No. 18-587

In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2006) ................................................................................... 8, 9
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) ...................................................................................... 4
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ............................. 6, 7
I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs,
482 U.S. 270 (1987)................................................................ 6
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) ..................................... 4
Nielsen v. Preap, 138 S. Ct. 1279 (2018) ............................... 4
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ................................................. 3
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) .......................... 2
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (2015), aff ’d by
an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) ..... 3, 9, 10
Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662
(S.D. Tex. 2018) ................................................................. 3, 9
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) .......................... 2, 4
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532
(2018) ...................................................................................... 2
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) ..................... 2
Statute and rules:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.:
5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)............................................................... 6
Sup. Ct.:
Rule 10 ................................................................................ 2
Rule 10(c) ........................................................................... 2
Rule 11 ................................................................................ 2

(I)

 II
Miscellaneous:

Page

Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice
(10th ed. 2013) ..................................................................... 11

 In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 18-587
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

When this Court declined to grant certiorari before
judgment to review the district court’s injunction requiring the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to maintain the non-enforcement policy known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the Court
made clear that it expected the court of appeals to “proceed expeditiously to decide this case,” at which time
the government could renew its request. 2/26/18 Order
(No. 17-1003). More than ten months later, the court of
appeals’ judgment is here and the Court is presented
the opportunity it anticipated in February. The Court
should now grant certiorari and resolve this important
dispute this Term.
1. When the government filed this petition in November, the court of appeals had still not issued its
judgment. The petition therefore explained (at 15-17)
why this case met the Court’s heightened standard for
(1)

 2
certiorari before judgment. See Sup. Ct. R. 11. Respondents rely heavily on that same standard in opposition. See, e.g., Indiv. Br. in Opp. 12 (“There is no reason
* * * to ignore normal processes and grant review”);
Regents Br. in Opp. 14 (arguing against “truncat[ing]
the ordinary process”). By virtue of the intervening
judgment, however, the certiorari decision is now governed by the Court’s ordinary standard under Rule 10.
And whether further review is warranted under that
standard is not a close question. Respondents’ arguments to the contrary lack merit.
a. Respondents contend (Indiv. Br. in Opp. 12-17)
that review is unwarranted in the absence of a circuit conflict. But certiorari is appropriate when “a United States
court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). And the Court frequently
reviews decisions, like the one below, that interfere with
the implementation of federal policies and enforcement
of federal law, particularly immigration law, without any
conflict. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532
(2018); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). Indeed, this Court granted certiorari absent a circuit conflict in United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), after the Fifth Circuit affirmed a nationwide preliminary
injunction preventing implementation of the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) and expanded DACA policies.
The court of appeals’ decision here presents at least
as strong a case for this Court’s review. The district
court’s nationwide injunction commands the government to preserve a policy that affirmatively sanctions
the ongoing violation of federal law by 700,00 aliens who

 3
have no lawful immigration status and no right to
the policy’s continuation. Cf. Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(AADC). Absent this Court’s intervention, the government will be required to maintain the policy nationwide
for years after DHS and the Attorney General determined that it should end.
Moreover, there is a circuit conflict. In Texas v.
United States, the Fifth Circuit held that the DAPA and
expanded DACA policies were “manifestly contrary” to
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 809 F.3d
134, 186 (2015) (Texas I), aff ’d by an equally divided
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). As the district court that
enjoined those policies has recognized, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning applies equally to DACA. See Texas v.
United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 723 (S.D. Tex. 2018)
(Texas II). Indeed, although the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Texas I in some respects, it ultimately disagreed with critical portions of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. Compare Texas I, 809 F.3d at 179, 186
(concluding that in identifying several “narrow classes”
of aliens eligible for deferred action, Congress “foreclosed” the creation of broad new categories), with
Supp. Br. App. 54a (“We think the much more reasonable conclusion is that in * * * instructing that this and
that ‘narrow class[]’ of noncitizens should be eligible for
deferred action, Congress meant to say nothing at all
about the underlying power of the Executive Branch to
grant the same remedy to others.”) (citation omitted;
brackets in original). And the Ninth Circuit did not
even try to square its determination that DACA is lawful with the Fifth Circuit’s determination that expanded
DACA was not. See id. at 55a (finding “the Texas court’s

