?iln?m? ?xings .


II.-

. - ..
wuhtnu  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. 

I ih?? IVE I Inli a. 

Lil: I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

krillJ?nTable of Contents. . 


Executive Summary I

 

Climate Science

Ovenriew" 1
Historical Record I
Modeling Future Climate .7 15-11
Critical Role of Clouds in ModelsL . - 

 

 

 

 

Other 0f GCMS it: 

Recent Critiques of Global 

Sources and Trends of Greenhofig

Long-Term Scenarios Of Future-I 
Ml
Economic Issues 111- 
1 1
Economic Impact of Climate 
Estimates of the Cost of GHG It.?

Different Kinds of Models for II 
Key Assumption: Polio}r Impl 

 

 


Economic Model .111. I I
DRI Model Results I
EMF satay Results II.
Insights for Policy I 1. I

 

 

Opportunity Costs of GHG 

Policy Analysis i 
International Dimension 11 . 11-
Very Long Time Scales. 1'1 -..--
Criteria for Policy Analyses
Policy 
Scienti?c ResearchI - .

I #11 
Near"Te?n P?lits Iii-1.11.1 - .



International Near-Tenn P111111 113 1 
Future Mitigation 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

[3211?

i 1.:
Carbon Sequestration as a 11. ..
Reforestation as a Future Miuga 1111111; -,

TEChnUlogY cmper?ug? j. 1; 1! 1- .1

Adaptation. . .
Joint Implementation 11111111 1111111 511'



i 03! 

Climate Engineering 

.1 1

 

 


Conclusions and .- -

Appendices .91 1
United Nations Activities 1 .
U.S. I 1i.

Other National and Regional .11:
Bibliography 1i . 1.

?1111 .
.1 1

. 1. -.
.rl:

 

 

 

 

.d


 

 

 

 

 

..11111111' :9


iitiam;. 91- 

 

 

 

ervapor carbon dioxide
natural greenhouse warm-
amounts for about two-

ii greenhouse gases espe-
dro?uorocarbons have
of human activities in
i ?ared emissions will lead

11
1 ge attributable to human

erature is estimated to have
'1'3nge of natural climate

. - temperature changeS

pi man-made greenhouse
~11 1 

reliable forecasts of the
11 tei change:
atmospheric
111111ty are not well under-

 

edback assumptions (for
2' 3,2th warming effects

1'11

1-: 115 into question their

316: not well understood
?i:,3tonnes) of carbon ((310
ii restation) but atmo-
sift yr in the late 19805 The
1 To put these figures in
atmosphere and ma-
5 is estimated to be 190

nQ?mic growth will require
i-z? "5120 be raised in the

 

 

 

 

 

 
    
 
 
 
 
  
     
   
   
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
  
  

 

 

 

 

 

 


developing World one 7 a ..
develop and introduce 
associated canon emis 
of expanding econorInir. T- 

 

 

       

 

 

 

 

 

Climate Change (1P "if: 21" sil
fuels would snore i To

 

II-
II

3 lions af? 
subjective Eiltrapola .5 .1 sresultslin
large increases in . i . Changes: in
technology,Will likely
slow or 13033 lyrI-Long-termp

 

 

 

Economic ostsI 4,

 

 

uncertain du to the {3358101331,
1133101131 01' 1041231 is"? 

Ie 7 IteIch-

 

nologiealI umpvatlo Efforts to sta I 
bene?ts are

 

 

 

 

1- Aceordingt a . 2 ct) would be
reduced by1.% or. if 

mentation W0 ld s. 
$16I/barrel Iii-fl


Lil cost

~11" i I
?1 . ?uon
aunt?s 
- i I. -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i- will impose costs long



'61? so would have a small
a 1 #3111: cost savings

 

I:ol" [geenhouse gas emis?

bl?ms of poor countries
health care and education

g, te' issues will divert interna-
la enda


I

ty', ncertainty about the

1.13141 OH ?es to reduce emissions,
1 elsdales involved.
understanding of climate.

fc sis can be established
steps The potential for
half Century could make a
in the near term even if
0P5 should be constrained.

.14"
Q:

amJl-t 11-1 "r1

ff?;

Eli-i1

 

 

?111315 


art?-

f3"
11:1 .
?5 

4.11.4.1. 11.4
5:

3L Ce and impact

'Of climate Change:

 

V. that improve the
less potential for the

. . ?nomic social and
1- i 11 11 11 ed policy responses.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 




 

 

 

111 1111 3 1116;11:03-
ost obvious
too yearsr is the

2 per year.

I data

- ture has in?
.l'l be attributable

gtoday?s limited

a. ruled out."

   

 

l_I 
- 1T 1?11.4. :2 
1? 

cord could be
trend Natural

01.5 . . - 
. . gcl. .. - .11' ..-
.1 1 1 11.. +1 1. 31:2.lGHG emissions

-since the 18505

115 llate 19705 incli-
ture rise in the

a111t rise is well

1not con?rm a long-

mlerowave mea-

Fglobal geographi-

ctemperature

all31.- 1 111" a V's-141725'?? d?qne' am J??we? 45:.
l1 1 1 111 1'ere are serious
tation of historical

northern hemi?
E. ting effects having

in the southern

i3 reliable for earlier

1?1
1.1.1"
it:
?i

?ti

"d #1111:



ceof warminga
feand Torn Karl) of
Statistically signifi-
or. change in annual
1 while the
1' among the most

:I-p

it

Iss?erm "ti?11'- .

es Page;

it i
IA. 

. . temperature 
I te change and

.
I -E ch? - 
I.

 

 

   
     
  
     

des little guidance concerning potential impacts. For example, as reported

1992, average warming over considerable areas of the continental

I?m Hemisphere in the last few decades is primarily due [0 an increase of

rather than maximum (daytime) temperatures. The his?

