DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER . "n (F-I ational Leader of Al-Oa'ida orAnAssociate 3 This white paper sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a US. citizen who is a senior operational leader of or an associated force' of al-Qa'ida--that is, an ai--Qa'ida leader actively engaged in planning operations to I er' determine the minimum requirements arecessgr lfitio nor does it assess what might be required to render a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen lawful in other circumstances, including an operation against enemy forces on a traditional battlefield or anoperation against a U.S. citizen who is not a senior operational leader of such forces. Here the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al--Qa'ida or an associated force would be lawful: re 1' r-A Leave] official of the U.S. government has dete1}yrne' I re -4 imminent threat of violent attack ag_ain.st the . (2Tl'fap is-ihfeas bio, and the United States continues to monitor er capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles. This conclusion is reached with recognition of the extraordinary seriousness of a lethal operation by' the United States against a U.S. citizen, and also of the extraordinary seriousness of the threat posed by senior operational al- Qa'ida members and the loss of life that would result were their operations successfill. The President has authority to- respond to the imminent threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its associated forces,,ari'siirg'fr'" "o to protect the country, the inherent right of the'Li flee f@e under international law, Congress's authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed con-flict with al--Qa'ida under international law. Based on these authorities, the President may use force against al- Qa'ida and its associated forces. A5 detailed in this white paper, in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen who has joined al-Qa'ida or its associated forces would be lawful under US. and international law. Targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent attack to the United States is lawful act of national self defense. Nor would it viglate ._the unlawful killings in Title 13 or the assissixrsgio he .fl'5S' No 1&3. Moreover, a lethal operation in a foreign-untied 5' I consistent with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted, for example, with the consent of the host nation's government or after a An associated force of al-Qa'ida includes a group that would qualify as a co-belligerent under the laws of war. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2009) (authority to detain extends to "associated forces," which "mean 'co--belligerents' as that term is understood under the laws of war"). determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual targeted. . I . i - Wei-e_--the t_a;g t.e'fa lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights' fa' ~rj" Fourth Arnendment, that individual citizeg' hi 'f irnrnunrze 11111 from a ethal operation. Under the traditional due process balancing analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, we recognize that there is no private interest more weighty than a person's interest in his life. But that interest must be balanced against the United States' interest in forestalling the threat of violence and death to other Americans that arises from an individual who is a senior operational leader of al-Q'aida or an associated force of al-Q'aida and in teing ag'a' sfithe United States. W- The paper beginsWr1'fl1--ahrief sun1rnai"y"' of the authority for the use of force in the situation described here, including the authority to target a U.S. citizen having the characteristics described above with lethal force outside the area of active hostilities. It continues with the constitutional questions, considering first whether a lethal operation against such a U.S. citizen would be consistent with the iith Amendmenfs Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. As part of the due process analysis,' the paper explains the I freon of of and . ape en rscusseswe ersuc anopera onwou e, I J. 4 "firth Fo ndi'rpent's prohibition on unreasonable It concludes that where certain conditions are met, a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces--a terrorist organization engaged in constant plotting against the United States, as well as an enemy force with which the United States is in a congressionally authorized armed conilict--and who himself poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, would not violate the Constitution. The paper also includes an analysis concluding that such an operation would not violate certain criminal provisions prohibiting the killing of U.S. nationals outside the i co crime or an assassination prohibigedlh I. i- either commission of a war . . t_fL?3155= The United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida and its associated forces, and Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those entities. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). In addition to the authority arising from the' Presidentjs use of force against al-Qa'ida and associated__fnrces is lawful . oil" er? and international law, including the Presidentls K: - to protect the nation and the inherent right-to-naelo defense recognized in international law (see, U.N. Charter an. 51). It was on these bases that the United States responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and "[t]hese domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day." Harold I-longju Koh,. Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) 0 Koh ASIL Speech"). 