Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 1 of 21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
L.S., a minor by her mother and
next friend YASMIN LORENA
HERNANDEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOT PETERSON, et al,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon five Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Andrew Medina (“Medina”), ECF No. [16]; Superintendent Robert Runcie (“Runcie”), ECF No.
[27]; Sheriff Scott Israel (“Israel”) and Captain Jan Jordan (“Jordan”), ECF No. [33]; Broward
County (the “County”), ECF No. [40]; and Scot Peterson (“Peterson”), ECF No. [42]
(collectively, the “Motions”). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, all opposing and
supporting submissions, the record in this case and the applicable law, and is otherwise fully
advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions filed by Medina, Runcie, Israel and Jordan
and the County are granted, and the Motion filed by Peterson is granted in part and denied in
part.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises in part from the tragic events that took place on February 14, 2018 at

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (the “High School”) in Parkland, Florida. By now, the

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 2 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
events surrounding the school shooting are ubiquitous; nevertheless, the Court sets forth the
relevant facts as alleged by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are fifteen students present during the school shooting perpetrated by Nikolas
Cruz (“Cruz”). As a result, the students allege that each suffered psychological injuries. See
First Amended Complaint, ECF No. [8] ¶¶ 5-20. Cruz, a former student, traveled to the High
School in an Uber carrying a duffel bag and backpack. Id. ¶ 61. Upon arrival, he entered the
school grounds and proceeded to the 1200 building, where he shot and killed seventeen students
and school staff members, and injured seventeen others over the course of approximately six
minutes. Id.
Throughout the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs detail numerous shortcomings in the
official response to the shooting by Defendants. Plaintiffs allege, in pertinent part, that Medina,
a school monitor, recognized Cruz as a danger when he arrived at the High School, but rather
than attempt to stop Cruz, he only radioed a colleague to report a suspicious person entering the
school grounds with a backpack. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. Even after the shooting began, Medina did not
call a code because he did not see a gun. Id. ¶ 67. Peterson, a trained law enforcement school
resource officer, remained outside the school building while Cruz was inside shooting students
and staff. Id. ¶¶ 70-76. Captain Jordan, the commander of the scene, prevented emergency
responders from entering the 1200 building to confront Cruz or render aid to victims. Id. ¶ 77.
Plaintiffs further allege that Israel, Runcie, and the County either have a policy of allowing
“killers to walk through a school killing people without being stopped,” or that they carry out
such inadequate training of the individuals expected to respond in such situations, such as
Medina, Peterson, and Jordan, that they should be liable for violations of Plaintiffs’ substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 87-89; Count IV.

2

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 3 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
In Count V, Plaintiffs assert a First Amendment Claim for retaliation against Medina
based upon reports by two unnamed female students, concerning inappropriate sexual comments
and conduct by Medina during school hours. See id. ¶ 156. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result, the
School Board suspended Medina on the students’ behalf. ¶ 157. In retaliation for the unnamed
students’ report, Medina allowed Cruz, who he knew to be dangerous, to enter the school
grounds uninhibited and perpertrate the shooting. Id. ¶¶ 158-165.
Plaintiff T.M. individually also asserts three claims against Peterson and the County for
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure with
respect to his detention in the High School office (Count I), an allegedly unlawful search of his
backpack (Count II), and seizure of money in his backpack (Count III), on the morning of the
shooting.
In the Motions, Defendants seek dismissal of the First Amended Complaint for various
reasons, including failure to state a claim, qualified immunity, lack of standing, and shotgun
pleading.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on
“‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

3

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 4 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]o
survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570);
see also Am. Dental Assoc. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288-90 (11th Cir. 2010).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the
plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir.
2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D.
Fla. 2009) (“On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true.”); Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Although the court is required to accept as true all allegations contained in the
complaint, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, “courts may infer
from the factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanations, which suggest
lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am.
Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682).
III.