.. Ir ,2 ecord also shows significant differences in decadal temperature patterns
3 the Northern and Southern Hemispheres over the past 100 years.

i ore, temperatures in different regions of the Northern Hemisphere, for

f?
than

   
    
    
  
   
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
    
  
  

.E I


?i e, have shown contrasting trends for long periods of time. These ob?



differences were not predicted by current climate models and remain

'r"l


Tun-F

rr

4



In

Ian-I



. ?l 
I - .w





"esFuture Climate Change

. I lions of future climate change and its potential impacts on ecosystems



rely on inherently untestable assumptions about future human

?rewfr





and on results from complex, unvalidated computer models that have
con?rmed capable of predicting climate. These investigations de-
),future emissions of GHGs, (2) resulting changes in atmospheric
. tions, (3) climate effects from such concentration changes, (4) im-
ite change on society and ecosystems, and (5) various feedback
-. in"; Ate from the impacts on ecosystems and society. To date, 211?-
elements interact in nature, each has been handled in separate
Teach contains numerous areas of serious uncertainty and ignoimpacts from human-induced climate change have occurred

.u.r

A.. .. glean. . .
-: w_aly ?have not been proven; observations have not confirmed

Hie from Increases 1n GHGs has occurred, and most dESCI'lpe
rest either on results from unvalidated and seriously incomI?n speculation. To be meaningful, computational models of


l- I 


H,

win-


.157?

?l

. . 
5




3-75



st include reliable descriptions of numerous climate pro-


. 

effects that can either amplify or dampen the direct heat-
.GHGs. With today?s limited theoretical understanding,

I putational capacity, these feedbacks cannot be described or
$51? lyinto models. Feedbacks include, most importantly, pro-

I

NW. ,ith water such as clouds, sea ice, evaporation, precipitation,

. and atmospheric humidity. Yet, based on IPCC and other

. stocused on ,results from massrve three-dimennonal climate
eneral Circulation Models (GCMS). Based on projected

J.

.:-pver the n?prt century, these unvalidated models predict

. . 
5. . ..

..L.. I 
?r .L-.- 

-J--.,



"Ii: -

iltlrapge Of 1.5? to 4.5? with associated climate changes

-- on society and ecosystems. Potential imagricultural crops,

i



in:

 

at?. 
?s A

 

 

 

LT

   

changes in air 7 

.

assessment re- .
long-termamp

reduce thiff - 

even be hen-51:5" ?i 

and is 

Possible 

by 2100 ?its?? 
. . :lhl. if$.31?th



?7143. -.-. 
e- . 'u'c II
. lees i?J? e?diwen
. ?7.3, -:

quency and infe 
change may a .

 

- .

the fre-
  raj; anc} magmtu d6 of

."ecially to evaluate
,g-lsome could
.. . lant growth and



b" the last ice age

Among the

i i _uld displace
31' 635 

I I hen dramatically

I . F: 
. 
II
. ?haikuWigley and
alevel rise

[-93 'irwith a 0
1 4 I- 
1" tip. 
I . .
We. . rise in sea

1 meter rise The
i 111 estimates of
?3?3 ry that occurred

if

t? If?lliO?S 113p
?n?ng,and

- .- ed or dampened

"edbacks amplify

13!: scientific uncer?
plex feedback
apor and clouds

Ii?" OW) could offs?t

 

 

  
   
  
   
   
       
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
    
 
   
 
   
    
   
 
    
   
   
  
     

Critical Role of Clouds in Models

I ClJmate models are used to identify a relatively small warming Eff?ct in the
presence 0f much larger and more uncertain processes. Errors in describing the
. larger PTOCESSBS can easily give misleading warming pf?leC?ons- Radiative
'I?ffects of clouds are far larger, more complex and variable, and uncertain than

?103.6 Of C02, and they have not been incorporated properly in models 0f

1.,

5911'th Climate. Climate effects depend on the cloud WIDE, amounts, height

distribution and other properties, which models must account for at local
.- '3135

Whig-'7' illustrate the importance of clouds, consider the size of various effects of
gases and clouds on the global radiation budgets as esumated from
i'ttit'i??: if and recent satellite observations. Without additional feedback, models

6 that doubling CO2 concentrations increases atmospheric heating by 4

square meter Effects of clouds on current climate are estiltbbe much larger and actually have a net cooling effect. By re?ecting

Niamey are estimated to cool by -44 1112; bY trapping IR they heat the
..I -Mr?re by 31 W/mz. Together these result in net global coolmg of -1 3 

if? els of current climate, cloud effects are often in error by more than
,s ?ve times the magnitude from future warming prolectlons. 'Yet, to
?5 I?e imore difficult and critical goal of how clouds might

-. is

m? as future GHG concentrations change requires filling in significant gaps

- f. . -
l- 

knowledge.

- "it"s


. 


'Ir if



?f2 clouds vary geographically and seasonally, consequences of cloud
in must be evaluated in GCMs, but models do not exist today that can

. 

. .

I .1




?t guidance on possible changes in the amount, vertical distribu-
I nuUOphysical properties of clouds. According to the 1990 IPCC

inn-a, "there is no a priori means of determining the sign of cloud feed-
. ost GCM results in the past have shown that changes in clouds amplify

from increased GHGs. However, these early approximations are



it}: be seriously incomplete. Slight changes in cloud properties easily
jected warming associated with CO2 increases. A study by A. Slingo

E-H's-na-

i -I that radiative forcing associated with doubled CO2 could be offset
til?increases in the amount of low clouds and modest changes in their
.. sical prOperties.2

- i, EIPCC 1992: ?While the treatment of clouds in GCMs is becoming
. a a clear understanding of the consequences of different cloud
'tions has not emerged." Moreover, ?Observational data on the

. . . .- 3-lib. in?: a
Id. ?ll- 

u. 



- il
i: .. concludes that radiative forcing associated with doubled CO 2 could he

 

 




1tirritated relative increases of 1596-2096 in the amount of low clouds, and
{@3595 in liquid water path, and by decreases of 1596-2096 in mean drop
liquid water path refers to the total amount of water in clouds and the

treats to thesize of condensed water droplets in clouds.)

 
 

 

 

 

as": -
- -
I.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- . 

. ?atly;- "Lilli-HIE. 



3'23; if; Earn cum: mrwi Int??mm?
I: .1231.

#5 

 

 

.I.- .. 
ti?'

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.





-.

