U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney

District ofMaryland
LeoJ. Wise

Siuie400

Assistant United States Attorney
Leo.Wise@usd<y.gov

36S. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-3119

DIRECT: 410-209-4909

MAIN: 410-209-4800
FAX: 410-962-3091

November 20, 2018
Gerard P. Martin

Rosenberg Martin Greenberg, LLP
25 South Charles Street, 21st Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Re:

United States v. Darrvl De Sousa.

Criminal No. CCB-18-276 (D. Md.)
Dear Counsel:

This letter, together with the Sealed Supplement, confirms the plea agreement (this
"Agreement") that has been offered to your client, Darryl De Sousa (hereinafter "Defendant"), by
the United States Attomey's Office for the District of Maryland ("this Office"). If the Defendant

accepts this offer, please have the Defendant execute itin the spaces provided below. Ifthis offer
has not been accepted by November 21, 2018, it will be deemed withdrawn. The terms of the
Agreement are as follows:
Offenses of Conviction

1.
The Defendant agrees to plead guilty toCounts 1, 2 and 3 ofthe Information now pending
against him, which charges the Defendant with Failing to File a U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, for calendar years 2013,2014 and2015. The Defendant
admits that the Defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offenses and will so advise the Court.
Elements of the Offenses

2.

The elementsof the offenses to which the Defendant has agreed to plead guilty, and which

this Office would prove if the case went totrial, are asfollows: That onor about the times alleged
in the Information, in the District of Maryland:

1. The Defendant was a person required to file a return;
2. The Defendant failed to file at the time required by law; and
3. The failure to file was willful.

 Penalties

3.

The maximum penalties provided by statute for the offenses to which the Defendant is

pleading guilty are as follows:
COUNT

MAX

MAX

MAX

SPECIAL

IMPRISONMENT

SUPERVISED

FINE

ASSESS

STATUTE

MENT

RELEASE
1

26 U.S.C. § 7203

1 year

I year

$100,000

$25

2

26 U.S.C. § 7203

1 year

1 year

$100,000

$25

3

26 U.S.C. § 7203

I year

1 year

$100,000

$25

a.
Prison: If the Court orders a term of imprisonment, the Bureau of Prisons has sole
discretion to designate the institution at which it will be served.

b.

Supervised Release: If the Court orders a term of supervised release, and the

Defendant violates the conditions of supervised release, the Court may order the Defendant

returned to custody to serve a term of imprisonment up to the entire original term of supervised
release ifpermitted by statute, followed by anadditional term ofsupervised release.
c.

Restitution: The Court may order the Defendant to pay restitution pursuant to 18

U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A, and 3664.

d.

Payment: Ifa fine orrestitution isimposed, itshall be payable immediately, unless

the Court orders otherwise under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d). The Defendant may be required to pay
interest if the fine is not paid when due.

e.

Collection of Debts: If the Court imposes a fine or restitution, this Office's

Financial Litigation Unit will be responsible for collecting the debt. If the Court establishes a

schedule of payments, the Defendant agrees that: (1) the full amount of the fine or restitution is
nonetheless due and owing immediately; (2) the schedule of payments is merely a minimum
schedule of payments and not the only method, nor a limitation on the methods, available to the
United States to enforce thejudgment; and (3) the United States may fully employ all powers to
collecton the total amount of the debt as provided by law. Until the debt is paid, the Defendant
agrees to disclose all assets inwhich the Defendant has any interest or over which the Defendant
exercises direct or indirect control. Until the money judgment is satisfied, the Defendant
authorizes this Office to obtain a creditreport in orderto evaluate the Defendant's ability to pay,

and to request and review the Defendant's federal and state income tax returns. The Defendant
agrees to complete and sign a copy of IRS Form 8821 (relating to the voluntary disclosure of
federal tax return information) and a financial statement in a form provided by this Office.

 Waiver of Rights

4.