2 Any operation of the sort discussed here would be conducted in a foreign country against a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces who poses an - "nent attack against, the United States. A use'o,f'force und it - 'pawns esivoyi as an act of national selfvdefenscz In if' person wouldbe within core of individuals against whom Congress authonzed\Tlie use of necessary and appropriate force. The fact that such a person would also be a U.S. citizen would not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has held that the military may -constitutionally_ use force against a U.S. citizen who is a part of enemy forces. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, S18 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 587, 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ex-Parte UIS. Like "mposi of military detention, the use of lethal force' ggusgr eneni is" "int ortant incident of war." Hamdt, 542 U.S. a urality opinififi) quotaftilon onritteig See, General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies ofthe United States in the Field'|| 15 (Apr. 24, 1863) necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies") (emphasis omitted); International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of12 Aug. I949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed icts (. diditior-1 . .ptocol II) 4739 (1987) ("Those who belong fofi-1tnay.- ked at any time"); Yoram Dinstein, fie~Condnc? fikf*s a rider of tonal Armed Conflict 94 (2004) ("When apersorn' es or merely dons a uniform as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to enemy attack"). Accordingly, the Department does not believe that U.S. citizenship would imrnunize a senior operational leader of or its associated forces from a use of force abroad authorized by the AUMF or in national self-defense. In addition, the United States retains its authority to use force against al-Qa'ida and associated forces outside the area of active hostilities when it targets a senior :3:-rztisnal leadefjtlaf fie forces: 'mt gerlgz piaming operations to ericans. nite rates ,in _ex?a an ed conflict with and its associate orces. See Ham Reef' .S I 43 . 557, 623-31 - (2006) (holding that a conflict between a nation and 3. transnational non-state actor, occurring outside the nation's territory, is an armed conflict "not of an international character" (quoting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions)'because it is not a "clash between nations"). Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-intemational armed conflict, even if it were to take place away fi'om the zone of active hostilities. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security, Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our . 3: erif/g" d(C)ur Values and Laws (SeptEiiotatie oli ta.iise military force against al-Qa'ida as 'hot" battlefields like Afghanistan"). For example, the AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation on the use of force it authorizes. See Hamdon, S48 U.S. at 631 (Kennedy, ., concurring) (what makes a non-international armed conflict distinct from an international armed conflict is "the legal status of the entities opposing each other"). None of the three branches of the U.S. Government has identified a strict geographical limit on the permissible scope of the AUMF's authorization. See, 3 :2 Letter for the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate from the President (June 15, 2010) (reporting that the armed forces, with the assistance of numerous international partners, continue to conduct operations "against al- - the United States has "d6P10Y?d comltatreciui pegbigreestgive be U.S. Central . . .Command area[] ofoperatio t: those [overseas counter-terrorist] operations"); Bensayoh v. Obama, .3d 71 7271'," 724-25, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding fliat an individual turned over to the United States in Bosnia could be detained if the government demonstrates he was part of al- Qa'ida); oi-Adahi v. 613 F.3d 1102, 1003, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting authority under AUMF to detain individual apprehended by Pakistani authorities in Pakistan and then transferred c' -, .-rs {l Claiming that for purposes of intemational law, an armed conflict generally exists only when there is "protracted armed violence between govemmental authorities and organized armed groups," Prosecutor v. Todic, Case No. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 'll 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia, App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995), some comrnenters have suggested that the eonflict between the United States and al-Qa'ida cannot lawfully extend to nations jznistagei ,which the level of hostilities is less intense or prolonged th . - izzbe ., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the C'om_ - Zr' f-4 . . . (2009). There is little judicial or otlTe'Fatltlior'itati precedent that speaks directly to the question of the geographic scope of a non- international armed conflict in which one of the parties is a transnational, non-state actor and where the principal theater of operations is not within the territory of the nation that is a party to the conflict. Thus, in considering this potential issue, the Department looks to principles and statements from analogous contexts. The Department has not found any authority for the proposition that when one of the parties to an armed conflict plans esgop I base in a new nation, an operation to '1 fig: tl bejart of the original armed conflict, and thus subject to the laws of war goveming that conflict, unless the hostilities become sufficiently intense and protracted in the new location. That does not appear to be the rule of the historical practice, for instance, even in a traditional international conflict. See John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, United States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of