A 
.1:Dbserva-
5i itWhiCh is

:6 uncer-
5 {tit-ms

:4 fasured in

[agree"damen-

it is

i; I erature
i]

mother
I 31136 at

stems

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GCMs is that they lack adequately validated representations of important 
tors like cloud cover feedback, ocean circulation, and hydrologic interactj ac-
Therefore it is unreasonable to expect the models to provide precise predis-
tions, decades into the future, of global average temperature. This is BSpeciall
so given that the expected global temperature rise is smaller than current 
naturally occurring regional temperature ?uctuations on all time scales, daily
seasonal, and decadal.? I

The report also states: ?In essence there are fewer than two dozen GCM Sirnu-
lation runs with five independent models on which to base conclusions. Every
one incorporates untested and unvalidated hypotheses. They may be sensitive
to changes in ways that current calculations have not yet revealed.?

Results from climate models vary considerably from actual climate data and
from one another. At the scale required to assess potential impacts, compari-
sons must be made at regional gridblock) scales. Estimates from today?s
models, even when tuned to match current climate, differ significantly from
observations for essential factors such as precipitation.

Projections of future climate differ so much across models that they cannot be
used to draw reliable conclusions about potential local impacts. Models do not
even agree on the sign (positive or negative) of future regional changes in
critical climate variables such as precipitation and soil moisture. The standard
disclaimer about the uncertainties in GCMs, as expressed in the 1992 IPCC
assessment, states: there are many uncertainties in our predictions particu-
larly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate
change?

Although the historical record over the last century shows some warming, it
offers little support to confirm greenhouse models because the magnitude and
pattern of change differ significantly from model results. In other words, the
models do not replicate global temperature history, which calls into serious
question their current usefulness in projecting the future. When GCMs are used
to ?backcast?? history, they delineate a pattern of accelerating warming over the
past century. By contrast, the historical record (Chart 1) shows intermittent

- periods of warming (in the 1930s and again in the 19805) and long periods of
little change. The record even shows cooling between the late 1930s through
the late 19703 (during which scientists expressed concern about the coming of
a new ice age), while the models ?backcast? warming.

Attempts to account for the historical variations have led to suggestions that
major volcanic eruptions, changes in oceanic upwelling (such as El Ni?o), and
possible ?uctuations in sunlight, account for some of the variability. More
recent studies suggest that sulfate aerosols from SQ2 emissions-may have offset
greenhouse climate change, especially in the northern hemisphere.


However, efforts to disentangle these possible effects from the historical pattern
are controversial and at best demonstrate plausibfe, not de?nitive-answers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 1; a biomass burning
ontributions from

entrations both
Eindirect effects

 

if" 
111 the Earth?s

is gfiill
1

Itipms of changes in

"1
1? E: r1yd1ffieult to

:5 1'

and marine

Ough photosyn-
and soils. Over
Change pro-

11d seawater

absorbed by cold

1es are known to

?4 weasurements of

 

The 
.. 1 u?ed 1101? 13 11:

gm from the end of
i 6 the middle of
11 1290 parts per

:1
the mid-18005
deforestation

 

corresponds to
dup appears to

.. 1? the ratio of the
pr decrease in the
.. 5 nt increases.
- ?3 total ?ux balance
ieports indicate

?ne fate of the

11

 

 



.. 4 early ceased
have been

i precedent or
entrol atmo-
?anamn

and trends in
if 1111211011

is ncentrations
I i?decompose in
osphenc reser-
1 Bare difficult

    
   
   
   


. .
41.51E1116 new,

I ncentrauon



 

a . .1 .I. 

 


33"?

 

 

CO emissions

 

 

2 cycle. In
ediate emission
i - 1-1; the carbon cycle.
reduced by
?laihze concen-
IPCC finding
5 stabilize CO
els that incor-

.II I 11.1

r'







?:31
I
_i

i 0'5 

jgyearly basis
'tC/yr, pfim?'
per

QI ost carbon-

I

I
I

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1

as emissions

 

 

 

 

. dines over

 

j; .J't rises to 36
over the
eductions

 

 

 

 

40 to 50


j; 1 . Ice base
lead to
t: 1 reviously

L-r- if proved
#1 versal of
c; 1?1" I136 at a

Silons.

1

. History
GM of

 

1H



 

.

. 



 

 

- ilarge
- I 11
.I- 
king?

uld be for

 

_r-uur

1111.116 other
1 615' such



pollcy?
that they
?es1lS related
In the
lfuels it

6 next


 
  
   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 




When projeCting 50 years or more into :thlagfu 
the production and use of energy should the - {cu
sumptuous to speculate about the cost, p?tf? . 
energy technologies not yet invented. . at ..
dramatically lower the cost of solar phOt,   - -
world have to turn to oil shale, tar sands 
more carbon-intensive than current sour-ti i .
conventional sources of fossil fuels (1 .:

ity or cold fusion or something unimgiljti 
landscape? Will technologies advance all 

energy conversion processes, in effect itu?ll'lq.=v-44 a -.-. 144 A,

   
  
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 

I mar-awarr-h? - . A. 

Hams-?mm?u-?-carbon-intensive in some uses? Forecasts, [7 i, 
just such speculation about longetenn to .5: c: 
long-term emissions, and those forecasts-?l1 .. 
much emission reductions are needed .

1.. 
-. amuse-1?? I- 




 
 
 

 
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
  

Suppose it were 1893 instead (if-H.993 ,7 
use a century into the future. A??that ,2 if; TEE: . 
source worldwide. Diesel engines, .3in 11-: .
satellites and microchips were tihkno I
fuel use and economic growth 2 '5 - 314-
have been largely useless in forecas 
Over the past century, our capaliilities
proved, but our balls stillfeanno .. ..
scienti?c insights and technolo 1 br 4 . l: - its?

mass .,
try-12.1?" 1' ail-:15; A I ltd; I in 
.. -?unlm arm Iii?z ?t?n I'll-"lr--.. . .r . H- 5'
?.111illnl-Iu . -

   

antis? Sahib

Hi

16 

 

 

 

 

 





 

 

 

11' 1 1e estimates of (1)
:3 without actions
1 1 constraining



11

tial global climate
I 1131111113 GHG emis-

1-..,

"ll-IL. .m?mku A

i

long period of
- ?:ng constraints today

 

