MEMORANDUM
To:

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
Assistant Attorney General Steve Engel

From:

Bill Barr

Re:

Mueller’s “Obstruction” Theory

8 June 2018

I am writing as a formerofficial deeply concerned with theinstitutions of the Presidency
and the Department ofJustice. I realize that I am in the dark about manyfacts, butI hope my
views may beuseful.
It appears Mueller’s team is investigating a possible case of “obstruction”by the President
predicated substantially on his expression of hope that the Comey could eventually “let... go” of
its investigation of Flynn and hisaction in firing Comey.In pursuit of this obstruction theory, it
appears that Mueller’s team is demanding that the President submit to interrogation about these
incidents, using the threat of subpoenasto coerce his submission.
Mueller should not be permitted to demandthatthe President submitto interrogation about
alleged obstruction. Apart from whether Mueller a strong enough factual basis for doing so,
Mueller’s obstruction theory is fatally misconceived. As I understandit, his theory is premised on
a novel and legally insupportable reading of the law. Moreover, in my view,if credited by the
Department, it would have grave consequencesfar beyond the immediate confinesofthis case and
woulddo lasting damageto the Presidency and to the administration of law within the Executive
branch.
Asthings stand, obstruction laws do not criminalize just any act that can influence a
“proceeding.” Rather they are concerned with acts intended to havea particular kind of impact. A
“proceeding”is a formalized processfor finding the truth. In general, obstruction laws are meant
to protect proceedings from actions designed subvert the integrity oftheir truth-finding function
through compromisingthe honesty of decision-makers (e.g., judge,jury) or impairingthe integrity
oravailability ofevidence — testimonial, documentary,or physical. Thus, obstruction lawsprohibit
a range of “bad acts” — such as tampering with a witness or juror; or destroying,altering, or
falsifying evidence — all of whichare inherently wrongful because, by their very nature, they are
directed at depriving the proceeding of honest decision-makers or access to full and accurate
evidence. In general, then, the actus reus of an obstruction offense is the inherently subversive
“bad act” of impairing the integrity of a decision-maker or evidence. The requisite mens rea is
simply intending the wrongful impairmentthat inexorably flowsfrom theact.
Obviously, the President and anyotherofficial can commit obstruction in this classic sense
of sabotaging a proceeding’s truth-finding function. Thus, for example,if a President knowingly
destroysoralters evidence, suborns perjury,or induces a witness to changetestimony, or commits

 any act deliberately impairing the integrity or availability of evidence, then he,like anyoneelse,
commits the crimeofobstruction. Indeed,the acts of obstruction alleged against Presidents Nixon

and Clinton in their respective impeachments were all such “bad acts” involving the impairment
of evidence. Enforcing these laws against the President in no way infringes on the President’s
plenary power over law enforcement because exercising this discretion — such as his complete
authority to start or stop a law enforcement proceeding -- does not involve commission of any of
these inherently wrongful, subversiveacts.

The President, as far as I know,is not being accused of engaging in any wrongfulact of
evidence impairment. Instead, Mueller is proposing an unprecedented expansion of obstruction
lawsso as to reach facially-lawfulactionstaken bythe Presidentin exercising the discretion vested
in him by the Constitution. It appears Muelleris relying on 18 U.S.C. §1512, which generally
prohibits acts undermining the integrity of evidence or preventing its production. Section 1512 is
relevant here because, unlike other obstruction statutes, it does not require that a proceeding be
actually “pending” at the time of an obstruction, but only that a defendant have in mind an
anticipated proceeding. Because there were seemingly no relevant proceedings pending whenthe
Presidentallegedly engagedin the alleged obstruction,I believe that Mueller’s team is considering
the “residual clause”in Section 1512 — subsection (c)(2) —asthe potentialbasis for an obstruction
case. Subsection (c) reads:
(c)

Whoever corruptly-- (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or

conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the

intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so [is guilty of the crime of obstruction].
[emphasis added].

As I understand the theory, Mueller proposesto give clause (c)(2), which previously has

beenexclusively confined to acts of evidence impairment, a new unboundedinterpretation. First,

by reading clause (c)(2)inisolation, and glossing over key terms, he construestheclauseas a freestanding,all-encompassing provision prohibiting any act influencing a proceeding if done with an
improper motive. Second, in a further unprecedented step, Mueller would apply this sweeping
prohibitionto facially-lawful acts taken by publicofficials exercisingoftheir discretionary powers
if those acts influence a proceeding. Thus, under this theory, simply by exercising his
Constitutional discretion in a facially-lawful way — for example, by removing or appointing an
official; using his prosecutorial discretion to give direction on a case;or using his pardoning power
~ a President can be accused of committing a crimebased solely on his subjective state of mind.
As a result, any discretionary act by a President that influences a proceeding can become the
subject of a criminal grand jury investigation, probing whether the President acted with an
improper motive.
If embraced by the Department,this theory would have potentially disastrous implications,
not just for the Presidency, but for the Executive branch as a whole and for the Department in
particular. While Mueller’s focusis the President’s discretionary actions, his theory would apply
to all exercises of prosecutorial discretion by the President’s subordinates, from the Attorney
General downto the mostjuniorline prosecutor. Simply by giving direction on a case, or class of

 cases, an official opens himselfto the chargethathe has acted with an “improper” motive and thus
becomessubject to a criminal investigation. Moreover, the challenge to Comey’s removal shows
that not just prosecutorialdecisionsareat issue. Any personnel or managementdecisions taken by
an official charged with supervising and conductinglitigation and enforcement matters in the
Executive branch can becomegrist for the criminal mill based solely on the official’s subjective
State of mind. Allthat is neededis a claim that a supervisor is acting with an improper purpose
and any act arguably constraining a case — such as removing a U.S. Attorney -- couldbecast as a
crimeofobstruction.

It is inconceivable to me that the Department could accept Mueller’s interpretation of

§1512(c)(2). It is untenable as a matter of law and cannot provide a legitimate basis for

interrogating the President. I know youwill agreethat, ifa DOJ investigationis going to take down
a democratically-elected President, it is imperative to the health of our system andto our national
cohesion that any claim of wrongdoing is solidly based on evidence of a real crime — not a
debatable one.It is time to travel well-worn paths; not to veer into novel, unsettled or contested

areas ofthe law; and notto indulge the fancies by overly-zealousprosecutors.

Aselaborated on below, Mueller’s theory should be rejected for the following reasons:

First, the sweeping interpretation being proposed for § 1512’s residual clause is contrary to the
Statute’s plain meaning and would directly contravene the Department’s longstanding and
consistentposition that generally-worded statuteslike § 1512 cannotbe applied to the President’s
exercise of his constitutional powers in the absence ofa “clear statement”in the statute that such
an application was intended.