The Defendant understands thatbyentering into this Agreement, theDefendant surrenders

certain rights as outlined below:

a.
If the Defendant had pied notguilty and persisted in thatplea, the Defendant
would have had the right to a speedy jury trial with the close assistance of competent counsel.
That trial could be conducted by a judge, without a jury, if the Defendant, this Office, and the
Court all agreed.

b.
If the Defendant elected a jury trial, the jury would be composed of twelve
individuals selected from the community. Counsel and the Defendant would have theopportunity

to challenge prospective jurors who demonstrated bias or who were otherwise unqualified, and
would have the opportunity to strike a certain number ofjurors peremptorily. All twelve jurors
would have to agree unanimously before the Defendant could be found guilty of any count. The
jury would be instructed that the Defendant was presumed to be innocent, and that presumption
could be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

c.

If the Defendant wentto trial, the government would have the burden of proving

the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant would have the right to confront
and cross-examine the government's witnesses. The Defendant would not have to present any
defense witnesses or evidence whatsoever. If the Defendant wanted to call witnesses in defense,

however, the Defendant would have the subpoena power of the Court to compel the witnesses to
attend.

d.
TheDefendant would have the right to testify inthe Defendant's own defense if
the Defendant so chose, and the Defendant would have the right to refuse to testify. If the
Defendant chose not to testify, the Court could instruct the jury that they could not draw any
adverse inference from the Defendant's decision not to testify.

e.

If the Defendant were found guilty after a trial, the Defendant would have the right

to appeal the verdict and the Court's pretrial and trial decisions on the admissibility ofevidence to
see if any errors were committed which would require a new trial or dismissal ofthe charges. By
pleading guilty, the Defendant knowingly gives up the right to appeal the verdict and the Court's
decisions.

f.
By pleading guilty, the Defendant will be giving up all of these rights, except the
right, under the limited circumstances set forth in the "Waiver of Appeal" paragraph below, to
appeal the sentence. By pleading guilty, the Defendant understands that the Defendant may have
to answer the Court's questions both about the rights being given up and about the facts of the
case. Any statements that the Defendant makes during such a hearing would not be admissible
against the Defendant during a trial except ina criminal proceeding for perjury orfalse statement.
g.

Ifthe Court accepts the Defendant's plea ofguilty, the Defendant will be giving up

 the right to file and have the Court rule on pretriai motions, and there will be no further trial or
proceeding of any kind in the above-referenced criminal case, and the Court will find the
Defendant guilty.

h.
By pleading guilty, the Defendantwill also be giving up certain valuable civil
rights and may be subject to deportation or other loss of immigration status, including possible
denaturalization. The Defendant recognizes that if the Defendant is not a citizen of the United
States, or is a naturalized citizen, pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to the
Defendant's immigration status. Under federal law, conviction for a broad range of crimes can
lead to adverse immigration consequences, including automatic removal from the United States.
Removal and other immigration consequences are the subject of a separate proceeding, however,
and the Defendant understands that no one, including the Defendant's attorney or the Court, can

predict with certainty the effect of a conviction on immigration status. The Defendant is not
relying on any promise or belief about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The
Defendant nevertheless affirmsthat the Defendant wantsto pleadguiltyregardless of any potential
immigration consequences.
Advisorv Sentencing Guidelines AppIv

5.

The Defendant understands that the Court will determine a sentencing guidelines range for

this case (henceforth the "advisory guidelines range") pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 at 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3742 (excepting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)) and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991 through 998. The Defendant further understands that the Court will impose a sentence
pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, as excised, and must take into account the advisory
guidelines range in establishing a reasonable sentence.
Factual and Advisorv Guidelines Stipulation

6.
a.
This Office andtheDefendant stipulate and agree to the Statement of Facts setforth
inAttachment A, which is incorporated byreference herein. This Office and the Defendant further

agree that the applicable base offense level is a level 14 pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") §§ 2T1.1(a)(1) and 2T4.1 to account for a tax loss of more than $40,000
but less than $100,000.

