Alexandra Hall
Director, Division of Labor
Department of Labor and Employment
State of Colorado
______________________________________________________________________________
DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN A DISPUTE THAT
AFFECTS THE PUBLIC INTEREST
____________________________________________________________________________
School District No. 1, in the City and County of Denver (a/k/a “Denver Public Schools” or
“DPS”) submits the following request for intervention pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-1-125, to the Director
of Division of Labor, Department of Labor and Employment, State of Colorado and responds to
the Notice of Intent to Strike filed by the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (“DCTA”) dated
January 8, 2019, as follows:
1.
DPS and DCTA have two primary agreements: the Agreement and Partnership
between School District No. 1 in the City and County of Denver and the Denver Classroom
Teachers’ Association (the “Master Agreement”) and the Professional Compensation System for
Teachers Agreement (the “ProComp Agreement”).
2.
The Master Agreement contains all of the provisions regarding employment for
DPS teachers and Specialized Service Providers (SSPs) (e.g. school nurses and psychologists).
The parties renegotiated the Master Agreement in 2017 and signed a five-year contract in the early
hours of the morning on September 1, 2017. The agreement was ratified by just under 90% of
DCTA members and unanimously approved by the DPS Board of Education. That contract
included financial terms, which covered new investments in teacher compensation for a three-year
term (the “Financial Agreement”). DPS committed to invest an estimated $45 million “new”
dollars to fund this financial agreement (new dollars being an investment above and beyond the
$400+ million that the district was already investing in teacher and SSP compensation). This
investment guaranteed pay increases for teachers and SSPs for the 2017-18, 2018-19, and 201920 school years. In accordance with this 2017 agreement, teachers and SSPs received increases in
the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school years (on average, a 10% increase over the two years). Under
this 2017 agreement, teachers and SSPs were also guaranteed an estimated average increase of just
under 5% for 2019-20. As explained further below, DPS has now agreed to double this increase
for 2019-20 if DPS and DCTA can reach an agreement on ProComp.
3.
Whereas the financial terms of the Master Agreement address the $400+ million
that DPS invests in teacher compensation, the ProComp Agreement covers the $33 million that
DPS receives annually from Denver voters pursuant to a 2005 mill levy. The ballot language that
DPS and DCTA jointly took to voters states that the funds should be used to provide compensation
for teachers for:


Teaching in hard-to-staff schools;
1

 




Teaching in hard-to-fill positions, such as math, science and special education;
Increasing teaching knowledge and teaching skills by successfully completing
ProComp approved advanced degrees, professional teaching standards licenses,
and additional training to improve classroom skills;
Positive professional evaluations; and
Achieving distinguished school status.

4.
DPS and DCTA have amended the ProComp Agreement numerous times through
their financial agreements over the years. The agreement also has an implementing body called
the ProComp Transition Team, which is made up of half DCTA members and half district
members. For an explanation of how the ProComp incentives currently work and how DPS
allocates that $33 million, see the explanation on this website.
5.
Even with the financial terms of the Master Agreement in place through 2020, DPS
and DCTA still had to negotiate the ProComp Agreement because it was due to expire. DPS and
DCTA’s negotiations of the ProComp agreement began in November 2017 and continued through
January 18, 2019. For a quick summary of the history of negotiations, please see the linked
Negotiation Timeline. For an in-depth history of the negotiations, please see Appendix A.
6.
One of the most important pieces to note is that DPS could have taken the position
that DPS and DCTA were only negotiating the $33 million in ProComp incentives. Instead, DPS
voluntarily agreed to revamp and improve the entire compensation system, with its corresponding
$400+ million budget. DPS heard from teachers and agreed that the current system was too
complex and that teachers and SSPs deserved a transparent salary schedule with fewer incentives
and more invested in base pay. Although DPS was not required to do so, DPS agreed to re-open
the financial terms of the 2017 Master Agreement and double the compensation increases for
2019-20. As explained below and in the attached Appendix, if DPS and DCTA reach an agreement
on ProComp, DPS will invest $20.5 million ongoing dollars and $6 million one-time funds.
This is on top of the money previously committed for the 2019-20 increase. With this significant
new investment, teachers and SSPs would now receive an average base pay increase of 10% for
2019-20.
7.
After fourteen months of negotiations, DPS and DCTA were not able to reach
agreement and the ProComp Agreement expired on midnight of January 18. Despite the outcome,
we believe that the final DPS proposal is generous, highly competitive with Colorado districts, and
responsive to what we have heard from teachers and from the union. For example:






Highest starting salary in the metro area with one $2,500 incentive ($48,000); secondhighest starting salary, after Boulder, with no incentives.
Pathways to make $100,000+ (current teacher calendar is 187 workdays per year).
Teachers with a bachelor’s or bachelor’s plus 30 credits would have the highest lifetime
earning potential of any of the school districts in the metro area. Unlike many other
districts, DPS does not set caps on any of the lanes and allows for 30 years of continuous
growth in any lane.
With one $2,500 incentive for either working in high-poverty schools or hard-to-fill
positions (which 72% of DPS teachers/SSPs would receive), educators with a masters
2

 



would have the highest lifetime earning potential of any of the school districts in the metro
area.
For those educators with a masters plus 30 credits or doctorate degrees, DPS would be
among the top three school districts in the metro area.
Supports retention (a top district priority) with a salary increase of at least $3,500 after 10
years of serving Denver kids in DPS classrooms.
A salary schedule with multiple ways for teachers to earn base pay increases, including
years of experience, college credits, advanced degrees, advanced licensure, national board
certification, and ten years of commitment to DPS classrooms.