Second, Mueller’s premise that, whenever an investigation touches on the President’s own
conduct, it is inherently “corrupt” under § 1512 for the President to influence that matter is
insupportable. In granting plenary law enforcement powers to the President, the Constitution
places no such limit on the President’s supervisory authority. Moreover, such a limitation cannot
be reconciled with the Department’s longstanding position that the “conflict of interest” laws do
not, and cannot, apply to the President, since to apply them would impermissibly “disempower”
the President from supervising a class ofcases that the Constitution grants him the authority to

supervise.

Third, defining facially-lawful exercises of Executive discretion as potential crimes, based solely

on subjective motive, would violate Article II of the Constitution by impermissibly burdening the

exercise of core discretionary powers within the Executive branch.

Fourth, even if one were to indulge Mueller’s obstruction theory, in the particular circumstances
here, the President’s motive in removing Comey and commenting on Flynn could not have been
“corrupt”unless the President and his campaign were actually guilty ofillegal collusion. Because
the obstruction claim is entirely dependent on first finding collusion, Mueller should not be
permitted to interrogate the President aboutobstruction until has enough evidence to establish
collusion.

 I. The Statute’s Plain Meaning, and “the Clear Statement” Rule Long Adhered To Bythe

Department, Preclude Its Application to Facially-Lawful Exercises of the President’s

Constitutional Discretion.

The unboundedconstruction Mueller would give §1512’s residualclause is contrary to the
provision’s text, structure, andlegislative history. By its terms, §1512 focuses exclusively on
actions that subvert the truth-finding function of a proceeding by impairing the availability or

integrity of evidence — testimonial, documentary, or physical. Thus, §1512 proscribesa litany of

specifically-defined acts of obstruction, including killing a witness, threatening a witness to
preventor altertestimony, destroyingoraltering documentary or physical evidence, and harassing
a witnessto hindertestimony. All of these enumerated acts are “obstructive”in precisely the same
way — they interfere with a proceeding’s ability to gather complete andreliable evidence.
The question here is whether the phrase — “or corruptly otherwise obstructs” — in clause
(c)(2) is divorced fromthelitany ofthe specific prohibitionsin § 1512, andis thusa free-standing,
all-encompassing prohibition reaching any actthatinfluencesa proceeding,or whetherthe clause’s
prohibition against “otherwise” obstructing is somehowtied to, and limited by, the character of all
the other formsof obstructionlisted in the statute. J think it is clear that use of the word “otherwise”
in the residual clause expressly links the clause to the forms of obstruction specifically defined
elsewherein the provision. Unlessit serves that purpose,the word “otherwise” does no workatall
and is mere surplusage. Mueller’s interpretation ofthe residual clause as covering any andallacts
that influence a proceedingreads the word “otherwise”outof the statute altogether. But any proper
interpretation of the clause mustgive effect to the word “otherwise;” it must do some work.
As the Supreme Court has suggested, Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142-143
(2008), when Congress enumeratesvarious specific acts constituting a crimeandthen followsthat

enumeration with a residual clause, introduced with the words “or otherwise,” then the more
general action referred to immediately after the word “otherwise” is most naturally understood to

coveracts that cause a similar kind of result as the precedinglisted examples, but cause those
resultsin a different manner. In other words,the specific examples enumerated priorto the residual
clauseare typically read as refining orlimiting in some waythe broadercatch-all term usedin the

residual clause. See also Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085-87 (2015). As the Begay

Court observed, if Congress meantthe residual clause to beso all-encompassingthatit subsumes
all the preceding enumerated examples,“it is hard to see why it would have neededto include the
examplesatall.” 553 U.S. at 142; see McDonnell v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 2369 (2016).

An examplesuffices to makethe point: If a statute prohibits “slapping, punching,kicking,biting,
gouging eyes, or otherwise hurting” another person, the word “hurting”in the residual clause
would naturally be understood as referring to the same kind of physical injury inflicted by the
enumerated acts, but inflicted in a different way — i.e., pulling hair. It normally would not be
understood as referring to any kind of “hurting,” such as hurting another’s feelings, or hurting
another’s economicinterests.

Consequently, under the statute’s plain language andstructure, the most natural and
plausible reading of 1512(c)(2)is that it covers acts that have the samekind ofobstructive impact
as the listed forms of obstruction — i.e., impairing the availability or integrity of evidence — but
cause this impairmentin a different way than the enumerated actions do. Underthis construction,

 then, the “catch all” language in clause (c)(2) encompasses any conduct, evenif notspecifically
described in 1512, that is directed at undermining a proceeding’s truth-finding function through
actions impairing the integrity and availability of evidence. Indeed,this is how the residual clause
has been applied. From a quick review ofthecases,it appearsall the cases have involved attempts
to interfere with, or renderfalse, the evidence that would becomeavailable to a proceeding. Even
the more esoteric applications of clause (c)(2) have been directed against attempts to prevent the
flow of evidence to a proceeding. E.g., United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273 (7" Cir.
2014)(soliciting tips from corrupt cops to evade surveillance); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d
1261 (10" Cir, 2009)(disclosing identity of undercover agent to subject of grand jury drug
investigation). Asfar as I cantell, no case has evertreated as an “obstruction”an official’s exercise
of prosecutorial discretion or an official’s managementor personnelactionscollaterally affecting
a proceeding.
Further, readingthe residual clauseas an all-encompassing proscription cannotbe reconciledeither
with the other subsections of § 1512, or with the other obstruction provisionsin Title 18 that must
be read in pari passu with those in § 1512. Given Mueller’s sweeping interpretation, clause (c)(2)
would renderall the specific terms in clause (c)(1) surplusage; moreover, it would swallow upall

the specific prohibitionsin the remainderof § 1512 -- subsections(a), (b), and (d). Morethan that,
it would subsume virtually all other obstruction provisions in Title 18. For example, it would
supervenethe omnibusclause in § 1503, applicable to pendingjudicial proceedings,as wellas the
omnibus clause in § 1505, applicable to pending proceedings before agencies and Congress.
Construing the residual clause in § 1512(c)(2) as supplanting these provisions would eliminate the
restrictions Congress built into those provisions -- i.e., the requirement that a proceeding be
“pending” -- and would supplant the lower penalties in those provisions with the substantially
higher penalties in § 1512(c). It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that, if § 1512(c)(2) can
be read as broadly as being proposed,then virtually all Federal obstruction law could be reduced
to this single clause.