b.
This Office does not oppose a two-level reduction in the Defendant's adjusted
offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a), based upon the Defendant's apparent prompt

recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the Defendant's criminal
conduct. This Office may oppose any adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
§ 3El.l(a) and may decline to make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b), if the Defendant:
(i) fails to admit each and every item in the factual stipulation; (ii) denies involvement in the
offense; (iii) gives conflicting statements about the Defendant's involvement in the offense; (iv) is
untruthful with the Court, this Office, or the United States Probation Office; (v) obstructs or

attempts to obstruct justice prior to sentencing; (vi) engages in any criminal conduct between the
date of this Agreement and thedate of sentencing; (vii) attempts towithdraw the plea ofguilty; or
(viii) violates this Agreement in any way.
4

 7.
There is no agreement as to the Defendant's criminal history and the Defendant
understands that the Defendant's criminal history could alter the Defendant's offense level.

Specifically, the Defendant understands that the Defendant's criminal history could alter the final
offense level if the Defendant is determined to be a career offender or if the instant offense was a

part ofa pattern ofcriminal conduct from which the Defendant derived a substantial portion ofthe
Defendant's income.

8.

Other than as set forth above, no other offense characteristics, sentencing guidelines

factors, potential departures or adjustments set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines
are in dispute or will be raised in calculating the advisory guidelines range.
Obligations of the Parties

9.
Atthetime of sentencing, this Office and the Defendant reserve the right to advocate for a
reasonable sentence, period of supervised release, and/or fine considering any appropriate factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This Office reserves the right to bring to the Court's attention all
information with respect to the Defendant's background, character, and conduct that this Office
deems relevant to sentencing.
Waiver of Appeal

10.

In exchange for theconcessions made bythis Office and the Defendant inthis Agreement,

this Office and the Defendant waive their rights to appeal as follows:

a.

The Defendant knowingly waives all right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or any

other statute or constitutional provision, to appeal the Defendant's conviction on any ground
whatsoever. This includes a waiver of allright to appeal theDefendant's conviction onthe ground
thatthe statutes to which the Defendant is pleading guilty is unconstitutional, or ontheground that
the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the statutes.

b.

The Defendant and this Office knowingly andexpressly waive all rights conferred

by 18 U.S.C. §3742 toappeal whatever sentence is imposed (including any term of imprisonment,
fine, term ofsupervised release, ororder ofrestitution) for any reason (including the establishment
ofthe advisory sentencing guidelines range, the determination ofthe Defendant's criminal history,
the weighing of the sentencing factors, and any constitutional challenges to the calculation and
imposition of any term of imprisonment, fine, order of forfeiture, order of restitution, and term or
condition of supervised release), except the Defendant reserves the right to appeal any sentence
that exceeds the statutory maximum; and

c.

The Defendant waives any and all rights under the Freedom of Information Act

relating to the investigation and prosecution of the above-captioned matter and agrees not to file
any request for documents from this Office or any investigating agency.

 Restitution

12.
The Defendant agrees to the entry of a restitution order for the full amount of the victims'
losses, which the parties stipulate is at least $67,587.72, as described more fully in the factual
stipulation. The Office further understands that the Defendanthas already paid certain portions of
tax directlyor through an offset of refunds by the Internal Revenue Service and/or the Comptroller
of Maryland. In this regard, the Internal Revenue Service has already applied the amounts of
$344.25 and $422.05, which represented a portion of the Defendant's tax refund for another year,
to the amount due and owing to the Internal Revenue Servicefor 2011 and 2012, respectively. In
addition, the Defendant has already paid all tax, interest, and penalty due to the Comptroller of

Maryland for the years of 2013, 2014 and 2015. Accordingly, the total restitution remaining due
to the Internal Revenue Service, in the aggregate, is $51,612.70 and to the Comptroller of

Maryland, inthe aggregate, is $9,032.41. The total restitution remaining due asof the date ofthis
agreement is $60,645.11.