ANALYSIS
A. Count IV of the First Amended Complaint is a Shotgun Pleading
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs engage in a quintessential form of

shotgun pleading because they incorporate two separate claims against all Defendants in Count
IV—one based upon violation of Fourth Amendment rights and the other based upon violation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313,

4

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 5 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
1321-24 (11th Cir. 2015) (setting forth the four most common types of shotgun pleadings). The
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned shotgun pleadings as a waste of
judicial resources.

“Shotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact an

intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and
impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and
resources. Moreover, justice is delayed for the litigants who are ‘standing in line,’ waiting for
their cases to be heard.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Cramer v. Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Upon this basis alone, Count IV of the First Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed.
Nevertheless, in the interests of conserving judicial resources, the Court considers the merits of
the theories asserted throughout the First Amended Complaint.
B. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claim Does Not Implicate a Constitutional
Right (Count IV)
In Count IV, which comprises the bulk of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs assert a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendement based upon their “clearly established right to be [free] from deliberate indifference
to substantial known risks and threats of injury.” ECF No. [8] ¶ 143. Plaintiffs maintain that
Defendants had a constitutional duty to protect them from school shooters like Cruz. As such, the
Defendants’ failure to protect them violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. “[T]o prevail
on a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff must prove both that her harm
was caused by a constitutional violation and that the government entity is responsible for that
violation.” Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 568 (11th Cir. 1997). Defendants argue, in
pertinent part, that Plaintiffs’ due process claim fails because there is no constitutional duty to

5

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 6 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
protect students from harm inflicted by third parties. Because the determination of this issue is
dispositive, the Court considers it first.
“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of [the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment] explicates that the amendment provides two different kinds of constitutional
protection: procedural due process and substantive due process.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d
1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994). 1 “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects
those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ that is rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’” Id. at 1556 (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). “The Due Process
Clause protects individuals against arbitrary exercises of government power, but only the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” T.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 598, (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998)) (internal quotiations and citation omitted).
“[O]nly state action that is an arbitrary exercise of government power which ‘shocks the
conscience’ rises to the level of a substantive due process violation.” City of Fort Lauderdale v.
Scott, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). Moreover, both the
Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court have “said repeatedly that the Fourteenth Amendment is
not a ‘font of tort law’ that can be used, through section 1983, to convert state tort claims into
federal causes of action.” Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074
(11th Cir. 2000); see also Nix v. Franklin Cty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 2002);
Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003); Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 848.

1

Although not explicitly stated in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not dispute in their
responses to the various Motions the characterization that their Fourteenth Amendment claim is a
substantive, rather than procedural, due process claim.
6

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 7 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
As interpreted through case law, the Due Process Clause protects individuals first and
foremost from action taken by the state. But,
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain
minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due
process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State that those interests do
not come to harm through other means.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Indeed, “[i]ts
purpose was to protect people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from
each other.” Id. at 196.
To that end, “the only relationships that automatically give rise to a governmental duty to
protect individuals from harm by third parties under the substantive due process clause are
custodial relationships, such as those which arise from the incarceration of prisoners or other
forms of involuntary confinement through which the government deprives individuals of their
liberty and thus of their ability to take care of themselves.” White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253,
1257 (11th Cir. 1999).

Conversely, “where non-custodial relationships are involved, the

government can be held liable under the substantive due process clause only where an official’s
act or omission is arbitrary or conscience-shocking.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs contend that a substantive due process violation may arise in a non-custodial
setting when state actors act with deliberate indifference toward a substantial risk of injury,
relying primarily upon Nix and Waddell. However, in Nix, which involved a claim arising in a
school setting based upon the acts of a teacher, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its explicit view
that deliberate indifference “is insufficient to constitute a due-process violation in a noncustodial setting[.]” 311 F.3d at 1377. In Waddell, although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
7