Needlessto say,it is highly implausible that such a revolution in obstruction law was intended, or
would have gone uncommented upon, when (c)(2) was enacted. On the contrary, the legislative

history makes plain that Congress had a more focused purpose whenit enacted (c)(2). That
subsection wasenacted in 2002as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. That statute was prompted by

Enron's massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company's outside auditor, Arthur

Andersen, had systematically destroyed potentially incriminating documents. Subsection (c) was
added to Section 1512 explicitly as a “loophole”closer meantto addressthe fact that the existing
section 1512(b) covers document destruction only where a defendanthas induced another person
to do it and does not address documentdestruction carried out by a defendantdirectly.
As reported to the Senate, the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act was expressly designed to
“clarify and close loopholesin the existing criminal lawsrelating to the destruction or fabrication
of evidence and the preservation offinancial and audit records.” S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 14-15.
Section 1512(c) did not exist as part of the original proposal. See S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002).
Instead, it was later introduced as an amendmentby Senator Trent Lott in July 2002. 148 Cong.
Rec. $6542 (daily ed. July 10, 2002). Senator Lott explained that, by adding new § 1512(c),his
proposed amendment:

 would enactstronger laws against document shredding. Current law prohibits
obstruction ofjustice by a defendantacting alone,butonly if a proceedingis

pending and a subpoena has been issued for the evidence that has been

destroyed or altered.... [T]his section would allow the Governmentto charge
obstruction against individuals whoacted alone, even if the tampering took
placepriorto the issuanceofa grandjury subpoena.I think this is something
we need to makeclear so we do not have a repeat of what we saw with the
Enron matter earlier this year.

Id. at $6545 (statement of Sen. Lott) (emphasis supplied). Senator Orrin Hatch, in support of
Senator Lott's amendment, explainedthatit would“close [] [the] loophole” created by the available

obstructionstatutes and hold criminallyliable a person who,acting alone, destroys documents.Id,
at $6550 (statement of Sen. Hatch). The legislative history thus confirmsthat § 1512(c) was not
intended as a sweeping provision supplanting wide swathes of obstruction law, but rather as a
targeted gap-filler designed to strengthen prohibitions on the impairmentofevidence.
Notonly is an all-encompassing reading of § 1512(c)(2) contrary to the language and

manifest purposeofthestatute,butit is precludedby a fundamental canonofstatutory construction
applicable to statutes of this sort. Statutes must be construed with reference to the constitutional
framework within which they operate. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
Reading § 1512(c)(2) broadly to criminalize the President’s facially-lawful exercises of his
removal authority and his prosecutorial discretion, based on probing his subjective state of mind
for evidence of an “improper” motive, would obviously intrude deeply into core areas of the
President’s constitutional powers. It is well-settled that statutes that do not expressly apply to the
President must be construed as not applying to the President if such application would involve a
possible conflict with the President's constitutional prerogatives. See, eg., Franklin vy.

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). OLC haslongrigorously enforcedthis “clearstatement”

rule to limit the reach of broadly worded statutes so as to prevent undueintrusion into the
President’s exercise of his Constitutional discretion.
As OLChasexplained,the “clear statement”rule has two sources.First, it arises from the

long-recognized "cardinal principle"ofstatutory interpretation that statutes be construed to avoid
raising serious constitutional questions. Second,the rule exists to protect the “usual constitutional
balance” between the branches contemplated by the Framersby "requir[ing] an express statement
by Congress before assuming it intended" to impinge upon Presidential authority. Franklin, 505
US. at 801; see, e.g., Application of 28 U.S.C. §458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal
Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350 (1995).
This clear statementrule has been applied frequently by the Supreme Court as wellas the
Executive branch with respect to statutes that might otherwise, if one were to ignore the
constitutional context, be susceptible of an application that would affect the President's
constitutional prerogatives. For instance, in Franklin the Court was called upon to determine

whether the Administrative Procedure Act("APA"), 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706, authorized "abuse of
discretion" review offinal actions by the President. Even thoughthe statute defined reviewable
action in a way that facially could include the President, and did notlist the President among the

express exceptions to the APA, Justice O'Connorwrote for the Court:

 [t]he Presidentis not [expressly] excluded from the APA's purview, but he is
notexplicitly included,either, Outof respectfor the separation ofpowers and
the unique constitutionalposition of the President, we findthat textualsilence

is not enough to subject the Presidentto the provisions of the APA. We would
require an express statement by Congress before assumingit intended the
President's performanceofhis statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

505 U.S. at 800-01. To amplify, she continued, "[a]s the APA does not expressly allow review of
the President's actions, we must presumethathis actions are not subjectto its requirements." Jd. at
801.
Similarly, in Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), the
Court held that the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. app. § 2, does not apply

to the judicial recommendation panels of the American Bar Association because interpreting the
statute as applying to them would raise serious constitutional questionsrelating to the President's
constitutional appointment power. By its terms, FACA applied to any advisory committee used by
an agency “in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President." 5 U.S.C.
app. § 3(2(c). While acknowledging that a "straightforward reading"ofthe statute’s language
would seem to require its application to the ABA committee, Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 453, the
Court held that such a reading wasprecludedbythe "cardinalprinciple"that a statute be interpreted
to avoid serious constitutional question.” Jd. at 465-67. Notably, the majority stated, "[oJur
reluctance to decide constitutional issues is especially great where, as here, they concern the

relative powers of coordinate branches of government," and "[t]hat construing FACA to apply to
the Justice Department's consultations with the ABA Committee would present formidable
constitutionaldifficulties is undeniable." Jd. at 466.
The Office of Legal Counsel hasconsistently “adhered to a plain statementrule: statutes
that do not expressly apply to the President must be construed as not applying to the
President, where applying the statute to the President would pose a significant question
regarding the President’s constitutional prerogatives.” E.g, The Constitutional Separation
of Powers Between the President and Congress, __ Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996);
Application of 28 U.S.C. §458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op.
O.L.C. 350 (1995).

The Departmenthasapplied this principle to broadly-wordedcriminalstatutes,like the one
at issue here. Thus,in a closely analogous context, the Departmenthaslongheld that the conflictof-interest statute, 18 U.S.C § 208, does not apply to the President. That statute prohibits any

“officer or employee of the executive branch"from "participat[ing] personally and substantially"
in any particular matter in which he or she has a personal financial interest. Jd. In the leading

opinion on the matter, then-Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman determined that the
legislative history disclosed no intention to cover the President and doing so wouldraise "serious

questionsasto the constitutionality" of the statute, becausethe effect of applyingthestatute to the
President would “disempower” the President from performing his constitutionally-prescribed
functionsasto certain matters . See Memorandumfor Richard T. Burress, Office ofthe President,

 Jrom Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict ofInterest Problems Arising
outofthe President's Nomination ofNelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the TwentyFifth Amendmentto the Constitution at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974).