The following chart represents Defendant's taxes due and owing for tax years of 2008
through 2015, as well as an accounting for payments made bythe Defendant prior to sentencing:

Year

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

2014
2015

TOTAL

IRS

IRS REST.

Comptroller

RESTITUTION

DUE

ofMD

$6,460.00
$7,067.00

$3,911.00
$6,497.00
$6,667.00
$6,845.00
$7,019.00
$7,913.00
$52,379.00

Comptroller
DUE:

$6,460.00

$1,848.76

$1,848.76

$7,067.00
$3,911.00
$6,152.75
$6,244.95
$6,845.00

$1,894.71

$1,894.71
$1,500.07
$1,895.12

$7,019.00
$7,913.00
$51,612.70

Total Restitution:

$67,587.72

Total OUTSTANDING:

$60,645.11

$1,500.07
$1,895.12
$1,893.75
$1,949.68
$2,019.30
$2,207.33
$15,208.72

$1,893.75
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00
$9,032.41

The Defendant agrees that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A and 3563(b)(2) and 3583(d),
the Court may order restitution of the full amount of the actual, total loss caused by the offense
conduct set forth inthe factual stipulation. The total amount ofrestitution shall bedue immediately
and shall be ordered to bepaid forthwith. Any payment schedule imposed bytheCourt establishes
only a minimum obligation. The Defendant will make a good faith effort to pay any restitution.
Regardless ofthe Defendant's compliance, any payment schedule does not limit the United States'
ability to collect additional amounts from Defendant through all available collection remedies at
6

 any time. The Defendant further agrees that the Defendant will fully disclose to this Office, the
probation officer, and to the Court, subject to thepenalty of perjury, all information (including but
not limited to copies of all relevant bank and financial records) regarding thecurrent location and
prior disposition of all funds obtained as a result of the criminal conduct set forth in the factual
stipulation. The Defendant further agrees to take all reasonable steps to retrieve or repatriate any
such funds and to make them available for restitution. If the Defendant does not fulfill this

provision, it will be considered a material breach of this Agreement, and this Office may seek to
be relieved of its obligations under this Agreement.

In order to accommodate the proper application of any restitution payments arising from
this matter, the Office agrees to recommend that the Court enter a restitution order (or orders)

specifically outlining the amounts due from Defendant (1) by tax period and (2) by payee. The
Office will further recommend that the Court enter an order indicating that restitution due to the

Comptroller of Maryland for the 2013 and 2014 tax periods has already been satisfied and/or that
no restitution order for these periods should be entered by the Court. The Office further agrees
that the Defendant will receive proper credit for any payments made pursuant to this agreement,
which represent payment ofoutstanding taxes for the above-referenced periods. To the extent that
the Defendant makes additional restitution payments prior to the date of sentencing and provides
information confirming payment, the Office will not object to a request by the Defendant to the
Court that the restitution order (or orders) be reduced or eliminated to reflect payments already
made.

Tax Liabilitv

13.

The Defendant understands that this Agreement does not resolve anyciviltax liability that

the Defendant may have, and that this Agreement is with the United States Attorney's Office, not
with the Intemal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service is not a party to this Agreement

and remains free to pursue any and all lawful remedies it may have. The Defendant agrees,
however, asa special condition ofsupervised release: (a) toexecute a final and conclusive "Closing

Agreement" with the Intemal Revenue Service, pursuant to section 7121 ofthe Internal Revenue
Code, in order to resolve tax liabilities forthe years 2008 through 2015; (b)to provide a complete
and accurate financial statement, under penalty of perjury, to the United States that shall identify
all assets valued at $1,000 or more owned or held directly or indirectly by the Defendant, as well
as all such assets transferred by the Defendant to any third parties since 2008, including the
location of said assets and identities of the third parties; and (c) to pay to the Intemal Revenue
Service all additional taxes, interest and penalties thatthe Intemal Revenue Service may determine
that the Defendant owes for the tax years 2008 through 2015, pursuant to the aforesaid Closing
Agreement.