 4
treatment of the DACA expansion” not “to be strong
persuasive authority”).
b. Respondents argue (Indiv. Br. in Opp. 17-19) that
the interlocutory posture of this case is reason to deny
review. But the Court reviews interlocutory decisions
presenting important legal issues. See, e.g., Trump v.
Hawaii, supra; Nielsen v. Preap, 138 S. Ct. 1279 (2018);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014). Again, the Court granted certiorari in Texas to
review the preliminary injunction against the DAPA and
expanded DACA policies. Just as in Texas, even if the
question were only whether to maintain the nationwide
“status quo” while litigation proceeds, Regents Br. in
Opp. 22, in a case of this magnitude the answer should
come from this Court.
In any event, respondents are plainly wrong to assert (Regents Br. in Opp. 15) that it would be difficult
for the Court to “fully resolve the litigation at this
stage.” This Court always has the authority, in reviewing a preliminary injunction, to “address the merits” of
the litigation when appropriate. Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 691 (2008). Moreover, the district court also
certified for interlocutory appeal its order resolving the
government’s motion to dismiss, in which the government sought to dismiss the entire case. And the court of
appeals affirmed that order alongside the preliminary injunction. Supp. Br. App. 61a-77a. If this Court grants
certiorari and agrees with the government on the merits, termination of this litigation would thus not only be
“[]possible,” Regents Br. in Opp. 15, but inevitable.
Respondents also err in contending (Regents Br. in
Opp. 18) that the earlier dispute about the scope of the
record counsels against further review. Respondents
themselves recognize (ibid.) that the Court does not

 5
need to resolve any record issues to review the preliminary injunction itself. The Court would also, of course,
not need to resolve the scope of the record for APA review if it determines the rescission is not reviewable under the APA at all. If the Court determines that the
merits of respondents’ claim are reviewable under the
APA, it may need to determine the scope of the record.
But that subsidiary question itself is one on which the
lower courts are in need of this Court’s guidance. See,
e.g., 138 S. Ct. 443.
c. Contrary to respondents’ assertions (Indiv. Br. in
Opp. 21), the government’s conduct has been consistent
with the need for prompt resolution of this dispute. It
has so advocated from the very start of this litigation,
and it has made considerable effort in all of these cases
to make it possible—filing briefs in advance of courtordered deadlines, seeking expedition, and seeking certifications for interlocutory appeal of dispositive rulings. Respondents nevertheless fault (State Br. in Opp.
16) the government for not requesting stays of the injunctions here and in the related cases. But seeking
such relief is not a prerequisite to seeking certiorari.
And the government has taken other steps to ensure
that the injunctions are not unnecessarily prolonged, including filing a petition for a writ of certiorari before
judgment within days of the entry of the first injunction
and filing this petition in time for the Court to hear this
dispute in the ordinary course before the end of this Term.
d. Finally, a decision from this Court would not “preempt the political process.” Indiv. Br. in Opp. 24. A decision concerning DHS’s authority to rescind DACA would
say nothing about Congress’s unquestioned power to alter the immigration status of DACA recipients. And if
anything, it is the preliminary injunction obtained by

 6
respondents and the legal uncertainty surrounding the
rescission that is impeding legislative efforts.
2. Review of the court of appeals’ judgment is further warranted because the decision is wrong.
a. Establishing enforcement policies is a type of
agency action that “traditionally” has been regarded
as unsuitable for judicial review, Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), and is therefore “committed to
agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). Pet. 1721. Respondents argue (State Br. in Opp. 19-22) that
rule does not apply because DHS supposedly based its
rescission decision solely on a legal conclusion—
namely, that DACA is unlawful. But even if Chaney
“left open” whether resting on a legal ground can render a traditionally unreviewable decision reviewable, id.
at 19 (citation omitted), this Court’s subsequent decision in I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (BLE), removes any doubt. See
Supp. Br. App. 82a (Owens, J., concurring in the judgment). As the BLE Court explained, agency actions falling within a “tradition of nonreviewability” do not “become[] reviewable” any time they rest on the agency’s
view of the underlying legal regime. 482 U.S. at 282-283.
Indeed, “a common reason for failure to prosecute an
alleged criminal violation is the prosecutor’s belief
(sometimes publicly stated) that the law will not sustain
a conviction,” yet it is “entirely clear” that such decisions are unreviewable. Id. at 283.
In any event, DACA’s rescission is also based on concerns about the implications of maintaining a nonenforcement policy of questionable legality and other
policy concerns. See Pet. 23-28. In other words, it reflects the sort of “complicated balancing of a number of

