transmission pipelines are commonly made of concrete, ductile iron, cast iron, or steel. These could be elevated/at grade or buried. Elevated or at grade pipes are typically made of steel (welded or riveted), and they can run in single or multiple lines. Canals are typically lined with concrete, mainly to avoid excessive loss of water by seepage and to control erosion. In addition to concrete lining, expansion joints are usually used to account for swelling and shrinkage under varying temperature and moisture conditions. Damageability of channels has occurred in some earthquake, but is outside the scope of the scope of the methodology. 555 Supply Facilities- Water Treatment Plants (WTP) Water treatment plants are generally composed of a number of physical and chemical unit processes connected in series, for the purpose of improving the water quality. A conventional WTP consists of a coagulation process, followed by a sedimentation process, and finally a filtration process. Alternately, a WTP can be regarded as a system of interconnected pipes, basins, and channels through which the water moves, and where the flow is governed by hydraulic principles. WTP are categorized as follows: Small water treatment plants, with capacity ranging from 10 mgd to 50 mgd, are assumed to consist of a filter gallery with flocculation tanks (composed of paddles and baffles) and settling (or sedimentation) basins as main components, chemical tanks (needed in the coagulation and other destabilization processes), chlorination tanks, electrical and mechanical equipment, and elevated pipes. Medium water treatment plants, with capacity ranging from 50 mgd to 200 mgd, are simulated by adding more redundancy to small treatment plants (i.e. twice as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks). Large water treatment plants, with capacity above 200 mgd, are simulated by adding even more redundancy to small treatment plants (i.e., three times as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks/basins). Water treatment plants are also classified based on whether the subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored or not as defined in section 3.2.1. Pumping Plants (PP) Pumping plants are usually composed of a building, one or more pumps, electrical equipment, and in some cases, backup power systems. Pumping plants are classified as either small PP (less than 10 mgd capacity) or medium/large PP (more than 10 mgd capacity). Pumping plants are also classified with respect to whether the subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored or not. As noted in Chapter 3.2.1, anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored means equipment with manufactures normal requirements. Wells (WE) Wells typically have a capacity between 1 and 5 mgd. Wells are used in many cities as a primary or supplementary source of water supply. Wells include a shaft from the surface down to the aquifer, a pump to bring the water up to the surface, equipment used to treat the water, and sometimes a building, which encloses the well and equipment. 556 Water Storage Tanks (ST) Water storage tanks can be elevated steel, on ground steel (anchored/unanchored), on ground concrete (anchored/unanchored), buried concrete, or on ground wood tanks. Typical capacity of storage tanks is in the range of 0.5 mgd to 2 mgd. Distribution Facilities and Distribution Pipes Distribution of water can be accomplished by gravity, or by pumps in conjunction with on-line storage. Except for storage reservoirs located at a much higher altitude than the area being served, distribution of water would necessitate, at least, some pumping along the way. Typically, water is pumped at a relatively constant rate, with flow in excess of consumption being stored in elevated storage tanks. The stored water provides a reserve for fire flow and may be used for general-purpose flow should the electric power fail, or in case of pumping capacity loss. Distribution pipelines are commonly made of concrete (prestressed or reinforced), asbestos cement, ductile iron, cast iron, steel, or plastic. The selection of material type and pipe size are based on the desired carrying capacity, availability of material, durability, and cost. Distribution pipes represent the network that delivers water to consumption areas. Distribution pipes may be further subdivided into primary lines, secondary lines, and small distribution mains. The primary or arterial mains carry flow from the pumping station to and from elevated storage tanks, and to the consumption areas, whether residential, industrial, commercial, or public. These lines are typically laid out in interlocking loops, and all smaller lines connecting to them are typically valved so that failure in smaller lines does not require shutting off the larger. Primary lines can be up to 36 inches in diameter. Secondary lines are smaller loops within the primary mains and run from one primary line to another. They serve primarily to provide a large amount of water for fire fighting without excessive pressure loss. Small distribution lines represent the mains that supply water to the user and to the fire hydrants. In this earthquake loss estimation study, the simplified method for water system network performance evaluation applies to a distribution pipe network digitized at the primary level. 4.1.2 Definition of Damage States of Potable Water System Components Potable water systems are susceptible to earthquake damage. Facilities such as water treatment plants; wells, pumping plants and storage tanks are most vulnerable to PGA, and sometimes PGD, if located in liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, the damage states for these components are defined and associated with PGA and PGD. Aqueducts and pipelines, on the other hand, are vulnerable to PGV and PGD. Therefore, the damage states for these components are associated with these two ground motion parameters. Damage states describing the level of damage to each of the water system components are defined (i.e., slight/minor, moderate, extensive, or complete), while for pipelines, the number of repairs/km is the key parameter. 557 4.1.2.1. Damage State Definitions for Components Other than Pipelines A total of five damage states for potable water system components are defined. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4), and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For water treatment plants, DS2 is defined by malfunction of plant for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality may occur. • For pumping plants, DS2 is defined by malfunction of plant for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or slight damage to buildings. • For wells, DS2 is defined by malfunction of well pump and motor for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or light damage to buildings. • For storage tanks, DS2 is defined by the tank suffering minor damage without loss of its contents or functionality. Minor damage to the tank roof due to water sloshing, minor cracks in concrete tanks, or localized wrinkles in steel tanks fits the description of this damage state. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For water treatment plants, DS3 is defined by malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, extensive damage to various equipment, considerable damage to sedimentation basins, considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or considerable damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality is imminent. • For pumping plants, DS3 is defined by the loss of electric power for about a week, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings. • For wells, DS3 is defined by malfunction of well pump and motor for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings. • For Storage Tanks, DS3 is defined by the tank being considerably damaged, but only minor loss of content. Elephant foot buckling for steel tanks without loss of content or moderate cracking of concrete tanks with minor loss of content fits the description of this damage state. 558 Extensive Damage (DS4) • For water treatment plants, DS4 is defined by the pipes connecting the different basins and chemical units being extensively damaged. This type of damage will likely result in the shutdown of the plant. • For pumping plants, DS4 is defined by the building being extensively damaged, or the pumps being badly damaged beyond repair. • For wells, DS4 is defined by the building being extensively damaged or the well pump and vertical shaft being badly distorted and nonfunctional. • For Storage Tanks, DS4 is defined by the tank being severely damaged and going out of service. Elephant foot buckling for steel tanks with loss of content, stretching of bars for wood tanks, or shearing of wall for concrete tanks fits the description of this damage state. Complete Damage (DS5) • For water treatment plants, DS5 is defined by the complete failure of all pipings, or extensive damage to the filter gallery. • For pumping plants, DS5 is defined by the building collapsing. • For wells, DS5 is defined by the building collapsing. • For Storage Tanks, DS5 is defined by the tank collapsing and losing all of its content. 4.1.2.1. Damage State Definitions for Pipelines For pipelines, two damage states are considered. These are leaks and breaks. Generally, when a pipe is damaged due to ground failure (PGD), the type of damage is likely to be a break, while when a pipe is damaged due to seismic wave propagation (PGV), the type of damage is likely to be joint pull-out or crushing at the bell. 4.1.3 Functionality of Potable Water System Pipelines The loss assessment methodology estimates the flow reduction to the areas served by the water system being evaluated. In other words, a functionality of 50% means that 50% of the population would be affected because of potable water disruption. 559 4.2. Waste Water Systems This system consists of transmission and treatment components. These components are vulnerable to damage during earthquakes, which may result in significant disruption to the utility network. 4.2.1 Description of Waste Water System Components A waste water system typically consists of collection sewers, interceptors, lift stations, and wastewater treatment plants. In this section, a brief description of each of these components is given. Collection Sewers Collection sewers are generally closed conduits that carry normally sewage with a partial flow. Collection sewers could be sanitary sewers, storm sewers, or combined sewers. Pipe materials that are used for potable water transportation may also be used for wastewater collection. The most commonly used sewer material is clay pipe manufactured with integral bell and spigot end. These pipes range in size from 4 to 42 inches in diameter. Concrete pipes are mostly used for storm drains and for sanitary sewers carrying noncorrosive sewage (i.e. with organic materials). For the smaller diameter range, plastic pipes are also used. Interceptors Interceptors are large diameter sewer mains. They are usually located at the lowest elevation areas. Pipe materials that are used for interceptor sewers are similar to those used for collection sewers. Lift Stations (LS) Lift stations are important parts of the waste water system. Lift stations serve to raise sewage over topographical rises. If the lift station is out of service for more than a short time, untreated sewage will either spill out near the lift station, or back up into the collection sewer system. In this study, lift stations are classified as either small LS (capacity less than 10 mgd) or medium/large LS (capacity greater than 10 mgd). Lift stations are also classified as having either anchored or unanchored subcomponents (see Section 3.2.1 for the definition of anchored and unanchored subcomponents) Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP) Three sizes of wastewater treatment plants are considered: small (capacity less than 50 mgd), medium (capacity between 50 and 200 mgd), and large (capacity greater than 200 mgd). WWTP has the same processes existing in WTP with the addition of secondary treatment subcomponents. 560 4.2.2 Definitions of Damage States of Waste Water System Components Waste water systems are susceptible to earthquake damage. Facilities such as waste water treatment plants and lift stations are mostly vulnerable to PGA, and sometimes PGD, if located in liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, the damage states for these components are defined and associated with PGA and PGD. Sewers, on the other hand, are vulnerable to PGV and PGD. Therefore, the damage algorithms for these components are associated with those two ground motion parameters. 4.2.2.1. Damage States Definitions for Components other than Sewers/Interceptors A total of five damage states are defined for waste water system components other than sewers and interceptors. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For waste water treatment plants, DS2 is defined as for WTP in potable water systems. • For lift stations, DS2 is defined as for pumping plants in potable water systems. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For waste water treatment plants, DS3 is defined as for WTP in potable water systems. • For lift stations, DS3 is defined as for pumping plants in potable water systems. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For waste water treatment plants, DS4 is defined as for WTP in potable water systems. • For lift stations, DS4 is defined as for pumping plants in potable water systems. Complete Damage (DS5) • For waste water treatment plants, DS5 is defined as for WTP in potable water systems. • For lift stations, DS5 is defined as for pumping plants in potable water systems. 4.2.2.2. Damage States Definitions for Sewers/Interceptors For sewers/interceptors, two damage states are considered. These are leaks and 561 breaks. Generally, when a sewer/interceptor is damaged due to ground failure, the type of damage is likely to be a break, while when a sewer/interceptor is damaged due to seismic wave propagation; the type of damage is likely to be joint pullout or crushing at the bell. In the loss methodology, it is assumed that damage due to seismic waves will consist of 80% leaks and 20% breaks, while damage due to ground failure will consist of 20% leaks and 80% breaks. The user can override these default percentages. 4.3. Oil Systems This system consists of refineries and transmission components. These components are vulnerable to damage during earthquakes, which may result in significant disruption to this utility network. 4.3.1. Description of Oil System Components An oil system typically consists of refineries, pumping plants, tank farms, and pipelines. In this section, a brief description of each of these components is given. Refineries (RF) Refineries are an important part of an oil system. They are used for processing crude oil before it can be used. Although supply of water is critical to the functioning of refinery, it is assumed in the methodology that an uninterrupted supply of water is available to the refinery. Two sizes of refineries are considered: small, and medium/large. Small refineries (capacity less than 100,000 barrels per day), are assumed to consist of steel tanks on grade, stacks, other electrical and mechanical equipment, and elevated pipes. Stacks are essentially tall cylindrical chimneys. Medium/Large refineries (capacity more than 100,000 barrels per day), are simulated by adding more redundancy to small refineries (i.e. twice as many tanks, stacks, elevated pipes). Oil Pipelines Oil pipelines are used for the transportation of oil over long distances. About seventy-five percent of the crude oil is transported throughout the United States by pipelines. A large segment of industry and millions of people could be severely affected by disruption of crude oil supplies. Rupture of crude oil pipelines could lead to pollution of land and rivers. Pipelines are typically made of mild steel with submerged arc welded joints, although older gas welded steel pipe may be present in some systems. In this study, buried pipelines are considered to be vulnerable to PGV and PGD. 562 Pumping Plants (PP) Pumping plants serve to maintain the flow of oil in cross-country pipelines. Pumping plants usually use two or more pumps. Pumps can be of either centrifugal or reciprocating type. However, no differentiation is made between these two types of pumps in the analysis of oil systems. Pumping plants are classified as having either anchored or unanchored subcomponents, as defined in 3.2.1. Tank Farms (TF) Tank farms are facilities that store fuel products. They include tanks, pipes and electric components. Tank farms are classified as having either anchored or unanchored subcomponents, as defined in Section 3.2.1. 4.3.2. Definitions of Damage States of Oil System Components Oil systems are susceptible to earthquake damage. Facilities such as refineries, pumping plants and tank farms are mostly vulnerable to PGA, and sometimes PGD, if located in liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, the damage states for these components are defined and associated with PGA and PGD. Pipelines, on the other hand, are vulnerable to PGV and PGD. Therefore, the damage states for these components are associated with these two ground motion parameters. 4.3.2.1 Damage States Definitions for Components other than Pipelines A total of five damage states are defined for oil system components other than pipelines. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For refineries, DS2 is defined by malfunction of plant for a short time (few days) due to loss of electric power and backup power, if any, or light damage to tanks. • For pumping plants, DS2 is defined by light damage to building. • For tank farms, DS2 is defined by malfunction of plant for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of backup power or light damage to tanks. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For refineries, DS3 is defined by malfunction of plant for a week or so due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, extensive damage to various equipment, or considerable damage to tanks. 563 • For pumping plants, DS3 is defined by considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or considerable damage to building. • For tank farms, DS3 is defined by malfunction of tank farm for a week or so due to loss of backup power, extensive damage to various equipment, or considerable damage to tanks. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For refineries, DS4 is defined by the tanks being extensively damaged, or stacks collapsing. • For pumping plants, DS4 is defined by the building being extensively damaged, or pumps badly damaged. • For tank farms, DS4 is defined by the tanks being extensively damaged, or extensive damage to elevated pipes. Complete Damage (DS5) • For refineries, DS5 is defined by the complete failure of all elevated pipes, or collapse of tanks. • For pumping plants, DS5 is defined by the building being in complete damage state. • For tank farms, DS5 is defined by the complete failure of all elevated pipes, or collapse of tanks. 4.3.2.2. Damage State Definitions for Pipelines For pipelines, two damage states are considered. These are leaks and breaks. Generally, when a pipe is damaged due to ground failure, the type of damage is likely to be a break, while when a pipe is damaged due to seismic wave propagation; the type of damage is likely to be local buckling of the pipe wall. 4.4. Natural Gas Systems 4.4.1. Description of Natural Gas System Components A natural gas system typically consists of compressor stations and pipelines. In this section, a brief description of each of these components is given. 564 Compressor Stations Compressor stations serve to maintain the flow of gas in cross-country pipelines. Compressor stations consist of either centrifugal or reciprocating compressors. However, no differentiation is made between these two types of compressors in the analysis of natural gas systems. Compressor stations are categorized as having either anchored or unanchored subcomponents, as defined in Section 3.2.1. The compressor stations are similar to pumping plants in oil systems discussed in Section 4.3.1. Natural Gas Pipelines Pipelines are typically made of mild steel with submerged arc welded joints, although older lines may have gas-welded joints. These are used for the transportation of natural gas over long distances. Many industries and residents could be severely affected should disruption of natural gas supplies occur. 4.4.2 Definitions of Damage States of Natural Gas System Components Facilities such as compressor stations are mostly vulnerable to PGA, sometimes PGD, if located in liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, damage states for these components are defined and associated with either PGA or PGD. Pipelines, on the other hand, are vulnerable to PGV and PGD; therefore, damage states for these components are associated with these two ground motion parameters. 4.4.2.1 Damage States Definitions for Compressor Stations A total of five damage states are defined for gas system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) DS2 is defined by slight damage to building. Moderate Damage (DS3) DS3 is defined by considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or considerable damage to building. Extensive Damage (DS4) DS4 is defined by the building being extensively damaged or the pumps badly damaged beyond repair. Complete Damage (DS5) DS5 is defined by the building in complete damage state. 565 4.4.2.2 Damage States Definitions for Pipelines For pipelines, two damage states are considered. These are leaks and breaks. Generally, when a pipe is damaged due to ground failure, the type of damage is likely to be a break, while when a pipe is damaged due to seismic wave propagation; the type of damage is likely to be local bucking of the pipe wall. In the loss methodology, it is assumed that damage due to seismic waves will consist of 80% leaks and 20% breaks, while damage due to ground failure will consist of 20% leaks and 80% breaks. The user can override these default percentages. 4.5. Electric Power Systems 4.5.1. Description of Electric Power System Components As mentioned before, the components of an electric power system considered in the loss estimation methodology are substations, distribution circuits, and generation plants. In this section a brief description of each of these components is presented. Substations An electric substation is a facility that serves as a source of energy supply for the local distribution area in which it is located, and has the following main functions: - Change or switch voltage from one level to another. - Provide points where safety devices such as disconnect switches, circuit breakers, and other equipment can be installed. - Regulate voltage to compensate for system voltage changes. - Eliminate lightning and switching surges from the system. - Convert AC to DC and DC to AC, as needed. - Change frequency, as needed. Substations can be entirely enclosed in buildings where all the equipment is assembled into one metal clad unit. Other substations have step-down transformers, high voltage switches, oil circuit breakers, and lightning arrestors located outside the substation building. In the current loss estimation methodology, only transmission (138 kV to 765 kV or higher) and subtransmission (34.5 kV to 161 kV) substations are considered. These will be classified as high voltage (350 kV and above), medium voltage (150 kV to 350 kV) and low voltage (34.5 kV to 150 kV), and will be referred to as 500 kV substations, 230kV substations, and 115kV substations, respectively. The classification is also a function of whether the subcomponents are anchored or typical (unanchored), as defined in Section 3.2.1. 566 Distribution Circuits The distribution system is divided into a number of circuits. A distribution circuit includes poles, wires, in-line equipment and utility-owned equipment at customer sites. A distribution circuit also includes above ground and underground conductors. Distribution circuits either consist of anchored or unanchored components. Generation Plants These plants produce alternating current (AC) and may be any of the following types: - Hydroelectric - Steam turbine (fossil fuel fired or nuclear) - Combustion turbine (fossil fuel fired) - Geothermal - Solar - Wind - Compressed air Fossil fuels are either: coal, oil, or natural gas. Generation plant subcomponents include diesel generators, turbines, racks and panels, boilers and pressure vessels, and the building in which these are housed. The size of the generation plant is determined from the number of Megawatts of electric power that the plant can produce under normal operations. Small generation plants have a generation capacity of less than 200 Megawatts. Medium/Large generation plants have a capacity greater than 200 Megawatts. Fragility curves for generation plants with anchored versus unanchored subcomponents are presented. 4.5.2. Definitions of Damage States of Electric Power Systems Electric power systems are susceptible to earthquake damage. Facilities such as substations, generation plants, and distribution circuits are mostly vulnerable to PGA, and sometimes PGD, if located in liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, the damage states for these components are defined in terms of PGA and PGD. A total of five damage states are defined for electric power system components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Note that for power systems, in particular for substations and distribution circuits, these damage states are defined with respect to the percentage of subcomponents being damaged. That is, for a substation with n1 transformers, n2 disconnect switches, n3 circuit breakers, and n4 current transformers, the substation is said to be in a slight or minor damage state if 5% of n2 or 5% of n3 are damaged, and it is in the extensive damage state if 70% of n1, 70% of n2, or 70% of n3 are damaged, or if the building is in extensive damage state. A parametric study on n1, n2, n3, and n4 values shows that the medians of the damage states defined in this manner don't change appreciably (less than 3 %) as the ni's vary, while the corresponding dispersions get smaller as the ni's increase. 567 Therefore, we used dispersions obtained from the small sample numbers along with the relatively constant median values. Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) • For substations, DS2 is defined as the failure of 5% of the disconnect switches (i.e., misalignment), or the failure of 5 % of the circuit breakers (i.e., circuit breaker phase sliding off its pad, circuit breaker tipping over, or interrupter-head falling to the ground), or by the building being in minor damage state. • For distribution circuits, DS2 is defined by the failure of 4 % of all circuits. • For generation plants, DS2 is defined by turbine tripping, or light damage to diesel generator, or by the building being in minor damage state. Moderate Damage (DS3) • For substations, DS3 is defined as the failure of 40% of disconnect switches (e.g., misalignment), or 40% of circuit breakers (e.g., circuit breaker phase sliding off its pad, circuit breaker tipping over, or interrupter-head falling to the ground), or failure of 40% of current transformers (e.g., oil leaking from transformers, porcelain cracked), or by the building being in moderate damage state. • For distribution circuits, DS3 is defined by the failure of 12% of circuits. • For generation plants, DS3 is defined some by the chattering of instrument panels and racks, considerable damage to boilers and pressure vessels, or by the building being in moderate damage state. Extensive Damage (DS4) • For substations, DS4 is defined as the failure of 70% of disconnect switches (e.g., misalignment), 70% of circuit breakers, 70% of current transformers (e.g., oil leaking from transformers, porcelain cracked), or by failure of 70% of transformers (e.g., leakage of transformer radiators), or by the building being in extensive damage state. • For distribution circuits, DS4 is defined by the failure of 50% of all circuits. • For generation plants, DS4 is defined by considerable damage to motor driven pumps, or considerable damage to large vertical pumps, or by the building being in extensive damage state. Complete Damage (DS5) • For substations, DS5 is defined as the failure of all disconnect switches, all circuit breakers, all transformers, or all current transformers, or by the building being in complete damage state. 568 • For distribution circuits, DS5 is defined by the failure of 80% of all circuits. • For generation plants, DS5 is defined by extensive damage to large horizontal vessels beyond repair, extensive damage to large motor operated valves, or by the building being in complete damage state. 4.6. Communication Systems The major components of a communication system are: • Central offices and broadcasting stations (this includes all subcomponents such as central switching equipment) • Transmission lines (these include all subcomponents such as equipment used to connect central office to end users) • Cabling (low capacity links) Central offices and broadcasting stations are the only components of the communication system considered in this section. 4.6.1. Description of Communication System Components As it was mentioned previously, only facilities are considered. A communication facility consists of a building (generic type is assumed in the methodology), central switching equipment (i.e., digital switches, anchored or unanchored), and back-up power supply (i.e. diesel generators or battery generators, anchored or unanchored) that may be needed to supply the requisite power to the center in case of loss of off-site power. 4.6.2. Definitions of Damage States Communication facilities are susceptible to earthquake damage. A total of five damage states are defined for these components. These are none (DS1), slight/minor (DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5). Slight/Minor Damage (DS2) Slight damage, DS2 is defined by slight damage to the communication facility building, or inability of the center to provide services during a short period (few days) due to loss of electric power and backup power, if available. 569 Moderate Damage (DS3) Moderate damage, DS3 is defined by moderate damage to the communication facility building, few digital switching boards being dislodged, or the central office being out of service for a few days due to loss of electric power (i.e., power failure) and backup power (typically due to overload), if available. Extensive Damage (DS4) Extensive damage, DS4 is defined by severe damage to the communication facility building resulting in limited access to facility, or by many digital switching boards being dislodged, resulting in malfunction. Complete Damage (DS5) Complete damage, DS5 is defined by complete damage to the communication facility building, or damage beyond repair to digital switching boards. 570 Part II 5. Casualties In the loss assessment methodology there are four categories for casualties, from Level I to IV, depending on the injury classification scale. 5.1. Injury Severity Level I Injuries requiring basic medical aid that could be administered by paraprofessionals; these types of injuries would require bandages or observation. Some examples are: a sprain, a severe cut requiring stitches, a minor burn (first degree or second degree on a small part of the body), or a bump on the head without loss of consciousness. Injuries of lesser severity that could be self treated are not estimated by HAZUS-MH MR2. 5.2. Injury Severity Level II Injuries requiring a greater degree of medical care and use of medical technology, such as x-rays or surgery, but not expected to progress to a life threatening status. Some examples are third degree burns or second degree burns over large parts of the body, a bump on the head that causes loss of consciousness, fractured bone, dehydration or exposure. 5.3. Injury Severity Level III Injuries that pose an immediate life threatening condition if not treated adequately and expeditiously. Some examples are: uncontrolled bleeding, punctured organ, other internal injuries, spinal column injuries, or crush syndrome. 5.4. Injury Severity Level IV Instantaneously killed or mortally injured 571 Conclusion This terminology guide contains definitions for the loss assessment analysis reports made by the Mid-America Earthquake Center for the FEMA Catastrophic Event Planning project. The main objective of this document is to help planners to understand engineering terms contained in the reports. In order to improve this document, comments and suggestions from users are very important to be considered in future versions. 572 Appendix VIII: Damage and Loss Maps This appendix includes maps of direct damage and functionality loss to infrastructure as well as demographic data, induced damage, and social impacts. These maps are designed to support the scenario report provided to each state in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. A total of ten scenarios are represented in this appendix and are listed below: 1. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Alabama 2. East Tennessee Seismic Zone Mw5.9 Event for the State of Alabama 3. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Arkansas 4. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Illinois 5. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Indiana 6. Wabash Valley Seismic Zone Mw7.1 Event for the State of Indiana 7. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Kentucky 8. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Mississippi 9. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Missouri 10. New Madrid Seismic Zone Mw7.7 Event for the State of Tennessee For more information on the scenarios employed, including hazard, inventory, and fragility components, please refer to the appropriate appendices. Additionally, a discussion of detailed results for each scenario represented in this appendix can be found in Appendix V. Each scenario represented here has more than 30 maps showing impacts to various types of infrastructure and population groups. Though not all scenarios will have every map listed below, each scenario will contain a majority of the following types of damage and loss maps: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 Airport Damage Airport Functionality at Day 1 Worst-Case Casualties1 Communication Facility Damage Dam Inventory with Modified Mercalli Intensity Total Debris Generated Displaced Population Electric Power Facility Damage Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Damage Emergency Operation Center Functionality at Day 1 Ferry Facility Damage Fire Station Damage Fire Station Functionality at Day 1 Hazardous Materials Facility Inventory with Modified Mercalli Intensity Highway Bridge Functionality at Day 1 Highway Bridge & Segment Damage This indicates the time of day where the greatest number of casualties occur 573 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Hospital Damage Hospital Functionality at Day 1 Liquefaction Susceptibility Modified Mercalli Intensity Natural Gas Facility Damage with Major Transmission Pipelines Oil Facility Damage with Major Transmission Pipelines Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) Police Station Damage Police Station Functionality at Day 1 Total Population Port Facility Damage Potable Water Facility & Local Distribution Network Damage Prison Inventory with Modified Mercalli Intensity Railway Bridge & Segment Damage Railway Bridge Functionality at Day 1 School Damage School Functionality at Day 1 Waste Water Facility & Local Distribution Network Damage All infrastructure damage maps represent the likelihood of damage for facilities in the at least moderate damage state. The definition of this damage state varies with the type of facility, and descriptions of these damage states can be found in Appendix VII. For additional information on these damage states, please refer to the HAZUS-MH MR2 Technical Manual. All infrastructure functionalities are displayed for the day after the earthquake, termed Day 1. Estimates of infrastructure functionality are available for various intervals after the event including Days 3, 7, 14, 30, and 90, though they are not illustrated in this report. The greatest number of facilities will be non-operational immediately after the earthquake, thus Day 1 functionality represents the greatest number of non-functioning facilities and the greatest reduction in services to affected populations. Finally, all maps include a table quantifying impacts to a set of critical counties in the state shown. These counties are closest to the source of seismic activity and are likely to experience the most significant impacts. 574 Airpert Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event 1 . L1 JUL El State efAIabama Ceuntlee [12} WM . Tetal Me. At Leaet . F4 .- at Illa-delete Complete -. HHLI '9 County Faeilitiee Damage Damage $15,933? Eeltert 4 . Eullman El Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale 4 Lawrenee 5 Limeetene 4 Marian Hergan 4 Legend ?irpert Faeilitjlr Damage .. AtLea-et l'uhdenie . Higl?i'lenliltEl'f t} Unlikely Mederate Ulteliheed HigHyLikely I ICertain =Critieal Cauntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretatee CI 12.5 25 5] T5 4L . l'u1ilee - - Errtleal mutt-e are ?ea-a eat experience the gear-st .: Earlhquak'?' CHI-I151 e1' the epeen'led damage s?a'e. Fer -. LII Maryanne-3h: at USP. gates Image- can?: 119 mummie- r3. EIIHHEII. IIUE ??i?tlr IMPACT 'I'IereeaJt-Tt- FIJI. Prlielnal liueetmbr 5?5 Airpert Functionality - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Mil? Event March Legend Airpert Funetienalityr [llajlir 1 I Met Funetianal Ir Functianal =Cr'rtieal Ceuntiee Rivera LIS Heutee =Interatatee II Ei?wt?it?. Jr}; :13 . ?Lfi?_ 12.5 25 T5 1L, l'u1ilee State ef?labama Critical Ceuntiee [12} He. ef Tetal Funetienal He. of Facilities Facilities 4 4 Cullman El El Fayette i' i' Franl-rlin 2 2 Lamar 2 2 Lautlertlale 4 4 Lawrence 5 5 Limestone 4 4 l'u'larien 2 2 4 4 ?Mneten Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Champs gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Errtleal mute-e are ?ea: ?atexperhtee- the gear-st at the epeeh'htl clan age mt. Fer attempte- and Leaet underat' clan JJE rates 1H attaetea F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT FE Werst Case Casualties - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event March EDDIE .LIACH-s I 12 Ueeat E31 a?egutState efAIabarna Critical Ceunties [12} He. at Ineries T-:ta He. [h'liner 5: He. at at Eeurty Sen-ere] Fatalities Casualties Cdtert 11 11 ELllman 2 2 Fayette 5 5 Flanlclin 4 4 Lamar 5 5 Lauderdale 21 21 Lawrenee 1 1 Limestone 2 5 5 I-I-Irsan 2 2 3 3 5 5 Legend Werst IEase ICasulaties {Majer Cities I - I - I sesame =Critieal l:eunties Risers LIS Heutes =Interstates 12.5 25 50 T5 11;. Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. It'll! ?'?i?tlr Iertleal saute-s are 11ers ?atexperhee- the gear-st prdnatulrtr' e1' resell-g the speen'led clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts clan aJe rates please- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT Ccmmunicaticn FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event March EDGE Inch: . State cf Alabama Critical Ccuntiee {12} Tctal Me. At Leaet cf ete Ecunty Facilitiee Damage Damage Delbert 315 Fayette 52 Franklin Lamar 5D Lauder-dale 21?" Lawrence Limeatcne 134 Marian 131 Mcrgan 442 245 'I.I'I.Iinetcn 35 Legend Cemmunicatien Facilitjlr Damage At Least luhtler?e Unlikely Mcderate Ukelihccd Higl?ly Likely Certain =Critical Ccuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =Interetatee 12.5 25 ED T5 l'ulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Una-rem at Mala-Clamps! Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? EDI. Citric?3 ennui-e are ?cse ?at-emulate? tie gear-at premium" c1' the epecn'le? clan age 5111?. Far attempte- and Leaet Mcclera?e' clan aJe mes phan- czulelrt 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI FE Dams - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event March a f: . State at Alabama 7- Critical Ceuntiee 12 .. .l'i _tlatr-em . uni"I -..-. I 15;, He.ef ?aunt]; Facilities I Celhert i1 i. ?ullman 23 1:11.? Fayette 1&1 Franklin 1:11 Lamar 13 Lauclerclale cl Lawrence 12 Limestene 12 Marian 13 Mergan 2 Walker run-W": '1 lili- ?l 1 . Legend i: ?a "i u' - . .-..- I 1? - -. 1' fesi- MMI arne ?Eh-1" - . . ?Elf =Critical Ceuntiea Rivera 5. -1n_ LIS Heutee 5 =lnteretatee 12.5 25 ED T5 Mid-?m?ri?? Earlh?uak? 13" and 55.12 Lli'aet c'atec peace 11-? attached rllelilal Iw-a-c?gat-r FIZ-F: IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEFEMIHLI E-IZII. ES Displaced Pcpulaticn - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March EDDIE 's . .- ?Eh 5;?le ?33 a . - yams: 7'2" 'ville I: Mil?f . .r I E1: ?air- I ?Meet-1?1: recLIJL a . II, 12.1! .TL?ia-a" 451Jr'- . 1- 1: Hall 75JJVIIHUTJH ifState cfAlabarna Critical Ccunties [12} Displaced Displaced ?it-gr Hesidemas Pcmlaticn Colbert 2 5 Culln'an Fayette Frarl-Ilin 1 Larrar 1 1 Laulerdale 5 13 Lawrence ljn'Iestcne l'u'hricn 1 2 l'u'hrgan 1 1 Legend Displaced Pcpulaticn - Majer Cities I emcee I team - I seamen =Critical l:cunties Rivers LIS Heutes =Interstates 12.5 25 5] T5 11;. l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. It'll! ?'?i?tlr candles are acre ?at-experience- tle gear-st c1' resell-g the specn'led clan age s?a?e. 12' and Least Mctlera?e' can aJe rates please- czumlrt 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Electric Pcwer Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March I r, I State at Alabama . I Critical Ccuntiee [12} 7'2 - - Tctal l-lc. I11 Leaat . 3 cf Medelate Ecmplete . 3Ecunty Damage Damage I13 celtert _Ir Eullman 1 I w- I I '1 Fayette 11 egg. -. I, Franklin 4 I: I, H. I Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence 1 I LImestcne e? -- Ir hlaricn 5 13 151 I 1 MergerELF. I 'r 1 Le deii- I . a I. 3311? II ELFIt: --I Fit-?1 ;l1_ at - I d315- I. 33' I Ire-{1 . -. Legend at"? I 11'- -r BAR -- El F- 11.. . II ?ee'tlb ewer acl Ithr amage .?ItLeaetl'u'bderme hill-Ll LILE - - I - .- lira131511: I 1 Unlikely .Ic' - I "t Mcderate Ukelihccd .ee-eI', 3111 If wl LU .31 I 'E'd HIQH'y'Lll-tEll'f "113'" 31 I .x I I Certain Trananiaa'cn Linea I- I II =Critical Ccuntiea L. . II Hie-ere 1:33 . ea LIE =Interetatee I it I CI 12.5 25 EEI T5 IL, l'ulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at gt. USP. r3. Eliaslal. It'll! ?'?i?tlr EDI. entice-e are Item: ?at-experience- tle gear-5t prdnatulrtr' c1' the epecn'led clan age e?a?e. tea-rum attempte- and 'At Leaet Mcclerat' can aJe pleaae- celelrt 11-3 attache-:1 F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Emergeney Dperatien Center Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: MIT Event ?Wm - ewe ate-e arelauama A Java fiel?lii'l?t?i' - Ceuntlee [12} 1.: I er?: at I'l'lederate Cemplete .4 .5 kin. Faeilitiee Damage Damage ?nal-$333 Eullman 1 - . Fayette 1 ?m 1 - .. Delbert . . Flari-tlin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrenee Limeatene I'l'larien I'l'lergan 'I.I'I.Iinaten [l [l [l gl? ee? xee?ee- . Legend e. '1 . . I . Emergeney?peratlen l[Ientere I 5 -. .- u? Unlikely - c} Mederate Ukeliheed -eijh'k'EE f" g" - ?u HigHyLikeltl ..-. ICertaln are a e. - new} lama re a we? - .- - Rivera LIS Heutee =Interetatee CI 12.5 25 5] T5 l'u1ilee till?! Earlhquak'?' el' the epeen'eptl dallage s?l'e. Fer -. antes eznulrt 11-? attaeied FmrDEllatial. l-r-zleetl-nlepel lluee'?i?tlr Fee Leer.- FIJI. SEE EDC Funetienality - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event March Maggi . . D: -. V-"q Li H. :13? ls?asuttcan will . - ?n 'rti'sJeII '1 State efAIabama Critical Ceunties [12} He. ef Tetal Functional He. ef Facilities Facilities lIliullman 1 1 Fayette 1 1 Walker 1 1 Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone I'I.I'larien l'uiergan 1Il'll'insten Legend Elnerg en eratien lCenters a1;[lla1ur 1 Met Funetienal Ir Functicnal =Critical l:eunties Rivers LIE Heutes =I-lnterstates 12.5 25 5] T5 lu1iles Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. nicpal ?'?i?tlr 'l'lerecaJIa-Tle- FIJI. Critical calm-c are 11cm: ?at-experience the gear-ct pram-ure- cn' the cpech'htl clan age c?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts and Least Mcdera?e' clan JJE sates pleas-e- 11-? attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT 533 Ferry Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March . ?Ll-1.1.15.1 ft State efAIabama A {Mutter Critical Ceuntiee [12} m?r Tetal Me. At Leaet 1.: HHLI h. .- at Complete .411 Hr: Eeurty Faeilities Damage Damage 113:1 Ll Delbert an It'li?t . It)? 5 Eullman 53 .. Fayette 13 Franklin 14 Lamar - Lauderdale 23 Lawrenee 1 1 Limeatene 21] ltlarien 12 ltlergan 34 23 Legend Fern?r Facility Damage At Least l'uhdertte HigH'lel'IliltEI'f i} Unlikely.t Moderate Ultelihaad . . a - r: _r'j . ,1 {it . Hittite?. H. lUS?fl'lIl Certain =Critieal l:auntiea Hitter-a LIS Heutea =Interatatea CI 12.5 25 5] T5 _?hlL l'u1iles - - Errtleal ezuu?t-e are ?eet eat experience the grate-at If Earlhquak'?' at maelltg the apeen'lttl damage a?att. Fer -. tit-Turtle? danaJ-t antes pleat-a- 11-? attaeled IMPACT TheretaJt-Tlt net. Prltettal Itueatlgatur 334 Fire Staticn Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March EDDIE . . - .. Ilr__,r? -. State at Alabama Critical Ccuntiee [12} Tctal Me. At Leaet cf Ccurty Facilities Damage Damage Cclt-ert Cullman 53 Fayette 13 Franl-:lin Lamar 1EI Lauderdale 23 Lawrence 1 1 Limeetcne El] Haricn 12 Hcrgan 34 26 'I.I'I.I'inetcn 14 Legend Fire Station Damage At Least l'ubderete C- Unlikely Mcderate Ultelihccd Higl'h.f Likely Certain =Critical Ccuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretatee 12.5 25 ED T5 l'u1ilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rlJaIaallampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE ??i?tlr 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. candles are acute ?at experience tle gear-at c1' the epecn'led clan age e?a?e. and Leaet Mcclera?e' clan aJe e'ertee pleaee celelrt 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDDHEHT 335 Fire Statien Functienalityr - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Mil? Event March sees State ef Alabama Critical Ceunties [12} He.ef Tetal Funcliena He. ef My Facilities Facilities Celhert Cullman 53 53 Fwd'te 13 13 Franklin 14 14 Lana Lauderd-de 23 23 Lawrence 11 11 Lilneslcne Marien 12 12 M?f??ll 34 34 Walker 25 EB Winsten "5,1 -. Il- . r- .1133: i? "H-h?eiw . e??lme-ed- m1! . ed? Ee- - If. ?51 Jami"? e?Fe?E? HE Fe Legend PEA- Tji" Fire Static-n Functienali I 4' - imp-Fit 1-: 1? Day'l Met Funeticlnal Ll l'l1.'lE.l ?aw: i L. Hingl?x Ir Fundicnal =Critical l:aun?ties ?Hieers Heutes =I-lnterstates 12.5 25 a: :5 Jr lu1iles Earlh?uak? Canter $5.12 Elgll.ncs . c- E-IZII. EBB Hazardcue Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March acce State at Alabama Critical Ccuntiee [12} He. at ?aunt];r Facilities I:icllaert lBullman Fayette Franklin 22 Lamar 15 Lauderdale 213 Lawrence 23 Limeetcne Mancn 5d Mcrgan 193 Walker 32 Winatcn :11? 1.1_ . -- ilk?r - ., 1 5:51; . Legend I: I Materials Facilitiee AME: . MMI 13?" - {a i3. cam-?5: HIHH -"111 ?h =Critical Ccuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =Interetatee 12.5 25 ED T5 Mid-Amarica Earthquaka Caner academiccs rearzaaz'arce 13" 35.12 E-IZII. Highway Bridge Functianality - New Madrid Seismic Zane: 517.? Event March 2555 State cf Alabama Critical Ccuntiee {12} He. cf Functicnal He. cf Facilities Facililiee Cclhert 131 131 Cullman 235 235 Fayette 152 152 Frail-:lin 152 152 L?l'l'liEI' 122 122 Lautlerilale 22':r 22T-r Lawrence 21 1 21 1 Limeetcne 233 233 Mai an 232 232 Marga] 233 233 Walker 135 135 ?u'lrinetcn 35 55 Legend Highway Bridge Functicnali?.r [lay '1 Met Functicnal Ir Functicnal =Critical Rivera LIE Heutee =I-lnteretatee 12.5 25 cc 1'5 et- l'uliles Mid-?marica Earlhquaka Canter LII at Mala-Clamps! Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. EDI. are ?cce ?at-experience- gear-ct c1' the cpecn'lerl clan agre- me. :le-TInltIc-Ic c1'-lance and Luz-act Mc-clera?e' clan aJc ct?rtcc phac-e- 1H attache-Ll F1 TEEIJIHLI SEE Highway Bridge 3: Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Mil? Event March EDGE . .131?- - State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee (12} Tetal l-la. At Least of Moderate Complete Egurty Faeilities Damage Damage Celt-art 131 Cullman 23D Fayette 162 Franklin 132 Lamar Hi Lauderdale 22? Lawrenee 211 Limeetane EQEI Harlan Hergan 239 196 85 Legend Higlnn'llrajlr Bridge Damage At Least I'Il'btlerele . Higl?ly Unlikely Mederate Ulteliheed Higl?ly Lil: el'f . Certain Segment amag At Least Madenie Higl?ly Unlikely =Critieal Ceuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretatee CI 12.5 25 El] T5 l'ulilee Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII L'erert- at LanaIa-Clam pagl. LISA Pm rC. Ellaelal. PrdeetP unequal Ilue e?gatnr 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- eel. F'rllelnal llueetlgatur calm-e are ?ese ?at-atpermee- tie geala-et pramlre e1' the epeen'led clan age me. Fer ten-rum. and Leaet Meclera?e' clan age amt-e ghee-e- ezulelrt 1H attaeletl F1 FEEDEMEHT Heepital Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Mil? Event March . .