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 8 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
that disregard for a known and extremely great risk to victims’ health or safety might give rise to
a violation premised upon deliberate indifference, the court was faced with a very different claim
based upon the consequences of actions taken by a confidential informant—and the Court
purposely refrained from defining an applicable standard. See 329 F.3d at 1306 n.5 (“We do not
rule out today that the correct legal threshold for substantive due process in a case like this one is
actually far higher.”). Simply put, the facts in Waddell are not the facts before the Court in the
instant case.
Rather, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is replete with allegations—legal
conclusions, rather than factual—regarding the arbitrary and conscience-shocking actions and
omissions by Defendants in preparing for and responding to the threat of a school shooter like
Cruz, about whom Plaintiffs additionally allege Defendants had been warned. See ECF No. [8]
¶¶ 52, 58-60. Plaintiffs frame their claim as arising from the actions, or inactions, of Defendants.
However, viewed properly, the claim arises from the actions of Cruz, a third party, and not a
state actor.

Thus, the critical question the Court analyzes is whether Defendants had a

constitutional duty to protect Plaintiffs from the actions of Cruz. As previously stated, for such a
duty to exist on the part of Defendants, Plaintiffs would have to be considered to be in custody.
Plaintiffs suggest that the essential nature of a public school’s role and control over its
students requires that schools provide protection and safety for their students. However, the
suggestion that school attendance equates to the level of custody implicating a constitutional
obligation to protect has been expressly rejected by the Eleventh Circuit. See Nix, 311 F.3d at
1378 (“This court has ruled that schoolchildren are not in a custodial relationship with the
state.”); Wykes, 129 F.3d at 569 (“By mandating school attendance, the state simply does not
restrict a student’s liberty in the same sense that it does when it incarcerates prisoners or when it

8

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 9 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
commits mental patients involuntarily. Absent that type of restraint, there can be no concomitant
duty to provide for the student’s ‘safety and general well-being.’”) (citation omitted); see also
Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that “[t]o date, every federal
circuit court of appeal to address the question of whether compulsory school attendance laws
create the necessary custodial relationship between school and student to give rise to a
constitutional duty to protect students from harm by non-state actors has rejected the existence of
any such duty.”) (citing cases). And in the context of substantive due process, “it is the State’s
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act
to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
200. Therefore, even assuming that Defendants intentionally disregarded warnings about Cruz,
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim fails because they cannot assert the violation of a constitutional right.
See Aracena v. Gruler, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2018 WL 5961040, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2018)
(finding no due process rights implicated in officer’s response to Pulse nightclub shooting
because the entire circumstance began and ended with a private actor).
Moreover, this Court cannot ignore that the Supreme Court has been “reluctant to expand
the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended,” and cautioned that the “doctrine of judicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (internal citation
omitted). Even in the face of such a senseless tragedy, this Court must respect and adhere to the
caution against expanding substantive due process outside the realm of its proper application.

9

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 10 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
Because the Court determines that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to implicate a constitutional right,
the Court does not consider Defendants’ additional arguments for dismissal.
C. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert a First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against
Medina (Count V)
Medina argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment because Plaintiffs lack standing, the allegations regarding retaliatory conduct are not
plausible, and there is no causal connection between Medina’s alleged retaliatory conduct and
the alleged constitutionally protected speech.
“Standing for Article III purposes requires a plaintiff to provide evidence of an injury in
fact, causation and redress[a]bility.” Dermer v. Miami-Dade Cty., 599 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th
Cir. 2010) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Specifically,
“[t]o have standing, a plaintiff must show (1) he has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, not just merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819-20
(11th Cir. 2003); see Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 980 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
“The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim are that (1) the plaintiff engaged in speech
or an act that was constitutionally protected, (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely
affected the protected speech or act, and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory
actions and the adverse effect on the constitutionally-protected speech or act.” O’Boyle v.
Sweetapple, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d
1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005)). Thus, in order for Plaintiffs to have standing to assert their First
Amendment claim, they must allege that they engaged in constitutionally protected speech or a
constitutionally protected act.