 7
factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise” that makes enforcement discretion traditionally
unreviewable. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. Particularly in
light of Secretary Nielsen’s official memorandum
clearly stating that these concerns justify rescinding
DACA “whether the courts would ultimately uphold
[the policy] or not,” Pet. App. 123a, judicial review of
such a decision is not required to “ensur[e] clear public
accountability for government actions.” State Br. in
Opp. 21.
Respondents also briefly repeat (State Br. in Opp.
19) the district court’s theory that programmatic determinations of enforcement priorities are “different from
day-to-day agency nonenforcement decisions.” Pet. App.
28a (citation omitted). The court of appeals declined to
endorse that theory for good reason: it is flatly contrary
to Chaney, which itself concerned the programmatic determination whether to enforce the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act with respect to drugs used to administer the death penalty. See 470 U.S. at 824-825.
b. Even if the decision were reviewable, it was eminently reasonable for DHS to rescind DACA based on
three independent rationales.
First, the rescission is supported by DHS’s serious
doubts about the legality of the policy. Pet. 23-27. Contrary to respondents’ assertions (Regents Br. in Opp.
32), that rationale is readily discernible from the Duke
memorandum—which explained that, in light of the
Texas decisions and the Attorney General’s letter, the
DACA policy “should be terminated,” not that it must.
Pet. App. 117a (emphasis added). Acting Secretary
Duke rescinded the policy “[i]n the exercise of [her] authority in establishing national immigration policies and
priorities,” not as compelled by law. Ibid. And in any

 8
event, the Nielsen memorandum removes any doubt
whether the rescission rests on concerns about maintaining an enforcement policy of questionable legality,
independent of its ultimate legality. See id. at 123a.
Respondents contend (Indiv. Br. in Opp. 31-32) that
the government did not adequately consider either potential non-merits defenses to a lawsuit by the Texas plaintiffs or DACA recipients’ reliance interests. But there
are “sound reasons for a law enforcement agency to
avoid discretionary policies that are legally questionable,” wholly apart from whether those policies will ultimately be invalidated by courts, including “the risk that
such policies may undermine public confidence in and
reliance on the agency and the rule of law.” Pet. App.
123a. Respondents also provide no basis for secondguessing DHS’s conclusion that these concerns “outweigh” any reliance interests that DACA recipients may
assert in the maintenance of such a policy. Id. at 125a.
Second, the rescission is justified by independent
policy concerns that Secretary Nielsen explained would
support rescission “[e]ven if a policy such as DACA
could be implemented lawfully.” Pet. App. 124a; see
Pet. 27-28. Respondents insist that the Court ignore
these concerns because the Nielsen memorandum was
not a “ ‘fresh agency action’ (a Rescission 2.0).” Indiv.
Br. in Opp. 33 (citation omitted). Respondents would
apparently require DHS to reset this protracted litigation by issuing a “new” independent agency decision on
DACA before the current Secretary could offer any further explanation of the rescission. But where, as in
NAACP, a court determines that an agency’s initial explanation is insufficient and requests further explanation, “it is incumbent upon the court to consider that explanation when it arrives.” Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt,