- wht.? ?ll 1. yam-State efAIabama Critical Ceuntiee [12} Tetal Me. At Leaat at ll'ladelate Complete County Faeilitiee Damage Damage Celt-art 2 Eullman 2 Fayette 1 Franklin Lauderdale 1 Lawrenee 1 Limeatene 1 Marian 1 Morgan 5 1 1 Lamar Legend Heapital Damage At Least lu'bderme Higrl'lenliltel'gr Unlikely Maderate Ultelihaed HigHyLikely I12ertain =Critieal I:euntiea Rivera LIS Heutea =Interatatea a 12.5 25 a: 7'5 3L 1? Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Fm r3. Ellatial. Prdeeti' niepal llue FIJI. Errtleal ennui-a are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-at pram-intr- e1' meeting the apeen'led clan age mt. Fer tie-Tinnitus attempte- and Leaet undera?e' clan aJe rates pleaae- EDWIN: 1H attaeled IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Heepitel Funetienelity - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March Wei, - ?m ,1 ,E?Gm. 113 5 EWFIEIILE .- 131' . - 373leer-In II '1 State ef?lebeme Critical Ceuntiee [12} He. ef Tetel Funetiend He. ef Ceuntyr Fedlitiee eeilitiee Celhert 2 2 2 2 Fayette 1 1 Frail-din 2 2 Laudenlele 1 1 Lawrence 1 1 Limestone 1 1 Merien 2 2 Merge" 5 5 walker 1 1 Willem" 1 1 Lame! Legend Hee pitel Funetienelity [lay 1 Met Funetienel Ir Fundienel =Critieel Ceuntiee Him-ere LIE Heutee =Interetetee 12.5 25 ECI T5 Tr Miles Mid-America Earlhquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. niepal edger-r FIJI. Critteal ennui-e are ?ew: ?at-experience the gear-st e1 resell-g the epeen'led clan age me. Fer de-TIHtIens and clan JJE $13125 plasm- 1H attained IMPACT E31 Liquefacticn Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March EDGE State cf Alabama Critical Ccuntiee {12mum mum Ecurty Eusceptituility EiJsceF-tituility Celt-art Eullmen Fayette umnmn Franklin Lamar Lauderdale che Lmt? Li mat-zine h-?lzurgan kEl' Legend Liquefaction Sue Ncne Maj-cl I[:itiee - I - I nacm =Critical l:cuntiee Rivera LIS Heutee =Interetatee 2.5 5 15 Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII at rIJalaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- cutie?3 ennui-e are ?eece ?at-Hpermce- the gear-at c1' the epecn'led clan age me. Fer tie-Turtle? attempte- b' and Luz-act Mcclera?e' clan age came-e piece-e- EDWIN: 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDEMEHT ESE Medi?ed Merealli Intensity - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event March a" r" -. I. J. "bl?l II. LI. ?31- I - . Hal?3?; 1 I E5 f'u- Ia? if]? I. EH State efAIabarna Critical Ceuntiee [12} Ceunty' Max. MMI VI Cullman =1 ?nil Fayette "all Franklin WI Lamar "all Lauderdale "nil Lawrence "nil Lim estene =1 ?nil l'u'lan'en WI Mergan =1 ?nil Walker =1 VI Winsten =1 ?nil Legend Medi?ed Merealli lntene it]; IIll-I'l'I-I'll' Majer Cities II elem aspen I - name I new 255,000 =Critieel Ceuntiee Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretetee 12.5 25 5] T5 11;. "Tr. luliles Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Eliarlal. nlepal Iii-Ell. Errtleal WINE-3 are ?ere ?at-experience the gear-5t e1' the epeen'lerl clam age mt. Fer eT'CdTuple- 12' and Leaet clan aJe ?nes pleae-e- EDWIN: 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E33 Natural Gas Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic: che: Ml? Event March aces State cf Alabama Critical Ccunties [12} Tctal Me. At Least cf lI'cherate Damplete Eanty Facilities Damage Damage Delbert 25 Eullman 1 Fayette 3 Frarldin 2 Lamar 1 Lauderdale 1 Lawrence Limestcne Hadcn 2 Mcrgan 4 5 Legend l'latural IGas Facilityr Damage At Least Llnliltel'f i} Mcderate Ukelihccd - . . g" .5 . I ICertain - 'r 1' . . . 1 t1:? JUSJU LInes - . _r - .- =Critical l:cLInties Rivers LIS Rattles =Interstates 12.5 25 5] T5 Miles - - cause-s are 11cc: 11st experience- tle . prdnatulrtr' ct resell-g the specn'led Haney-a sat. clue-Turners attempte- and Least Mcuerat' can atLanaIa-Clampagl. use. rate: pleas-a- 11-? attached dchm-e- r3. Ellaiial. PrdectP nicpal Ilue F: IMPACT 'I'IeresaJ-a-Tt- sci. Prlictnal s34 Oil Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Ml? Event March I. I. ILi'l- If lemma - HHLI In; crime-1133 wastrel}. - eases-e}- Is lr?"T?s-k I .. -- ,r Flam . Hf I F: I 1. . it?? Josie State cfAlabama Critical Counties [12} Total No. At Least of liloderate Complete Courty Facilities Elamage Damage Colbert 2 illorgan 1 Cullman Fayette Franklin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrence Limestone lilarion 'I.I'I.Iinston Legend [lil Facility?r Damage At Least I'llbdenie Higl?lerlnlileell,r e- Unlikely C- Moderate Ultelil'lood Ea" HigH'fLiitEll'f I Certain Transmission Lines =Critical Counties Risers LIS Routes =Interstates 12.5 25 5] T5 11;. TF- l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJ-EII-El-Ctal'l'lpa Lu. USP. r3. Ilue sugar-r FIJI. cau?es are ?cse ?at experience the gear-st prdzusltulitr' of reacting the specified dam age s?a?e. For definitions oT'ColTlF-Ie and Least Mcdera?e' dall aJe s'ertes please catsuit ?e attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E35 Peak Greund - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event March EDDIE - [feeat - ?nale: nel?m I State ef?labama Critical Ceunties [12} CDHIW l'u'in. PEA. PISA Celherl.? I1I1ir I115 I1I1ir Fayette I115 Frarldin I1I1ir I115 Lamar I115 Lauderdale I115 Lawrence limestone I'II'larien I115 I'm-rm? W?ll'il?l' I1I1ir 1II'II'insten Legend PG?lm I1I15 - I1I1'rr - I11 - I11 - I115 Majer Cities I slum I ream I 115,001 EESJ1I1I1 =Critieel Ceunties Rivers LIS Heutes =lnterstetes 12.5 25 51 T5 11;. luliles Mid-America Earlhquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Grilleal mute-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gash-st e1 resell-g the speen'led clan age me. Fer 12' and Least underat' clan JJE sates pleas-e- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT ESE: Peliee Statien Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March "l~thl ?"311 IQ. ~33 u'lh?l? Imugnjhi - 3355 PEI: :52: 35:? r' -. Ira-'- :?nffl-? In I State ef?labama Critical Ceuntiee [12} Tetalhle. Leaet cf Medemte Cemplete Facilities Damage Damage Celt-ert El El Cullman Fayette Frarldin Lamar Lauderdale Lawrenee Limeetene Medan Hergan Legend Peliee Statien [lI amage At Least l'u'IJ-derme Higl?ly Unlikely {31- Llnliltel'f C- Mederate Ulteliheed {33' Higl?lyLiltely I Certain =Critieal Ceuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretatee 12.5 25 5] T5 4L l'ulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. ?'?i?tlr EDI. calm-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' the epeen'led clan age s?a?e. Fer eT'Cemple- 12' and Leaet underat' clan aJe rates pleaae- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Felice Statien FunctienalitglF - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March - 72 Li I A 1= ?13" 'tswesllt913m in? r" -f it -. ante-er J- .l-Jallsirfaw' 11:1? - l_ - JH .- State efAIabarna Critical Ceunties [12} He. at Tetal Functiencl He. at Cem?y Facilities Facilities Celhert El El 5 5 Fayette 3 3 Franldin 5 5 Lanar 5 5 Lautlertl?e El El Lawrence Lilnestene 5 5 l'ularien Marga] El El ?u?lall-ter El 9 Wnsten 5 5 Legend Pe lice Statien Functienality Day '1 Met Funetienal Ir Functicnal =Critical l:eunties Rivers LIE Heutes =I-lnterstates 12.5 as a: as luliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Eliaclal. nlcpal It'll! ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Iertlcal calm-c are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-ct c1' the cpech'htl clan age c?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts clan rates please- camrt 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E38 Part Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Mil? Event Marchaena 1 . 9 State efAIabama mm; ?jammy Ceuntlee [12} mx? J: Tatal l-la. At Leaat Hit-?1v. I cf Complete -.. Ccunty Faeilitiee Damage Damage Delbert - "h Lauderdale ?m _l Lawrence 1 - Egg Limeatene 3 I- 1" 15 . ?in? a ElJlman Fayette Flanltlin Lamar Marian 'I.I'I.I'in3ten .II - ea a - - 9.131, 1 I Legend - Part Damage I, -. -. I-IE ET A: ?elderate - - 1 lg 3* I'll e3? L: w? . EJJ {31' Unlikely HF - i} Mederate Ukeliheed f' HigHyLiltely . Jug-Ii} I Certain =Critieal Ceuntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =Interatatee CI 12.5 25 El] T5 Miles - Earlhquak'?' e1' the apeeh'ia-Ptl damage a?l'e. Fer -. antes phase-a- 11-? attaeied melmelt'GUIDE FmrDEllaital. PrdeetPnIepal "mam-r Fee IMPACT TEEMIHD FIJI. Pctahle Water Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: M17 Event March EDDIE 1 I5 5 . ?Ii. A State cfAlabama a Critical Ccuntiee [12} --I 7-2 T. :5 4; pa" Tctach. l- 31 . cf Moderate .. Danty Facilitiee Damage Damage 3:13 inmg?f Flt: Delbert 2 RID-H Dullman 1 Fr Eat-latte 2 . El .. awrence 1 A Limeetcne 1 a? Flarklin I. meh?? L. A Lamar IE - "Lf' I. l'Ilcrgan i- ..- (- . 4, 'I.I'I.Iinatcn I32 LthceIleI e31'1 ?IraLegend I e: UT Pctahle Water Facilityr Damage I I I At Least Iubrlerae HI. {?31 c- Unlikely My I I Mctlerate Lr" I .I J. . ELI HigHeLiIIelIe I: .I II 1' II . Certain I- 2' [5 [?it 33-1 I "iE Pctahle Water Dietrihuticn Linea I an .- 1: 'l [.15 He. Ii Lealre I - nae-i- 3-1 .I I Leg . 1-2 2-LL: ??ue U?l:cLIrltlea 3:3 I Hwera LIS HcLItee .l =Irlteretatee - 12l'ulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. EDI. PTIIDIJEII can ?125 are acre ?at-experience- tle greatest ct the damage mt. and Leaet Mud-era? can my? fate: caulrt In attached IMPACT FEESSMEHT EDD Prisens - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event March sees J..- State ef?lebeme rr' Criti eel Ceunti es [12} JACK-E Ne. ef ?aunt}: Facilities Celhert 2 cullman r11 Fayette 1 Franklin 2 Lemar 1 Laud erd ale 2 Lawrence 1 3 Marian 3 Mergan Walker 5 Winsten 2 Legend I F'rise ns I .. . - - =Critieel Ceunties Rivers LIS Heutes =Interstetes 12.5 25 5] T5 11;. Miss Mid-America Earthquake Canter . message: semesters: UI at Lanala-Ciampagl. sates pleas-a- 11-? attested deelme rs. Eluanal. Prd-a-etP Hispal Ilues?r?t-r Fe F: IMPACT .asseesuEHT TEEMIHEI FIJI. Railway Bridge Functionality - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March - - J-J- if: aw? min tIcEtm?E . itawaguuz tram?! 333:3 13g, r-h?l - I'State cfAlabarna Critical Ccuntiee [12} l-lc. cf Tcta Functicnal He. at Ccuntyr Facilities azilitiee CellIeIt 2 Franklin 1 1 LiIneetcne 3 3 Mari en 2 2 Walker 4 4 Winetcn 2 2 Fayette Lana? Lawrence Legend Railway Bridge [Iaj;.;r 1 I Met Functicnal Ir Functiuznal =Critical I:cLIrItiee Rivera LIE HcLItea =Interatatea 12.5 25 T5 TIT l'u1ilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. ??i?tlr FIJI. Brutal are acre ?atexpermce- the gear-st [Irma-Ila;- c1' the epecn'led clan age s?a?e. cute: pleaae- 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Railway Bridge 8; Segment Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: M73 Eyent March a [rEFtErr 1333 115123 f'jf'larJ?i? . 1 L1. JClS?-ql "Emmy - kEn??k State efAIabama Critical Ceuntiee [12} Tetal Me. At Lea at at Complete Courty Facilities Damage Damage Delbert Eullman Franklin 1 Limeetene 3 Marian 2 4 2 Fayette Lamar Lauderdale Lawrenee Morgan Legend Railway Bridge Damage At Least lull-[latte Higi?ly Unlikely Unlikely Maderate Ukelihaad HigHy Likely Certain Railway Segment Damage At Least Higi?ly Unlikely =Critieal Cauntiea Rivera US Reutea =Interetatee 12.5 25 ED T5 4L l'ulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Ctampa gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal e?gatur EDI. Critteal calm-e are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st pram-um- e1' meeting the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer attempte- and Luz-amt underat' clan my? mates mum in attaeied F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E333 Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March ?es 1 State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee [12} Tetal He. Pt Least ef Demplete Deunty FacilitiE Damage Damage Delbert ED Dullmen 3? Fayette Franklin 13 Lamar Lauderdeie 213 Lawrence Li meetene 2D Merger: 43 her 33 'I.I'I.Iinsten 13 Legend Selieel Damage At Least l'u'IJ-derrte Unlikely Mederate Ultelihaed Higl?lyLiltely I ICertain =Critieal Dauntiea Rivera LIS Heutee =lnteretatee 12.5 25 ED T5 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center . UI at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Eliaslal. ?'?i?tlr EDI. WINE-3 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-5t e1' the epeen'led clan age e?a?e. Fer tut-30mph- 12' and Leaet Metlera?e' clan aJe dates pleaae- EDWIN: 1H attaeled FD F1 IMPACT ED-li Seheel Functionality - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Mil? Event March EDDE 11.11.1515-143"11.1le - . at: - .- n' I I :eulm?n State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee [12} He. ef Tetal Fun-:tienel He. at ileum}.r Facilities Fadlitiee Cellieit 33 33 Cullntan 3T 3T Fayette Fratltlin 13 13 L?l'l'l? Lautlertlale 33 33 Lawrence 13 1E Lilneetene 33 35 Maien 13 13 Merg at 413 413 Walker 33 33 1ultiineten 13 13 Legend Selle-DI Funetienalityr 1 I Met Funetienal Ir Fundienal =Critieal IZeuntiee Rivera LIS Heutea =Interatatee 12 .5 25 ECI 3'5 Tr luliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaallampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE Flu-Flt? E-IZII. WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-5t e1' the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer eT'CdTuple and Luz-eat Meclerat' clan aJe $131235 pleaae- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT EDS Tetel Debris - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event March 2553 I 1 5.5115111 . - -J 1' 3.1151? Stete ef?lebeme Critical Ceunties [12} Erieie' Concrete! Tutsi Weed Eteei Debris County [Tens] [Tens] [Tens] Colbert 5.355 2.432 3.533 Cull men 352 155 Fayette 2.515 1.1II5 3.?15 Frsnidin 1.221] 53] 2.331 Len-er 2.223 15$ 3.317-r Leuderdsie 15.35 4.151 Lewenee 342 54 355 Li mestene E4 33 5571' Med cm 2.333 1.153 4.125 Marga-1 1.110 250 1.550 her 323 151 Eli-'3 2.525 3.533 Legend Tetel ehris ens.000 1. 001 5.0:10 5.000 11.100 Mejer Cities 1- 50.000 15000 I 15001 -115000 I 115001 555.000 =Critieel l:0L1r1ties Rivers LIS Heutes =Interstetes 12.5 25 5] T5 11;. l'111iles Mid-Ameriee Earthquake Center . LII lime-cumulus at Male-Champs Lu. USP. Ilue EDI. Errtleal tenths are ties-3 ?at 1350101101512- greet-5t 01' resell-g the speen'led clan age s?e?e. Fer tie-Turtlels JJE rates please- 155151111 111? attested melmelt'GUIDE IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EEIE Tetel Pepuletien (2000} - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event State ef?lebeme Critical Ceunties {12} ?euntyr Pepulatien -.. Celhert eased m' - Gunman i?l?EE Ie? . Fayette ?Iii-?195 Franklin 35.339 Lamar were Leuderdele ETHEE Lawrence HERBS Limestene Marian ELEM Mergen Walker MESS Winsten 2&1 ,Erii? Legend Tetel F'epuletien 0-1.500 1,5:31 -eme 3pm sum - menu - Mejer Cities II- - I I new sesame =Critieel Ceunties River?s LIS Heutes =Interstetes 12.5 25 53 T5 4L . l'u1iles Mid-Am?ii?? Earlhquak? CEIWEF . message: E. 55.1: Mud-3- LII lame-cumulus at LlrIJ-EII-EI-Iliampayl. USP. sates please- 119 mummie- Prune-HP Michal Ilue ?'?i?tlr IMPACT TEFIMIHIZI FIJI. El]?r Waste Water Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March secs State cf Alabama Critical Ccunties [12} Tctel He. ?t Least cf Ecmplete Ecunty Faciliti-E Damage Damage Cclt-ert 1D Eullma'u El Fayette 2 Franklin 5 Lama' 5 Lauderclae 2 Lawrence 4 Li mestene 5 5 Marga-u we l=:er 'I.I'I.Iinsten 1 Legend Waste Water Facility Damage At Least I'llbti??ie Unlikely Mcderate HigHyLikel'f I Certain 1I.I?.laste Water Distribution Lines He. cf Leaks - =Critical l:cunties River?s LIS Rattles =Interstates 12.5 25 5] T5 4L . l'u1iles ?at-experience- tll? .: Earlhquak'?' CHI-I151 pram-mt;- c1' the specn'htl damage s?a'e. -- Eyl? LII at LanaIa-Clampagl. sates pleas-a- 11-? attached acclm-e- rs. Ellatlal. Pr-zl-a-ctP ?lcpal Ilues?t?t-r F: IMPACT .nssecsuEr-IT FIJI. EEIE Damage - East Tennessee Seismic che: M53 Event March LMIDERHNJE hiss-.3453it". L: ., . State cf Alabama Critical Ccunties [13} Tctal He. J'l'ut Least cf hu'lzuderate Deunty Facilities Damage Damage Ellcunt Dalheun 12 Dhercltee 5 Deltall: Etctuah 4 Jackson Jefferscn 24 Limestcne 4 Madiscn 24 Marshall 5 lulcrgan Saint Blair 3 Talia-:lega 4 [3 Legend ?irpert Facilitjlr Damage At Least l'ubtlertte Higl?lyf Unlikelyr Llnlilrel'f Mcrlerate {33' Higl?lyLiltely Certain Rivers LIE Rattles =lnterstates =Criticel I:cunties 12.5 25 ED T5 4L l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Eliarlal. nicpal ?'?i?tlr EDI. are acre ?at-experience- tle gear-st c1' the specn'htl clan age mt. Fer clan aJe rates please- 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDDMEHT EDEI Airpert Funetienality - East Tennessee Seiemie Zene: [1.45.9 Event March 13-11-53 State ef?labama Critical Ceuntiee [13} He. ef Tetal Functienal Ne. :31 Cnunty Faeilitiee Faeilitiee Elleunt 2 2 Calheun 12 12 Cherekee 5 5 Dekalb Etewah 4 4 Jackeen Jeffereen 24 24 Limeetene 4 4 Madieen 24 24 Marehall 5 5 Mergan 5 Saint Blair 3 Talladega 4 4 Legend Airpert Funetienalityr Day1 Met Fum?tienal Ir Funetianal Rivera Heutee =Interatatee =Critieal I:eun?tiee 12.5 2'5 5] Miles PL Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII Maryanne-3e at Mala-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Critteal ezuu?t-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at e1' the apeeh'htl clan age mt. Fer attempte- and Leaet MeJeraF clan JJE rates pieae-e- 1H attaeietl melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Worst Case Casualties - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: Event March EDDIE I - rjesrsir 31m tr .r1.x" leuil?eTlm State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} He. at Injuries (MnerS: He. at Tetal He. at Cuun?qlr Severe) Fatalile Casualties Ell-:uunt Calhe un 1 1 Chereltee 10 1EI Del-call: I33 1 E4 Etewah BE 2 BE: Jacks-1n ?15 1 4? Jefferson LimEtene lula dis en 1 1 Marshall 1 1 Mergan Saint Clair Talladega Legend Werst lEase Casualties All-I'Majer Cities I - I - I sesame =Critieal l:aunties Rivers LIS Heutes =Interstates 12.5 25 5] T5 "Tr. luliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Malaallampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ezuu?t-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st mamm- e1' resell-g the speen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts eT'Canplt- and Least MecleraF clan aJe sates pleas-e- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT E11 Cemmunieatien Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: 11115.9 Event March EDGE R, a 1: - 9% if?! f%l HIE: . is in; Ti?t 1531535.; :3 -- -.I .- . Irish: . State at Alabama Critical Ceunties {13} Tetal He. ?t Least ef hut-aerate Eemplete County Facilities Damage Damage Elleunt 161 Calheun 35? Enereltee E15 13 Deltalt- 149 Etc-wan 293 Jaeltsen 229 Jeffersen 1631 Lirnestene 13-51 l'ula-zlisen Iii-=19 Marshall 255 lulergan 442 Saint Clair 310 Talia-:lega 263 Legend Facilityr Damage At Least I'U'htl?'trte Unlikely Mederate Ulteliheed HigH'f Likely I ICertain Rivers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Critieal I:eunties 12.5 25 ED T5 luliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII Una-rem at Mala-Clamps gt, USP. r3. Ell-33L?. Flu-Flt? EDI. cutie?3 calm-s are ?eas ?at-stpermee- tie gear-st prenatally at meeting the speen'le? clan age 5111?. Far attempte- and Least Meclera?e' clan sates phase- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI E112 Dams - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: Event if. State ef Alabama Critical Ceunties {13} He. at Cum-I133,? Facilities - 1.. -. Bleunt 3E: '1 l. -, .- Calheun Elf.? ere ee ..- Delta?: 19 Etewah EB Jaeksen 5 Jeffersen El Limestene Madisen 13 Marshall Mergan 2 SaintClair Tallatlega rill Legend - Dams MMI am Hill WI =Cr'rtieal l:eunties ?Hi~l'ers ?L S?eutes =lnterstates 12.5 25 ED T5 luliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter assesses senseless: and Hill? LII Una-rem at LanaIa-Clampagl. antes pie-asle- 11-? attested tleelmne- IMPACT EIZII. ??9512le 513 Displaced Fcpulaticn - East Tennessee Seismic che: liil?ii Event March 2DDE . . a - . . and} .- I 1.1-. State cf Alabama Critical Ccunties [13} stimate cf Displaced Displaced Ccunty Residences F'cpulaticn Lint Calhcun l:herclree 1 4 Deitallc 1 253 Etcsniah 323 EDS 222 555 Jeffersan Limestcne Madiscn Marshall Merci an Saint I:Iair Talla dega Legend Displaced F'cpulaticn - 2] - 25EI 250 - EDS Majcr Cities In - 25,000 I - I Irspm sespcc Rivers LIE Entries =Interstates =Critical I:cunties 12.5 25 ED 2'5 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. IIUE ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. Critical candles are acre ?at-experience- tie gear-st prdnenliir' c1' reacting the spech'led clan age s?a?e. attempte- ta' and Least Mcclera?e' can series pleas-e- 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT EH4 Electric Fewer Facility Damage - East Tennessee Seismic Zene: M53 Event March ecce WEE WE . - - - State of Alabama -Ccuntlee [13} 1 .I- I 1- . Tctal He. at Least cf l'u'lcderate Count-5r Faciliti-E Damage Damage Ellcunt El Calhcun ?14 Cherclaee 3 Delaalb 2 1 Etcwah 2D Jadaacn Jefferacn 19] Limatcne El luladiacn 32 Marshall lulcrgan El Saint Clair Talladega 43 Legend Electric Power Facility?r Damage A1 Lea?et l'u'btlenie an- Unlikely '3 Mcderete Higl?ly Likely I ICertain Trenaaniaaicn Linea River-a LIE Heutee =Interetetee =Criticel I:cuntiee 12.5 25 5] T5 l'ulilea Cll'??al IE5 are Earlhquak'?' ct the apecn'le? damage amt. Fer 55.12 rate" atLanaIa-Clampagl. antes pleaae calalrt 11-? attached Prclectl'nlcpal Inuaauget-r Fee 'I'lerean-a-Tt- EIZII. 515 Emergency Dperaticn Center Damage - East Tennessee Seismic che: 11:15.9 Event March r" 5. .. Fl . I- mime?r" tic-1L -. I I Beast- I. State cfAlabama Critical Ccunties [13} Tc1a He. ?t Least cf Medal?ate Ecunty Facilities Damage Barrage Ehercitee 1 Etc-Lu ah 1 Je?ersen Madison 1 Marshal 2 Talladega 1 Elleunt Ealhcun Eleiualb Jacks-3n Umestcne Mcrgan Baht Clair Legend Emergency?r ?peratien lCenters At Least l'ubtlerrte ?ange 1: {21- Unlikely c} Mcderate Ukelihccd Higi'h.f Likely I ICertain Rivers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Critical I:cunties 12.5 25 5] T5 4L . l'u1iles LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. nicpal ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Mid-America Earthquake Center ennui-s are acre ?at-experience- tie gear-st pram-inc c1' reacting the specified clan age s?a?e. Fer attempte- and Least underat' can JJE sates pleas-e- 1H attache-:1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E15 EDC Funetienality - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event March EDDIE LE: [Imus {Wit -. l-i {Earl's-er"?rst ?n?mm .. "gigwhi'i'm: If]? I ?ll - I'd! ., ,a x' :eu 13.11" I '1 - .l . State ef?labama Critical Ceunties [13} He. at Tetal Functienal He. at Cnunty Facilities Facilities Chereitee 1 1 Etna-ah 1 1 Jeffersen 2 2 Madisen 1 1 Marshall 2 2 TaHadega 1 1 Eileunt Calheun Del-tails Jaeksen Limestene Mergan Saint Clair Legend Emery en eyr eratien lCenters at [1amr 1 Met Funetienal 1* Functienal ?Hi~rers Heutes =Interstates =Critieel liIeLinties 12.5 2'5 T5 Eli-L. ?rr l'u1iles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. niepal ?'?i?tlr FIJI. ennui-s are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st mummi- e1' meeting the speen'htl clan age mt. Fer tie-Tinnitus attempte- and Least underat' clan JJE sates pleas-e- 1H attested melmelt'GUIDE IMPACT Ferry Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zone M53 Event March Elie .- ?State ofAlabama Critical Counties [13} Total No. At Least of Moderate Complete County Faoili?E Damage Damage Etowah 2 2 2 Ellount alhoun neroltee eltaltu Jackson Jefferson LimEtone Madison Marshall Morgan Saint lair Talladega Legend Fern?r Facility Damage At Least fut-dermis HigHy Unlikely D- Unlikely Moderate Ultelinood Higl'h.f Likelyr I ICertain Rivers LIE Routes =Interstates =Dritioal Counties 12.5 25 ED T5 4L Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. liue ?'?i?tlr Tlereant-Tie EDI. Errtloal ennui-s are none ?at-experience tie gear-st [armature- o1' the speon'led clan age a?a?e. For ot'Complt- and Least Moderata' clan an rates please- ooinrt 1H attained IMPACT ENE Fire Station Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zone: M53 Event March EDDIE Jo- State of Alabama Critical Counties [13} To13 Ho. J'l't Least of hn'lo-zlemte Complete County Faoil'rlies Damage Damage Ellount 22 Calhoun 23 Cherokee 13 3 Del-call: EEI El Etouuah 32 Jaoltson Jefferson Limestone Madison 45 Marshall 23 Morgan 34 Saint Clair 23 Talia-:lega 21 Legend Fire Station Damage At Least Moderate C- Unlikely Moderate Ultelihootl Higl?la.? Likely Certain Rivers LIE Routes =lnterstates =Critioal Counties 12.5 25 ED T5 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at ?oataallampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE 'l'loreeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. oou?e-s are ?ora ?at-exponents the goat-st o1' the speelrlotl clan age s?a?e. For tie-flirtlols ot'CompIo and Least Morlera?e' clan an auto: pleas-e- 1H attaoleo F1 IMPACT FEEDDHEHT Fire Statien Funetienality - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event Marel12??3 State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Me. at Tetal Functienal He. at Ceunty Facilities Facilities Elleunt 22 22 Calheun 23 23 Cherekee 13 Deltalle 13 23 Etewah 32 32 Jaeksen 2T 2T Jeffersen 133 1313 Limestane lulatlisen 4E 43 Marshall 23 23 lulergan 34 34 Saint Clair 23 23 Talladega 21 21 - .. ?f-a -- 1 i- e?r Ii": 35?s HE F?s Legend E155 Fi?-m- Fire Statien 1? ea . Hat Furetienal ?In. .i JEL Functilznal Rivers LIE Heutes =lnterstates =I3ritieal I3eunties 12.5 25 53 25 luiiles lili'El'I'Et Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI pranaalrs at the speen'lelzl damage sf-Il'e. Fer LII at LlrIJ-aI-El-IZIJ-lmpayl. USP. sates please- 119 mclme r3. EIIarlaI. Prqeetl' nIepal Illa-E ??i?tlr F1 IMPACT TEFIMIHILI E-IZII. Hazardous Materials Facilities - East Tennessee Seismic Zane: M53 Event March EDDIE . 1. . -- I 1 LBJ LAUDEERFTEF 1- l' 1.35 i 1- - a ?it. let-{Lima-?gs? -t I_I__cs5-.1th I. .I-II State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} He. at {jaunt}; Facilities Bleunt Calheun Cherekee Dekalh SE Etawah i3 Jacksen EB Jeffersen rilEEl Limestene 4F Madisen 13? Marshall 7?1 Mergan 193 Saint lClair 54 Talladega i'El Legend I Hazardeus Materials Facilities MMI cw WI ?Hi~rers Rattles =Interstates =Critica Ceunties 12.5 25 ED T5 4! luliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaallampa gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le Citric?3 WINE-5 are acute ?at-emulate? the gear-ct prchatulrtr' cn' resell-g the specn'htl clan age 5111?. Far tie-Turners attempte- and Least Mc-clcra?e' clan JJE c'ertec pleas-e- caiclrt 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI E721 Highway Bridge FunetienalityF -Eaet Tennessee Seiemie Zene: M53 Event March EDGE ism?11""? Hit 1'31? State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee (13} He. at Tetal Funetienal He. at Ceunty Facilitiee Facilitiee Elleunt 1TB HE: Calheun E33 E33 Chereiree 159 159 Delta?: 2:3? Etmr-rah Eng Jackeen ETD Jeffereen ESE: E153 Lirneetene Egg Madieen Marehall 155 155 Mergan Saint Clair 153 153 Talladega 23: Legend Higlnl'irajmr Bridge Funetienality Day1 Met Funetienel Funetilznel River-e Heutee =Interetetee =Critieal Iileurltiee a 12.5 25 e: :5 4f l'uillee Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII L'Ia-rart; at Hume-Chem pagl. LISA Pm r3. Ellaatal. PrgeetP unequal auger-r TiereeaJeTt- eel. Prllelial IIL'eatlzgat-r crummy-1m are ?ese ?at-atpermee- tie great-at murmur,- e1' meeting the apeen'htl clan age me. Fer anti Luz-eat MecleraF clan age was phae-e- eaialrt 1H attaeietl F1 Highal'ayF Bridge 3: Segment Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M5.9 Event March EDGE .1 11-31.: ?wage-?fi?t?ts - . v?i'a State at Alabama Critical Ceunties (13} TetalHe. At Least ef rule-:lerate Eemplete ?aunt-5r FaeilitiE [:Iamage Damage Elleunt 1TB Calheun 2138 Chereltee 159 Delta?:- 33? 1 Etewah Jaeltsen 27?] Jeffersen 958 Limestene 299 53? Marshall 165 l'ulergan 339 Saint Clair 163 Talladega 332 Legend Higlnn'llrajlr Eli-[lye Damage At Least I'Il'btlerale Higl?ly Unlikely Unlikely Mederate Ulteliheetl Higl?ly Lil: el'f Certain Higlnalajllr Segment [l amag At Least Higl?ly Unlikely Rivers LIE Heutes =lnterstates =Critieal I:eunties 12.5 25 5] T5 l'uliles Mid-?mariea Earthquake Center UI t'ersrt- at mania-Clam gt. USP. r3. Ell-33H?. are ?eets ?at-atpermee- the neat-st e1' the apeen'htl clan age me. Fer ten-rum. eT'Canple and Least Meclerat' clan age was phase- ezulalrt 1H attaeletl F1 E23 Hespital Damage -East Tennessee Seismic Zene: M5.9 Event March 5 I I. . . lr?c l! State cfAlabama Critical Ceunties [13} Tctal c. Ht Least cf lulcclerate Ccuntgr Facilities Damage Damage Ellcunt 1 Calhcun 4 Chercltee 1 Delcalb 1 1 Etc-wan 4 1 Jefferscn ED Limestcne 1 l'ulacliscn 5 Marshall 2 l'ulcrgan 5 Saint Clair 1 Tallaclega 2 Legend Hes pital Damage .?ttLeast I'm-Ilenie Unlikely C- l-chclerate Higl'lyLiltel'f I Certain ?Hie'ers Hchtes =lnteretates =Critical Ccunties 12.5 2'5 5] T5 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. ?'?i?tlr 'l'lereeaJe-Tie- EDI. calm-e are ?ere ?atetperlence tie gear-ct c1' reacting the specified clan age sate. and Leaet Mcdera?e' clan aJe e'ertee please ?e attached FD IMPACT FEEDDMEHT E24 Heepital Functionality - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Event March Lat Wt. IF Hf}; I, -. 33;: 5:?nr . were[fir lathefirState ef?labama Critical Ceuntiee [13} He. at Tatal Functlenal He. at Caunty Facilitiee Facilitiee Ellaunt 1 1 Calheun 4 4 Cheral-iee 1 1 Deltalln 1 Etawah 4 4 Jackeen 1 1 Je?eraen Limeetane 1 1 Madiaan 5 5 Marshall 2 2 Margan 5 5 Saint Clair 1 1 Talladega 2 2 Legend Hes pital Funetienalityr Day1 . Hat Funztianal 1* Functilznal ?Hi~rera Heutea =lnteretatea =Critieal Cauntiea 12 .5 25 ECI T5 Tr l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at rlJaIa-Ctampa Lu. USP. r3. Eliarial. niepal EDI. Err?ml WINE-3 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' the ape-email clan age mt. Fer (Humans attempte- and Leaet underat' clan JJE rates pleaae- 1H attaetecl F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT 5125 Liquefaetien Susceptibility - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Eyent Marsh EDDIE . I . I. - ?eleess' State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Minimum Maximum lEaunty Su aseptileility Susseptileility Elleunt Very Law Very Lew lCalhaun Very Law Very Layy Cheralree Very Law Very Lew Del: all: Very Law Very Layy Eta yuah Very Law Very High Jadesan Very Lew Very High Jeffersan Very Law Very Lew Lim estene Very Law Very Lew Madiszun Very Lew Very Law Marsh all Very Law Very Lew Margan Very Law Very Layy Saint lClair Very Law Very High Talladega Very Lew Very Law Legend Lit u efaet is Sus ee 1-til1-ilit1yr Vary Law Law Maderate High Vary High Majer Cities amen I ream - name I assume Hiyers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Critieal I:eunties CI 12.5 25 5] rs 4L "Tr. luliles Mid-Amariea Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIa-Ctampa gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le ezuu?ee are ?ese ?atetperienee the greatest prenatulrly at reaeillg tie epeeh'le? clan age state. Fer eT'Caruple 13' and Leaet Meclera?e' dam in e'ertee please eelelrt ?e attested melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Medi?ed Merealli Intensity - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event March fr. metre .- _l . .-- seam .r?ff Hues LL seals? I rte wn??gr'em I State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Ceunty Mas. MIMI Bleunt all Calheun Ell Cherekee Delqalle SH: Etewah Ell Jaeksen VII Jeffersen Ell Limestene VI Madisen Ell Marshall Ell Mergan VI BaintClair sill Tallatlega Ell Legend Metli?etl Merealli lntens itjlr l'u'lul WI -3-: Majer Cities - I I assume Rivers LIE Rattles =lnterstates =Cr'rtieal I:eunties 12.5 25 53 T5 luliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Ellaslal. It'll! ?'?i?tlr EDI. ezuu?es are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st er resell-g the speen'le? clan age s?a?e. Fer (lie-Thrusts attempte- and Least Meclerat' clan JJE sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Natural Gas Facilityr Damage - East Tennessee Seismic che: M53 Event March aces State cf Alabama Critical Ccunties [13} "f mesa I Tctal Hc. J'l't Least cf Complete Ecurty Facilities Barrage Damage :3 12 Je?ferscn 38 Limatcne 4 1 Merger: 4 Saint Blair 14 Tallaclaga El Ellcunt Chen-cites Delta?: :3 Legend Hatural IGas Facilityr Damage At Least l'u'IJ-tlenie {31- Llnliltel'f i} Mcderate - HigH'fLiltEll'f .lilr' .5 - 1? ICertain _1 .f -. ,{wljijJ-H t'i' 'il_l$fnji ?Transmissicn Lines Rivers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Critical I:cunties 12.5 25 5] T5 4L l'uliles - - are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st Earlhquak'?' cal-"E" . c1' the specn'le? damage s?a?e. tie-Thrusts attempte- and Least MeJeraF can aJe LII at LlrIJ-EII-EI-Iliampayl. USP. sates please can?: 119 EltL?lE-? mummie- r3. Ella?al. PrqectP nicpal Ilue ??i?tlr F1 IMPACT TEFIMIHEI Tl re ea J-a- Tia- sc I. II ueetga'cr Dil Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M5.9 Event March r? #335 E11: I ,1 I e-r l} JENIINEIJH ELK, Jesse State ef?labama Critical Ceunties [13} Tetal a. 31-1 Least ef lulederate Eemplete Count-5r Facilities Damage Damage I3 alh sun 5 effersen 3] lulergan 1 Talia-:lega 2 Elleunt I: her-zit as eltall: Etewah atltsen Limestene luladis en lularshall Saint Clair Legend Dil Fa-eilitjlr Damage At Least l'uIJ-tlenie Higl?ly Unlikely Unlikely t} Mederate HigH'fLiltEll'f I ICertain Transmissien Lines Rivers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Critieal I:eunties 12.5 25 ED T5 4L . l'uliles Mid-Amariea Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. niepal It'll! ?'?i?tlr 'I'lereeaJt-Tie- FIJI. Errtleal ennui-s are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st pram-ile- e1' the speen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer attempte- ta' and Least undera?e' clan JJE sates pleas-e- ezuislrt 1H attained IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Peak Greuntzl - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event March EDDIE I -. ?u at -. . trig? gimme .- _l . .-- gait-same .r?ff . at; huge LL ??iif I iliE . wnmlete I - . . T315 - I i State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee [13} Ceuntv Min. PEA MEI-E. Elleuni Ill]? Calheun EH35 ELIE [literal-tee Delta": ELDEI Eiewah EITIEI Jaelteen EH35 Jeffereen EH32 ELEIE Limeetene EH33 ELEIE Madieen ELEM ELEIE Marshall EH35 Ill? Mergan EH33 Saint Clair Ill]? Tallatlega EH32 ELEIE Legend In} - I115 - I115 - I13 I13 - I145 I145 - ISLE: - Majer Cities - I - I naem Rivera LIE Heutee =Interetatee =Critieal I:euntiea 12.5 25 53 T5 lulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Eliaslal. ?'?i?tlr EDI. mute-e are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-5t at meeting the epeen'htl clan age mt. Fer eT'Canplt- 12' and Leaet Meclerat' clan aJe a'ates pleaae- EDWIN: 1H attaeletl melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT Feliee Statien Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: Event March gain an 1r 1. 313}; a. a - ,4 jeullm?i 211%? $5455.?? State ef?labama Critical Ceunties [13} Tetal a. At Least ef rule-:lerate Eernplete ?aunt-5r Faeilities Damage ?amage Elleunt 3' Ealheun Cher-:ltee 4 1 Delcalla ?l4 5 Etc-wan Jacks-an Je?ersen 45 Limestene 5 luladisen 16 Marshall El lulergan El Saint Clair Talladega Legend Peliee Statien [l amage At Least l'u'IJ-tlerrle Unlikelyr {31- Unlikely.r i} Merlerate {53' Higl?lyLiltely I ICertain Rivers LIE Heutes =lnterstates =Critieal I:eunties 12.5 25 5] T5 4L . l'uliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Eliarlal. nlepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Iertleal mute-e are ?ere ?at-experience tle gear-st er the epeen'le? clan age a?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- and Least Merl-era?e' clan aJe sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E31 Peliee Stetien Funetienelity - East Tennessee Seiemie Zene: M53 Event March 1 252.-1. I - -.- Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Male-Champs Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. State ef?lebeme Critical Ceuntiee [13} He. at Tetel Funetienel He. at Fecil'rtiee Feeilitiee Elleunt 2 Celheun 1 Cherekee 2 4 Dekelh 5 14 Eteweh 1 2 12 Jackeen 1 Jeffere en 45 #5 Lime etene 5 5 rm edieen 1 1 erehell El El ergen El 2 Saint Clair 12 12 TeHedege 2 Legend Peliee Stetien Funetienelityr [lay 1 I Met Funetienel Ir Functiuznel River-e LIE Heutee =Interetetee =Critieel I:euntiee 12.5 25 e: '25 JL l'u1lles IE5 are til? e1' the epeen'htl clan age s?e'e. Fer 35.1: F5135 11!? H'tt??ili'd F: IMPACT TEEMIHIZI E32 Part Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: Event Marchsede LMItrERgnlit State ef Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Tetal He. J'l'tt Least df Mederate Eemplete Edunty Faeili?E Damage Damage 4 Jeffersdn 1-4 LimEtdne 3 Madisdn 2 Marshall 16 Morgan 15 Elldunt Calhdun Chereltee Delta":- Etdwah SaintElair Talladega a I Legend . . . . . PertFaeIlItjlr Damage l' I Frill, I'Ublif'l?? i - 1' .l Llnlilrel'f - Maderate -- .HigHyLikely 1" . certain . . sally} Jasmin if?; JP Rivers LIE Hdutes =Interstates =Critieal I:dunties 12.5 25 ED T5 . Miles - - Errtleal mute-s are ?are ?atexpermee- the gear-st .: Earlhquak'?' CHI-I151 mammar- d1' the specified damage s?a'e. Fer -. tie-flirting attempte- ta' and Least MeJ-era'e' dam: age sates pleas-a- Dillillt 11-? attaeled PrgeetPniepal Ilues?t?t-r FDR IMPACT 'I'ieresaJt-Tie- sen. Prlieinal E33 Fetable Water Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Event March _1 W?s _r a. ml I eue~ LE e31: State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Tetal He. J'l'tt Least ef Mederate Demplete Deunty Faeili?E Damage Damage Elleunt 3 Delta?:- 1 1 Etc-wan 2 Jacltsen 2 Jeffersen 3 LimEtene 1 Marshall 2 Dalheun Dhereltee lulaelisen Morgan SaintDlair Talia-:lega Legend Petahle Water Facility amage At Least I'm-tierete HigH'f Unlikely Unlikely Maderate Ukelihaael HigHyLikel'f I Certain Petahle Water Distrilmtien Lines tle. Leaks - Rivers US Heutes =Interstates =Dritieal IDeunties 12.5 25 ED T5 luliles Mid-Amariea Earthquake Center . UI at gt. USP. r3. Eliaetal. ?'?i?tlr TtereeaJeTIe- EDI. azuu?ee are arse ?atexperlenee the greatest prenatally at reaetllg tte epeeh'len clan age e?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts eT'Caruple and Leaet Meclera?e' clan aJe e'ertee please ?e attested melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT E34 Frisens - East Tennessee Seismie Zane: M53 Event March "wig {?ees Esau-.1 15:? . I: - Elf-ii: . r" EEll _f 'h 1- 4 a I State efAIabarna Critical Ceunties [13} He. at Ceuntg Facilities Bleunt Calheun Ch erelrcee Delta?: Etewah Jasksen Jeffersen 24 Limestene Madison Marshall Mergan Saint Clair Talladega hmm?m? Legend I F'risens MMI aw ?Hrl MI WI ?Hi~rers Rattles =lnterstates =Critisa Caunties 12.5 25 53 T5 4L . luliles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Eliaslal. niepal It'll! ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Iertleal WINE-3 are ?sts ?at-experience gear-st at resell-g the speen'lstl clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- and Least clan as rates pleas-e- ezuislrt 1H attested melmeit'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E35 Bridge Funetienality - East Tennessee Seiemie Zane M53 Event March Wham :1 . If; aria .I HE IIA - ?n my arm State ef?labama Critical Ceuntiee [13} He. at Tatal Funetienal He. at Caunty Faeilitiee Faeilitiee 3 2 Calheun 3 3 Etewah 2 2 Jael-teen 3 3 Jeffereen 23 Limeetene 3 3 Saint Clair 3 3 Talladega Cherekee Delta?: Madieen Marshall Mergan Legend Bridge [lay-'1 I Met FLInztienal 1r Fundicnal ?Hi~rere Heutee =Interetatee =Critieal I:eLIntiee 12.5 2'5 53 l'ulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . UI at rIJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. PrdeetP ?'?i?tlr EIZII. Errtleal are ?ea: ?atexperhlee- the gear-at prdIatulrtr' at the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer tie-TIIrtIeIs attempte- and Leaet underat' clan aJe rates 1H attained F1 IMPACT Railway Bridge a Segment Damage - East Tennessee Seiemie Zene: M5.9 Eyent March LMDERHM *1 mean 1 . State efAIabama Critical Ceuntiee [13} Tetal Me. At Leaet ef Mederate Demplete Deunty Faeili?E Damage Damage Eileunt 2 Dalheun El Etewah 2 Jacket-n 3 Jeffereen 2E: LimEtene 3 SaintDlair 3 Talia-:lega Dherekee Dekaltu Media-an lularehall lulergan Legend Railway Eritlge Damage ?it Least milerae Higi'ly Unlikely Unlikely Maderate Ukelihaaei HigHy Likely Certain Railway Segment Damage At Least I'U'btl?l'i?le Higi?ly Unlikely Riyera US Reutee =Interetatee =Dritieal IDeuntiee 12.5 25 ED T5 4L l'ulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Critteal mute-e are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st at meeting the epeen'ktl clan age s?a?e. Fer attempte- ta' and Leaet Muderat' clan aJe rates phan- 1H attaeied F1 IMPACT Seheel Damage - Seheel Damage Seismie Zane: Event March State at Alabama Critical Ceuntiee [13} Tetal Me. At Leaet af lulauzlerate Eemplete Eauntgr Faeili?E Damage Elamage .- I Elleunt 18 El Tilt-g. . Calheun 45 a a . . Cherokee 2 a it .- . Delta?:- 1e :3 a - Etc-wan ea a Jadtsan Jeffersen 253 LimEtene EEI lulatlisen lularehall 36 Margan EIEI Saint I3 lair EEI Talladega SEE Legend Selma-l Damage ?it Least l'ubtlerde Unlikely.I Maderate Ultelihaael Higl?lyLiltelyI Certain Rivera LIE Heutee =lnteretatee =Critieal I:auntiea 12.5 25 5] T5 l'uliles IE5 ?at-experience Earlhquak'?' pramlre- at the epeen'htl tlanage s?a'e. Fer 55.1: atLanaIa-Clampagl. e'atee pleae-a- EDWIN: 11-? attaeletl rleelmne- Prgeetl'nlepal lluee'?t?tlr Fer: IMPACT 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. ESE Seheel - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M5.9 Event Marchaees State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} He. at Tetal Funeiienal Me. at ?aunt-5.- Faeilities Facilities Elleunt Calheun 45 45 Cherelree 5 Etewah 45 4E Jacksen Jeffersen 253 253 Limestene 25 25 lulatlisen Marshall SE SE Mergan 45 45 Saint Clair 29 Talladega SE SE {gallium-{51E .Legend I: lux- Selteel Funetienality ?ifMet Funstienal IL )1;th Ea r" mull-[tin .ill "in. Fundima .I ?Hiaers ??33 Heutes =lnterstates =Critieal Ceunties a 12.5 as s: as 4L Mid-America Earthquake Caner assassiss reassess: 13' Least antes pleas-a- eznlalrt 11-? attested Prqeetl'rllepal lluea?t?tlr IMPACT TEEMIHIZI E-IZII. Iluestigatur Total Debris - East Tennessee Seismio Zone: M59 Event Marel12D?S State of Alabama 2" Critical Counties [13} Elrlolt! Concrete! Total County Wood Steel Debris Ellount 2.24 I122 SEE Calhoun 2.2? 2.2?r 2.2-4 Cherokee 2.22 2.22 2.25 D2lt2 2 42.24 S524 2522 Eto'wah 12.21 25$ Jackson 12.22 2.22 12.22 Jefferson 2.22 2.24 2.2?r Limestone 2.12 2.21 2.12 Madison 1.42 2.1 1.52 Marshall 1.22 2.1?r 1.22 Morgan 2.22 2.22 2.2-4 Saint Clair 2.2 2.22 2.22 Talladega 2.12 2.21 2.1?r Legend Total t'l'l?rousantls of Tons]: - 5 5-12 - 2IZI - . - l. .- . Major Cities '3 .h . 22,222- 25,222 - - . . I 25221 :uuiln'etl I 125,221 assess Rivers LIS Routes =Interstates =Critioal Counties 12.5 25 5] 2'5 Miss Mid-America Earthquake tie-mar . 224.222.2212 2122221221.: 22*. s'atss pleas-a- 11-? attaoled Prdeotl'nlobal llues?t?br For: IMPACT posessuEHT EIZII. "?2512le Tetal Pepulatien (2000} - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event March State ef?labama Critical Ceunties [13} Ceunty Pepelatien Eileunt 51,224 Calheun 112,242 Cherekee 22,222 Dehalb 64,452 Etewah ?22,452 Jaeksen 52,225 Jeffersen 552,24? Limestene 55,525 Madisen 225,222 Marshall 22,221 Mergan 111,254 Saint Clair 54,242 TaHadega 2222i Legend Tetal Pepulatien 0-1.500 1,501 - area 3,001 - sum - mane - 14,?10 Majer Cities a slam 25.00:] In 25pm name I 125,001 assume Rivers LIE Entries =Interstates =Critieal I:eunties CI 12.5 25 53 T5 Miles 11; far;- Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Champs gt. USP. r3. niepal ?'?i?tlr FIJI. ennui-s are item: ?at-experience tie gear-st at meeting the speen'htl clan age s?er?e. Fer tie-Tinnitus attempte- ta' and Least MeJera?e' clan JJE sates pleas-e- 1H attested IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E41 Waste Water Faeility Damage - East Tennessee Seismie Zene: M53 Event Marsh EDDIE Uneelnn?t ??us 3. 113.5 1, 5 [73.41. t. jun- - .- I State at Alabama Critical Ceunties [13} Tetal Me. At Least of Moderate Demplete Danni-5r Faeiliti-E Damage Damage Elle unt 3 alheun herelt ee 3 1 eleall: 1 Etc-wan El Jadesen Jeffersen 2D Limestene 5 lulaslisen Marshall Man; an Saint Blair 8 Talia-:lega Legend Waste Water Facility?r Damage ?it Least l'uhtlenie HigHy Unlikely Llnlileel'f Maderate Uleelihaasl HigHyLileel'f ICertain Water Distrilnltien Lines He. Leaks - Risers LIE Heutes =Interstates =Dritieal IDeunties 12.5 25 ED T5 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE Flu-Flt? EDI. ezuu?es are ?sse ?atetperlenee tie gear-st prenatally at the specified clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts et'Cemple and Least Meclera?e' elem aJe s'ertes please ?e attested melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT E42 Airport Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDGE . er :1?er ELM 33" name? 35;" {seiner .. .. . mHHeeH eL-eeueHE I . 5.3. - . 434'- . I - E. -. .-I eemwt? 6- it. . . rage??lialGARLAND ?1l . it . 4-Pine?ltgay. 52' El-ll - ll Ell-l meek DUAEHITP. 'euLH UH I. 6* I . HILLER .-.- I 54':qu State efArltaneae Critical Ceuntiee [34} :11 Lee IT Tetel rec-1' Med-area Camp-Irate Cit-mt; Eamage Damage Mental Safer Eta"; -::Iel:uurne Cleveland Crelghead caterer-n Cruz-u Dalila Faulkner Fultun IBrant Greene hdependenee leer-2 Jaeluen Je?arien Lawrence Lee Llneeln Lendha Mululppl h'luzunree F'elniett Frelrle Pulaihl Fandelph ?alnt Fran-HI 5min:- ?tene 'u'an Euren Legend Aim-art Facilityr Damage At Lee at Hedem?e Haw-unear- e- LII lite Mede- a'e E- theh I- ma 3 Ire retit- High-me Lt: Belt-e em 5 CIIZIIZIIZICIILJCICICI-F-EICI 1a a: a: Jili? l'u1ilee l" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-fell.- Ell: Mala-Champs! gt. USP. r3. lluli' Flu-Flt? E-IZII. Cline?3 calm-e are acute ?atewcpermee- the gear-at e1' the epeen'led clan age me. Fer tie-Turners attempte- b' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan eatee pieae-e- eelelrt 1H attaeied Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI E43 FUHGtiDnality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April 1 "Te" State Critical Ccuntiea [34} Had Tcta Furc?cnal l-lcu.cf Ecurty Facilities Facilities Arkansas Barter Clay [let-me Crag-read Crittenclen Ercaa Deal-Ia FaIJIc'ner Fultcn Elart Ereere hclepenclence laa?cl Jaclaacun Je?eraan Lawrence Lee Hissiaaippi hicrrce F'l'illipa F'cinaett F'Iairie PUaaki Hal-dalch Sairt Flancia Sharp Stare 'I.I?anELIren Legend Aimm Facility Functicnaliljlr Eajr I i-lctFIIc?cIal In: ram Hgiwa-r?c uc cum =Crr?11lccutt-c an?; 1c 2c ca 454a l'u1ile5 l" Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Ciampa gt. USP. r3. Ell?iial. nlcpal Ilue c?gatur FIJI. Critical calm-c are ?cce ?at-experience- tle gear-ct prcizuatulrtr' c1' the cpecn'leu clan age c?a?e. and Luz-act Mcdera?e' can aJe c'ertec pieac-e- 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E44 Werst Case Casualties (2AM) - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event April sees State ef Arkansas Critical Ceunties {34mum EEHTUH .mun-art. Teul He. c-1' Elli 73.; Eff. - If: Eat-Er? Feta-tier. Camila-H- 2 - Springdale El? ELI at was 7 .- rail. jI' SHIIL HP - - 53, . EHEEHE Eng." :1 - . IEP. RD 1 .. el-I-t-urn-I- I I Faydter?'nel? DH . I Blew-land I - . . mlallead apes Lee 32 .E-ll . - EIEHEE man He as HIST - team 2 2 . . -. J'i- I Faulkner I I: I I. -- Fulten FIGURE '31? - - -ELEEUHHE sum-na- E-H- 3e ere . . Indep ell-1e 3 . l:l:lr-:I PEPE . can 335 3s+ 3 . IZEI Jun-LtdWEI: Lent-ice 2 +3 - Mndt-dppl 2.7es le2 2.5-Elill Elli: Hert? - . Pelnt-etlPram-I- I Is an HLII HEI s- I: as Fan-jelpll as I. Hat 2 +23 sum- 3 at-ne IZI IZI El AFIEHP. HP. 3 - Em? [33? ass 23 HI 1 II-drufl' Isl .135.- - . 3:6. . .. ELFLHEI HJFIHEDLH - Legend 1ll'lliIzIrst Case Casua?ies Elli-Jul 5 - - -25 - - - - l'u'tuer CHI-ES . . LE Flares -. I LP. .3 . Bum Filer-.5 10 ED 4] ?545. Miles 1? - - siltmleeulje-s. are ?ea: ?atEtperlHee- (Jest-st MId-?m?n?? reselling tlI.I [lawye- stlt. Fer and Least Mecleras' clan age LII at Lanala-Ciampatll. st-ltIe-s pie-ase- eleslrt 1H attested deelmIe- Pm r3. Eliasial. PrdeetP Michal sugar-r FIZ- F: IMPACT FEEDSMEHT 'l'lerEEIaJIa-Tt- sen. Prllelnal lluestlga?er E45 Ccmmunicaticn Facility.F Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event April EDDIE . . . I ?l _u . - 512% EFJ EELHEH I-- -- y; . 3.1. - CE can an 33?. - . . I gumEIUHE .ELEEILIHHE I 8 +131 . ?3 - .3.- I rid . 3332.93. emrIT PHILLIP 33?! . . .. .3. 3a- tIIcIrrchIEe.? -, . "gamma 3 - - "33 i I LIL-lulState cfArltaneae Critical Ccuntiee {34} chal Ilc. At Laa-It ct Hccarata IIaunt'; Eamaga Damage arhanIaII a .3. .3. EIa='er 1: Eta"; 3 3 -I:al:uuma 4 .3. .3. GralgIa an IE I3 I3 '3 {Ian I I. I. Faulhnar 3 Fultun 2 I3rant '3 Graana I I. a ncapandanaa 1-3 .3. .3. Izar-zl 2 ?than 2 Jana man :3 .3. .3. Lawranaa 3 Laa 2 Llnacln I Lanai-a I3 II-II Ilppl I: I: 3 I'?cnrca 2 7 .3. .3. 3 3 F'ralrla a Ihl 5.: .3. .3. Ranaclph I 3alnt I I alIarp 3 etcna 3 Swan 3 I I I .3. .3. Legend Facility.r Damage at Laa It mad-Irat- LII Ilea- I..