International Law, Address before the Harrimarskjold Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (May 28, 1970), in 3 The Vietnam War and International Low: The Widening Context 23, 23-30 (Richard A. Fallc, ed. 1972) (arguing that in an international armed a . "able for any reason to prevent violations of neaqaflfiif eebellig i rd its territory as a base of operations, the-otheiz-b has historically been justified in attacking those enemy forces in that state). Particularly in a non-international armed conflict, where terrorist organizations may move their base of operations from one country to another, the determination of whether a particular operation would be part of an ongoing armed conflict would require consideration of the particular facts and circumstances in each case, including the fact that transnational non- state organizations such as al--Qa'ida may have no single site serving as their base of 4 operations. See also, Geofirey S. Corn Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot." A Proposal for Determining Applicability ofihe Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 787, 799 (2003) ("If . . . the ultimate purpose of the drafters of 'a enevl nsjwas to prevent 'law avoidance' by developingade fact lafilj with the humanitarian foundation of the g' the 7 myopic focus on the geographic nature of an armed eonflict in the context of transnational counterterrorist combat operations serves to frustrate that If an operation of the kind discussed in this paper were to occur in a location where al--Qa'ida or an associated force has a significant and organized presence and from which al--Qa'ida or an associated force, its 'o ichal leaders, plan attacks against U.S. persons and}n' flame' ofthe non- intemational armed etween the Unite States and al-Qa'i that the Supreme Court recognized in Moreover, such an operation would be consistent with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted, for example, with the consent of the host nation's government or after a determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual targeted. In such circumstances, targeting a U.S. citizen of the kind described in this I Tape woul autlp . 'under the ACMF and the inherent right topational self . - - tl"t9nty, the question becomes whether and what 7 . majflinut ise. II. The Department assumes that the rights afforded by Fifth Amendmenfs Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion); United States v. Verdugo-- Urquidez, 494 U.S. 25 9, 269-70 (1990); see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East vf.3_ n.7 The U.S. citizenship of a leader ct? how' oes not give that person constitutional immunity from attack. 's paper next consi ers whether and in what' circumstances a lethal operation would violate any possible constitutional protections of a U.S. citizen. A. The Due Process Clause would not prohibit a lethal operation of the sort contemplated here._ _1n_Hqma'i, a plurality of the Supreme Court used the_Morhews '4 !F?i&idg mg'f? 'EURana1yze the Fifth Amendment due processfights of _2 be? capthred on the battlefield in Afghanistan and 'detainedli th -.--.. rd 2 See Prosecutor v. Tc-die, Case No. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused, at 27-28 (1nt'I Crirn. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, App. Chamber July 17, 1995) (in determining which body of law applies in a particular conflict, "the conflict must be considered as a whole, and "it is artificial and improper to attempt to divide it into isolated segments, either geographically or chronologically"). 5 Ii": Nip: . Ethel 3 United States, and who wished to challenge the govemmenfs assertion that he was part of enemy forces. The Court explained that the "process due in any given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the official action' asserted interest, 'including the r-i fifive" eifiyvould face in providing greater process." Hamiyi, 529 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, The due process balancing analysis applied to_ determine the Fifth Amendment rights of a U.S. citizen with respect to law-of-war detention supplies the framework for assessing the process due a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of an enemy force planning violent attacks against Americans before he is subjected to lethal targeting. . er' xx In the circumstances conga sfionfli" ._s31les would be weighty. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) ("It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this An individual's interest in avoiding erroneous deprivation of his life is "uniquely compelling." See Aka v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 178 (1985) ("The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely coinpellingf'). No private interest is more substantial. At the same time, the en i}mmr aging war, protecting its citizens, and . - 1..-. 3/ E$Pdsed forces is also compelling. Cf Hamdi,.542 U.S I "f (plfifality opinion 'On other side of the scale are the weighty an sensitive govemmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United As the Hamdi plurality observed, in the "circumstances of war," "the risk of erroneous deprivation of a citizen's liberty in the absence of sufficient process . . . is very real," id. at 530 (plurality opinion), and, of course, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a cit_izen's life is even more significant. But, "the realities of combat" render certain uses of force "necessary and appropriate," including force against U.S. citizens who have joined enemy forces in the armed conflict against the ~Uni'te5i State" a Mjifics go imminent threat of violent attack against the United'S I ue: not blink at those realities." Id. at 531 (plurality opinion). These same realities must also be considered