Defendant's Conduct Prior to Sentencing and Breach

14.
a.
Between now and the date of the sentencing, the Defendant will not engage in
conduct that constitutes obstmction ofjusticeunderU.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; willnotviolate anyfederal,
state, or local law; will acknowledge guiltto the probation officer and the Court; will be truthful
7

 in any statement to the Court, this Office, law enforcement agents, and probation officers; will
cooperate in the preparation of the presentence report; and will not move to withdraw from the
plea of guilty or from this Agreement.

b.

If the Defendant engages in conduct prior to sentencing that violates the above

paragraph of this Agreement, and the Court finds a violation bya preponderance of the evidence,
then: (i) this Office will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (ii) this Office may
make sentencing arguments and recommendations different from those set out inthis Agreement,
even if the Agreement was reached pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(C); and (iii) inany criminal or civil
proceeding, this Office will be free to use against the Defendant all statements made by the
Defendant and any of the information or materials provided by the Defendant, including
statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement, and statements made

during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A determination that this Office is released from its obligations under this Agreement

will not permit the Defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. The Defendant acknowledges that the
Defendant may not withdraw the Defendant's guilty plea—even if made pursuant to Rule
11(c)(1)(C)—ifthe Court finds that the Defendant breached the Agreement. In that event, neither
the Court nor the Government will be bound by the specific sentence or sentencing range agreed
and stipulated to herein pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
Court Not a Partv

15.

The Court is not a party to this Agreement. The sentence to be imposed is within the sole

discretion of the Court. The Court is not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines stipulation in this

Agreement. The Court will determine the facts relevant to sentencing. The Court is not required
to accept any recommendation or stipulation of the parties. The Court has the power to impose a
sentence up to the maximum penalty allowed by law. If the Court makes sentencing findings
different from those stipulated in this Agreement, or if the Court imposes any sentence up to the
maximum allowed by statute, the Defendant will remain bound tofulfill all ofthe obligations under
this Agreement. Neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the Court can make a binding
prediction, promise, or representation as to what guidelines range or sentence the Defendant will
receive. The Defendant agrees that no one has made such a binding prediction or promise.
Entire Agreement

16.
This letter, together with the Sealed Supplement, constitutes the complete plea agreement
inthis case. This letter, together with theSealed Supplement, supersedes anyprior understandings,
promises, or conditions between this Office and the Defendant. There are no other agreements,
promises, undertakings, orunderstandings between the Defendant and this Office other than those
set forth in this letterand the Sealed Supplement. No changes to this Agreement will be effective
unless in writing, signed by all parties and approved by the Court.

 If the Defendant fully accepts each and every term and condition of this Agreement, please
sign and have the Defendant sign the original and return it to me promptly.
Very truly yours,
Robert K. Hur

United States Attorney

By:
Leo J. Wise
Derek E. Hincs

Sean R. Dclaney
Assistant United States Attorneys

I have read this Agreement, including the Sealed Supplement, and carefully reviewed every

part of it with my attorney. I understand it and I voluntarily agree to it. Specifically, I have
reviewed the Factual and Advisory Guidelines Stipulation with my attorney and I do not wish to
change any part of it. I am completely satisfied with the representation of my attorney.
//- Z c.-Date

Darryl De Sousa

1 am the Defendant's attorney. 1have carefully reviewed every part of this Agreement,

including the Sealed Supplement with the Defendant. The Defendant advises me that the
Defendant understands and accepts its terms. To my knowledge, the Defendant's decision to enter
into this Agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Date

Gerard P. Martin, Esq.

 ATTACHMENT A

STIPULATION OF FACTS

The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that if this case had proceeded to trial, this
Office would have proven thefollowing facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The undersigned parties
also stipulate and agree that the following facts do not encompass all of the evidence that would
have been presented had this matter proceeded to trial.

Darryl De Sousa was hired by theBaltimore Police Department ("BPD") on December
14, 1998. From 2008 through 2015, De Sousa held the ranks of Deputy Commander of the
Northeast Division, Commander of the Northeast Division, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and

Deputy Commissioner. On January 19,2018, De Sousa was named interim Police
Commissioner by the Mayor of Baltimore and was confirmed bythe City Council on February
26,2018.