433?: change With 1'6-
11d cooling, health
:1pollution and
. changes in
1 ables such as sea-
rates soil moisture
5 (1ng impacts on
1 sectors Because

1 quantifications of
11 elves highly specu-

11 magmtude and also
11a the pace of natural
3111.13 hampered not
1311? forecasts of change

?23 ut also by the
ecosystems to long-
es to changes in
?an selenu?c knowledge
til fl
:eji' 
11! 11W by William
11? ?irojected that the
1 :es from a doubling
1-1 of GDP per year. To
1" nous costs of
1 dent on unreliable
1: climate variables

     

i: 

..1L

1



  
  
   
     
   
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
      
 

"l

 

Sea levels, however, would be affected primarily on a [Jew ji- i regional
climate forecasts would not be as critical to calculate 21:? 2. course,
the inability of GCMs to forecast the magnitude and global scale also limits the ability to estimate the o"
Several studies have made an assumption about sea 1e 22.2! -
2100 is most common) and then calculated the cost ofw I9

?t ?i It.
levees and the value of lost wetlands and ?ooded dry 2 9?

According to Morgenstern (1990), EPA estimates that? 
cost of a 1 meter sea level rise would be around . 2 Iase on

$370 billion in future capital, maintenance and'ope . . ted With

a .3 percent rate). Cline (1992) points out that 
take into account the long phase?in of capital outlay 2, 2 I. 
he estimates the cost at about $7 billion per year (165259. ?W?s
GDP).

2





In a 1991 study for the OECD, Rijsberman estimate .
would cost OECD countries about $800 billion (un :22
century in terms of lost wetlands and beaches, ti
tional infrastructure around 0.1% of aggregate 
tho-ugh the United States and OECD estimateS-fare n? 
because of different assumptions about the amalg-
of discounting, the important point is that thegfutut's- 

i
u, 
Ill-

    
 
   
   
   
 
        
 
   
  
  
 
  
     
 
 
 
 



9d. the use
.I. 
sea level
rise would be a small fraction of 1 percent ofiannuw?: "tronsre-a'reas
9 1 ,2 
from .2
cos of 
ould coat
stand .9
'on 

Certain island nations and countries 
would suffer much larger economic harm, ?13
1 meter rise in ocean levels. For example,
erecting protective structures in the event of a? 1 me,
the Maldives about one-third of its GDP annually. 9' .
Bangladesh?s arable land would be inundated, EPA {92*
peeple would be displaced in China from a 1?"2111?t?2
sence of protective structures. According to 922 1+
the former Soviet Union would be less affectefl .2319?:
.

2.: 

-. 1 5. 

    
  

  
 
 

cause the timing and magnitude of sea?leveli.esi .

The variance in the estimates of the COSt?using today?s GCMs. Thus, discounted cost
Cline?s, which depend on the timing of the



as discussed above, the current thinking substantially less than 1 meter for a doubi sf . 99

result in significantly lower economic 

II--
9tThe cllmate of economies cania 99The d1scuss1on that follows builds on tpei 999 .
tions, especially market-based 

     

.

'9 91.:
I'g.

 

 



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policies over very lo
ma eroeconomic disru
quickly and focus 0
employment ecdno3 
have more detailed 3  .-

ing a wide rang?3333:13413 .



-
- gigs:

gnomes adjust
011 the full-
iodels often
4?4 demand includ-
.2 nonuc models



  

?9
?11
. ?4 -.. .

3333.111 

Over very long I I 33 '4 3 less importance
than the dampe .4 - economic
growth rates: 411%? lhave to live
through the 8110 4 de?
valuations etc 5 33 . .2 .. ted with
emission cons 2? 3m I, could take
years Families 4 '4 4444 4: to accept
potentially scve 2.4.5 eases (such
as climate C113 
especially unlt
Key Assumpti .. 

. ?tl?44 esignecl t0
:4 to mini-
3 erally employ
Iceded to
a? a 41363 in model-
?based on the
4 these en-
1 cost
3? the impact
cy standards

g' 
4 

Essa?2
-: 231414:: .
'I-s 43154-. 2'3. - -:
41 

37::334'l' 


- w" 4 
.. 

required to4
of when
for hUndIi? .

"'i's'tent with
king in the
4: 3 6137 be 
erably more I: .3 I: filed

The assump :44 

Paid and ill 3.1421 nner as a

3 . .
carbon tax - 33 a 2:22.24: for 
ment 131211111444 5 4444 4 ll influence
3? 
I

 

21

 

  
   
   
   

Table
Garbo Tax1F
(1992 -

Cou

 

Unite I States

Canaua

3133 

Aust 'I.-: 4.444. .444
-. 'l 7 I: - .- T. ?wag-IfAItaly
Unite I Kingdom

-n



a)
I






Neth lands

-


(311261

Emissfo . Major OECD

"ii-Iii.




E?m 
a 4 ..
3115?. it; i

1 Assum 5 each ceuntry 
reduces missions to 10%1es



    
  
  

'1

?t

'th

A .

afar"

Nate: IP price de?ater use};

A 3' E3
a I 

Seurce: IRI/McGraw?Hill, Ea 4;
?3 ?jam - 

t'e . 
I. .4 - 
i 'Ilr
.lFl 35$" I 1.4}

  
  
       
    
 

allars per tonne carbo?

1?

 

 

 

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i
-.044 hang"mic4:323.? .I weJay wafers:
. - .: 

Jr
a"

#?Fi .. ?1!le ?you: at," 

a. 

 

  

ted States energy use
.4 and 25% between

italc! have to be cut C/r. in
V6 to be reduced by
the 1938 level of emis-
. .l I I
I
would be necessary to
. - .and that the tax would
20% below 1988 levels.
S16/barrel or 
.. A. and coal prices by
trillion/year at the

.


- 'r
:x

err-r 

1m? 

.motor fuels tax in

ff; 34/t0nr1e on all

a as to be achieved
fuels tax would

f. 

I a} 
. -. 

'u fin-h." 