10

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 11 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that two unnamed female students, who
do not appear to be any of the Plaintiffs, reported Medina’s inappropriate behavior in February,
2017.

ECF No. [8] ¶¶ 156, 159.

The First Amended Complaint otherwise contains no

allegations of any speech or act in which the Plaintiffs themselves engaged or participated.
Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to set forth the first requisite element of their claim. In addition,
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert such a claim based upon the speech of two unnamed students.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs further allege that acting on behalf of all students, the School
Board engaged in constitutionally protected conduct by first placing Medina on administrative
reassignment pending an investigation, and then suspending him for three days without pay. Id.
¶¶ 157-58. The suspension ended February 1, 2018, less than two weeks before the school
shooting. Id. ¶ 158. Plaintiffs next allege that Medina, in retaliation for the School Board’s
actions, then intentionally failed to perform his job and deliberately allowed Cruz, who he knew
to be dangerous, to enter the High School freely and ultimately commit mass murder. Id. ¶¶ 161,
163, 165. However, the School Board is not a party in this case, and therefore cannot properly
assert any claims. Moreover, even assuming the School Board had standing, Plaintiffs fail to
allege a plausible causal connection between Medina’s purported retaliatory conduct and the
injuries sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of Cruz’s shooting rampage. While confined to accept
the allegations as true, the Court expresses a concern as to the the plausibility of such a wicked
motivation, which appears to be based on nothing more than pure conjecture. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim fails.

11

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 12 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
D. T.M. States Fourth Amendment Claims Against Peterson 2 (Counts I, II, III)
The County and Peterson move to dismiss T.M.’s Fourth Amendment claims arguing in
pertinent part that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, Peterson is entitled to qualified
immunity, and T.M. fails to allege sufficient facts of a policy, custom, or practice to impose
municipal liability.
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures
conducted by school authorities. N.J. v. T.J.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); see also Ziegler v.
Martin Cty. Sch. Dist., 831 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that the “applicable
reasonableness principles guide” the analysis of searches and seizures).

However, school

officials do not need to obtain a warrant before searching a student under their authority. T.J.O,
469 U.S. at 340.

“[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the

reasonabless, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 341. The determination involves
a two-part inquiry: “first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception
[and] second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Thus
“[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will
be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.” Id. at 341-42. Overall, “[w]hile schoolchildren do not shed their constitutional rights
when they enter the schoolhouse, Fourth Amendment rights are different in public schools than

2

The Court notes that the only connection between the claims asserted on behalf of T.M.
individually and the remainder of the claims premised upon Cruz’s actions is that the alleged
search and seizure took place on the same day as the shooting. For this reason, Peterson also
requests in his Motion that the Court sever these claims; however, because the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, there is no basis to sever.
12

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 13 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
elsewhere; the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
responsibility for children.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) (internal citations and alterations omitted).
T.M. alleges that after arriving late to school, he was pulled out of his first class and
escorted to the office for questioning. ECF No. [8] ¶ 31. When he arrived at the office, another
ten to fifteen students (not Plaintiffs in this case) were also waiting to be questioned. Id. ¶ 32.
T.M. then alleges that he was taken into the office and an unidentified faculty member searched
his backpack. Id. ¶ 33. Thereafter, Peterson allegedly also searched his backpack, removed
$200 from the backpack, detained T.M. for an hour, and conducted an interrogation. Id. ¶¶ 3536. Even though T.M. explained to Peterson that he had the money to take his girlfriend to a
Valentine’s Day dinner after school, Peterson accused T.M. of selling drugs and did not
immediately return the money. Instead, he placed it in an envelope and stated that only T.M.’s
mother could pick it up. Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 42. Peterson then called T.M.’s mother, who confirmed
T.M.’s explanation regarding the money. Id. ¶ 45. Peterson eventually returned the money to
T.M. Id. ¶ 49. As a result, T.M. asserts three claims for violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights – unlawful detention, unlawful search of the backpack, and unlawful seizure of the money.
a. Detention, Search, and Seizure by Peterson
Peterson argues that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the search and
T.M.’s detention were based on reasonable suspicion, since the First Amended Complaint
affirmatively establishes that T.M. was suspected of selling drugs and that he possessed $200. 3