On or about June 10, 1999, De Sousa submitted an Employee's Withholding Exemption

Certificate ("W-4") to the City of Baltimore falsely claiming nine (9) allowances for both federal
and state tax purposes. By virtue ofthis claim, De Sousa substantially reduced the amount of
taxes withheld from his salary each year. When he filed his federal and state income taxes for
calendar years 2008 through 2012, he falsely claimed deductions that he was not entitled to,
including for unreimbursed employee expenses, when he had nosuch expenses, mortgage
interest deductions and deductions for local propertytaxes, when he did not have a mortgage or

own any real property, and business losses, when he did not operate any businesses. By virtue of
these improper deductions, De Sousa was able to artificially reduce the amount oftaxes he owed
to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the State of Maryland.

For calendar years 2011 and 2012, De Sousa failed to file tax returns at all and did not do
so until 2014. De Sousa also failed to paypenalties and interest on those late filed returns
despite having been told to do so by the IRS.

As of May 5,2018, De Sousa had not filed taxes for 2013,2014 or 2015, despite having a
clear legal obligation to do so, which he knew. By virtue ofthe nine allowances he falsely
claimed, De Sousa owed additional money to the United States and the State of Maryland in each
of those years, as he also knew.

Specifically, during the calendar year 2013, De Sousa received gross income ofat least
$93,104 from the BPD. As a result, on or before April 15, 2014, De Sousawas required to file a
tax retum with the IRS. De Sousa did not file a 2013 tax return. Had he filed a return, he would

have owed a total tax of $16,710 to the IRS. As a result of the nine allowances De Sousa falsely
claimed on his W-4, his withholdings would have been insufficient to coverthis tax debt, and he
would have beenrequired to pay a total of $6,845 in additional taxes to the IRS.
In addition, De Sousa did not file a MarylandResident Income Tax Retum for the year
2013. Had he filed a retum for this year, he would have owed an additional $1,949.68.
10

 Similarly, during the calendaryear 2014, De Sousa received gross income of at least
$101,985 from the BPD. As a result, on or before April 15,2015, De Sousa was required to file
a tax return with the IRS. De Sousa did not file a 2014 tax return. Had he filed a return, he

would have owed a total tax of $18,887. As a result of the nine allowances De Sousa falsely

claimed on his W-4, his withholdings would have been insufficient to cover this tax debt, and he
would have been required to pay a total of $7,019 in additional taxes to the IRS.
In addition, De Sousa did not file a Maryland Resident Income Tax Return for the year

2014. Hadhe filed a return for this year, he would have owed an additional $2,019.30.
On or about November 16,2015, the IRS sent a letter to De Sousa stating, in relevant

part, "Ourrecords show that you haven't filed your tax return forthe tax year ending on
December 31,2014," and requesting a response from him. De Sousa did not respond to this
letter.

During thecalendar year 2015, De Sousa received gross income of at least $127,089 from
the BPD. As a result, on or before April 15,2016, De Sousa was required to file a tax return
with the IRS. De Sousa did not file a 2015 tax return. Had he filed a return, he would have

owed a total tax of $25,514. As a resultof the nineallowances De Sousa falsely claimed on his

W-4, his withholdings would have been insufficient to cover this taxdebt, and he would have
been required to pay a total of $7,913 in additional taxes to the IRS.
In addition, De Sousa did not file a Maryland Resident Income Tax Return for the year
2015. Had he filed a return forthis year, he would have owed an additional $2,207.33.

These three years were not the first time De Sousa failed totimely file income tax
returns.

De Sousa did not file either his 2011 or 2012 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns with

the IRS at the time required bylaw, and did not request extensions. Instead, onor about

September 29,2014, De Sousa filed both his 2011 and 2012 tax returns, each ofwhich he signed
under the following warning: "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this
return and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best ofmy knowledge and belief,
they are true, correct and complete."

