NRC FORM 464 Part I

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(03-2017)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

2017-0638
RESPONSE
TYPE

D

INTERIM

I.; 1

FINAL

"Digital copy of the response from Troy Pruett to William Dean's DPO letter (ML 17178A311 is the ADAMS number for
Me Dean's letter)"
PART I. - INFORMATION RELEASED
You have the right to seek assistance from the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison. Contact information for the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison is
available at https:llwww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/contact-foia.html
records subject to the request are already available on the Public NRC Website, in Public ADAMS or on microfiche in the
O Agency
NRC Public Document Room.
[{] Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.

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Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been
referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.
We are continuing to process your request.
See Comments.

AMOUNT'

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'See Comments for details

-- FEES
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NO FEES
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You will receive a refund for the amount listed.

Due to our delayed response, you will
not be charged fees.

Fees waived.

PART I.B - INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE
We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law
enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This is a standard
notification given to all requesters it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not. exist.

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We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II.
Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to
appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination.
You may appeal this final determination within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or e-mail to the
FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be
sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." You have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the
NRC's Public Liaison, or the Office of Govemment Information Services (OGIS). Contact information for OGIS is available at
https:/Iogis.archives.gov/about-ogislcontact-information.htIT!

Digitally sgned by Nina Arget!t
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NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017)

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Page 2 of2

 SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DIRECTOR OF NRR MEMORANDUM REGARDING DPO-201701 and DP0-2017-02
I am submitting my response to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's
(NRR's) memorandum regarding DPO's 2017-01102 dated June 28, 2017. I request my
response be made publically available, in ijs entirety, as part of the DPO 2017-01102 package.

The Director of NRR's transm ittal letter undermines the credibilijy of NRC regulation and
interferes with the ability of inspection staff to ensure licensees maintain minimum standards of
safety as prescribed by Technical Specifications. The approval of the Palo Verde licensing
actions to extend emergency diesel generator allowed outage times by 600 percent is, in my
view, a major failure of the agency; and demonstrates a failure to understand and consistently
implement regulatory precedent. Based on first~ hand discussions with senior managers from
NRR, I believe the staff were pressured into approving the amendments by the Director NRR
(")()()()( is really pushing approval of these amendments." ")()()()( really wants this approved."
")()()()( is pushing hard on risk informed changes and wants this case to be an example.")
At the time the OPO's were submitted I verbally and in writing expressed concern regarding the
ability to obtain an unbiased response given the person pushing for approval of the
amendments (Director NRR) also served as the deciding official for the DPOs. The bias is
clearly evident in the Director NRR's response (self-congratulatory, does not address inherent
failures in the license amendment review process, and continues to push an agenda of less
oversight through a dangerously broad application of mostly licensee controlled risk informed
decision making process).

The belief by Office of Enforcement (OE) staff that the Director NRR would be able to overtum
his decision regarding approval of the licensing adions demonstrates a lack of understanding of
human behaviors and is disrespectful to the person submitting the DPO. OE stated the DPO
process dictated the Director NRR be the deciding official even though the bias existed . This is
not entirely correct, as NRC Management Directive (MD) 10.159 allows for the assignment to a
different office director. During the submittal of the DPO's, OE suggested I file a DPO appeal
following the Director NRR's decision, in order to have the Office of the Executive Director for
Operations (OEDO) address the likely biased outcome.
The timeliness of the DPO's review failed to meet standards of excellence. The licensee
received prompt attention to the licensing actions. However, immediate safety concerns
submitted by NRC staff were set aside. NRC staff worked days, nights, weekends and holidays
to rush the approval of the Palo Verde amendments. At the time I attempted to submij a
nonconcurrence to ensure an appropriate safety review was performed. I was instructed by OE
staff that the nonconcurrence process did not apply and that I could use the OPO process to
have the concerns reviewed. MD 10.159 states the DPO should be resolved in 120 days. No
allowance is made in MD 10.159 for escalating the timeliness goals for immediate safety
concerns (Note: the OPO form has the submitter indicate if an immediate safety concern is
present). NRR never attempted to process the OPO during the period the amendments were in
effect. Working non-stop to satisfy the needs of a licensee and ignoring immediate safety
concerns of the staff is disrespectful and fails to ensure safety is an over-ridding priority.