3

However, the Court notes that before even reaching the question of whether Peterson’s actions
were justified at their inception, as alleged in the First Amended Complaint, T.M.’s removal
from class, initial detention, and search were not conducted by Peterson. Indeed, T.M. alleges
that he, like the other ten to fifteen students, was called into the office individually, interrogated
and searched by a “member of the school’s staff,” and then his backpack was searched by
13

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 14 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
However, the Court does not agree. Specifically, T.M. alleges that after initial interrogation and
search by staff and faculty, he was then detained by Peterson, who took the $200 from his
backpack, and accused T.M. of selling drugs. Id. ¶¶ 35-39. 4 Thus, as alleged in the First
Amended Complaint, Peterson simply accused T.M. of selling drugs, and he offers no reasonable
basis to conclude that the accusation arose as a result of any particular reason. To the extent that
Peterson suggests that mere possession of $200 provided a basis for Peterson’s search and
detention of T.M., the Court is unpersuaded at this juncture. The mere possession of money
alone does not violate the law or a school rule. Notably, T.M. has not alleged that Peterson
suspected him of anything, but instead simply accused him of selling drugs based upon finding
and removing $200 from T.M.’s backpack. Furthermore, T.M. also alleges that he was late to
school that day, and that during his encounter, upon Peterson’s demand that T.M. name to whom
he sold, he explained that he was late and would therefore have been unable to sell anything to
anyone. ECF No. [8] ¶¶ 39-40.
In general, “[a] student’s privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where
the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.” Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
And, “[s]ecuring order in the school environment sometimes requires that students be subjected
to greater controls than those appropriate for adults.” Id. at 831. However, those controls cannot
be limitless. Here, T.M. maintains that there was no basis for Peterson’s accusation. Thus, the

faculty, before any encounter with Peterson. ECF No. [8] ¶¶ 32-33. As such, to the extent that
T.M.’s claim depends upon the initial removal from class, search, and detention by unnamed
members of the school’s staff or faculty, there is no basis for a claim that Peterson is liable for
the actions of others or for the actions of an unnamed member of the school’s staff or faculty.
4

T.M. also asserts that Peterson sent T.M. to in-school suspension for possessing late passes in
his bag, which is against school policy, ECF No. [8] ¶ 48; however, T.M. does not appear to
challenge this particular action by Peterson.
14

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 15 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
Court cannot say that Peterson’s actions in searching T.M. were reasonable under the
circumstances.
As a result, the Court also cannot say that T.M.’s detention was justified at its inception,
since, as alleged, there was no basis for Peterson’s accusation. See Ziegler, 831 F.3d at 1322-23
(“The initial detention of the students on the party bus for breathalyzer testing meets the T.L.O.
standard of being justified at its inception, because it was reasonably related to the circumstances
that caused the detention: to determine if students on the party bus had been drinking.”) (citation
omitted). In Ziegler, the circumstances that necessitated the initial determination of whether the
students had been drinking was the discovery of an empty champagne bottle and twelve cups
inside the party bus. 831 F.3d at 1316; see also Roy ex rel. Roy v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 509 F.
Supp. 2d 1316, 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (finding that a search is reasonable when based upon a
direct tip). Here, the only circumstance alleged to have given rise to the need to detain T.M. is
T.M.’s possession of $200.
Finally, T.M.’s claim regarding seizure of the $200 may proceed for similar reasons. “A
‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
(citations omitted). “[A] seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth
Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘unreasonable seizures.’” Id. at 124. In
order to determine the reasonableness of an infringement upon possessory interests, the Court
“must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”
Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Here, there seems to be no