On these late filed returns, De Sousafalsely claimed deductions that reduced the taxes he
owed the IRS and the State of Maryland.

Specifically, De Sousa falsely claimed onhis 2012 return that he donated $9,540 to
charity, $7,190 of which he claimed was by cash or check. The return also falsely claimed that
he had unreimbursed employee expenses in the amount of $15,977 for the year 2012, including
$1,050 in vehicle expenses, $2,162 in parking fees, tolls, and transportation, $4,198 in travel
expenses, and $8,567 inother business expenses. De Sousa had not, in fact, incurred these
expenses related to his job as a Baltimore City Police officer that the BPD did not reimburse. By
11

 virtue of these false representations, De Sousa claimed he only owed a total tax of $9,936, when
his total tax owed should have been $15,486. The BPD withheld $8,819 from De Sousa's wages

for the payment of federal income taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been required to pay
an additional $6,667 to the IRS if he had filed an accurate return.

De Sousa falsely claimed on his 2011 return that he donated $9,289 to charity, $7,539 of
which he claimed was by cash or check. De Sousa also falsely claimed that he had unreimbursed
employee expenses inthe amount of $17,597 for theyear 2011, including $1,106 in vehicle
expenses, $2,168 in parking fees, tolls, and transportation, $2,543 in travel expenses, and
$11,780 in other business expenses. De Sousa had not, in fact, incurred these expenses related to
his job as a Baltimore City Police officer that the BPD did not reimburse. By virtue ofthese
false representations, De Sousa claimed he only owed a total tax of $7,831, when his total tax
owed should have been $13,619. The BPD withheld $7,122 from De Sousa's wages for the

payment of federal income taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been required to pay an
additional $6,497 to the IRS if he had filed an accurate return.

On or about October 27, 2014, the IRS sent De Sousa a letter telling him that he owed

late fees, a penalty, and interest as a result of his late filed returns for the years 2011 and 2012.
De Sousa did not send in any payments to the IRS to satisfythose debts.

Additionally, on or about November 13,2013, De Sousa filed false 2011 and 2012
Maryland Resident Income Tax Returns that underreported histax due.
In 2011, De Sousa calculated total Maryland income tax of $3,812 when the amount
should have been $5,578.12. The BPD withheld $3,683 from De Sousa's wages for the payment

of Maryland and local taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been required to pay an additional
$1,895.12to the State of Maryland if he had filed an accurate return.

In 2012, De Sousa calculated total Maryland income tax of $4,543, when the amount
should have been $6,191.75. The BPD withheld $4,298 from De Sousa's wages for the payment

of Maryland and local taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been required to pay an additional
$1,893.75 to the State of Maryland if he had filed an accurate return.

De Sousa filed returns for calendaryears 2008, 2009 and 2010, but claimed false
deductions in a manner similarto the way he claimed false deductions on his 2011 and 2012
returns.

De Sousa falsely claimed on his 2010 retum thathe donated $7,815 to charity, $5,565 of
whichhe claimed was by cashor check. The return also falsely claimed that he had
unreimbursed employee expenses in the amount of $4,369. De Sousa had not, in fact, incurred
these expenses related to hisjob as a Baltimore City Police officer that the BPD did not
reimburse. De Sousaalso falsely claimed $8,792 in business losses, when he did not have any
such losses. Byvirtue of these false representations, De Sousa claimed he only owed a total tax
of $4,796, when his total tax owed should have been $9,977. The BPD withheld $6,066 from De
12

 Sousa'swages for thepayment of federal income taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been
required to pay an additional $3,911 to the IRS if he had filed an accurate return.