Similarly, OLC opinedthat the Anti-Lobbying Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1913, doesnotapply fully
against the President. See Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op.
O.L.C. 300, 304-06 (1989). The Anti-Lobbying Act prohibits any appropriated funds from being
“used directly or indirectly to pay for any personalservice, advertisement, telegram, telephone,
letter, printed or written matter, or other device, intended or designedto influence in any manner
a Memberof Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 1913. Thestatute provided an exception for communications
by executive branch officers and employeesif the communication was madepursuantto a request
by a memberof Congress or was a request to Congress for legislation or appropriations. OLC
concluded that applying the Actas broadlyasits terms would otherwise allow wouldraise serious
constitutional questions as an infringementofthe President's Recommendations Clause power.
In addition to the “clear statement”rule, other canonsofstatutory construction preclude

giving the residual clause in §1512(c)(2) the unboundedscope proposed by Mueller’s obstruction

theory, As elaborated on in the ensuing section, to read the residual clause as extending beyond

evidence impairment, and to apply it to any that “corruptly” affects a proceeding, would raise

serious Due Process issues. Once divorced from the concrete standard of evidence impairment,

the residual clause defines neither the crime’s actus reus (what conduct amounts to obstruction)
norits mens rea (whatstate of mindis “corrupt”) “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conductis prohibited,”or “in a mannerthat does not encouragearbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” See e.g. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S.Ct. at 2373.

This

vagueness defect becomes even more pronounced when the statute is applied to a wide range of
public officials whose normal duties involve the exercise of prosecutorial ‘discretion and the
conduct and managementofofficial proceedings. The “cardinal rule” that a statute be interpreted
to avoid serious constitutional questions mandates rejection of the sweeping interpretation of the
residual clause proposed by Mueller.
Even if the statute’s plain meaning, fortified by the “clear statement” rule, were not

dispositive, the fact that § 1512 is a criminalstatute dictates a narrower reading than Mueller’s allencompassing interpretation. Even if the scope of § 1512(c)(2) were ambiguous, underthe “rule
oflenity,” that ambiguity mustbe resolved against the Government’s broaderreading. See, e.g.,
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these circumstances -- where text,

structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct -weapply therule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor.”)
In sum, the sweeping construction of § 1512(c)’s residual clause posited by Mueller’s

obstruction theory is novel and extravagant.It is contrary to the statute’s plain language,structure,
and legislative history. Such a broad reading would contravene the “clear statement” rule of

statutory construction, which the Department has rigorously adhered to in interpreting statutes,
like this one, that would otherwise intrude on Executive authority. By it terms, § 1512 is intended
to protect the truth-finding function of a proceeding by prohibiting acts that would impair the
availability or integrity of evidence. The cases applying the “residual clause” havefallen within
this scope. The clause has never before been applied to facially-lawful discretionary acts of

 Executive branch official. Mueller’s overly-aggressive use of the obstruction laws should not be
embraced by the Department and cannot support interrogation of the President to evaluate his

subjective state of mind.

I. Applying §1512(c)(2) to Review Facially-Lawful Exercises of the President’s Removal
Authority and Prosecutorial Discretion Would Impermissibly Infringe on the President’s
Constitutional Authority and the Functioning of the Executive Branch.
This case implicates at least two broad discretionary powers vested by the Constitution

exclusively in the President. First, in removing Comeyas director of the FBIthere is no question
that the President wasexercising one of his core authorities under the Constitution. Because the

President has Constitutional responsibility for seeing that the lawsare faithfully executed,it is
settled that he has “‘illimitable” discretion to removeprincipalofficers carrying out his Executive
functions. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S.Ct.
3138, 3152 (2010); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Similarly, in commenting to
Comeyabout Flynn’s situation — to the extentit is taken as the President having placed his thumb
on the scale in favor of lenity — the President was plainly within his plenary discretion over the
prosecution function. The Constitution vests all Federal law enforcement power, and hence

prosecutorial discretion, in the President. The President’s discretion in these areas has long been

considered “absolute,” and his decisions exercising this discretion are presumedto be regular and
are generally deemed non-reviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464

(1996); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); see generally S. Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521 (2005)

The central problem with Mueller’s interpretation of §1512(c)(2) is that, instead of
applying the statute to inherently wrongfulacts of evidence impairment, he would now define the
actus reus of obstruction as any act, including facially lawfulacts, that influence a proceeding.
However, the Constitution vests plenary authority over law enforcement proceedings in the
President, and therefore oneofthe President’s core constitutional authorities is precisely to make
decisions “influencing”proceedings.In addition, the Constitution vests other discretionary powers
in the President that can havea collateral influence on proceedings — including the power of
appointment, removal, and pardon. The crux of Mueller’s position is that, wheneverthe President
exercises any of these discretionary powers and thereby “influences” a proceeding, he has
completed the actus reus of the crime of obstruction. To establish guilt, all that remains is
evaluation ofthe President’s state of mind to divine whether he acted with a “corrupt” motive.

Construed in this manner, §1512(c)(2) would violate Article II of the Constitution in at
least two respects:
First, Mueller’s premise appears to be that, when a proceedingis looking into the President’s own
conduct, it would be “corrupt” within the meaning of §1512(c)(2) for the President to attempt to

influencethat proceeding. In other words, Mueller seemsto be claimingthat the obstructionstatute
effectively walls off the President from exercising Constitutional powers over cases in which his
own conductis being scrutinized, This premise is clearly wrong constitutionally. Nor can it be

 reconciled with the Department’s longstanding position that the “conflictofinterest” laws donot,

and cannot, apply to the President, since to apply them would impermissibly “disempower”the

President from supervising a class of cases that the Constitution grants him the authority to

supervise. Under the Constitution, the President’s authority over law enforcement matters is

necessarily all-encompassing, and Congress maynotexscindcertain matters from the scopeofhis
responsibilities. The Framers’ plan contemplates that the President’s law enforcement powers
extend to all matters, including those in which he had a personal stake, and that the proper
mechanism for policing the President’s faithful exercise ofthat discretion is the political process
~ that is, the People,actingeither directly, or through their elected representatives in Congress.
Second, quite apart from this misbegotten effort to “disempower”the President from acting on
matters in which hehasan interest, defining facially-lawful exercises of Executive discretion as
potential crimes, based solely on the President’s subjective motive, would violate Article II of the
Constitution by impermissibly burdening the exercise of core discretionary powers within the
Executive branch. The prospect ofcriminalliability based solely on the official’s state of mind,
coupled with the indefinite standards of “improper motive” and “obstruction,” would cast a pall
over a wide range of Executive decision-making, chill the exercise of discretion, and expose to

intrusive and free-ranging examination ofthe President’s (and his subordinate’s) subjective state
of mindin exercising that discretion.
A. Section 1512(c)(2) May Not “Disempower”the Presidentfrom Exercising His Law
Enforcement Authority Over a Particular Class ofMatters.