- Hg I I. Han.- unmar- =crrteaI-g5.- l'ulilee l? Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Una-ram at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? EDI. era ?ea: ?at-atparialca tla gear-at cI' tla apach'latl clan age ant. Ia' and {at LII-eat Mcclara?e' clan aJa acme-a calalrt ?a attache-:1 FIZ- F1 MFA-ET PE TE F5 LEG E45 Dams - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April sees State ef Arkansas Ceuntles [34} Heat lieu-11y Facilities Arkansas 7"1 Elarter ?ay ?atume 14 [Taighead 2? Erittenden 1 [Tess 15 Elesha . FaIJkner BE FLtt-zn 24 Erart E: Greene 12 hdependenee 11 Izard Jaeksen 2 Jefferson Lawrenee 17" Lee Line-:uln 1EI Len-eke 23 Mississippi Mel-res 5 Pl'illips 3 F'einsett 2? Prairie 19 F'IJaski SQ Handelph El] Saint Flaneis El Sharp 24 Stene 5 'I.I?an ELIren El 'I.I'I.Ih'rte 1 Legend Dams Critieal Ceunties Interstate Highways - LIs Heat-E . [If i Rmers 11.. 10 EU 4-5? Miles Mid-America Earthquake Canter masseuse: teenagers: =21; -. mum-s eT'Cemple 12' and dam age- veers-mulling at LlrIJ-EII-EI-Ctal'npayl. USP. sates please mum 119 mud mummie- r3. Ellaital. Michal Ilue sugar-r IMPACT TiereeaJ-a-Tle sen. Prllelnal Ilueatmbr Displaced Pepulatien - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event April . .. II . a! :a-aaHIrI -. 'Fayetlemlle a - - 'Featr EFI Hera . .. I i- - a. iPineEllijiuj- 3 . -. I LINEDLH: ..- State Critical Ceuntiea [34} Eltll'll ate at mntlu FiaIIda naaI Peptlaier: arI-IanIaI Tl- IE2 Eaa?er Clay- .2i35 Eta-Mane in?ll] Crittandan IT 2.343 5.334- Faulkner Fultun Grant Graana 2.523 ndapandanaa I Iaard J?'li? Jame-nan 2 E- Lawranaa I. I63 Lee I. 3.355 Llnaeln I: Lenelia 5E ?an? 1'33 Lean I5: I F'elmalt 1.1'95 lama Fralrla I39 55 aal Lana $a ntFran? II LES anarp a a ?rm 2. 51 5.715 9-34- 2.3l3 Legend [lieplaeed Papulatien aal - Lena - - - - I'II'hjt-r Cilia Pepda?en In anal: Le Hm? I BSJIIEI - ra'a'e HIgiwa-ra I Ideal-vane: =ermaaIeDI um 7am I - lemma am: a 0103] 5D hi ?Jr. l'ulilea Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clampa gt. USP. F111 Ell?iial. lull! FIJI. Critteal are data ?atatparialee- tla gear-at [Irdzuatulrtr' eI' tia apeen'latl dam age a?a?e. Fer de-TIHtIeIa attempte- ta' and MadaIat' dam aJa a'artaa ealalrt 1H attaeiad IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E48 Electric Fewer FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Mil? Event April EUUE . 3.5. eerie- PHW .. I '3ij -M'Iwg if State cfArltaneae Critical Ccuntiee [34} H1 ?t Lee It Putz-aerate Ecun?q Eemege Enmege Mantel Ee:ter Clay Clean-rue I'J'elgheed IZrIttenden Eenhe Feulhner Futcn Grant Greere Itdependenee leer-2 Jeehlcn Je?ertcn Lewrenee Lee Lenche Mululppi F'clnlett Prelrle Fan-:Iclph ?alnt ?lter;- eta'ne Euren Legend Electric Fewer Facilityr el'nage At Lee-t Mcdere?e Ham unwr- Mece late Llelr' I Haw Elec1I cTra em rem Lllee =CrrtImI-3cl Itt-e lit- re1a'e LEI E: 1e 2e a: l'elilee l? Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaaltampa gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le cutie?3 czuu?ee are ?atetperlence tie Qua-abet c1' the epecn'led clan age eti?e. and Leaet Mcclera?e' clan aJe e'atee pleaee celelrt ?e attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI EmergeneyI CIperetien Center Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zene: MIT Event April EUUE . . 333' LP CLJW 13" - nl i'u . ,i 33;: . HADISEIH Pine Burr - El"? . Fir.- - UHF-EHITPDREW -- ee' b?in?x? .. - . _iej. 4* I State Critical Ceuntiee [34} htLaaIt EHMHQEI Faulkner I Ja?anen 2 Pula I :3 Manny Emu-r c. I: CruzGreene El El El El El El Lawrence: I: Lee Menrea Randolph ealnt I: elIarp etena 'mlte Legend Cpere?en Centers At LII-ant Heal-arse Damage Hi mm Ie'e II HIE-E lit- LE Hem Fille- E: i l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhqueke Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me an.I ?ee: ?at-experience the gear-at resell-g the speen'lm clan age 5111?. Per .=nr.l clan JJII ?nes mane-I- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EOE: Funetienalityr at DayF 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zane: 111111?r Event April EDGE mas - i . BEHTDH ?at: c: 'H?elc.? I =l'l1' . aesHIH - unclean '15? Hem-Teri 13- {eat ecw? I. .. .. - -- BUHE HSDH - . - He .. "a PE I Pine?l' I 53?? . smile; LN: 1. eweex . . 2 are emu-II LIH 251?3}. caecHna 173' I 54':qu State efArltansae Critical Ceuntiee [34} He. cf Tctal Funeticna He. cf Eeu1y Facili? es Facilities Arkan?s Elarter ?ay EletLrne Eleuela'nd Etaigheazl Critter-den 1 [Tess Elesha Faulkner 1 1 Fulten Giant Greene hdelzendence lzard Jackson Je?erscun 1 1 Lawrence Lee Luz-nice Henrce Pl'illips F'ci nselt Plairie 1 1 Handalph Said Fra'ncis Sharp Stare 'I.I'an ELren 'I.I'I.h'rte Legend ?peratien Celtere FLInc1enallt,? at day I .- retn Icthlal Fllett-Ial Itt-c In: HIngaT?e U: 1a a: a: Miles 1" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII DIE-fell.- at Mala-Champs! Lu. USP. r3. lluli' Flu-Flt? 'I'IereeaJ-a-Tt- E-IZII. are acute ?at-atpermee- the gear-ct prdnatulrtr' e1' the specn'led clan age 5111?. Far tea-rum eT'CempIe and Least Mc-clera?e' clan aJe c'ertec pleas-e- 1H attached Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI E51 Ferryr Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event April EUUE eel I re_. ewe naeeHne . eeLIklele - Lll?-l .- II I Ell?Elf I I.: I. FanneLPH '1 CLAY eel EHEEHEHM ?Til?I . I _m I I _eeaenee 1:3 lee 6 - Fine Bli?. . - _ee' ,_uHeeLH El Emnm eEelm TH- State efArltaneae Critical Ceuntiee [34} Cat-mt;- HZI. 1:1 Leelt Eemege Cemelete Damage ?rl-Ienlel Emir Gle'; I::lel:uume Crelglleed IZTltIenden Caz-u E?ll'? Faulkner Fultun Grant Greene ndepende nee IEard Jeehuen Je?erlen Le'e'renee Lee Llneeln Lend-Ie rm .ln Ilppl l'?enree F'elnlett F'I'Elrle Ihl Eendelpll ?elnt Freneli ?ller;- $tene Euren Legend UI ?Ell-1.: the if HhJi Ir" Llae Ll: re Ferry Faeilitjlr [Il antage At Lee IT l'llederete rat- LIE lr ll?lIIE' lg 0103] {El l'elilee 'el "if. Cline?3 candle-e are ?atetperlenee tle Qua-abet e1' the epeen'led clan age etl?e. Fer eT'Cemple and Leaet Meclerat' clan aJe e'atee pleaee eelelrt lie atteeled melmelt'GUlDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII Ell: rlJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. lluli' ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. E52 Fire Station Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event April EDGE IHE ?lm-1iatState ef?rkaneaa Critical Ceuntiee {34} at Lee It Teal He. at biz-aerate Camdete Damage Damage .Iu-I-ama. IS a c. E?=hr :5 a Cia',? I I II a I9 Ir. Chan-dead In a a Cralghead Cdtlanden 9 Gran I. Eenha a a Faulhner :a a c. Fumn IS a a Grant I I a a Greene I II a Izard I: a a ?than I: I: a Juana-nun :3 a Lawrence 7 .3. Lee E- E- a Llneeln I I a a Lent-he :3 .3. .3. .Ippl I9 IEI Ia Menrae I a I: I F'elnlett a F?relrle a a Fulani-l aa a a Randelpl?. I I a Mint French a a a sharp a a 51am 2: a a lien Eur-an a a "mite in a 'Mnde 5 E. Legend Fire Sta?en [Ian'age at Lee .t Medere'e Ham-unear- Mecle Iat- .- =I3rr?eaI-3e1 HIE-3 Ire Lt: Halt-5 era-e EU ?45? l'u1ile5 1'i? Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-raft,- at rLIaIa-Ciarnpa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?'?il?tlr -:Htle3le:-u1ie-a are ?ea: ?at-.ncpermee- the gear-at at the apeen'led clan age me. Fer mum-m and LIB-eat Maclera?e' clan age was phaae- exam 1H attained thetrnelt?GUIDE F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI E53 Fire Statien Functionality at Dayr 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zone 1113.? Event April 301313 'i 1-. 1! Ill ?Ema? 1111:3111 2416.1 11 State efArltaneaa Critical Ceuntiee134} He. ct Tctal FLne? enal He. cf County Faeil'rtiee Faeilitiee Ari-canaas 13 13 Etarter 11] Etaighead 34 Erittenden El Chase Deana FaIJitner 3:3 1:3 FLiten 13 13 Erart 11 11 Ereere El 11 hdependenee 13 1g Izard 13 13 Jaekaen 12 Je?ereen 33 33 Lawrence 14 Lee [1 E1 Line-:uln 11 11 13 33 Hiesissippi 13 Hal-me Ei F'i'illipS E1 12 Peineett El El Prairie 12 14 F'IJaski 53 E13 Randalph 11 Saint Flaneis El 3 Sharp Stone 33 33 'I.I'an ELIren 3-4 24 White 23 4D 3 Legend Fire Statien 1 I t-letFl manual 1- Fllettllal =errtealem um Ire eat- where; LE Fille- 3] ?13 d! Miles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Canter at Malaeltampa gt. USP. Eil-Fl3i?i. iil?lilai 3133.312? 113133-51 are ?eece ?at-atpermee- tie gear-at 11rdnenltl1' e1' the ape-amen clan age me. Fer ten-rum attempte- b' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan age $151313 phan- 1H attaeietl tnellnelt?GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDEMEHT E54 Hazardcus Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismic che: Event April secs State cf Arkansas Critical Ccunties (34} I . . . Ccunty He. cf Facilities Arkansas Barter 1E I Clay 4 . - - .-: Clebume . .: - - . Cleveland 'mesHIH . .. - ?nial-read 21 I - i Crittenden 43 Cress 12 Elesha El] Faulkner 34 FIJtcn Grant Greene 21 Independence 56 lard 3 Jacks-an Je?erscn Lawrerce 2 Lee Lent-He 4 Hississippi Ei? an am He Phillip-S '34 I Pcinsett 1 I I Prairie 2 I I Pulaski 109 -TI 3P3 El I - ,i Saint Flancis Sharp Stcne 'I.I'an ELIren 2 1Q Wc-adnJl'i 4 Legend LGTLE .- Hazardcus Materials Facilities Mill "?75 DREW . Critical Ccunties - . - aft I. . risen - H'ghwm 1m Hchtes I 'u'm Eleni} Fit-ere CHI. {fl-IV. FAYETTE II 10 ED 4] Miles Tl" - - candles are acce ?atetperlence tie gear-st ct the epech'led danage rate. due-Turtle? and Leaet Medera'e' can age at 53333344?" i143 Til?? .mrsThereeaJeTe sci. liueetiga?cr E55 Hight?rayF Bridge Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemic che: N132?r Event April EDDIE - t" 15.? I EH-TEIH I 51; 3., I ?tilt3-.-- niteu NE q. ?ll'i Lf?eE - 'I-Ilw State cfArltaneae Critical Ccuntiee {34} He. at Tctal Functional He. cf Canty Facilities Facilities Arkansas 31 31 Halter 24 24 Clay Elebun'e 31 31 Cleveland 31 31 Eraighead =13 13=1 Drilterden 31 14? [Tees =13 33 Elesha Fat-:11 55 55 Grad T"=l Greene =13 T3 hdependence 133 133 laard I33 I33 Jacks-2n 3:3 7'1 Je?erecn 33 33 Lawrence 55 33 Lee 33 =13 11? 11?" Mieeissippi 14? Herrce 7?3 7?3 Pl'illipe =11 =13 Pcinsett 35 Prairie 34 PLlaslti 333 333 Randalph I33 3? Saint Flancie 54 11'] Sharp 33 33 Stone =13 =13 'I.I'an ELIren =13 =13 White 133 131 33 51 Legend Hi?l'l'll'l?y'" Bridge Ea'; I II- Il- Ire r51ate- LE Belt-5 :5 nth-5 13 23 it] ?45? l'ulilee Mid-?marica Earthquake Center - LII L'E-rettl- at pat". LISA r3. Ell-33h?. ??i?tlr E-IZII. an.= ?ea? ?at-emulate? th.= deal-5t c1' tin.= 5 :ecn15tl clan age 5111?. Far ten-rum. attempte- 3' and Luz-eat Mcclera?e' clan age 5W5 chau- 11-? attached F1 HighwayF Bridge 3: Segment Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Mil? Event April EDDIE i .. i 1L3. eff-J '2 .33, . see I: metre '1 ?rs-2-4 1-1- I I LIN. ,JeHHsew he .. 1- . FI- I- ?if sesLeHe I I eg' sheerre i' Lit-its . . . - e- .- -. Isms . . - - see?e. ?es? a, . . Is", -- I I: i i -Tf II- I'll: . State ef Arkansas Critical Ceunties {34} Tetel Me At Lee It L's-replete Gaunt: Elemege Eemege ?rl'anlal E-l EB =ter El as, re :s I 3 Cleveland I'J'ngl'le ed lilIlia 31' Feulhner 55 Grant Gleene 3 rise I33 Izer-zl Jeehusn 7 3.3 a Lewrenee es I3 Lee 43 II I Mululppl HT liPrairie '34- EI F'uIe-hl 33 61' 4- $3ll'lt Fransli I33 I35 3 enerp es 413 Ewen 1.3 Wilt IEI I: 5 Legend Bridge [Ian'age .i?t Lee It Medere'e Ll: Belt-s 1- Ilterete'e ngi'e'srye UI Ilee IIrrtIsaI-I?sn?ee reme as 0 Ute-If 1- Highway Segment [Ian'age it Lee It Medere'e thil-r UI lite- I.- fit-tie- 10 ii] ?l5? l'eliles (.5 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII L'ersrt; at LImaIa-Ciam page. LIEJI. r3. Ellasial. PrdestP Ilue sugar-r 'I'iereeaJe-Tle eel. Investigate esu?ee are ?ees ?atetperienee tie gee-sleet at resell-g tie speeh'leel elem age en?s. Fel tie-Thrusts and Least Meclerate' clan age e'ertes please ?e attested Heepital Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Mil? Event April EUUE I. ml. _Wl 3.: ?at: - ELM IEP. RD e?i'ilGARLAND LEIHEIHE . a "gamma . . Flue Blt?. . .- Iff 'I-r .. . 4* Fill :1 1. HIUEK _re . HILLER naneHnn 173' I FanTTEgie ea le: em State efArltaneae Critical Ceuntiee [34} Gnu-It; Tetal Me. At Lealt CIT mar-rate 0:111 plate Damage Damage Al'l'lal'll?l Emir Clay CIEI Willa CTalgl'Iead L'Tl'l'la erant lard HI Ilppl F'I'alrle Ihl anndelpli ?alnt Sharp Legend Heepital Damage At Lea it hit-dentin ngii,? {5 Metie- a'e LEE-?lean the I- thih'thet =I1rr?eal-3eutlae U3 E- 1a a: a: 45.45:- l'u1ilee l" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaaltampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-emanate? the gear-at prdnatulrtr' at the speen'led clan age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan JJE mites 1H attained F1 MPACT FE EHT TE LEG ESE Hospital Functionality at theyr 1 - New Madrid Seiemio Zone: Event April EDDIE I. 1&1. . . an fir?'5'? - oLiw h'l? .- S2 . 512'. Sun'- Hem-Tori HIST . -- I "ii" 3' -- - - PHILLIPS . .495- . - - _Ie_a Plne?lt? 'I-r . . . aeolian -.. Fill . 3r? RISER . HILLEH: ?if o?aoHnn I State ofArltaneae Critical Counties [34} No. of Total FLnolJ' onal EoLnty Faeil'rtiee Facilities Arkaneae El 2 EIaIter Slay Elelaun'e Cleveland Craighead IITilten-zlen Eat-55 Eleeha FLtton Erart Greene hdeoendenoe laard Jaoltson Jefferson Lawrenoe Lee Linooln Lonolte Moi-roe Phillips Poinsett Prairie PLiaelti Randolph Saint Flanois Sharp Stone 'I.I'an ELIren Legend Hoeuital or; I I HotFl Iomlal Il- Fnotoial lita- renta- Hgiwa? Lt: =Crr?eaI-2ol Fille- E- 1a a: e3 Jili? l'ulilee l? Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Ell: Mala-Champs! gt. USP. r3. ll'Jli' Sim-Flt? EDI. are dose ?at-atpermoe- tie gear-at o1' the epeon'led clan age 5111?. For ten-rum oT'CompIt- and Leaet Moclera?e' clan t-EItt-e phan- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI EES Liquefacticn Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic che: Event April EDDIE .SEHTDH FU farm; 13" ii' 136' I'l- 5 Fayetteuille unclean . - ?Emu? ecw? SURE . Wet Memphis GARLAND AHHAHHS - _Ie_a Pine Hlt?_ 526' ELAHEI . jar}. . - ifm State cfArltansas Critical Ccunties {34} Miriern Marin-nun DaLrty Susceptibility SLsceFtibil'rty Arkansas thuncLLIn Elarter th-ncLLIn Clay Lew "tee-5r th Eleerne che Cleveland [Taighead Lew ice-5r th Erittenden 'ubry th "tee-5r th "ea-5r th Elesha th-ncLLIn Faulkner Fuitcn che Slant Greene Lew ice-5r th hdependerce che Hene laard che Jacks-an che "ea-5r th Jefferscn th-ncLLIn Lawrence l-bne "ea-5r th LEE leis-5r th th-nctun "tee-5r th Hississippi 'ubry th Mia-5r th Hene F'l'illips "ea-5r th F'ci nsel't 'ubry th "ea-5r th F'Iairie che F'IJaslci th-nctun l-bne "tee-5r th Sairt Flancis Mia-5r th Sharp che Hene Stcne Hene ELren th-ncLLIn 'I.I'I.hite "ea-5r th ice-5r th Legend Utnlefactien Hem rT- lu'bjer Cities F?cpda?cn In em :e.u:cu:u- were I me: I 45cc: i TSJII - U3 EDIE-5 E'i?'tIi' Elma?a lent me. ii] l'uliles Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII Denali.- at rbalaallampa Lu. USP. r3. EiI-F?i?i. il'Jli' Sim-Flt? 'I'leresaJ-a-Tle- curb?3 candles are ?eece ?at-atperblce- tie gear-st c1' resell-g the specn'led clan age me. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- b' and Least Mcclera?e' clan age was pleas-e- 1H attached F-I- F1 PE El'-lT TE F5 Medi?ed Merealli IntensityF - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April 2??3 l? I?m?sh 3 ray-anemia lanesen .3 I .J IaeHTeemeer Jill-Lu FAYETTE State efArkansas Critical Ceunties (34} EeLrty Arkan?s 'ul EIaIter 'ul Clay E1el1rne "u'1 -: "u'1 [Taighead Erittenden [It [Tess [I-i Desi-Ia 'ul Faulkner 'ul Fuiten Giant 'ul Greene hdependence "all laard 'ul Jackson "all Jefferson Lawrence tell Lee 'ul Len:+:e 'ui Hississippi HII Hennae "all Pl'illips F'ci nselt HI F'Iairie tell F'IJasIci 'ul Handelch Saint Francis Sharp 'ul Stene M1 'I.I'an ELren 'ul 'I.I'I.hite "all Weed-LE 'e1l Legend lubri?etl l'u'lercalli lrtel'rslitjlr Major Cities =5 F'epulatien in I I repel 45ml: WI Team-1am): LE: Hertz-c Hate Highways HI =3rtcalcelr11e1 Flu-m EU has: Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Lu. USP. r3. Ell?iial. nrcpal llLlI! cigar-r FIJI. Critical ceu?ec are ?ere ?at experience the great-ct e1' reaellrg the cpeeh'led danage me. Fer due-Turner: arcl clan my; fate: pleas-e- ?e attached IMPACT FEESSMEHT Natural Gas Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event April lifts; 'I__Ill it'll gr". I. r' I 1 ee Ind: HID State cfArkansas Critical Ccunties [34} 'lt-tal tic. At Lee It at I'llcdere?e Cmplete Count; Damage Eamage .Iil'l'l?l'l Ea :ter I: a Clay 2 ?'elglieed -:r tten::len .3. .3 .3 Gen EB I: Faulhner I: FLItcn a Grant I: Greene .3 .3 .3 me pence nee Iaard Jeeh ten 2 .3 .3 Je?ericn I I LEIEI .3 un: I I a mnree El I: 1 F'clmett F'ralrle I: I a ealrrt French I: Sharp El El ?tcne El a 'e'an ELIren I I: see-curt :1 Legend llattral Gas ?l'l'lilg-E'. At Lee It Hcdere?e LII lite I. Ia'e thel. .- Han. Lite-1f Ite Ire re1a'e Higlwa? U3 ELIE In a] an a] 4-5? h?Hes ail" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Ileana-Clamps gt. USP. r3. nicpal Ilue FIJI. candles are Itece ?atetperlence tie gear-st prebatulrt.? c1' the epech'led danage e?a?e. cT'Can-Ie and Leaet Medera?e' can aJe e'atee: please EDWIN: ?e attached IMPACT Dil Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event April ??irlxec HE - 444444;:ch 1i?ll-cfPH 44.413 3&7? \dlaelieeleelrr I . J- H4 ?1-1 43444 HLPIr"- :3 '4 1an diff-erg; State cfArkaneae Critical Ccuntiee (34} 'ltlt?l HIZI. A1: Laalt at Madame Flat Ccunt'r Eamaga Darn age .?rhanlal Clay Cleturne Cle Helena 424-4445414444: Cl'lt'hnden Caz-u Ela- the FauIHn-a-r FLItcn Grant Greene nee-pandemi- lair-2 Ja Juan marten Lawrence Liana- tin ilppl Herrera- Pclmelt F'I'all'le ?alnt H'ancll ?ner;- 5124:1143 Ema-n "ii-hit Legend ?il Facilitjlr Damage at Lee It Media-rah Ilue- MIZIIJE Elt- LEE-lilac: ell-pane: crrucalc-z-n me I U3 14:: 2c a: 4'5- l'ulilee Tl" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. nicpal ?'?i?tlr FIJI. PTIIGIJEII Caz-twee are acre ?at-experience- tle gear-ct prdzusltulrtr' c1' the epecn'led damage mt. mum-s aJe rates phase-e- czulnrt 1H attached IMPACT E53 Peak Greund - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event 1451512115115 State lI3r1t1125I Ceuntlee [34} -. . - 13-11-1131 PEP. 1115.5. 2514 BEHTEIH 1' 53551111145 144151-555 I115 I115 -I ?2 111141111114 - Barter 11.115 11.15 5153.1 I125 I144 5.115 _5 Clebume I115 11.15 .. r' 5112.1 . Cleveland -. Fayetlewlle . 515191-555 11.44 1125 I HHDISDH 551151451514 I124 I154 I 5 . 12555 I124 1155 I i' '3 .- 1155145. 11.115 11.15 -.-- - -I 5'31? .. -.., .. . .- 11.115 I115 .. If .- . I115 I115 -- - - - -- Erart 11.115 11.15 .. .. - I- Greene I134 244 1? In!? hdependenee I115 025 155551 11.15 11.15 Jeekeen 1125 1:125 Jefferson I115 I115 Lawrence I125 D25 WEI Memphis Lee I125 1125 LII-55114 11.15 11.15 LEI-.5115 I115 11.15 1115515515151 I154 122 I I'I'lerrce I125 D25 1 1' Phillipe I115 1125 I '35 14511-5521 I124 1.14 Prairie I115 D25 111.115.5111 11.115 11.15 1451-5151514 I125 1125 Seirt aneie I125 Sharp 11.15 11.15 5151-5 I115 11.15 'I-I?an EILren 111215 1115 444-115 I115 1125 . . 4- 11115-5de 11.25 1125 . 1--s 1 I Legend I - - P13141511 LED-LP 1" -1125 5.5 .15.. 525-115 I :15 -I115 21.1 _Jg?lem I115- 111 1.15. jer 1211155 HILLEH - 23.11:: PcpuletieninEEI?? I I 511-1. . Emu-2min! Itl15 25251-411255 55 L55: 5114 I a: I 44541-151414 .-.-.. . FIN-111. . 1e 2e 41 e: 1511155 Mid-?m?ri?? Earlh?uak? Cani?r 55554155535221.3113 55.12 USP. gates Image- can?: 111;- ?tt??lelj mcumelt'GUIDE r3. Ella?al. PrdeetP Illa-1- F: IMPACT TEEMIHEI LIZ-GT3 EIZII. I554 Peliee Station Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event April acme State ef?lrltaneae Critical Ceuntiee {34} Teal rle. AtLeent at Liz-aerate Gama-ate Gaunt? Damage Eamage Manual :3 Elam-r l?I. FU 334 I . Eli?- HTEH canit-algllea-mean-Jan Cruz-u Era-ma le Faulkner le Fult-n Grant Izar-zl Mill" LEIEI . -- it . . .73 . F?elmet - 1.1! Eli'- IE {seiner l" EUHE iPEem? .. GP. HLP. HEI ll. Il'l - - Ftandelph ?alnt Fla Hell AHHP. ?In. 3 .1 .: It} I. ?l'l?l'FI - i stone 5 L. Etren . . - 1 Legend 36' ,Llrlee Felice Stalien [Ian?age At Lee at lac-derail Haw-untur- e- litt- Metle- at .- thih' me 5. Lt: Belt-e Ftlue Fralrle - m?wrn-Jme-EU-p-de-e- Ffi "l-ifEl'iP'S HIUEHX 1- 173' I 54':qu a 1D 21:: a: .3545? l'u1ilee l? ?ea: Earlhquak'?' llralmlre at the epeell'lelil damage 5141?. Far PI EIIU 55.1: LII Una-rem at LanaIa-Ciampagl. USP. FEE-5 pie-agra- can?: 119 am?ied mummie- PrqeetP nlellal ellgat-r FC- F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI EDI. "?951:me EES Feliee Statien Funetienality at [layF 1 - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Mil? Event April EDGE - . 3E6 Mm? . ti.- HTEH melee Hem-Teri HUN jeEA ear I if SURE Pine?lt? ..: SEUIEH . 3.Il- State eferkaneae Critical Ceuntiee {34} He. cf Tctal FLreticnal Hedi lieu-liq Faeilitiee Facilities Adda-lea: Barter Clay Elel1rne Cleveland Eraigl'ead Eriltenden Cress Desi-Ia Faull-u'er FLtten Giant Greene hdependenee laard Jaekeen Je?ereen Lawrenee Lee Lineeln Mieeissippi Herr-3e Pl'illipe Peinsett Prairie Hendelph Saint Franeie Sharp Stene 'I.I'an ELIren 'I.I'I.hite Legend Felice Stmien I I HetFl lemlal Il- Fllettllal Ire rem- Lie Betta-3 =Crrti11ICel I5 mewwnu?enweumenw cl:- 1e ea a: a l'ulilee Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII Iuerertf at Mala-Champs! gt. USP. r3. Ell-E?i?l. ll'Jli' ?lm-Flt? element-1m are ?ese ?atetpermee- tie gear-at e1' the epeen'led clan age me. Fer eT'CdTuple and Leaet Meclera?e' clan age et-rtee ealelrt 1H attaeied thettnelt?GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Mil? Event April zcce State cfArllaneae Critical Ccuntiee (34} . He. Lee It ct Illederete Demple'e .- Crcunt'; Eemege Damage .drllenlel i :1 Bauer Claij' r:1el:-urne Cle-lele n-:l Eran Denna Fult-n Grant Greene ndependenee Iaard Jere Lewrenee Lee Llnecln Prairie Rendelpll ?elnt Frenell Ellen: 5133M 'e'e l'l Eluren Legend Part Facilityr Damage .et Lee at Hcdere?e nglh'UIlltel-r' c- ee thellictd i Llr.el.r .- thll-r' the1r' Err?caIEcl 1: rem! Hume-re Blue :5 eff?LED HE Tea" - Heelcll 1" se' 1 I-Jhlit?? I I. FATETTEii'lj-llh 4"]ch ale a: a: 4-5? l'elilee Tl" Critical (EC-ITET CHI-IIEI cl' the epecll'leEIJ damage e?lt. Fer E. 55.1: [312' LII at LanaIa-Clampagl. USP. $5121! Image mum tie Mien: mclme PrdectP nlcpal IIUE IMPACT FIJI. PTIIGIJEII Fetable 1it'llater Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event April EDGE '5 .412:- -. Berna? 1% me I. --.-- .- . . IEP. en 3% He t'eEA Her SURE . GP. AHHAHAS - Pine mm: ?1'35 . a wee .. I .5. Emma ?tmeemHILLEH - all . 543m State efArltaneae Critical Ceuntiee [34} Mal At lea trl: 1' Mn:- dera'b Deni plat-e- D-z-unt; Fat-"Hal: Damage [am we El Ii-rl-cantat. Halter Eta; Etna-burnt- I:=le Ireland Crittenden Ell-Ella Faulkner Fult-n Grant Ere-e- ne apt-n den tui- lard Jan-Hear. Jeffert-en lawn-nee lee i=1- Mlededppl Menrt-e Fame-Ht Prairie F'ulnd-rl Fandalpll ealnt Fran-all: alum ru1'1' Legend PetalJle F?ciitjf [Ian'age Lee rr Modem:- nglh' unmarr- LII line- If Med? late- a- LIZ-H.- I- Fetalile [Il ielrilntien Lita: H1 IZIT LEI a? 0-50 5 ItEt. Im -33..) lite- r5131? - all - Lieu em 5. ED 4] l'ulilee 1i" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII lit-rail.- at Mala-Clamps! Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. Errtle'il ezul ItH'i art- theat- ?at expert-lee the- gasket at tha- tpEIGh'lE'tl damage- eta?e. Fer rtlele eT'C-zruple 12' LeastM-zd-a-rata' tlan age Hates. pie-ate enlelrt 1n- ataeled mellnelt'GUIDE Prisens - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April 2??3 I?m?sh . I . a - State efArltansas Critical Ceunties (34} He. cf lieu-It}; Facilities Arkansas Barter Clay Cletume Cleveland Claighead Erittenden Cress Elesha FaLil-:ner FLitdn Erart Greene hdependenee Jacks-an Jefferson Lawrence Lee Linedln Hississippi Merrce Phillipe Pdinsett Prairie Pulaski Sairt Flaneis Sharp Stdne 'I.I'an ELren 'I.I'I.hite Legend Prisens . . . a Critical Counties Interstate Highways - LIs HeutE I . - II - HWEE 0103] 5D eli? l'u1iles Tl? Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. Ell?iial. niepal llLlI! e?gatur FIJI. Errtpal Caz-Hues are ?ece ?atetperienee the greatest er resell-5 tie epeelrled damage e?el?e. Fer er'cemple and Leaet Medera?e' clan aJe fates please mum ?e attested melmelt'GUIDE IMPACT FEESSMEHT Railway Bridge Funetienality at DayF 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDDIE I. TL- FP-?nv Leanne -. CLAT - . - h'l? I.- I- m- ":17 WIS-HIM - . malacn Hem-Teri jeenecw? FHP. HHLIH BUHE 1c:- 5.44 . I . . .2 PEIPE "3 cal :eaee 1T - .. . . AHHAHHS - _I 3c- Blt?. lI NED LH- DEJAEHITP. 3W . EELHILIH with y-?eea I .. JEL: .HILLEH: ?if 53?- State eferkaneae Critical Ceuntiee {34} He. at Tctal Functional Eanty Facilities Facilities Arkansas Barter 1 1 Clay Cletume Cleveland Elaigheacl Erittenclen Erces 3 3 Elesha FaIJl-:ner FLitc-n Erart Ereere hclepenclence laarcl Jacks-an Je?erecun Lawrence Lee 1 1 Lincc-ln Lcnc-lce Herr-:e Phillipa Peineett 4 Prairie Pulaeki 4 4 Hanclculph Said Flancis 1 1 Sharp Etc-he 'I.I'an EILren 'I.I'I.h'rte Legend Railway Britlge ca-J- I .- r-lc-tFnc11c-Ial Il- Fllettllal In: rcia?e HIgiwaTc Lt: Halt-3 Fille- E- =I3rrti11II2c-utt-c 10 ELI l'ulilee 1'l? Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Una-ram at Mala-Clamps! gt. USP. r3. EiI-E?i?i. il'Jli' ?lm-Flt? EDI. cutie?3 calm-c are ?cce ?at-atpermce tie gear-ct cut the cpecn'le? clan age 5111?. Far cur-30mph- and Luz-act Mcclera?e' clan cattle-c phan- 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI EFT-TI Railway Bridge Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Ml? Event April EDDIE . ner'J 3 Lean - Lilli} me 512'. Han-Ten -- IfFJW 3'3: 2 aces I. - iPEee.? - . ECU-"we; - it an HLII HEI ?We we? jag. 5 I .. PDLH ll AHHAHHS . . . Fill - Teal-- ?2 em .3: . n: State efArlIIaneae Critical Ceuntiee {34} Teal He. at Lead Hede rate C-dnplete Gaunt; I- Eanlag-a- Earn-Igna- Manualemu-rm a '.Ieland Cralghead FLIl'en a Grant Greene hep-Inna.? El Izard I2. .3 Ja than .3. .3. .3. JEI 1Terlen I: :3 Lawrence El El LIN I Llne dn Lenehe Prairie .3. .3. I .3 ealnt French I .3 eharp $1:an I: I: 'I'an a W13 Legend H?il'?'l?y Bridge Danage It It Modern 1. mm- Ia'e I Railway Smment [Ian'age at Lee It Medera?e I5 Lulu-I,- I-r' liters-"ate- ngiwa-re Mum Iat- In a: It: a: .3545? l'ulilee l? Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rLIaIa-CIampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? EDI. Cll??l?ll calm-e are ?ea: ?at-Itpermee- the eT the steamed dam age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and 'At Meclera?e' clan I'ertI-I phaI-I- 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI Eli-?I School Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event April 2003 513'- . Il- -- HEILHRE I. ill 33;- K. 1* . .. 1' 33;: 31wWPHILLI I In" -. I PDLH . . . 33w "x .. I3 4 ELF. RH :3 I: I I..- . 1- Fl ENE-N . I State ufnrkansas Critical {34} Tntal m. At Cami",- Damage: Damage. L3 Emir .Faull-n-ar 38 5 Gram E- Gmanva IT IT I: ndapandanma Jachmn JI-TlarI-zun II 5 E- II 2 El Ilppl Fralnna 5 Eandulph 5 ?alnt L3 l3 5mm: :3 Sic-ma: .5. .3 .3. 'I'an :3 34- 3 'mndm? 5 5 Legend Sdmal Dan-age IlIt IT LII Made- lit- r5131;- Human: Ila-Gd U3 a: a: .3545? Miles 1? Mid-?marina Earlhquaka LII Una-mus. at Mala-Champs! Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. are ?are ?aterpermde- the gear-at resell-g the ape-med clan agre- mt. clan Irma-I mum 11-3 attache-LI F1 TEEIJIHLI 5T2 at Dayr 1 - New Madrid Seismic che: Event April EDGE Eli'- emcee; -. Il- . IEJHREI q. Sml'ulE jeenecv 4-- - ?4.5 fume in. 4.4..-. . . I - . . a'l" PDLH . . i. c.3454?" e- . . Pine ?li? 7m? L. 44 .-.4 4 . Ie??ee . 4-44. 1' i . El-i I I . .. . 4-773". rl'. fill 512?512ch cc Lag: em State cfArlIaneae Critical Ccuntiee {34} Tclal Hc.cf Echty Facilitiea Facilities Arkaneaa 13 13 EIaIter E14414 Eielzqune 12 12 E1e.4elancl 5 5 [Taig'eacl 39 ETil'tenclen 1? [Tees Elesha FaLIIl-Irer 2E: 33 Fultcn 5 5 Glart Greene 1? helepenclence Jackecn Jefferecn 44?] Lawrence 2 14 Lee IJnc-zln 3 3 Lcn:l4:e El 22 I'Ilississippi l'Ilcnr-ze 2 5 PI-I'Ilipc 4 15 F'cineett 14 PIairie 5 5 F'Liaski 111 142 Harddeh 1 1c Sail-t FIaI-cis 12 Share a Stare 'I.I'an ELren :3 3 1.4".er 25 34 5 Leger?ig Elayi l-lct Func?cnal Functicnal hteretate Highwaya LIE Heutea Fivere = 2ritical Ecunties In 2c cc g5- . l'ulilee Mid-?merica Earlhquake Center LII Iuercrif at rIJaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ll'Jli' ?lm-Flt? -:Irtlc:Ilc:-u1ie-a are ?cse ?at-experience- tle gear-at premium" c1' the apecn'le? clan age me. cT'CchIIe and LII-act Mcclera?e' clan age c1?-rte: phaee 114.4 attach-.4411 Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI Tetel Debrie - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event April 2131313 State Critical Ceuntiee {34} Genera-b: Tet'll 31ml DHE FLI LTD Wind '3 lin'l?d': Eull'ld'i HP. HID Chi-uni? on u; Ten . ill-Hall ISEIEI +3133 . Edit-r cm 33.5 3 .e3 lee.? -. .. . :Hi- mt-urn-a- I337 I EA RD Cleveland lee me . HP. EIIS . mule-ad e3+ee I.e+3.ee - STE-I HE -. . EITrI-nden 33553 ?-333 7:35;; IHDE Griz-u. IEJII HEIDI 5333* mm- 3.33: +33 . . Faulkner me I323 use e333 I325 - I Grant l.3+ FHA JUHHSUH SURE mini. 2.3.3; +3333 -- 34_. . _5 . Independent-e 3:33 3:3 I335 . . _34' lair-1 tux-3 I327 -- ert- Smi?ch '1 PUP - Jan-keen me: I l1-.l I 3:333 - - Je'I'Il-rlz-en 33:7: 724 27:33 ED WW WITE lav-?n 33- 7:337 Hail 3 . Ll'iil-lEF-E m- e325 D313: 3 lln-mh 2.3-3 me - E4 - lent-ice 335:3: 3333+ ?.33 TELL Conway-r 7:33.? 7 I.+Ie.+e ILL. . Henr-zul- nee I353 31-: . . L. ?ak: .PFHW. Herth . . :lrneetl: .5. ere-5+ 3: GP. HLP. Hn -- SHINE ?k - . . - - mum:- mr 3:33 SPF I?ll "uah?rFranc-II: Ile? FIJI elm-p 3.33 me am 3 :13? mm :33 tux-3 I315. -. Eur-3n I133 I137 - HP- 3 -. -. nee-E. I3 - Pil'l??llff 13,6 53m elm Imee We 5 Legend 3 . 1 31:13 DES H?l Tetal ehris Interstate igrme . 34 . Tlleueande ef Tens LIE .. LIH :fi-u- EI-SEI H'Were Elli. 51 - Critical I: euntiee 5 31E - 15D I'll'hj-IZIPeplla?en In 33:33 HILLEH: 3.3 333-1.- - ?131 -252 ?lmmqupnn I I . . -- - elem-meet: I :31 em .. 33:331-1eu3uu33 i ED El] luliles Mid-?m?ii?a 55.1: LET-let LII at USP. 3.13:3; pie-.333- 11:3 m?ieql mummie- r3. Elieelal. Prdeetl' nlepal Illa-l- ?'?i?tlr F1 TEFEMIHIZI Tetal Fepulatlen {Year 2000} - ew Madrid Seismic: Zene: 11.1131?r Event Apnl 31:11:13 State ef Arkansas Critical Ceunties {34} 13'3? CeLnty 33am FULTEIH 3.111.133LPH v??lig?j? Arkansas 31313 - I Elaxter FEE 19 a 3; Clay 330-510 - -, Cleturne 30301-1 lid-i1 :Ll? GREENE Cleveland 01304 311111 0HIH Fay-31311113 1.111111313111133 Craighead 131133 3 1111 1:113 1:111 . Errtter-zlen 333-13 Cress 00003 DEF-ICE 1333113 300 07" HIST Faulkner 103010 . Fulten 30131-1 . . y. srarrt 31333 133111111 . NEH-IRE 1133331113 311-13311 Greene F0049 - Independenee 0'33 1511 3an: 00000 3- 511m 1 as sen T. RUSS Je?ersen 1 10043 WU DDRUF Lawrenee 033 00 . Lee 433113 W51 Hemp? Linseln 43334 Lent-11:3 10000? .. Jacks-malls? 59939 North . Henree 310030 . 30400 . 311L133 $3311 - 01.1 i . . all" F'einse? 3333? ngpg. - - Prairie 3334? . 71:1 1 . . 30. F'ulaSI-Iii 4010-51-0 01'1? .- '1 . Hand-:1 ph 331??" HUT 3P .- Saint Francis E11021 0har :1 40103 3L3 3tcna 57.932 1.1ar. 31_rar. 333 33 . '1.1'1.Ihite 113331 me?l' 111133333 411433 . fr" 1. 31.? .L 3 L11 111:1 . . 1:13 3 1-111 Legend . . - - . l'u'hjer Cilia: 1' HEl'r'l as" 73 . 311.13 UH . 3.3 1. 1-1-1- eapuauan In 3111 . - . 1111??- - l1 13.12-33- 11:11:13: 1h. .- 11:1 1:13 1 4512112121 Tetal Feuulahenr jarj 333 1151.1 1.1 13331-131333 'raar 3111111 1H3:usr D. 33?1-1? r3131? 3: 3311.13 313131 4.3113 31.111 3 - 11:11:11 - 900' "5?30 3 13 31:1 321 3:1 .3515? Miles 1 100330 ?at-11111111103131- tl0 ?Id-hm?n?a Earlhquak'?' 31' tie 3333030 03113311- 3310. F31 all] '01: L0?0t ?$210 1311' 330 at Urlmaellampagl. Hill-:13. 03*. 33101-3 pie-3311- 331310 1113 attasletl 1133111111- .am rs. 31133131. PrcleetP n e 1al 111111 31mm 32- IMPACT 133333113111 T333133 ?01000-1011? ?0001330131 Waste Water Treatment Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event April EDGE "ii-.aee?e' :35- stems ece ?cLEeuenE ahm - e. - - . .1 cc mess TELL - I GP. HLP. HEI '2 a "em-ample ?3'2 - . a Ine Huff-?13' _ 3_Ie . i scene Eli. ewE'FK?h _rL' A hill-LEE: . if'm State cfArltansas Critical Ccunties {34} lie. ?tleacl' e1' Med em'l- Demplete Iii-hunt: Faell'?ee Elam-Ice Dam erHane-Ic E- El Batter IIZI Ciel:- urne 2 Eralque-Ie en Erect. Dedla Faull-mer Fult-n Gm nt Greene Indepen den ee lard Jaekcen Jetrereen Lawrenee Lee Llneeln Le ne He Mledsde pl Menree Peln cett F'I-alrle F'ula dd Fan delpll saint Frallele ell-In:- $tu ne 'e'an Buren Wee dru'r'l' Legend FacilityDanme it Lea It Medera'e ngll-r unres- LII lite l'.lede Elt- Hull-r Lice Ir" [Iistriliutien Lines HII. ItEs 5 - ?:eI-see - wm +?e'u?wezueul?enue ice-?ee 1:2: as cc a Miles I Mid-?marica Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-Hei?l. ?lm-Flt? 'I'leresaJ-a-Tle- are ?eas ?atetpermce tie gear-st e1' the specn'led dam age me. Fer tthIttIens and Least Mc-clera?e' clan age et-rtes please ?e attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI Airpert Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event Felzrruaryr EUDE inane-?lees *1 'mm - . I-I..E 3?3: I ESIEI 1 I I I a i thIlltiff Ifri?e . a I. I'll II 313+: Page I-EHII . -Jr?? I . i1} -- I Here-- ??lm it. I: ?1 I3I1H EGAN ugh-H". Jill - ELE HERE 3 f? I 13ng . ewe Eda ,Iee LAII I. I Ehkl'_l?rggState ef Critical Ceuntiee He. Al'l-I-IIt-t H-z-d-I-mt- taunt: Fadlli-I-I: Danna-I- Tam-1H 3 -I- I3 I3-IllI-:-un -I- I3 Elan-I 2 I3 Clan." 3 5 I3 I3 Ema-turd I: I3 E'l'lnullam -I- I3 Farm-th- -I- Franl-Illn I3 I3all.11n I I3 I3 linen-I- I I3 I3 I-lImIIt-n 3 Hardin El Jet-keen 3 I3 J-I-?I-rlx-n E- I J-z-lIn-I-n 3 3 I3 la'a'rII-n-I-I- E- nueeupln El II- I3 I3 Marl-In I- I3 F.1d Eta-:- I Mann-II- I I3 Full-Internet; I3 Far; 3 I3 3 3 Fandalpll I I3 Flt-Illand 2 I3 l3 I3 "calln-Mum-Ft-p-I- I3 I3 I3 Legend ?airpert F'?Cilil?j? Damage At Least Unlikely.I l-Ilederate Ulteliheed CI Higl?lyLiltelIJI I ICertain LIS Heutee =lnteretatee =Critieal Ceuntiee Rivera 15 33 lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rlJaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. EDI. are ?ea: ?atetperhlee- tie eI' maellIg the epeeh'led clan age 5111?. Far tie-TlIttluzuIe and LII-eat Meclera?e' clan I'ertI-e attain-Id F1 IMPACT EFT Airport Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Mil? Event Felzrraruyr EUDE 'e MESS ,3 IT en: . - I '?itl. I I-t ?ilg - a I I EAII ?131? 5f It f4 .alill-H Fling-flHeel'f'if.? Ell?3'3 . .rl' 1.: Ja- 'lr - Pi.-Jill-l. Il_ .EIHEP. W: ?l l- I Hf ?335. 3 Legit "1x *1 ,f Ewen; F: i .. ?nite-mu .- -. .- 2.. EH JE-ee a I. .. . . WEE 3J3 I..- .. .- fr? T?i" m- ,9 I.__lh HEII I'll-I Ali-Ilia.? [an I P. Ill". State ef Illinois Critical Ceuntiee He. FIm-z-tl-z-nal He. Den n1;- Fat-"lien. ?le an der IZI Ben-1 Cam-:- un Clan-i IIilnt-z-n treat-rd E'Inulla'n Fayette Franl-illn Gallatln Green-r- Hardln Jae-lean Jaw-er Jena-r Jere-w em lawn-nee Hat-:upln Madison Harlen Hi'l era-:- Henna-a- Mentq-z- men. Flu-n1: Fan-1 tallne UnI-z-n 'Mt-atll are dllnut-zull 'r-hrne 'Nll?b Pepe Legend Airpert Funetienality Day'l I Met Funetienal Fune?enal Rivera =Critiea Ceuntiee = nteretatee Heutee 15 a: e: e: A, Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII lime-annuals. at rIJalaallampa Lu. USP. r3. Flu-Flt? E-IZII. WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at?permee- the gear-5t e1' the speeh'htl clan age stat. Fer tie-Turners attempte- ta' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan JJE mites pleae-e- 1H attaeletl F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Werst Case Casualties (2 AM) - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event Felzvruaryr 211E113 State ef Illineis Critical Ceunties taunt." Ha. ?l'lanl'le r3. saw-m . 1' at" He. Ea wal?le Amanda-r LEE _lur Jill-Fa: _l "isles-1e I 1 amnesir?tmagain =4an EELLETI Ii?- "u 't HEII - - a Per: AL Ehn-d Ddlmun Dial-H Gas-rem award I: E'inulla'n Fayette Galla?n Green-e- hunk-Inn Jasper Jeff-amen Jared-5' J-z-lmmn Harm-2e Mae-nupln mule-m Marl-an Manta-:- Mann-e Farr; Ft-p-a- Fulad-il Fmd-z-lpll taint?alr :allne Wit-am Wilt-a- HEDE DE I.I meumag l'.I HWEEHH 5-1 Legend lCase Casualties El350 -351- i'31 Rivers Maj-er lCities =Critieal =Inter51'at33 - . Heutes I 15 "Tr. luliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st mumm- e1' resell-g the steamed clan age s?a?e. Fer (Humans eT'CuTuplt- and Least Meclerat' clan aJe sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT Ccmmuniceticn FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event February 20cc State cf Illincie Critical Ccuntiee He. Etna-act IIcmpl-I-b nt; Fatilli-I-t. lInm-u-I- It It 33 El: IZallI-zuun IIlarl-I IE- I II Iii-I- Elwartl I. c. Farr-Int!- IIEE: E-I Gullain EEI a El I-l-ImIIt-n Ell II Jack-mu 333 333 Jute-Ir El: Jethro-In El Jere-II: 1?3 IE II lament-I- :35 Haul-Inn 73 Marl-m hum-:- IIEI IIE: Henna-I- Manta-amen 2-D Fern" IE Pep-I- FIJI-J lid 35 35 Fand-z-lpll :13 I E: t-IllntIIlalr Ell u; E- 33 'Ht-n I3: 'I-JllanI-I-n Legend Facilityr Dem-age At Least I'IItItlerIie 1- Mcderete Ukelihccd Hicll'lyLilIelI,I Certain LIE HcLItee =Interetetee =Criticel Ccuntiee River-e 15 e: cc ?Jr. l'ulilee . are ?at-Itperhlce- Earlhquak'?' cI' the demagne- atIt. Fer - allil 35.12 ?ll? LII Luz-reth- at LIEJI. cute-e pie-aera- 11-? Incline .Im re. Elleeial. PrcIIa-ctP "unmet-r F-Z- r: Dame - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event Felzvruaalryr 211E113 resale-Renewing; .- fewgag. en: .- I IFJrie5! 7'3? .. BEIF - W551 -: .L1 - .- - -I r? "Hull. if It 35:; '?wi LT . u. E. ri?ed??.51.. - I. I - PIA-II"12'71W?eh?gState ef Illinois Critical Ceuntiee Deunt.? Ale-under 2 Eben-1 I2 Elan-c ll IE- m'h'r-z-rd El Eiward 5 E'in ID Faye-11? I3 FranI-illn 3E: Gallatln IE- Ereene Hamllt-z-n I I Hardln Jar-keen Jar-per E: Je'I'Ia-rlz-en 3+ Jere-a; IE: IE: lawn-n cui- Maeeupln 3" Hauler-n 13 Hail-an Hana-:- 1- H-z-nrlzue Hen mer; 41:. Fern; IIZI Fer-e E- Fula dd 1- Randelpll 3+ IIZI tl?dr 1.7 eillne 2D Unlen 'Md lnqt-n l2 'H-hyne ll 7 Legend 1- De me Medl?ed lntene my "-rl - - 2am Hwere 3.: Ceuntlee =Interetetee LIS Heutee 15 l'ulilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center LII at rlJaleallampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. CrrtIeal WINE-5 are ?ere ?at-experience the gear-5t e1' resell-g the epeen'lerl clan age mt. Fer tie-Turners eT'Cemple- and Luz-eat Meclera?e' clan JJE ?nes pleae-e- enlelrt 1H Ethel-rd F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT E31 Tetel Debris - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event Felzvruaalryr 211E113 Jill-5:35: lessee - 1. PE?th] - .- I 11"as" sel?sh illState ef Illinois Critical Ceunties Ell-3H." lien-ant! Te'lal Ilunt.? Ell-tun I: mder lea..+ ns; 3 Bind I133 I131- Ill: 'J?l'l'i I133 ELISE IZla',? 3.3+ LEI +35 Clint-n ILEI 3.5 Era-Merl: Eiward LIE- 6.33 E'Inullam I3 Fire-1.1- I153 ELISE: DEE- Flanl-Iln ELI 23.12 Cellain 521' MD 356: emm- IIH-I ISL-IE mmlt'l'l 3.93 2.33 6-1 ELI Jld-i TEI. IE- DEE-.77 J: I3 D33 daft-rum I55 3.3: Jellnezun EUII Leanne-:- ELEII 3' wwupln LII: ?Idler-n E235- .35: Human .53 FM IIEE- 35-. IE E. 2.3 35+ Maniac-men; ELIE-T Fern; Eli-l 7 .SI ILE 351- BE 5.35- Fulfld-?l I IIT 3+ EILTE Fand-z-Ipll l-I . I-l- 333' I132 IZIJIM- ELE- "J-ah?tl?lar 55.43 34-75;? 5. l+ BEE: Men I: #533? 3. E. E- 'r'I-I'Idllnat-n see 2J3 I21- EI.35- 7.1-5 3.7+ 'NII-lmmn II: 335' SIJE Legend Tetel ehris Thousands of Tens El - 5 Mejer Cities 5 25 I 25 El] I 100,001 enema I 2130.001 arsenal: - Rivers =Criliee Ceunties = nterstetes Heutes 15 s: e: e: 4, Miles Mid-Ameriee Earlhquake Center LII at rlJeleallampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. CrrtIeal mute-s are ?ere ?etexpermee- the gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'lerl clan age mt. Fer tie-Thrusts eT'Cemple- and Least Meclere?e' clan JJE sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT E132 Displaced Pepuletien - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event Felzvruaalryr 211E113 $0000.53; State (If Illineie 725;;2? - 13' - Ceuntlee Hem: Elm-lawn: . ?new?t 5 . 0 neea- ?2222? II SID ?Jim'- ehicegc. am 0 .1. __rf - .2 Cam-nun c. c. - . .ILI I. A - 1- IZIlarl3e; Cram-rem 1' .. Edward?2222Franl-Illn ITE "11%11 . . EIalla'ln ll :5 II Ewen-I- 2 HamIIt-n 3 - --.- Hardin 0 0 . 3i Jael-Iten use: me:- - Jan-per Jam-men Jere-2' .: ,r 5+9 Lawn-nee Mae-nu -c Medic-0n I Mam-n I 2 m2:- - - 22222 22? Menhemer; .1 It," EE .3: F'ula d-Il 35E: Randelpll 5+9 Ff- 0 0 - .L 355E- SIS-SIE- Eulln-I- -. .- EH Jig-'3 E445 . Wabadl I3: 3.2-0 -. r. manage-n Ie 3e 3:222, an .222? 2 .2 2 7+e Ie0+ Legend [35? I -- Pepuletlen _iqj?m ?jl?m. - {01300 . 101 - 0%:me _r 000an LEE 3,001 0000 Meyer Cltles .. I, - a. . -Eill:ll:l'1 .J l? US 1DDIDD1 - . ?Emma 200,001 4350000 I HEII =Criti0el C0untiee '15 3] El] El] 4L l'u1ilee - - ezuII?I-e are ?etexperhee- the gear-5t CHI-IIEI . prdnenlm' 01' maellig tin.I epeeh'led damage me. F0r den JJII antes meagre- eznlelrt 11-.I street-Id r3. Ella?al. edger-r F1 IMPACT eel. F'rIIelIel E33 Electric Pcwer FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Mil? Event February acne nameless I - State Df Illincie . - Critical Ccuntieelal?} -- He. ?it-acct - Med-mut- Camp-late -- mum;- Damage Damage Ha.? I Hemnder 3 II SID . "i Band can: IV. :4 ?3 Clan"; l- . I. - Elln't-z-n - - _r - mat-rd E'u'u . I E'Inullan . J: - . Fallcumin .I i Greene .- - E. . l-lamllt-n - I - H-ll'dln - .F ..- - Jacl-it-3-1.5 3% ?w defiant-n Jena-3." In. J-z-lInII-n lama-nee . .L. I VEHH .$133PIPEgii?wrath ~Wyn-'Nll?b lgl'l'Legend Electric Pcwel Facility Damage I ?ttLeaet luhtllertle ., I - .. -. Unlikely Fi? I . at Mcderate Ukelihccd . . a -. {3 HigHyLikelCertain is? . 'a Electric Tranmiaeicn Linea ?Lle Heutee - =Interetatee =Critical Iilcuntiee - River"Tr. l'ulilee Mid-?m?ii?? Earlh?uak? tie-Turners attempte- ta' and Leaet Mcclerat' can aJe LII at Lanala-Clampagl. rates phase-a- 11-? attached Fm r3. Ellaelal. PrqectP nlcpal Ilue auger-r FC- F: IMPACT TEEMIHLI E-IZII. E34 Emergency ?peretien Center Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zene: MIT Event February emerges I. .I -. IEHE State ENSUH . . . - CI?ltl eel Ceuntlee 'jr_ 7+3; . Tehlle. rem-.1 1- - 1' bee-Ii- cgun-l; ting;- ?31112;- WINE Hue-sander SID. -. . .. I I) E'l'lnullam I Jar-Hm" I I FIl-Ie-zuupln 3 Hadllzen 3 Meme-I- I I I I :aIntCIaIr 3 sauna I .3 mm: I I IIallI-zuun ear Crawler-2 FranI-Illn l-lardln . . it?lDEEP. DULTHI ail 1-. I. LEE fa hheu-z- . - rill-"1 EPIELW Ii Fame-HIE-E II - I Hut- IJEHS . Legend r1" Emergent}.r ?peretien lCenters .?ItLerast WEE, . I??lm 3 - THEME L-I.I .J ?4 1h r- Mederete R?fh? HigHIrLikelI,? hf}r H. x'l I ICertain II gm rum RENEE "1 =Interetetee I. HEII =Cr'rtieel Ceuntiee H. 4-0 5 - .- ?HIIrere IITF7- l'u1ile5 - - an.I ?ea-a the gear-5t eI' the epren'lrrl me. Fer and antes phase-II 11-.I street-rd r3. Ilasial. ?'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT eel. E35 Emergency Dper. Center Functionality - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event Felzvruaryr EDDIE 'eaw? as -. LEM-E mammary? .- 2-: r?f . . {Regime? utem?iqq "if State at Illinois Critical Ceuntiee FLIne?lenal l-le.e1' Gaunt; amends-r Band Clark EMnglam Jaehien Jena-nan Lawrence hue-zupln mallen Harlan Memes: Manna-Inert Parr; ?all'lt-Ilalr ?allne wean "way-nua- Calhoun Clay -:IInt-:-n Create-rd Edward: Fay-att- Gallain Greene Jatper Jeriey Jelmen Hanan: Fandelpn Fieliand Legend Elnerg en eyr lCentere [layr 1 . Net Funetienal 1r Functilznal Rivera =Critieal Ceuntiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee 15 11L lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. Ilue ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Iertleal calm-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-5t prenatally e1' the epeen'htl clan age e?a?e. Fer aJe rates pleaae- 1H attaeletl F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT ESE Ferry.I Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event FelzIruarI_I,Ir EDDIE I -. State {If Illineis an{my l[Irltleal Ceuntlee 1- - HI. 1 - Damp-hi- IEPI-HHELL. EIE WINE IIt-unt.? Elam-sue Danae-In": .. I - LIEII run-darIl-II I: I Mr? {Ebb .: want-In I: I - - d-a-Imr-I P. lit-H EL: ?1 . HE 3-, award ealm r- - a 1? 5- I: xvi" 1 ?le LS Jaekwn - . Jaw-VEHHEIU 'i - .r ?3 - Mue-z-upln --Mama-In I: .x I. PHI 3 5-7- f. . eta-:- HEI 1.II- Him. menu-mar; . r. f, Fen-,- Ft-pe . J- CD If FIJlad-I-3V- ?3'1 Iallno Wlil?b IIJERS . .- . wulammn Legend -I. 1 I - f? i Ferry Damage I -. At Least full-[Hie u-?Ir IEM 3 I. .J LlnliiIel'II {a r. If I I Mederate _1 If .- Certain Eiq?. I. 1 LIITI RULES 3. =Interetatee I. HEI =Critieal Cauntiea :IthI-l ??IIES - - Errtleal mum-I are ?ea-I ?at experience the Earlhquak'?' Izn' the Ilanage I?a'e. Fer age 11-.I attaeied r3. [?le IIUE ?'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT eel. Fire Statien Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event Februaryr EUDS H.-..I I 113m #11.?ka e; .lai'i' 3'5 are :Ili. II State ef Critical Ceuntiee Tehlile. Idle-act H-z-dera'b Chomp-let- Fadll'let. Damage Illa-lander Hun-1 cam-nun IZIarl-r Elan" IJInt-n Erna-turd Eiwrdt- Gallalh Greene l-hmlIt-n Mel-men tut-per infra-can Jere-3." J-z-lmmn Lianne-u meeupln mule-m Harlan Hat-tan:- Mann-e Maniac-men." Pent." Pep-l- Fulani Fandelpll FI-z-Illand HInt-Zlalr atllne llnlen Wat-am 'r'idlhut-n 'f-hme 'Hll'b Legend Fire Statien Damage At Least l'ubtlerde Higl?ly Unlikely Unlikely Mederate Higl?lyLikel'f I Certain LIS Heutee =lnteretatee =Critieal Iileuntiee River-e ?1 15 SD lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rlJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. Sta-Flt? 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-emanate? the gear-5t at the speen'htl clan age 5151?s. Fer attempte- t' and Luz-eat Mmlera?e' clan JJE ?nes pleaae- EDWIN: 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EBB Fire Station FunctionalityF - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Mil? Event Felzrruarylr EUDE . .. .. - . . h- Legit-z rah . 1" State of Illinois Critical Counties No. of 'ltutaI FLInc1onal Ho. of Count; Eon-:l Calhoun -:Iarh Clay I:Ilnton -j'a'.l.'1'orcl Eclwarcli Eulnglam Fay-ate FIarl-Illn Galla 1n Graana l-amllt-n Ion Jaipar Ja?anon Jaria; Jolnlon Lawrence Pac oupln I'Pacllion I'I'arlon Illa: lac Monroe: I'llonuoman' Fan-j Fara Fandolpn Flcliancl aalntIJalr $allna thon moam Ion I e-?w Legend Fire Station Functionalitjlr [layr 1 . Not Funotional 1r Functicnal Rivera =Critical Countiea =lnteratatea LIE Houtea 15 "Tr. l'ulilea Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rlJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. canoe-a are ?cca ?atatparlaloe- tla goat-at prdnamrtr' o1' tla apecn'latl clam aga- ata?e. For de-TIHtIc-Ia oT'Compla and Moclara?e' clan aJa a'ertaa oalalrt 1H attaolacl mclmalt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Hazardaua Materials Facilities - New Madrid Saiamia Zane: Ml? Evant February Ema 0 ma?a 'mm State af Illinois I I-.. Critical Cauntiaa - .. . - 1* ll; . Eaunt.? HL Mann-jar Ia .- - Ha. Band 3 SID -. Clark Cilantall - .. . .rr m'a't-rd 3a ?rm-Iran. El HE . E1nullan1 :rt,? Quail-:11: - . -. '3 I211- I HARE "MFR. Jamar IT 3' - 1 32:3?" - .2 . Iu?r' L. .- J-z-Iln can a I - lawn-nae- mutual-z w. r- I. ?Elma. Ian?H $3.355" . .-- -I I. I. amarLE lime-$Er? II.II tn: r. an J. ?5.53 1134.15; .- .rr :1 J. Jam" I, 1-1.1 . mini1:33;. . - Ii:- 1' 3 .-- I. WEI-H -: .- l? -. 2:311:13? ails {if WLEI ?Man -'Myna 'Nll'b HJEHS . .-- - Legend - II Hazardaua Matariala Facilitiaa I I I M?ill??tl lntana ?31.1r - Hwara "ref.- 3.: =Cr'rtiaal Cauntiaa =Intaratataa 1 . 1.1 HII LIS Hautaa PTr. lulilaa Mid-Am?ii?? Earlhqualta E?c?iil?n?'ig?il tie-flirting attanple- 12' and L-a-aat Maclerat' clan age LIEJI. rates camrt 11-.I attached r3. Eliarlal. ?'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT E-IZII. Highway Bridge Functionality - New Madrid Seiarnie Zane: Event Februaryr {wh?ah? 1m: 3 E. 34 flu-win.- ?Ewh . 1-H- -I 311.,? ?yin-r Ah? ?ck-Kg 3?33: I I. - State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee ?3.37 Tetal ?3.37 Gaunt. 313:3an 3 3 I33 I33 -13 1eun 3-3 3-3 'Jarh I33 I33 33; I3: IE -: I1ten I73 I73 I73 I73 33 33 Fay-m 33:: 33:: :33 :33 Gallatn -3r33n3 HJII I37 I-IarcIIn 3333 mm I77 Jalper I3I I3I Jana-n31 Illa-r13; 3?9 Ill-3 Lawns-I133 I 1,3 HE: 7333me :33 333 mall-3n 3-5.5. 39E- rmrqun :17 :37 I'm-3'7 II: II3 733mm It: Inc: henna-man- I: I: Pan-J- 33:3 33 7I 33 33 Fandalph I33 I33 Fieliand I3I I3I saInthaIr 333 333 $3 n3 I31 3-3 I73 "333331 73 73 133333 :Legend Day'l 3 Nat Funetianal 3 Functilznal Rivera =Critieal Cauntiee =Inter3tatee LIE Heutee 15 El] MIL 1P l'u1Ilee (.5 Mid-America Earthquake Center at LImaIa-Ctam pat". LIEJI. r3. EII33I3L PrqeetP eel. F'rllelnal llu33ti? atur are 13:33 ?atetpermee- the neat-3t manure 31' the clan age 31113. Full mantle-3 3m clan age 3W3 3i3333 I33 3Irt 113 attaetetl Highway Bridge Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Mil? Event Mid-?meriea Earlhquake Center LII LIE-rem at rIJaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. EII-FISIBL Sta-Flt? Felztruaryr EDDIE State ef eal Ceuntl ee Jul-Ind: Camp-lei- IIaun Danna-I- Il-J-In'an-I er Bend Gain-Jun SE: El El Ill-13' I52 ITS m'l'l't'm El El EI'Irar-it- E?Inqllam Fag'e'tb CI :33 c. c. II-Iallain I IE-T El Hardin Jaw-Ir ISI er'I'l'l l5 El Lean-nee I43 CI Hat-I:- upln LII-E- EI Hail-Ian 395- 21-? IIS 3 El Mellree Manta-amen FarrIE- Fandelpll IEIE- a El taln 3133 El Eullne ITS EEI I3 'r'whbaII-ll TE- 'r'wh?lln ED: El 231- El El r37 Legend Budge Danage 15.1: Had-area . LIS Heutee UI Elt- c. HIIJII: um: Ceurltlea 1' '39 It'll. River-E Segment [Ian'age LII Hail-f If MIMI- 15 a: a: a: 4L "Tr- l'u1ile5 CINE-II at the epeenhtl clan age me. Fer P. and 55.1: F-Z- F: IMPACT PEESMEHT TEFEMIHILI E232 Heepital Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Mil? Event February zeea nameless I. I new IEHE State {If eeIL.? - - - -.I- my. Ceuntlee Eli-.1 IaI-Ieet 5 'fI of Hedera'b In?ll-E Fat-lilies ., e-I:IlntE?:?ll?m I Ellgt . I-- Fame I I: .