A parallel 10 CFR 2.206 pemion request was submitted by a technical reviewer in NRR. The
individual also stated an immediate safety concern existed. Once again, NRR never attempted
to process the petition request during the period the amendments were in effect. The delay in
review of the pe@on allowed the amendment time-period to expire; and then the petition review

 was canceled. Once again, this tactic is disrespectful to NRC staff and faits to ensure safety is
an over-ridding priority.
Many technical staff and senior managers in regional offices and headquarters believed the
actions to approve the Palo Verde amendments were inappropriate. However, only two staff
were willing to formally challenge the agency decisions. Based on conversations with NRC
staff, I believe the staff feared retribution and retaliation ~ they formally opposed approval of the
amendments. I myself was unable to partiCipate in the review of the OPO's because of the
Chilling Effect placed on me by referral of the OPO's to the Office of the Inspector General.
Addttionally, I believe senior NRC managers retaliated against me in April 2017, following the
submittal of a third OPO involving a different site. The retaliation resulted in a continuing
Chilling Effect for participating in the OPO process. I believe senior NRC staff need to rethink
how OPO's are viewed. Statements from senior executives that "DPO's are nuclear bombs'
and ~ Managers submitting DPO's cause staff to not trust management- and -The NRC receives
too much negative public and media attention when OPOs are submitted reflect poorly on
agency values.
W

As a reminder, Nuclear Safety Culture is defined as, -The core values and behaviors resulting
from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing
goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.· The Director of NRR admitted in the
transmittal letter that,
guidance documents are unclear or don't seem to support the actions
taken by the NRC .. .' The OPO Panel's transmittal letter described disagreement regarding
approval of the amendments, "The principle bases for some DPO Panel members concluding
the license amendment requests (LARs) should not have been approved ... involve the staff not
strictly adhering to available guidance, not documenting the basis for the deviations from this
guidance, and inconsistently applying the guidance based upon past staff approval or denial of
similar LARs. The letters indicate NRC staff in NRR failed to meet many nuclear safety culture
principles:
M •••

Resources: leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other
resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Change Management: leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and
implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.
Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design
margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and
rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers,
defense-in-depth, and safety related equipment.
Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work. instructions
Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions.
Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make
decisions.
Conservative Bia8: Individuals use decision making ~ practices that emphasize prudent
choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe
in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop.

The Director NRR stated, "The Panel incorrectly notes that the D.C. Cook emergency LAR was
denied (the licensee withdrew the request prior to a formal action by the staff). While the staff
had created a draft denial of the LAR, this had not received senior management review and thus
did not reflect a formal agency position." This is an example of double-speak. The agency
rarely, jf ever, denies a license amendment request. Instead, the agency verbally
communicates the intent to deny the request, at which time the licensee ~ volunteers" to

 w~hdraw the amendment request. Additionally, the comparisons made between Palo Verde

and D.C. Cook by the Director of NRR are misrepresented. Numerous similarities existed in the
requests from D.C. Cook and Palo Verde to extend EDG allowed outage times . The primary
difference in the disapproval of D.C. Cook's request and the approval of Palo Verde's request
was not addressed. Staff supporting a broad application of licensee dominated risk informed

decision making were unavailable and staff supporting upholding defense in depth provisions
associated with emergency core cooling systems during loss of coolant accidents were present
during the D.C. Cook review. Accordingly, the defense in depth argument prevailed and the

amendment was withdrawn by the licensee at the agency's verbal request. In the Palo Verde
case , staff supporting a broad application of licensee dominated risk informed decision making
were present and staff supporting upholding defense in depth provision associated wh

emergency core cooling systems during loss of coolant accidents were unavailable.
Accordingly, the licensee's view prevailed and the amendment approved. The dependency on

who happens to be in-office during an emergent/emergency licensee amendment request on
the agency decision has not been assessed.
The DPO 2017-01/02 review failed to fully consider: (1) the risk associated with the license
amendment request, (2) single failure impacts, and (3) other related NRC decisions.
Specifically:

One of the two NRC Qualitative Safety Goals is, "Individual members of the public should be

provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that
individuals bear no significant additional risk to I~e and health." The supporting NRC
Quanmalive Health Objectives (QHO's) are, (1) "The risk to an average individual in the

vicin~y

of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not
exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatal~y risks resuning from
other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed , and (2) "The
risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatal~ies that might result
from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of

the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from aU other causes."
For a majority of risk informed decisions, core damage frequency provides a reasonable method
of assuring the QHO's are maintained. However, there are occasions where the use of core
damage frequency is Inappropriate in assuring the QHO's are met.
For the Palo Verde case, the amendment relied on m~igation credit from portable equipment to
offset the core damage frequency estimate. In reality, the risk from the plant remaining at full

power without an emergency diesel generator substantially increased the consequence element
of risk. As noted in NRC guidance documents, the risk associated with Large Early Release
Frequency (LERF) can be dismissed 8 days following a plant shutdown. The NRC uses LERF

as a means of assuring the aHO for prompt fatality is met. While the total radioactivity released
is still large after 8 days, the quantity of radioisotopes released does not result in a prompt
fatal~y. Given the Technical Specifications required a plant shutdown that would have lasted far

more than 8 days, the risk comparison that should have been considered is "zero risk" to the
public for prompt fatal~ compared to the prompt fatal~ risk from an event in~iated from full
power with one emergency diesel generator inoperable. The NRR staff responsible for the
license amendment approval ignored the agency's QHO's and qualitative safety goals.

 Transient risk considerations are not a factor for extended shutdowns (shutdowns expected to
lasl more than 8 days). Additionally, the NRC has not established reliable guidance on the
degree to which transient risk concerns should be used in decision making.

Single Failure
The OPO Panel report states: "The OPO Panel notes that design basis accident requirements
could not be met if a single failure is assumed during the 38 OG CT (e.g., in the event of a failure
of the 3A OG, the portable diesels could not be aligned in time to meet LOCA accidenl analysis
assumptions during a LOOP). However, as discussed under Concern #6, single failure
considerations are temporarily relaxed while operaling under a TS AOT; Iherefore, the OPO
Panel concluded that it is not necessary to demonstrate that manual actions associated with
defense-in-depth considerations be accomplished in the same time frame required of the normal
Class 1E onsite power system for design basis accidents.· -For short duration CTs, the
reduction in safety is minimal and likely offset by the avoidance of the risk arising from
unnecessary plant transients and shutdowns. However, very long CTs may allow a plant to
operate for an extended time without the same level of safety normally afforded by the plant
licensing basis. As further discussed under Concern #5 and highlighted as a OPO Panel
recommendalion, additional guidance should be evaluated with respect to defense-in-depth, the
adequacy of long duration CTs (one-time AOT extenSions), and whether there should be a
backstop (maximum AOT) even with supporting risk information."
NRR slaff ignored single failure consideralions by staling they can be relaxed during the allowed
outage time. Single failure vulnerabilities are explicitly addressed for the time windows allowed
by Technical Specifications. When requests to extend allowed outage times are submitted by
licensees, the added risk from single failure vulnerabilities must be explicitly accounted for in the
submittal and review process. For Palo Verde , the single failure vulnerability was purposefully
dismissed by NRR staff without any analysiS or consideration.

Related NRC Decisions
The Union of Concerned Scientists is correct in their June 30, 2017, assessment regarding the
Palo Verde approval and Ihe agency decision to not support rule making for loss of coolant
accidents. The agency's reversal of opinion (Palo Verde allowance to not meet safety criterion
versus the D.C. Cook disapproval and termination of rulemaking) is disturbing and not reflective
of nuciear safety principles.