. . '7-3 and coal the most,

pewhat less than
1 and coal prices by
. States oil con-
tain east and coal usage
l? to the DRI base
351.9031 consumption

tuna larger percentage of
i .1 share of energy and,
affects natural

'1

. r;
is.?

If?? in. the U?jl?d 

Ed would be cut b)

E. .u 0 period natural
gglven the projected


1

in

have grown O. 
the projected
to growth

 

  
  
 
 
 
  

 



 

DRI results show that the economic impact is ,3 
by 2010 and a 20% cut by ZOZOswould be ?3 3 
States than in other key OECD nations (sees-1M 3% iffnnual percent-
age loss of GDP in the United States for 7? -'ce as great as
the annual percentage GDP loss mJapanla - Germany
United States losses as a share of GDP w9 3, er than the
average OECD nation. Yet as seen in Table .i .- ,3 HS, in general,
would have to enact even higher carbo 31?14; 5? ET .2. Emu-3d States to
achieve the DRI emission constraints: I- - 

less that .33:

Sweden, Japan and France losei '1
carbon taxes because they hav the gre '13"
Sweden is expected to reduce xports .13
electric needs at home and to' 33:1 ash r,
carbon taxes is projected to sp is
and to increase the role of nucl ar f3 3' .
of nu clear-based electricity to ee 
natural gas already plays a mor 
States than most OECD countri?
natural gas are fewer Political 

 

    
   
   
  

    

  
  
 

.- -
esface of stiff
sUbstitution.
order to meet

a ition Of
3' substanua?y

. 'Educe exports
Is :parison,

_h'the United

      
  
 

1?1.

.

1-3} - 

. :35 3?1} . . ,i
1-.has! qu'mh-th.5. six_mfmhnomic impa ct on Germs ny re ts 
tion options than in the Unite ?35 'i
economy is projected to be 

    
  
 
   
 
 
    
   
   
   
 
 
 
  
 

*m-v
.. 

. 
.. h- 



EMF Study Results 1 

Although each model in the _i  
EPA and DOE, builds in the 1n 3 3 .
ued increases in energy efficie Cle .. :7 

government intervention woul I 3 j; ,""ns*6to 1990
levels or below There are no}: T, i 5
that would make stabilization 3 .37" -75 . . 
study, stabilization of United I i" calm GDP
losses of 0.1% to 0 5% per yea' -- . 1- i 
levels in 2010 would cost be? 3
into perspective a 0. 3% GDP 1"
1992$) and 3 GDP reduction: 33;:
b1ll1on/ year Cumulative costs-?E 
found that a 20% reduction is"
taxes ranging between $50/t. 

I .

The estimates of the EMF 1n '13 32;;
cost estimates because of a Li' - 
degree of substitutability?m i'i'sts, 
the ability to substitute 

model most of the EMF mode lf??Ct that C05
-1 l? 
I.

. 3.2- 
'5 . Nani-I517 1-1-1


I

  
    

26

 

 

Jaw-ira3-H




111117 51IJ'M-uri- 

aer?? 127.3" -- 
?of '1 

?WHJ-fm'l? "ii-"r MUTW. Iii?111: 7-1.[fr


231-1.! 3'11r-..-II J?rfh

itf"? 

1 .IF-21. 4.1_ .
.1

?in: 'r 11151-1

- I'm-1. 1 .1. :31
1,1111 1

i? WK:
. .

.1 21ft I.
1, me"-

    

 
 
  

t.

.71.
.IlqFig-flJr.r

. I .
II . 

11' 2000 or 2010 target are

I:

I
world emissions at
Jovel of world GDP by
1 toda is around $1

be about $3 8 trillion

i

If

11



ted to how far the

the target rather than
1 glcalu innovation is
baseline from in-
*Kl ally moving away from
.1 i get farther and farther
~?Krthe EMF study found
. wwould 2010.

135
?nqeasmg rate with the



i; . =vela would cost 0 2% to

pr 01:0 1.7% of GDP with a

I 


1 ?111

i eted goal by a decade

us but would result in
i" - emarglnal control

I jgast to meeting a target.
i For example Manne

.i1

Lb {gifted (at a 5% real rate)

.?ssions at 1990 levels
ilevels and maintain-
Ve discounted cost to
i onstralnts by 10 and
5% and 40% respec-
Lye emissions over the
111d increase cumulative

11 than the target. in the

'15!
'l

.. v.2 j} ture in order to

 

 

 

 

   
  
  

 

 

f?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xi?-



i
t:
i

fineed. As the

vernent of eco?

{It b6
ii :31 addressed."

diate life-threaten-
uch of the world
Nation. Over one

f. 0f cases of debili-

111'esult of the lack
dren from

i I ate sanitation and

mose local prob-

'1 in: action on a

-ab0ut industrial
that have

1. *17131 

11'.

,7 it? ars in the future are
i Chma India the
f. the developing

T1 ?1;of a possibly more

i ,therwise antici?

i kely to worry

. t;

. same coun-
1111.135 publicized
fie air they breathe,
1 are prepared to

,concentrate on
1 ?110de 1will appear

HG emissions
would be better off
111011 and basic infra?
:11 cems in the future

earls.

.T
I 


 

 

 
 
  
  
  
   
 
    
  

On the environmental front U. S. busmess --
to costly changes mandated by the Clean 

Energy Policy Act of 1992 CERCLA ..
cleanup of DOD and DOE facilities. EPA 1 5 
ronmental regulations will mcrease to 51 5?
3% of GDP (vs $115 billion and 2% of. .i
include the costs of alternate fuel 11131161313: 
1992 the likelihood that Northeastern I I
dards under the recently amended Cl
house-related program. Based on the 
limit year 2000 CO2 emissions to 199011
estimate of $185 billion' 1n omez-re
that year 2000 costs would more than do
The domestic policy agenda is also 
increased private and public 
that would compete with GHG emlss'l.
goals of unproving international com
jobs would be hampered by poltctes
industry (recall projection 1.34" ms amu?tmFtp1.7-111.
. 3 . . 113cc.- .
., 1: . 
?11!
IQ



 

?37qu 1?1.11.4

a! "fab.
ii- 4-1-11 ?was:
11 hill? 
Lii I.
..
Emilie-:1 

f-Hh-J 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 

.- - I 
- 1 nos-r Hansen?tweaks:- ..