Asdiscussed further below,a fatal flaw in Mueller’s interpretation of §1512(c)(2)is that,

while defining obstruction solely as acting “corruptly,” Mueller offers no definition of what
“corruptly” means. It appears, however, that Mueller has in mindparticular circumstancesthat he
feels maygiverise to possible “corruptness”in the current matter. Histacit premise appearsto be
that, when an investigation is looking into the President’s own conduct, it would be “corrupt” for
the Presidentto attemptto influencethat investigation.
On a superficial level, this outlook is unsurprising: atfirst blush it accords with the old
Roman maxim that a man should notbe the judge in his own case and, because “conflict-ofinterest” laws applytoall the President’s subordinates, DOJ prosecutorsare steeped in the notion
thatit is illegal for anofficialto toucha case in which he hasa personalstake. Butconstitutionally,
as applied to the President,this mindset is entirely misconceived:there is no legalprohibition — as
opposed a political constraint -- against the President’s acting on a matter in which he has a
personalstake.
The Constitution itselfplaces no limit on the President’s authority to act on matters which
concern him or his own conduct. On the contrary, the Constitution’s grant of law enforcement
powerto the Presidentis plenary. Constitutionally, it is wrong to conceive of the President as
simply the highest officer within the Executive branch hierarchy. He alone is the Executive
branch. Assuch,heis the sole repository ofall Executive powers conferred by the Constitution.
Thus,the full measure of law enforcementauthority is placed in the President’s hands, and nolimit

is placed on the kinds of cases subject to his control and supervision. While the President has
subordinates --the Attorney General and DOJ lawyers -- who exercise prosecutorial discretion on

 his behalf, they are merely “his hand,” Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) — the

discretion they exercise is the President’s discretion, and their decisions are legitimate precisely
because they remain underhis supervision, andheisstill responsible and politically accountable
for them.

Nor doesany statute purportto restrict the President’s authority over matters in which he

has an interest. On the contrary, in 1974, the Department concludedthat the conflict-ofinterest-

laws cannot be construed as applying to the President, expressing “serious doubt as to the
constitutionality” of a statute that sought“to disempower”the Presidentfrom acting overparticular
matters. Letter to Honorable Howard W. Cannon from Acting Attorney General Laurence H.
Silberman, dated September 20, 1974; and Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office of the
President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest
Problems Arising out ofthe President's Nomination ofNelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974). As far as I am
aware,this is the only instance in which it has previously been suggested that a statute places a
class of law enforcementcases “offlimits” to the President’s supervision based on his personal
interest in the matters. The Departmentrejected that suggestion on the groundthat Congress could
not “disempower”the President from exercising his supervisory authority over such matters. For
all the same reasons, Congress could not makeit a crime for the Presidentto exercise supervisory
authority over cases in which his own conduct mightbeat issue.
Theillimitable nature of the President’s law enforcementdiscretion stemsnot just from the

Constitution’s plenary grant of those powersto the President, butalso from the “unitary” character
of the Executive branchitself. Because the President alone constitutes the Executive branch, the
President cannot“recuse” himself. Just as Congress could not en masserecuseitself, leaving no

sourceof the Legislative power, the President cannottake a holiday from his responsibilities.It is
in the very nature of discretionary powerthat ultimate authority for making the choice must be

vested in somefinal decision-maker. At the end of the day,there truly must be a desk at which

“the buck stops.” In the Executive, final responsibility must rest with the President. Thus, the
President, “though able to delegate duties to others, cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the
active obligation to supervise that goes with it.” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Acctg.
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 (2010) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-713

(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)) (emphasis added).

In framing a Constitution that entrusts broad discretion to the President, the Framers chose

the meansthey thought bestto police the exercise of that discretion. The Framers’ idea wasthat,
byplacingall discretionary law enforcementauthority in the hands ofa single “Chief Magistrate”
elected by all the People, and by making him politically accountable for all exercises of that
discretion by himself or his agents, they were providing the best way of ensuring the “faithful
exercise”of these powers. Every four years the people as a whole make a solemnnationaldecision
as to the person whom theytrust to make these prudential judgments.In the interim,the people’s
representatives stand watch and havethetools to oversee,discipline, and,ifthey deem appropriate,
removethe President from office. Thus, under the Framers’ plan, the determination whether the

President is making decisions based on “improper” motives or whether he is “faithfully”
discharging his responsibilitiesis left to the People, throughtheelection process, and the Congress,
through the Impeachmentprocess.

 The Framers’ idea ofpolitical accountability has proven remarkably successful, far more
so than the disastrous experimentation with an “independent” counsel statute, which both parties

agreed to purge from oursystem. By andlarge,fear ofpoliticalretribution has ensured that, when
confronted with serious allegations of misconduct within an Administration, Presidents have felt

it necessary to take practical steps to assure the people that matters will be pursued with integrity.
But the measuresthat Presidents have adopted are voluntary,dictated by political prudence, and
adapted to the situation; they are not legally compelled. Moreover, Congress has usually been
quick to respondto allegations of wrongdoing in the Executive and has shown itself more than
willing to conductinvestigations into such allegations. The fact that President is answerable for
any abuses of discretion and is ultimately subject to the judgment of Congress through the
impeachment process meansthat the President is not the judge in his own cause. See Nixon v.
Harlow, 457 U.S. 731, 757-58 n.41 (1982)(* The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the
President remains accountable under law for his misdeedsin office.”)
Mueller’s core premise -- that the President acts “corruptly”if he attempts to influence a
proceeding in which his own conductis beingscrutinized — is untenable. Because the Constitution,
and the Department’s own rulings, envision that the President may exercise his supervisory
authority over cases dealing with his own interests, the President transgressesnolegal limitation

whenhedoesso. Forthat reason,the President’s exercise of supervisory authority over such a case
does not amountto “corruption.” It may be in somecasespolitically unwise;butit is not a crime.
Moreover, it cannot be presumedthat any decision the President reaches in a case in whichhe is

interested is “improperly”affected by that personalinterest. Implicit in the Constitution’s grant of
authority over such cases, and in the Department’s position that the President cannot be
“disempowered” from acting in such cases,is the recognition that Presidents have the capacity to
decide such matters based on the public’s long-term interest.