- . Fianl'Illn :5:er 'd i JaeI-Ieen Jere-Haeeupln 2 DFLEL 1i HadlDI-n El . em .2- nun-In I: I. hheu-z- -.-- him" I a . unit?'EITI l1 II: t- I - 'f-hgn-r11 Helm-1a- I) I3 I: . . Ili'I 'F-i 3 3133.--JI -.. -I LEE k? mien?3':eff-II .3 .3 I. .- jch-II - .. I - Legend JRHeepltal Damage . .- I At Least I'II'bderme I. r. a 'e?jm 3 I. FIEENH 3- Ilr II . 724?, I Mederate Hr . WEE ?Ir? I i I I . MEIR LIITI HWEIS I =Critieal r1U [:13 =Interetatee I H1 LIE Heutee a 15 a: a: ?Jr. - - are ?ere ?at experience the gear-5t Earlhquak'?' prdnenlrle' e1 resell-5 the epeen'lerl rlanage e?e'e. Fer 12' and Leaet Meclera?e' age eutee enlelrt 11-? attaeied IE. Ellaii?l. F1 IMPACT ThereeaJII-Tle- eel. E333 Hespitel Funetienelity - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event Felzvruer'glr EDDIE identi?es '1 5mm -. Lin-z .-. . was} n-c-J'I ll" 'i ,r RH DEl'i?n L. 1? .m SID. I I Rik??51: .. in?? Willi af- ii 1 mum? gel: 1 will? WEE a! - Hr an.? . HEII PD ?1 P. stun State ef Illinois Critical Ceunties IZIT Tehl Fursienal Me. of Gaunt,- Clay illnten Emnglum Payers Greene l-anlln Jachlen Je?arlen Jeriay Lawrence h'HeeuF-In mellen Harlan Illa I I an: Menu-emery Fen-j Rand-Jim Fit-Hand ?alnt-Zlalr ?allne "Mt-Elli 'l?aililngtun am I en Meander Clark ISaallalln Jaipar Jelnien Pup-e- Legend Hes pitel Funetienelityr [Hullr 1 . Net Fun?ienel 1r Fundimel River?s =Critieel Ceunties =lnterstetes LIE Heutes 15 11L l'uliles Mid-America Earlhquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. nlepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Errtleal mute-s are ?ee: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'led clan age mt. Fer tie-Thrusts eT'CdTuple- 12' and Least Medera?e' clan JJE stiles pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EiEl-li Liquefactien Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event February sees Degrees 4 State ef Illineis .t - Critical Ceunties - - . - um Maxim um .- LEE. - '71- cu enmepiemtr . . WINE . Illa-sander Uri-newn 'e'err Hleh II I. - I. QP - Chicage Enend r. .P-M Callieun Uri-rewn Ilene .112: ?5 11'2? Clark Urine-en Urhrewn ILew e'err Hlul'r a . . r" . mwt-n: Uri-ne'erEda-rarer. Lew Lew HE . . WU. Uri-rm Lew I 3 Fag'etb Uri-rem e'er: Hlul'r - ?Meyer-"- .- Franl-illn Hen-e Lew In. i-r. -. ?Hm callain Uremwn Lew 1' . Greene Uri-newn Uri-.re-m 1. 4' -- Hamllt-n Lew Lew .- _Ir Hareln Uri-rem Ilene WEIDFQII .4 J- Jaell een Uri-ne'er: - - 'u Jars-er Uri-rem LewI P??rl Je'l'l'ercen Ilene Lew rir? . ?m5? Uri-ne'er. - 3?in?3 Jellneen Ilene . lene I Ili' .4- .. - VEHHEIUH ?gment-r eeIrIa' _ften Uri-ne'er: 'e'en- Hler. . - Harlen Ilene 'e'en' Hlul'r - 4..- Ha eerie Llrl-r-ewl'. High Henree Uri-ne'er. Lew .3 'Tr' El ar-w- 13-. Men'lJemen' Uri-ne'er. lene 4.91 Fen-,- lene Mederale . . Jil- A -. Uri-ne'er. lene El ec I_ r AI: hi? mm" ?m HEP-H . - r. . - delpll Urn-gem 'e'erf ngl'. .- 4 a sweetie: - mum Ilene Lew 1r r- Lew 'e'en' ngl'r REE I, I a? sallne Hen-e Lew -- .- . - . nlen Urine-rm LemI '1 Bf Wat-am Urine-en 'een' High gr HTI DHE . Wadllnuten Lew Lew . .1 Warn-e Hen-e Lew . Uri-ne'er. Lew . I Iene High I . Legend -, Liqtlefectien Susceptibility . ., Lew HF.- 'i FE. ?Mederete - I . -. I . - Mew High ELI. Rivers Mejel lCities =Criticel I - -- Heutes 2130.001 creeperluliles - - callers are ?eas ?atetperlenee tie gee-sleet Earlhquak'?' prdnenlrle' e1' the specn'led damage 5151's. Fer tie-Turners eT'Cemple 13' and Least Meclera?e' dam age atLanelaellampagl. entree please eelelrt he attached declme r3. Ellaelal. S'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT set. Ilueetlge?er E235 Medi?ed Mereelli IntensityF - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event February sees 4 State of Illinois lCritieel Ceunties a Cemt,? M?l. MMI . damn-Jar 'le =4 zineElaine-Ln aw.- - r? a. . Ellnten - .. . I I - In'?'m 'v'l r- lam-arm 'u'll -. ul' LL- . r. Emrlg'l?l'l'l -: 'g'l - "f 3?3? Faye-11a . -- - Galla?n 1m ?fl Greene -: Ila-I nu. I.-. r??jln Ir . Ii' 6- - Jaehien -, - r- Jalper a. 1 -J Je?anen 'u'll -. 1. iglire' Jen-3'; .. . Jelnien bf - 13:. - Lem-nee 'u'l - - - i; weeudn . .1 . I - . 'u'l marl-3n . Milan: In'u'l ., i -- Pan-J- Juli-'- - . 1 Pepe 'u'll as ur 1.5. 1* 1-:1 .3 1? HT 'u'u Egr-?r' .. . . .r'Ir . 55-. ?lehland 'u'l -. J, r? 6-H. . .. sallne 1 . . L.L _Js' _x .I. "Illa Lnlen Ell II - ear-am 'u'l 1.3.1.5" .. r, 'u'u . .- If - In? 'uhen Legend Medi?ed Mereelli lntens it};r mu" Mejer lCities eleme? menus I 100,001 semen - WI -- 3.: =Cr'rtieel Ceunties =Interstetes HII LIS Heutes .R: '15 33 EU l'u1iles PL - - Errtleal mums are ?ea-a ?at experience the gear-st e1 the speen'leu sewage ms. Fer clue-Turtle? eT'Can-Iue- and Least MeJeraF dam age atLanele-Ciampagl. rates pleas-a- 11-? attested deelme r3. ??i?tlr IMPACT sen. Prliepal liuestm?er Natural Gas Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: llI?li'Jr Event Februaryr EIJCIE '2 If . . I I Ii: Ii: waf?attain-E31alums" "may Ilia-:15State cf Illincis Critical Ccunties silent ct Had-Irat- complete Fadlli-I-I: dc land-Ir i 5 EI:-nd IIallIt-un 3 I: Clark 7 5 II- Cram-3rd I- E'Inullam Far-Infl- FrIInHln r9 5 I: Gala-In I: male I- 2 Jud-scan I: Jam-er 2 a a El [alarm-:4- E- Hat-nucln 2 Han-In 3 M-zunrc-I- -I- H-z-ntacm-I-n' Hm. E- 2 2 Fulad-Il E: 2 iahtIIlalr Legend l'latural IGas Facility.I Damage At Least I'II'bderIIe II HigHy UnlikelyI LlnliltelI,I '3 Mcderate Ukelihccd HigHyLikel'f I Certain Natural Gas Transmissicn Lines Rivers =Critical Ccunties =Interstates LIE Heutes 15 "Tr. l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at HJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. CIrtlcal cJII?e-s are new ?at-Itpermce- the gear-st cI' the specn'led clan age stat. and Least Mcclerar clan aJe sates pleas-e- 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Oil Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Eyent February EDDIE amylase I. I Ian" . Whine . dei?ed, nErtu?e- l! [r SIDteam:th SEE7:4. . . 1. ?milE-FIEII ji-e 5 I- II. mil? State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee Tet! ?it-Ind Med-Irate Champlai- IIt-unt.? Fa-z-lli-I-I: Danae-I- Eon-1 2 2 Clay E. I- II E'Inullam 5 II- FI'anI-Illn I Eta-Ina I l-I'Imlrten 2 Jam-er I I: Imam-ze- mule-n 3 Harlan I: H-zunh-z-m-I-n' II 2 I 'Nt-Ildl 3 I: I: I- 5 'Hllam 2 .Ii-I-I-and-Ir Clint-n I: I: I: tIad-Imn In El em Auteur-In Ham-In:- Henna-I- Pep-I- E. El Legend [Iil Facility Damage At Least l'uhderme HigHy Llnliltely Llnliltely '3 Moderate Ukeliheed Higl?ly Likely I Certain Trananiea'an Linea Hiyere =Critieal Ceuntiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee 15 "ff-I lulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mme-Champs Lu. USP. r3. EIIaslaI. eIIgat-r EDI. are ?ea: gear-5t at clan age mt. Fer dates pleaae- In attaeled F1 IMPACT EEIE Peak Greund - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event Felzurueryr ZEUS Arlen - girlie 1 MHEI El . SIEI . . I .. Chicago Ill?JELI..: PEemri'i-Fl?-Eihr r" . Jl' .4- . RHEIQI - ?r I - . ?llEIIJLTHI ?5 if . 4? .L-i LE ,?31 I I.- If LETMEI-E . H. "ea-ff . Hun rmeizg? EIH w? '4 "Kim, T. 1' r50 In, State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee Caz-u nt.? Mas. FELI- ELTE IJE Bend ELIE Calhoun EIIZIE EdarI-I EIJJE til-l1." ELIE Edlnt-z-II ELIE ELIE m'a'l'drd Edward It. ELIE EIJE dIIam ELEIE Fayette Franl-illn D3 ELEM- ?alla?n linen-u ELEIE Hamllt-z-n EIS Hardln EIE EIJE ELTE Ja lip-er ELEIE Jefhre-z-n ELIE EIJE EIIZIE ELTE Law-ruined ELIE ELIE Had-m an; an; Hadlez-n ELIE Marl-an ELIE I'I'Idnrde ELIE EIJE Menu-amen ELEIE ELEIE Pm' DE El? Pep-I- ELEM- Fulau-il I135 Fand ELIE EIE le-z-Illand ELIE ELIE Euntclalr ELIE EIJE E?lnd EIJE ELEM- EIEH- LEE: Wit-am ELIE ELIE ELIE Wayne ELIE ELIE EIE Legend PGJEI Maj-er lCities I105 - [Li I- I11 I125 I I125 - 0.5 I 2130.001 I15 - Ili'? ELFS - 1 - - 1 .38 Hiw'er?e =Critieel Ceuntiee =Interetetee LIE Heutee 15 92' Jr. I'Ldilee Mid-America Earlhquake Center . UI umrir-mmlme at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. IE. edger-r 'I'IereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. Critleel ennui-e are den: ?at-experience tie gear-st e1' resell-g the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer ef'cmph?e' and dem JJE rates pIeae-e- eels": 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Peliee Statien Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event February rem-eel I .1315 -. State ef Illinois eeH - - - a. . 7+ -- IEntleal Ceuntlee i- Idle-ad: 1 ?tel-m . e1- Med-Irat- eempIr-e af??L I-- [mogul-e- W1. mm. Damage $131? a - - . IJarl-I I -L . IIla:.' i - . eweE'l'lnullanl it"; IEE- i FI-enI-Illn "itHeme. .. geese eaJena-mu a 'f I - Jere-3." 4. a I: fr. - ?ll JZII I I J: it 343:5 . ?-133Mat-eupln menace . . "Hf-"5rin]; i: {Lil?E il ii 4- - Mat-tanI..I I . Henna-I- E- .LU If.- Hunt-amen II - EIH #533 I, ., . FI-rn' I ?55 - . PIMP Pep-I- I .I Ir! lil Ful?lREP. I. 9-. I-I iu?m . 1- GineelnteIeIr 3e I dig-Tm I- 1- J. eullne ha" . .. f: Eril- I . Ilhlen El. e13; I: - r? lee IJEHS Ii- Legend _a '2 Peliee Statien Damage - - .. -: . - At Least l'u'bderele - $44?qu 3 It'll?C: '3 -, - ""33 fr 5 - Mederate Ukeliheed bee??i -. INFINITE .. HigHyLikelI:ertain IH . q. .I all? eL =CritieaICeLIntiee r-I =Interetatee . LIE Heutee '15 33 El] ED 45- l'u1ilee - - are ?ee-e ?etetpenelee- tIe Eur-abet Earlhquak'?' prdnelalne' at the epeen'lerl rlanage eat. Fer 13' end Leaet Merl-era!" nan age entree eJIeIrt 11-? attaeied r3. EIIHMHL e?gat-r F1 IMPACT TEEMIHD eel. Feliee Stetien FI..Inetienalitr_rrF - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event EUDE i? recedesif- REP. "a 1' H1 at ?(Elm 1h?. EifL . *1 ?neeynrr 2.. Raw 'JE-ee a Hint-1 if . ed ??reside~55? Hairrem,- a r. ?hdu?i rut-1.15 IL. fa, HEII Hull? P. I I State ef Illinois Critical Ceuntiee He. IZIT FLIn-rienal He. e1' ?le andar Clan-I Clay Eran-Herd Edwardr E'mnglu nr Fayatb Balls in Greene Jack: ten Jarpar Ja?arndr Jerney Lawrence Matter-In I'u'erlen I'm Ian: Menu-ma r; Pan-,- Par-e- File? and ?allne LI'Ildn wet-am hen Legend River-e =Cr'rtieel =Interetetee LIE Heutee F'eliee Stetien Fllnetidnelitjmr [Iey1 Met Funetidnel Ir Functidnel I '41- 15 "Tr. l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriee Earlhqualre Center LII verse-urnnme at rIJelealiampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ezuu?es are den: ?at-experience the gear-5t d1' resell-g the speen'led clan age 5151?s. Fer rte-Turners eT'CdmpIr- 13' and Luz-eat Merlere?e' darn JJE ?nes pleae-e- 1H ettaeied F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Tntal Pnpulatinn - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event February 2003 State I3f Illinais Critical Gaunties taunt: .EIJIaIlzandIaIr 63nd 5333+ Iziarh I3.3I3 I213: 751-2 cunt-n +3.37; lira'a'l'I3rId ?13.45: Edward-r. E'I'Inullam 333.3l3 Fan-11- Fran Gnllain 5.145 ?ne-n3 22.3? Hamllt-n 3.5.3 Hardin 4.33:3: Ja-3H3-3n 5.3.1.;3 Il:I.llT 43:333.; $553 @373 5.3.5: . . .. . Madlwn 333.3? I . - - Mam-n +3.93: . 3 - - 5.lI3[.13an3-3 DEE 3?.521- . 5:4 EH: #133133 ,3 I -- Pm. ,3 i: xii?d .. - - FulauII 3.53:. Hm? ?Ere-3 P. Ill?u. .51" Ell-Sikh F'and-z-lpl: 'af HGAH .. II. J. -. "4 man-and L: I: 71"? 3 ..- I 3.1IntI:1nIr 33:33:32 F: .H?rla 33mm- 25.733 I. ..I, REE . . .I '1 Wat-am 5.33:; I g? r: 'n'aunnut-an Ian-3 . nu - . I Nil-"Jamil; HIHJI Nut-a- 3; .. .. IMEIEEH HEW.) Hk?l?l? ?fly-'25. Legend ..3. . . a . 3- HAEUS [Hf-l: .. - .-.I Ara .I . #333,334 3 3-3.333 gram-?br? 3 3531?5333 . .- 5331?13333 33113an - r" ?1I3.nm-15.333 '3 . I '3 '333331'3 ?Warm? ?HiI.er3 Majm Cities 5 L- r'ica I3u . - . .3 =I3rt II: nt 33333133333 ".3415 .. =Interstatea 133.33 333.33 I 3:33; Huutea 333,331 3,353,333 I AL 34' 15 Mile: Mid-America Earthquake Cantar 333.333.33.33: 33333233333333: (Hummus and '.I5.t M-3cl-3ra?e' clan ?nes phan- I33 3Irt 113 attained mclm?lt'GUIDE FIZIF: IMPACT FEEDSMEHT 11333333233- E-IZII. FEE Part Facility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Ml? Event Februaryr EDDIE Dm?l?gg II MW x' EHE LIIH State Elf ?lint-Jig . - . . . 1d - -- . l[Irltleal Ceuntlee '5 5' - 1 Tehl He. Jame: . I '1 I Med-In granted, DEF Ia, eEm?en - mum,- mum Danna-I- mum. 7.- El ?ue-pander E- E- II SIDI :r :5 -I 5 . IEIalla'?n 3 - I _q Era-Ina I .- BE . - .L Ila-align hurdTn-zun 4Fumealntdalr 2 h, I Band a PEEIH --. can: a - er1., 1 ??le L3 treat-rd EH in E?wardI: I 1% 1E .J mn?llFa:. El I, - Haxmln H- nil?'1 Ha'nllt-n . Hf 5., Jaq-?ig'i?r Lanai-enm- CI h'h-z-eupln c. c. 'i nun-GilElam-H -, LE J. I 1 :alln-I- . 1. HRH . -. 'r-ht-adl . . If?? a - Han-I- HERE .- .- . .1 I, wne .- El I WEIR I: It?? . A Legend I I I - f? i Pelt Damage . if I I l'uhderme r, a ??im 3 Ir fibula: H- rr ?at 1-. Unlikely . 'r a, Moderate Ukeliheed _1 HigHyLikely a. - I 'r I I:er?tain EEIH . I. I-- 3' I =Critieal Ceuntiea HUN $3 HUI I . US Heutee '15 33 El] El] l'u1ile5 - - Errtleal calm-e are ?ea-a ?at experience the gear-5t Earlhquak'?' prdnanlre' e1 the epeen'lecl (Image mt. Fer (Humans clan age LIEJI. rate: meagre- 11-.I attaeied r3. IIUE ?'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT TEEMIHCI LII-GT: eel. Prllelnal IIuestIga?er F03 Petable Water Faeilityr Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event FelzIruaryr 211E113 4 realises .t . irJEee A . -- . MWEE T'??ig?Stimuliamllneu?il EIT-IEE 1HEII .1 In, State ef Illinois Critical Ceuntiee II. :u l. l. .ll1ll.?.l - ram--3 - - Ill I Legend Petahle Water Facilityr Damage At Least l'uIJ-tlenie Unlikely Moderate Ukelihaad HigH'fLiltEll'f I ICertain PetaII-le Water Dietrihutien Linea He. {If Leal-Ie 1'1? Heutea - =Interetatea - 1m] 7:15 Hwere a 15 a: lulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at gt. USP. r3. IIUE 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-5t at the ape-email clan age mt. Fer clan JJE mites pleaae- 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT I?D-ll Prieene - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Mil? Event Felzuruer'glr . 1- 1? ?35PEER .- weenlied; "Image; .. - ?din?WW Fl r" LT - a firm?? may: [1 Tail?g- . PM a JUIHD Jrll-rl:Ir I'llIRIE I, ?l 1 5 3 in. ll} .3J LEFT. .. REE 1 3 Lil-If 4; . - ., rfr. l-State of Illinois Critical Ceuntiee Fa-z-Illiel: mean der Bend Cam-:- un Glad-i Claw-lard Elm-arm: E'Inqllam Fayette FI-anI-illn mllatln life-ana- HamIIt-n Hardln Jar-Hem Jaw-er Jere-53' J-z-lln em lax-trance Ma-z-z-upln Hadlez-n Marl-an Ha Henna-e- Mentq-z-mer; Pent; Pepe Fulad-cl Randelpll FleIIland El" 1321:? $alln? 'r-ht- adl 'Myne Legend 1' F'rieene Medi?ed Mereelli lntene it};r ill-I'll-I'll 3.: =Cr'rtieel Ceuntiee =Interetetee LIS Heutee 15 lulilee PL Mid-Ameriea Earlhqualre Center LII at Mela-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. niepel edger-r FIJI. PTIIGIJEII Grilleal are ?ee: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' resell-g the epeen'led damage mt. Fer Lie-Turtle? eT'Cemple- and Leaet Mud-era? clan JJE mm: pleae-e- 1H attained IMPACT FEE Railway Bridge Functionality - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event February 2333 State ef g; i- . lErltleal Ceuntlee - rec-r Tetal II FLIretenal Hat-1' ?ll Gaunt.- 4% - . man-jar 3 i - Eend 3 3 -:Ian- 3 3 Clay 3 3 amt-n I I Edward! I I E?ngham 3 En Fa'J'atla 3 3 FranI-IIn IEwhet-upln I3 I3 Ileana-I 33 33 Marl-2n ?lial?: I'I'Ienuemran' a 5 Parr,- 3 3 I remap-II 3 3 FielIland 2 2 $alnt-Zlalr 33 33 sauna 3 3 "wet-am 1 I 7 7 CallIlzun I3 :3 I3 :3 Gallatn :3 Jaiper Janey I3 :3 Pope I3 :3 then I3 :3 - . "II-?4'13th . . - 33m "145333 3 Legend Hallway Budge I- 3-, e' [Iaj? famii? II Nat Fun?ienal . - 3' - um a? ?r Fundicnal 3' LIIT HHEIE 5? =Critieal Ceuntiea I 333?" =Inter3tatee a Heutea TF7- l'u1ile3 ?13'5 Earlhquak'?' at the ape-3mm Haney-3 3hr. Fer 13' 55.1: ?Dill? entree phase-3 e3 3Irt 11-3 atta3I-3d I-rrI-ectI-nIcII-al lluee?t?t-r Fer: IMPACT E-IZII. FEE: Bridge 8; Segment Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event EUDE State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee Tehl Me. At Meat-rate Camp-late mun Damage Damage ?le-lander E- 5 Ben-2 II 5 I I E'inullarn E. El Fay-Ith- II E- Greene 2 HamlIt-n a I: 1' deft-rem I-l- can I. I Hae-z-upln Mail-Ian 7 a El Hat-ran:- an 5 Fern; 5 Fula I FandeIt-II E- 2 Ealn 3 El II 'Hlt-adl I 1' Cam-nun Gallain HartIIn Jag:- er Jersey Menr-z-e 'H'l?lln lat-n CI Legend an'age II- HUIH-?Utlltehf .3, U. If. LIE Heutee mm at Interatatee=l Critical Cauntiee: Hiw'era H?il'?'l?y Segment [Ian'age 13.1: Hyillr' UI If 15 "Tr. l'u1ile5 Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at gt. USP. PM IIUE E-IZII. are Item: ?atexperhlee- tie gear-5t eI' the clan age e?a?e. Fer clan aJe ?nes In attaeI-Id F1 IMPACT Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Februaryr EUDE State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee Atleali Medal-ate Champ-let- Gaunt; Damage Damn-a- ileulnder l5 Bend cull-nun L'hl'l-i L151: ?aw-rem Elm-rare:- H'?nqllarn Fayette anl-rlln mllatln Cree-nua- H.rdln Jael-amn deeper Jewel-ten Jere-x." tear-ante Hue-nupln melt-en Marl-en Manta:- Maniac-men Farr; Pepe Fulad-H Rmd-z-lpll Fit-Illand talntlitalr 2" Saline ?Men I: 'r'Iul'lb?dl 3 l: l3 I: Legend Sell-eel Damage Ml?m??hm?me Moderate Ukelihaad HigHyLikel'f I Certain ??HWma =Critieal Cauntiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee mam amwnE: "lint-Emmi?. 15 El] l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII hererlr' at rIJaIaaliampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me calm-e are daze ?at-emerald? the gear-at e1' the steamed clan age 5111?. Far tea-rum attempte- b' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan all? ?nes eelelrt 1H attached melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI TUE Seheel Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Mil? Event Februaryr EUDE State ef Illineie Critical Ceuntiee HIZI. IZIT Funeienal NEIL IZIT {nun-t.- ?le nan-jar Clark Clay Crew-turd Edward! E'I?Ingham Payers Gall?in Greene Jack ten JBIPBF Ja?anen Jar-a3 Jenni-:11 Lawrence ?temp-In l'u?edllel'l Hen nan: h'lenruze Menu-1m er; Parr,- Pepe Fendelpli Fiel'lland ?alnt-Zlalr ?allre eat-am Hem-He "white ten Legend Selieel mw1 . Net Funetienel 1r Functilznel =Critieel Ceuntiee =Interetetee LIE Heutee Heme H- a?a?mn 15 El] l'u1ile5 Mid-Ameriee Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me WINE-5 are ?ee: ?at?permee- the gear-at e1' resell-g the speen'le? clan age 5111?. Fer attempte- b' and Luz-eat Meclera?e' clan JJE ?nes phae-e- EDWIN: 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI FDEI Waste Water FaeilityF Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Mil? Event February 290a 3 gr; -, grate ef Illineie 1 Rag95'2?eet91;: - If - - . 3i. in?ating." at - r? 311'." .m?eea?i. '3 312-1111. .1 I j! Pl-l.: ?llfi?l?m *Iiri . I .2 Waste Water Facilityr Damage . l- . f-E? I EJERE -. Iii-Ii .r U. - 2i?- $2.4m AtLeaet l'u'htlerLlnliirel?,r Maderate Ukelihaael . - - . . . HigHyLikely w. Certain .. Em?'h Waste Water Diatrihutien Linea Di -- 0 11-1] I He. {if Lealrie 5- -- - e- Heutea a: -1IZIIZI . 3333; ?1an_asn . - 2'50 - STU =Interetatea =Cr'rtieal I:eun?tiea Rivera In. 15 El] 1f" l'u1ile5 Mid-?m?ii?? and 55.1: LII Una-rem at LanaIa-Ciampagl. et-Itr-e pie-aera- EDWIN: 11-? attained chem-e- F: IMPACT r3. F'I'Iiili'lltF' . Im- ?'t??tlf F1 El Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event March EDDIE THEE I I. I I 5331aseel-I__ -kaeclLIka a a33-111 . FULTEIH ??smee?aLL =weLLe - . H- eenTel?1215. i 1- II 1 HAND - -EHHITI . .3. EL HEHEL 'FER-HE PLI . 1. 1- . maeehry_cLay . - Ham-IIF-L IT. . . -331 . j" case can UL a JENHLHE: a? - . Jackal: . . . - LeweEHcE - aH .EliylES eTiH . .53 15aanIaTa I: LARH 1 331'. marquee c1 14 ell-TE -- . - eels - .335.? . T. caeWFce can l5 PERRY Hakni'ean ea'a'Ew EH eueeH State of Indiana Critical Ccuntiea Tc-tal Ha. At Least Ecurty a Ema-ate Facilities Ela'nage "1399 [Ia-.Iiess 1 Bids 2 Gibson 7" Greene 3 Him: 3 Pike 2 Pasey ET Spencer 5 Sullivan 5 3 Legend Facility Damage at Least Mctlerate - Highly Unlikely Unlikely Likelinccd Highly Likely I Certain = nterstates US Heutes Mid-Amarica Earthquake Canter LII at rlJaIa-Clampa USP. r3. E-IZII. calm-c are ?cce catatpermce- tie gear-ct cn' reacting the specified clan age stat. tle-TIHtIc-Ic and Least Mc-clera?e' clan aJe sates pleas-e- 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT T11 Airpert at Dayr 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March EDDIE WAE332$. 1' 5' ADE MS II- we?tLe :31: 1* aeaFe"e WHF LAWRENCE - II- 1- . ll DHAHEE 5133 I HIS-J. ElfState of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} He. ef Tetal Ceunty Funetienal He. ef Facilities Facilities 1 1 [lulmie 2 2 Gilleen i' i' lGreene 3 3 Fine]: 3 3 Pike 2 2 Peale}.r I3 3 Spencer 5 5 Sullivan i' 1llantlerIJIIJrgl'n 5 5 Warl'i?li 3 3 Legend Airpert FUHCti?l'l?lit?f Day1 NetFunetienel it Funetienel = nteretetee US Heutee E?ritieel Eeuntlee Rivere a: a: e: ?45? lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rlJalaallampa gt. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me cutie?3 mute-e are ?ea: ?at?permee- the gear-at armature" e1' resell-g the speen'htl clan age 5111?. Fer Elf-30mph- and Luz-eat Mmlerat' clan JJE ?nes ply-lave- eelelrt 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI T12 Worst Case Casualties (5PM) - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March sees EL - State of Indiana amment ?I2r - - - mm STEUEEH Ceuntles {11} seIrIT . E: _u Inprlei HZI. IZIT He. IZIT KHFELE I'F?nerri'. Fatall?en Caiual?lei 'sai _33 El Cunt: Mum'- STAR El]! Ens-den J. J. ma a i 1:21.315' . _393- Iii-Jim 2 2 ME: Eli-i FIJI-HEW WAEPLSH LL Film- 9 a El - Pele" E- WH IT CREE. 124;? _5 ?panJI: 2 2 HIJHTIH - a Emu? I: I WELLE- FEMS ?air-burgh LIP "i . MIFLMI ale?- 3% . LaeHFe El 4m was HEN 3531? ELAWAH Legend In - - - - mm 59.. l[Itasualtles - - use I -- - PARKE 2 Terra te'?jp? . 2 - ii MEIR sea 4 ELM SHELEW - FRAHHLI - 12 WED ME FIT Manes - 5name new LIL VAN GREENE HIM till til-II JEHHIHE . MEHSIZI . . .53.. . . - EWITEEHL we - ealess RTIH - . . JEFFE CLARK = nterstates 31:5 . 331;. - CHANGE 3115.3, LJS Reutes leseH EDIE '3 .. . - . eve Eeuntles PEHFW Hassles? Rivers - 1e 2e e: EUHEH .3545? Miles l? Earlhquak'?' e1' the speen'led damage $1.1m. Fer Elli] 55.1: LII Una-rem at Lanala-Ciampagl. sates pie-asle- 11-? attested deem-e- r3. Eliasial. PrdeetP nlepal FIZ- F: IMPACT TEEIJIHILI E-IZII. F13 Ccmmunicaticn Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Eyent March II, T.. FTEFL iiaa'sP'Ea_ '11, 3?3.1" A: . .333: NE: DH tug-1 MHSHI 51am: T31 . .351 .. . hr? "a EH'rcti . - .J- Elana i:11barge 45-. I'wan?gg. 331i . ,1 . um? . i I. T111 . _52 I: 1 .- II EHHD .Il.155 .1 In" g! ill-I.?Iii I. REJK Ila-EaNEE .32fl: as; 1".1 . ear" an .?EwnEE'elf' . 1 1'51 "120. - - .y . . cat21:1 :33" aux-5' . d" I. :f I c'Fil.? I: I: . ulHassles c: .. - I EUHEH State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Tctal Hc. At Least Ecurty cf lac-jalate Crime? Facilities Damage Daaiess 16? DIJacis 27"4 Git-sen 235 Greene 155 anI 3EI1 Pike 12? Pusey EDD Spencer 12?" Sullivan 134 'I.I'I.Iarrick 213 Legend lEcnmmunicatic-n Facility Damage lit Least Mctlerate - Highly Unlikely . Unlikely '3 Highly Likely I Certain = nterstates US Heutes E?ritical Ccunties - Hiyers 1a an ac cc 45k. luliles l" .. Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. nicpal Ilue FIJI. Critical calm-c are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-ct c1' the specn'htl clan age c?el?e. tie-Turtle? and Luz-act Mcdera?e' clan aJe cute: pleas-e- 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TI 4 Dame - New Madrid Seiernie Zene: Ml? Event March 2DDS a 5-3-3 LAEH. APE gee LE es: rim EUHEH State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} He. at C?unt?f Facilities Daviess 14 Dubai: 24 Gihsen El Greene 12 Hnex F'il-ze 25 Pesey 5 Spencer 11 Sullivan 21 22 1Ill-.larricl: 15 Legend MMI e21 -121 -1211 Interstatee LJS Heutee E?ritical Ceuntiee Rivera a [lame 10 4 lulilee Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps! gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. Sta-Flt? are ?cce tic gear-ct cut the cpecn'htl clan age me. Fer and Luz-act Mcclerat' clan age cattle-c phacc 1H attaelecl F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI 2'15 Displaced Pcpulaticn - New Madrid Seismic che: llI?li'Jr Event March EDGE Hammeni 4'27 596% EL STELIEIEH EH - rIceLE AH PUHTEH HDSCILIHIZI 'eai STAR _33 _i MA HALL 33? {11? rag-1': IEEL La WHI JASPER 35' 5:1" . 93-3- HE: Ell-l PLILAEHI WAEPLSH LL cAss -- WHITE . n24 - HIJHTIH - - EHTIZIH - cAeecLL MIAMI WELLE- is? . GHAIIT 52 PP HIZIE _ehs?l MT WAI: HEN 3531? ELAWAA TAI _52 - Ic - 31?. ems": m4 - - -- - PARKE Terra te'?jp? . 32? MEIREAII 31 SHELET - I- WEE Hence 31-. ea; I mas-5? LIEAFI can LIL VAN HIM lill til-II JEHHIHE . .33EWITEERL RTIH - - . . JEFFE cu in 15g, - KWASHIHETD CLAW "my 331;. - E133 ecIs . I: WFIZIH cw: PEHFW answ SPEH eueeH State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} l'stimste cf Displaced Pcculsticn Displaced Ecunty Raidenc? Dad-Es ElutIcis Gibson Greene ans F'i ks Pcsey Spencer Sullivan Vanderburgh W'?kies alum] IJLII - . 2cm = nterstates LJS Heutes E?ritical Ccunties Displaced F'cpulaticn dis_pcp - ?45? Miles Mid-America Earlhquake Center LII Una-rem at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. are ?eas ?at-experience- tle gear-st c1' resell-g the specn'led clan age 5111?. Far mum-m and 'At Least Mcclera?e' clan aJe Acme-e pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI T1 Ei Electric Pcwer Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Mil? Eyent March EDDIE T21 Iii3'1.wa l/ - it 2?1? "a . 55"? - - . . HE ae? wa'eaeH . I n35. ea? m. . I Maia MI - ELLE - - 35; I I. IT. was REI-I 3:31it?? MA .30 Hana ILT ,5 EH . 33-. I-lEtl - - 'may HEL. I I . 521' 31!. 331' BREW - can - Hlijl- 'fc' RENEE . Hc . ERL {in JEF in 15:: cm waeHi "mi GE - leecn WAR EFIFW Haemecri USE I, EUHEH State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} Tctal Me. At Least Ecurty cf Mcderate Eng?EtE Facilities Damage a?nage _E Ltld5 4 Eitecn Greene linen-c 15 Pike 14 F'csey Spercer Sullivan 3 Ll?andertIJrgh 14 12 Elatiess Legend Electric Fewer Facility Damage At Least Mctlerate - Highly Unlikely Unlikely Likelihccd Highly Lil-:ely I Certain Electric Tran arniaaicn Linea = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritical Ccuntiea Hiyere it: a: a: a: ?45? l'ulilea 1i" Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at Malaaltampa gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. Cirtlcal calm-s are Item: ?at-atpermce- the gear-at c1' reacllig the specn'led clan age stat. attempte- t' and Leaat Mcclerat' clan aJe $131335 plane-e- czuiclrt 11-3 attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EmergeneyF Dperetien Center Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zene: MIT Event March eerie .59" Elk - State of Indiana P-IZIHT imam?? STEUEEH Critical Ceuntiee {11} . ENHT .- HZI H1: gt 3] . . ea XHDE LE ef l'i'lederete Eng?EtE RH - . E. Facilities Damage ??399 331-" a STAR HALL HFIEII 1 ?121.1- - J. WHI Pee-2y 1 Speneer 1 JAE PER . . . Sullivan 2 ULTEIH wee LL hl'endertuurgh 1 WHITE CASS. 12-15" a1; EILtieie . HIJHTIH Git-sen - . . ADE-ride . -. reene . MIAMI EHMT WEL Le 21 . Pike E, LAEHFIZI EI m1 warn wen . ELEM921:: _E?ll- HAND - ?_ze - DMEH EIIHW . IE. El? email: :04 .313. HEEL H- I ?r mid . . 5.2? Legend - MUH m? . - - Emergency ?peratien lCentere ELM SHELEW . FRAHHLI At Least I'II'leilerete Dem-age . .I?1l IPLET - Highly Unlikely 5. 331' Ei TH DEAF: CIR LIL WIN GREENE I Liam-me - - LAWRENCE DH, Mederete Likeliheed HHDH - . . . . . . . {ii Highly Likely FIFE-HESS JEFFE . 1-53; CDT I CE rtEHrl n' I . . CLAW = nter3tateg 711;,? 331-. 515:. . US Heutee EDIE '3 .. . DVD Ceuntiee WARRIEH . . Heemeeii Hwere 10 e: e: EUHEH .3545? l'u1ilee IE5 Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI mummy-:1 the damage 511?. Fer 55.1: atUMe +3Iampag . antes plane-i- EDWIN: 11-? street-id L'Ieeln'I-i- r3. Ellaeial. PrqeetP nleliel Inu-i- ?'?i?tlr F1 IMPACT E-IZII. ??951:me TI 8 EOC at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Mil]r Event March EDDIE a - a . LAEHAHEE DEE . 331-. . HDSEIUHD 3] I HALL "5 I121 WH .31 ease PU Jets PEF: 1r waeesH 2-1 WHITE 3 .351 EHT HTIH In WELLE- MIAMI ?Esau-IT 35 CL _52 ?ail El was. TETIZIH HAND HELEN: 33 MEIR Ell-'11? - . Ell-111W? UHI SWIT JEHHIHE LAWRENCE . DAVIES an." . 15 Eli as DIS GRANGE FIHE "seaere State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Ile. of Total Fune?enal He. ef Faeilili? Faeilities Fine: 1 1 Pas-qr 1 1 Spencer 1 1 Sullivan 2 2 1Il'anderliurgli 1 [Iaui ass [Itllieis Gills-5n Greene Pike 1II'II'an'ielI Legend Emery en eff ?ip eratien ICenters at [ll-a1?r 1 I: Met Funetienal Funetienal te relates US Heutes Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rlJaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. ?"951:me WAHHIEH PEFIFW Rivers seen a 1D 51:: a: a: .3545? Miles l" IE5 eT resell-g the speen'led clan age 5111?. Far manta-I5 clan aJe ?nes pleas? 1H attested F1 MPACT FE EHT TE LEG Fire Statien Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March EDDIE HE: Eli-l 1.4" PanT . amnT DEEP II I Jae HALL -- a? in LL 5 WAF- HENUHEH eeie? -I ?l wannlek 1' ere-I i .3313. taeef . - -l ha] Laeeayeg?i, eTeueEH I ?ee LE, WEI: Le LaekFa a ADE MS a; J?'MEIR an?. - 'MDf-i?lji . -.I I enayyn 1 . .- i '1 i Katyaekmefa EIHAHGE . 3 ll! ital. men an" a; . Heal-:- . . 1:1- 1.. JEFF my cat a tank PEnny i . 1 Haeelea'n IZIHI .euynEEel. a State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Tctal He. kt Leaet Complete Ecurty Elf Moderate [lama Faeilities Damage 9E Elan-lees 12 14 Eitean 13 Greene 14 linen-c 19 Pike 3 1EI Spencer Sullivan 12 26 'I.I'I.I'a'riek 11 Legend Fire Statien Damage At Least Mederate - Highly Unlikely Unlikely '3 lylederate Likeliheed Highly Likely I Certain = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Hiyere a: a: a: .1545? lulilee i" E-IZII. Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at rlJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. mute-s are ?ea: ?at-emulate? the gear-5t at the ape-amen clan age 515m. Fer (Humans eT'Canple- 13' and Luz-eat Mmlera?e' clan an em: pleaae- 1H attaelecl F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TED Fire Statien Funetienality at Dayr 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zane Event March 2MB .35? 1F . State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} He. ef Tetal (Darrin.r Funetienal He. ef Faeili?ee Faeili?ee Davina-e 12 12 [Il uhei 14 14 13 13 Greene 14 14 Hue}: 1EI 1EI Pike :3 Peeveu?lr Spencer i' Sullivan 12 12 1llandeltlilrgli 13 2E Warrielli 11 11 Legend Fire Statien Funetienality Day1 NetFunetienal it Funetienal = nteretatee US Heulee E?ritieal Ceun?nee Rivera 1a a: a: 444? lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center LII DIE-rail.- at Mala-Clamps! Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. Grille?3 WINE-4 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at e1' the epeen'lerl clan age me. Fer Elf-30mph- and Luz-eat Mulerat' clan JJE ems pleae-e- can": 11-? attaeled Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI T21 Hazardous Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event March SDDS ?33* ?In a I Ell?.CASS HE: MS - FRAHHLI fill- -. Heemsan EUHEH 1r-1 HI State ef Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} He. ef Ceunty Facilities Daviess Duheis BE Gihsen r115 Greene 4 ?ne: ED Pike 2? Pusey 52 Spencer 24 Sullivan 1Ill'anderleurgh i3 Warriek SE Legend HazmatFaeilities MMI {all -?rl = nterstates LJS Reutes El?ritieal Ceunties ED El] Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-felt,- at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. rS. EII-HSIBL Sta-Flt? 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- are ?eas ?at-stpermee- the gear-st at resell-g the steamed clan age me. Fer ten-rum et'Canple and Least Meclerat' clan age et?rtee phase- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI T22 HighwayF Bridge Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March 2DGS I I .5. I ?if: - an. 3% 132531;! the Milk 1 WHF :55- ?and?! - JP. . i, i. State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee (11} He. at Tctal Ceunty Functicnal He. cf Facilities Faciliti-H: [tau-ices 1 SE: 13E: Duheie 1 S2 1 S2 Gillercn 293 293 Greene 2EI1 201 line: 2SS 283 Pike Spencer 212 212 Sullivan 20-1 20-1 1u'aI'IderIJIuI'gl'n 1 SS 188 Warnch 1 23 123 Legend Higlnr-rajlr Bridge Functi-nn-nalityr [lay1 i Net Functicnal . Func?cnal = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritical Ccuntiee Rivers 1a a: a: 4 l'ulilee 1" Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII L'erett- at male-Clam gt. USP. l3. S'?i?tll ??2512le are ?ea! ?at-emulate? the deal-at prdnatulttr' c1' the epecn'led clan age mt. attempte- b' and Luz-act Mcclerat' clan age was piece-e- 11-? attached F1 FEEDEMEHT T23 Highway Bridge 81 Segment Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: 1111111r Eyent March EDDIE . i . I law?? F?iEt HDSDILIH Elli T'E?eg - up.? . l* '1 - as: Vita?14H; EH-liLih-?-E?l I: 105111111 @5113? 1. in? State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Tetal Me. At Least Demplete County cf Hedemte Damage Faeilities Damage Dauiess 136 DLtIeis 192 Gibson 293 Greene 2131 11m: 233 Pike 136 F'esey 191 Spenser 212 Sullivan Ell-=1 133 V's-Trick 113 Legend Highway Bridge Damage At Least Mederate I Highly Unlikely Unlikely lylederate Likeliheed Highly Likely i Certain Highway Segment Damage ht Least Mederate Highly Unlikely Unlikely Mederate Likeliheed = nterstates US Heutes E?ritieal Ceunties Rivers 1a a: a: a: 11L Miles 1'1" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Malaallampa Lu. USP. PM IIUE E-IZII. mute-s are ?ea: ?atexpermee- tie gear-st at meeting the steamed clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-111111315 aJe sates please- ezumlrt 11-1 attest-1d F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT T24 Heepital Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Mil? Event March EDDIE aiPDHTER ELIE-.INT . - 5-3] LHERHH - a HALL - in LL WAF- HEN WHITE NDE ease WHI ?peLE PIS-EH El HELLE- all. HIJNTIN T?l DMEH PD .em WED l?i: UL waw_ GREENE HEIDI-IE a m; leeaH WAHHIEH . EUHEH - PM aavmee euaem 3'3 . he 52 '1 an hema?f . i MEIR EFL-ELM MARE-F31. Lee LL Id?" ADE WEL LS i . Hanan LHNRENDE he .- TH MEHSD 1a. ay . n' I . GRANGE TEE l3 31 . et_r_ meme!? JEFF eaT egaee . HARRIEEIN ai' it. HFD ea HAND rh-l} FATETT ung?h MS FLET DEAR new I DHI 5 awaneL DH State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Eeurty DLt-eie Diteen Greene liner Sullivan 'I.I'I.I'arrielI: Pike Pusey Spencer Tatal Ne. At Least ef Illederate Faeilitiee Damage Legend Heepital Damage At Leaet Mederate II thNl??Mew Unhkely Mederate Lil-:eliheed Cenam Heutee Rivera Complete Damage DECIDE-DECIDED El 43 El] l'ulilee M4 "if. Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI lit-rem at rlJaIadllampa gt. USP. r3. EDI. ?"951:me WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-emanate? the gear-at at the speen'led clan age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan JJE mites pleaae- 1H attaeled F1 MPACT FE ENT TE MIN-LI LEG T25 Haepital FUHGti?nalit'f at Dayr 1 - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Ml? Event State of Indiana a I I mama-1] Critical Ceuntlee {11} IZISE in"? Iranian HIDE: LE He. 01 Total 1.. E. ?aunt}: Fum?enal ll-J. ef 312-. HALL - Facilities Facilities e21 . . a - 3TH WH [lawless 1 1 JAE -- [IulJeie- 2 2 1 1 3 WHITE CASS . :23 Greene 1 1 _2_d HTIH Hnex 1 1 EHTEIH . . . M3 Sullivan 1 1 . MAW 1liranderlaugh . El . Warlich 2 Pike El ELIHTIZIN TETDH Pusey Spencer qua $53.1" . nee Legend ?_eji? Heepital Funetienalityr LAWRENCE UHI Day 1 EWITEE - .. JEFF i Nat Fdnetlanal 15.51- 13.3. it Funetlenal = nteretaiee 33E deeHeE 15:. FIHE US Heutee '3'5 -- - aw: Caun?nee PERM Rivera SPEH 1a a: a: e: g5.? l'u1ile5 Cll'l??l ?at-experience Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI prdnenlre' e1 the damage 511?. Far 55.1: rat" atUMa +3lampag . e'atee calem 11-? attained melme r3. Ell-Heidi. PrdeetP niepal liue auger-r F: IMPACT TEHMIHILI EIZII. ??951:me TEE Liquefaction Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic che: Eyent March EDDS P?ca Ler- LAEEAHEE SAINT DEE Iii-It? 'puetse "233 1" -. . El ?acme es: AH {?21 Last-{I cass WH. waeasH 2-1 WHITE .351 . HTJH EHTDH . renew LEAHT . 3:5 see EHFIZI tr 4m "SL-lt-lTEIt-t TIETDH .- Haas PH yea SS amass Terr .5in I lac? ac 331 . eacw'rt Else 1 1 to we . LAWH EH I: SWITEE JEFF "cc 331 'cls . 'caaw'Fca Haaeiscn State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Hinimum Maxiern Ecurty Susceptibility Susceptibility Dauiess Law Law '1de che Sibscn che 'yEFy th Greene Llnlunctun bin-:1 teary th F'ilte che F'csey Lew 'yEFy th Spencer che Sullivan Lew 'yEry th cl: che l'u'lcdemte Legend Liquefacticn Susceptibility We let awn Ncne - Made rate - ?y?ery ig Majcr Cities 4: i . eccpm-esapcc = nterstates US Heutes E?ritical Ccunties - 1c an ac a: 4-i? l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rbata?Ctampa gt. USP. r3. EIIHSIHL nicpal S'?i?tlr FIJI. PTIIGIJEII candles are ?at-experience tte gear-st prdJatulttr' c1' the spech'led danage rate. cT'CcmpIe and Leaet Medera?e' clan aJe rates please ?e attached IMPACT Medi?ed Merealli IntensityF - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event March EDDIE State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Hammem 4'27 590PDHTEH Km? - eme _33 a HALE . II . a? :21? me Hl'l'gLL .l 1:4. I WHI ESPER 35' 3'11 333- m: Ell-l PLILAEHI WAEPLSH LL WHITE 42.3mm.? 5% . - enema MIN-ell eeaHT WELLE- Eri- PP El 4m wan REl-l E31: ?Eli . ELawae Tm _52 . .. Lei ?will ?g?x Harm . - IZIHT IZIMEH . eH' Ia ED. .313. . nee 1' -- - PARKE -. Terra te??jp? ?52? 31 SHELBY - - ELM . AT FHAHHLI WEE mailer: 31'. 223:1: I TH DEAF: earl LIL we: Elee Iin ten JEHHIHE . Jam-nee . -- LAWRENCE Eh" . IZIHI Hum-r. . . . . - SWITEEHL eawIEe'e . eTm - JEFFE IZIH '53 15E. eeT . KwaeHmeTa CLARK "a 331;. $13.3" Ij eele . I: WFIZIH eve Haee'leerl eueeH ?aunt!?r Max. MMI Daviess VI Duheis c: VI Gihsen VI Greene c: VI line}: VI Pike VI Pese}l VI Spencer VI Sullivan c: VI 1 ll'anderleurgh He?ll Warnel: WI Legend MMI call an Majer Cities enema-manna . anneal-reapnn = nteretatee LJS Reutee El?ritieal Eeuntiee Rivers a: a: a: ?45? lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center LII at rlJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me Grille?3 WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at e1' the speen'lerl clan age 5111?. Far Elf-30mph- and Luz-eat Meclera?e' clan JJE ?nes ply-lee- EDWIN: 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI T23 Natural Gas Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March EDDIE PU Leer-{I WHITE JEFF gig-mes ?e 'c sHIrietc has? WA Haemscri State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Tctal Me. At Least Complete Ecunty cf Moderate Damage Facilities Damage Tamers 1 Greene 4 2 Elauiess Bibs-an liner-r F'csey Spencer Sullivan Legend Hatural IGas Facility Damage At Lemt Mctlerate - Hicii'ly'LlnlilreIr.r -. Llnliitel'r.r Mcderate Ukelihccd Higi?iy'Liitel'f Certain Natural Gas Pipelines = nterstates US Reutes E?ritical Ecunties Rivers re a: e3 ?45? Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rears-Clamps gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le Critical ennui-s are acre ?at-atpermce- tie gear-st prdratuliir' c1' reacting the specified clan age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and Least Mcrlerat' clan aJe series please- calslit 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI TEEI Oil Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March EDDIE 3] gag-3E STELIEIEH - HT: El a HALL - WHI r. 34.5" An. WERE LL WHITE CREE. {jg?Hun . - .. ADAMS RRIZILL WELLS IT. TIPT WAI: HEN 331HAND "-23:61? - - - EIHI - I Eli. ?a3mcnec . . "Eu 3:31- - can WIN . GREENE - - Ilia =35? - . cI-IZIHI . . - . - F's? . JEFFE 15'; . CDT . WAeleIetc {3mm 331.; - e; WFIZIH are PEHFW I. I: EUHEH State of Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} Tctal Me. At Leaat I: let Ccurty a Hc-jemte Elm? Facilities Damage amage Eitec-n Greene 2 Pike 1 Pusey 14 Sullivan 2 [Ia-.Iiess EILtIcis I: anI-I Spencer Legend Dil Facilityr Damage At Least Mcderate - HigH'lel'IlikEII'f Llnliltel'I.I l-Ilcderate Ultelihccd HigH'y'Lll'EEll'y' Certain Dil Pipelinee = nteretatee US Reutee E?ritical Ecuntiee HitI ere In a: A: a: l'ulilee 1i" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Malaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. WINE-5 are ?ea: ?atetpermee- the gear-ct c1' the cpech'led clan age 5131?. Far and 'At Meclera?e' clan A'Ertee ply-Ice- czumrt 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TED Peak Greund - New Madrid Seismic Zene: MIT Event March EDGE Hammeni 596% eeIrIT El]. - HIZIEILE PEIHTEFI HDSCILIHIZI x: es: HeLe . If- STAR we - -El:1- #121; 315" La WHI JeePEe 35' 5:1" 33-3- ME: Ell-l PLILASHI WAEIASH LL ,1 WHITE q_24 d- . '95 HIJHT-IH - . en?s-me CEILRHIZILL .. WELLE- 7?3?3. Enema?3? 1m wee 531? ELIHTEIH ELewee . Tel .53 3-121 . WEED 15351. eerie - IZIHT IZIMEH Erma? ID 311. em": 54 35, nee . eel Terra .55. mane-en 31 SHELET - - ELM I- ?55' EWE MEIHHIZI 'Li?i .111 223? TH mam-3f DEAF: earl LIL we: HIM 1i" JEHHIHE . MEHSD LAWREHI: ~55. Hum-I. . - . - eaVIEe'e mm JEFFE all '53 15:1, eeT . KWASHIHETD CLAW 11:17?. 331:. - GRANGE 31135? - . are waeelee HARM-50H anew eueeH State ef Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Legend CLUE-D1 D15 - DEE Majer Cities In . enamel-ream] = nteretatee Mill. Mai-I. PEA PEA I155 I115 [Iuheie I155 I155 Gilieen I155 I115 Greene I155 I155 Finer-I I155 I115 Pike I115 I115 Pesezr I115 I115 Sueneer I1. I15 I115 Sullivan I155 I155 1lul'anilerII-urgli I11 5 I125 Warriek I115 I115 LJS Reutee El?ritieal Eeuntiee Rivers 1a a: e3 545? lulilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center UI luerellr at Malaellampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. Prllelnal Ilueetlgatur Grille?3 mute-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at e1' the epeeh'lerl clan age 5111?. Far (Humane eT'CemplI- and Leaet Meclera?e' clan e'ertee pleaee ealelrt 1H attaeled melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT T31 Peliee Station Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Marchaetie a. - - State eflndiana - a .. . - .333 . lCritical Ceuntiee {11} . . 3mm DEEPH LaGemiGE . "at? - HG. Em late . E- riaeLE' Gaurty ai 'Ai-i PDHT.EH- . HDECIUHEI E: HALE. Facilities Damage an?? a. 1..- ERR .m - Elli? 3 EL 3-14 JASPER - an"; Greene 5 ELILaei-ii?ll FLILTGH wa'eaeH LL i-ii-aa . Pike 4 WHITE again-I'? Pusey 5 HIJHTIH :a - Seer-Jar 2 '3 '3 . . HEW-MS . canteenmam!? Wa-n'aii I?l??IZIHT DMEH - Erma Gri' . E, EU . . animal: - - a4 . .555.- .- MED i-i- - I . if PARKE any" mama? . a F'eliee Statien Damage - . Least Mederate -- - . RT . . . WNW . 'aGil - HighlyUnlikely _at1i 31' 4 .TH DEAR. LIL win. -. - JEHHIHE - . . JAGi-iee -- - - - - LAWRENCE ail. . IZIHI Mederate Likellh??EWITEEHL {ii Highly Likely _f . 37'? - . - 15g. cm- I Certain GLaei-i = nteretatee 231'. GRANGE 5215Heutee ieeGii El GGIG . I: WFDH .. E?ritieal Ceuntiee . I . 1.. ?AH-man? Rivera GPEH 10 Ge a: EUHEH .3545? i" Cil?l?ll IE5 Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI prmmIrlir' GT the epeeli'leiil claiiage Fer 13" 55.1: antes EDWIN: 11-? attaeied melmelt'GUIDE nleliel Iluee?t?t-r IMPACT TEFIMIHILI EDI. T32 Felice Staticn Functionality at DayF 1 - New Madrid Seismic che: Mil? Event March EDDS RHEE DEE . 4535.545 3] I Pc :53; I- ARE HALL a #121 . .31 caee 35?. PU L?tSl?ii?I JASPER . WAE: HSH 2-1 WHITE HTIH . an we MIAMI WELLE- . 35_ REED - caeecLL. I ELet'ieH- II .135? .FEAHEI . DEAR UHI SWIT JEHHIHE DENIES 1- . 15 Eli 33L GRANGE I FEE .i '3'5 WAHHICH 1- n- HAHRISDH State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} tlc. cf Tctal Ccunty Functicnal tic. cf Facilitie? Facilities [Ila-tieele 3 3 [IIulJIcie 5 5 Gilleen 3 3 Greene 5 5 anI 3 3 Pike 4 4 Pceejlr 5 5 Spencer 2 Sullivan 3 3 1IllandedJ-urgli 1 4 4 Legend Pc lice Static Functic nalitjlr [in] 1 i Net FLI ncticnal . Func?cnal = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritical Ccuntiee Rivers 1e 2e 4a a: 545? l'u1ilee 1i" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII tJ-a-r5ttr at Mala-Clamps! gt. USP. r3. EIIHSIHL Sta-Flt? 'I'tere5aJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. are acre ?at-5tperhce- the gear-5t c1' the clan age 5111?. Far tie-Turners aJe 5W5 phan- 1H attached Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI T33 Part Fatalityr Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Ml? Event March ET EL - State aflndiana ?12 a I I I i p'nm Lasagna? ETEUEEH Critical Gauntlea {11} - aeiriT Tat Fae?T'E'e riaEi LE County 0f Madame Crime? 35W: - HUSFJUHU HALE Facilities Damage 5' 331'. STAR Pusey El] 'h J. Spencer 1D . - 3.14 WW aanaerturg-i 4 JASPER 35'- . . an"; Warricii 2 FULTIZIH wa'eaeH LL Dauiess EILtIais WHITE 124;" a1; Git-sari Greene . - .. enema ?ne: [i i: RRIZILL WELLS - MIAMIV GRANT 37-: Pike PF Ei gunman air WEE HEN CLWEH- . T?l _52 . a it?? Hamm- 95". Heat: - E. {333. . . In El? EHELRIE m4 - . HEEL i-i- 1? I PARHE PLI AM . . - . EQEH - 52 . . ant-I'? m? - . F'ert Damage MDHEFLH 31 mm a 2 At Leaat Maderate man'aEil IPLET - HighlyUnlikely _.Lt15, 331- BH-IZIWH TH DEAF: aeri LIL VAN aeEEriE I JEHHi'igia Ev Jeni-zen - - LAWRENCE a DH. '3 Maderate Likelihaad HHDH - . . . . . SWITEEHL El H gh 3r L kely _aamE-ee . R-IIH JEFFE . {in 1'55", EDT . Certain n' I . . WHEEHIHETD mam-i = nteretatee 231'. EIHAHEE 315.3 . US Heutee EDIE '3 .. . DVD Gauntiea WARRIEH FEHFW . . Haemeaii Rivera SPEH a 10 ea a: EUHEH .3545? l'u1ile5 Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI liraimlm- aT the ape-amen damage 511?. Far 55.1: ?Dill? Hill? antes phage azumrt 11-? attaaied maimelt'GUIDE nlelial Iwea?gat-r IMPACT TEHMIHLI E-IZII. T34 Fetable 1ii'iiater Facilities Damage - Madrid Seismie Zene: Event March sees EL - State eflndiana "12f - hi5- . P-DHT ETEUEEH Ceuntles {11} - I 53-1 1-34 5mm JDSEPH 1 i Tetal Me. At Least Emplete E11111 cf hit-dents HIZIELE De HUSCIUHU a ?1393 AH 'eai sTAe '33} mm '12: Famgtl? [Engage 4 .i MA HALL E13E HUI-355 I 1121" . EILtucis 3 --5 LL I WHI {w Gibson 1 DH I PULAgg-it? ll LL Elf-L Elte?im 1 . Pike 2 .. WHITE EASE 12.11 Pesey 1 HIJHTIH 1: - Spenser 1 WELLs is? re 5-2. PP . . 3.5433191? - - Wa-?Legend WAR ?3:331: Emma -- Petahle Water Facility Damage TAI 52 . ?121.. MAeIse ?351 PH At Least Meilelate - - E: Unllkely - em - Erma 1311' - ..J. ., Unllkely ._331 emsES.- . 111:1: 1-1 _l Mederate leellheed PARHE M11 - - - 52' LII-:ely 11 3.1 . I Certain ELM SHELEW FHAHHL AT Pehhle Water F'i eline [#111111 We FJWE A 31-, 3,1331: BHEIWH TH DEAF: new He. ef Leaks LIL VAN - JEHHIHE 3-51 - 2 - - LAWRENCE '33" - 2 5 - JEFFE 1:111 SWITEERL 1:1 5 . - - E'l- 1:an - - 3F - = nterstates . 331;. - 3115.3 PHE E1 eels 1 WFee LJS Reutes - E?ritieal Ceunties PEHFW . -- Hwers SPEH A 1e a: A: e: EUHEH .3545? Miles 1? ?13% ?eas til? MId-?m?n?a Earlhquak'? cal-?Er e1' the amen-1 damage stir. Fer mes pie-asle- the stash?? melmelt'GUIDE nlepal Iluee?c?t-r IMPACT EDI. T35 Prisens - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Mil? Event March EDDIE R's ?a 'r EL El] GRINT 3'31- . PERT . - Eit- _1 1-: WHI _Erj'i . PUHTEH - FLILTGN sass WHEASH NEENRRIG 3'5 s. PARKE RM . I 31 CLAY SHELEW NIGN GREENE - JEHHIHE . LAWRENCE 5-- NNGN. . .59. . - . JEFF '53 15E. CDT i Rw?m? ETD 331;. GRANGE Fi?" - I WFIZIH 1' . PEHFW EUHEH . PF HIIWARL Lam-zip El - Jeff was REN 3531"? TETIZIH .53 it .315 I - GNT GN1ER . 5.4m: HAND rh-lx I FRNET - GRN _?jl IZIHI El State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Ne. ef ?eunty Facilities Daviess 1 Duheis Git-sen Greene 1 1 Ends 1 Pike 1 1 1 2 1 1 Pusey Spenser Sullivan Vanderhurgh Warriel-z Legend ll Prisens MMI = nterstates LJS Reutes El?ritieal Eeunties Hitters 10 a: a: a: .3545? luliles l" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at rlJalaallampa Lu. USP. r3. TleresaJ-a-Tt- E-IZII. ?"951:me mute-s are ?ea: ?atetpermee- the gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'letl clan age 5111?. Far de-TIHtIens Elf-30mph and Least Mulerat' clan JJR sates pleas-e- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI T35 Railway Bridge at DayF 1 - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March EDDIE mm IZISE PUHTEH Header-1a 33:1" HALL a? ?h ?11 . - . 1-. JASPER . WHITE CREE. Sari 2.1 HTIH an we . .. WELLE- MIAMI GRANT . -1. . 35 El CLIHTIZIN wen. DEAR JEHHIHE a? UHI SWIT LAWEEHC . El 15.0." are 133? 331* aeanee FIHE El DIS "eeaere WRENCH Haem?ean State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} He. ef Tetal Canny Fune?enal He. ef Faeilitiee Facilities Greene 1 1 Hnex 2 2 Sullivan 1 1 1Il'anrlerhurgh 2 2 [review-e [rulmie Gillie-cm Pike Peew Sneneer Warrielr Legend Bridge Funetienality [lamr 1 i Net Funetienal . Fune?enal = n1eretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Rivers 1a a: a: a: 145? l'ulilee 1i" Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center LII at Malaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le Grille?3 WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at e1 the speen'led clan age 5111?. Far mum-s Inf-lemme and Leaet MacleraF clan JJE ?nes mule-e- can": 11-? attained F1 IMPACT TEHMIHLI Railway Bridge Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Eyent Marel'iEC-DS State of Indiana r-ia'i ?wail-i - - - a . mm? Critical Ceuntiee {11} . .II Hwy. F'D?'