De Sousa falsely claimed on his 2009 retum that he donated $5,000 to charity, $4,500 of
which he claimed was by cash or check. The return also falsely claimed that he had
unreimbursed employee expenses in the amount of $12,593. De Sousa had not, in fact, incurred
these expenses related to his job as a Baltimore City Police officer that the BPD did not
reimburse. The retum also falsely claimed $10,987 in home mortgage interest deduction and
$3,145 in real estate taxes, although De Sousa did not own any real property and did not havea

mortgage. By virtue of these false representations, De Sousa claimed he only owed a total taxof
$5,537, when his total tax owed should have been $13,981. The BPD withheld $6,914 from De

Sousa's wages for the payment of federal income taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been
required to pay an additional $7,067 to the IRS if he had filed an accurate retum.

De Sousa falsely claimed on his 2008 retum that he donated $10,357 to charity, $9,857 of
which he claimed was by cash or check. The return also falsely claimed that he had
unreimbursed employee expenses inthe amount of $15,936. De Sousa had not, infact, incurred

these expenses related to his jobas a Baltimore City Police officer that the BPD did not
reimburse. The retum also falsely claimed $10,562 in home mortgage interest deduction and
$4,652 in real estate taxes, although De Sousa did not own any real property and did nothave a

mortgage. De Sousa also falsely claimed $6,621 in business losses, when in fact, he did not have
any such losses. By virtue ofthese false representations, De Sousa claimed he only owed a total
tax of $8,149, when histotal taxowed should have been $18,121. The BPD withheld $11,661
from DeSousa's wages for the payment of federal income taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would
have been required to pay an additional $6,460 to the IRS if he had filed an accurate return.
De Sousa filed false 2008,2009 and 2010 Maryland Resident Income Tax Returns that
underreported his tax due.

In 2008, De Sousa calculated total Maryland income tax and local tax of $3,868, when
the amount should have been $6,717.76. The BPD withheld $4,869 from De Sousa's wages for

thepayment of Maryland and local taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been required to pay
an additional $1,848.76 to the State of Maryland if he had filed an accurate retum.

In 2009, De Sousacalculated total Maryland income tax and local tax of $3,473.57,
when, the amount should have been $5,581.71. The BPD withheld $3,687 from De Sousa's

wages for the payment of Maryland and local taxes. Therefore, De Sousa would have been
required to pay an additional $1,894.71 to the State of Maryland if he had filed an accurate
return.

In 2010, De Sousa calculated Maryland income tax and local tax of $3,725, when the
amount should have been $4,929.07. The BPD withheld $3,429 from De Sousa's wages for the

payment of Maryland and local taxes. Therefore, DeSousa would have been required to payan
additional $1,500.07 to the State of Maryland if he had filed an accurate retum.
13

 On or about December 2, 2015, the IRS mailed a letter dubbed a "lock-in letter" to both
De Sousa and BPD. The letter to Dc Sousa stated, in relevant part:

Generally, the amount your employer withholds for federal income tax is based
on your Form W-4, Employee Withholding Allowance Certificate . . .We
determined you aren't entitled to claim exempt status or more than a specified
number of withholding allowance... We sent your employer a "lock-in letter" . .
.We also instructed your employer not to honor your current Form W-4 or a new
Form W-4 from you, UNLESS it results in MORE withholding than at the
withholding rate and withholding allowances listed above.
As a result of the lock-in letter, BPD began withholdingtaxes in greater amounts from De
Sousa's regular paycheck.

On or about April 15, 2017, De Sousa filed a 2016 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return
and claimed a refund of $1,644. On or about April 24, 2017, the IRS sent Dc Sousa a letter

stating that it had levied $344.25 from that refund to cover Dc Sousa's late fee, penalty, and
interest from his late 2011 return, and $422.05 from his refund to cover Dc Sousa's late fee,
penalty, and interest from his late 2012 return.

In total, the combined lax due and owing to the United States and the State of Maryland
as a result of Dc Sousa's actions is $67,587.72.

SO STIPULATED:

Lco J. Wise
Derek E. Mines

Scan R. Delaney

Assistant United St^s Attorneys

' C^- \
Darryl De Sousa
Defendant

Gerard P. Martin, Esq.
Counsel for Defendant

14

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