In today’s world, Presidents are frequently accused of wrongdoing. Let us say that an
outgoing administration — say, an incumbent U.S. Attorney -- launches a “investigation” of an
incoming President. The new President knowsit is bogus, is being conducted by political
opponents, and is damaginghisability to establish his new Administration and to address urgent
matters on behalf of the Nation. It would neither be “corrupt”nor a crimefor the new President
to terminate the matter and leave any furtherinvestigation to Congress. There is no legalprinciple
that would insulate the matter from the President’s supervisory authority and mandate that he
passively submit while a bogusinvestigation runsits course.
Atthe endofthe day,I believe Mueller’s team would haveto concedethata President does
not act “corruptly” simply by acting on — even terminating — a matter that relates to his own
conduct. But I suspect they would take the only logicalfallback position from that — namely,that
it would be “corrupt”if the President had actually engaged in unlawful conduct and then blocked
an investigation to “cover up” the wrongdoing. In other words, the notion would bethat, if an
investigation was bogus, the President ultimately had legitimate grounds for exercising his
Supervisory powers to stop the matter. Conversely, if the President had really engaged in
wrongdoing,a decision to stop the case would have beena corrupt coverup. But,in thelattercase,
the predicate for finding any corruption wouldbefirst finding that the President had engaged in
the wrongdoinghe was allegedly trying to cover up. Undertheparticular circumstances here, the

 issue of obstruction only becomesripeafter the alleged collusion by the Presidentor his campaign
is establishedfirst. While the distinct crime of obstruction can frequently be committed even if the

underlying crime under investigation is never established, that is true only where the obstruction

is an act that is wrongfulinitself -- such as threatening a witness, or destroying evidence. Buthere,
the only basis for ascribing “wrongfulness”(i.e., an improper motive) to the President’s actionsis
the claim that he was attempting to block the uncovering of wrongdoing by himself or his
campaign. Until Mueller can show that there was unlawful collusion, he cannot show that the
President had an improper“cover up” motive.
For reasons discussed below, I do not subscribe to this notion. Buthereit is largely an

academic question. Either the President and his campaign engagedinillegal collusion or they did

not.If they did, then the issue of “obstruction”is a sideshow. However, if they did not, then the
cover up theory is untenable. And, at a practical level, in the absence of some wrongful act of

evidence destruction, the Department would have no business pursuing the President where it
cannot showanycollusion. Mueller should get on with the task at hand and reach a conclusion on
collusion. In the meantime, pursuing a novel obstruction theory against the Presidentis not only

premature but — because it forces resolution of numerous constitutional issues — grossly

irresponsible.

B. Using Obstruction Laws to Review the President’s Motives for Making FaciallyLawful Discretionary Decisions Impermissibly Infringes on the President’s
Constitutional Powers.

The crux of Mueller’s claim here is that, when the President performsa facially-lawful
discretionary action thatinfluences a proceeding, he may becriminally investigated to determine
whetherhe acted with an improper motive. It is hard to imagine a more invasive encroachmenton
Executive authority.
1. The Constitution Vests Discretion in the President To Decide Whether To Prosecute Cases or
To Remove Principal Executive Officers, and Those Decisions are Not Reviewable.
The authority to decide whether or not to bring prosecutions, as well as the authority to
appoint and remove principal Executive officers, and to grant pardons, are quintessentially
Executive in character and amongthe discretionary powers vested exclusively in the President by
the Constitution. When the Presidentexercises these discretionary powers,it is presumed he does
so lawfully, and his decisions are generally non-reviewable.
Theprinciple of non-reviewability inheres in the very reason for vesting these powers in
the Presidentin thefirst place. In governing anysociety certain choices must be made that cannot
be determinedbytidy legal standards but require prudential judgment. The imperativeis that there
must be some ultimate decision-maker whohasthe final, authoritative say -- at whose desk the
“buck”truly does stop. Any system wherebyotherofficials, not empoweredto makethe decision
themselves, are permitted to review the “final” decision for “improper motives”is antithetical both

to the exercise of discretion andits finality. And, even if review can censor a particular choice,it

leaves unaddressed the fact that a choicestill remains to be made, and the reviewers have no power
to makeit. The prospect of review itself undermines discretion. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

 598, 607- 608 (1985); cf Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. at 801. But any regimethat proposes
to review and punish decision-makers for “improper motives” ends up doing more harm than good
by chilling the exercise of discretion, “dampen[ing] the ardorofall but the mostresolute ...in the

unflinching discharge of their duties.” Gregoire y. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.

1949)(Learned Hand). In the end, the prospect of punishmentchills the exercise of discretion over
a far broader range of decisions than the supposedly improper decision being remedied.

McDonnell, 136 S.Ct, at 2373.

Forthese reasons, the law haserected an array ofprotections designed to prevent, orstrictly

limit, review ofthe exercise of the Executive discretionary powers. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

457 US 731,749 (1982) (the President’s unique discretionary powers require that he have absolute
immunity from civil suit for his official acts). An especially strong set of rules has been put in
place to insulate those who exercise prosecutorial discretion from second-guessing and the
possibility of punishment. See.e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. 8. 409 (1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 275
U. S. 503 (1927), affg 12 F, 2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926). Thus,“it is entirely clear that the refusal to
prosecute cannotbe the subject ofjudicial review.” See, e.g., ICC v. Brotherhood ofLocomotive
Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1965)
(The U.S. Attorney’s decision not to prosecute even wherethere is probable causeis “a matter of
executive discretion which cannot be coerced or reviewed by the courts.”); see also Hecklerv.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).

Even whenthere is a prosecutorial decision to proceed with a case, the law generally
precludes review or, in the narrow circumstances where review is permitted, limits the extent to
which the decision-makers’ subjective motivations may be examined. Thus, a prosecutor’s
decision to bring a case is generally protected from civil liability by absolute immunity, even if
the prosecutor had a malicious motive. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. S. 503 (1927), aff'g 12 F. 2d 396 (2d
Cir. 1926). Even where somereview is permitted, absent a claim ofselective prosecution based on
an impermissible classification, a court ordinarily will not look into the prosecutor’s real
motivations for bringing the case as long as probable cause existed to support prosecution. See

Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Further, even whenthereis a claim ofselective

prosecution based on an impermissible classification, courts do not permit the probing of the
prosecutor’s subjective state of mind until the plaintiff has first produced objective evidence that
the policy under which he has been prosecuted had a discriminatory effect. United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). The same considerations undergird the Department’s current
position in Hawaii v. Trump, where the Solicitor General is arguing that, in reviewing the
President’s travel ban, a court may notlook into the President’s subjective motivations when the

governmenthasstated a facially legitimate basis for the decision. (SG’s Merits Briefat 61).