?ikI?i Ecun'ty Tatiana" $33: CEImFlete Lia-i I 1 IHECJUHD 33- Facilities Damage Damage :11 .- a STAREE WREHALLI Dreene 1 - Tl .121} LE km: 2 Sullivan 1 PLILaei-ii?h Wn?emum? 3 '3 WHEHSH Ha Dan-lees \eaee ?Ti? Bibi-In .. Pike HT Speneer 'I.I'I.I'arriek Legend Railway Bridge Damage At Least Moderate . Highly Unlikely Unlikely Maderate Likelineed Ci Highly Likely . :Fhle-Hlem-a. I Certain TH may! ?Salaam? Railway Segment Damage 33-} as? At Least Moderate . Highly Unlikely a Unlikely Maderate Likelinead = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Cauntiee Hiyere a 1D a: an a: ?15? 1'1? are ?ea: Earlhquak'?' at meeting the apeeh'lekl damage a?lt. Fer PI EIIU 55.1: UI Uni-rem UrIJ-aI-EI-CIJ-ll'npayl. USP. ante-5 pie-age- 119 am?ieij mummie- r3. Eliaalal. PrdeetP nlelial llut- FC- F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEFEMIHILI EDI. T313 Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event March EDDIE PEEP :r . I 1 -- - Ri?ee" . SHHT aeER er ., 5 LEEWELE EH m1; . ALE -- - 331.?- PM elude HALL -- 3331 - '1 4. 1'1" "521": . . I: 1?31JASPER I Elli WHITE "Eh . HIJHTIH ,1 . . - . 1 items . RRDEL WELLS F-F- we? Lama.ell'l?' wen 331a . Willi: TLRTEIH . . ?ll?35 2} HAND - . . DHT DMEH -- 'ewe": m4 . . . .33. cal-:- "1 FARHE i 52 -- 4} . Jay-:3" . . - maReRH. I . . ELM. 1 3?1 SHELEW- - . . . FEAHHLI - if? ewe .real leLeR - m: . ?323:1?? - 1 - JJEAR EIRH tiEREEHE - . - . elem-tea - LAWRENCE ?5'5 . . DHI HwyReyIEee . Rye-I JEFF an - in 15gELARR "e1? . . .3311- EIRAHRE 515.3 I I I PHEWFDH i. 1+ . H, II . EUHEH State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee Tctal Me. At Least mm late ef Faeilities Damage amage 21 DLtueis 21 Git-sen Greene linen-c 13 Pike 5 Pusey 14 Speneer 13 Sullivan Warriek 21 Legend Seheel Damage At Least Mederate . Highly Unlikely Unlikely lyleclerate Lil-:eliheelzl Highly Lil-:ely I Certain = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Hiyere 1a a: 45L lulilee 1'1" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJalaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. calm-e are ?ea: ?at-npermee- the gear-5t at meeting the speen'letl clan age state. Fer eT'CaTuple- 13' and Leaet Meclera?e' clan all? ?nes pleaae- eelelrt 1H attaeletl FEEDSMEHT F1 IMPACT T353 Seheel Funetienality at [layF 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Ml? Event March sees State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} He. ef Tetal Functic-nal He. cf Facilities Facilities [levies-s 21 21 31 [Illinois 21 21 1. sin-5m 1e 2D case I 1 Greene 1-4 14 5.7' anx 18 1a I- Fil?i?- 5 5 WELLS Pesey 14 14 Spencer 13 13 Sulliv an 1llanderlJuurgli 14 WM Warrick 1E: 21 1 33-?11.3.1 Legend Scheel Lm? . a 1 - 5' DAVIESS 1 NetFunctIenal -- .. 't . Functienal 333 = nterstates LJS Heutes 39'5' 'c?ewfree-r [3 It. IEEI eun IE3 Rivers 1e 2e a: .1545? luliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. candles are acute ?at?permce the gear-ct e1' resell-g the cpech'led clan age 5111?. Far tle-TIHtIc-Ic eT'CempIe and Luz-act Mcdera?e' clan all? came phace 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI T40 Tetal Debris - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Ml? Event March EDGE Hammeni 396% EL STELISEII ISSEPH 3] -- A11 FDHTEH- HEISEILIHIZI STAR _33 ITALS 3 3'3" 31 I t' 1131? 1111A HALL "Mi- . l, 15% - SASPES _315' 5:1" 93-3- HE: Eli-i PLILAEHI WAEPLSH LL SASS -- .- WHITE 3 -_33 HIJHTIH - - EHTSH . ASAMS I: WELLE- jg . ?mm? LASI-IFS - 3A3 WEE '33 ELIHTEIH ELAWAS TAI _53 3331.. Whitman SAHS PH - IZIHT IZIMEH ?3 311. IS 33_. - _313 1-1 -- . PARKE PU HM Terra tex?jp? 32? 31 SHELET - ELM . ML FSAIIHLI ?'33 WE 11131133 31 '_31 333.: 3 TH SEAS SSH LIL VAN BIDS Tin 13.1 .35.. LAWSEIISE .353. . - ANSI-1. . . - SWITEESL F's? JEFFE SII 33 133 . SST SLASH 331-I SSAHSE 51153 PII1E SSIS . WFDH PEHFW HASSISSII . SPEH State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Censrete! Tetal Gaunt]: Weed Steel Debris [Tens] [Tens] [Tens] Dauiess 3 .431 T33 3.333 2 .137"? 3.7"54 3113333 1333 3.133 Greene 3134 133 1.313 111-.33 1 .133 134 1.333 3133 4331 1.433 3.113 Pussy 1 .4443 EDS 1.652 Spenser ESE 313 33 3T3 34333 33.?34 143.433 WarricI-I 13.333 3.431 13.333 Legend Tetal Debris Tens Majer Cities I - .1 DEVI - . SSI - 333 333 = nterstates LJS El?ritieal Rivers 1S SS AS a: 34?5? Miles 1P Mid-?meriea Earlhquake Center UI Una-rattler at Maladliampa Lu. USP. r3. ?'?i?tlr EDI. -:IrtIe:-IIe:-u1ie-3 are 13:33 ?at-3Tp3ri3lee- the gear-3t resell-g the Spa el1'l3d clan agre- 31'113. a_ 3 Arm-3 3-333-1- e3 3lrt 133 attest-3d F1 TEEIJIHLI T41 Tetal Fepulatien (2000} - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: li?i?ir Event State ef Indiana Critical Ceuntiee (11} LIE-GRANGE Hammeni '32" enunty Pepulatien a ran-Le Daviess $1,373 guildF I 52,739 Gihsen 50,515 35' 3-1 reene ?18,832 FLILTIZIH waeaeH Hnex 59133 - - .21; ?Tm FIRE 23,5253 . an rae MIAMI GRANT WELLE- 31"]33 '3 MD if cm I: Sullivan 33,5?3 5" came? TIPTDH ELHWM 1 mirilnuderlnurgh 33" jg Warnek 55,152 Legend Tetal Pepulatien Tear a .313 PLI - Terr ut man: 3.001 - - ELM FHAHHLI WED ?l:1 IZIWE ?ai MEIH HCI eeawn DEAF: TH AM GREEN 1i? to JENNIHE Majer Cities LAWRENCE enema ?Hm EWITEE i enema pale a 15;: . am am Dan = nteretatee EEI SHIHETEI 331 GRANGE a DIS eeawme LJS Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee HAHHISEIH . vi Hm ere SPEH 1a a: a: a: 1-3-45? Miles ?esta Earlhquak'?' e1' the epeen'led demagne- atit. Fer 55.1: rat" LII line-rem- at Llrualaaliampagl. LISA ems pie-aera- EDWIN: 11-? attained (helm-e- Pm r3. PrdeetP niepal Illa-B- auger-r F-Z- F1 TEFEMIHIZI T42 Waste Water Facilities Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March tetra 'et- EL - State eflndiana ?DHT .313 Ceuntres {11} i 3m? Tatar He Least . a in HDELE Ecunty er art . - HUSCJUHD If: HALE Faeilities Damage 5' 7' 33ml? e- a. STAR HALL _Elauiess 5 [r _tt1 . ?31? . WHI . [Mania :3 -- ?r 351T . - . {a airaaen a .ates .35 -- areere a HE: art . PULHEHI wagagH LL rtnee . Pike 3 . _am WHITE - __th .. Pesey -- Speneer EHTDH I . . I .. Sullivan I MIEMI. WELLE- I'l'larl?ertlug'l 3 - :1 m? -W ,ee' . Legend war: HEN. 52 Em Waste Watel F??ilil'j' Damage . 1- eat . At Least Metlerate Elli-4T DMEH - - . WEE 1 In re - ..J. -- '?El3 . . - - a __313Mederate Lrltelrheed THREE . - a L'rt I 32? IE 3" I ?mm? I Certain 3?1 SHELEW - ELM a - . :3th I . . AT Waste Water Pipeline Damage . tEt . 331 Veeutt-ert -TH - LrEete aert He. at Lealts LIL "mt-I GREENE . JEHHIHE El - 2 a . tater-ts LAWRENCE e53. . 2 5 rtrrett. . a . .- JEFFE DH eerzErtL El 5 -1 ELAHH "a . 3313' . = nterstates HrtE . - a ears . mime . US Heutes - are -- - - E?rrtreal Ceuntres PEHFW Haeersert 9' SPEH WW3 rt EUHEH ED 4] EU 4 Miles Mid-?m?ri?? Earlh?uak? and 55.1: ante-e pit-aet- 11-.t attested Prd-tetPnIepal llute'?i?tlr Fri-F: IMPACT EIZII. T43 Airport Damage - Wabash Valley Seismic: Zene: MR1 Event March EDDIE State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Tea-a EU a . . - .IHT . - . HujseILIHe - '1 . . . a 331. .?TeFt Hue HALL -- ElWHI .I'i?ll .- HE FHETEIH . LE WHITE CASS nrgj?mn; ?55 'l I . --.. . Hue-His . n: HHEILL WELLs ?2 f? . 31"? Hat-men ill 4' I -. - 4e: was 3531?21. . . . a ILTEIH. -I .- HT EIH1EH EH IE. Ell l-llilil I . ?a FREE .151T aw HIEIH - . ,?Eil . 331' . El TH - JEHHLHE . - LAWREHIHriH DH 151' e. CDT a? say, 5133 I) I IHFEE. I - lesaH va I: 1 I. I. I. QHEH EUHEH Tetal Me. At Least Ecurty er Heelerate Faailitis Damage 3'3 _Elauiess 1 [Heels 2 Git-sen 7' Greene 3 linen-c 4 Files 2 Pusey Spencer 5 Sullivan 1 hl'an-zlererg': 5 3 Legend Airpert Facilityr Damage ?at Least Metlerate - Highly UnliHely a LJnliHely Mederate Lil-:eliheed Highly LiHely I Certain = nterstates US Reutes E?ritieal Eeunties Rivers 1a a: a: .3545? Miles l" Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at Malaclampa gt. USP. r3. Prllelnal Ilueatgatur ezuu?t-a are ?ea: ?at-emanate? the gear-at e1' resell-g the apeen'letl clan age 5151?s. Fer earl-rum Elf-30mph- and Least Mmlera?e' clan a'atea please- ezulalrt 1H attaeled F1 IMPACT e14 Airpert at DayF 1 - Wabash Valley Seiamie Zane: M11 Event March EDDIE - .5 . 3.1! La STELIEIEH i Jig-waeaaH l'lu . . jar- 1' 5-7 - arm-me . "w 1* WM LAWRENCE - . . E5 a?rszEHL DHAHEE 5133 I State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiea {11} lle. ef Tetal Ceunly Funetienal He. ef Faeili?ea Facilities 1 1 [lulmie 2 2 Gilleen i' i' Greene 3 3 Hum: 8 Pike 2 2 P?eey a 5 Spencer 5 5 Sullivan 5 i' 5 5 Warriek 3 3 Legend Airpert Funl::ti+:malit5lr Day1 I NatFune?anal Fune?anal = nteratatea LJS Reutea El?ritieal Cauntiea Rivera a: a: a: ?45? lulilea Mid-America Earlhquaka Canter LII Luz-rally at rlJaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. E-IZII. ?"951:me Grille?3 WINE-5 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-at prenatally e1' the ape-alum clan age 5111?. Far eT'Canple- and Leaet Mmlera?e' clan JJE mes pleaa-e- can": lie attaelea F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI T45 Werst Case Casualties (2mm- Wabash Valley Seismie Zane: M11 Event March sees State of Indiana n12 - CrItIeal Ceuntles {11} dsE ?a Tetal rle. mun-II - LE Iseunt" e1' HDSCIUHD 33 5' HALE 59 were: newsman is I :7 ?21 3:33 33 _3_5 .31 ll Green-a- m? ?333 Is: sass Penal" I95 3 :53 WHITE EEL- HTJH spin nJear AB M3 33 33 - 2.333 IEEI 2.9-3? . EHRHIZILL . a I and 3; Legend Casualties El - ?lEl Terr at "'de MEIR sen - ELM, - 5D '15] FRAHHLI - EWE Man an: IE1 - - 331 eeawn TH - LIEAFI 25'] 354 an GREEN Elm: ii] is JEHHIHE Majer CltlES LAWRENCE . I - . - JEFF SWITEE . - 5] . - F53 = nterstates 31 de?nes LJS Reutes eeswme aw: EeuntIes PEFIFW Haas-IsaEUHEH .3545? Miles IE3 Earlhquak'?' at reading the speen'led damage 5111?. Far 55.1: LII at LanaIa-Ctampagl. sates pie-aera- 11-? attested deem-I- r3. Ell-33ml. FC- F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHIZI EDI. ??951:me T45 Cemmunieatien Faeility Damage - Wabash Valley Seiemie Zene: M11 Event 1 . State eflndiana ?13 .313? . ua Ceuntlee {11} . . ehm 33-1. .31 ?e I: ?t T-:ta 11:. AtLeast ELI 11'. Elf .: ?lial: 33 .- . Faeil'rLies Damage Damage 1.33137Git-sen 235 {Dag?ill . "at I - Eur-Em 2313 3131 1 1? Pike 1251g. 3'1 I. I i .11] a 1 12? .351 1' ., . E1.- sp?r?w 1:34 11? EH'rerl 1- - . - Male wan 312? . .11- . . .- I 1 213 :11 71fwane H, a 3? A . . +55! 3311 52 . -. . uniln'f'. . i'Ellh '1 35 If. Ill. - I I'jhl m1: 35.2-513%" Legend EliCelnmunlcatlen Damage r1111: At Least Mederate 4" WE Ellie . 1. - HighlyUnlikely 331II. 15-51.: UhllkEIEl'l I i .II - I Mederate Likellheed r-'e?rm . w? 1 - . JEF .314 leely . . . . .131:21am jH?. 1-: = nteretatee in ?331, UHRHGE- 513- 1 HE 1- US Heutee a I I. 111313111:: E?rmeal Ceuntlee .- II: pf; . i . HER 'Hwere .21:: a: . EUHEH :st l'u1ile5 Mid-?m?ri?a Earlhquak? Cani?r Ep?i?fi?n??a??f -. rates mule-a- 11-? attaeied melmelt'GUIDE nlepal "unmet-r IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEFIMIHIZI FIJI. Dams - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: Event March EDGE - I .- a 3] LAEHAFE W-ITE FLILTIZI cass I . inseam WELLE- Tu State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} MD. of ?aunt!?r Facilities Daviess 1a Dulacis 3&1 Gihsan Greene 19 anx Pike 25 Pcsejlr 5 Spencer 11 Sullivan 31 22 Warl?iclt 15 Legend I Dams MMI till - a WI - = nterstates LJS Rcutes El?ritical Ecunties Rivers 1c 21:: a: a: ?45? luliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. EDI. are acute ?at-stpermce- tie gear-st c1' reacting the specified clan age 5111?. Far and Least Mc-clera?e' clan aJe sates pleas-e- camrt 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI T48 Displaced PopulatiDn - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: M11 Event March EDGE Hantlnent 596% EL STEUEFEH -13- SAINT DSEPH 3U. . a EH - rlDeLE AH PUHTEH i-iDSelLli-iD km.- STAR i-iALe .. _i rilA HALL 33? 221? 531-33- L. WHI - thl'i?F'EFi 25' 5:1" . 233- ME: PLILAEHI WAEPLSH LL SASS -- WHITE . -i_2-1 - HIJHTIH - - EIITDII - ADAMS I: WELLS . MIFLMI - SAT WAI: SEll E313. TIPTDII ELAWAS TAI _52 mama] PH - DIIT DMEH Dll' IE. - Ef?i. m4 - HCIZI l-i -- - PARKE Terre te'?jp? . 32- UHl?'lIm? riilDSSAIl 31 SHELSS - ELi'l't?l? I- ?55' MDIISD "Li?i 331 I TH Dell LIL HIM til-II JEHHIHE . LAWSEIISE 'Ei'j . - - SWITEERL JEFFE SS DDT In. KWASHIHETD 231:. - DSAIISE 31133 Pli-iE SDIS . I: WFDH WRENCH PEHFW HASSISDII anew SPEH SUSSH State of Indiana Critical CeuntieS {11} Emmet-eat EIiSDIEi-zned El F'DDulm Eleni-ES A: IDS ElutIDis 1 3 Lee? ASSI Greene 2.333 6.6413 Pike F'Dsley Spender Sullivan 31 SS 5.344 14.226 Warriek Legend Displaced Pepulatien - 5 - - 1 - - 5.001-14225 Majer CitieS - meme 253 SDD = nterStateS LJS El?ritieal ID AD ED MileS Mid-Ametiea Earthquake Center LII Iuerettr at rLiala-Ctampa gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. EDI. are Daze ?atetpermei- tie gear-St at meeting the Speen'led dam age Stir. attempti- and Lia-Set clan Sate-S Dime-i- tie attaeted F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI 2'49 Electric Fewer Facility Damage - Wabash Valley Seismic che: MR1 Eyent March EDDIE ceE 133% - . ceeirice" a a Iii-H - IU . _33 Le rite - 3'1 l/ - it 2?wa'eaeH . I caee 12:1 . I were caeecLi. .lw ELLeh__E.y_i - 110:. - 35; I I. If were eeri 31a . aw .52 I I I ?1311 are, .30 eerie 33: I EH yer ri' MEE-I I I: m4 - . rec i-i- . 1' . . QIEU fr? . edi-i 52? rii ELe'E111 53-1 BREW - ceri - riiri . ric . ERL __-iri JEF -_5c 15:: cm .. waeHi i Eii?. '33? GE 5133 Fri-i - - WAR eceeH State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} T-:ta tic. At Least Eanty cf ii'lccleiate mm? Facilities Damage *9 [Lit-dis 4 Eibscn 1' [i Greene i'fnci-i 15 3 Pike 14 F'ceey Spencer 3 SLlliya'i i3 3 1-4 'Ii'iierrick 12 Legend Electric Fewer Facility Damage ?it Least lIilcderate - Highly Unlikely -. Unlikely lyicderete Likelihccd {Ti Highly Likely I Certain Electric Tran ernieeicri Linee = nteretatee US chtee E?ritical Ccuntiee Hiyere ic ec ac a: d; l'ulilee 1'i" Mid-America Earthquake Center UI at rLiaIa-Ciampa Ul- USP. r3. Iluli' ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. Critical candles are ijcie ?atetperience tie gealeet prdieclily c1' reacting the specified daii age eiate. dethitlme ct'cdripiete' and daii aJe e'ertee calelit ?e attached F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Emergeneyr Dper. Center Damage - Wabash Valley Seismie Zene: M11 Event MarehE??E Eh - State of Indiana P-IZIHT . STEUEEH Ceuntlee {11} . ENHT .- Tam HZI p't gt 3] . . ea RENEE LE . Eeurty ef Made-ate 333$? . El HHLE Faeilitiee Damage 9 331-" a STAR HALL Fine'35? "4.51, Speneer 1 JAE PER . -- . _3'11- Sullivan 2 HE wa'eAeH LL "-I?andertureh 1 I3 '3 CASS . WHITE - HEB - ?5 eta-jg HIJHTIH . - E'te - -- AMMS elm-:2 canteen . . MIAMI WEL L3 2? Pike. PP HMARLEE, LJ-JLEHFD El wen HEN ELAwae Tit?? 35". Harm - . . IZIHT IZIMEH . IE. Eli EHQHIC 53.; - _Efl_3_. .. neeLegend - . I .53. mil-Eh" MUR eat: 31. - Emergency er. ICenter Damage LEHEI M?iler?IPLET Highly Unlikely 5, 331' 8 TH We DEAR CIR LIL VAN GREENE Jam-tee . - - - . . LAWRENCE . DH. a Mederete Likellheed HHDH - . . . . . . . EWITEEHL {3 Highly Likely _eemE-ee . arm JEFFE Cerialn - . . n. -I mam: = nteretatee 711;,? 331-. GRANGE 515:. . US Reutee eele . I: WFIZIF-E .. DVD E?ritieal Ceuntiee WAHHIEH EEHFW Haemeeu Riv ere 1a a: a: EUHEH .3545? l'u1ilee i" IE5 Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI manure-:1 the Epeen'htl damage 5111?. Far 55.1: atLanaIa-Ctampagl. antes plane-a- eznlelrt 11-? attained rIeeIm-e- r3. Eliaetal. PrqeetP nlepal Inu-e- ?'?i?tlr Fi IMPACT TEFEMIHILI 'I'tereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. ??9512me 7?51 EDC Functionality at Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seismic che: Event March acca State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} . LAEHAHEE SEIHT DEE t: DB LE c_ He. cf Tctal HDSEMHD E: Ceunty Functional He. cf a; HALL 53'? . Facilities Facilitiae a IE1 . WH anJt El 1 JASPER 35?. I P?sw 1 I .. are: I .1 case 32.1 WI-IITE . __24 ?Tm 1 1 . EHTEH . . . an MS Device-e MIAMI .3an WELLE- . - Gillacn an 35_ care I: 1e Jar cL TIZIN wan. Em- 3 3 arnc 52 1. . HAND 51211 351' . . HELEN: mace-en SHELEW - FHAHHLI HENRI: Ea" 391::er 3 TH . mare Legend :11" CHI SWIT JEHHIHE Emergencyr Up?l?ti?ll lCenter .LAWHEHEE Functicnalityr at Day1 El DAVIES I Met Functicnal "i '?ff 1* Functicnal = nteretatee 3311 IZIF-EAHEE FIHE US He utee "ceache DVD Ecuntlee WAR RICH . . Haeelecu Hwere SPEH 1e 2c a: 43.45.? l'ulilee 1" Cli?l?ll??l?i? til? Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI pram-Int,- c1' the epecn'htl damage 5111?. Far 55.1: rate" LII at LanaIa-Clampagl. rates plane-a- 11-? attache-:1 r3. Eliarlal. PrqectP nlcpal llut- F: IMPACT 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- E-IZII. ??951:le T52 Fire Station Damage - Wabash Valley Seismie Zene: MT.1 Eyent March EDDIE WAF- ESEI I v. 1.4" PenT . El?ll?w-IT 'a II .iae HALL a? {in LL 5 weenieg taeegee LE4. a PEnny Langa 4m Etill?l 33 ll . . m?r 11' MERE-EM 'rieienea ll! Kawaeamgfa GRANGE Tig? - meal 35:" . . WEI: Le 1 13H Fj? ADE lI' II-IZIHI .ei-ynieel. HE State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Tctal He. kt Leaat Complete Ccunty ef Hedeiate Damage Faeilities Damage Davies: 12 DLtieis 14 Git-sen 13 Greene 14 linen-c 19 Pike :3 Pesey 1D Speneer Sullivan 12 26 'I.I'I.I'arriek 11 Legend Fire Static-n Damage At Least Metlerate - Highly Unlikely -.. Unlikely Mederate Likelineed {3 Highly Likely I Certain = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Rivera 4] Miles k4 "Jr. Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at rlJaIadllampa gt. USP. r3. EIIHMHL IIUE e?gatur 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-emulate? the gear-5t ei' maellig the speen'htl clan age 5131?. Far attempte- ta' and Leaet Mmlera?e' clan aJe gates glean- ezuirlrt 1H attaeletl F1 IMPACT FE EHT TE Fl MIHILI LEG T53 Fire Stetien Funetienelity at Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seiemie Zene: M11 Event March . State 0f Indiana -n meuaEn Ceuntlee {11} 3'3 He. 01 Tetel 1 HeeL Tt . "Strung.r Fune?enal He.ef 1 . Facilities Feeilitiee 11311 WH [Ia-?eas 11 12 1 EFL [Iuheie Gilieen 13 13 i Jan- - Greene 14 14 Hnex 1EI . 1 .. meme Pike E: Pile-.1511I 4 LAEHFD .. El Spell-leer i i AM. Sullwen 12 12 WM ELMIFAH. . . Unntlerliurgh 25 25 3311 . 1 Wenieh 11 11 1 1 1 HAND .35- I.- -1. I: B- 1I- IZIHT i I. I ?1 -- 1?3.5? . 1 I1 1- 5:511th th?djn'?' .ELMI- I1 i - . 1: H-HLI D. i DIME 111:"351511111 1 .-- FEE 9151.11 new Legend were i TH JEHHIHE - .51? ?re Stetlen I .- 1.11 EHEIE 'JEFF DH i NetFunetienel __I;15yIEee . 11 . . 1 . 5?9. 1 ee' 1 Funetlenel I- I i . Ef??i? =1 nteretetee ".113: gay,- . SHAME-E [1115Heutee eel: . 1 . . DVD Ceuntlee WARRI 1 . i :1 -: 1 1:91; EEHH Hwere 1. 1' 1e 21:: 11:: e: EUHEH .3545? l'u1ile5 l? IE3 ?at-3111 Earlhquak'?' 11rd1mlrl1'e1' the epeen'lelil damage 514?. Fer 55.12 U311. ante-e pie-aera- EDWIN: 111.1 attain-.1121 nlelnel "unmet-r IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI EDI. T54 Hazardcus Materials Facilities - Wabash Valley Seismic che: M11 Event March EDDS ll 12? ?53* .iJIa! - =94? a; - if? II- UHCI ?nial-IF:- ll. saihwu_ 5? HE ?ill" _1 . h? '35? 31 1 Ir: ME: -.I I.- waeasH . .1 WHITE CREE. I - set-'? 22.5.State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Hc. cf cgunw Facilities Daviess Duhcis Git-sen 45 Greene 4 anx ED Piite F'cseyir 52 Spencer 2-4 Sullivan 1 liltinderleungh T3 SE Legend Hazrnat Facilities MMI an -m - IE = nterstates LJS Reutes El?ritical Ecunties ED ?45? Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. EIIHSIHL Sta-Flt? E-IZII. are arse ?atetpertelce tte gear-st c1' reacting the speci?ed elem age eti?e. cT'CcmpIe and Leaet Mcclera?e' dan aJe e'Ertee please ?e attached Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI 7?55 Highway Bridge Funetienalitjll:Dayr 1 - Wabash Valley Seiernie Zene: M7.1 Event March EDGE 1 WHF I I .5. I ?if: - an 3% . :11? ?and?! - JP. . i, i. State ef Indiana Critical Ceuntiee (11} He. ef Tetal Funetienal lle. ef Facilities: Faeili?eg 135 1 SE [lube-i5 1 ?34 1 ?34 Giheen EEIE EEIE Greene 2I2I1 Hue: 23:3 233 Film 135 1 35 Peew 1EI1 1 EI1 eneel 212 212 Sulliu an 204 204 1Il'anderllnurgl'l 1 EEI Waniel-v; 1T3 1 7'3 Legend Higlnmajlr Bridge Fun-etienalitjlr [Ilayr1 I Met Funelienal . Fune?enal = nteretatee LJS Reutee El?ritieal Ceuntiee Rivers 1a a: a: di? lulilee 1" Mid-?meriea Earlhquake Center LII L'erer?- at male-Clam Lu. USP. r3. ?'?i?tlr 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tle- are ?ea: ?at-experience the deal-at e1 the epeen'led clan age me. Fer and Leaet clan age was phaae- can": 11-? attaeled inellnelt?GUIDE F1 FEEDEMEHT TEE Highway Bridge Segment Damage - Wabash Valley Seismie Zane: M11 Eyent March EDDS WA . 233' . M. J_i lea mar imam?LE- i; I [Eh ?at?TH; 253+ ll, .1 He? Mien 1&3qu I ?l ?twee. '1 3'5? - 'f 'E?l?I-m?l a" I af?ne-lye ?lial?J35 7 . EL 3:th I l' I . l' SEN. 4' Ii I FEET: EL?'?l?ee A'jj I HR ?ee Eu State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Tetal Me. At Leaet lete a Mederete [engage Fadlitiee Damage Dallas 136 194 Site-2n ESE Greene Elli Had-I ESE Pike 136 191 Spencer 212 SlJliyan Ell-4 Ll'arderlzurgh 139 marriek 17"3 Legend Highway Bridge Damage At Least lII'lederate I Highly Unlikely Unlikely lylederate Likeliheed Highly Likely i Certain Highway Segment Damage ht Leaet I'II'lederate Highly Unlikely Unlikely lylederate Likeliheed = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Hiyere a 1D 21:: a: 4L l'ulilee 1i" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at rlJaIaellampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE Su?-Flt? 'l'lereeaJ-a-Tt- E-IZII. candles are ?eze ?at-experience tie gear-5t at meeting the epeen'led clan age e?a?e. Fer attempte- ta' and Leaet Med-Hate" clan aJe e'ETtee pleaee eelelrt lie attaeled F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT Hospital Damage - Wabash Valley Seismie Zane: MR1 Event March EDDIE as 5t .- -- - . LAERAHEE ETELIEEH saiHT . .- a. EH - HDDLE PDHTEH- . HDSDILIHD . - HALE: 331: STAR has .33: - 1.32.151 - - 2i?! . . WHI . -- as. 4-331. FLILTEH wa'EaaH LL WHITE sass {2:53 HIJHTIH :13 . WEL LS i . Hana-En LAEHFD sear was HEN - ?Eli I ELawaE . .52 . - .. Esau gen - 35'. - . DHT DMEH Ehgy . IE. EU - . Eli. HDDH- 1? PMHE . mm 53 min-'? meals-an 31' . SHELEW . - ELM . . an FEAHHLI WEE EWE . Ea. LIL yaw Ea Jam-ass - ?5'5 . DHI aria}: - . . . sayanEL _E_syiE-ss arm JEFF DH in 15g, DDT n' . . KWASHIHETD ELaai-a 331'. EEAHEE 31133 . IDSEIH EEis . I: WFDH . PEHFW EsEa EUEEH State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Total He. a'l'ui Least Deunty Elf h-?I-zuderete Faeilitia Damage mplete Damage Dauiess 1 Dubeis Eibsen Greene ?nes Sui i van Werriel: Pi lae Pesey Spencer Legend Hespital Damage At Least lIile-tlerate . Highly Unlikely -.. Unlikely lyladerate Lilaelihaad {3 Highly Lil-:ely I Certain = nterstates US Heutes E?ritieal Daunties Rivers a 1D a: an .3545? Miles l" Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center UI at Maladllampa gt. USP. r3. Ella??l. ?'?i?tlr E-IZII. ??951:le calms-s are ?eas ?atatparlalee- tha gear-st ET raaellig the speen'latl clan age stir. Fer tie-Tlirtluzuis attempte- b' and Least Meclarata' clan aJ-a a'ertas pleas-e- ezuislrt 1H attest-ad menmait'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEHMIHLI TEE Hospital Funetienality at Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seismic: Zane: M11 Event Marchaeea State of Indiana 1. . . Lasagna? Ceuntlee {11} He. ef Tetal - HIDE: LE 1213mm.r Funetlenal He. at 331-. . Facilities Facilities :21? HALL - Li Davida-e 1 1 M3 FER _3_5 I. Dlheie 2 2 i, LHSHI FULTUH WHEHSH Gil??l] 1 1 Greene WHITE CREE. 2.1 1 1 HTIH ?"01 1 - . an MS Sullivan 1 1 . MIAMI Pike CLIHTIZIN Tlf'm? Spencer ?Jeri FRAHHLI :55" - Legend JEHHIHE . . . - a? Heepltal Funetlenallty LAWRENCE i EWITEE a Day 1 JEFF .. I Met Funetlenal 1530; ea . Funetlenal edema = nteretatee 3311 UHAHEE 15.] WE US He utee "eeaere DVD EeuntIee WARRICH . . Haeeleen Hwere 1a a: a: a: .2345.? l'ulilee l" '3ll'?1?ll?i?l1?'5 are thin! Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI prdnaiulrlr' e1 the epeen'led damage 5111?. Far 55.1: rat" atLanaIa-Clampagl. antes phan- eznlelrt 11-? attaeled deeIm-e- Fm r3. Eliaelal. PrdeetP nlepal Ilu-e- auger-r F: IMPACT E-IZII. ?"9512le Liquefacticn Susceptibility - Wabash Valley Seismic che: M11 Eyent March SUSS Pics .. 1s- LaseAHsE' SAINT DEE E- name .- RH . ES- El cass waeasH WH IT 2-1 Eran?dc HTJH AD MS c?ee'c'LL'3- maur .315] .- 52 mmr- - EHFIZI 'tr day 52 331 i351,? Hana PH gal EH .T cMEe . n: Es?- eases Terr .5in cLey; t1 Hit: .55. - mcesari EWE Hence "Si SEW-H JSBEEH ?les 1 1 to :53. -. LaweEHcE . . sayITzE "cc 331 'cls . 'ceaw'FcH Hassles? State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Hinimum Maxiern Ecurty Susceptibility Susceptibility Elayiess '1de che Sibscn che wary th Greene Llnlunctun Law anI 'hbry th F'ilte che F'csey wary th Spencer che Sullivan Lew WW th cl: che l'u'bdelate Legend Liquefacticn Susceptibility I-tn Ncne - Made rate - ?y?ery ig Majcr Cities 4: i . = nterstates US Heutes E?ritical Ccunties - Rivers 1c cc ac 4-i? l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rbata?CIampa gt. USP. r3. EIIHSIHL PMS-SIP nicpal S'?i?tlr FIJI. PTIIGIJEII ccu?es are ?cre ?atexperblce- the gear-st c1' the damage rat. tie-Turtle? and Least Mud-ara?e' dam aJe rates please- 1H attached IMPACT Mcdi?ecl Mercalli Intensity - Wabash Valley Seismic Zane: MR1 EVent March EDDIE P'tle . LAEHAHEE Eli"? Pceree 3371-. ?u EDELE 3] I ARE _?l21 31 caee 35 clearer: WEE: . HTIH WHITE caeecL-L- Miami GRANT 35 WA Terr FHAHHLI DEAR JEHHIHE- EWITEE El JEFF "cc: II: LAHH GE State of Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} Max. Milli Daviess VII Duhcis VI Gihscn ISreene anx Pike VI Pace!?r VII Spencer VI SulliVan IF: Vanderhurgh VII Wan'iclt VI Legend MMI - VI gr: VII - Majcr lCities . . cancel-rescue = nteretatee LIE Reutee El?ritical Ecuntiee HiVere 1a a: a: .2345; lulilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaallampa gt. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. calm-c are ?are ?at-experience- tle gear-ct prmmInV c1' reacting the cpecn'le? clan age c?a?e. and Luz-act Mc-clera?e' can aJe c'ertec peace 1H attached F1 IMPACT T51 Natural Gas FaeilityF Damage - Wabash Valley Seismic: Zane: M11 Event March ELI-sea eErI .. .HT In: I '3 II . ILII-I 3:5: n- 331' Ell-l I11: I I 1- L. I WHI 35' '31 1-3332 PULHEHL a sH WHITE A35 a HIJHTIH . .. a DIE-MS LL MIAMI ELLs Eri_ . . I 9.5.. eEliEE 5' . . 1,1! r: ?w war: ?31? CLINT II an ml . _52 Tame . 35. . '35lIEIFI 321' 111:. IPLE LI I . . "Ed" IacI-Is . c: If," 51* - El gamEss arm JEFF cm CDT [3mm a? 331,, TIIHFIH I I: - are WA RICH as II II EUHEH State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Tetal Me. At Least Complete County of Moderate Damage Faeilities Damage Tamers 1 Greene 4 2 Elauiess Bibs-an line: F'c-sey Spenser Sullivan 'II'II'arrielI Legend Hatural IGas Facility Damage At Lemt Merlerate - Higl'lyILlnlilcel'I.I Llnliicel'I.I l-I1cuclerate Ulcelihcucuci Higi?iy'Liicel'f Certain Natural Gas Pipelines = nterstates US Reutes E?ritical Ceunties Rivers c: 10 a: a: ?45? Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-rem at Malaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. ?"951:le are ?cce ?atecpermce tie gear-st prcinatulrtr' at meeting the sceelr'lecl clan age 5111?. Far cir-TIrttIc-Is attempte- b' and Least Mcclera?e' clan cares pleas-I- cculcm 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Oil Facility Damage - Wabash Valley Seismic che: Event March EDDIE 3] gag-3E AeeArIeE" j- - ?Ln k7: cILIkc a MA HALL - 7' WHI r. 34.5" en. en t"sir-e. WERE LL WHITE CREE. {jg?Hun . - .. AcAiyis eecLL WELLS TIPT WAR 331HAND - - - I Eli32? urn-39? wk 31 - - - sHELee - - ELM . - .. AT relcnec . . "El: 3:31- ee-cwn - cEAe' can . EHEEHE - - Ike =35LAyeeEncE LEE . . IZIHI . . -- . - syITzEeL F's? . arm JEFFE en 15'; . CDT . {3mm 3313* - ceAneE eL wees PEFIFW I. f; eueeH State cf Indiana Critical Ccunties {11} Tctal Me. At Least Echty cf Medal?ate ?ag? Facilities Elan'iace Eibscn i" 1 Greene 2 Pike 1 Pcsey 14 SLlliuan 2 2 3 Elauiess [Lit-dis Spencer Legend Dil Facility Damage At Least Mcderate . Highly Unlikely Unlikely Likelihccd 42} Highly Likely I Certain Dil Pipelines = nterstates LIE Reutes E?ritical Ecunties Hiyers 1a a: A: e: .3545? Miles l" Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. czuu?ee are Itese ?atetperielce tie gear-st c1' reacting the speci?ed elem age state. cT'CcmpIe and 'At Least Mcclera?e' clan a_ e e'Ertee pier-lee celelrt ?e attached F1 IMPACT T53 Peak Greuntl - Wabash Valley Seismie Zane: M711 Event March 2555 . LAEHAHEE Hamment 12-? saIrIT asE '3 . HaseIIJI-za a El 'p55229 eai- t? 5'1 HALL .. .521 WH . .311 FLILTIZIH sass #13 PE H. . WEE: FLSH . .31.: WHITE - 11-155 aae- 'eaeehLL; '3 . . 52 __seam 3-5 . WA Terr FRAHHLI DEAR :53. . UHI EWITEE "as sH+rIsTa GE Hassles? El State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} I'Il'lil'l. Mai-L Ila-untilr P511 P511 Dauriess I115 I125 Dull-sis I115 I115 Gilisen I115 I125 Greene I115 I125 lines I125 I145 Pike I115 I115 Pesezilr I115 I125 Snell-eel I115 I115 Sullivan I125 I155 1II'amlerliurglI I115 I125 WarrieH I115 I115 Legend I105 - 0.15 - I115 - DEE 53?: I125 - 0.35 I135 - 0.45 - I145 - DEE Majer Cities sauna-155,555 . 255551-255555 = nterstates LJS Reutes El?ritieal Eeunties - - 1a a: a: 54L luliles 1i" Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r5. Eliaslal. niepal ??i?tlr EDI. calm-s are 11ers ?at-experience the gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer eT'CaTuple- 12' and Least Mmlera?e' clan aJe sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT T54 Peliee Stetien Damage - Wabash Valley Seismic: Zene: Event March Eh - - State eflndiene ?er - 3 .. . - P-DHT .333 . lErltleel Ceuntlee {11} . . STELIBEH . 43' TetlHe 3t 1 :Ejr :f I EDI-?mew 133-: . . E: HeLe' Feeiliti-E Damage Damage 3? a .me HALL - . 3 3 3 31 ?3312313,. EILtueis 3 3 I3 . "33? 3-1-1: Gite-en 3 3 3 JASPER . -- . Elli Ereere 5 FLILTIZIH Pike 4 3 3 WHITE HEEL: HIJHTIH 315 Pesey 3 3 3 Speneer 2 . . I . Sullivan 3 3 3 a . WELLS EniLbJI-gh 3 3 PP HMAREI?l??l wen 331? 3 . . ELewee ".533. . IZIMEH emw eH' . 35 . eueele - . . m4 . .513. . nee. - PARKE m3: . . 7? Legend -JIZIH - 53 431? rel-rM?il?l'tUnlikely _at1'. 31' 4 .TH 3-15.36? eeH LIL were -. - - . . eater-tee -- - - - - LAWRENCE 55-J- . IZIHI leellheed enee - . . . . . . . - . . - EWITEEHL {3 Highly LII-tely . erm . . eh . 13:3, cm I Certain ELAHH = nteretetee "31} 231'. 5215Heutee eele . I: wree .. DVD E?ritieel Ceuntiee I WAFERIEH PEHFW HARRIEDH Rivere 1e 3e e3 EUHEH .3545? l'u1ilee ?ere Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI e1' the 3 :een13tl damage 31:413. Fer 13" 55.1: 3Ete3 plane-3 eelelrt 113 atteetee melmelt'GUIDE Michal Iluee?t?t-r IMPACT E-IZII. TEE Feliee Stetien Funetienelity at Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seismie Zene: M11 Event March EDDIE PLHEE DEE HeeLEi HEECILIHI: 3] I PEI :55; I- ARE HALL a #121 . .31 55?. PU Leer-{I JASPER . WAE: HSH WHITE CREE. HTIH - . . an we - - RRIZILL MIAMI - WELLE- Sui-3'- . MHEHAFT . 35_ new: EI- ELevieH- tit" 35;. eerie . DEAR UHI SWIT JEHHIHE 1- . 15 Eli GRANGE II ere WAHHICH 1- n- HAHRIEDH State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} He. ef Tetel Funetienel He. ef Feeilitiee Feeilitie? [Ia-Him [lubeie Gilleen Greene Fine}: Pike Pee-e; Spencer Sullivan Umule?mrgh Werrielr Legend Peliee Stetien Funetienelitjlr Dey1 i Net Funetienel . Fune?enel = nteretetee US Heutee E?ritieel Ceuntiee Rivers 1e 21:: e: 545? lulilee 1i" Mid-Ameriee Earlhqueke Center LII DIE-fell.- at Mela-Clamps! Lu. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. are ?ere ?at-experience the gear-5t prenatally er resell-g the clan age 5111?. Fer :le-TInltlens eT'Cemple- and Luz-35?: Meclera?e' clan JJE 5W5 phan- e:u 5lrt 1H ettaeled Fl:- Fi IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEMIHLI Part Damage - Wabash Valley Selemle Zane: M11 Event MarehED?E ?ej- EL - State eflndiana ~12r _1r "h . . . P-DHT .333 Critical Ceuntlee {11} 3mm LAERMEE STEUEEH .- ?El. l?lt Leagt HIE HUELE Cf . HDSEILIHIZI a Faa'li?es Elamaae Damage 333i; STAR . .. e. HALL Spencer l: 1.. WHI eeraerbergh 4 . 35? were-eh 2 JASPER . . -- .. Ella. Git-ean WHITE 12:15" HIJHTIH e15 ereere - Hm: . . .. enema Pike I: RRIZILL WELLS - ?11 . . PP ?an; HMAREI LaeHFa El elm WEE HEN CLWEH921:: -_35 ll- HAND - ".333. aH' . In El? lineal: m4 - _Efl_3_. H- -- 5.3? 7? Legend - 53 471? my! UHID - 31. . . F'ert Damage ?t M?d?ll?t? "wee - . . . 1qu IPLET HighlyUnllkely 331- TH DEAF: new LIL were GREENE UHIIEEW MEHSD - - LAWRENCE DH. Mederate Likellheed HHDH - . . . . . . EWITEEHL a {3 Highly LII-:ely _aemE-ee . em JEFFE ah . {in 1'55", CDT I Certam n' I . . Re?ehmnem CLARK = nteretatee "aj 231'. GRANGE 315.3 . US Heutee leeaH EDIE '3 .. . DVD Ceun?nee WAHHICH FEHFW . . Heemeau Rwere 1a a: an a: EUHEH .3545? re1ilee IE5 Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI prmenlrle' e1' the epeen'ml damage 5111?. Far 55.1: Hill? e'EItee plane-a- eznlelrt 11-? nlepal Iw-e-e?gat-r IMPACT TEFEMIHILI 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EIZII. ?"9512me Petable Water Facilities Damage - Wabash Valley Seien'iie Zane: MR1 Event March EL - State of Indiana ?12 l' . hi5- i 1311111111353] Critical Ceuntiee {11} . .1 -6- DEEPH 1.3131 11:. Least in?: Complete EH Cf Elam .UFELE. Facilities Elan-lane 3'9 . _33 El HALE [Ia-.Iiees 2 [i [i 1 Bill 1 STAR HHLL .3133 EILt-eie 3 .3 _a ?21? I. - 241.. Git-sen Greene 1 Liee .35 -- HFEIZI: 1 1 13 ME: Eli-l FIJI-HEW WHEASH LL Pike 2 - F'eaey 1 EASE. ab Spa-leer 1 - HIJHTIH - Sullivan 2 2 . . enema aeraertiugi-i 1 i: RHIZILL WELLEMIME 1 35 Laei-iFa MIT. I I wan HEN 12:31;- Petal} le Water ainage mi _52 .1 . 1 - ?121., 1111-1113131: 1-35? Hana At Least Metleiate ?ll-TD? 1 Hi LJriIii-iel E: 3? in? - IZIHT - Enri' MIC Unlikely . a: . . .33. 3133-4} Highly LikElf? adj .1in . 313. UN a Linea-ea - I Certain ELI-W 3? SHELEW . . wee FHAHHL Petalile Watel Pipeline Damage Manna e~ L121 _ati .l 331 Veanwri TH DEAR He. 13f Leaks LIL win eeEEriE - JEHHIHE ?-551 2 Jeni-131:1 2 - LAWRENCE .L--. - if?? 3L - SWITEEHL 25 _aawEe'e - JEFFE -1130 H1. 1 CLARK 1 331;. - 3115.] WE US 1:1. . I: WFIZIF-E . . i . Ceuntiee WARRIEH . ., 11:: a: a: EUHEH .3545? l'ulilee l? IE3 are time Earlhquak'?' eT reaching the ape-email damage 5111?. Far 55.1: rat" LII Uni-rem at LanaIa-Clampagl. anti-e pie-aeri- eelelrt 11-? attain-id ileelmii- r3. PrqeetP nielial FIZ- Fi IMPACT TEFEMIHILI EDI. FEE Prisans - Wabash Valley Seismic: Zane: M7.1 Event March EDDIE abHT we? . LAEHAHEE SAINT DEE . Eng-1'. PDHTEH 3371-. 1; HDSEIUHD .- 3] I HE #121 :3-1-s FUtTaa sass 35 JesPEa assasH 35L: . WEL LE- asip 35 -saauT CL 1 _52 s- .esl WA 33 TETEIH ICI SHELET -- FRAHHLI . TH . DEAR EWITEE JEFF EEI II: LAHH GE MS EI State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} Ne. ef cgunw Facilities Tilaviess Duhais Gihsan lGreene Hnex l??te Prise].I Spencer Sullivan Warrielt Legend in F'risans MMI s?l Illt? zit-1w? Heutes Rivers 454; has: Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at rlJaIaellampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-experience tle gear-st at resell-g the steamed clan age s?a?e. Far Elf-30mph- and Least Mmlerat' clan aJe sates pleas-e- 1H attained menment'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT TEEI Railway Bridge Functionality: Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seismie Zane: MR1 Event Marchaeea State of Indiana 1. . . .333 Ceuntlee {11} IZISE '3 HIDE: LE He. at Tetal HDSEIUHD Fune?enal He. ef HALL it Faeilitiee Facilities :21 at Greene 1 1 JASPER .35? 3'1 Hnex 2 2 - FLILTIZIH Sullivan 1 1 waeaeH CASS 2 2 ?34 WHITE - Ed Devi-?e HTIH . . an we [IIulJeie a a MIAMI WELLE- Gilleen In 3.5. a F'll'iE Peereu?lr CLIHTIZIN ?pm? WAR- Speneer a Warnek lure? FHAHHLI 1a.. - - DEAF: Legend JEHHIHE . . . . - Funetlenallty IZIHI LAWEEHCE . Day 1 SWITEE - DAVIES i Net Funetlenal 33. 15:51" . Funetienal eHmeta = nteretatee 331': GRANGE 1'5? FIHE US Heutee a cue - - eeawFae . . . are Ceunhee PEHFW Haem?een Rivera SPEH 1a a: a: a: .2345? l'ulilee l" IE5 are 11am: ?at-n til? Earlhquak'?' EHHIEI prmaiulrtr' e1' the apeeh'lelil damage 514?. Far 55.12 atLanaIa-Clampagl. e'atee pleaee enlelrt 11-? attained tleelmne- r3. Eliaelal. PrqeetP niepal llut- F: IMPACT TEHMIHILI 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tt- E-IZII. ??9512le Railway Bridge 31 Segment Damage - Wabash Valley Seismie Zene: M11 Event Marcheega State of Indiana Critical Ceunties {11} a; seirnZesEPH .. i Tetel He. At Least template Eeurty ef Medemte HI HUSHIHHD Facilities Ela'nage Damage WREH J?ll-Ll Greene 1 1, thin-:1 Sullivan 1 - J?s Elauiess siteen HTIH Pike I F'esey .. EH15. HT HEARD I wen CLIHTDH Railway Bridge Damage ?it Least lulederate Highly Unlikely Unlikely lylederate Likeliheed Ci Highly Likely I Certain TH ?Salaam? Railway Segment Damage ~55} as? ?it Least Mederate Highly Unlikely I a Unlikely Mederate Likeliheed = nterstates US He Lites IEEDHF .. . Ceun?nes Riy ers -neey 1e 21:: a] enemas-Hm- .3545? Miles ii are thin! Earlhquak'?' prdnaiulrly e1' the epeen'led damage 5111?. Far and 35.12 UI Una-rem at LanaIa-Clampagl. sates pie-asle- EDWIN: 11-? attested deem-e- .am rs. Ellaelal. PrdeetP mepei nape-3T ?remen-mm TEFEMIHILI EDI. Seheel Damage - Wabash lII'alley Seismic Zane: MR1 Event March EDDIE .39Slain er 8 LEEHIDEILE pm: I. HTEHETHFI .Iae HALL -- El3.5? {1 .l WHITE {213" "51inertia . I: - WELLS F-TLETEIH . . 1. Tm .53 a it?? . 1 men ?135DHT DMEH 'EHDIFHC 31L . ear-I- t. I. det v.42] i3. anneal-eta. . .- may 1 SHELEW- - - - . at FEAHHLI a tiny . . . . - . .m - EFL-awn - JJEAFI new - .. Item-tea - -- LAWRENCE 5-- . DHI Hm 'Cl' I . .. -I -. EWITEEFEL . - ll. paylEee . - JEFF DH 15gCLARE "mi. $3315" 515Hear: .D WFDH . ?i - Haemaan i . -I Ey eunEH State of Indiana Critical Ceuntiee {11} Tctal Ha. Leaat of Moderate Faeilitiee Damage mage DENIES 21 21 Gite-2n Greene 14 13 F'll?iE 5 F'eaey 14 Speneer 13 SLlliLIan EEI 'Il'llarrielr 21 Legend Seheel Damage At Least I'II'le-tlerate - Highly Llnlil-tely -.. LJnIiI-tely lyletlerate Likeliheed Highly Lil-:ely I Certain = nteretatee US Heutee E?ritieal Ceuntiee Riyere ID ED ED l'uliles M4 Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Malaallampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-5t a1' meeting the Epeen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer eT'Caruple- and Leaet Mmlera?e' clan gates pleaae- 11-3 attaeletl F1 IMPACT Functionality at Day 1 - Wabash Valley Seismic che: MT.1 Event March acca State cf Indiana Critical Ccuntiee {11} He. cf Tetal Ilicuntiur Functicnal Hc. cf Facili?e? Facilitie? Devices 21 21 _3-1 [IIulJcie El] 21 ME: 1 Sillecn CASS I 1 Greene 1.4 14 I ill?I '13 . Hire 5 WEL LS Ileana}.I 14 Spencer 13 13 Sullivan 1D 1D 1IliaI'ltlerlJIurgl'n SE SE WM 21 21 33-1 SHELEW "'13 .J II I II '7 11.3.1 Legend Lm? EHce . ay1 HmDAVIESS 1 thFunctIcnal . Functicnal I i i .. Kg = nteretatee _ea1'- ceeHeE LJS Heutee 39'5' 'c?ewace-r .. . Ccuntlee Rivera 1e 2c a: 4 MIIES Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at era?Clampa Lu. USP. rS. EII-HSIHL Sta-Flt? 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. are ?ea: catatpermce- the gear-at c1' the specn'htl clan age 5111?. Fer carter phaae- 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI W3 Tbtal Dsbris - Wabash Valley Ssisrnis ans: Event March 3333 EL - State of Indiana 31111113111 ?I2r - - - 3331 LAERMEEH 31333311 Cbuntles {11} 3.4111T 4 333113 I231'13r3t-31' T3t3 1: nt W333 Ste-3 Debris 1133 LE 3 41-1 PUHTEH 1333313113 x351 3 134L131 3.. 4? ?331.; STAR HALL if? Dauiess BEBE .41 I ?h 1331?: 531?1- EILb3is 3331 3333 3333 L: WHI - 33:31:14 33.331 33.343 133.113 31 1 3reere 333 13 333 3433311 I _35' -- 119.543 139.149 253.392 LL Pike 333 113 333 WHITE 3433 1333.3? Pesey 31.334 13.343 33.333 Humm - - 3peneer 134 13 133 EHTDH . . 43.41313 331113314 3333 3333 3.133 11.11.31.311 WELLE- hl?snds?bugh 364.059 344.?62 1.003.321 5-2. PF 11 3= . 3 3.351191?? 1111331313 333 33 411 ?211? .. H3134I33 l1?35 . 3431-133 3 . .1411 14343 HEN 331? T133311 EL4W43 I T41 .53 33% 34-43%: 34113 PH Legend 3 . .- 311T 313E131 733- - E11133 . T3t31 Debris 3311111.} 311 13 13 - -?33 41 333 - - .3 r133 3 . 1; 5:3? 5 Terra 19935? .JEIH . 1 SIDED 11.113113113131111 31 - 25 33411 SHELEW - 25 - W30 I 33'333 433 333 4121 - - _31 331 I 333111311 3 :4 3343 31311 LIL 43411 33EE11E HIM lill til-II JEHHIHE 1-5-51- M313r 3431-133 11311 . . . - SWITEERL 3 .1 11:11] 1:11:11 - 21:11] 1:11:11] . 141111 - . . JEFFE 311 _33 1-33. . Em . 333331 - 333 333 - - 33431-1 =1 1113r313133 .41 331:. 3314113E 3115.3 US 933133 3 3313 . 1: 11-33313 . . DVD El?ritissl [33311333 1313331314 PEHFW 14413313311 Rivers - 3 13 33 4:1 33 EUHEH .3544?? Miles IE3 133333133r13 33 til? Earlhquak'?' 13rd33l3lrl11' 31' 13313H151 the 313333133 3.11131313- 31113. F31 3113 55.1: Eli" LII Una-r3311 at Lanma-Ciampagl. U33. 33131-3 1113.133 331313 113 33313133 313311113 r3. Ell-513i.? Freq-3311' 3131333 I133 FIZ- F: IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHILI EIZII. TF4 Tetel Fepulatien {2000} - Wabash Valley Seismic Zene: Event March State ef Indiana Critical Ceuntiee (11} LIE-GRANGE Hemmem '32" Eeunw Pepulatien Daviess $1,373 guildF I 52,739 Giles-en 50,515 35' 3-1 reene ?18,832 FLILTIZIH Hnex 59133 - - .21; ?Tm FIRE 23,5253 . an we MIAMI GRANT WELLE- 31"]33 '3 MD x35? cm I: Sullivan 33,5?3 5" amen TIPTDH amen Veneerhurgh 33" jg Wernek 55,152 Legend Tetel Pepuletien Tear .313 PLI - Terr ut men: 3.001 - - ELM FHAHHLI WED ?l:1 IZIWE 223:1 MEIH HCI DEAF: TH AM GREEN 1i? to JENNIHE Mejer Cities LAWRENCE meme ?Hm EWITEE 1 mm eerie Ea: 15;: . zen em me me = nteretetee EEI SHIHETEI 331 GRANGE Cue LJS Heutee E?ritieel Ceuntiee HAHHISEIH . vi Hm ere SPEH 1e 21:: e: 1-3-45? l'u1ilee ?eei- Earlhquak'?' pram-1m,- e1' the epeen'le? Haney-2- me. Fer 55.1: rat" LII Hue-mt,- at Llrualaaliampagl. LISA et-It? pie-aera- eznlelrt 11-? (helm-e- Pm r3. Elleeial. nlepel Illa-B- ?'?i?tlr F-Z- F1 TEFEMIHIZI TF5 Waste Water Facilities Damage - Wabash Valley Seiemie Zane: M11 Event Marel'iEC-DE "ei- EL - State eflndiana 7' Ir - . - DHT ETEUEEH Critical Ceuntiee {11} - eeiriT . - . a TctalHa. 33-" Biz-Lnty ei HATE fiH .. - . HUSEJHHD . if: HALE Facilities Damage 9E ?In? Emil?I? e- STAR Hal-L 5 . WHI . meeie El I ii. 3-1?1: . I EitISCi-l 5 .eiee .35 -- Greene 3 HE: 1 FULTEIH WHEHSH F'ilaie . WHITE -i_2_-il_i ., at; Paaey HUHIIH Spa-leer i" EHTDH . . . I a .. FEMS 2 . GRANT WEL LE- 2? i wmemug-l 3 . . - . meme: 5 fine?l 3% LAFHFIZI Legend wen HEN, Waste Facility?r Damage mi 52 .. . LEII 1* menial: "35? HEW ?it Least Metlemte - - - . E: . ?533.: . Highly Unlikely - - - ?i-?EFr-iilljl: ari' en: la - Unlikely ._33 _313_ _ea ii 1" I Mederate Likeliheed . . We, 52 4h Highly Likely xii? . a Lima ?magi? I Certain 3?1 - :3th ., - FT-ti'l'iHHLl wee AT Waste Pipeline Damage I HEW-JED .f I E?i - DEAF: can He. ef Lealie LIL 'ea- '3 GREENE *1 i JEHHIHE . .Jeei-ie . LevgeEHeE .33.. . 2 . JEFFE SWITEEHL a 1D 25 '53 _aewEe'e -25 - F5 . {:51 leg, at . - F5 - 12E WASHIHETIZI = nter3tat33 5:1 I 331:. -. - . Hi-Ceuntiee . PEHFW Heemeari . . .. . in a: an a: EUHEH .3545? l? Hie-e HEIFE Earlhquak'?' premium" ei' the epeeli'htl damage 5111?. Far Bid 55.1: Hill? ante-e pie-aeri- eelelrt 11-? attain-id nlelial liuee?i?t-r IMPACT TEEIJIHLI EIZII. ?"9512me Airpurt Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Ml? Event MarchE??E i? 1. "i335; Fig: 4: . . .LHFT ERSLIH -. . . . IREL HIERR I 5- . . . $131! .- "#153 - 1NIB-ST E, 5 43" M?i?l?State Kentucky - {25} Legend Huh. .51 LIME-1: Darn idle-.1 Dimple-ta . . Critical I: IZIIJ Gaunt.- Damau-I- Damau-I- Gaunt.- M-z-d-I-ra'b Damau-I- Damau-I- - Ballard Lt-n 2 2 .51 L335: mug-ate Interstates uan . . U3 mmHardlall Unlikely HWETS Man 3 El 1. 4. . . Emu-nun I I: 7 madam? ?kal'h??d Elam-Lu I: I: I HIQHYLIHEIY I I .3 ENE: 2 I: - Crawl:- I I .3 I . Han-mm: I a mm: 2 are unma- that-urn me mammal-3.1mm: . H-I-nd 3 I: I mm 12-2- mi. tlma '3 1'3 2'3 42' EU HIc-Icman I I .3 I c. aIcl Mule-Ia? damage mate-5 phase mm rt?-a- :Ittmlecl - - Tr. 4. El ASSESSMENT (1a. Mid-Alumina Earlhquaha LII at Lu. USA '51" f3. I'll Elli-HI Functionalin at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event March EDDIE - 6:11? ?712:5 1- g1IEH?f?a' "a a, a DEF: - a. . 1- I-m?ijl I a. DH :1 5::an . a MEH Hl' 7'41(.503 EL @315 LEE .. . Eli-1 . ,ft - 11:;le Ens? . .. 5 :3 {41- 331: UR . . NGST "u if? .EHFETFIJ. 1r - . Rf?? EIJTIZEEH -. . Ell- 1. :33 A RUSEL in . i '33 we 12?- .. r131: - - . State Kentucky - Critical Cnunties {25} Legend 1:331?? $11.33* Aime-n Fumimliw US Routes? Ballard I: ll1'll1? c-t-n 2 [my 1 Elm?. 33;" 4! Nut Fantilzunal Critical CDUFHESH Garllm-J I Fundimal 3 3 rat-Draw? 1- Mill-El?n Emine- ban: FlIIt-n 2 ?dd are 1mm: tlatIa-Ipe-rincne- 1n: :"Em Ti? 2 2 31 each lug 11m my. Forum um '3 1'3 33 42' EU Jr. "in? I: 3" am L-a-aat Mulls-Mr :Iarnage- ante-s phage Caz-m rim atmiecl . wnmeut?GUInE MIIE Mid-Alnarina Earlhquaha Canter LII at Mia-Gianna Lu. USA '51" f3. I'll BLT-HI WEI Worst Case Casualties - Haw Madrid Seismic: Zana: Event MarahE??El .. DER..1ERSLIH ?Owens Era . MEH ?InuHsTa a - saassan i CRHTE .1 ass; . . :11HssT.. . a I GEE. LE i BUTLER [Imansa - KI .- til? 62" hi LDWEL-Sig?? . UMBERLA I WMTH Ii"; ?r I 1k Kw Stata af Kentucky - Critical Counties {25} Legend Ia. mm la. I: la. la. C35 Jun" nt.? IMI1 MS. 31' 31' F?hll'l?'l- mm?l??l? - I I sail?m: 3a: 21:: Ll?nusr-z-n as 3 7 M?j?ll US RENEE Child's-all IZI Luz- nt 3r3tat33 call-ram." 3+6- HIE-E IE I IE- 33 . Ian-una- Is:- I: Imam-:- Hue-I1 IE- :sa +.:Iss . 44:. ["31 ED curl mm a II. Han-an IE- I 101 - 25D Ia-Itbud-eDal-.11- 637 +3 1'33 TIE- IBIZI 251 El?n-1 2T1 Furt-z-n :3 +37 - - '1 F25 IErn-m-I: Lass a: ma: Tad-1 a a ?mow .3. 3 .3. ?rm-sell canvas are- ?aae- that-Hp? rle nae- 11-2- greatest 3] 4] Han-1 ?ll-m" 3:12h? i'Fl?I'. ?3.5 1.[it MacI-e-ra'e' (amalga- sate-.5 phase cam rt?e stash-m . cmulneut'sLIInE F: Iran-5m PESEESMEHT rum-s Mid-Amarisa Earlhqualca Canter UI at Mala-Champs '51" I3. The-rem EDI. Communication Facility Damage - New Madrid Seiemic che: Event March . i?h?eemEe . - r? i1." . Ii - HT feemch-e a . :53 - I. II- can?IE gm Ll .3 if: whee FL - .mait??k I I. I IE Ii g?-?ifptn" .. .. I: . etc-H lg?r?lm'al I: e- - It? 'Icl:I fig; we i a 1mm: State cf lIiIentuclIIyr - Ccuntlee {25} Legend Te hl He. e1' Atlea e+ Demelete He. e1' ?t leae'emcee ?We e: e: 53 lI-rlrlu e: e: At Least [Illa-{Hate Inte retatE Caldwell lecan Ila EI . . LIE cum-Ira;- I II a: 5+ nghl'f 4.: 4.: Martha" HNEIS :65 Mellmellen ZSI 3 - - Britten-1 en El 2 Melean 53 I: Elm-lect- 33e hen: ITT ng?ll'y' LIkEl'lee lee Ted-:l e3 Ham MB 35 Tn,? 7. Crt?c'Il are tiatII-Ipe ll? Ice 1n- geateet ED 4] . HIlIl'ld ?rm" 33:. I: Unl-I-l'I I I3 El El CIT E33. In] th? FEE. FEW ?3.3 FE. mm? +3 +3 3.5, LII-act cute-e pie-ace cam rt11e TIP :55 Fr.- eccechEIIT MINE Mid-America Earthquake ISenter LII :11: ?3a. .all'l I 3. I'll Elli-Ell 5-H TED Dame - New Madrid Seiernie Zene: Event March ECCE .- .- l- [ll?ellse - State of - Critical Counties {25} Legend He. of M3. of Hg. cf nib-ri?ed l'lI'lereelli lltenelitjlr I Came Ceunty Fa-ziliti-E County Facilities County Faeilitia -: China-,5 Ballard 5 Hence-3k 14 McLean V1 I 2-5pm] - Caldwell Hal-.clersen le el tell HII Elm EU DUE, Calleway Hickman 5 Ell-lie 22 WI Carlisle 33 Hep-kins 33 Ted-:l 12 Hit-'mng?mn 4 ?.99 3 Interstates Ceuntee Ei 1E 34 ?Eli-I? til? W31: 13 3 1'3 er lug me. Ferd-H1: tent. eT'Cempil-E' 1'3 33 an EU Fult?n lj Marine? El and clemati- fete-e Caz-m rt?e ateeiecl 'Tlr- GEE 33 WEEGEH 3 F-J F: IMPACT TEFIMIHZI Leer.- Mid-Ameriee Earthquake Center LII at U?mn?iampegi. USP. i3. I'll CIZIEII E-IZII. T81 Total Debris - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March 213133 Iih?h _?gr g1 Lnuisville - . L. IETTF . .l I MEI-EDIE I . RMDGE HM umens Era [m . f} Iii-w..- I la: "?41 I 35?1} FE- . wk. GRMSUH Ll can 1] L. i MIMMR State 0f - Critical Counties {25} Legend Dm-z-r-a-I-Jml T-ml Dan-ambl?al T-ntd Eta-tum. - LIE Huuteg 'Tll'ilu tan-1 ; UNI: 'Tll'ilu land Ulld?- tan-1 ; T?tal M?j?l IZx-unt.? Hm I: Hm DI .- EEIDUU Bdlarlzl [Imam40,001 - cam-Ha;- E. a 5 25 I: nuntl? Murat-Han 755. 37-3 LEE- . curlmn 1? E- 25 ImtI-nd-a-n Harm-all :7 H: - Dam-n: IE- IEI 35 FIJlt-n - cm:- c- 235 Era-m . m? 3 I a an!- 11m: than-Inn! rle me 1n- gluten Erma-um. ED 4] Eli! each 5131?. Ford-e11: than: Eur-Jump? '37 and Lie-an Mml-e-ra'e' clamagne- :Ete: pie-3!: ?zz-m rt11-e- alumna TF- TI F3 PACT ASSESSMENT MINE Mid-Alumina Earlhqualpa LII wmr: at unml?ian'upagl. USP. IS. I'll Ell-Ell TEE Displaced deulatidn - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event March 2mm . I I MEJEIIDE a - . . Ti NEST cah '53} Kn LI IE State Inf Kentucky - Critical CnuntIes {25} Legend DIE-lawn: at- EII-r-pla-zua-d cue-d EIc-tlmab nan: . . IZIc-unt.? madam-Ian:- Punpulainzun awn-t; Fwd-11mm I: Punpuhinzun Ballard LETS 3.IIEI llant-t-n 3:5 50:. - - - Ealdw-a-ll 3 [wall M?j?'l CHIES HUI-HES 3.02-1- TE- 51 EDD .. 25pm] Interdates Ipal 2.5:.3 demon-an "3.3m 331 Ellj?lj dun-mu 5 l5 l-e-an IT: +32: 2 ["31 443.3'31 - 53.33] IIrlfI-n-d-a-II Mardlall 38:3 5553 I Emit-Ell Eu-rl-a- 3.3K 9.5-3? an; 373 in; - - 24,400 2H Fult-II LEE- cum .3. E, Bra-ml:- +le7 ?3.74.5 T?dd Han M. m; I are ?nale- tlatexpe rle Ide- 11-2- gIa-ateat .1?,de .353 ham M: 3.37 or each lug 11m my. Purdue-m um urtulnlm'e' 33' 43' '33 ?mm? 7+1: ?77.3 .mbmr :93 and L-a-aat Mulls-Mr damage- ante-5 phage rtm- smacked I: .333 2.453 F1 FACT PESESSMEHT NINE Mid-Alumina Earlhquaha Canter I LII at Ll nma?mam pa Ul- LISP. f3. Elli-HI EDI. T83 Electric Fewer Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March EUDE State cf Kentucky.I - Ccuntlee {25} Legend Te lie. e'r Atlea I:.t Benn-let. Te'hl Lee I:.t Gemple'le - Critical I: uuntieg mun-r..