in assessing "the burdens the Crovernment would face in providing greater process" to a member of enemy forces. Id. at 529, (plurality opinion). in view of these interests and practical considerations, the United States would be able to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen, who is located outside the United States and is an operational leader continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in .atl the 'oll win stances: (1) where an informed, of the, . . '4 . gofi ed that the targeted individual poses -ieag nited States; (2) where a capture operation-we-ulel'b! infeasible--and where those conducting the operation continue to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) where such an operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war principles. In these circumstances, the "realities" of the conflict and flie weight of the govemmenfs interest in protecting its citizens from an imminent attack are such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide further process to such a U.S. citizen before using lethal force. Cf." Hamdi, 542 6 qeive 31-ties agree that initial captures on the hamehldw pgt'(4 . U.S. at 535 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court "accord[s] the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities i.n matters relating to the actual prosecution of war, and . . . the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide"); id. at 534 Loses; efiwc discussed here; that process is due only whe -, determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized") (emphasis omitted). Certain aspects of this legal framework require additional explication. First', the condition that an operational leader present an "in:|mir1ent" threat of violent attack against the United States does notr?vquirc the cl tee to five' cl evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interi: lace-7 ture. Given the nature of, for example, the terrorist attacks on eptember 1 1, in which civilian airliners were hijacked to strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this definition of rrnminence, which would require the United States to refrain from action until preparations for an attack are concluded, would not allow the United States sufficient time to defend itself. The defensive options available to the United States may be reduced or eliminated if al-Qa'ida operatives disappear and cannot be found when the 1? or ,en1 sis ey aveoyarrnr whic to defend Americans in a manner that has a likelihood of success and sufficiently reduces the probabilities of civilian causalities. See Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Low, l7.Yale J. Int'l L. 609, 648 (1992). Furthermore, a "terrorist 'war' does not consist of a massive attack across an international border, nor does it consist of one isolated incident that occurs and is then past. It is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks. It is very difiicult to know when or where the next incident will occur." Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. Int'l 145, 173 (2000); seaaiso Testimony oi'Attorne -Geireral Lord'; Hansard. H.L. (April 21, 2004) 370 avail . 5 ublications. a./1d2003 42lftexti4042] - 07.htm (what constitutes an imminent threat "will develop to meet new circumstances and new threats . . . . It must be right that states are able to act in self-defense in circumstances where there is evidence of further imminent attacks by terrorist groups, even if there is no specific evidence of where such an attack will take place or of the precise nature of the Delaying action against individuals continually planning to kill Americans until some theoretical end stage of the planning for a particular plot would create an mracceptably high risk that the action would fail and By its nature, therefore, the threat posed by and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imnrinence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate. In this context, irnminence must incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks on Americans. Thus, a decision maker 7 :2 ;3l\ that al-Qaiida would engage in such attacks r_ arly tent dose; that the U.S. government may not be aware C.) . P: rt that the member poses an imminent threat. _prohibitior_1s_ ainst treachery and perfidy, which address a breach of confidence the - - '?s?ailan '0 Whether an al--Qa'ida operational leader presents an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States must take into account that certain members of al- Qa'ida (including any potential target of lethal force) are continually plotting attacks plots as they are eveloping and thus cannot be confident that none is out to occur; and that, in light of these predicates, the nation may have a limited window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood of success and reduces the probability of American casualties. With this understanding, a 1211 cial uld 'cone for example, that an individual poses an "imminent t_ly' ent e_\U ited States where he is an operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an assoc .ated force and is personally and continually involved in planning terrorist attacks against the United States. Moreover, where the al--Qa'ida member in question has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that member's involvement in al-Qa'ida's continuing terrorist campaign against the United States would re?ardi5l'gJ the feasibility of capture, capture would n'OT'b'5'fEURdsi|liEifi|TrJ i could not be physically effectuated during the relevant window 'of opportunity or if the relevant country were to decline to consent to a capture operation. Other factors such as undue risk to U.S. personnel conducting a potential capture operation also could be relevant. Feasibility would be a highly fact-specific and