In short, the President’s exercise of its Constitutional discretion is not subject to review for
“improper motivations” by lesser officials or by the courts. The judiciary has no authority “to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they havea discretion.

Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the

executive, can never be made”in the courts. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (3 U.S.) 137, 170
(1803).

 2. Threatening criminalliability for facially-lawful exercises of discretion, based solely on the

subjective motive, would impermissibly burden the exercise ofcore Constitutional powers within

the Executive branch..

Mueller is effectively proposing to use the criminal obstruction law as a means of
reviewing discretionary acts taken by the President when those acts influence a proceeding.
Mueller gets to this point in three steps. First, instead of confining §1512(c)(2) to inherently

wrongfulacts of evidence impairment, he would now define the actus reus of obstruction as any
act that influences a proceeding. Second, he would include within that category the official
discretionary actions taken by the President or other public officials carrying out their
Constitutional duties, including their authority to control all law enforcement matters. The net
effect of this is that, once the President or any subordinate takes any action that influences a

proceeding, he has completed the actus reus ofthe crimeof obstruction. Toestablish guilt, all that
remainsis evaluation of the President’s or official’s subjective state of mind to divine whether he
acted with an improper motive.
Wielding §1512(c)(2) in this way preempts the Framers’ plan ofpolitical accountability
and violate Article II of the Constitution by impermissibly burdening the exercise of the core
discretionary powers within the Executive branch. The prospect of criminal prosecution based
solely on the President’s state of mind, coupled with the indefinite standards of “improper motive”
and “obstruction,” would cast a pall over a wide range of Executive decision-making, chill the
exercise ofdiscretion, and exposeto intrusive and free-ranging examination the President’s (or his
subordinate’s) subjective state of mindin exercising that discretion

Anysystem that threatens to punish discretionary actions based on subjective motivation
naturally has a substantial chilling effect on the exercise of discretion. But Mueller’s proposed
regime would mountan especially onerous and unprecedentedintrusion on Executive authority.
The sanction thatis being threatened for improperly-motivatedactionsis the mostsevere possible
— personal criminalliability. Inevitably, the prospect of being accused of criminal conduct, and
possibly being investigated for such, would cause officials “to shrink” from making potentially
controversial decisions and sap the vigor with which they perform their duties. McDonnellv.
United States, 136 S.Ct. at 2372-73.

Further, the-chilling effect is especially powerful where,as here,liability turns solely on
the official’s subjective state of mind. Because chargesofofficial misconduct based on improper
motive are “easy to allege and hardto disprove,” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257-58 (2006),
Mueller’s regime substantially increases the likelihood of meritless claims, accompanied by the
all the risks of defending against them. Moreover, the review contemplated here would be far more
intrusive since it does not turn on an objective standard — such as the presence in the record of a
reasonable basis for the decision — but rather requires probing to determine the President’s actual
subjective state of mind in reaching a decision. As the Supreme Court has observed, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1982), even whenfaced only with civil liability, such an inquiry
is especially disruptive:
[I]t now is clear that substantial costs attend thelitigation of the subjective
goodfaith of governmentofficials. Not only are there the general costs of

 subjecting officials to the risks of trial — distraction of officials from their
governmentalduties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able
people from public service. There are special costs to "subjective" inquiries
of this kind. ...[T]he judgments surrounding discretionary action almost
inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and

emotions. These variables ...frame a background in which there often is no

clear end to the relevant evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation

therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery .... Inquiries of this kind can
be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.

Moreover,the encroachment on the Executive function is especially broad dueto the wide
range of actors and actions potentially covered. Because Mueller defines the actus reus of
obstruction as any act that influences a proceeding, he is including not just exercises of
prosecutorial discretion directly deciding whether a case will proceed ornot, but also exercises of
any other Presidential power that might collaterally affect a proceeding, such as a removal,
appointment,or grant of pardon. And, while Mueller’s immediate targetis the President’s exercise

ofhis discretionary powers,his obstruction theory reachesall exercises of prosecutorialdiscretion
bythe President’s subordinates, from the Attorney General, down the mostjuniorline prosecutor.
It also necessarily applies to all personnel, management, and operational decision by those who
are responsible for supervising and conductinglitigation and enforcement matters -- civil, criminal
or administrative -- on the President’s behalf.
A fatal flaw with Mueller’s regime — and onethat greatly exacerbatesits chilling effect -is that, while Mueller would criminalize any act “corruptly” influencing a proceeding, Mueller can
offer no definition of “corruptly.” Whatis the circumstance that would make an attempt by the
Presidentto influence a proceeding “corrupt?” Mueller would construe “corruptly”asreferring to
one’s purpose in seeking to influence a proceeding. But Mueller provides no standard for
determining what motives are legal and what motives are illegal. Is an attempt to influence a
proceeding based onpolitical motivations “corrupt?” Is an attempt based onself-interest? Based
on personal career considerations? Based on partisan considerations? On friendship or personal
affinity? Due process requiresthat the elements of a crime be defined "with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," or "in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." See McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373. This,
Mueller’s construction of §1512(c)(2) utterly fails to do.

It is worth pausing on the word “corruptly,” because courts have evinceda lot of confusion
over it. It is an adverb, modifying the verbs “influence,” “impede,” etc. But few courts have
deigned to analyze its precise adverbial mission. Does it refer to “how”the influence is
accomplished — i.e,, the means used to influence? Or doesit refer to the ultimate purpose behind
the attempt to influence? Asan original matter,I think it was clearly used to described the means
usedto influence. Asthe D.C. Circuit persuasively suggested, the word waslikely used in its 19"
century transitive sense, connoting the turning (or corrupting) of something from good andfit for
its purpose into something bad and unfit for its purpose — hence, “corrupting” a magistrate; or
“corrupting” evidence. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.1991). Understood
this way, the ideas behind the obstruction laws come moreclearly into focus. The thing that is

 corruptis the meansbeing used to influence the proceeding. They are inherently wrong because
they involvethe corruption of decision-makers or evidence. The culpable intent does notrelate to
the actor’s ultimate motive for using the corrupt means. Theculpablestate of mind is merely the
intent that the corrupt means bring about their immediate purpose, which is to sabotage the
proceeding’s truth-finding function. The actor’s ultimate purposeis irrelevant because the means,
and their immediate purpose,are dishonest and malign. Further,if the actor uses lawful means of
influencing a proceeding — such as asserting an evidentiary privilege, or bringing public opinion
pressure to bear on the prosecutors — then his ultimate motives are likewise irrelevant. See Arthur
Anderson, 544 U.S. at 703-707. Evenif the actoris guilty of a crime andhis only reasonforacting
is to escape justice, his use of lawful means to impedeorinfluence a proceeding are perfectly
legitimate.
Courts have gotten themselves into a box whenever they have suggested that“corruptly”