- Damage Damage mum; Medenrb Damage Damage It [it'll-IF Ballard 3 AI L335: mil?m"? Interstates .Iald'e'ell 4- Logan 2 ngH'f LIE Huut? ITalle'e'a'; 1- 4- I 1- - IIarllue Mart-Hall 7 7 Hmers curl e1'lan Meliraeken +7 .7 3+ .3. Mgderate Uke?hggd Mejcr Electric 5 Heleall . . Davie 44:. .3 .3 en: 4.Certain I: E- E- Tedd 1- Han.) :5 .3 Cl .3 Cl Elm-1 til? ?Mum. 5. .3 .3. cf each kg m: speeneclclanage me. den. tlcle cTIIcInple-F 33' EU 4} "Mm" 3 3 35 E, am LIB-set Mcclere'e' carnage elem-e please em. ri?e attache-cl 1PT- H?p l'IlnI: I: I: FCI F: IMPACT ASSESSMENT Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at nme-Clempa Lu. USA '51" F'llili'BTF' I'll Elli-3 Tili'I'E'e-El T84 Emergency Dperatien Center Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event 'feEEHcEe ?Eli? 450;?? ?i a - Him I . 1'far: ?at - we I era. a. ?a Le- IJE eemeeu ?rs.EIFIRE ?u?v - If MEIERL LEI-I SIM 5 3 GRMES CIIL ewm'? State ef l'iientuelelI - Critical Ceuntlee {25} Legend it In? eI-mpI-I-b He. AtlaalFt - ?uer?ti?? -Critiea Eeun?v? Den Faellt?er. Med enli- Damage Elam aqe Gem 1; Fat-"Hal: Ill-:- derat-I- Damage (It-Inn Caldwell c. [an an c. 1- Highly. U3 Gall-r?; EI CI . rat-Gm el-Ien a a I: Erltt-I-nd-I-n - - nae-w: H'gr'llf L'kEh'. I. Certain crawl; I: Tedd I: I: NIH 113ea-I- a expUni?" E, E, at man ?ab. um eT'Cemp 33' 43' EU "mm? a Mb mr and LIB-5E1: MeIl-I-ra'e' Inmate Hate-e pie-ate cam rt11-e- TF- I: I: ASSESSMENT Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LlnIaIa-mampagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Elli-Ell $113312? TEE Ferry.I Facility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event II. . ESE231. I -- . .. STER .3de .l If. RIMES H. hr 422R a Maggi .. Ll HreT (':53TIEI .- - -ILI I 13E. - CAL In State ef - Cutleal Ceuntlee {25} Legend He. Idle-ant He. fat Lean-1: camp-late - - _Sritieal Dnunn' Damage Med-amt- Fen-f ?all?? Dull-Inge I2111't-I-nd-I-n Hep klnII. Least I'II1ederate Fult-n I I I Ll?nut-t-II a a i- - - ngteg Ln:- Han HIQ-IIY . Ballard a El El 0 Cal-1m? El El .3. Held-all can-Hm- MardIall H'g?ll'h? L'ka'h? I: I: E: El . II-II GM IZI ?Eli-I? til? El 3] EU . Han-:- eek El El E33. Ilg FEE. FIZIT ?Illand LII-set MeIl-I-re'e' demagne- Hate-e pie-ea? cam rt11-e- ataelecl TF- c. c. c. MINE Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LlnIaIa-CIanIpagI. USP. PM I 3. Prd-a-etF' I'll SIZI-EII $113313! TEE Fire Statien Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March EDDIE H313 13-" may 3 .- II- "15' I - 'i a II 2-3i. 7333333333 HIJST 33 j-f 3 3 -- HERE . I 3 3-H 3 33w Been 33.33 - 3 w. B. 1 .EILEEIWEL - Il- - - th?i' h. .3, State ef Kentucky - CrItIeal Ceuntlee {25} Legend Tetel jam-ant IiemFt-a-ta Tetal of At Lealt Compete - - - - - FacIIn-a-I [Hz-13mm Damage Eamag-a- imm- mun-an Mz-jaratua Damage Damage- F're Eeuntles EHllartl Least l'IIhILIerate '?tEEtatEE 3 :3 Legan 3 :3 . . LIE H?utg Cm'llule 3 3 3 rI'le-J'aehen a a i} RWETS 2-3 McLean 3 .3. MDCIEFEITE -J1thn-:len :3 MarthaFumn 3 3 3 can: a :3 :3 .- Certain era-nan Eli-i? 3 (JENeael In; 11.3 see. Ferd-311i um cure-met-Inter and LII-set MeII-I-ra'e' demagne- 31at33 pie-333 cam rt11-3 a1IaeI-3tl TF- '3 Fuz- TEFIMIHZI Leer.? rails Ila-palm Mid-America Earthquake Center LII NIB-REE.- 3t LInIam-cmmpagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell 7?3? Fire Station Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seien'lie Zene: Event March EDDS 'i 1- Ef?? .. if iv? 1. 1- H?n I?m "41231WHEN . 1. L2. 1? I r- II .41HGST e2;- - IF: ll'mug-1e h. ~63 _IiIili-Ie TI- HR :1 -I. 0 mm" In. State ef - Erltleal Countlee {25} Legend Tamil-n.? . . . . e-z-unt- chun- F re LIE Ballard Ie ll?nua?bn [my 1 IZald?m-ll II II leaan E- E- . Gall-mu; II 4- . HUI: Carlin-I- IE- r?ardlall I: Fundima HIE-EVE lawman :3 :3 Heineken a Britten-1 en 1' Meta an 7 en: 3 3 FIJlt-n 3 Cum-:- Ella-rel:- IS . "Ital 11iname lee- age. a I I . ?2:32:93" 5" I: Uni?" 3 at lug 11m apmneclclanagp a'a'e. Fertlenl um. cure-JmF-HI' 33 EU mm? mum-r and ?lathe-rat" namely? rate-e phat-I ezum rt11-a- a11aeiecl TF- klne I [Elmelt?GLllElE FIJI F: L-IIG Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Llnram-mempagi. USP. PM I 3. Pr-zi-a-etF' I'll TEE Hazardous Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March secs 41ft? - Eng-:3! 1 1 1: MJ fsPE a a ME 'r ling?ii? . . 'H?R?jglan HR - 55 ml umsEnLn'l ruicme - 5 J. State cf lviientuclc-lr - Critical Counties {25} Legend He. Elf Hc. Elf Hn. Elf tub-ri?ed l'u'lercalli ?tensity {Mull Cities Ecunty FacilitiE Ecunty FacilitiE County Facilities d. 3.: .- 40.0'3'] Ballard 2s T4 McLean DUE. Caldwell Henderson :31 nunlennerg as Eallcway 21 Hickman Dhic El] 5.313.5? .DF ?5 E: Hthes Hazardcus Materials Facilities Rivers 53 2 5 enden 1 chan as Unicn 1s ?Briana Emma - Ermcal are ?Eli-I? 12h? DEMES '39 2 19' at each 11m sate. Fcrdenl than. 1'3 33 43' EU Fultcn El Marshall 331 and Lean Mcclerat' damage sates phase cam rt?e stacked TF- GEES 1:3 WEEGEH 4? F: lam-3T .r-ssecsuEriT Mil-E Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LInJaIa-mampagi. USP. l3. I'll GIZIEII EDI. TEEI Highway Bridge Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March 2131313 State ef lv'iientuelwr - Critical Counties {25} He. efFun e1e n.1l Tet'll He. e1' He.e1'Fune1ena He. e1' Geun I: I::eun Ballard I: :5 ll?neet-II 2'3 3I3 Caldwell 3+ 3+ leuan 33 33 talle'a'nI 3+ 3E- +3 +3 Carllde I3 Ii Heliraek en l3 3D 2E1: 332 Helean 6+ 5+ Britten-1 en l'3 Hardlall Eda-leec- :33 :33 u: 2 I3 IEIIZI Gm vetTrlue 3E: 33 Hendereen ITI ll+ Hlel-iman El Wet-eter ?3 HE: He:- .33? Legend Higher-raj.r Bridge U3 tt?lmelt'GLllElE FIJI F: TEFI HIP-I3 LCIG [lay 1 Interatatee I Met Funatianal CauntIee- 1r Fundienal Rivera ?rm-rel een?ee are tiatexpe rle lee- 11-2- geateet pram-ante EU . e1' 11-2- epeen'lecltlemage e'a'e. Ferclem this. e1"-3emple-F AL and Leaet Little-rate" damage- e'atee pleat-e eem rte-a- a11aeiecl TF- Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at unml?lanupagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell Highway Bridge SI Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event Maren 2121133 4.3_ I- ICMIL 4-h-i'u I .I . an ugly. 1-9 :32? etha- Egg?{g Fl". . in I :T?gfij- ?Mill?Elam ?Hi? a! I. ER euqnPym?I'm? Hw1_?_ Il- i?r4-333? e- 1 I BUTLER 'j?ieI??h' IEMRREH '3:in ..M-IHR a; if Ham-Imel?r'mn it I .I. II Lee, ILLEHI i 531%; I36 WWI-A153. I - -.I - I KLEIN-UH 4W 431 I I - amaze?? -I. . If State of Kentucky - CrItIeal Countlee {25} Legend Tetal He. Atl-I-aet Camp-let- Tetll He. at ?tleant Dem plet- my ?Hm; ?aunt; M?d??l?l ?aunt; Mild El-ll'? Hl?l [.3an Hl?l Slain-IE? [Ian-Flue Ballard :5 I: I I: L335 "Mime mime; i: 3 $33" 1: H'g?ll'f Eh" Hig?ll'f US - . a e: Criti??l IJIrltIian II: I1 El Like ihgg? MDCIEFEITE IJI'I'li-nden Ia:- 1- Certain Gram- I: II T-I-dd .3 I: Trim: :3 El .3 n? It? til? gEatE'E-t El 3] 4] El] HIMIIWII I: etreaei hg ?e I?a'e. FerIIenI tlenI a El .mbmr and LeaI'It Meclera'e' damage I?atea please tt?e "3r I 2,3: I, I, 91.5 a: F: Mil-a Mid-Alneriea Earthquake Center LII at Lu. USA '51" f3. F'flili'BTF' I'll BLT-HI T91 Hospital Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zone: Event March EDDIE #130FI-EI: ICHJ 1'41 5' II 331-, - EIIFTLERJ Im?usEIFEL State Kentucky - CrItIcal CnuntIes {25} Legend Ian-Ian mum .. . M-z-d-I-rat-I- H05 ll??l Damage EHITIHII El D?lTl?ll?l I a [Mil IE a El mlIlI-nb-I-n: El I I c: Cum-:- I I: Higql'f Lll'iikEi'f RENEE tun-mm 3 I: I: In.? I I: . I I UHIIHEIY Dam-w, El Balm c: FIIlt-n I I El Gamm- El El - - lira-nu. I I I Inna-ma I: '3 El H-z-I-Irnan H-npl-IlnI: I Caz-"119$ are ?ns-I- tiatexpe me- 11-2- gnateat lI-d t- I: .3 . I 91' each In: apecmeclclanagp my. Forum um cum-mph? 33' 43' EU .. .. allil 35.1: rat" FETISH BEE Ittll? TF- Mart-hall _l I _l FD F1 Mid-Alumina Earlhquaha Canter UI at Lu. USA '51" f3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll BLT-HI Heepital Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event 1-. SHELBY Ii" :?hip-- if m! 5.594 U- . H. . - llEFt 1? F: l: GE Hl?l F: II HII . I I415 I [Hi f; ?ll" LI "If? .131]. . . ESE .- - 11"? IE: I .51; EL Ila I RITFE IE-H ,m I . Er l.41BIFLEREur?J1 I I cHeIeTmn . ARREH . i .. - Mn men RIDE am "Ha I .-I. - - UWIEIT State of Kentucky - Erltleal Countlee {25} Legend Tlilt?l Elf Tlilt?l I I I n1; mun?. mu?. mum-n H05 Il'lt?l ?lltj? US RENEE Ballard thing I [my 1 Caldwell lea an I - - - mm?? I m" .- Net Funetlenal I:eun?tlea- IIarllde Martini-Ill RIVERS elm mm 3 men elm-n 2 IITItI-nden Mela-an Elam-la 2 2 Pure-n one I I Gram. Ted-1 Ham-eel: In? I Crt?eal centre are nee-I tlatexIJ-e re lee- 11-2- geateet pram-amt; Hm: WWII I: I ?Man a I at ?na- ep-e-en'lecltlamage e'a'e. Ferclem than. attenuate-'9' ED 43 EU HleHman I: wu- I: and Mule-rate" namely? rate-e phat-I ezum rt11-a- ataeiecl - - H'3'l2- HIM. CI PACT TEFI HIP-I3 LCIG NINE Mid-America Earthquake Center LII I've-rem at Lanam-CIampagi. USP. .all'l 3. I'll Elli-Ell $113312? F93 Liquefacticn Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic che: l'?i'li'Jr Event March EDDIE .L i. ape-Mus - [t ceawecn - . I Fh'l'i? Ti El - ta ,Ll State cf lv-{entucliwr - CcuntIee {25} Legend Matlmum F.1II1II11IJI11 Haslmum cunt.- cu eu teet- mm. 1.- a: tee:- cu m- Ll{ ll Ef? SHE CE Hll1l lty Eallard 'uenr ll?nuct-z-n Hen-e- Lew cal-1m" ?mm-m [can Uri-mum Here Mm? RENEE cult-altar Lc'i.I 'e'en' Uri-Icahn I. 25pm] Carlin-la 'u'en' Mch-z-Hell u'era' Hluh Guilt-?an Uri-.ncwn Hen-e McLean Hen-e- High MDCIEFEITE . HIVEFE Chill-"d M?rdl?ll LEW.I Fult-II Lew Hc-Jerale Hen-e- Hen-e- Tlildd lift MI t. n? 11 at? 1: [1are can? a expe Ice- gt? a. 1 1 "Em? ?mil-r; mm: Infra? at each ?e apt-cli'ledtlanagp aceLEM. in I J. and Luz-eat Maths-tar damage rates [mace cam tt?e attached .. NINE cp Hint. lien-e- uen' Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Lu. USA '51" f3. I'll BLT-HI T94 Modi?ed Merealli Intensity - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event Maren EDDIE .- SHELBY . t. 3 a . :1 I State of - Critical Counties {25} Legend Ceth Mm. l'ulul Candy rum. Mu'l l?u'hx. l'ulul ?mill? "Mi IWi?jlr C?ii? Ballard HII Hancock Marshall i 25.000 - 40.000 Caldwel Hentleraen lullienherg - El 40.001 - Callemy 2-: enic - - Carliele Hopkins Te-tltl a . 2? lICZI'Iriatian Liuirgetan Trigg WI Heutea Rivera Logan Unit!" = nteratatea =Critical I:euntiea Davie-.525 wager Cri?eal center are near tiatcxpe lee- 1H- geateet pram-amt; ED ii] 4 ST EHSI til? 5 FEE. [Elli HI ?mnha? and Held-era? rater peace? ezum rt11c 311;:th Grave:- drtmett'SUlEIE FCI F: PAST ASSESSMENT L-IIS Mil-E Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII L'E'rtil'?- at Mala-Champs: Ell. USP. r3. Ellasial. HIGIJEII $113312? EDI. PHISIZIEI Illu'l?ty?tll Natural Gas Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event March EDDIE eemeen LI 15. HT 1, manna]:- 1?5-3: T. :5 . SHELE 54;. _ee . .- a MEFI . qr M. ?lm-r RU SE State - ErItIeal CeuntIee {25} Legend Tetal He. Idle-net Camel-ate T-:-1al He. I:.t htt- Natural F??tiliw =Critieal Medemte EHITMIIEI Dl'll'l'l?ll?l L-PZIIJ Hlild D?l'l'l?lil?l D-IITIQIIEI Il'l't eretatee Ballard I a Hit Least MIME I leaan I HigH'f LIE Call-ma; IZI CI CI . - Mardlall I I I Unllkelr lam-mu 3 Mom-mm 2 2 2 Mgderate Natural Gag Lmea eaten-Ian I Male-an Elan-leu- I '9 '3 rum-u I I I .- Certain mm.3. Trluq I Crt?eal Caz-"119$ are neu- that-exp? nu? ma- 11t- geateet prdIaI-Ittr' ED . H?Hd?mn I I El El CIT EH13. 12h? FEE. Mir- mm," am LII-art hit-claret" damage- e'atI-e phat-r Caz-m rt11-a- ataeietl TF- I F-J F: Lee Mil-5 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LInIaIa-I:Iampagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell Oil Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zone: Event MarchE??E . db - ?f JIL- - .- JSPEHIZER . I I I II?my? IIm?uii' If Fm HERE - I - 5'5 IIZR leE NIB-ST in!- State of Kentucky - {IrItIcal Countles {25} Legend A1: [II-act hl Idle-act damp-Im- ?il Facility Dam age IIx-u nt.? rat-d 1-mi- Ina-I- lIurnIIu-I- ram: Damnq-I- Il'lt eratatea Ballard I: .5 ?made-n At L335 MIME Gdld'H-I-ll I: I: I: I: HigH'f El . - Carlin-I- Mardlall HIE-EVE mu I .3 a a I Mgderate LikEthgd Majujr DII LII-IE3 mum-1m .3 ram-Ian I: . . tum-Inn: 9 I: .3 I: Fult-I-n .3 I .3 Certain It? til? Hmeach In: apecmeclclanagp my. Purdue-m um 33' 43' '33 air. HI-z-Icmnn I I .3 I LI-aat (Limage- ante-s phage IInIlli-l Irm- 3113mm I I: I: F1 TEFil'?ll'IlC' NINE (-5 Mid-Alumina Earlhquaha Canter LII at Lu. USA '51" f3. I'll Elli-HI TEIT Peak Greuncl - New Madrid Seiernie Zene: Event Maren 2111115 13.;1 .. . 1" E11111- 5511 3' Leuisville '3 Hit?'1' 1 .1:_3111 SHELBY 133nn??n Ti DR mevn .- 33H 5? 11% State of lv1?3entuel111-1r - Critical Counties {25} Legend count-J- 1.11:. Pen 1.11:. e111 H11 1111:. 11-11 Peek eauard 1111 1:5 1:11:15. I1115 mean I115 I115 [1.33.11 . . . Caldwell 1111-5 1111-5 I-IIaInleaIrIIen I325 h'anhall I111 I151 01 El 25 MEIJCT Ctellewaj' 11,11 I155 Ht: Hm an I155 055 H.1I1Ienl15rg I115 I1. 15 - - .- Interetetee Cam-11 0:11 1.11 I115 I125 I111I-1 I115 I115 DES - '15 . -:1rII1an I115 I115 U'I'Il'l?ltll'l I111 I151 T515 I115 I115 115 .115 43.331 - 533.333 intend-1n 11:5 1151 Legan I115 I115 Trigg I125 I115 frugal C?umieg 11111111 I115 I115 L'J'en I115 I151 I125 I115 3' - -: Fultln I151 1111 111-111-1th I115 125 11.1- tII?er I115 I115 1 .U - 1 .25 Era 1111 1155 11.111 . ?Eli-I? tlatexpe 11'? eael til? tltlanage FBI. HEIN- 3:3 13:3 3:3 in El] AL and Lll'a? Men-1151? nemage mite-5 [11155-1 e111! 1111-1 51151115? thenmett?CLllEIE F: 1111 PACT Lee 1' lulu-E Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII I'll-Hilt- .11: unmi?lampagi. USP. .al'l'l l3. I'll CIILEII TEIE Fclice Staticn Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March acne I i 5" SPENCER . -. .. IE HT - - #130- a - 'l a. I II-I II I. rlEFt -- - . n?nm? a ..- 2? .REL I II . a II Ii 271-, I'll I Ii. . 231; .- - I canteen ., - ia- - - - - 5.13152Jaeaf?x 1 F: is?! IIZRITIE Ll HGST 112??- Eng BJJE 1 I State cf leientuclIzi-Ir - ErItIcal Ccuntlee {25} Legend Atleat-T comp-In- Te?t'll Jane-arr Damp-late Pincg 51-min.? Dam-.39.; Med-Irate Damage Ila-I- Dcun Med-Irat- Damage Il'ltEi'StEltEES Ballard 2 2 2 [him] lat-3n I I ?it Lena MIME cal-1m" 2 lead" a .1. HigH'f Unlikely tall-ma; II 3 2 . - curIIu-a 2 2 2 Memeken E- EI 2 den 2 Martha" 3 3 II - - cam-Certain :1 3 3 Tlildlj El Han-neck 3 2 Grin-cal cen?ee ar-I- ?ee-I Ice- 11-2- geateet Bil . "mum." 3 .3 um" a at each mt. than. "Mm" 2 2 mt, m, all: LII-act carnage- piece-I cam rt11-FACT TEFI HIP-I3 LCIG Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at LInIaIa-CIampagI. USP. PM I 3. Pr-zII-ctF' I'll Ell-Ell TEIEI Police Station Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Event March q: a 1. . LEE: FIFE - Emil-Rim} MEH HI . [m 15-, ?ux?[15 .. a} CRITFE lE-(.41.: Ll HGST a 3315 2% am fem-m? i _[rmoueo - ei ElfLELWELF - . L. IET Lil :j ?3 Eur?3 - r~ To [1?53"if? C1311 IM I MUN RUE 1 State of Kentucky - Critical Counties {25} Legend mm. $131.11?? Willie? 3.1111? WELSH Pt- lite Static" Fun ctimmlitzr ?3 RENEE Ballard I [lay HUI: FL-I'lCtlEll'lEll CHHEEII '3 3 I3 2 emu: 2 i- Fundinnal n5. 5 Hole-an Britten-1 en 2 Mardlall El 3 Duh-Ill- Et- 2 2 lint-I'd 3 3 Fult-n I3 3 3 3 331;; I: CINE-HI are tI-Fltli'IqIIE' 13'? geateet Frail-FIN?: El 3] in EU . "?n?mn I 3 3 I of each lug ?na- anch?le-tltlamagp rat. Ford-n1: than. ot'CquF-H' and Lie-act lilocI-e-rat' damage- c'atec peace com rt11-a- enacted TF- 7'3 F: .raccechEHT Lee Mil-5 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at unai?lampagi. USP. .all'l I 3. I'll Ell-Ell Part Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event March EDDIE Ni. *{11313E Hl231; m4, -- 1? - 4? '33. STER guchE?-f- eemeen -. .5 1- 'H?R?jglam - . I. 13' Ilia?: 41 I HFST - I H-Iqq-h?f?.-3 TIEI State of leientuelIzi-Ir - ErItIeal CeuntIee {25} Legend He. Ian-ant camp-et- Tetal He. mm Damp-let- rt Futility Dam-.3913 -:FitiE? era?l- EHITI ?ll? hinder-11:1- D-IITIHIIEI Inter?ateS Ballard 3 2 Ll-rlnur-T-I-n I: I: a At L335 MIME Caldwell c. LII-I: an .3 .3 l- HigHHarman I3 Ell-1m" I'M-3mm II II I i} Mederate Likelihaed 5 - - Elam-lees :5 II HIQHYLIHEIF amen cm:- Certall'l amen Tedd Hmune- eat. Ferd-Inn then-I. eT'CeIupII-t? at; "Mm" a E, 2 E, and Med-Irate" damage rate-e pine-I cam rt11-a- 7P Hm.? c, c, cmnment?eLIInE F: Lee MIIE Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell $113313! Fetalale Water System Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March 2131313 I. . (GE '?r1 "f . .5 RMDGE ,r [ml-.5 I - I - WE eHIn a HGSTI. '53? I Ft' 3'45?th if? E- a CH Em TSDDI . "?aml - 65 .I SE .-.. EL I5. I ., W??l?SHELBY . a} EHFIIL. a; waif-FISH?! TI. State of - SrItIeal SeuntIee {25} Legend ?le-Her If PIJtalIle Water FaeililyIr [Ian'nge Water Dietrilnllien Imunt Moderati- Damage aqe Seunt.? Med-unrat- Baum E, ummn 3 3 At Least lule-tlerate lle. ef Leaks LIS Heutea Gald'H'II-ll CI CI 2 CI [j Il'ltEl'StEltElS tall-ma; 3 i} I 11 5D Garllde 3 3 I CDUWIES- 2 2 a Maderate Likelihaad 51 - Rivera den I Hardlall 3 3 - - IzuHa nn: 2 2 ?Halli" - EDD 3 .- Cer'tain - 331 1 I) I El 2 I are ?ee-I tlatE'IqIIE' ll? lee- 11-2- geateet I a um" 0 e1' eael ?na- age- e'a'e. Ferd-Inn than. EU 43 EU "Wmeat Mud-Hat" damage emFIJI Fill-3T ESSESSM El'-lT L-IIS MINE Mid-America Earlhqualpe Center LII at LlnIaIa-CIanIpagI. USP. .all'l 3. I'll $113312? Priacna - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March EDDIE I . :d?iin . I 5' MEH I 1:733 I IaicH UR I I . MB 1 State cf - Critical Ccuntiea {25} Legend Hc. cf He. at Ma. cf lubii??d l'u'lercalli {Mill} IH ll Ecunty Facilities County Facilities Ecunty Facilities 1-: [uhjgr ?i?eg Ballard 1 Han-:cck El McLean 1 - - Caldwell 1 Hen-:leracn 1 h-?iJhlent-erg 2 - - i 4D [?31 El] Call-away 1 Hickman 1 Chi-:- 1 Eariislie kins 2 Tad-2 1 . - 2T1 Ehrlatlan 2 Lmngatcn 1 . . . Eri?endm 1 L?gan 1 ?rim 1 Interstatea Ccuntlea - Err?cal centre are thee-e- tlatexpe rle ice- 11-2- gcateet pram-amt; Da?'55 2 2 W'Et'?a' 1 at each 11m cpech?ie-tltlanage ant. Ferd-311i um 1'3 33 43' EU Fultcn 1 Marshall 1 and Least Men-era? carnage rate-c phage cam rt?e enacted Eran-E q. 1 FCI ASSESSMENT TEEMIHII LCIG Mid-America Earthquake Canter UI at Mala-Iliampa Ell. USP. r3. Ellasial. HIGIJEII $113312? EDI. PHIGIZIEI Illu'l?ty?tll EDS Railway Bridge Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event March EDDIE a I150.) if . emit . RSI.-- II. [Hill I. :5 til-5? . e- . .m 231remeen - IE-H I an; I: 41 I 3-3?mil-L L. I. I. THREE _[Imeuee - a; a; PI '5 i . ?Gil? f?r? RU SEL warn . -'Ll I {j a 5 State of - Critical Counties {25} Legend aunt-,- ?magnum Tmu??r eountr ?.2313le 1:35;? HailII-Iajmr Bridge U3 Ballard 2 Lia-Inn: don a [my 1 Interatatea 2:32:1- 321:" 2 '2 II Nut FLnetianal Cummi- IZarIId-a- I: I: II- Funljiljnal 3 3 MeGrat-Hen I 2 hit-Lean I I 5 5 FIJlt-n em:- 3 3 an If Crt?eal entitle: art- nee-e- that-age rle lee- 11-2- geateet prdIaIIttr' 3:33?? 3 at Ilg ?na- gJI-en'H-tltlamagp rat. Fertlem than. attempt-'9' EU 43 EU Hlekman I: I: t-?I-r I: I: 1-3.1: Fill" damage- - - . He:- 7 FESESEHEHT TEFI LCIG MIIE Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at unIaIa-I?ampagi. USP. PM I 3. Prd-a-etF' I'll Ell-Ell $113313! Ell-4 Railway Bridge 3: Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: l'Illi?Jr Event I. I 5- e-Ile II ae --H - RIB: 35.1?? 1-. I ?Hm ?e I. 113% - LI HFST IZHRISTLEIH I - . CAL State - ErItIeal CeuntIee {25} Legend Te in He. e1' .Iltleat-t temp-let- Te in He. e1' nun-.1 I:.t eemplee Hailtn?jf Br? .3 [pm-I E: - nt. Mederat- due Damage Damage lg Hallmy Segment Ballard 2 2 a a '51 Least mime A1 Least Eli-Er? Caldwell I Leuan I.- Hi - US REL-HES tall-ma; 3 Eh If If UHIIHEIY came. Mar-mall c. c. CrItIeal ?an II lMGreeI-Iell 2 I Mgder?e Like?hggd l-Ilederate Il'ltEl'StEltES den hit-Lean H- I I anew: I '3 Furten cm:- 3 .- Certain era-en. Ted-:l 2 a a Grin-rel entitle: are Ile lee- 11-2- gII-ateet prdI-aI-Ittr' ED ilII . "Mm" E, WII. m, am LII-set Little-rat" damage e'atee pleaee rt?e TF- H-i-Ii- HIM. E. F-ZI F: LCIG MINE Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII LInIaIa-I:Ianupagi. USP. I 3. I'll Elli-Ell There-5a EDS Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event Tammie rim .TS #335IIFIMIQLIFI if}. Fir-.wailiemm . ?Mung? I ?1 . WWI-State at - Critical Ceuntiee {25} Legend 5 1., "aerate ate: 5 I were ewe: Em? c.5533 I IJI1 Ballard 7 7 4. thing when a 3 I: At Wil?'?t? Interstatee II- can I5 .. LII-Ilil'iEll'f HEILIIEE Gall-away I3 I3 l3 5 l3 l3 RiverElm-?an =7 It} Mederate Likeliheed ETHICertain IE IS IE Ted-1 '3 l3 CINE-HI ?Eli-I? ?-31:93: I: Em?t If; 3 my" 3' at el'a'e. Curl-11mm:- EU 43 EU . aI-zI damage- mm "211-? attaeied 33 I: .53 3 chmIIt'eLIInE F: II.I .IaaezenIEIIT TEEMII-I: Lee NINE Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at USP PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell $133313! Tili'l'li-i-EI Sahaal Funatianality at Day 1 - New Madrid Saiamia Zana: Evant March 21:11:13 II- 2'31; 11' - 1 1.111111111111115 7? 1 11?11 11111311511 11.1:111 .. HGST 1.1 1' {3111 Will 11 11 111.11111E11 1 1. 3:4 .. -. _1:111: 1111: 1 1111 SEL Tm? .1211. 1' y? 1 a; 111.1 11 1 1111111111 - ?-719 - H11: 1111111 I -1 I - ?5GENE 0 1111.111 State of I112antuc 1111r - Critical Counties {25} Legend Tn:- t'll Ila. Tahl la. 1:11' - - 1:11.? 111:,- Fat-"liar. Gun Faalltlar. Faallr?ac. Flln?tl? ??lmy US HUMEE Ballard 7 1:1- 5- 1 31:11:11. 1 33:" :1 L1 111 1111 111111111111 1111111 111111111- Earllua-I 1:1 4. an 1: :3 Fundign? HEN-EVE 1.1M 27 :7 Mal-Mn 5 IE- 1:111:11n11111n :1 3 1.11ru1111 1:1 13 [Ia-.1111 1:11: +3 1.5 r11uI1I11-nt-11-1'1: Fult-n 11 1311111- 1: 1: 111-11111- 1: 111 111-111 131111-1111 ?zz-11111111 a111- ?a11 1111111111 111 11:11- 111- 1111-5111111 armanlnr' 3:33?? 1:3 {1:11. 3 3' 1:11' 1151 111 rat. Fara-1111mm. 1111' EU 43 EU 11:11 HI 1:1 3 1:11. E- HIIZI $131213 FIFEI 111:5? Ittll? Elli-33H? - - 11:11:11: 1: :3 '5 F: 11.1 PAST FESEJEM El'1lT 1.11115 Mid-Amariaa Earthquaka Cantar LII :11: UHJaIa-I:Ian1pagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell ??i?ltll El]?r Total Populatidn (2000} - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Event March 25125 um um State of - Critical Cnunties {25} Legend Candy lelty chnl?ticrn T?I't'?l M?j?r CitiEE RENEE Ballard 5,255 5,552 55,125 mAzus - 2am? I 3,555 45,502 Caldu?l 13,060 Haul-5mm 44,3253 Millailerg 31 .839 - . 4D Elm-'35 Call?my 54,122 Hickman 5,252 ?hio 22,515 2,551 - 5,525 -:ritiI::5 C5un1i55 Carisle 5,351 45,51 El 11 3,531 - .E?ij - 27?] Chrisli?n F1255 Uri-hush)" 9,804 Trigg 12,59? - 53.334 25,5?3 Unit-n 15,53? - T531 - 15.433 [Ia-alias 91.545 Lyra? 8,030 WEIJEIH 14'120 arena-3'5? trauma: ch5 1'1; gt?m?' Eran-25:: 10 21] EU . T352 ?Dacha? 55.51 '4 an: TI :3 rt 11; ?ied '45" Graves airings [mm-an 9.93:3 cmnmeurdumE F: IMPACT ASSESSMENT Mid-Alumina Earlhquaim LII at unmi?iampagi. USP. I'll Ell-Ell Waste Water System Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event March EDDIE l- - State ef - Erltleal CeuntIee {25} Legend Tet-ll Idle-.1 er Tet'll He. at Jane-arr Damp-late magma [Ian'h'Ige Wate- Uri-es Moderate Damage age Deunt.? flied-unrat- Eanm 2 2 I: ?Mum" 5 5' At Least l'uie-tlerate He. ef Leaks LIE Heutee Gald'a'ell a lean" +5 ntergtat33 tall-maCarlin-a Ie Ie Malia-hem" HT ea . . 11 Emma? ammn e3 '3 Mederate 51 - Rivera den .2 Marmall IE IS - - IE: Mululenbem 3'9 HIQHYLIHEIF 1'31 SUD la I5 Cum-:- la: a Certaln - EDD 1T. :l:l 3: :3 a are thee-I tlatexmnenee- 11-2- geateet pram-ame- 5 ED "?n?mn lee um" 5' at nua- eat. Ferclem than. eT'Celupie-F "Wm" 2+ 2+ Wet- ,m :15, and Meme-rat" carnage- e'atee phat-I Caz-m rt11-a- ataeiecl Tr. H-i-Ii- ,5 ea .3 FIJI F: TEF: Mid-America Earthquake ISanter LII unmiwiampagi. USP PM I 3. PrdeetF' I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Airpart Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDGE 1.1- PAII A TETTE ts- . e'ATIA lei-[UH] - . I I 43' LEAHE ITEEIH Bi REIT-TE . I .3. MT LAIJD A 3" . . . muf? 4i?? SMTH 13L 1, . I53 use" HE A Ams JEFF A A ?I-Lll m1 AI-IITE WALTIIA I 931-. 4'9 1 ARI. Isa". PEARL State sf Mississippi Critical Csunties {25} At It Tetsl He. at Camp-lets C'eunt'; Earn Damage Alsem Eent-n Bell var Cash-ms Es lets Ls Marl-hall Memes Panels Prsn? II TI .slet-uuhs Legend ?irpert Damage ?It Least l'uhtleraie HigHe.f UnlikelyI i} Unlikely.I Moderate Ukelihaasl HigHyLikely Certain Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers =Critieal I:eLIrIties ED I'u1iles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII at Thais-Champs Lu. USP. I3. are ?eas gear-st at Teasing the speen'lstl clan agre- stI?e. Fer sT'CsmpII- and Least Maclsra?e' clan age st-ItI-s phase Its attains-:1 F1 IMPACT Airpert - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event April EDGE 7? TI 7.2?7. I. DEETI 9? LI-I I - r- LII IE: IITIs I .ETTE . WEBSTER -AA. TTIITA . . TL IILIAIIIEs?e Is ISIS A LEAHE 1 1T lIiElIIle77167;? 31:43.11 IA .71- 7774- . 77{em I.LI.IIE I I- amps - I -- 77 A JEFF aseII . MI MN I - WILII7.77:; I, HI 7m - A. State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} He. ef Tetal FtnetienIl lle. ef Facilities Facilities: Aleern Benten Beli'Irar Chickasaw Desete Grenatla Lafayette Lee l'u'hrslIall Panela Fentetee Premiers ?uih'r?'l SLII?ewer TallalIatelIie Tate TIElIeninge Tuniea l.lnien "I?alehusha Legend I?IirII-ert 1 I. Met Funetienel Funetiuznel LIE Heutes Interstates Rivers =Critieel l:eLIrIties ED l'u1iles FT Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-felt,- at ream-Champs Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?'?il?tlr an.I ?ee: eI' age Fer and 'At Least age pie-33!? eeItIrt 1H attest-It! FIZI F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI Ei?l?l Worst Case Casualties (2PM) - New Madrid Seismie Zane: l'Iili'J?r Event 1351110 State ef Mississippi I I I I . Ceunttes {25} p. thnes Tetal 11:. I: I 3-45: cf PAH I Severe] Fatalitis Casualties . . .. I Ale-:1..-.I I'ii'i?: - 13' ea-IthI-I 32 1 34 E: ectit-ar 24 1 25 . Bah-1111 2 2 . . 2.13m 133 221313 5' SEE ADA Grenada 19 19 ZIWI BSTE ELAT 3 3 1 l' Jj ?ame 223: - - HTIBB i 133 - x' Pat-Ida 13ATTALA Prentiss 5 5 H?s?.5 IA Euitman 1B 1 19 I AIS-I Surflewer 22 1 23 IE SH {13 TalIaI'Iatel'Iie 25 1 ea '55 -- aw} LEAHE 1 HEMPE We 3'3? ?5 3? eh stat It an A I anger It 1; -. . 9: 1s seen I mu? 31312 21 see 1' LII-tcn fileri liaII ?New 3 '3 3 It" .eeuf: It" . CDFIIH Legend Waist ICase Casualties - - - AI Ams JEFF e? 5 Mai? DUES I mm! .. iesh'urg SE. 1- manta-40.0110 ail] 191?: 51 150 I AMTE ALTHA I I- Ett. 15-1 35'] I 45,001 - 134,000 W. I."l I $1 - res . 13E IIJRG LIE Heutes PE As Interstates . Rivers =Critieal I:eun?ties l'u1iles Mid-?m?ii?? 55.1: Least ?Dill? LISA Amt-s pit-aet- 11-? attested r3. Ell-33ml. ntepal F1 8?12 Ccmmunicaticn FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event Aprilacce State at Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} Me. At Least cf lac-delete Ecn'plete Eanty FacUities Damage Damage Ale-2m 17": Ehentcn 23 Et-liuar El]? Ball-cm Chickasaw 7'3 Ecal'cma 121 Elasctc 250 250 Grenada 7"4 ttawamlze 55 Lafayette as Lee 219 his-shall 114 136 Panels 11: Prentiss 4:5 Quitrnan EnTallahatcl'ie . Tate 13 I55 U- Tip-pan 55 Tish-:rningc 65 Twin 11? Lhicn 1'3 35 Legend lEelnmunicatien Fa-cilitj.r Damage At Least l'u'htlertie Higl?ly Unlikely Unlikely Mcderate HigH'f Likelyf Ir Certain Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers =Critical I:cunties ED l'uliles 55.1: Least LII Ell: USP. ante-s pie-asle- ems?: 119 manne- 9111 r3. Eliaalal. PrclectP nlclial It'll? F1 TEFEMIHILI (y Mid-?m?ti?a Earlh?uak? E113 Dams - New Madrid Seismic Zane: M73 Event April EDDIE .- I I I I :1 911- 1 lerl?igsnut - State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} He. ef Camry Facilities Aleern 33 Better: Beli'u'ar 2E: Call'uznun 43 Cli ekasaw Ceallema 5 [taste 113 Grenada 22 ttamniia 43 Lafayette TEI Lee l'u'larshall 52 I'Imrnree 41 Panela I34 Pants-tee 3? Prentiss 23 Illuitn'lan 3 Sun? ewer Tallaliatehie 4Ei Tate 4E: Tippah 5E: Tishen'ilue Ttlliea 13 Ulien 43 ?I'alelmsha 43 Legend 1 [Jams Medi?ed Merealli Intens it}.r 1-1 - WI LIE Heutes Interstates Rivers =I3ritieal lSaul-dies 13 ED l'u1iles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII L'ersr?- Ell: Mala-Chem pa gt. USP. l3. Ell-F?i?l. ?'?i?tll 'I'IereeaJ-a-Tle- F'fllGIJ-Fll -:Irtleale:-u1ie-s are ?eets ?at-stperhlee- the (Jest-st mamm- e1' resell-g the steamed clan age ms. Fer tie-Turners Elf-30mph- and Least Meclerat' clan age sate-s pleas-e- 1H attested F1 FEEDEMEHT E114 Tetal Debris - New Madrid Seismic Zane: M2.2 Event April 2999 - 2_ as- FIE-HA I 94:5 J. I 1'1? PAH ll I I 2:971?- l. _eeIITeTe EI Iii. . . GEE-ADA enamel I II . .. ATTALA I - I 3:51 .- . '55 -- LEAHE ?1 ILH 4. ..II . I .. H. seen I mu? I Merl Iii." I I [sea .3.qu I SIMPS HI- Faj- . JEFF BIA . _m 35" .- iesIItIrg Ti .93. sell AMTE IH --IIFI State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} Tl'IIqusends 51 TI: ns Briele' nIzreteI' TIzItsl County 9teel BetIris ?ieem 14.92 9% 23.59 BentI:In 12.99 11.43r 24.15 19.42 9.93 23.94 3.E5 1.91 4.92 Chielca?w 4.19 2.25 9.44 Eeeherna 13.99 32.95 43.51 393.99 53391 934.49 Grenada 9.92 9.91 19. 29 item-amine 4.39 1. E9 9. 93 Lafayette 192.32 22999 331. 22 LE 22.29 15.92 33.25 Marshall 94.19 94.34 129.53 Menree 5.53 2.54 9.19 F'enIzIIa 43.23 93.55 119.29 4.94 2.23 2.24 F'rentiss 5.23 2.12 2.43 I3uitrnan 5.24 9.52 11.99 Sunflower 5.5 2.25 13.2? Tsilshatel-Iie 11.93 15.15 29.19 Tete 22.92 93.95 193.93 Tippeh 33.29 93.29 93.59 4.34 1.94 9.19 $.93 94.94 122.92 LlniI:In 12.12 12.94 23.21 1?9 usha 2.43 I122 3.1? Legend Tetal l3 elIris Tl'IIzrusantls ef Tens 5 Majer lCities 5- 25 33.5th - 49,999 15-5'3 I 49,991 -45,999 5?3 I 45.001-194.000 199 2m Bautes Interstates BiII'ers =9ritisal l9I:ILInties 9 19 23 43 93 Miles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII LII-rem,- at rlJaIa-Ciam pa gt. USP. l3. Ell-B9I?l. l'll9l39l 9133.312? 1199399 ??9912le an.I ?eets ?atetpermee- ?esta-It prdIerIIrtr' ape clan age me. Fun an! LII-est Maciera?e' clan age I'ertII-s 1H attested F1 PEBBEMEHT 515 Displaced Fcpulaticn - New Madrid Seismic che: llI?li'Jr Event April 20133 - TIE-2 ceusnr Iii] HIE I I 5" WEBSTER ELM I 1'rtrlePJI lGreensr . - - i I ATTALA I . . 5:57. - I . IEche '55 IA - LEAHE 1 ?1 . I LAUD II I I I II. scan .- I lIlen llan I .-. I I .DHII car-1'41 asell 1" es . JEFF _m 35" .- ieslitlrg - Pf": WlLl-{l sell AMTE .State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties Estimate cf Displaced Displaced Ecunty Reside-Ices F'cpulaticn 42 1D1 Ele'Itcn 1'9 211 EIclis-ar 42 125 Cain-jun 1 Chiclca?w 1 Ccahcma T1 2E5 4.133 11.4% Grenada 35 Q3 ltawarnt-a La?ayette 313 344 Lee 4 El Marshall 453 1.313 1 2 F'ancla 334 351 1 Prentiss 1 2 Duitman 43 13] 14 El] EB 2743 Tate 23? 2.114 Tippah 14D 353 Tishcmingc 1 Tunica 331 2.4934 Unicn TIE: EEG 'I?alct-usha 1 Legend Displaced Pcpulaticn 0- Maj-er lCities 5" emcee?Incas 331 I 43.331 ?1.nm 4.510 I 45pm -Ispnn - 2.531 - 11 LIE HcLItes Interstates =Critical Rivers 1D 2D 43 DJ l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Denali.- at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? are ?eece ?at-Itpermce- the gear-st c1' resell-g the spech'led clan age me. and 'At Least Mcclera?e' clan age sates phase- EDWIN: 11-? attached F1 IMPACT FEEDEMEHT E115 Electric Fewer F?Cility Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Event State ef Mississippi I Critical Ceunties {es} Tatal Ha. At of Moderate Complete Comfy Fssilities Damage Damage PAll I. A . Alaam 2 ?r?w a. II I EIent-Calhoun 1 II 3H 1 Chickasaw 2 AL ll.ll 303mm 34 '3 '3 LEI I I "Hi Des-zit:- 23 23 El It; A Grenada 5 l: I ll laa 3 wesstge a? 1* SEEM 2 IE- if 1315:?; Marshall 1 I) li? l} ll?iki Hal-ma 2 _i - I Pen-:Ils I3 . a" . Pent-jinn: 1 -I- Quitmsn 1 Sunfl-z-wer 11 I55 sir. 2 -- 1 I HEMPE 3 -. 4? I Tiaham ingcu 2 . seen I Tuniaa 3 .. - Llnian In 2 - 1 GRIT Legend Electric Fewer Facility?r Damage ?hmUkelih??d - . "13,52- It - I Certain 31' II I -. I Interstates PE ?us Reutes . Ia'34, ".J?lalr: I Hwers 1s 2s A: s: d: Miles ?Fi? ?cse II PEPE-1: ?Id-hm?n?a Earlhquak'?' el' leasing the apesn'elil clam-lye sills. Fer 55.1: rat" LISA same-s pie-asle- 11-? stashed Ilues?c?t-r TEFEMIHIZI EmergencyF Dperaticn Center Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: MIT Event April EDDIE - E15 SW5 Inf Mississippi . If: TILJ I n'ermlre Ccuntles {25} I T3 I Tctal Ha. At Least I HEEHA 315i er Heelerete Camp-late LAFAYETTE II Damage Damage I I AWAME Alccm 2i _jp? Bent-2n lir?lT II I E: 3:8. 1 - . Ealhcun L- 1 Chickasaw 1'51: ALHDUIF ..HICHAI Des-ate Grenada 1 3U L1 FF. - itawamtLafayette Harshall II 11"? ETA 1 1 Panels 1 was II.- II II . I EE Pant-aim -I5. Prentiss a I I Duitman El El sH=' HI . I :15- I Tallahatchie 1 I53 - LEAHE 13.51 HEMPE Tate -. I TippahI wff?? SI: ILAUD I IA 1 $11e".1 Ill 1 r" .. It'll. . . nil-HIT _eItI' I sIMPse Legend EZTIEF HE Imll. Emergency?r Dperatien Centers .td[Utithl-II?E AIIHLIH 2* 1H - . . II AIAMS JEFF RSMIIWIIAH II - 1? . '3 tri- AI-IITE Em? IGREEHE Mcderate Ukelihccd sell' WWII we THA I I-I..PI EIT 91?- HigHyLikely LIE- Certain 5:51 "391:" GED 13. = nterstates Reutes AFI Iscll - mm =Critical Ccunties 71:- Miles Mid-?m?ii?? Center UI at gt. USP. r3. I. ItuestIgatur P. 55.1: LTD. Hill? em? F-Z- F1 IMPACT E113 EmergencyF Dper. Center Functionality - New Madrid Seismic che MT.T Event April EDGE I .yE 3 T-D AL "ht-l} 33E ?pp-AH 11?3- {HI-?Ilia? LII IAAFIAHAI I: II A . I-J PAHI .A I - - EI . "I?ll" '1'an HilE" I -3 I?l EA A5 WEBSTER - WHEN, .. . . g'lmAI AIEH 1L IIG - . ATTALA A etcIEsHee '35 UL ?3 WA jl LEAHE 1 ?33 iI .1391 A 1' I I .__ruf'l Flu?J..? Fr .13 . Ft? [cu .IJFIIT .I A. AE . - I Iii-1' F5 .3?3 . JEFF IJI WILHI scII 3-H - 9F - . H'cecH State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} lle. cf Tctal Functicnal He. cf ICIqunthr Facilities Facilities Alccm Benten BeliII'ar 1 1 Chickasaw Ceahcma [II-mete 1 IISreInatla 1 1 ltawan'lia 1 1 Lafayette Lee 1 1 Marshall I'II'Icnrce 1 1 Pancla 1 1 Prentiss Sun?cwer TallalIatclIie 1 1 Tate TippalI Tisheninge El 1 TIInica l.lnien 1 1 Legend EIneI'g en cy CHI eratieII Centers 1 I. Met Functicnal FunctiIznal LIE Heutes Interstates Rivers =Critical l:cLII'Ities EU luliles Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII DIE-refil- at rLIaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? an.A ?eas ?at-Atpermce- the c1' tlI.A [Ian age and Least Mcclera?e' [Ian age 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT Ferry FaeilityI Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event April EDGE . ?1'2'3 I. DEE. ?ak?'4 I i - - 115' I113 H3. F45: - i'J PAII "f A IJ I E: eu? fi13I I- I LIE-LIL - 1: 1 . - RH IiiI_. 'i3 LILIILIILIL ,rui LL. I I -L LIL .I}FIllf JASPE ILL IIE . II JEFF I II II MS . I..- .-- ?l - L3 I 1mg em ?Ir-Ii E1: Lip. - . 9117-; 53 "449$ sE ease-1' PE LILEL Lj?l'u1.. State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} Tatal Ha. At Least sz I'L'Iaderate Complete Ecurty FaeilitiE Ela'nage Damage Ale-:Irn Berton EIdiIIar Calhaun Cl'ieka?w Baal-Lama Elesete Grenada ltawamlaa Lafayette Lee ILIarsI'Iall lL'II:an:Ie Pan-:la Parts-tee Prertiss Quitman Sun?lawer Tallahetehie Tate Tippah Tisha-mingle Turiea Llrien Legend Fern?r Facility Damage Least LII I_lnliILel'LI Mederate Ukeliheed Certain Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers =Critieal I:eLInties ED 4] Miles Mid-?meriea Earlhquake Center LII DIE-fall,- at IIJaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-E?i?l. ?lm-Flt? CIl?lIlI-ll an.I ?eas ?at-Itpermee- e1 speen'led clan age Fer and Least clan age phase eaIsIIt In attested FIZI F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI Fire Statien Damage - New Madrid Seismic ene: Event April 21312113 i I 4-4 FLE- M?l II- 43- 1?31? .. . 4-4 444 321- hgs-Waugh-J." Ur LE AHEJTJ $454 i?emee - I35 I 4 -- .3133inrte?eu' 4? .4, 44 I111_43" I4I 132F441 It?; useJEFF i II- l- Tr :15: 34 .. 331m 1-115. I State ef Mi33i33ippi Critical Ceuntie3 {25} Tatei Me. At Least l'I'Ii:II:IIerete Eerrplete Faeilities Damage Damage ?le-:rn 15 3 Etiliuar 1-4 IIlall'Iziu-I 3 Ceahama 11 1Q 19 2 Grenada 12 Lefayiette 16 Lee 22 I'I'la'sl-Iall El El 22 Pariala 12 El Pertiztee 12 Prentiss 14 Qu'rtman 5 SurfliziI-Irer 14 Tate 12 12 Tip-pan El El Tish-:rnirga 16 TLniea 2 2 Uni-2n 12 2 'I?alcilziusha Legend Fire Statien [tam-age ?it Least I'IItitler-Iie HigH'y'Ul'llil'iIEll'y' Unlikely.I Mederate Ukelihaeei Certain Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers =Critieal I:eLIrItiee Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII L'E'ral'?- at pa USP. r3. $123312? are ?atetperienee tie qua-abet 31' reaeilig tie clan age 3111?. Far tie-flirtlaie Inf-33mph- a' and Leaet Maclerat' clan age 1.131235 e:I 3Itt 113 attaeietl tnellneit?GUIDE F1 E121 Fire Statinn Functionality - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Mil? Event 2.2212222 -- TTW State 2f Mi22i22ippi Critical Cuunties {25} 33' II in? "12Facilitii? Facili?i? . ?mm 15 ?f I Bent-2n 2 2 1? Baliuar 14 14 . HEIDI-HI i 2 2 liHlE" . .11. 7" Cuzi?lmn'n 11 11 .- GEE ?Fl 22241.: 2 12 WE 2325 Grenada 12 12 ?amnim 12 12 13.21211?; Rhyme 15 . 2?4.1 II 1_ L44 22 22 WASJ -. .I. :19 [ml-El?n El El I, ATE '51. ing? I, my: l'IIi-rinrizi-E: 22 22 4 Pamla 2 12 Han?5;" 4T __215. El 12 . if Pren?if"; 14 14 ?E?L'ruil_ 3-4 T214 2 12 TI iI Iali i] Il- ii Tislmningizi 15 Il- TInicti 2 3.2: .123" 4 II 4 42 4 2245: 2222 II I. $1.134 .. - I - P- 212ml JEFF Legend I- Fir-2 _iin? I. II 11121 Fumiinnai Functiiznal HnLite2 = nter2tate2 =Critical Cnunti122 River-2 2 12 22 42 122 l'u1il22 Mid-?m?ri?a Earlh?uak? 3.221211122312323} all] fat" U32. 22121-2 pie-222 112 El'tt??i?tl Michal F-ZIF: IMPACT FEEDEMEHT ??2512me E122 Hazardous Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event April EDDIE AeraerEID I E?s-heal I gnu" HE r'?l .44 JIL- F.- .1. '1 fr EDEN Bi . State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} tie. at Facilities Alccm 14 Bentcn 3 Bali-war 1T lIZalhetIn 4 Chickasaw 12 Ceahcma 1EI EI1 lGrenada 51 ltawan'lla 1? Lafayette 13 Lee EB Marshall 14 I'I.I'lcnree 54 Pancla 34 12 Prentiss 1Ei ?titman 4 1E: Tallahatchie 3 Tate 15 Tippah Tishcningc 1? Tunica l.Inien 31 ?I'alchusha Legend I Hazardcus Materials Facilities Mctli?etl Mercalli lntens ?If 44 WI LIE Heutes Interstates Rivers =Critical l:aunties l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Una-rem at Mala-Clamps! gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? 'I'tereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. WINE-4 are ?eas ?at-Hammet- the gear-at prdnatulttr' c1' reach-g the specn'letl clan age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and Least Mcclerat' clan aJe me: please- czumtt 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT TEEMIHLI E123 Highway Bridge Functienality - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April 2333 72 2?54. ..- cmmce I II .II 4 Fl- 24 State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} He. cf Tetal Functienal lle. ef Ilieunt}.r Facilities Facilities: Alcem 234 234 Benton 113 123 Beliuar 233 233 lilalheun 224 224 Chickasaw 231 231 Ceahema 111 112 Denote 1?3 234 Granada 1?1 1?1 ?awanira 243 243 Lafayette 253 233 Lee l'u'larshall 251 253 l'u'lenree 233 233 Panela 251 251 Pentetec 134 134 Prentiss 233 233 Illuitn'an 11? 11? Sun?ewer 133 133 Tallahatchie 155 155 Tate 133 15? Tippali 1?5 1?5 Tishcninge 133 133 Tunica 54 33 Unicn 242 242 'r'alelmsha 1?3 1?3 Legend Hl?l'l?ll'li'?] Bridge Functienality 1 - Net Functicnal - Functicnal U5 Heutes Interstates Rivers =I3ritical l3::uunties 13 23 Eli. l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. Eliasial. nlcpal Iii-Ell. WINE-4 are aces ?at-experience- gear-st c1' resell-g the spech'lstl clan age s?a?e. Fer attempte- and Least Mcdera?e' clan aJs sates pleas-e- 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT 324 Highway Bridge 3: Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Mil? Eyent April 2131313 t-f'#41124]. L44- .: _Il?l i Hui-?Elm lug-314,4; WHTHE "if .. _a?ymug T: qurr1143"- . _El? . tie-4. I an State at Mississippi Critical Ceuntiee {25} Tatal Ha. Least cf Ecurty Faeilitiee Damage Damage Alecrn 234 Ebert-2n 12D 1 Ehziiyar ESE Dell-lam 224 231 Baal-pane: 112 2 ELI-41 25 Grenada 1?1 tee-ante Lafayette 263 Lee Marehall 256 239 Panda 251 1 Pei-tat-ze 164 Prertiee ELIE Jlj?tma'l 11?" ELI-timer 139 Teilahatel'ie 155 Tate 157" El] Tippah 1?5 1 Tiehzmirge 133 TLI'iea I33 El Li'ien 242 WEI Legend Highway El ridge amage At Least lubtlerme . Higl?iy Unlikely 4 Unlikely 4* Mederate Ukeliheed 4- HigHy Likely 4 I:ertain Highway Segment [1 amag At Least l'u'lederrle HigHy Unlikely Unlikely Maderate Ukelihaad US Heutea lnteratatee Hiyere =Critieal I:euntiee El ED 4] El] l'u1ilee Mid-America Earthquake Center LII L'ererk- at LImaIa-Ciam pagl. U344. r3. Ellaeial. PrdeetP Michal Ilue e?gatnr TiereeaJ-a-Tle- eel. F'rllelnal llueetkntur Cirilml ennui-e are ?ea? ?at-.4tperklee- tie geek-at at meeting the epeen'led clan age me. Fel and Leaet Meclera?e' clan age ems phage- ezulelrt 1H attaeietl tnellnelt?GUIDE FIZ- E125 Hospital Damage - New Madrid Seismio Zone: Event April EDDIE HIE . ?ll- 3,153,- . 11-1: 35": 113- T. AH 1 LAF "(tit-TIE PAII A . . I hag; I AWAIIE C- WITLL 43717111311 13?7 GHEIADA - 3U EH WEBSTER iI 1 -5 . . FARHDL ?uff-"BS I i. ?I'llI 519-- . {ll-?EH? ?i_Jl?J EE ?1 I ..-: -- maywe} LEAHE 1 ?51 11?; II .A Eff sroTT I . . . _r 1' 15;. . _1_r .- .1 fr ..1 - I -I nil-HIT ii": Il- r: A 49' I ASPE CL -: . . 5:5 -. IMHIDII. e: DLII 1 In- ..I. 13mm" 11mg IJEA THA - .EIIT 98- - - ?es .: It: com-I 'e?is? State of Mississippi Critical Counties {25} Total No. At Least of Moderate Complete Courty Faoilities Damage Damage Aloom 1 Berton EiIzliuar 1 Calhoun 1 CHCHEISEIW 1 Coahoma 1 1 El Descto Grenada 1 itawamloa Lafayette 1 1 Lee 1 Marshall 1 1 l'Ilonroe Panda 2 2 Portotoo 1 Prertiss 1 Du'rtman 1 1 El Surflower 2 Tallahatol'ie 1 1 Tate 1 1 Tippal'I 1 1 Tisl'Iomingo 1 Turioa UriIzn 1 '?I?alolousl'Ia 1 Legend Hospital Damage At Least C- LlnliitelyI Moderate Ukelihood I Certain LIS Routes Interstates Risers =Critioal Counties 1D 2D ED "Tr- l'II1iles Mid-?merioa Earthquake Center LII Denali.- at HJaIaallampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-F?i?l. ?lm-Flt? are ?eece ?at-Itpermoe- the oI' the Apeeltled clan age me. For and 'At Least Moclera?e' clan age Ame-s phase- olesIrt 1H F1 IMPACT FEEDEMEHT TEEIHIHCI BEE Hospital Functienality - New Madrid Seismic ZcIne: Event April EDDIE TH if "hulk 3'3" LII TIs Fifi :eeusH 131I..- 49H I ElfiSH- Ir_I'l. :15? I I rB '55 U. ?.5th LEAHE Hg lift/(f SPIDTT 3:31 . . _Its' ASPE LL .HE . 5?55: . -- JEFF 51-..1 .El? F.- State cIf Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} II a. at Tatal Functienal He. cf Facilities Facilities Alcent Benten Bali-war Chickasaw Cealtema [II-seats IGrenada ltawaniJIa Lafayette Lee Marshall I'II'Ienree Panela Fentetec Prentiss lIlitlitn'IIan Sun?ewer Tallal'Iatcl'Iie Tate Tiny-alt Tislteninge Tunica Unien ?I'alehuslla Legend Hes pital Functicnalityr [IlajIr 1 I. Met FuneticInal Functicnal LIE Rattles Interstates HiII'ers =Critical l:IzILIrIties ED 4] l'uliles Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII at rIJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. ?lm-Flt? candles are ?cce ?at-Itpermce the ale-abet ct the specn'led clan age mt. Fer attempte- and '.I5.t LII-act Mc-clera?e' clan age sates pleas-e- 1H attached F1 IMPACT FEEDEMEHT Liquefacticn Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic che: Event April EDGE AWFW 11F E: ceusH HIE IJHE ADA Ir i Mi,- WEBSTER lGreensr . - ., .- ATTALA l?J I fr". 5:51 I: A . - '35 11-" IA GIAEIJ ., LEAHE 1?9 scan I Men lIan ?3.31 . I y' AHA .IEIIHII 3mm LL HE ?1le Lg. I 1" F5 4' . JEFF ?maul ieslitlrg ?1 .1.- E5115 55" WI . WlLl-{l IH .E 111ALTHA - 9F- 5 11?: F.- I. PE AH 115- State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} h-?inimum h-?laraa' mum Ecunty Susceptitility ELIsceptibility Alccm Elentcn Lew Elclis-ar Unknown Call-1cm Chiclca?w che El?ctc Very High Grenada ltawan'lzua Lafayette che LEE Lew h-?lzunrce F'sncla Hene Prentiss Quit man l-lcne SLrIflcV-er Tallahatchie Tate Lew Very High Tippsh che Tishcn'ingc Tunica Very High Llnicn Lew ?r'slctuusha Legend efa ctie II Sus ce 1ti 1ilitjyr Ncne - Lew Mary High Majer lCities II - I - I 45,551 154,555 LIE Heutes =Critical l:cunties Interstates Rivers EU l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Lu. USA r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? -:Irtlc:Ilc:-II1155 are 11:55 ?at5tperh1c1- the gear-5t 1rd13l1lrly c1' the dam age 5111?. Far tie-TIIrtIc15 attempte- b' and 'At Least Mcclera?e' clan age pleas-e- c:II5 rt 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI 323 Medi?ed Mereelli IntensityF - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Event I State ef Mississippi . . - j? ICutteel Ceunttes {25} I - Met-t. MMI Aleern VII . FAVETTE Benten VII Helium VI VI Cltidttesnw VI Cealteme VII Desete ii . .. . .. . Grenetle VI I 2' ?ewanlte Lafayette VII lEreem.r - 9 '02Merslt?l VII W315 Pentetee VI Prentiss VI '35" I ?uitmen VII ILL-1 . VI I sc?TT T?l?ll??liie VI . - eekse Ttie VII Ti 1 ieh VII .3331 I Tislteminge VI FHA CL . I HE at! Unielt VII --JEF . Velelt-tlshe VII Legend JEFF Metli?etl MereelliIntensity.r - Eh??gr'r? Maj-0r Cities PM AMTE -V1 II 30.000-40.000 WILHI S?ll . 'Vil VELLTHA - 93- II 40001 415,000 -..- - I 45001 - 194,000 3 - PE Mt trtteretetee II I Ceurtties CID-11H Eli-=90?lint-ML! L- $15: Miles Mid-?m?ri?? Earlh?uak? iie?t?i'emtfai??i?ii V5.1: ?01:0: :EtFes I35 .3 II: IIEI 2' - .3 3 . Ll EIZII. Natural Gas Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: 111111?r Event April EDGE cl- :11ch Ill ?33 ?Wis"! I Ims 1-45-I Lair Tc 1r til?IerL-I- State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} Tctal Me. At Least cf Ecmplete Facilities Damage Damage Ehentcn 1 Et-liuar 16 Elall'naLn 3 Ecal'ncma Elesctc 11 11 El Grenada 2 ltawamlaa 1 Lafayette Lee Illa-shall 12 Pancla 5 1 Prentiss Quitman Tallahatcl'ie Tate 4 1 Tippah Tish-:mirg: 1 Tmica 5 Lhicn 3 'T?alclziJsha 1 Legend Hatul'al GEE Facility Damage At Least lul'bdertte HigH'f Unlikely t} Unlikely h-lcderate Ukelihccd HigHyLikely I Certain Majcr Natural Gas Lines LIE Ecutes Interstates Rivers =Cr'rtical I:cunties EU l'uliles Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? cutie?3 calm-s are acre ?at-atpermce- the great-st c1' the specn'led clan age 3111?. Far tie-Turners cT'CdTuple and Least Mcclerat' clan age me: please- 1H attache-:1 F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI 1330 Oil Facility Damage - New Madrid Seisrnic che: Ml? Event April EDDIE [Es Tc '1 3-H: . I cA-i. lit-ates I rs ll 3-454 causH HIE . MIA 11M ?11! - - - Hill-49:. xJ?l_.lf ATTALA l'35 LEAHE 1 {Ill I - L4 . Still-TT I ILAUD A . II r. ill? [can cenf? HIT A . . Kisslrapsr -. escII 84.: JEFF .II LII 1' .511 ?t A 93' l? lLl-ty??ll 9F: State cf Mississippi Critical Ccunties {25} Tctal Hp. At Least cf I'I'Icclelate Facilities Damage Damage P.1ccrn Etentcn Ecliuar Cancun Cl'iclaasatl.r Ccahc-ma Enact-z: Grenada Lafayette 1 Lee Marshall 1 1 1 Panda 1 Prentiss Quitman Tallahatchie 2 Tate Tieeah TLnica LII-icn "I?alct-LIsha Legend IEllil Facility Damage At Least I'II'bdthe C- Lll'IlitEEl'f Mcderate Ukelihccd HigHyLikely I Certain rI-1ajcr Transmissicn Lines LIE HcLItes Interstates Risers =Cr'rtical CcLInties l'u1iles Mid-?marica Earthquake Canter LII l'JH?l?lEr Ell: IIJaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? EDI. are ?cse ?at-stpermce- the geaE-st cI' the clan age she. cT'CcmpIe and Least Mcclera?e' clan aJe st-Ites pleas-e- cJIsIrt 1H attache-LI FC- F1 MPH-CT PE ECSM El'-lT TE F5 LEG 331 Peak Greund - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event April EDDIE I ?Email? 15-51 - 1? - . WI CA5. unseeusHA .. 151 ALLAHA EALHDUL . An A "1 441-34.? ?55? - I: I AHWL dHecTA '7 4912?? 1" 1 ?mm I 44' LEAHE HEMPEFJ TIE I. lGreem.r . Ir" .r WAS Iii:- - Iss- 11?11 51: INT I 12?d- . . I r, Men IIan g" I . 1. [1755. .11?llf 551? MSPE 13L HE . :1 95?1?1: 5 HI- 5'41 1' . JEFF Hsmi 51A . _m 31:" .- 9&2. 1 WILHI seII IF: EELTHA - 93?1- eEeHeE I . AH - State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} "learnt-Ir PEA l'u'lax. PEA Aleent I11 5 I125 Better: I125 I125 Bali-war I155 I115 [Ealheun I11 5 I115 Ellie Hasaw I11 5 I115 Ceahen'la I11 5 I125 [Iesete I125 I144 Grenada I11 5 I115 ?amn'lra I11 5 I115 Lafayette I11 5 I125 Lee I11 5 I115 I'II'larsl'Iall I125 I134 I11 5 I115 Panela I125 I125 Pentetee I11 5 I115 Prentiss I11 5 I115 ?llitl'l'liill'l I11 5 I125 Sun?ewer I155 I115 Tallaliatelie I11 5 I115 Tate I125 I154 Tippali I125 I125 Tisheninge I11 5 I115 ea I125 I125 Ulien I11 5 I125 Talelmsha I11 5 I125 Legend P13151191 Maj-er lCities 335 1434155 45.555 ms I125 I 45,551- 45,555 .125 [.35 I 45,001 - I135 - I145 U5 Heutes Interstates =Critieal lZeunties Rivers 15 2D 41 l'u1iles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII L'Ersrt; at LlnIala-Ciam pat". U55. Pm r5. Ellastal. PrdeetP ?lepal sugar-r 'I'iereeaJ-a-Tle- eel. F'rllelnal Investigatur -:Irtle:Ile:-u1ie-5 are 11:59 ?at-emanate? the Heal-5t eI' resell-g the steamed clan age mt. Fer tie-Tlti?jle and Least Meclera?e' clan age vane-5 pleas-I- 1H attested F1 FEEDEMEHT E32 Folioe Station Damage - New Madrid Seismio Zone: Event April EDDIE IE To if 31:]th I.I II IrA-i. .. A a; l??Jl' 'Il' 'tIIi PM 337? 23E. DBUSH - Inhale. I A34 1? um i '.82;: 1 "l I dl1I3I1Tg?lET?l?l_ i? I'l- IIHE ATIALIEI EE I l II- Hm 1 . lee l.I' My} LEAHE .'I'Ill ..1 AI l_ . . SI: 1:75r'l. .IIE [Eli-1H!" -. _Ae' 1* - I -- ff fThe; iffy}?