15

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 16 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
dispute that there was an interference with T.M.’s possessory interests in the $200. Nonetheless,
Peterson suggests that the money he seized was returned, and therefore that the unlawful seizure
claim is disingenuous. However, Peterson fails to support this assertion with citation to relevant
authority. See Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A
litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by showing why it
is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority, forfeits the
point. The court will not do his research for him.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Indeed, as alleged, the basis for Peterson’s search was not reasonable, and therefore, the
Court cannot find at this juncture that there was a governmental interest sufficient to justify any
intrusion upon T.M.’s possessory interest in the $200. Cf. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (“since the
property had already been lawfully detained, the ‘seizure’ could, at most, have only a de minimis
impact on any protected property interest.”).
b. Peterson is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage
Peterson next argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the totality of the
circumstances unequivocally demonstrate that he had arguable reasonable suspicion to believe
that T.M. was complicit in criminal activity. However, for the same reasons that the Court does
not dismiss T.M.’s claims, qualified immunity does not shield Peterson at this juncture.
Significantly, as pled, Peterson’s unfounded accusation cannot form the basis for arguable
reasonable suspicion.
c. T.M. cannot state a claim for municipal liability against the County
The County seeks dismissal of T.M.’s claims arguing that it cannot be liable for the
actions of Peterson, a Sheriff’s deputy, because the County does not control the Sheriff’s law
enforcement actions, and for failure to allege a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

16

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 17 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
According to the Supreme Court, § 1983 “cannot be easily read to impose liability
vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship with a tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692
(1978). “[I]n order to be held liable for a § 1983 violation, a municipality must be found to have
itself caused the constitutional violation at issue . . . .” Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d
1130, 1145 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989) (“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality
itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will
not attach under § 1983.” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).

Thus, the

constitutional deprivation must come at the hands of an official policy or “custom.” See Monell,
426 U.S. at 690 (stating that local governing bodies may be subject to liability under § 1983
where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers”). “[T]he touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation
that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution . . . .”
Id. Ultimately, a county can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those officials whom a
county has no authority to control. Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., Ala, 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th
Cir. 1998).
In support of his theory that the County should be held liable for Peterson’s actions, T.M.
argues that Florida’s Constitution labels sheriffs as “county officers” and authorizes counties to
abolish the office of sheriff, the County has superior control over the Sheriff than does the State,
the County funds the Sheriff, and the State is not responsible for judgment against the Sheriff.
However, T.M.’s arguments miss the mark, and his reliance upon Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty.

17

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 18 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) and Stanley v. Israel, 843 F.3d 920 (11th
Cir. 2016) is misplaced, because both arose in the context of a claim for Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and neither case considered a sheriff’s law enforcement functions. See Abusaid, 405
F.3d at 1303 (considering whether Florida sheriff entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
when enforcing county ordinance); Stanley, 843 F.3d at 924 (considering whether Florida sheriff
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting in capacity of chief correctional officer).
Significantly, there is no claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the instant case, and T.M.
does not dispute that Peterson is an employee of the Sheriff and that he was performing in a law
enforcement capacity.
“A sheriff’s policy or act cannot be said to speak for the county if the county has no say
in what policy or action the sheriff takes.” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331. “In Florida, a county has
no authority and control over a sheriff’s law enforcement function.” Troupe v. Sarasota Cty.,
Fla., No. 8:02-cv-53-T-24MAP, 2004 WL 5572030, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2004)); see also
Nix v. Cty. of Sarasota, No. 8:16-cv-3435-T-17AAS, 2017 WL 1106098, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
21, 2017) (same). 5 Thus, “[h]olding counties liable in the absence of control over sheriffs would
ignore Monell’s conception of counties as corporations, would substitute a conception of
counties as mere units of geography, and would impose even broader liability than the
respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell.” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1331. Therefore, T.M.
cannot state a claim against the County based upon Peterson’s actions.
5