potentially time-sensitive inquiry. Third, it is a premise here that any such lethal operation by the United States would comply with the four' iiples v_eming the use of force: necessity, distinction, prgo ,gnJd (1)1 atgdance 01? unnecessary suffering). See, United States Air Force, Targeting, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9, at 88 (June 3, 2006); Dinstein, Conduct at 16-20, 115-16, 119-23 see also .2010 Kai: ASIL Speech. For exampie, it would not be consistent with those principles to continue an operation if anticipated civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Implementation of the Law of War Program 1| 4.a, at 1 (Apr. 30, 2010). An operation consistent with the laws of war could not violate the gig Convention Iv, Annex, art. 23(b), Oct. 1s;'1907i_ 3 is esiltecially forbidden . . . [t]o kill or wound treacherous individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army . . . These prohibitions do not, however, categorically forbid the use of stealth or surprise, nor forbid attacks on identified individual soldiers or officers. See U.S. Army Field Manual 2?-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 1[ 31 (1956) (article 23(b) of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV does no "preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere"). And the Department is not aware of 8 _l_'Jc any other law-of-war grounds precluding use of such tactics. Sea Dinstein, Conduct of at 94-95, 199; Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 120-21 (1939). Relatedly, "there: is no prohibition under oi' ugje of technologically advanced weapons systems in: adj, (4. . - f_i - as',pi tlfis aircraft or so-called smart asihe of) 'f employed in conformity with applicable laws of war." .2010 ASIL Speech. Further, under this framework, the United States would also be required to accept a surrender if it were feasible to do so. In sum, an operation in the circumstances and under the constraints described above would not result in a violatioJnfl' any +4 . Similarly, assuming that a lethal operation targeting a U.S. citizen abroad who is planning attacks against the United States would result in a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, such an operation would not violate that Amendrnent in the circumstances posited here. The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutionality of a seizure is [lag] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ . - - n'_dtne9t~ against the importance of the governmental in r, to:i1Ist' ta 1011 i .1 ea fix n. ermessee Garner, 4'71 US. 1, 8 (1985) In em quo marks omitted); accord Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). Even in domestic law enforcement operations, the Court has noted that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Thus, "if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believethat he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to revent esca e, and if, where feasible, 'n eerjr 3' on!" Id. at 11-12. . Narrator as . The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" test is situation-dependent. Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 ("Gamer did not establish a magical onJ'ofi' switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute 'deadly What would constitute a reasonable use of lethal force for purposes of domestic law enforcement operations difiers substantially from what would be reasonable in the situation and circumstances discussed in this white paper. But at least in circumstances where the targeted person is an operational leader of an enemy force and an informed, hi gh--Ievei government oflicial has deterrnined that he poses an imminent threat of_ violent attack, . 5 and those conducting the operation would out 'f cd ere infeasible, the use of lethal force would-not-vibl' to Fourth Amendment. Under such circumstances, the intrusion on any Fourth Amendment interests would be outweighed by the "importance of the governmental interests [that] justify the intrusion," Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-the interests in protecting the lives of Americans. . 1' /e an C. I Finally, the Department notes that under the circumstances described in this r, theri ppropriate judicial forum to evaluate these 'constitutio . Haj) . - 11s It/1 giljestabhshed that "[m]atters intimately related ., an nationafficurity are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention, aig 45.3 U.S. 280, 292 (1981), because such matters "frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application," or "involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Were a court to intervene here, it might be required inappropriately to issue an ex ante command to the President and officials responsible or; petga? - specific tactical judgment to mount a potential Igh' peytional leader of Qa"ida or its associated forces. And judicial enforcement of such orders would require the Court to supervise inherently predictive judgments by the President and his national security advisors as to when and how to use force against a member of an enemy force against which Congress has authorized the use of force. D. "(fl 1 title 18 provides that a "person who, behjgh natib 'fr 1 tatefilcil a to kill a national of the United StatetTWl'tl1E'S'i.1c t'ltmJal"' is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113." 18 U.S.C. 1l19(b) Because the person who would be the target of the kind of operation discussed here would be a U.S. citizen, it might be suggested that section 11l9(b) would prohibit such an operation. Section 1119, however, incorporates the federal murder and manslaughter statutes, and thus its prohibition extends only to "unlawful 13 U.S.C. l11l(a), 1 l12(a) (2006). Section 1119 is best construed to incorporate the "public authority" justification; I <