. 11.1.1 3' I

- - ll It?I-?t?as? 1. 
?1.911:

half, .
.r f" 



     
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 

We!? Target; 
1"i 1. 4? 
. 

straints). Climate pohcies also would? 
ous policies having to do with power
and agriculture. . 1;






'Ir' 
I Ic?! 


 

A decision to enforce comphance 
date like an entitlements program 4 1
costs or the needs of compettng 1.136!sz -17 i
sions target is even worse thania net'sr i
be implemented largely off-budget :51
indu stry and consumers entire1Y outd l3 
and without annual oversight by Co1 I
between more funds for greenhouse .1.
for medical care or for trammg and
competitiveness. a

NAFTA Russian aid regional; c"
in developing nations are just 
coordinated action On the en
biodiversity forest initiatives a
implemented fully. The reallty f; . 
climate issues will divert inte'fif 
immediate needs

 

 

  
 
  
 
 
 
  

 

 

 

.1- 

 

. 

 

1.. 511%"-

 

1 obal climate

11.71
6 of scientific
conomic and social
ty concerning the

nature of GHG

lag time scales
the last two de-

 

111:5 in one nation or a

in the rest of the

tions were to drive
1 1. Lower oil prices

1

gr 'ssions in other
1 energy intensity

. :11 manufac-
11 I Th6 pOi?t 15

.2111 of emission
ion emiss1ons in

1I .
11 impact of unilateral

1 I I I of significant

1, 1onse however will
*?T'1Iuld have to wrestle

II

11 111mg emission

11

1'alized nations vs
- restation be com-

?1:11 emissions Many a
-- 2 :11sp1'0portionate share
?1 uer nations

1

11 elihood that the

be positive for

iCanada may find

I benefit in their

- I



4-11 :erefore avoids
1 acted to reduce
#1 hkely fail and some

 

 
  
  
  
   

 

type of punishment would have to be imposed on 544; 
1 proposition in the absence of a world governing I I 11: 37'

power.

Van/I Long Time Scales
1T?'hat matters for climate change is cumulative emir- i
. i el? not emissions today or in 2000. Thus the - 14;
king is not the next seven years but the ?rst not necessary to make a policy decisio
4 .r51' years. Policies can be changed as new inf 1
mics and technologies becomes available. w. 144:
yang action until the time when research has a-

a. of less carbon-intensive technologies and 1
4 a ther if action is delayed and science finds -

         
   

 

    
   
 
  
       
      
 
  
   

3:13 [on

 
   
 
   
  
   
  
  
   
    
   
    
     
  
   
   
  
   

    
    

was!

  

?4'iz-A- I:



41 ugly

.I.
an." . - .
. A 


'.gn On the other hand climate changes co
d; reversal if possible at all could take man

 

 

 

m4 I . an.

.4. uterm GHG emission restraints are deemed 
. that capital turnover takes time as do 
., 44-4011 and dissemination of new technologies

1 :1 ted but at a cost. It may be more costly to]
than to achieve a more restrictive taA ..

scarier; sacs

i 
.. I
- w- .I of?'l?
4 .3vault-b;- war} 

AA. -1 :14.I?14. Del;- 51.. I I. ?r .234-.




the costs of taking action now will prece if '2 
the proper discount rate is a critical pa 
the use of discounting is generations 
ys potential climate costs borne by fu . .. .
emission decisions made today. On the ?133; 

 

 

 

i 4 I 
.. 141:1 it: Standards of living and health for them
4r 'LAtely poor ancestors in developing coma 15114and; I

 

- A to invest in high-return endeavOrs 11
trons with more funds to address fu.

lT'

for Policy Analyses

.Jen:11 irange of response options is under ..
4.1-4 1 deciding how to choose among p41) .11..
15"-



0 develop more effective and useful 4 111114

4:1 a evaluate reSponse options and the c? I If

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       
    

 

 

 

  
 

  

?1.1 I 


.I


HA EH15. 

-- . lam-1w." +I??flL 

 

- .. 

i 
31-11mm}. 

  



I?Ir'll

?1

 

 
       
   

. Policies should 5A.. .
that in?uenae tha .-

POHCY analYSis'? si 2'
and environme 2.. 

- Policies should .



?ti

bene?-.-m-?T-?irw?f A .

-
Jul-\-

. - ?rA'ih?etemwgga - 
Amer, ?matter :AAe-z- -4. I. 
'2 A51
tann-

'r -1.- .- I
?II?il?IA-atmw?m a A A, 

ELM I. 

tunHi- ?as?Id
kinkmm?" Eli. 

- gr- Z'Ffa?i 

21

1

 

Ern?r i ?1 . 

pour? l'



huh hug-?maxi









if: 

- - ??libimnh

221's!

 



Fri-*4 9. 

.I-II. I
H.- .4

13-:




end, the fol I
optionspacts.

 

1* current uncer-
Ii Associal, technicalA

 

'42 ent sectors and

an be divided
(11011 to better
te Change 0n
reduce emis-
captured
?0perati0r1 t0

$.11
gies 

st [0 climate

Ops 01' building

te modi?ca-
te in ordLI In

I 2 fore procect ling

3! make eco?

ble to answer
is HELL S-

Li trypes of

1' in the arena (21?