But see C.P. by and though Perez v. Collier Cty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1097-98 (M.D. Fla.
2015) (denying county’s motion to dismiss based upon Eleventh Circuit law that states in
summary fashion that the county is the entity financially liable in official capacity suits against a
sheriff) (citing Adcock v. Baca, 157 F. App’x 118, 119 (11th Cir. 2005) and Cook ex rel. Estate
of Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005)). Upon review,
however, the Court finds C.P. inapposite, since the respective counties were the only defendants
in Adcock and Cook. In contrast, here, T.M.’s claims against Peterson in his law enforcement
capacity survive.
18

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 19 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
Even assuming T.M.’s claims against the County were proper, T.M. fails to allege a
policy, custom, or practice. “A plaintiff . . . has two methods by which to establish a [municipal
actor’s] policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated [ ] policy; or (2) an unofficial custom
or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the
[municipal actor].” Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). “To
establish a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread
practice[; h]owever, the custom need not receive formal approval.” Depew v. City of St. Marys,
Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Smith v. Mercer, 572 F. App’x 676, 679
(11th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff must identify a ‘consistent and widespread practice’ of
constitutional deprivations to prove local government liability for an unofficial custom.”); Carter
v. Columbus Consol. Gov’t, 559 F. App’x 880, 881 (11th Cir. 2014) (“the challenged practice or
custom must be ‘so pervasive as to be the functional equivalent of a formal policy’”) (quoting
Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330 n.6); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.
2001) (“[T]o prove § 1983 liability against a municipality based on custom, a plaintiff must
establish a widespread practice . . . .”).
In support of his claims, T.M. provides only conclusory allegations regarding policy
practice or custom and no sets forth no facts. See, e.g. ECF No. [8] ¶¶ 104-05, 115-16, 126-27
(“Defendants . . . engaged in conduct that constituted a custom, usage, practice or procedure or
rule of the respective municipality/authority.”). Accordingly, these allegations fall woefully
short of stating a plausible claim for municipal liability against the County.
d. Leave to Amend
Generally, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendment to
pleadings. Apart from initial amendments permissible as a matter of course, “a party may amend

19

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 20 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. However, “[a]
district court need not . . . allow an amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2)
where allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where
amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). The law
in this Circuit is clear that “a district court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint
under Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367
F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477
F.3d 1282, 1292 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Thompson v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 990 F.
Supp. 2d 1335, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend the
complaint under Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile.”) (citation omitted).
“[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the ‘complaint as amended is still
subject to dismissal.’” Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999); see
Dysart v. BankTrust, 516 F. App’x 861, 865 (11th Cir. 2013) (same); St. Charles Foods, Inc. v.
America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1999) (“When a district court
denies the plaintiff leave to amend a complaint due to futility, the court is making the legal
conclusion that the complaint, as amended, would necessarily fail.”); Christman v. Walsh, 416 F.
App’x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint if it
concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile, meaning that the amended complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss.”); Aguilar v. United Floor Crew, Inc., No. 14-cv-61605,
2014 WL 6751663, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2014) (same). In any event, “the grant or denial of

20

 Case 0:18-cv-61577-BB Document 50 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/13/2018 Page 21 of 21
Case No. 18-cv-61577-BLOOM/Valle
an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Because the Court has determined that no Fourteenth Amendment violations occurred,
and that Plaintiffs lack standing with respect to their First Amendment claim, further amendment
of these claims would be futile.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the Motions filed by Medina, Runcie, Israel and Jordan, and the

County, ECF Nos. [16], [27], [33], [40], are GRANTED, and the claims against them are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Motion filed by Peterson, ECF No. [42], is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Count IV is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, and Peterson’s Motion with respect to Counts I, II, and III is DENIED. Peterson
shall file an Answer on or before December 21, 2018.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 12th day of December,
2018.

_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record

21