 9
460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006). That is particularly appropriate here, given that every court to have addressed the question has agreed that the rescission did
not require notice-and-comment rulemaking and therefore the Nielsen memorandum itself satisfies the procedural requirements for a new agency action.
Third, the rescission is supported by DHS’s correct
determination that the DACA policy is unlawful. Pet.
28-30. Although respondents criticize (State Br. in Opp.
23-25) DHS for failing to sufficiently explain its legal
reasoning, it was utterly reasonable for DHS to rely on
the Fifth Circuit’s detailed analysis of the closely related DAPA and expanded DACA policies. See Pet.
App. 122a (“Any arguable distinctions between the DAPA
and DACA policies are not sufficiently material to convince
me that the DACA policy is lawful.”).
Respondents remarkably contend that the Texas I
decision is “inapposite.” Indiv. Br. in Opp. 30 (citation
omitted). They observe (Regents Br. in Opp. 32) that
the Fifth Circuit cited INA provisions that create a
mechanism for aliens to derive lawful immigration status from the status of their U.S. citizen children. Because no parallel pathway to lawful status allegedly exists for DACA recipients, respondents contend that no
direct conflict with the INA exists here. Ibid.; see Supp.
Br. App. 52a. But the pathway to lawful status in Texas
I is available to only some of the aliens who would have
qualified for DAPA, see 809 F.3d at 179-180 (not for parents of lawful permanent residents), and to none of the
aliens who would have qualified for expanded DACA,
see Texas II, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 724. A direct conflict
with those particular provisions therefore could not
have been necessary to the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.
They are simply part of the “INA’s specific and intricate

 10
provisions” that preclude DHS from creating vast new
deferred-action policies. Texas I, 809 F.3d at 186.
Respondents also observe (Regents Br. in Opp. 32)
that DAPA would have been available to approximately
4.3 million aliens, while DACA has been granted to
“only” around three quarters of a million aliens. But
that difference cannot be ascribed “legal significance.”
Texas II, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (emphasis omitted). At
the outset, the right comparator is not the number of
aliens granted DACA, but the number qualified to request
it: approximately 1.5 million. See id. at 676. In either
case, a non-enforcement policy affecting 700,000 or 1.5
million aliens is plainly a policy of “vast ‘economic and
political significance’ ” to which the Fifth Circuit’s analysis applies. Texas I, 809 F.3d at 183 (citation omitted).
c. Finally, the court of appeals erred in affirming
the denial of the government’s motion to dismiss the
other ancillary claims. Pet. 30-31. No respondent defends the court’s due-process ruling. Cf. State Br. in
Opp. 31-32 (urging only that the Court decline to review
it). As for equal protection, respondents make the puzzling contention that this Court’s decision in AADC
does not apply because this case purportedly does not
implicate AADC’s concerns about “inhibiting prosecutorial discretion, allowing continuing violations of immigration law, and impacting foreign relations.” Id. at 32
(citation omitted). But respondents assert an equalprotection claim in an effort to prevent DHS from rescinding a discretionary non-enforcement policy sanctioning the ongoing violation of federal immigration law
by 700,000 aliens based, at least in part, on their assertion that the primary beneficiaries of that policy are nationals of certain foreign countries. That claim, of
course, directly implicates the AADC Court’s concerns.

 11
In any event, respondents have not adequately pleaded
an equal-protection claim even if AADC does not apply.
See Pet. 31.
3. The Court should also grant the government’s petition in Trump v. NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5,
2018). Granting certiorari before judgment in NAACP
would eliminate any argument that the Nielsen memorandum is not squarely before the Court—a course that
seems particularly prudent given respondents’ failure
to offer any response to the content of that memorandum here. The Court may also wish to grant the petition in Nielsen v. Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed Nov.
5, 2018), despite the overlapping claims, to ensure the
fullest presentation of the issues. Supp. Br. 11.
Respondents in those cases also oppose certiorari by
arguing that the government has not demonstrated “exigent circumstances” justifying certiorari under Rule
11. NAACP Br. in Opp. 13. But the Court grants certiorari before judgment “not only in cases of great public
emergency but also in situations where similar or identical issues of importance [are] already pending before
the Court and where it [i]s considered desirable to review simultaneously the questions posed in the case still
pending in the court of appeals.” Stephen M. Shapiro
et al., Supreme Court Practice § 2.4, at 86 (10th ed.
2013); see Supp. Br. 11. That rationale applies here.

 12
* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the petition for a writ of certiorari and supplemental brief, the
petition should be granted. The petition in Trump v.
NAACP, No. 18-588 (filed Nov. 5, 2018), should also be
granted and the case consolidated with this one. The
petition in Nielsen v. Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (filed
Nov. 5, 2018), should either be granted and consolidated
or, at a minimum, be held pending resolution of the
other petitions and any further proceedings in this
Court.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General

JANUARY 2019