is not confined to the use of wrongful means, butcan also refer to someone’s ultimate motive for
using lawful meansto influence a proceeding. The problem, however,is that, as the courts have

consistently recognized, there is nothing inherently wrong with attemptingto influence or impede
a proceeding. Both the guilty and innocent have the right to use lawful meansto do that. Whatis
the motive that would makethe use of lawful meansto influence a proceeding “corrupt?” Courts
have been thrown backonlisting “synonyms”like “depraved, wicked,or bad.” Butthat begs the
question. What is depraved — the meansor the motive? If the latter, what makes the motive
depravedif the meansare within one’s legalrights? Fortunately for the courts,the cases invariably
involve evidence impairment, andso, after stumbling around, they get to a workable conclusion.
Congress has also taken this route. Poindexter struck down the omnibus clause of §1505 on the
grounds that, as the sole definition of obstruction, the word “corruptly” was unconstitutionally
vague. 951 F.2d at 377-86. Tellingly, when Congress sought to “clarify” the meaning of
“corruptly”in the wake of Poindexter, it settled on even more vague language — “acting with an
improper motive” — and then proceeded to qualify this definition further by adding, “including
making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a
documentor other information.” 18 U.S.C. §1515(b). The fact that Congress could not define
“corruptly” except through a laundry list of acts of evidence impairmentstrongly confirmsthat, in
the obstruction context, the word has nointrinsic meaning apart from its transitive sense of
compromising the honesty of a decision-maker or impairing evidence.
At the end ofthe day then, as long as §1512 is read as it was intended to be read — i.e., as

prohibiting actions designed to sabotage a proceeding’s access to complete and accurate evidence
-- the term “corruptly” derives meaning from that context. But once the word “corruptly”is

deracinated from that context, it becomes essentially meaningless as a standard. While Mueller’s

failure to define “corruptly” would be a Due Process violation initself, his application of that
“shapeless”prohibition on public officials engaged in the dischargeoftheir duties impermissibly
encroach on the Executive function by “cast[ing] the pall of potential prosecution” over a broad

range of lawful exercises of Executive discretion. McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373-74.

Thechilling effect is magnified still further because Mueller’s approachfails to define the
kind of impact an action must have to be considered an “obstruction.” Aslong as the concept of
obstructionis tied to evidence impairment,the natureofthe actions being prohibited is discernable.
But once taken out of this context, how does one differentiate between an unobjectionable

 “influence”and an illegal “obstruction?” The actions being alleged as obstructionsin this case
illustrate the point. Assuming arguendothat the President had motives such that, under Mueller’s

theory, any direct order by him to terminate the investigation would be considered an obstruction,

whataction short of that would be impermissible? The removal of Comeyis presumably being
investigated as “obstructive” due to somecollateral impactit could have on a proceeding. But
removing an agency head does not have the natural and foreseeable consequenceofobstructing
any proceeding being handled by that agency. How does one gauge whetherthe collateral effects
of one’s actions could impermissibly affect a proceeding?
The same problem exists regarding the President’s comments about Flynn. Evenif the

President’s motives were such that, under Mueller’s theory, he could not have ordered termination
of an investigation, to what extent do comments short ofthat constitute obstruction? On their face,

the President’s comments to Comey about Flynn seem unobjectionable. He made the accurate
observation that Flynn’s call with the Russian Ambassador wasperfectly proper and madethe
point that Flynn, who had nowsuffered public humiliation from losing his job, was a good man.
Based on this, he expressed the “hope” that Comey could “see his way clear”tolet the matter go.
The formulation that Comey “see his wayclear,”explicitly leaves the decision with Comey. Most
normal subordinates would not have found these comments obstructive. Would a superior’s
questioning the legal merit of a case be obstructive? Would pointing out some consequences of
the subordinate’s position be obstructive? Is something really an “obstruction”if it merely is
pressure acting upona prosecutor’s psyche? Is the obstructiveness ofpressure gauged objectively
or by how a subordinate subjectively apprehendsit?
Thepractical implications of Mueller’s approach, especially in light ofits “shapeless”
conceptof obstruction, are astounding. DOJ lawyers are always making decisionsthat invite the
allegation that they are improperly concluding or constraining an investigation. And these

allegations are frequently accompanied by a claim that the official is acting based on some

nefarious motive. Under the theory now being advanced, any claim that an exercise of

prosecutorial discretion was improperly motived could legitimately be presented as a potential

criminal obstruction. The claim would be madethat, unless the subjective motivations of the

decision makerare thoroughly explored through a grandjuryinvestigation,the putative “improper
motive” could not beruled out.

In an increasingly partisan environment, these concerns are by no meanstrivial. For
decades, the Departmenthas been routinely attacked both for its failure to pursue certain matters
andforits decisions to move forward on others. Especially when a house of Congressis held by
an opposing party, the Department is almost constantly being accused of deliberately scuttling
enforcementin a particular class of cases, usually involving the environmental laws. There are
claims that cases are not being brought, or are being brought, to appease an Administration’s
political constituency, or that the Departmentis failing to investigate a matterin order to cover up
its own wrongdoing,or to protect the Administration. Department is bombarded with requests to
namea special counselto pursuethis or that matter, andit is frequently claimed that his reluctance
to do so is based on an improper motive. When a supervisorintervenesin a case, directing a course
of action different from the onepreferred by the subordinate, not infrequently there is a tendency
for the subordinate to ascribe some nefarious motive. And when personnel changes are made — as

 for example, removing a U.S. Attorney — there are sometimesclaimsthat the move was intended
to truncate some investigation.
While these controversies have heretofore been waged largely on the field ofpolitical combat,
Mueller’s sweeping obstruction theory would now open the way for the “criminalization”ofthese
disputes. Predictably, challenges to the Department's decisionswill be accompaniedbyclaims that
the Attorney General, or other supervisory officials, are “obstructing” justice because their
directions are improperly motivated. Whenever the slightest colorable claim of a possible
“improper motive” is advanced, there will be calls for a criminal investigation into possible
“obstruction.” The prospect ofbeing accusedof criminal conduct, and possibly being investigated
for such, would inevitably cause officials “to shrink” from making potentially controversial
decisions.