 

 

 
  

      

I .
lemma-111g 0f
. Of the C011-



- United! States

- th??jlished an inter?
ed at: (1)

-und?rstand-

 
  
 
 
 

2-.-

Emil-e

  
 
 

    

estab?shing long?term monitoring of dimat
c?rnate processes c?mate modeling, and?; II:
sequences of climate change for society

    
  
  

    

     
     
 


II:
HIE
'l

 

 

 
 
   

 

 

In the quality and extent of Its research on I.
has provided global leadership The S. .
gIOb?l change research I) 1.: Ill";
gathering data to documenI global climay



forecast global
ing of key global c?mate processes; WI 
and regional climate and environmental PW ding an 01130

ing assessment of scienti?c knowledgeand . pp 637- I

te research
id ?scal year
.- . de spending on

I Il?t long-term

I. ?l These Include
1 te (Ibsewing
Hi These pro-
rim they repuire

es has be-I a major
.33

 
    

      

   
  

  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 

 

  
  
 
 

 

The government has spent over $5 I ..
since 1990 and an additional 8 
1995. The United States provides more
global c?mate research

 
   

 

 

The scienti?c community has proposed p; s. -
studies aimed at fundamental issues rela 
the International Geosphere Biosphere? 
System, and the World Climate Resea
grams will require many years to mp1 112i 
funding principally from national agent: I 2.. I .
supporter of these international men. . HI .enco
other countries to contribute toandp . 5-. ?3 at? effo



 

 

    
 
  
 

 

 
      
    
     
    

  

   

 

   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 

     
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  

 
 

 

 

 

 

- 7; for s-Irce re-
norm In: 11y-

?1335 fl 6 p0t??r
gro of

nI-t?ij?ts; ommen-
f. 10W 

. I. 1 and: pend

 

Because of scienti?c uncertainty :g . *3
sources the U. government shI- .. 
iusti?ed mimgation strategyi as th 
tial proble of climate change. I: I i3:: 
GHG emiinons and at the sa ?jf
surate with its costs. These I
bees; 5116113 strategy does if 
nothing. i II I. I j. 
Sustained research and dew-?an-free
energy, for energy Ef?cien?f 7 .   ..
6mm? Weld .IA re-
search and deve10prnent03: i . I I
needed because major . ..
for example) do not appea . 
base such a research pro_ VI
a?ons 

 
  

 

 

 

- tie 
3?1; 4-. 

- 94.-.. 4.4.-
. I
?Ia-a. 

..
HI
0

34

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A number of costgr1
management progm ii
cost?effective ef?oie 1
can provide a relativ 

it
providing the ad 1 
older less ef?eient 

Initiatives to irnp .1
by market forces 11
derived from 1

edge of speci?c; a:

preach is Hearth?


31 
carbon fuels fo 
Act of 1992 ii 
most of Wthlil g: .. 
opportunity 
f0r eleeHic .

and 1? . 1,21

I
,[Ml?ll I 11 . 11




_glt .
.-. I 

1 'El-?-ig 

. a: "If: lair? .

4- 1 items:
.
. i511II..
. . ~31:4naturali 1  
adiust to tiles
even more .1:

 

 

 

 

. Demand side

jig can lead to

i .iOf Old vehicles
.e pollution while
new cars for

   


i

1.3-1? When driven
provements are
cc and knowl-

- tUtion of low-

's Energy Policy

j? er providers
EFntuziuld provide

fossil fuels
4 safety, waste

all.

"legislation that
a "ents Of1990,

iof nitrogen
a Jade emissions

i" utilities use

g: mien time to
to force
ii.
Svper year ov er
i of the
total volume of


i.




i
i

US. economic
g: earlier retire-
and savings

2- til-i

- ii  .

:Jl =5
aucratically

Fineed to
. Enid be accom-

 

 

 

 

#v.will. flu. .1P fairlm? 

 

 

 




 

 

 

-. ragrs:- fast-"ab '3 




. GHG emis-
buld not be

sessment of

 

?the magnitude

9 transforma-
ar-term costs
the future costs

5_ i I
ould have a
expanmon of

land drastic
and
:3 it": .. 1.- tablishes that
i fits of the



. ination and



tghat emit less
2* sources

i
{a futuristic

5 portant to

if fossil fuels

32 I sit Ud? 

nfacilities
ther prod-
3 salt domes
;echnolog1es
out to be
tau unproven
'5




The IPCC

3 GK: and

Annual
ngEI' 3H
osphere and

a


uge in trees

a istores a large
If global

in 1 800,

 

 
   
 

. dp 4 44 4

then some 100 GtCu ould be removed from the 3
equivalent to 15 yea of emissions from fossil fu
Numerous studies 5 ch as the 1991 NAS report
among the most cos *effective options -
Of course forests ca ot cont' ii i
1nue to remove C.
uptake will decline a ver a period of several de 11
However growing rests could slow the rate.- of 
and provide time to ssess actual climate Chang
alternate energy ms and to allow human: .- 
expanding forests al I promote other social 6b] .2. i - it? 
improving watershe I quality, and providing .. -, 'i - . i i tatronal
Opportunities It mus be recognized thouth i 
involve serious interr ational political issues ass 1 i
eignty and contentio is local political issues Ci: 

'l had-r 

?cf?U" . . 
I "5 Err?.f-llhfa a. in. I 
19%" 53:. 
H'ii?e?h -.- 

?-13:th .J .- -.
- 7-11-5114"

I Fifi-i} ii".
I 7 psiNT.- 1'?if: .a-fsim

1?3

1" 21-71nah!
"-52:51- 

41.5-

. ., 
u" ..
?an 3.. Pk. maul-mam. ?qr-n1!
:57. 
u; i 

Technology Coo-pa ation

Money and effort in the United States 03%
change might achiev greater results if apphe
countries have pressi internal needs to use . 
technologies Thus - forts to promote coope is I- 
technology appear is offer a win-win oppo 
dress Climate change

Through its multinatiunal companies the .
successful record of chnology cooperation . ?when
appropriate conditio .. exist. Key criteria for If ?giggij. . i: .
tion include marketpl: ce opportunities aci-ce . 
multinational firms 3 Md opportunities to reali; . 
ment. 

When these criteria ve been met U. ene i .
entered into partners ps and shared develop - - -. . opera-
tions and mutual co ercial reward. In this . 

technology is of mutu 1 interest and beci i i - ??nal

of actually assimilatin; technology and 1.
pursue fUture Opportu 'ties. ?5

In the negotiations for the framework. con,
in Appendix I) devel ing countries (the .
preferential 1101?1- -co ercial transfer of 
no incentive f0!? effort private secth sin i - . ..
tance by governments . hich do not rim I ., 
nologies. The United ates can encourag 

private companies and developing or ifo. .. i

40 .