- 15r-rllE?l - AI TIE State of Mississippi Critical Counties {25} Total No. At Leaet of Moderate Complete Dourty Faoilities Damage Damage .'lloorn 3 Eienton 3 3 Ddiuar 13 Calhoun 5 Dl'iolaaeaw 4 Doahoma DEoto 2 Grenada 3 4 Lafayette 3 3 Lee 3 I'I'larei'Iall 4 4 5 Panda 3 5 F'ortotce 3 Prentiss 4 Duitman 5 SUI-flower 3 Tallai'Iatoi'Iie Tate 4 4 Tipth 4 4 Tiehomirgo TI_rIiea 2 2 Urion 4 ?r'alciausha 4 Legend Poliee Station Damage I41 Least I'II'IzItler ate AI UnlikelyI Moderate Ukelihood ngl?l'II'LllIEEl'y' I IZertain LIE Houtee Interstatee Rivera =I3ritioal I3oLIntiee 1D 2D 43 ED "Tr- i'u1ilee Mid-?mariea Earthquake Canter LII at rIJaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-H3I?l. F'l'l?li'D'lIF' ??i?tll -:Irtle:Ilo:Iu11I-e are ?ea: ?at-Itpermoe- tie of meeting the clan age me. For (entitle-Is and 'At LII-eat Moclerae' clan age I'ertI-e mum in F1 IMPACT TEEIHIHD 333 Police Station Functionality - New Madrid Seiemic Zone: Event Aprilaoce 7 I EEI 717:. State LEIE TI-I AI "qu Countlee {25QAHSHA IR .113 Il- No. of Total I I LN- I. 154 Functional IloMALI-IE Alcom 2 it I 1? I 33'3_r'i Calhoun 5 5 I 1' 4 4 ..I II. ICoalIonIa olflu 4 I [Ia-.Iecio 3U EH WE ESTE Fl GrIEl'l?tIrim-[IE IS aniEARAIIL II ?Imam maramu '3 4 ATELJJI EE 5 5 I IE1 1F-.- I 4125 Fanola 1 . It - . . Pontotoc 3 3 4 - .II It. Frentlee ?uitn'Ian 5 5 -. Sun?ower 3 E: 1_ 41,'Il SLIHT TallalIatclIe 4 TimIah Tiehon?ingo Ice _49' ASPE LLI .IIE ?my: a 4 . TalolI-ueha 2 4 . - AI .343 FF IA I I. L3 I. Police StationFunctionalityI 4 WI ??111 Ek WEI. THA I Ft . EI- "9'51 I Not Functional I 11% II- Functicnal LIE Houtee PE Ac Interstatee 4- Hie-ere =I3ritical l3ountiee I ?com: I. l'u1ilee Ii Mid-?m?ii?? ifr'??'amriai??c?i Pl HIU rate" LIEJI. 4W4 pie-344- oznlelrt 11-.I llue?'?i?tlr Fz-e e34 Tetal Pepulatien (2000} - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: It'll?r Event April EUDE ill - '1 . State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} Ilia-untilr Pe nllatien Alcem 34,558 Benten 1 4,902 Bolivar 43,2133 Calheun 1 3,539 Chickasaw 213,450 Ceahema 30,522 [Iesete 1 15,599 Grenada 23.253 ttawanila 22,??0 Lafayette 43,5813 Lee I'I.I'larshall 34,9533 tut-enree 45,894 Panela 34,2?4 Pentetee 25,?25 Prentiss 25,555 Illuitn'nn 1 I111?r Sun?ower 34,355! Tallahatellie 1 4,903 Tate 43,190 Tippah 20,825 Tisheninge 1 9,153 Tuniea 1 71,712? Uni-1n 25,352 Yalehusha 1 3,051 Legend Tetal Pepulatien 2111111]: Majer Cities 2m? I amen 40pm 3'32"] I - 45 - - 5,001 EJIIU 45.301 - - LIE Heutes Interstates =Critieal l:eunties Rivers ED 4] . . l'u1iles Fl Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at era?Ctampa gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. nlepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. calm-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' resell-g the speeh'led clan age s?a?e. Fer attempte- and Least clan JJE sates pleas-e- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E135 Felt FaeilityII Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zone: Ml? Event April 111 :"ll - EI I eeusHI 17313] ALHHUIFIHICHA . 1 .1 3U 'Li EF: I -"He ?1 - ltd-I Iss-I u- II- It: I Hines dill-3.33} 31' . J1 - 1L- 497% I- 7 . ATTALA I_le_l IESHD we 1 LEAHE 1 ?4 2'ij il SI1I1TT ILA [drill .I- Ill- e: -. . - I Iii-1' F5 HE .U LII- JEFF Ft??ll . ?1 I 1-3-. .- - . I L: IIMII. ?1 VEIEILTHA - .l 1 93 - a? a FIFI . If: a? State of Mississippi Critical Counties {25} Total No. At Least of l'Iloderate Complete Faeilities Damage Damage Aleom EIenton Call'Ioun Coal-Ioma I1 Elesoto 1 1 Grenada 3 Lafayette Lee lIlarsl'Iall lIlorroe Panola Pontoto: Prentiss Euitman Sunflower Tallal'Iatel'Iie Tate Tisl'IoI'I'Iingo i" Tuniea 1 U?on Legend Peri Facility Damage At Least tilt-derme Damage C- UnlikelyI Moderate Ukelihood ngl?l'y'LlltEl'y' I Certain LIS Routes Interstates Risers =Critioal Counties 1C 2D l'u1iles Earthquake Center LII DIE-felt,- at rLIaIa-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. F'l'l?li'C'lIF' ?lm-Flt? Ilir?zal calm-s an.I ?eas tin.I Heat-st prdIaitulrlII' of meeting tin.I speen'led clan age me. For definitions and Least Moclera?e' clan age It-rtII-s phase- 1H attest-Id F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI ESE: Potable Water Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event April EDDIE ?Ji- f' HIE GAE-ADA jw WEBSTER ELM It? - LII la diam IIPPAH ll #45: . Imam EI '13- I?ll. ceuaH - - 'DLMEIJE ATTALA l?J IDIIELI I auz- I: 55-. 31L IDHII Faj- AI . IDLII 1 AI-IITE an" IH l? IEALTHA - . PE AEI JEFF DIA MRI-DH. I LEAHE B?i I gcg?n? LQUD IA Fl: SII-ITH . .4: L3 .. Ennt WI .H. EI-T hi: fix: :1 State cf Critical Counties {25} At Leaat cf Mcderate Camp-late County Facilitiee Damage Damage 1 Eel-ten EIcliLIar EHclIasaw Descth El Granada 1 Lafayette Lee I'I'larel'Iall Hence Pan-:Ila Prertiee Duitman Tallal'Iatcl'Iie Tate Tisl'IIzImirgIzI 1 Turi ca Uri an Legend Petal} le Facilithr amage At Least UnlikelyI UnlikelyI l:ertain Petal} le Water Linea He. cf Leaks - E: 25 LIE HcLItea 25 T5 Interatatea r5 - Isa Rivera - 15g 335 =Critical l:IzILIntiea ED 4] Mid-?merica Earthquake Center LII LII-ran,- Ell: rlJaIa-Ctam Lu. USP. I3. Ell-F?i?l. ?'?i?tll are ?ea: ?atethrEIcI geaE-at the clan age mt. 5nd LII-eat Meclerar clan age a'ertII-a cJIcIrt 1H attached F1 Prisens - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Mil? Event April EUUE :7 '1 ATIALA WAs-?le Aer? H: I Issu I IA .I l' as?? - JEF- A-Ams FF asen qA- _r I . i A I??i 5-1 ANITE WILH?sellCID-11H H1. 315+ State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} He. at Facilities Aleent Benten Bolivar Calheun Chieka saw Ceahen?la [Insane Grenada ?awaniJ-a Lafayette Lee Marshall Panela Pent-ates Prentiss Sun?ower Tallahatehie Tate Tippah Tisheninga Tunica Llnien Legend 1' F'risans Medi?ed Merealli Intens it}.r "d - WI LIE Heutes Interstates =Critieal l:eunties Rivers ED Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII Ell: rIJaIaaliampa gt. USP. r3. Inu-e- ?lm-Flt? E-IZII. mute-s are ?ea: ?at-stpermee- the gear-st e1' resell-g the speeh'led clan age 5111?. Far attempte- b' and 'At Least Meclera?e' clan JJE sites please- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EBB Bridge Funetienality - New Madrid Seismie Zene: M73 Event April EDGE .I ah 1f7E Tl} ?ll-5 5L 3-8 WI IrAi. II I l?1 pm. A LAF FETTE ?aa? I AWAIIE - lijl?l?TIITI?ll'. El IL eeusH '17an IHIE 49H- 82?; I. .11 I . J1 LIA :19" . ATTALA i?J ?1 I I- 9:5 sH-- - HIILEAHE 1? ?51 II LIT [iffill-EW? JASPE . - MAME JEFF . Ul l-Il?IFtl?ll. 6-: l9?: LJERFT AMTE II: VLALTHA - EI-T 9'State [If Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} Tetal Me. At Least cf lI'IedEIate Complete Eeurty Faeilities Damage Damage Aleern Elenten Eeliuar Ealheun Chiekasaw Ceahema Des-ate Grenada ltawamlaa Lafayette Lee lIlarsl'Iall Henree Pan-:IIa Pent-ates Prentiss IlLitman Tallahatehie Tate Tippal'I Tishemirge Tuniea Llnien "I?alIzItILIsl'Ia Legend Bridge [IIajIr 1 Met FLInstiIzInal Ir FundiIznal LIE Heutes Interstates Rivers =Critieal ED 4] l'uliles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-felt,- at rLIaIa-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? are ?eas ?atEtperEIee- at [seeing the Apeen'led dam age Ian?s. Fer age phase- ezIIFIrt 1H attested F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI 3353 Bridge 3: Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event April EDGE AF "reeh?' . .. m1?. J?u-I-th - HIE I .i ATTALA l?J EE Willem": "i LEAHE I. MPE Rf'i 51:43.11 I ?Ewell . - I 3M TH JASPE ERRT ?em?I- 43% EIST ST I . mama" -. gm Ina State ef Critical Counties {25} Funetenal He. at Caunt; .I'ale em Benton .3. .3 Bell-rat Cellieun .3 ?nial-amt: 2 2 Graham :1 I I Ee late 3 3 Grenada Itawamtua Lafayette 2 2 2 2 Martha? 2 2 Menrea 2 2 Pant-Ia Penteten: 3 3 Prant 'Iultnan eun?ewar Tate I I 11 inemlnge I I Tunlea .3 slat-Lima a Legend Railway Bridge Damage At Least C- UnlikelyI Maderate Ultelinaad Certain Segment Damage At Least Medenle Unlikely.I UnlikelyI Maderate Ultelinaad US Reutee Interatatee Rivera =Critieal Cauntiee ID ED 4] l'ulilee Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-raft,- at rIJaIa-Ctampa gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. ?lm-Flt? -:IItIe:IIe:-u1ie-e are Item: ?at-Itpermee- tie gear-at at meeting the epeen'led clan age me. Fer and Leaet Meclerar clan age phan- 11-3 attaeieti F1 IMPACT TEEIJIHLI Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: 1141?.7 Event ril 213L113 i 4 .. .f-i - .5 ~45 .44? 1g,- - @444. . _1s' as #45' .-4- use 1" 1?44. A I .44' 444 54.41.4434]; *ll' ng?t?i ifrE. 4.41WEBSTER 4'55 {if ?44* IF '3 .14 _.se . tr: 1" II. f, 4443314: 441iL .. - . -. see-4.5 94314 - was - . 3.4% 4. 4. I 3H: I 45' *ell. seam If: BIL-IMPE- Iss -4 IA :51 41.144 44II I 49 I I I . 4-- ELDIT I Lg] I .IEI. II .4 I4IIE 4II J: 4-- rr '1'1414:1" 1. . I .I [4;24 _ss' SPE . tisIIl-?IPst .4. .4. RefAIAMS FF M414 4.44 I .Ieues I. .3 . 17.1? Iin_es: __444 EIFI 1: PE sng?IIle- II- State ef Mississippi Critical Ceunties {25} T4:4tal Me. At Least cf 1.14:4:lelate Complete Cam-t}; Faeilities Damage Damage Hie-:rn 3 Benton 5 5 Edi-ear 35 Calhoun 3 Cl'iel4asaw El C4:4al'44:ma 33 Dante 35 35 1D Grenada ttawan'iaa El Lafayette 15 Lee 33 Marshall 15 15 Monroe 13 Pan-:la 15 Parts-tee 13 Pre-Itiss 15 Duitman 5 Surflewer 34 Tallal'Iatel'Iie Tate 13 13 Tippah 13 13 Tish-:mirge El TLniea 5 5 Uri-an 5 3 5 Legend Selieel Damage 4541 Least I'4I'I:4der ete 4e- HigH'IILlnliltel'II C- Unlikely Maderate Ultelihaad Higl'lIILiltelyI I Certain LIE Heutes Interstates Risers =Critieal Caunties 1D 2D 43 EL, l'u1iles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Chem Lu. USP. r3. EII-H5I43I. ?311353-131? are ?ese ?atetperlenee tie gealest 4:41' reaeillg the specified elem age sti?e. Fer eT'Cemple and Least Maciera?e' clan age s'ertes please 5e attested F1 FEEDEMEHT TEFIMIHIZI E41 FunctiIenalityIF - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event April EDDIE . 4pm" IAF .'IlnceueH I . I I WI WEBSTER ALA: - I II "tiI?l_ l; i _351 - I. I I - :15- u, Ilr-alr I'11Ic?cen _43Imi? IT MAHIIJI I 1' . '9 I r? -49: EIFI State cf Critical Ccuntiee {25} He. at Tctal Functional He. cf County Facili?i? Facilitiei: Alcem 1? Benten 5 Bali-war 25 25 3 3 Chick amw 3 El Ceahcnta 23 23 [tact-c 35 lGrenada i' El El Lafayd?te 15 Lee 32 32 Marshall 15 Menree 13 Pane-la 3 15 Pcntetec 13 13 Prentice 5 15 5 5 Sun?cwer 2.4 24 Tallallatchie Tate 13 Tippall 12 Tieheninge 5 El Tunica 5 .Inien 1 El ?I'alelmeha 2 5 Legend Scheel Functienality 1 Met Functicnal Ir Functicnal LIE Heutee IrIteratatee Rivera =I3ritical l3cLIrItiea ED 43 "Tr- l'u1ile5 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Manaaliampa Lu. USP. r3. Ell-H5I?l. are ?eece ?at-emanate? the prdnatulrtr' c1' the Apecn'led clan age mt. Fer tea-rum cT'CcrrIpIIe- and LII-eat Meclera?e' clan age A'ertIe-A phaa-e- admin 11-? attached F1 IMPACT E142 Waste Water FaeilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event April 3131313 liar" I'I'eeusH? l? BEI ell? at $11.11*: State at Mississippi Critical Ceunties {35} Tatal Me. At Least cf I'I'ladEIate Dempl ate Ceurty Faeilities Da?nage Damage Ale-:rn 31 Benton 3 Edi-ear Calhoun 13 EHeFasaw 33 Eaahama 33 Dante 31] 33 Grenada 31 ltawa'nlaa 13 Lafayette 33 Lee :13 hia'shall 24 5 Henna-e 31 Pan-:la 33 Pertatce 35 Prentiss 13 Duitman Surflawer 34 Tallahatehie 13 Tate 3 Tip-push 1? Tish-:mirge 25 Twins 13 Uri-2n 13 ?I?alct-LIsha 1D Legend Waste II."I."ater Faeilitjlr Damage At Least I'II'lederele Unlikely Mederate Ukeliheed HigH'fLikely l3ertain Waste 1II"'II'ater Lines He. at Leaks - 5 25 LIS HaLItes 33 SD Interstates 51 -150 His"? -151 255 =I3ritieal lSaunties 1a a: an a: l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII L'ersrt; at LImeIa-Ctam pagl. LIEJI. em r3. PrdeetP sugar-r TiereeaJeI'e eel. F'rIIelJal -:IttleaIe:-II1iee are ?ese ?atetpertenee tle gealeet at reaelIIg the epeeltleel elem age etI?e. Fer aItI clan age e'ertee please eJIeItt tie attaetetl E143 Airport Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Event March EDDIE: State nf Missuuri Critical {Ii-aunties {46} Flu?.- I 1r.ll.;l.l 1a; 1 jftz". 53; fir PL ill-ti! 'I'lPETT cclElPEH fir-?933., r' :1 s? 3'Ham-:44qu . :?33 3??va - w? - . r? 15fmil? r" :15 I 5 1. '15. I I Gr 5-H. I - - l. '3 4343431 a? ??'r-l I [If] Legend - h" nab- E1 FILE C-FIZ {Elk Dam-age AWHE - Er . . 33' Lillie . '5 r" -. 5:351. #33.ng . ,1 I. WIN-Elfin? - 'q 73-Unlikely 15% En?? I Gilliam Him. MI I 'Hi ?New? ?kal'hmd .WEECertain ll =Critical 4.1 =Irlterstatl33 ?L SHl:lutl33 ?Hi~l'er3 El 15 3D Milez Birth-Ell IE5 Earlhquak'?' cal-?Er . reaming the rpecn'lerl damage F-:lr Mud-a- rates piearla- 11-? H'tt??ili'd For: IMPACT nmmsuErlT TEEMIHEI EDI. 344 Airpurt Functinnality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event March SAINT State nf Missuuri Critical Caunties [46} .I: 'In J-L Legend Aim-curt Functi?-nalityr Ea'j Nut Furctinnal Ir Functional =Critical Cnuntiea =Interstates LIE Huutes River-s 15 Miles Mid-Amarica Earlhquaka Cantar LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. nlcpal FIJI. mute-5 are ?rm: ?atexpermm the gear-st m' resell-g the gmcn'htl clan age mt. Fur (HI-mus and clan JJE ?nes phan- 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E545 Werst Case Casualties - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event March Kansas L'tityr Jami: lerissant IHT errt Saint Leuis gene-awe 1 La. '33 .- 1e. FLU State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunties {46} u: -.- v? - I. r.J ?bula-m- Werst Case Ililasualties 2' AM =Critieal l:eunties El - 25 =I-Interstates 25'1'35' Heutes 100?250 Ema 2s] sen SIZIIZI tee Maj-er ICities I- amen - renal] I teem 154mm i 15e,ea1 444,000 125 2'5 5] T5 1? l'u1iles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII Maryanne-3e at Mala-Champs gt. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Erttleal calm-s are ?ea: ?atexpermee- the gear-st mammar- e1' resell-g the speen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- and Least MeJeraF clan aJe rates please- 1H attested melmelt'GUIDE F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT E545 Ccmmunicaticn FacilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event March secs State cf Missouri Critical Ccunties {45} It ..-I-.- . Its?smm F. I[2emmunicatien F'??ilil?j? Damage At Least lubderite . We.? in c- Llnlikel If Mcclerate c- HigHyLikely Ir I12ertain =Critical I:cunties =Interstates LIS Rattles Rivers 1s a: a: sc 4L Tr. l'uliles are MId-?m?n?a Earlhquak'? cal-?Er prmaiulttr' c1' the specn'htl demagne- stit. Fer LII were at Lanala-Clampagl. st-Ites pie-asle- 11-? attache-LI rs. Ellasial. PrqectP Ilues?t?t-r FC- F: IMPACT .ncsecsuEHT 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. Dame - New Madrid Seiernie Zene: Ml? Event March EDGE State ef Missouri Critical Ceuntiee {45} le. Fez-llrle I: man? Eben-i- Euier I:.Illhwa: Cape Ell-ardeau Earl-r Ila'a'lzurd Eli-n1 lit-Hula EunHIh FranI-iln meet-natur- lit-well hz-n Jena-rte" lhe-z-ln mum-n Marl-a- I: ?Ina-r attest-pl Menu-amen" Hyman-2 mat-n Elan-i Fen'l ez-z-t Pent." Hie Hilda-H Flume-H I: Flt-Int." rah-te- Gene an emt FI'an-z-z-I emu :?lallnen end-1m Te-m 'H-hullnut-n mhtleul Legend MMI Deme VI =Critieel Ceuntiee - "5?1 =Interetetee ?Lle Heutee 3 Hivere 1-: HI GHEHEH4 alumina-SEE} IE 15 Miles Mid-?meriea Earthquake Center LII DIE-felt,- at Mela-Champs! gt. USP. r3. Ell-33L?. -:Irtleale:-u1ie-e are ?ese ?etmcpermee- the gear-at premen- e1' resell-g the epeen'htl clan age me. Fer er'CempIe and Luz-eat Meclerar clan age et?rtee phae-e- EDWIN: 1H attained F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT TEEIJIHLI E548 Debris - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Mil? Event March seas State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunti es {46} .l 1-.- v-u Jut' - r.I --I. 1:35.- are; em: int-1- I I "1-:an 1- 141'. Kansas L'lityr .2122?. MP: . lenssant IHT LEILIIs err-r Saint Leuis -- Legend ALI Total EIHIE Thousands ef Tens - a 5 I -. .1 ?Tf r_I:n:ILIsLas Li 5-25 - 2-5 - -- Citi?? I:ritieal I:eunties I - nter3tatea= I vane-I 154mm us Emma i 150,001 44mm Himluliles Errtlaaleantle-s (PEPSI Earlhquak'?' cal-?Er . murmurs-:1 the men-spa damage s?l'e- Fer LII harem-annuals at Lanala-Clampagl. sates pleas-a- 11-? attaaled deelme Fm r3. Ellatial. Prdaeti' rllepal llue IMPACT F-IZII. E453 Displaced Pepulatien - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event March Kansas ?it?r Jess lerissant IHT errv Saint Leuis State ef Missouri Critical Ceunties 'Js: ml; II uh: I- l' que- :1 'u'e . 'l-u'n Displaced Pepulatien - Rivers 51 - LIE Heutes 5'3? - =Interstates 2-331 ECritieal Ceunties ?1e,ee1 21.10:] Majer Cities 1- - reset: I return i 15am 444,000 all; luliles Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center . LII at Lu. USP. r3. Eliaslal. ?'?i?tlr EDI. mute-s are ?are ?at-experience the gear-st mamm- e1' resell-g the speen'led clan age s?a?e. Fer clan aJe sates pleas-e- EDWIN: 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Electric Pcwer Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March IHT State cf Mieecuri Critical Ccuntiee [46} I I. I'll-' I I. I I I .I- Legend Electric Fewer Facility Damage At Least MetIeI'He Unlikely i} Mcderate Ultelihccd Higl?ly Likely I Certain Trananiaa'cn Linea =Critical I:cuntiee =Interetatee LIE Heutee River-e 15 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. nicpal It'll! ?'?i?tlr FIJI. entice-e are acre ?at-experience- tle gear-st pranmlw c1' the epecn'htl clan age mt. and Luz-act MeJera?e' can aJe cute: phase-e- czuulrt 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT $1 Emergency Gperaticn Center Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event March Eu'l'tlHT isle} I'l? CHMEIE State cf Mieecuri Critical Ccuntiee [46} 'u'ccl I1: . I. Mu.- .l 4. I- -. -.-- Legend Emergency ?peraticn llieutere At Least Nbdenie Damage in E- Unlikely Mcderate Ultelihccd Higl?ly Likely ICertain =Critical Ccuntiea =lnteretatee LIE Heutee Rivera 15 l'uliles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at era?Clampa gt. USP. r3. nicpal Ilue e?gat-r FIJI. ennui-e are ?ea: ?at-experience- tle gear-ct c1' the epecn'led clan age s?a?e. tie-Turtle? attempte- and Luz-act undera?e' can aJe rates pleaae- caultt 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT $2 EUC Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: lii?li'J?r Event March Eu'l'tlHT Vii-3} I'l? CHI-ADE State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunties let-1' Te'tll Punt-tl-z-nal He. Count; Fat-Illiel; .Iiudraln uni-r Eben-i- Eu'I-a-r Callas?; Eel-a- Eunl-ilh Had-idem He'a'l?adrld Hlelpt. :SalntL-zu ulI: triad-13rd Salntte Cape Gram-nu Earl-r treat-rd Eent Et-uulaI: FlanI-illn Gum-made lrt-n h?a?mn nudist-n hurl-w: Menu-amen; treat-n Dune Femltt-et Fen-j Flim- Fulad-t Fla-:rn-z-Idt. Flt-leg saint?larie-I: taint- Genet-hw- Flaunt-ell: tat-11 diannen Teal: Warren dlhut-n Name Legend Emerg en eyr eratien lCenters Ea'j I Met Funetienal Ir Fundienal =Critieal l:eunties =Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers 15 l'u1iles . .. Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII heme-mulling at Mala-Champs gt. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Critteal ennui-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'led clan age me. Fer tie-Turtle? attempte- and Least underat' clan aJe rates please- ezulnrt 1H attested IMPACT FEEDSMEHT $3 Ferry Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Ml? Event March ZDDEI MCH . a. .1. I Wear-ta -- j: ?le u' 1-i- JUH?Heaii F-a- SAINT HENRY fun aswaf? DE FeITyr Faeiitgir Damage At Least i} {3 I =Critieal l:auntiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee State ef Critical Ceuntiee . lite if Ell- mg I hr 1.r De [tall Rivera -.- J-l J: .?lmueJ 153] Miles Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Critteal are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st at the epeen'htl damage mt. Fer tie-Turtle? attempte- and Leaet Mud-era? clan JJE rates 1H attaeied IMPACT FE EHT TE Fl $4 Fire Station Damage - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event MarehED?E State ef Critical Ceuntiee [46} -: - -. rm.- mt: 'l'thIEHiiIll. {-11 InEll-1 r. r. errt 'Ejn .-.II'Legend Fire Statien Damage At Least I'II'ledenie t} Made late- Llaelliecd . . Hit H..- LIE-3- . .- Cit-[tall 1* *1 =Critieal l:auntiea -. i =Interetatee LIE Heutee River-e 15 ED . i Miles - - are ace-a ?atetpermee- tie gear-5t Earlhquak'?' prdnenlre' e1' the epeen'led damage e?a'e. Fer tie-TIIrtIeIe attempte- ta' aId Leaet Meclera?e' dam age LII at UMaI+3IampagI. eutee eJIeIrt 11-? attaeied deelme Pm r3. EIIasiaL PrdeetP nIepal auger-r FC- F: IMPACT Th re ea Je Tie- ee I. II ueettga'nr $5 Fire Stetien Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Mil? Event March EDDIE 'l'tljl :li' rim"? Mil s1. Hal Wig . If; and: IHT State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunties [46} El:- tun-I- El: i-I-r Elnrd-I-au Cal-hr H- Ernst-rd uuh I: Eu nl-Iln I3: rIz-n J-I-fl'II-rezun [h win "at" Han-I- I: Men?q-z- HewMa-irld Eran-m Dena-I- I: HH-I- FIJI: FII-g'n-z-Id I: FlpI-I-y I: Den-I- IJ-I- FI'me-zul I: :alntleull: ecu-:11 dlann-z-n an a I: saintleulslj?t'] Legend Fire Stetien [Iey'I I. Met FLIretierIel FLIrIetiIerel =Critieel Ceunties =Interstetes LIE Heutes Rivers 'in'l I3 E: -J IuIc-wamunwl'u1iles Mid-America Earlhquake Center LII at rIJaIaaliampa Lu. USP. r3. IIUE E-IZII. I3rrtleal an.I ?ere ?atexperhlee- the gear-st eI' the speen'lerl clan age mt. Fer clan JJII Irate: pleas-e- 1H attested F1 IMPACT FEEDSHEHT Hazardeus Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event State ef Mlsseurl eal Ceuntl es {46} IIt-unt.? He. Fat-Ilia?: .Iiludrah SIE- E-Ilnqer Eeene El 2 IZalla'aI.? l Cap-a- IEIlra'd-a-au EE- Earl-r Cele ass-ma I: Eli-n1: 2 Eeuqtll: 2 EunHln FI'anl-ilh al 2 Hem-ll IT ran 2 awe-mu as Haul-Inn Han-at. 3 Mlle-r 2 M-z-nhemen' I: ARCH . - .. . PETT 1.: 2:?:de I h" i Elma E: errv Clark a FemlII-e't l - Fbrr,? Hlelpt. Elf'i? TDH 1, I: 1:5- 1 54: d. - FIJlad-il 2 i ?g 'll'u-llLLEi? -533?- awn-aids Is 'u Flt-lay 5 .3- .r saint-marten: HE aunt - Em: auntie-uh: In auln'tleullzl?t'l :53 Elena-dame I sac-11 alannen I sad-1m: IT TIEIHE 3 Warren 2 Name 3 Legend MM. I Haanat Faeilities . . . - Caurltles HI =Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers WI - #1 15 i luliles - - ErrtIealezuu?e-s are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st Earlhquak'?' . prawns,- e1' reaellig the speen'le? tlanage s?a'e. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- ta' and Least Meclera?e' clan age LII at LanaIa-Clampagl. sates pleas-a- EDWIN: 11-? attaelea aeelme Fm r3. Ellailal. PrqeetP niepal Illa-1' sugar-r F: IMPACT 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- eel. Prllelnal Bridge Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March State ef Criti eel Ceunti ee {46Legend Highway Bridge Funetielmlitjir [lay 1 i Net Funetienel . Fundicnel =Critieel Ceuntiee =Interetetee LIS Heutee Hivere 15 e: JL Miles - ?Id-hm?n?a Earlhquak'?' e1' the epeen'led demagne- ati'e. Fer - and 35.12 Leaet LII Luz-reth- at LISA ante-e pie-aera- eznlelrt 11-? :rtteeietl theIIn-e- .am re. Enaml. PrdeetP menial Iluee?t?t-r F-Z- F: TEFEMIHILI IS-IZII. $3 Highwayr Bridge Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March State ef Critical Ceuntiee {46} 'u'ecal-:I: . - . . . 533-]th LIJU Iflat-'Sufi-.. - "t Le end . Hig iway Bridge Damage l1 - .. BEST . 31:. MLEIFIEII l'uhderrte Iat- Lian-ace Hum-m1,- . eertau ngiwar'E-a-gme I?ll =I3rrtieaIC-JI nth: Mimi Lte Home: Rut-m Ll II 1 If.- I 32 15 Miles Mid-?m?ii?? Earlhquak? '38an . Mud-a- LII lime-mullme at LlrIJ-EII-EI-Iliampayl. USP. gates Image- can?: 119 EltL?lE-? mummie- r3. Ella?al. PrdeetP ntepal ??i?tlr F1 IMPACT TEFIMIHEI EDI. $9 Heepital Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Mil? Event March 1'11 r. i MCH 135 i '_ii:3 caliJPEH . a -, 3mm LIZILIIS ElT'i' - I HEr-Hit?eta?? it Ede? -. - I :3 ?4:43ch Hi -. it? CHMEIE Ir? State ef Critical Ceuntiee 1:.qu r.'i "n Jinn-.1.- I 4-1 nu.- i 1- Ii." Wu" '1 Legend Heepital Damage At Least Unlikely li-laderate Ultelihaad Higl?ly.f Lilteli,f I ICertain =Critieal l:auntiea =lnteratatea LIE Heutea Rivera 15 l'uliles .. Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Errtleal ennui-e are ?ea: ?at-experience tie gear-st [erzuatulrtr' at meeting the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer tie-Tinnitus attempti- and Leaet undera?e' clan aJe rates pleaae- 1H attaeled IMPACT Hcepital Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic che: M73 Event March SAINT isle} I'l? CHI-ADE State cf Mieecuri Critical Ccuntiee I- 'u'c - 1cm: I. Ii:- II I Tug": Legend Hce pital Functicnality Day1 I Met Functicnal Ir Functicnal =Critical Ccuntiea =Interetatee Heutee ?Hi~a'ere 15 Miles .. Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Chance Lu. USP. r3. nicpal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. ennui-e are ?ea: ?atexpermce- the gear-ct c1' the epecn'htl clan age s?a?e. ten-rum attempte- and Luz-act MeJera?Ia' can JJE rates phan- czulnrt 1H attached IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EH Light Rail Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March ZDDEI -.. I ?3133' a: ii . 5.231; 13 MCH 1-i- l? CDPPEH Je?heeh F-a- HENRY fun 'e-P?xfl?t I .- FLU EH PH State ef Critical Ceuntiee -r I I: LIJIIHII .1- -: 'eu. '1 Legend Light Rail Facility Damage At Least l'utrdenie Unlikely Mederate Ulteliheed Higl'h.f Liltel?,f I ICertain =Critieal l:euntiee =Interetatee LIE Heutee River-e 15 . Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue e11gat-r FIJI. Caz-twee are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' the epeen'led damage me. Fer tie-Turtle? attempte- and Luz-eat Mud-era? clan aJe rates pleae-e- 1H attaeled IMPACT $2 Liquefaction Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event March EDDIE: Hes lerissant IHT LIZILIIS Saint Lcuis State cf Misscuri Critical Ccunties [46] ?Ill.l1l h'y. I1I-I1I Inc-.1 Lie xi 1 J."ire: ILL-I.- Carr-r.- Jcn1.4.. 'L'rli11'Jd'l In" .J. JrRun-1:: . :r .. . 'u'n - . . I: Due;- :r "41v. 'cce :411' Hu- I Liquefactien Susceptibility ECritical Ccunties Lew =Interstates Risers Majcr Cities In - I teem . 150,001 444cm c153: e: a: his. luliles LII at nJaIa-Clampa gt. USP. r3. nicpal :?gat-r FIJI. PTIIGIJEII czuu?es are acre ?atetperlence the greatest precatulrtr' c1' the specn'leu danage rate. Fer cT'EcmF-Ie and Least Medera?e' clan age rates please ?e attached mclmelt'GUIDE FD IMPACT E53 Medi?ed Merealli IntensityF - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March ZDDEI Kansas Eity JeeHe a I qt [Fig LH . a] PEF- BUFFER wen Lh-t wee I in . - eel? 'ei-I H. . if?? 9' INT 913151 L- eE Ej??jrj?; z' 33 ?5 '91 CAMDE -- JAKhuh-?t II GREENE. n1:ane- e1 mam "fear-Fl 35?} ARTE J. i, I Leena I.-- - -. "1 1. HEP 1 M135 len IHT Saint 553111: em? State ef Critical Ceuntiee I1 L227. 'u'1 :11; 11.Legend Medi?ed Merealli Intene itj?r ?ulul} l'u'lajer ICities elem aspen I ream - manna i 150,001 444,000 LIE Heutee "5:1 =Interatetee id =Critieel ICeun?tiee El 15 3] El] EU l'u1ilee Mid-Ameriea Earlhquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue FIJI. Brittaal eau?ee are ?ee: ?at-experience the gear-at e1' the epeen'led damage mt. Fer tie-Turtle? eT'CemF-Iue- and Luz-eat Mud-era? dam JJE rates ealnrt 1H attained IMPACT $4 Natural Gas Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seismic: Zene: Ml? Event March SAINT 1? . Vii-3} CHMEIE State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunti es [46} Natural lGas Facility Damage .?tt Least whilenie Higl?ly Unlikely E- Unlikely Maderate Ukelihaad Higl?ly Likely I Certain Majer Trarsmissien Lines =Critieal l:aunties =Interstates Heutes ?Hi~e'ers 15 AL l'uliles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clamps gt. USP. r3. niepal It'll! ?'?i?tlr 'I'lereeaJt-Tt- FIJI. Errtleal ennui-s are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st pumm- e1' resell-g the speen'htl clan age mt. Fer tie-Thrusts attempte- ta' and Least MeJera?e' clan aJe sates pleas-e- 1H attested melmelt'GUIDE IMPACT FEEDSMEHT EES Oil Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event Marchzaea State ef Critical Ceuntiee ?21: JII. 1-: IJllu-I''11: In j} 4:41LDLIIS HI - - ?iw' I II .. . HEl-lR?r' I: l" . I Fa;- -- 'L'n 1, . RE 3 J55- - ?153 II I . I I ail?? min-In .. amen 41? . a r? . with 3* 31-: -- H?MinLegend ta 9?1. I ?a '3 (n 'l't c: I. :5 r" JEWEL . HULL I EICI ?i?s 333, 5" .5 5 1; - AtLeaet I I I Hum-unwr- . I. I. 1? hE-?EllLklh'hl' II I Ell-l "intarball TMEITI . .h .I a I I I 3.1T: LII-H33 I'i =Critieal Ceuntiea Jew. =Interetatee I Heutee Rivera 15 ELL Miles - Errtleal eat ?135 are ?ea-a ?atexperhlee- the gear-st eT 1H arena-d damage slate. Fer -- rate: meagre- 11-? attaeled melmelt'GUIDE IMPACT TlereeaJ-a-Tle FIJI. F'rllelnal Ilueetlgabr Peak Gruund Acceleratiun - New Madrid Seismic: Zane: Event March Ems State {if Missuuri Critical Caunties [46} . - ChillLug-:- . . . ME a: ?ne; . - I, . - BUFFER wm WAR H, l?nssant f3air? r? . samt Louis 33"" IF: ISM-ADE i 3404%? with: if P: . Legend .7 - . . - [Iii -l El FLU PEA Hi'v'Ei'S 11!; - [?35 '11 LIE Houtea Eff l? E3 . E?l'l'il; - - I12 =Inter3tat33 - . DDUELES ?'61] llEi - EH3 I I r?Ll5:ng ?1.n-1.45 Maj?r Cities .m . I - I 150,001 444,000 15 4.6L. Tr- Milez m' reaming the clan age Fur - tie-flirting nT'Cmph-E'ald ?ange LII at LlrIJ-EII-EI-Cial'npayl. USP. $5121? lmagg 119 am?ieuj mclme- Prune-HP nicpal ?'?i?tlr IMPACT TEFIMIHIZI FIJI. . Mid?Amari?a Earlhquak? mute-3 are ?rm: the gna?eat Peliee Statien Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March an *Jtra?ne .5 I-I'nu Eu'l'tlHT ea?e ll State ef Critical Ceuntiee {46} 'Iw. ,r - Lanna-t u, r. Jmuugu $-51 Peliee Station Damage At Least l'uhtlenie t} If mm at- Llaellieerl murmur .- De- rem =Critieal l:euntiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee Rivera 15 a L. Miles Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center . LII at Mala-Ciampa Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. niepal ?'?i?tlr EDI. Critteal WINE-3 are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st pramlre e1' the epeen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer mum-s attempte- and Leaet MeJeraF clan aJe rates 1H attaeied F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Peliee Statien Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event March State ef Critical Ceuntiee {46} 1-.- - J: LI rr. Zl'd I. Ir.? - l1 ire-4'. '13- H-I I'll 1-12 am *Jtre?ne .5 I-I'nu ee?e ll Legend Peliee Stmien Funetienelity [lay 1 Met Funetienel Ir Fundicnel =Critieel Ceuntiee =Interetetee LIS Heutee Hivere 15 Miles til? Earlhquak'?' cal-?Er . e1' the ?remen damage s?e'e. Fer 33? UI at Lanala-Ciampagl. dates phase-a- 11-? attaeied deelme re. Eluanal. PrdeetP ?lepal Iluee?c?t-r Fe F: IMPACT TEEMIHEI EIZII. Part Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane Ml? Event March Eat-a . a. .1. I Wear-ta -- ?le u' MCH 1-i- l? JUH?Heaii F-a- HENRY Mid-America Earthquake Center LII umrtr-mmlme at Mala-Charade Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. State ef Critical Ceunti ee [46} .- I I: Hi :illj.? ?an Irq-L' Ci?; CLI a. IHT LIZILIIS errv HE 2:53;. are. I AU Legend Part Facility Damage At Least I'l?lzrdenie if PH mm late- Lulu-am Line-1." .- De [tall =Critieal l:auntiea =Interatatea LIE Heutee Rivera 15 Iii. Miles Errtleal IE3 date-marble? til? at the ape-amen damage s?a'e. Fer 1'11: LIEEIHZ $51331! til? Mlle": Fe IMPACT Lem:- Event March State at Critical Counties {46} -l?IJ-f' Potable Water Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zene Dita gei- 5 *1 - . aw ?ittingLEI-I. I I . 532-.wu-u TH. Legend Patalile Water Faeiliyr [Ian'nge At Least I'U'Izntlenie Hiyiir Ll: new; 3 mfg; mum-1 my? - - D-thtieaIC-JI um - Ham-m1:- m? PetalJIeWatet Dieln'lntien Lites tle. Leake 25-53 - - LIES 15 i i'uiiles ?he HEIFE MId-?m?n?a Earlhquak'? cal-?Er at meeting the ape-amen demagne- atit. Fer Pl EIIU 55.1: LII at LlrIJ-aI-EI-CIJ-ll'npayl. USP. ante-5 pie-agra- can?: 119 am?ied mummie- FC- F1 TEFEMIHILI r3. Ell-33H?. 'I'ierean-a-Tt- EDI. Prieene - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Mil? Event March 4am: aamT LIZILIIS in? use; 1 .1- State ef Critical Ceuntiee ?aunt.- He. Fa-z-Iliel: .Il-udraln Ezullnqer Eben-a- Eu?I-e-r Callawq.? Cape IZ-Ira'deau Earl-r CEIH- mat-rd Eli-n1: lit-un?t. EunHln Franl-illn Gem-nah ren Jami-mu lI1-:-:-In meld-n Ham-I: HlH-r ?Diem-pl mutt-mar; ?ew Hail-Id Erect-I1 Ella]:- FemlII-et Fern; HI-i-Ipl: FI-g'n-zuldls Flpleg' mnt?laneu aunt Flame-alt. almi- Gene ie an {ac-e11: alannen aha-1am Teal: Warren 'Nlme Legend I ii sane =Critieal l:eun?tiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee River-e l'u'll'u'll HI 3-: EWI 15 Miles AL . .. Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Critteal ennui-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st e1' the epeen'led clan age mt. Fer tie-Turtle? and Leaet underat' clan aJe rates phan- ezulnrt 1H attaeied IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Railway Bridge Funetienality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Ml? Event March SAINT . 3.413} I'l? CHMEIE State ef Critical Ceuntiee 1-: Railway Bridge Funetienalityr [layr 1 Met Funetienal Ir Functicnal =Critieal Cauntiea =Interetatee LIS Reutee Rivera 15 lulilee .. Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Mala-Clampa Lu. USP. r3. niepal Ilue ?'?i?tlr FIJI. Errtleal ennui-e are ?ea: ?at-experience the gear-st [armature e1' the epeen'htl clan age s?a?e. Fer tea-rum attempte- and Leaet MeJera?e' clan JJE rates pleae-e- 1H attaeled IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Eli'3 Railway Bridge Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event March eat-a State ef Critical Ceuntiee 12[liPI-? I 1- I. .J u" IF: Lljg: LII2:IHT errv Legend Railway Bridge Damage AtLeaet l'uh-denie Hgnr-LI-Itw If i} Hede Iat- leelliecd I Railway Segmerta =Critieal l:eun?tiea =Interetatee LIE Heutee Rivera 15 xii. l'uliles ?125 Mid-Amariea Earlhquak'?' Canter prdzusltulrlr' e1' the epeen'led damage me. Fer due-Turtle? ef'Eemplue- and {it Leaet Mud-ara?e' clan aJe LII at LInJaIa-mampagi. USP. rate; Image- mum 11:3- atta?euj mummie- r3. niepal i'?i?tlr FIJI. PFIIGIJEII Ilu??t?l?tll Eli-'4 Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March ea . 4 I "egg - D1 '3an 1 AM ll??u .. -. ._ii 4.can; UL all-i ll- I Lilia J. Illa-J ISEIEHIIEWI mall's" i 5 .. ~39? .3144 - If: .. I . I h" #151 a hm" I 53. lrm-riij g! I Jrlr44- -4 RAH. PL - "its - a'i?'i a ~4 4 1r 34;: s- sauna .4 *1 Pitt 4:3] 4 P413 4-4 a Ts" 4 4.414 LH -. . E?r I: 3-.- .Til: . ass .4 mar-*- 31]- 4- TDH 13444;: ?i .45 .3 1.. 4-. 15% 4'HITslit -. . 4" LL 4:41er ?b 1 4-. .- 71'" 4. . as setJean 39., - .4 a .Ig? a EHE ?mm If. :5in ?4 453:. J?k? AWE-EH 1" h" 3135 .- '14: $3 I '4 . 444': .23! ?E?Ije?amL TH .. 2: Ir "vwithdraws d? j. - 4.23444Il"' Ema 1045.44.44 an L4 was?444 REE .I.-. 442 Eu'l'tlHT FLU State ef Misseuri Critical Ceunties II. --.-- lulu-:4: I ..s 5'11; In.? 4 l- an" . IJ?s-r. . Thl. . Legend Sell-eel Damage At Least l'u'ledenie Hum-untes- Much Iat- Llasllielzd Hun: ?441.4 .- De- Itall =Critisal l:aunties =Interstates LIE Heutes Rivers 15 l'u1iles Mid-America Earthquake Center . LII users-stunner; at Lu. USP. r3. Eliasial. ?'?i?tlr EDI. WINE-3 are ?sts ?at-experience gear-st e1' resell-g the speen'lstl clan age s?a?e. Fer tie-Tilithls attempte- and 'At Least Meclsra?e' clan aJs sates pleas-e- 1H attested F1 IMPACT Eii'? Functionality at Day 1 - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March ecce State cf Missouri Critical CIcunItiee {46DHIalibi meg I. . l. I I'?l UL J'l ?li' I 111-;- .l 'le 1' I I I iiDell-EH? 35.MEET Mam 53? .L W115 shim I-.- I ra- I -J RAH. PL La - hhli??: 5cancer a $3 Pitt t4 F29 a4 ?Li411' 1 Pi" r?E We JecIi a F, -. - - . rEiT I: 1 i lI-Ia'u'"-315; I. . J?fl '1 mace H.294 . .45HIT. n. .--I?43?h. . . - RH ea acacI IEH EHE ?'ime. IE EWULE I1l 55.3-- . I ?g 3 ewe-EH ate 3'faij-?Egh Ir' gmubI?ll- DE e'l . ?t DE. il??i - Al?e- x_ PU: ll! I I Met Functional BE MET -. ?1 ?5 ItiI If?! Functicnal I =Critical 4e . =Interetatee LI LIS Heutee Rivera 15 a: a: e: I lulilee Cll'l??ll Earlhquak'?' cI' the damage s?a'e. Fer 55.1: Hill? rates phase-a- 11-? attached nIcpal IMPACT 'I'lereeaJ-a-Tle- EDI. Eli-'5 Tstal Pupulatisn (2000} - New Madrid Seismic: ans: Hill?r Event March State 0f Missouri Critical Csunties {46} 44' 1444 4444441 3:41? it"s-Ii. II ":Eijtilln-ul. . I -II I I Saint J0 9.1.1.0 I . :I'nl1 h- TE if? i El Kansas ISIS: - ai 001545 3233?? . FETT I Iw? ?4 0rissant :Igit?. If - . INT L00 s 00v sass -. 4' 443- -- 11 AG E44 Saint L?uis if.? FE HEN-HIT. In. . 0 T400 - 4 BEBE r44 MILL '1 50.404 2- JrHURT . . serif-it ?:all" II - I I - .etl I UH If GI Legend - . TEL. - ?3th 5:1 . T0ta P0 mlatl0n Ei? 0 '4 . 044.5. {a -- $0040 Hiwm II . . i? 1.. 0?2000 uss 15m 0? - 'sT 0,444 If? 1; 2001 54-? I II -.. 44.. 4' ,4 0.001 0,000 Comma AW IEHW WELL ?I?v13,?50 In . . . - Maj0r 0 50,000 - $5,000 I 450,000 . 150,001 444,000 0 4s :30 00 00 J: 1"0? Miles LII news-01mm: at Mala-Champs Lu. USP. r3. Ella?al. ?'?i?tlr Iii-Ell. Mid-Amarisa Earlhquaks . mute-4 are 0:40 ?atexpermse- the gear-4t 01' the 509 00140 clan age 40m. F0r tie-Tilithls and 05m JJE 4m: pleas-r 04:04": 104 stashed F1 IMPACT FEEDSMEHT Waste Water FaeilityF Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event MarehED?E State ef Critical Ceuntiee [46} IIE-INT:Ii; -- . -. I 53IHT LIZILIIS errv Legend ?i?i?aeteWater Faeil?y?an?le At Least lubdertle Fm? G- U. Lt: Ftel'ee mm at- Ltellmm Emmealcel ITH Ham-Lut- .mm Diehilnttien Line-e He. Leaks 1:1 - 25D - aze 15 Miles - - are ace-a ?at?permee- tie grate-5t Earlhquak'?' at the epeen'htl Haney-1- st-It. Fer tie-flirting attempte- ta' and Leaat Meclerae' dam age LII at LanaIa-Ctampagl. rates phase-a- eznlelrt 11-? attaetetl Irleelmne- Pm r3. Ellaeial. PrqeetP nlepal Ilue auger-r F: IMPACT TEEMIHLI E-IZII. Eii'E Airpalt Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March $3?Ear [nif? . a I J3EE: Fae :3 . I 1 Jane - "at" PERRY 33- 31-. .. 5:1 gr?" liq-3311A .- ?mug" ?if333 ITE l.lFt fix?I Il- I - I meme 1Least Metlerate Moderate LI-I: eliheed Resin? Hhrers _Eritieal I: aunties US He utes Hegiah ast egian se 35 d3 State at Tennessee - CeuntIes Legend Tn:- lie-31' lea Caz-n1 plate lie. at tenet Damp-late - mun d-I-r-Ite Elam-me Damage mun-t; rat-derai- Elam-tuna- Elam age EAST Bent-n 2 El Hump-?rest. El El lanIEI I a El Lauder-HH- 3 3 Highhr Ghent-r Lawn-nee I Creek-31.1 let-{ls 2 :3 ?Mi? Ely l+ Madl mil 1- 2 2 Haun? IE- - tit-keen 3 :3 Me H-Iln' I :3 Highhr Ely Err-3r 2 2 Haunt-men." IE- Certain Ian-m s- 3 Dbl-3n 2 2 Git-ten 3 II Pen',? 4- Elle-:- I Rebel-hen IE- Hard-em an allelic. 26- 2+ Harm" gum-?r . Ehteal eeuntles are these 1hat experience the greatest Hay-around 3 2 .3 .3 probability of read'ning the damage state. Hand-Iran I 2 Fer de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least h-hdelate' 135 25 3 3 damage states please e3nsuit the attaehed deeument. 3mg: 3" '3 Fee MFAETASSESSMEHT Mil Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LII. U335. I'll Airpert Funetienality - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event MarehE?DE ?mH?Su II. WE {Sim . in a" . I I "I'll PH all] gin-1 . I F: HII: [IdesIEITU 5 . ;ruu-I-L. Ii. It? -- sewer .IJILES I . LIHL. LH II: State ef Tennessee - Critical Counties Legend IZIT IZIT HIEI. IZIT 'Itlt?l HIZI. IZIT FEIGIIHEII -II:Iunt.' ?lrpert Funetlenallty Healer: int? i i Hens- 2 2' EAST [my 1 Regen . rm 3 a . Chea?iam 5 5 Lauder-isle 3 .- Nanunctinnei EEa?t dmter Lawrence I I - Lewln 2 2 Functlenal EaI-Id-en H. H. .I. I, Hwy; [Beatlr 2 raur; E- Dell-Ian 3 3 rmrlalr; ?ght 9 Ell _Eritieal I: aunties elm-an a Parr,- I. I. IE- IE- rare-amen 5 5 E- I-Iar-zlln I I stewart I I eeunties are these Ihat experienee Ihe greatest 2 11ptun E- prehahil'rty ef read'Iing the damage state. 1 3 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and 'Pt Least l'u'ledemtedamage states please eensuit the attaehed deeument. ?meng 3" 3 Fee WE Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at Lu. USA '51" i3. EII-EISI-PII. F'flili'BTF' I'll GIJ-FII Werst Case Casualties - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Marsh EDDIE H51.) i 4 I meatm - - Imus WIS "1'21. SEE. a - a; "i . sauna? .E1 I RD ?13? .314 .I-iul H) I I In". - a. I 3?32IMHIDH - Emilia-slim ?Hf. .. chattaneega Stats ef Tennessee - liL?ritieal liteunties Legend rat-name. MILE-T Teal Heat Hat-thyme Heat Walst Case Casualties Majer ICities I ':I:Il_ntl' a a a 3 EQST 1? -:arreII let a Is: LaI-:hea1hem a a a Lataereale 92': as was Chatter e: 3 es Le-II-eree a a a 51 25'] i Emit-Sad 4-3mane-Jr. a: lia'e' I I - - Eye-r :te: II: 2.IH I'I'Ientguner,? I a I . Fey-ate ass 3? Eden sea as an RWETS ll-EI P'Eln?jrh 2 El 2 ?The [Sta-tag she: a a a Hate I-IertIeInan :Is In ?l'eltr; easel 2.11s susee '3 "?95 as E- aha-art :3 a Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 111a greatest US Heutes 5m 33 'I'Ipten lit IIZII print-ability ef read'Iing the damage state. Hanger-en 17' 7 173 I Fer de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'ledemte' 12.5 25 5] T5 Hana I93 9 as: 5-3? is If damage states please tenauIt the attaehed datum-ant. ESTER Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at LInIaIa-siampagt. USP PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell $113313! EIZII. E31 Cammunieatian Faeility Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March EDGE :55htutMII'le -: CHE RI a; State at Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Tn:- 1a at met emu-Im- Tetal rm. cam-n IJempl-a-b EAST . Fat-lilies rat-dent- Damn-a- Emmi;I ran-1 nint- lIumau-a- lInnIau-a- II- Ul'llil'iIEll'y' EQIDFI Bent-m Hump-Inert. 33 :Mi??e Hegign as a: lnl-ce 3s as East . Elle-Iii.? Tl lander-1am llII l - - lawn-r as Ha ?33 M'I'derate Bret-Halt 75 :5 le?M-c- 35: El El .3. ans-1 wn use a as le Elly. Ens-Hmr; Isa . Isa Isa Ls H-anu-z-mI-r; Hmers Faw-tte I29 I29 lit-Ian Is: lat-mu 2+5 2+5 Put-I11." as Interstates =Eritieal I2 aunties Hard-man s+ +2 elm-lb; Isa; less . . . . Ham." 5. Ehtealseuntles are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest US HeutE as as Tlr-t-n ef read'nng the speelied damage state. Hmdere-z-II It? :9 :u?i'la'ne I33 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and 'Pt Least ltI'lzudemte' 12.5 25 ED T5 Jr If '39 damage states please ennsult the attaehed deeurnent. ?gum" Milg Legend IEemmtmi-I:atien Facilityr Damage Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at gt. USA '51" I'll Elli-Ell Tili'l'li'l-El Dame - New Madrid Seiemie Zene: Event March 21303 l'llLTiIil II: J- Ehattaneega State ef - Critical Ceuntiee Legend He. ef He. ef lle. ef It Dame Majei Citiee Facilili-i? Faeilitiee dainty Facilitiet: AST Metli?etl Mercalli Intene it}.r I- EEIJJIZIEI Benten 11 Hardin 24 maul]. I Cartell 2T Hay-timed [Uhl'lt??l'l'?y Ei .: 1.31 I ["31 EH 5 DUB Citea?tam 5 Hentlereen 2? 23 'vl ?Elm I Cit-tester 11 32 Pen}.r "all Cree-ken 5 Hiclin'?lt 11 Hen-eneen a *5 [lau'itleen 23 Heneten 3 Shelley er Decatur Htln'ultrey'e 12 Stein-mt 2 3-: [licltenen 22 Lalte 1 Tipten 13 HI Dyer 22 Latltlertlale 14 Wayne 3 . . . . Fayette 42 Law Elite 1 1 Weahlw 25 ET Gihem 4? Lev-tie 35 Fer de?nitions ef 'Eernplete' and 'Pt Least I'tI'hIZIEl?erte' a 135 25 3'5 Gilee 5 413 damage atatee please eeneult the attached deeurrent. Hardem'rtn 41 mum, 32 11.1115 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Lu. USA '51" F'flili'BTF' I'll GIJ-FII E33 Tctal Debris {Thcusands cf Tens) - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March secs mm Si) N. DUE - {Siam 1 32% -. I i?p- sue 313- macaw El EECIEIITU GRUNDY.E1- as - 13-3Chattanccga State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties Legend ench: Cancrete.? Tctel Erch.? Caner-ante: Tc'el - - - - Ilium 3333 m? mm aunt. m?d 33m mm Tctal [Ilehrls Majcr l[:Itles Eantun 3 2 7 mmpIIr-ayu 3 I 1 EAST Tens 1' cam-II el 34 I33 Larva 23 23 33 Cit-331mm Leuderdale I33 2I3 Ice 5 . dam-I- 3 3I I33 strence I 5- 25 2130.001 - "lair-Hart 92 Ice 2 I2 Llama 25 Eu It: 2 I2 hicl?lal 3-3 3-3 3:3 Eecatur I3 9 2I h'lsdl Inn 3Ic 33I s? I - T5 - 15'] I I I I Eye-r 3II I27 73? Mun?cuman- 2 2 15F 32'] Fayette It?. Isa ch-zun I73 I93 333 HWEFS Elm-3n 3I3 3m 33-3 Pen? 2 I 3 cum :3 Fabian-on I I I?t_E_r5tatE5 l-hrdeman 33 3-5 I I3 32:32 ?2:33 -I:rItI-:al I: cu ntIes Hardln 1-9 3 a] stalwart a I: Eri?cal ccunties are these 1l'Iat experience the greatest LIE Heat-E Ian-Iced ?5.3 'I'Ipt-n 35': ill 7.5.3 prct-at-il'rttr cf read'Iing the speciied damage state. Hendencn I Far de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least l'u'lcdemte' 135 25 :5 7'3 73 '53 '99 357 damage states please censult the attached dccument. t?m: Ell 3 Ell 2 2 Fee MFAETASSESSMEHT WE Mid-America Earthquake Center LII Herein-annuals at U335. l3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll Tili'll? $3 EDI. E34 Displaced Population - New Madrid Seismic Zone: Event Marchsoos I retain)" I oatmor E1 JH -Iif- _o LEs I LH -- s11 JP, ?Hf. .. ?hattanooga State of Tennessee - Critical Counties Legend Biplane-2 Entma?o [Homes-2 Entrna?e otEngace-zl - - - - - Falldenoei mum; E-a-Ila-a-m-au F'opula1on CHIEE Ean?on I3 3 I ERST El - 25 l' EUIDUEI - 539 I 1-75 La 1% 4-675 Hit-3 33 1 Che I73 ITS Lawrence 1.0m - . HIDDEN - Ei? Crockett Ices 275:3 Lawn - [Balaton I 2 ?ll at Eeostur Is los- MadIIon ease teas - 33.331 - 152.333 :3 Manor" :3 - [yer ass: 2 Isle mn?umm Rm 5 277E- 3 H53 77% [51231325 5E3 959-3 - - - Ellen Hanan-non '3 'Z'L'r't'eg I-Hrdeman 1-Cli- IEE- 613772 IE- I US I-Iardln ass stalwart 33 as Eri?oal oounties are those 1hat experienoe 1he greatest l-a'J'woo-zl IEII 3 s Tlptun ans sztt probability of read'ning the damage state. I-Ianoannon 333 3'33 For de?nitions of 'Eomolete' and Least l'u'lzndelate' 135 25 $5 7 5'53 Milk?? ?5?35 ?5'7 damage states please oonsult the attaohed document. 71.377117: 3 3 Foe ME I Mid-Amerioa Earthquake Canter LII at unIaIa-Isian'upagl. USP. I'll Ell-Ell EES Electric F'cwer Facilityr Damage - New Madrid Seiemic che: N11?r Event March ecce 13W FE HI If . I: A LIHI: . State cf - Critical Ccuntiee Legend fatten-1' Hie-act P?wer Facility Dal-"age mun Mn:- derate mac Elam-me Med-crat- Elnmaue Damage EI-I-nt-n I 2 All Least Hi-rers gram-5m I: Ema-Male Ell 3 Higl?l'f Ul'llil'iIEll'y' EtatES ?llet-tr Lawrence El =Eritical menu Lewlc - - nae-1 can 33 Madlt-cn 3 3 EDELEFT: LIE chtE r.1.1ur,- g 3-5- Ell-?Eat HE im mean-n .3 .3 Mclaln' 3 . El 3 3 mum-3mm a I Ella-?ddle Regen Fag'efl- IZIt-len 2 2 . ?lm? I I Fm Elednc Trananleaan Linea :IEaat Raglan Elle-:- I erbertcen 2 Hardem-an 2 elicit-5' 3.: 32 Hardin 7 etc-arr 3 IIri1ica ccuntiee are thcee 1hat experience 1he greateat ID Tlr-t-I-n I arch-ability cf read'ning the speciied damage state. Far de?niticna cf 'Ecmplete' and Leaet l'u'lIzndeIate' 135 25 :5 'l :5:th 'l .3 damage atates please ceneult the attached Fee TEeramchcIr." ME I Mid-America Earthquake ISenter LII USP .all'l I 3. I'll Elli-Ell $113312? 5-H EBB Emergency Dperatien Center Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event March 21:11:13 add?I PE [11.11 111W .11:w' H- run-"111. ?5 - 5g; 31.11; In. 1E: .2. 1H 11:1 we Ir "11'1" 1.1.1.1315 I 1.11- 11111.1 1 1 111? MW -1 GILES I- Jim. . - ?g 11.1 .. State at Tennessee - Critical Ceuntiee Legend . . ICenters 12111111331 Hes T111111 111.11 Lent-t 1:1-n1 plate 11ml I111. 111' 1a [1.11 t-t em p.111-111- . age .111,- EAST Least M?d Ef?e: Dal-?age MIDICHE HEQ e112.12-11.11:Ea?t Reg Swarm Ian-111mm Llnlit ?ItLil: Ellh??d Dul'n?ld El El El El Highly. Lil: Ely. [11.1-am 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 [1111111111111 1:1 1:1 1:1 r.1auI:.' 1:1 1:1 1:1 I Certaln [1.11m [1 1:1 [mum-n1 en. 1:1 1:1 [1 . Fan-1.11 [1 1:1 1:1 IZIt-lt-n 1:1 1:1 [1 ?mm? Interstates 1:1 1:1 1:1 Rebel-teen 1:1 1:1 1:1 Hard-11m .1111 aunt-1,- _ErItIeal I: an ntIes Hardln 1:1 1:1 $t1'11'11rt 1:1 1:1 Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee the greatest US Heutes 1:1f read'1ing the damage state. f?mmn Fer de?nitiens [1f 'Eemplete' and Least l'11'l1:11:leIate' 125 25 5] 3'5 I Henn. CI ?Mm? 1:1 1:1 1:1 ?lump? 1:1 1:1 1:1 damage states please [ansult the attaehed deeument. men 1:1 l'ulilE Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at U335. l3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll Tili'll? $3 EDI. Ferry.r Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March ecce FIE I I _1 4- Isaa? I ?55.55 -.. If: ?-"-rtll1? I GI. I) . . I?l' hall-Ilka is; leLuU?d??li 1. i Hmaman 4' I {sai? . 'naue mag" W15 Ii: 11' PTUH I STER . - I I. "a - . I l?w. 1?waHUI llIl_ - _313LII ?were: I- .- - I: I FILWEITE IEIRDEM Lilli ML. IRT I a a .- JET: I . LIHLI LH RMIIHLIH State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties Legend__ Teal rant IltLeaI-t Teal rent AtLea-t IIpmplete Re?ll?? -Ian1'I' I'm-dame Damage Damage membe- Enm age Eamege EAST AI MIME EIaInt-n I I I Hum . Carrdl Lelia-Fl II Highly LlnlilIel'II Che-31mm Lauder-Jae - Chemr :3 Lawrence :3 "Incl-e11 Lewll lI-lcderate mam-n - - Em? raur; Likely I Certain IIyer a cam HWEIS :3 a elm Fat-amen Inter?tateg I-hardelnen sheltr; _Eritical I3 cu nties Hi'mEthical ccunties are these Ihat experience Ihe greatest LIE Reutes _?l'lF'I'i'l'l probability cf read'ning the speciied damage state. magma? 