1 

 

I +111 be
I 51:0mote
I 0 Global
3 The
I 1 ?ntlon and
I
I

5 for multi-

1
I I
1'

1 bed Stan-?
1E IIiecades to
1(21?6356

II: range 21521
I tegy

era-3hr



 

 

c: In"
lb: 

- Hir'


1 people and

1111 LCCIBCI
I11hange and

11017 and

3? 31.151 climate

I any of the
IE ?oods,
m1 climate

te
J: Vlde agri?

I tes and

:31? 

I the ability
I 1I1n31d61'6d

lands.

(1 the
ese agen?



7c and

I
1 as those

I

 

 

 

While it may be that the need for more 

sions will be established scie tif' 
delay will make the 11 really 

efficiency improm-
and promote free market economies wd

 

goals would be easier to achieve and at.?
knowledge to advance could very well. 

 



centrally planned government i-

tional levels, that many are 
ii

Because of the uncertainty about the :l
targets, timetables, carbon tax? 

now justified. Instead, society should pg}

knowledge and advanced technological}: i
low-cost options which are justifiable of." 
issues and are directionally constructiv?

i 


   
  
 
   

When combined with serious 

issue and reduce the uncertainty surroui'w

?11}

approach for today.

lel i 

The Global Climate Coalition recomnw
0pdona 



it?

I Accelerate the pace of research into a
assessment. 


.4 PI
. I

- Identify and pursue measures that .,

yet also make sense in their own right. ll?:

1

- Establish sustained research and dearest?

 

53? 
ability to economically produce and u-l  

accumulation of greenhouse gases.

 

.- EXpand efforts to understand arid c' i1

w-

4.

political consequences of both climi-z:




 







l.

.4,

I .I 
.


The following speCific actions shd?ldEmphasize scientific research
to demonstrate whether or not 

acts on Studies that imp

ii

in.

cal climate precesses, especially 9?11 . L.
,itnrf'h.


Fail '39; ?3

biosphere, and the carbon cycle; and ii

.?ii'l 
.i I

"h


cling climate and its in?uence 41". .gi
. 15a
..



. I
I I





 

. 
.il

Appendix I: '1
United Nations Activities 

LE

The United Nations established an Intergovermn 111*-

(IPCC) to prepare scientific and technical 111*? 
tal Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop a Fra
Climate Change Once the convention enters into 1 .
seded by a Conference of Parties In the'l1 *1

function developing preparatory work for the a
tion entered into force on March 21 1994 90 d3);
rati?ed its terms. National Action Plans are to be

September 21, 1994. The first meeting of the i .
The United States ratified the convention in 19921.

  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
  

IPCC produced a major 1990 assessment covenn
spouse options and an update in 1992 IPCC has
ment to be completed in 1995 covering: (1) sc1e
options and (3) crosscutting economic issue5 
IPCC proposes to include comprehensive econ! 1 .
adaptation and mitigation.

11.1L

By its charter IPCC does not conduct original: res?t
available published results- in a few instances; 1t *1

1990 and 1992 reports IPCC prepared rather con
emissions of GHGs. Its current work 1ncludes?1d
required by the Framework Convention. Fort?i
oped a methodology for assessing national 1m,
with the International Energy Agency (1
emissions inventories. INC has also requested' 
the adequacy of existing emission scenanos l1 

Negotiations of the Framework 1 
and timetables for stabilization of greenhous 1?1 1'
countries (typically with stabilization at 199
provision of additional financial aid and pr 1
ogy transfer to developing countries. The 1. 1.

LIL-IE
<3 
oped countries to adopt programs to hunt n1. .11

additional financial aid from deveIOped to 1 1. 11
following United States rather than Europe .11 
convention does not impose targets and 1111

country positions it does not specify am 11

Jill
1*

 

 



I 
gar:

I 
a .A 
i .-.241m - - Irnon covering

  
    

 

- II we future

rolecuons of



 
 

II ilization of



I

II IlThe analysis of

I: would prevent

I 9 de?ne and
NI ssion (Recall
genuanons at
60% 

 

 I.

3?Appendix II: 
U.S. Policies mlIt.

The UN. Famework Convention and the US. End-[y EN 1; 
are driving U.S. climate policy. On October 15, 1992, i .
the Framework Convention, which calls for each $1 lib.

.l 


to develop a national plan to mitigate GHGs. As 15?
Of 1992, the Secretary of Energy must report to Mrs:

GHG emissions by 2005 or reducing CO2 

2005. also requires, by the spring 0f 199:4: 4 74
policy instruments for reducing emissions. An mt ,f 5 
technology transfer program is also authorized to-:M, .
per year for 1993-98his Earth Day 1993 speech, President Clinton 
Bush Administration by announcing his support f? 
tion target. The Clinton Administration followed .1- 
its Climate Change Action Plan in October 1993, 1?
voluntary initiatives and business/ government pa ?i .1:
GHG emissions in 2000 to 1990 levels?on; ?Elm-1t .

P1
.1 
m?i 53-: tI-Ir stra?- am 
.. :15 r: r. .32--.I - I .
"ii-Pit 

According to the plan, the Administration has; e. 
reduction of around 108 million tonnes of car 1
above what will be achieved under the;Clean . .. 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 and other existing-giro; 
estimates that the Energy Policy Act would red c. .. 
tonnes.) Excluding the BTU tax, the 1993 Clinton l. 

tion assistance, federal building ef?ciency imPr?V 1: a 
reduce emissions by 5 to 25 million tonnes of 1'3 3?3;

?rlHuh?Hi1. Ens?.- 
?y?qr- .., - -.
. .. Jr. as; .y-..energy, social, environmental and competitive 111111?, . 

    
  
  
   
   
   
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

   

111131113. Paris: OECD 1992.
DRI/McGraw?Hill Economic Effects 
Dmmde Emissions 1'11 Major OECD Co
McGraw-Hill january 1992.

Darius \?11.Gaskins ]r and John P. 

Reducing (a revie111r of the 3536 :11 1
Energy Modeling Forum) in Amrice 1 4
nlume 83 Number 2 May 129 -

 

Kirby Hanson George Maul and To
Effects Apparent. in the Climatic Rec.
(n 90131111111111 Research Le?em Volume

I. T. Houghton (31].Ienkins and] 
Sczem?rfzc Cambridge; Ca 111

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