3 $331-- 3 3 3 Far de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least huladelatedamage states please cansult the attached dccurnent. I-Ipu-tpn I I I Fce Mile Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at U335. l3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll GIJEII Tili'll? $3 EDI. EBB Fire Statien Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event a, .F. ml}; Ii_- LII If. I . a-?u - Jr 4'5 State at Tennessee - Critical Ceuntiee Tetal at Camp-In- Tet'll Hum-.1 St'?tl?ll 3:1: FaellLlIi-I-I: 33$er Holy?:- due-rat; Damage Bergen-I- EFIST AI EMiddlE Hegien cam-II II II I l- Unlikely :Ea?t II L-Iud-I-rdal-I- 1' - In: In: I: Lawn-nee l3 El UHIIHEIF Creek-I11: 7 7 7 I emunghl'f I: I: -- Certain II- E- IE- MentI-z-m-I-I'; IT Fan-th- I3 I. In In E. eII-mn I: I: 1? Ell-bl:- I: Rebel-teen Interstatee Hard-man I: I: 73 73 as. - 3ritiea I: aunties 9 9 5 eeuntiee are 1hat experienee the greateet LIE Reutee pant-ability ef reaching the damage state. Handermn II. Adm-H-I-nr; I: mm? l: I: Fer de?nrtlene ef Eemplete and Pt Leaet l'u'ledelate 135 25 3'5 HleHm-In 7 FEES PIEESE the me." c. c. i Mid-America Earthquake ISenter LII at USP PM I 3. Prd-a-etF' I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Fire Station Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Marchsees q. Ill {1 m? - HII: Imam 4 . - 1.: Minus . d5 .Kb. ?5.State at Tennessee - liL?ritieal Ceunties Legend HII. HII. $1231: it"? Fire Statien Funsti-nn-naliljlr Email Hesi?n I I1 ire-"i - - .Iarrell Labs 3 [my 1 Cheatiam II II Lauder-jam II - a egmn Omar warren-:3 Ia IE: . Nun Eunm?nal freshen a 7 I II Fundlenal El] 3? 3T - Eaeatu' a 3 Mann" I: I: HWEE I: I: Metlalr; 2 Interstates [yer a I'm-linemen . . . Fayete I3 celen In _Erltleal I: euntles Glhlen I: Fem LIE Heutes Glle Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest print-ability ef read'ning the damage state. ?nder-a1 3 :3 :2 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'lzndelate' 135 25 :5 ?grim? .. 'M?ar?lien In I: damage states please eensult the attaehed deeJmentMid-America Earthquake Center LII Llniaia-uslampagi. USP .all'l I 3. I'll Ell-Ell Hazardcus Materials Facilities - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March secs 1" .-I ll ?rig??rlp '1 - . - ?derw an E1 1.11:. I, 3.1mm)" *f . - ugh-HIE?: chattanccga State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties Legend HeHamrdDUSM?e?al?Fadl?iES Majer Cities Facilities tel-m Facililies Fasililie-S lulctli?ed Mercalli Intens i1] Ir Bentcn 2 Hardin 31 {Mull I - 33 ?Wild '13 33 c: "9'1 . EDDIDEH Belgium] Chedhmt 31 Henderscn 2? Ellen 213 ?teaater Ei Henry Pen}; 1 Haters Crecltett Hicllin'an 12 Hehertsum as am ?191513195 [Iatridscn 241 ?nally 549 Ecr't'?a' '3 ??95 Decatur Ei Hunulreys ES Stewart 41 LIE [licks-an 4? Lake 3 Tiptcn 1g :1 Dyer 44 Lauderdele 51 Wayne 3 . . . . E111Jca ccuntles are these 1l'nat experience 111a greatest - Fayette 31 ?Fame 25 Wang 13 larch-ability cf read'ning the speciied damage state. 51 LENS Mll'?nm? 33 Far de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least l'u'lzndelate' 1:1 135 25 5] T5 is? Giles 2? I'I.I'latlism BE: damage states please cansult the attached ddeurrent. H?mm? 25 ?hum, re ch WE Mid-America Earthquake I1'.Ianter LII at unreleaslampagi. USP .all'l I 3. I'll Ell-Ell $113312? 5-H EEH Bridge Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event MarehE?UEl El .13 RH is", State ef Tennessee - Erltleal Ceuntles Legend He. FIJne?ehal Tetal at Ila etFune?eml Tetel He. at acIIH-a- Facllma- Facllma- Famum- Budge Fun Eenten 5: Humphrey: EE- E-E- EAST 1 Hegien I:Bl'l'IIil Ill-3 1: Lethal I: H- ay . Chasiiam as as Lauderdale '31 Ngn_F __ n ji jna I:IEast Raglan 33- ui-I L3 L3 - ?'eel-mtt as Lawn 2 2 Fundmn?al Ea ddten ?l 52 rac Mair; es en Rivers 3-9 3? IT Del-nah .33 .33 Maur,? Interstates 55"? Mentgerne VI 33' 3'3 - 2ritiea I: aunties IEIT El IH Glt-Ien as HI Pan-,- as as IT 7'3 7'3 I-Hrdaman as. shalt-5' has 4.35 I-tardn 53 5E: stalwart TIZI TEI Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest I33 Tlpten II 51 probability ef read'ning the damage state. I-Iendanen 31: 3'3 Fer de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least h-hdelate' 135 25 :5 Herr; feeble; '31 damage states please ennsuit the attaehed deeument. ?HmMid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII Herein-annuals. at Mala-Champs U335. 3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll GIJEII $3 EDI. EEIE Highway.I Bridge 31 Segment Damage - New Seismie Zane: M73 Event 12"? i. F. 1.- 1151:1111--. I WILLIFI. {11111: 1F 1 I 1.1 gm?m IJTH F4daue111-F? 1 FF .-1.-. iatIIs1111115-1/ 114.1? LEeeTim I I will" I. 9-1-1 ll 1. 1m 11541111111111 F- - 1111.1 111.11:- 1- - II {hi?glint {my 151- t; 1' 1111'- Friar-s IMHIDH FF .- 1111: 15111.. - . 1 1. 111LT11II1. . {15%qu 1 111' GILES . .1 - . ?rm-egg" State ef Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Te?tal 111:1 1:11 111 Lee 11 Cam 1111111111 Tetsl 11:1 :11 1:1 Leett Budge amage I'lledemh IInmsgIaI IInmegIaI I'm-111mm Enmsga Enm age . FIFE: 1:3 II 3 5'1: I I EAST Segment amag 'l . 1311131113 n1 5:3 Lauder-11m '31 Ell 45 Un?likgha If Llel? TIE-TE Che-tar 11 a L11'1'.'rel1ee 1.3 1:1 1:1 1g 1; n1 e1.I as is I. ?st-El :1 1:1 1:1 Mederate leellheed Unlikely 1:111 13a :1 1:1 11111111an 115 a: 99:1? Mederate lJlIeliheed Deb-e11 es :1 :1 11111.111:1Wsst Heglcn g?g?a 1131 E'gl?m? F11 1-53 1'35 311112111 Ceunties 1:1111' - I - Iddle Regen 111 51 15 Far" as 1:1 I: Risers - ell-an 111 1:1 1:1 Eat-Jenrt-en re 1:1 933ml" rem-11m 111': a: is 1:1 $111113;- 1315 15' Interstates 53 $te11'11rt Ei'i?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee the greatest I133 53- _TIpt-zn 54 4-3 probability ef read'1ing the damage state. 3'9 J. Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'ledemtedamage states please ennsult the attaehed deeument. 11111111111 11 Fee 11111115 I Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center 1.11: U335. 3. I'll 1a EDI. EEIE Haspital Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: MIT Event MarehEDDEl .HE .112. I 2 I - __sz i HII: 4 . Farr-w _1 PERRY r" I else? WIS - rd", I I . 1- - STEII . if511; E-ILI edum)? I IllLT2-H State at Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Legend WEE r-IaI He. 51: Tet-'Il He. 51: e-I-mpII-tI- Pit?l Hill?? '3 :l Egi?n d-I-rat-I- Damage Gaunt: Mederat- Damage EAST Bent-n Hum Hegien Darrell 2 2 Lake a I tau-1mm I I I - El [warrant-II- I El new-Hadleen 3 3 Dee-nut I Maur,? I LIHEIY I rHeH-lln' I I DIN Maniac-mar; 2 I I et-I-I-n I I E. Hwers Git-ten 2 Pen?; I a Interstates I I Hard-man 2 2 2 2: _ErItIeal I: euntIes Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest LIE Routes Hair-"Md probability ef read'Iing the damage state. 3 ?min." 1 '3 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'ledemte' 125 25 5] 3'5 "Wham I I: .mm?m?mu a damage states please mnsult the attaehed deeument. "Mm" I E, E, mug (I Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII U335. 3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll GIJEII $3 EDI. lwestlgat-r Haspital Funetienality - New Madrid Seismie Zane: MIT Event Marsh - FEH oer-z sort. ix Ti?iltm I. rr-13.: I . I -. .- L-IRUHDT . at. ?Ist- as - 17? amen FotErrE MIins. ?om-s" State ef Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Legend Ito.otFImo11oroI Tetal IIo.ot otFunotonoI TotoI Ito ot . . . . count,- Hes Esnten I I [lay 1 Middle Region -:orroII 2 Labs . -:Itoo111om I I Louooroolo a I Nen-Funetienal E33 'Jililltlilf - -:rooI=ott t: Fundlena 2a h'adlten a Hhrers I Iaur- I I not-ton I I I '?tEEtatES Eyor I 2 2 =Eritiea I2 aunties layers I -:I:Ion I sIoton Parr; I Gllet I I F'et-erhen I I I-Ioroomon 2 one-Io; I-hr-Illn $h'o'al't Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee the greatest I probability of read-ting the damage state. ?in?rm? I For de?nitions of 'Eemplete' and Least h-hdelate' 125 25 5] 3'5 ?in? '3 '3 3 dama states I It th att nt I-Iohmon I I 'MIIomton 2 2 .. 5' ease mm? mum? GUIDE Mid-Alneriea Earthquake Center LII at mate-Champs U335. l3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll Tili'll? $3 EDI. IILIE'ft-tkjatlf EEIS Liquefactien Susceptibility - New Madrid Seismic Zene: Event March sees ,r . - WILudnimF; i fag..? PERRY n'ln'llJR I and - E1- nEcaLtEre? was 1 - 1-2-- :33. I GHIJHDT . - 1 a- - dealer: 1.. I unmui Renaud as! .- . a} "*3qu? ?as" Chattaneega State cf Tennessee - Critical liteunties Legend I'n'la=lmum inhalmun IIeun?g- dune-naming Izdunng- SHE M?jm Cltles Eenten Untnewn Lew H.II11 Finre'J'n LInI-:newn r-len-a- EAST EUIDUEI - 'IHrrell rnene te Lehe Hdne new Che-amen Unknewn Ldueareala r-lene HUI-IE . Che-tar Lew 'e'ee'Hgn Lawrence Unknewn Uni;newn . - "Jedi-art Lew tree High Lewln LInItnewn Unhewn - knew-n LInItnewn h'eelnen Lew- 'd'erT' Mederate a'ur Unhnewn Lew fn'?UFj Unhnewn Unknewn - LInInznee'n Unhnewn McHaIr; Lew Riders Elf? Hens 'e'err High In'lengemerj Fayette Hene Lew Helen Hene 'e'erT' Interstates ISIDIDH Lew 'e'err'Hign Unhnewn Henn- - - - Glleln Enenn'n LInn;nenn-n Feet-crunch Unltnem Ecr't'ca' I: "?95 l'l?l'd?m an Unluee'n Lew ?li?ltl'n' r-lene High US HeutE Hardln LIanew-n 'den: Shwal't Leg.- Enucal ceuntnes are these 1hat experience he greatest Lew Muscle-rat? TIpt-n Hene 'u'E-rT prelealeil'rty ef read'ning the speciied damage state. I-Iendernen Hene geFr-Hngn gag-Ina LInLnewn r-lene Fer de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'ledenate' El 135 :5 5] T5 {Ir H?l'ln' were? _nini'ai'ltl' damage states please eensuit the attached ddeurrent. Ht: Fm an FUFI l-Ieu-ntnn Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at Llnaana-cnannpagn. USP. PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell EEIE Modi?ed Merealli IntensitV - New Madrid Seismie Zane: EVent IIJEE SD ?fth maleII:htItt'tIntnmega State ef Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Legend Matt. tull'ul Canny Mat. Ml'tl Matt. Mutt Metli?etl I'II'leIealli Intensity.r I'II'lajer lCities Bent-en VII Hardin VII Maury VI VI Ir - Carrell Hayweetl I-il VI VI I - Cheatham V1 Hentlersen VII Ethic-n HI I 3]]ng Chester VII Henri-Vr VII RWEE Ell aVItsen en an .. . I: II: Decatur VII Htln'ull'treys VII Stewart VII I-II Emil? '95 [Ii-alt sen V1 Lake 3-: Tip-ten HII Dyer HII Lautlertlale HI Wamte VII Fayette IH Lawrenee W'E??ltlw 3.: eeunties are these 1hat experienee the greatest - - probability ef read'ting the damage state. Gillan)? LENS: W'll'anm? VI Fer de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least I'u'lademte' 135 25 :5 GIIEE damage states please cansutt the attaehed deeurnent. Hmlen?n II-I Mailim? II-I Fee ME I Mid-Ameriea Earthquake Center LII at U335. i3. I'll EDI. IIUH-tkj?tlf Natural Gas Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Eyent March EDDIE a El State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccuntles IZIT Tctal IZIT fez-carat- [cm Fig? Haj-arms Enm age Errm age r2: r2: Humphrey. El Lari-a- EI El Cliea?am E- E- 5 cached r:r Lewlrr rr:r r:r r:r Heraln' r:r r:r EyelGHEII r:r r:r stalwart r:r r:r r:r Eri?cal ccunties are these 1l'rat experience he greatest ran-reed '3 El a 3 arch-ability cf read'ring the speciied damage state. l'l'i'l'l'j'i'r'mi 3 de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least 3 2 wast-lay '3 damage states please censuit the attached ?$ng 3 3 ?War? Fee MPacTassEssrurEHT Legend l'latural lGas Facility Damage At Least I'II'lc-tlerate HigHy Unlikely Unlikely i} r-rlcderate Likelihccd Higrly Likely . l13ertain r-rlajcr Natural Gas Lines Hi-rers Interstates - 3ritica I3 cu nties US Heutes Elia-Est Hegicn Hegicn I:IEast Heg?cn l'u1il Mid-America Earthquake Ilitanter LII at UHma?Ciampagn. USP .all'l I 3. I'll Elli-Ell 5-H EEIE Oil Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Ml? Event March EDDIE "Mum - State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties llII. .Ikt It {dudes Camp-lets Inca-arena age Carnage Ills-1mm Damage [Imam I LcI-e dwa?am I a Laudsrdals El Lawrence a: a a II'hdI-Icn a a a Dance in l'I'lcllalr'J' Eyer I'I'Icnudner] :3 Hyatti13- i'E- ray-Inca I I :3 11pm "II-agha- I-Ia-nr; "seam-,- Hchm?l'l El El ccunties are these Ihat experience Ihe greatest prchahil'rttr cf read'Iing the speciied damage state. de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least lII'lzndeIate' damage states please cansult the attached dchment. Legend IICl'il Facilityr Damage ?tt Least lII'b-Iler ate Risers Interstates I. Unlikely- - 2ritical I: nties UnlikelhI LIs chtE lI-1cderate Ultelihccd :Imsa Health Lil: Eh? lII1Idd e Reg cn . East Heglcn .- IZertaln lI-1ajcr Lines 12.5 as l'u1il IE Mid-America Earthquake Ilitanter LII L'E'r?l'h- at [IBIS-Clamps LII. U315 I 3. I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Peak Grcund Acceleration - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March 2222 . .El 1] ?14. I . . 1221111211 . I, ?141221211 *IIthtI'ttanccga State cf Tennessee - lErItIcal Ecuntles Legend EchIty PEP. PEP. Ecurty I'I'lin. PEP. 1.151. P1311. Ecurty I'I'lin. PEP. 1.151 P1311. . . . eel-11m 2.15 2.25 Ha'cin 2.15 225_ 1.1eu-y 2.2? 2.15 EAST l l?JPl cerreII 2.25 2.54 Ham-reed 224 1.14 2.2? 2.15 - 2.1 Ir 52.22121 - 122.5132 Eheatham Ill]? I115 Henderscn I325 Ebicn '11 '12 ., EDUIDDU Chester 2.25 2.24 Hen 225 2.44 Perr 2.15 2.25 E'ccitett 2.44 1.14 222 225 Reba-ism 2.22 2.15 '12 '14 - 515.000 Elauidscn 2.25 2.15 Heustcn 2.15 225 Shelby 2.24 1.22 '14 - '15 Him; ElecatLr 2.15 2.25 2.15 1125 2.15 11.25 2.13 - 2,2 Intmtateg Eici-iscn 2.15 2.15 LeI-e 222 225 Tipten 2.55 1.22 a _1 Dyer 2.22 1.22 Lauderdale 224 1.14 2.15 2.25 -Eritical Counties Fayette 2.25 2.24 Lewreree 22? 2.15 Weahley 2.25 2.25 1 23 L13 mute; Eituscn 2.24 1.22 2.15 2.15 2.2? 2.15 Eiles 2.22 2.15 I'I'Ichlairy 225 224 Harden'Ian [1.25 1155 Hajiggn [115 [15-4 E'i?cal ccunties are these 1hat experience 1he greatest prchahil'rttr cf read'Iing the speciied damage state. de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and 'Pt Least l'u'lcde1ate' 1:1 135 25 5:1 :55 damage states please c2nsuit the attached dccurnent. F22 1211115 Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at USP. i3. I'll EDI. IIUH-tkj?tlf Folioe Station Damage - New Madrid Seismio Zone: Ml? Event Marol?tE?UEl i?p- i Home" 4 't'l?tlJH meme .PERRY . .5. - _l 5 . . 3hr {It also .gt/ Ks, Ecarije e?d - a. I ?13. 4. ee?uor . t?Farsi?m M3- JIJ. 3* I . I. alert Il - .5.th LIH i. ark-H. State of Tennessee - Countlee Legend To'al No. AtL-aatt Complete Total Ho .51 Lea-1: Comp-It- Count, Hellman Mode-rota Damage Damage Count; Moderat- Damage Damage 5131'") ll Dt'll'l'l't'l?? HWETS out: I: 3 HI ml: HIST Lem ?Name Interstates -_arro a t- tg'lgaglam _3 3 t?um E- Unlikely. El: ritioal I: - tat 2 2 entrance . Cruz-chart l. I. l. Lat-.1. US En-.-Moderate Ukelihood 3 2 l't'?lfLII-E eh.I ?ag on Eytr 7 7 7 tonne-man: I Certain :lEast Heginn Pareto 7 2 colon 7 1 El El Gllet 335 Herdln 3 53'3?? 3 Eri?oal oounties are those 1hat experienoe 1he greatest 3 3 3 '5 probability of reaching the damage state. mafrmn ?i ?i 3 ma?a" '2 For de?nitions of 'Eomplete' and Least l'u'lodemte' El 125 25 5] 3'5 Hehrlnan 1 damage states please oonsult the attaohed doournent. men 2 Foe WE (I Mid-Amerioa Earthquake Center LII at ?rtta-Clantpa U335. 3. F'l'lili'?tF' I'll GIJEII $3 EDI. Felice Statian Funatianality - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Event MarchE?DE hearse H. IwE?Tqu 1- MLLIM .. Ha _i .131 ?use 33* K3 513nm It" - F: . "if ELEI gm I13: .- sci?. _ai-EL? NEITHE - I..- 'f MRIDH h. - 5; FMEHE MI: . 1i I :3 .Lj' 7.5? I I GILES I, .. 33State ef Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Legend m. manlmunml Tatel ram Tum rm :3 . mum? mum. mum. Pallee Statlan SWEET EIaInt-n 3 3 J. EAST Day 1 :Middle Hegiun El E- Lake 3 - dmaham 3 3 Lauderdala c: 5 I Nan-Fundianal :Ea? Che liar 2 Lawrence Rivers EEII3IEIILIF El .3 ?Eur Ii- 4- I. I. m: IlaJlr,? I2: I. '?tmtateg Cum a 5 5 _Eritieal I2 aunties Frette a cal-an a 7 El US all-an 5 5 Fat-mien 5 5 l-Hrdeman a 5 a as I-ardn .3 3 333-33? 3 3 [Meal cauntIes are these 1hat experience 1he greatest raj-355.: .3 Tlptan 3 E- prahahility at read'ning the damage state. I-Iandaruan 3 Myra I. J. Far de?nitians 'Eamplete' and 'Pt Least l'u'lIzndeIate' 135 25 35 if damage states please cansuit the attached daeurrent. 2 2 i i MFACTAESESEMEHT l'u1il5 um 2 2 Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at Lu. USA '51" i3. F'flili'BTF' I'll Elli-3 Tetal Fepulatien (2000} - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Mara-lanes "sen" Er In -H - ?51? HANK ,r - .allr Ehattaneega State at Tennessee - Critical Counties 13?} Legend Iii-mum?r Pepulatien Ill?nlzruntyr Pepulatien Camry F'epulatinn T?'t?l P'E'lmlm'?'? Benten 15,53? Hartin assra Maury ss,4se EAST 4011'"? 53.05"] 400.000 Carrell 29,415 Hay-weed 19,19? l'u'lentgemely 134.1513 100.00? ?00.00? [:heatham 35,5312 Hendersen 25,522 32.450 1.501 - 3.003 . Chester 15,540 Henryr 31 .115 Pen}.r 71,531 3,001 - Creel-salt 14,532 Hielrn'an 22,295 Hebe-Its)? 54,433 - [Iauidsen 569.1391 Heusten - Decatur 11 .7131 Hun?plieys 171,929 Stewart 12.37?] Rise [5 [licks-en 43,155 Lake F.954 Ti Ien 51 ,2?1 lnter?tateg Dyer 371.2719 Lauderdale 271,101 Wayne 15,1342 -Eritiea Eeunties Fill-I'm? 2BEBE: Lama-me 34.395 Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest LIE Bibs-1n 43'152 Lewis 11'313}r William] 1251333 print-ability ef read'ning the damage state. Gil-25 29 44? l'u'le?airy 24 553 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least hu'ledemtedamage states please eansuit the attaehed deeJrnent. H?nhn?n 213.105 5'1 .33? "sums Fee meaeTassEssMEHT WE 1" Mid-America Earthquake IZentar LII :11: unmaia-u?ampagi. USP. I'll Ell-Ell Facility Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: Event March secs DICHSUHI La? 713[Ilse L13EL. NEITHE - - MHIDH h. - .i .. . . State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties Legend He. at it Lee-t temples He. at Lee It camp-lets IIcunt; I'I'chara'e Damage Damage -:cu1t,' Mada-rah Damage Eamege F?giIit-jr H'r-Iers EIaIntcn Humphrey?- II At Least Met Interstates Letha- 2 ?ies 1mm I Lauderdale 5 5 5 .. Him?. Unlikely =Eritical Ecun? es . Fl 1: deer-I11 a Lawn *5 3?11?" 3:3 3 3 Emu-In 3 3 3 lI-1cderate Likelihccd E'M'ddle month-Inst.- I I:IEast He icn Fa?'?th El I El I-hrdeman El El 6'3 5'3 I-Iardn 5 a ?tewart I ccunties are these 1hat experience 1he greatest T'F't'I'l'l 3 3 3 arch-ability cf reaching the speciied damage state. made-hm 3 ?int" 3 3 3 Far de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and 'Ii't Least l'II'lzIdeIate' 135 25 5] 3'5 Hefrjnan damage states please censult the attached dchment. FEIH Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LInIaIa-clampagl. USP .all'l I 3. I'll Elli-Ell $113312? Ell-'4 Fetable Water System Damage - New Madrid Seismic che: MIT Event March secs .. ecar'tie .. . Haemr594 MINE ?shedFare Mf- 1 - r- - I IGILES fee-J I . . I .I State cf Tennessee - Critical Ccunties Legend T?ll??'m ctnampm mm Hg? PetaII-le Wate Facilityr Damage an era megs nIage mum,- an era nIage nIage Eentcn I pm}: a EFIST L335: Mcderate 'i?mlLEEWMT E. .3 .3 G- Petalile 1Ir'lI'ater Distrilmticn Lines 'T'J?l?m M?dera?te Likelih??d Ile. Leaks 5 . . Eeca'ur a a near; 2 - Elclucn maln- I Certain 1c 5c 'er 2 I I'Ilcn cum-Ir" . . cal-3E CcLIntIes El] - emu-an Perr' I - ena- ant-3mm HWEE I-er-zl-a-man a charm-,- I I Interstates 5'33 - 1 .333 - I steal-art I Ethical counties are these 1hat experience 1he greatest 3 3 arc-Inability cf read'Iing the speciied damage state. mange-ch 3 Him" 3 3 Far de?niticns cf 'Ecmplete' and Least l'u'lzndelate' 135 25 5] T5 {Ir Hcl-rJnen I I damage states please censult the attached dccument. if," Hen-tun Mid-America Earthquake Center LII at LInIaIa-clampagl. USP. PM I 3. I'll Elli-Ell Frisens - New Madrid Seismic Zane: Ml? Event Marchaeea CLlh" - r? FEM sense?. _l I 5" -. MRHEM is; se?unv E. I, 72?; MHIUH p. i I - .- I. 1-1 WWI. State ef Tennessee - Critical ISeunties Legend He. {If He. {if He. 0f Citieg. Emma Fit-?lms? Emmy Facil?i? ?aunts Facil?i? EAST M?tli?ed Merealli Intensity manna Benten 1 Hardin 1 1 . '1 '1 mllt??l'l'?y '1 c: . gluing-1 [Er-Islam] [Elleatham 1 Hentlersen 1 1 'vl . Hmers Chester 1 1 Pen}.r 1 Creel-led 1 Hiel-iman 2 Reba-tsuzrn 1 '3 ES [Iauitlsen Heusten 1 Shelby EC ?'?Bal '3 ?unt'EE Deeatu 1 Hun'qlhreys 1 Stewart 1 Dieltsen 1 Lake 2 Tint-an 1 'l L?lltleltl?l-E 3 WWE 3 Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat ex perlenee 1he greatest Fayette; 2 'l wml'il?flu" 'l print-ability ef read'ning the damage state. Ginsu)" 1 Lewis 1 1 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and 'Pt Least l'u'lzndelate' 135 25 3'5 Giles 1 3 damage states please eansult the attaehed deeJrrent. H?nlm?? 2 ml? 1 Mid-America Earthquake Canter LII at male-Clamps Lu. USA f3. I'll CIJ-FII Hail11'1'a'11r Bridge 31 Segment Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: M73 Event March 21:11:13 111.111111E 1111113111 - - a - I ?lm?E1 HE 711' TE MET I11 f: 1 EVE 133111 LEIHE . .TF-H {LE-lg 1 [1 EH 11.111 e111? 1 [11 I r1111 WLLl?l?j?: i 1. 1 UDER 1.1. PERRY 111111.111in - _13- El ?1:1 Fill - E1: 11.11111 E1111 I "13.1? - I 1. WE 1? *1'iia ?1 Ml: 4" ?rth [l GILE 5 II 11.. . - - . State at Tennessee - Critical Ceuntiee Legend Te'al 11:1. :11 11-.tLeaIt Comma T111111 11:1. Camp-late Gaunt; Lillian?? Damage Damage ?aunt; Helm-1111 Madame Damage Damage Hallway EIIHIQE D?l'l'l?g? II I 111 La? "Mime Segment Damage Curr-:1" 1:1 1:1 Lana 1:1 1:1 1:1 Cheamam 1:1 1:1 1:1 Lauderdale 1:1 1:1 1:1 11 Hi Llnliltel Che-tar 1:1 1:1 1:1 Lawrence 1:1 1:1 Un?gly A1 L335 0131111111 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 12111-111111 2:1 1:1 1:1 1111;11:1111 1:1 1:1 1:1 Maderate Likelihacd 1:111:11 1:1 1:1 1:1 Hhur" a 1:1 1:1 - - 1111-11- 1 I1I 3 win- :1 3 2 11111111311.? Maderate 11113111131311 E- -:riti1:a C1:1untiea 36$ 3 3 ?IeIr'rIf-I 3 121111231 Region Ema en 2 1:1 1:1 ant- 2 1:1 1:1 - - 1:1 1:1 1:1 ?lielIiIzr,? :7 1:1 1:1 HIEIglIle-l Hardln Eri?eal eeuntiee are theae 1hat experienee 1he greateat I phat-ability ef read'ning the damage state. mgtr'?" '3 '3 '3 Ham? '3 '3 Fer de?nitiena 1:1f 'Eemplete' and Leaat l'11'l1:1delateHeh?nn 3 3' 3 damage atates please caneult the attaehed deeJrnent. 111.111.1511. ,3 ,3 Fee 1111115 Mid-America Earthquake Ilitanter LII .11: unaiwiampagi. USP PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell ?li'l'li'l-HJE'TE' EIZII. El]?r Railway Bridge Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Ml? Event Marsh EDDE FMETTE HsenEmsn rm: 4 lFt?f Hash Iii} scares - run-F'- GRUHDT .El? Fill "a Elf-1H State at Tennessee - Critical Ceunties IZIT 'Ihtsl IZIT Esnten Carr?ll 'Jllilltlill Crash-art Eli": [yer Fay-3113 Glisten Glls- Hardin I-Isnr; HZI. IZIT Tetsl HZI. IZIT II Fa Hun pm}: lels Lsuds Lawrence stli raw,- his Hair,- Mange-m sr'; an'; Eds-amen shalt-y TIpt-n seam-a3- ten w?c-c-DLiIJc-DIJc-wc-D?c-D? Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest First-ability ef read'ning the damage state. Fer de?nitiens sf 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'lzndelate' damage states please esnsult the attaehed deeJrnent. Legend Railway Bridge Funetienality Resin? Day 1 :IMiddle Heg? an I Nen-Funetianal Region 1r Funetianal Risers Interstates - 3ritiea I3 aunties US Heutn? 12.5 25 5] T5 his 1i? Mid-America Earthquake Ilitanter LII at USP .all'l I 3. I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Seheel Damage - New Madrid Seiemie Zane: Event l? FE eElillirI' ameey. euEfer E1 . git 2-3- magma" '31 43mm 'MTHE HA .. wane?? '51 pm: State at Tennessee - Critical Ceuntiee Legend TIZITFII HIZI. IZIT 111T LIMIT HIZI. IZIT it Llil?l?t Gaunt," Made-rat; Damage age Gaunt; Majerate Eanlage Eanlage an] ?g .3 El liarrell la la a Lake a I At Wl? Ellt?ret?at I5 Lauder-dale IEI IEI IEI er ES Che-tar II Lawrence la a Heutee gm]? 113:5 3 i i} Mederate Likeliheed Hegian [?3an In; a jg, a Highly Hegien Ey-ar mnuomarCEll?tall'l '3lt'1'3'rl 2 2 5 I I I-hardeman melt-'3' '3 J. I Eri?eal eeuntiee are 1hat experienee 1he greateet 3 3 3 print-ability ef read'ning the damage state. ma?a-an :3 l: 3 ma?a? :2 Far de?nitiene at 'C-z-rnplete' and 'Pt Leaet hu'ledemte' 125 25 3'5 In 'at-nllemJien 5.. damage etatee please eeneult the attaehed deeJrnent. H?umn 3 ,3 Fee 3335 Mid-America Earthquake ISenter LII at unmiwlanupagi. USP PM I 3. I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Seheel Functionality - New Madrid Seismie Zene: Event EImftIe NEITHE Farm?E MC aleState at Tennessee - Ceuntles Legend He. at FLne?eml Teal He. at He. at FlIne?cnal Tetsl He at SWEET entm In Hunphraxu 9 In HIST [my 1 Hegien IE 3 . Cheamam IS IS Lauder-?le .- Nun?Fundinnal :Ea? Eli-?tar I I Lawrence Is - -'J'et:Hett a 7 FLInetIeral 3:5 3:.5 Ian u, Rivers I Mae-,- :3 is Ia g Methlr?,? I: ers 3 es 53 5'3 =Eritiea I: aunties Payers I I Glhlen Par; U3 II I I I Ell I-hr-zlln 3 IS 3 1 eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest phat-ability ef reaching the damage state. m'I'Jtr'D? '3 '3 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least l'u'ledelate' 135 25 :5 ?cl-EM? :3 :3 ?76 damage states please eensuit the attaehed deeJment. 5 5 FEIH Mid-America Earthquake ISanter LII LInIaIa-ciampagi. USP PM I 3. PrdeetF' I'll Ell-Ell 5-H Waste Water System Damage - New Madrid Seismie Zane: Event Marchsees biennium: ill-ii 5 - .EHIIEID ll. HT FEH 'h ER 51:! I II - - we ?Rm? E1 In h. . Rene LIH ?kw-5 State ef Tennessee - Critical Ceunties Legend Twill?" UT I Fm Emmi- 1Il?llaste Water Faeilitj?r Damage nu era magn- mege - LII el- ere magna- magnLam.? 5' 3' c. Waste Water DIstthIItIe-n LInes 5'55?? 5 5 5 Maderate Likelihaad . Enema-I en a mall-an :s :s . . ?fl'?hs Eeen'ur I: a a new; as a a .- leele - Elel-Ien la a h'lellelr'; In a a Certain Eye-r :e :e Mengemer" Fay-ante Is Is a -Il:-len :l :l -:rrtleal I:eLIntIes - 150 sun-IEllen: 5 a Hangman 5 a HWEE 15'] - l-hrdeman la 9 a Interstateg - '5 Eri?eal eeunties are these 1hat experienee 1he greatest HDLIIES :5 35 1:5 35 3 print-ability ef read'ning the damage state. :ndenan 3 Elm?" 3'3 LEE 3 Far de?nitiens ef 'Eemplete' and Least hn'lzndelate' 135 25 :5 Henl-Irern .3 "Mis?ts-I ,1 a damage states please censult the attaehed deeJment. ,3 ,3 Fee MPesTsseessnnEHTTeen-Immense" WE Mid-America Earthquake Il'Jenter LII L'erere at LlneaIa-clampagi. U35 I 3. PrdeetF' I'll Ell-Ell 5-H 911 Appendix IX: Comparison with CUSEC Earthquake Impact Assessment The purpose of this appendix is to provide comparative data points for the main analysis, and to verify that consistent results are being obtained in the Central US regions when undertaken by different groups. Moreover, the CUSEC analyses were used in the SONS07 workshops. Providing comparisons between CUSEC and the MAE CenterGeorge Washington University study is necessary for the calibration of response measures intended to be employed by agencies involved in both SONS07 and the current FEMA-lead effort. All scenarios in this appendix employ the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) southwest segment event. Liquefaction susceptibility data was included in this analysis, though all other impact assessment parameters remained at the default setting within the program. No scenarios were completed for the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone or the East Tennessee Seismic Zone earthquakes. As a result, no comparisons are made with the scenarios completed by the MAE Center in the investigation presented in the main body of the report. All scenarios discussed in this appendix refer to the NMSZ southwest segment event and results are shown for the critical counties only since the CUSEC analyses only include the areas identified as critical counties in this study. Alabama MAEC CUSEC Table 1: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Alabama Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 227,442 13,052 2,856 63 0 223,226 14,228 5,502 437 26 Total # of Beds MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC 2,624 2,254 Table 2: Hospital Functionality for the State of Alabama Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 2,134 81.3 2,142 81.6 2,492 95.0 2,620 99.8 1,821 80.8 1,826 81.0 2,080 92.3 2,238 99.3 Table 3: Households without Potable Water for the State of Alabama # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 248,471 0 0 0 0 248,471 0 0 0 0 Total 243,419 243,419 Day 90 # of % Beds 2,621 99.9 2,243 99.5 At day 90 0 0 Table 4: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Alabama # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 7 0 0 7 0 0 912 Table 5: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Alabama Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC 20,629 33,222 152 112 37 28 Table 6: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Alabama # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 248,471 0 0 0 0 0 248,471 0 0 0 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 7: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Alabama # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 63 3 0 42 1 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 8: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Alabama Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 12,378 121 30 19,933 88 22 MAEC CUSEC Table 9: Damage to Highway Bridges # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage 2,366 18 1,935 13 Complete Damage 1 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 10: Debris Summary Report for the State of Alabama Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 32.7 12.2 45.0 53.0 26.0 78.0 MAEC CUSEC Table 11: Shelter Requirements for the State of Alabama No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 27 5 89 25 Table 12: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Alabama Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury - (Severe Injury- Level IV (Minor (Fatality) Delayed Immediate Injury) Attention) Attention) MAEC (5PM) CUSEC (2AM) 29 64 1 7 0 0 913 0 1 Total Casualties 30 72 System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Table 13: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Alabama MAEC CUSEC $264,939,000 $129,322,000 $19,734,000 $9,340,000 $175,662,000 $28,514,000 $460,335,000 $167,176,000 Arkansas MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 14: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Arkansas Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 368,648 83,427 41,327 18,332 50,159 359,205 84,171 49,306 16,428 52,796 Total # of Beds 7,222 6,979 Table 15: Hospital Functionality for the State of Arkansas Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 3,101 42.9 3,130 43.3 4,395 60.9 5,719 79.2 3,246 46.5 3,268 46.8 4,175 59.8 5,515 79.0 Table 16: Households without Potable Water for the State of Arkansas # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 519,225 175,565 174,382 171,216 132,671 519,225 176,151 175,059 172,140 134,692 Total 561,893 561,906 Day 90 # of % Beds 5,978 82.8 5,850 83.8 At day 90 79,736 92,600 MAEC CUSEC Table 17: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Arkansas # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 31 7 1 31 6 1 MAEC CUSEC Table 18: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Arkansas Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 85,192 19,309 29,673 85,195 19,983 32,239 MAEC CUSEC Table 19: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Arkansas # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 519,225 95,309 68,562 39,397 13,540 113 519,225 96,438 70,923 42,544 15,291 112 Table 20: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Arkansas # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage MAEC CUSEC 229 229 90 90 914 23 24 MAEC CUSEC Table 21: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Arkansas Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 51,117 15,267 23,467 51,117 15,805 25,498 MAEC CUSEC Table 22: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Arkansas # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 2,883 775 512 2,879 287 167 MAEC CUSEC Table 23: Debris Summary Report for the State of Arkansas Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 3,361 3,708 7,069 3,526 3,624 7,150 MAEC CUSEC Table 24: Shelter Requirements for the State of Arkansas No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 126,987 37,244 47,694 13,865 MAEC (2AM) CUSEC (2AM) System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Table 25: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Arkansas Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) 8,883 2,648 409 742 10,847 2,963 330 612 Total Casualties 12,682 14,751 Table 26: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Arkansas MAEC CUSEC $12,533,364,000 $11,681,053,000 $1,946,586,000 $1,977,353,000 $3,794,526,000 $4,142,127,000 $18,274,476,000 $17,800,533,000 Illinois MAEC CUSEC Table 27: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Illinois Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 352,043 48,140 20,321 5,711 16,857 402,264 24,818 10,204 1,521 4,267 915 Total 443,072 443,074 MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Total # of Beds 6,814 5,796 Table 28: Hospital Functionality for the State of Illinois Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 4,202 61.7 4,224 62.0 5,186 76.1 6,113 89.7 4,782 82.5 4,793 82.7 5,212 89.9 5,577 96.2 Day 90 # of % Beds 6,312 92.6 5,639 97.3 Table 29: Households without Potable Water for the State of Illinois # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 524,859 69,661 48,146 24,347 6,672 524,859 20,357 17,003 10,781 0 At day 90 76 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 30: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Illinois # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 74 18 3 74 3 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 31: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Illinois Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 79,646 4,857 5,243 79,646 610 1,491 Table 32: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Illinois MAEC CUSEC # of Households 524,859 524,859 At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 69,641 0 48,139 0 24,340 0 6,678 0 83 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 33: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Illinois # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 2,221 642 78 300 18 1 MAEC CUSEC Table 34: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Illinois Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 47,788 3,842 4,147 47,788 483 1,179 MAEC CUSEC Table 35: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Illinois # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 6,554 432 242 6,554 106 57 Table 36: Debris Summary Report for the State of Illinois MAEC CUSEC Brick, Wood & Others (Thousands of Tons) Concrete & Steel (Thousands of Tons) Total (Thousands of Tons) 1,214 385 1,143 285 2,358 669 916 Table 37: Shelter Requirements for the State of Illinois No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 51,381 14,706 5,042 1,376 MAEC CUSEC Table 38: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Illinois Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) Total Casualties MAEC (2AM) 4,478 1,236 146 276 6,136 CUSEC (2AM) 1,074 277 30 56 1,438 System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Table 39: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Illinois MAEC CUSEC $4,868,224,000 $1,246,257,000 $841,922,000 $267,402,000 $25,372,048,000 $678,455,000 $31,082,194,000 $2,192,114,000 Indiana MAEC CUSEC Table 40: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Indiana Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 141,978 14,010 3,281 135 1 147,672 8,063 2,901 377 401 Total 159,414 159,414 Table 41: Hospital Functionality for the State of Indiana Total # of Beds Day 1 # of % Beds 1,347 64.1 1,720 85.5 Day 3 # of % Beds 1,354 64.4 1,724 85.7 Day 7 # of % Beds 1,690 80.4 1,867 92.8 Day 30 # of % Beds 1,995 95.0 1,984 98.6 MAEC CUSEC 2,101 2,012 MAEC CUSEC Table 42: Households without Potable Water for the State of Indiana # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 188,251 44,112 34,801 11,073 0 188,251 2 0 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Day 90 # of % Beds 2,009 95.6 1,998 99.3 At day 90 0 0 Table 43: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Indiana # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 16 1 0 16 0 0 917 MAEC CUSEC Table 44: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Indiana Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 22,653 221 597 22,654 74 49 MAEC CUSEC Table 45: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Indiana # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 188,251 0 0 0 0 0 188,251 0 0 0 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 46: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Indiana # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 52 3 0 52 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 47: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Indiana Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 13,594 172 469 13,592 59 39 MAEC CUSEC Table 48: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Indiana # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 2,214 76 14 2,214 2 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 49: Debris Summary Report for the State of Indiana Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 107.3 64.7 172.0 98.0 59.0 158.0 MAEC CUSEC Table 50: Shelter Requirements for the State of Indiana No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 52 13 549 141 MAEC (5PM) CUSEC (2AM) System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Table 51: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Indiana Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) 57 12 12 2 143 31 3 6 Total Casualties Table 52: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Indiana MAEC CUSEC $348,068,000 $230,130,000 $69,853,000 $20,278,000 $430,017,000 $34,521,000 $847,938,000 $284,929,000 918 84 183 Kentucky MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 53: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Kentucky Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 135,946 27,878 32,403 17,297 28,891 179,147 25,914 14,468 5,203 17,618 Total # of Beds 3,312 3,112 Table 54: Hospital Functionality for the State of Kentucky Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 1,314 39.7 1,323 39.9 1,685 50.9 2,131 64.3 2,155 69.2 2,162 69.5 2,408 77.4 2,708 87.0 Total 242,337 242,350 Day 90 # of % Beds 2,271 68.6 2,792 89.7 MAEC CUSEC Table 55: Households without Potable Water for the State of Kentucky # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 256,132 80,808 65,328 39,301 14,371 253,853 75,168 71,778 64,250 14,039 MAEC CUSEC Table 56: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Kentucky # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 36 14 2 36 4 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 57: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Kentucky Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 35,884 7,351 7,116 35,884 1,757 4,728 MAEC CUSEC Table 58: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Kentucky # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 256,132 51,079 37,329 20,113 5,613 58 253,853 7,333 4,590 2,174 700 9 At day 90 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 59: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Kentucky # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 1,561 661 170 93 17 2 MAEC CUSEC Table 60: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Kentucky Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 21,532 5,813 5,631 21,530 1,390 3,740 919 Table 61: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Kentucky # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 2,173 368 203 2,082 132 82 MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 62: Debris Summary Report for the State of Kentucky Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 2,136 2,337 4,473 1,100 1,144 2,244 MAEC CUSEC Table 63: Shelter Requirements for the State of Kentucky No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 52,964 13,904 18,168 4,925 MAEC (2PM) CUSEC (2AM) Table 64: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Kentucky Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor - Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) 6,722 2,051 318 593 3,463 932 96 176 System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Total Casualties 12,584 4,667 Table 65: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Kentucky MAEC CUSEC $9,221,413,000 $4,218,542,000 $990,682,000 $880,577,000 $23,302,503,000 $716,440,000 $33,524,598,000 $5,815,559,000 Mississippi MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 66: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Mississippi Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 167,551 61,934 23,844 11,399 7,300 166,536 52,522 28,283 8,342 16,362 Total # of Beds 2,659 3,312 Table 67: Hospital Functionality for the State of Mississippi Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 779 29.3 790 29.7 1,272 47.8 1,959 73.7 1,314 39.7 1,326 40.0 1,778 53.7 2,547 76.9 920 Total 272,027 272,045 Day 90 # of % Beds 2,174 81.8 2,798 84.5 MAEC CUSEC Table 68: Households without Potable Water for the State of Mississippi # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 275,342 41,790 40,256 39,752 28,749 275,342 62,670 61,956 59,729 35,492 MAEC CUSEC Table 69: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Mississippi # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 3 1 0 3 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 70: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Mississippi Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 31,053 2,448 2,566 50,006 2,223 4,093 MAEC CUSEC Table 71: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Mississippi # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 275,342 32,601 18,416 6,452 1,276 44 275,342 8,685 4,944 2,011 607 12 At day 90 0 0 MAEC CUSEC Table 72: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Mississippi # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 630 176 8 116 20 1 MAEC CUSEC Table 73: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Mississippi Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 30,007 1,935 2,030 30,004 1,758 3,237 MAEC CUSEC Table 74: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Mississippi # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 5,043 300 100 4,032 233 122 MAEC CUSEC Table 75: Debris Summary Report for the State of Mississippi Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 905 1,288 2,193 1,166 1,259 2,425 MAEC CUSEC Table 76: Shelter Requirements for the State of Mississippi No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 20,832 5,555 15,086 3,926 921 MAEC (2PM) CUSEC (2AM) Table 77: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Mississippi Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor - Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) 2,036 474 45 86 3,484 878 81 145 Total Casualties 2,646 4,588 Table 78: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Mississippi System MAEC CUSEC Buildings $3,591,980,000 $4,213,844,000 Transportation $224,612,000 $321,705,000 Utility $4,659,756,000 $580,516,000 Total $8,476,348,000 $5,116,065,000 Missouri MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 79: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Missouri Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 780,084 81,136 32,675 13,456 36,889 831,862 59,568 25,692 6,418 20,729 Total # of Beds 15,023 12,648 Table 80: Hospital Functionality for the State of Missouri Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 9,875 65.7 9,926 66.1 11,985 79.8 13,988 93.1 9,826 77.7 9,853 77.9 10,825 85.6 11,767 93.0 Table 81: Households without Potable Water for the State of Missouri # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 1,184,976 146,376 115,385 79,849 77,817 1,184,976 93,066 87,846 78,000 66,313 Total 944,241 944,269 Day 90 # of % Beds 14,164 94.3 11,944 94.4 At day 90 38,425 38,744 MAEC CUSEC Table 82: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Missouri # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 3,413 843 179 52 13 3 MAEC CUSEC Table 83: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Missouri Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 71,169 13,501 20,020 114,598 9,539 17,003 922 MAEC CUSEC Table 84: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Missouri # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 1,184,976 100,141 70,719 39,500 12,957 119 1,184,976 40,254 28,491 16,897 6,326 49 MAEC CUSEC Table 85: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Missouri # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 605 107 21 626 54 11 MAEC CUSEC Table 86: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Missouri Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 42,698 10,674 15,837 68,759 7,544 13,448 MAEC CUSEC Table 87: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Missouri # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 7,803 1,306 879 7,803 800 564 MAEC CUSEC Table 88: Debris Summary Report for the State of Missouri Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 3,171 3,386 6,565 1,750 1,575 3,325 MAEC CUSEC Table 89: Shelter Requirements for the State of Missouri No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 121,927 28,999 25,215 7,292 MAEC (2AM) CUSEC (2AM) System Buildings Transportation Utility Total Table 90: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Missouri Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor Delayed Immediate (Fatality) Injury) Attention) Attention) 11,267 3,177 401 760 5,871 1,614 193 364 Total Casualties 15,605 8,042 Table 91: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Missouri MAEC CUSEC $11,690,440,000 $5,528,119,000 $1,727,420,000 $1,200,249,000 $24,502,340,000 $2,886,090,000 $37,920,200,000 $9,614,458,000 923 Tennessee MAEC CUSEC MAEC CUSEC Table 92: Damage by General Occupancy for the State of Tennessee Green Green Green Yellow Red (None) (Slight) (Moderate) (Extensive) (Complete) 495,284 192,666 131,358 42,367 81,907 609,392 128,847 67,201 22,572 115,591 Total # of Beds 15,351 12,002 Table 93: Hospital Functionality for the State of Tennessee Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 # of # of # of # of % % % % Beds Beds Beds Beds 7,018 45.7 7,053 45.9 8,311 54.1 11,821 77.0 5,566 46.4 5,592 46.6 6,533 54.4 8,299 69.1 Total 943,580 943,603 Day 90 # of % Beds 12,884 83.9 9,093 75.8 MAEC CUSEC Table 94: Households without Potable Water for the State of Tennessee # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 Households 1,041,220 446,873 433,653 408,184 360,565 1,041,220 533,925 531,864 526,080 424,725 MAEC CUSEC Table 95: Damage to Potable Water Facilities for the State of Tennessee # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 30 12 3 30 8 2 MAEC CUSEC Table 96: Damage to Potable Water Pipelines for the State of Tennessee Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 49,280 18,539 12,242 79,354 11,419 24,050 MAEC CUSEC Table 97: Electrical Power System Performance for the State of Tennessee # of At day 1 At day 3 At day 7 At day 30 At day 90 Households 1,041,220 426,576 296,234 146,292 37,714 507 1,041,220 262,730 162,971 76,363 24,269 341 MAEC CUSEC Table 98: Damage to Waste Water Facilities for the State of Tennessee # of Facilities At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 742 366 76 188 70 15 MAEC CUSEC Table 99: Damage to Waste Water Pipelines for the State of Tennessee Length (miles) Total Number of Leaks Total Number of Breaks 29,568 14,662 9,683 47,613 9,032 19,021 924 At day 90 164,784 317,321 MAEC CUSEC Table 100: Damage to Highway Bridges for the State of Tennessee # of Bridges At Least Moderate Damage Complete Damage 3,815 953 567 2,815 674 444 MAEC CUSEC Table 101: Debris Summary Report for the State of Tennessee Brick, Wood & Others Concrete & Steel Total (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) (Thousands of Tons) 8,767 11,846 20,613 7,554 8,282 15,836 MAEC CUSEC Table 102: Shelter Requirements for the State of Tennessee No. of Displaced Residences No. People Needing Short-Term Shelter 262,907 73,293 129,869 36,454 Table 103: Worst Case Casualties for the State of Tennessee Level II Level III Level I (Moderate Injury (Severe Injury Level IV (Minor (Fatality) Delayed Immediate Injury) Attention) Attention) MAEC (2PM) CUSEC (2PM) 31,913 25,692 9,706 7,696 1,544 1,182 2,904 2,183 Total Casualties 46,067 36,752 Table 104: Total Direct Economic Losses for the State of Tennessee System MAEC CUSEC Buildings $40,192,166,000 $30,557,641,000 Transportation $1,645,129,000 $2,181,371,000 Utility $14,221,248,000 $2,941,503,000 Total $56,058,543,000 $35,680,515,000 925 This report is the outcome of one of the largest and most comprehensive earthquake consequence assessment projects funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The report contains earthquake impact assessments for the 8 central US (CUSEC) states. It reports damage and other consequences to the built environment as well as social and economic impacts. The earthquake scenarios used represent the New Madrid, the Wabash Valley and the East Tennessee seismic zones. The analysis employs new and more reliable hazard and inventory data that has not been used before. The work was undertaken in partnership with the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management at the George Washington University, with contributions for the 8 State Geological Surveys, IEM, FEMA, US Geological Survey and the Central US Earthquake Consortium. Mid-America Earthquake Center Report 08-02 Project funded by Federal Emergency Management Agency Managed by US Army Corps of Engineers ERDC-CERL The Mid-America Earthquake Center is a National Science Foundation Engineering Research Center Funded under cooperative agreement reference EEC 97-01785 Director: Amr S. Elnashai Managing Director Timothy Gress Mid-America Earthquake Center