8.
At the end of negotiations on January 18, 2019, the total cost difference between
the DPS and DCTA proposals was at least $8.5 million. However, DPS has been clear that the
district is not willing to eliminate incentives to recruit educators in the district’s 30 highest-priority
schools or decrease incentives for educators in Title I (high poverty) schools. The DPS Board has
named this as a key priority. Recruitment and retention of educators in these schools is a critical
tool for closing the opportunity and achievement gaps. If that commitment to our highest-priority
and high-poverty schools remains in place, the difference between the DPS and DCTA proposals
is actually $15 million.
9.
DPS is committed to deep cuts in its central administration, which will result in the
elimination of a significant number of administrative positions. Staff whose positions are
eliminated will be notified in February, at which time the district will be able to share more
information about the extent of the cuts. To put the reductions into perspective: DPS is cutting its
non-discretionary central administration spending by over 7% in order to fund the $10.5 million
in cuts that are committed toward teacher compensation. (Note: most of our spending is not
discretionary, like special education and funding for our English Language Learners under the
consent decree.) The cuts are deeper than 7% because DPS will also increase compensation for
its hourly school-support employees (like paraprofessionals) and increase spending on key needs
for special education. Cutting an additional $8.5 million would require DPS to undertake another
6% reduction in the district’s non-discretionary central administration spending.
10.
We are deeply disappointed that we were not able to reach agreement with DCTA
on the terms of our ProComp Agreement. However, DPS believes that through the support of state
intervention, DPS and DCTA can find more areas of alignment, resolve this dispute, and move
forward in mutual partnership to support our students, our educators, and our schools.
Accordingly, DPS requests that the Director assume jurisdiction of this dispute.
11.

Pursuant to C.R.S. § 8-1-125, the Director

may exercise jurisdiction over any dispute between employer and employee
affecting conditions of employment, or with respect to wages or hours, only when
the employer and the employee request such intervention or when the dispute, as
determined by the executive director, affects the public interest, and such
jurisdiction shall continue until after the final hearing of such dispute and the entry
of the final award therein or until said director shall enter an order disposing of or
terminating such jurisdiction.
3
 

 12.
The potential of a teacher strike in the largest school district in Colorado undeniably
affects the public interest. There is a direct and negative impact to over seventy thousand students
attending DPS schools and their families. Among the expected impacts:
A. Loss of Instructional Time from Teachers on Strike: If we are forced to
close schools, there is a loss of instructional time that cannot be recovered.
This is critical for all of our students, but most critical where we are trying to
close the achievement gap. When our lowest performing students miss out on
instructional time, they suffer the most, and have the most difficulty catching
up. Every day matters. This is also particularly true for our seniors who are
on track to graduate in 2019 and may lose vital instructional time, putting
them at risk of not attaining necessary credits in order to graduate on time.
Even if we are able to keep schools open through use of guest teachers/subs,
we know that our students are best taught by their current teachers and best
served by the SSPs who know them.
B. Students with Special Needs: Currently, DPS serves approximately 10,073
students with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) and approximately 2,648 additional students through 504 plans
authorized by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. IDEA requires the
development of individualized education programs to serve students eligible
for services, and Section 504 requires the development of plans to ensure that
students with disabilities receive accommodations and other services to enable
them to access education. These plans require individually designed
instruction, modifications, accommodations, and supports to meet the needs of
the students (Supports and Services). Failure to provide the necessary
Supports and Services required by an individualized education program or 504
plan to students with disabilities would necessitate the provision of
“compensatory services” to redress any negative consequences of the denial.
Payment for these compensatory services would come from either the general
fund or the District’s Maintenance of Effort funding which could have
significant financial consequences on the District once the strike ends and the
District resumes the provision of Services and Supports to students with
disabilities. In the past, payment of compensatory services included private
tutoring, summer instructional activities, and even private educational
facilities to meet a student’s individual educational needs. Additionally, many
students with individualized education programs or 504 plans receive social
and emotional supports, occupational therapy, speech therapy, nursing
supports, physical therapy, and other related services. Disrupting the
continuity of those services greatly impacts student progress and can expose
students to significant regression in areas of their lives (i.e. impacts on basic
life skills).
C. English Language Learner Students: Our English Language Learners rely
on our bilingual teachers not only for instruction and for the commitments
4
 

 made within our Consent Decree but also as the gateway to access and
communication in our buildings. Absent these qualified instructors, our
English Language Learners may be isolated and denied the opportunity to
fully participate in many substitute activities that will be provided during a
strike. In the event of school closure or staffing through guest teachers, DPS
may be unable to provide the full services and supports required by the
Consent Decree. For example, the Consent Decree requires 45 minutes of
English Language Development (ELD) per day and Spanish instruction. If
not provided, the district may be legally required to increase summer school
opportunities to catch students up on English acquisition. There would be
additional expenses required to expand those programs during the summer.
D. Potential Denial of H1-B Visas. DPS recruits educators from other countries
in order to meet the high demand for bilingual teachers. Based on federal
rules, the district’s 14 pending H1-B visas may be denied by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) due to a strike.
E. Students Enrolled in Affective-Needs/Autism Center Programs: These
students rely upon DPS social workers and school psychologists to provide
consistent, reliable mental health services. For these students, the immediate
and abrupt interference with services threatens their social-emotional wellbeing and may also lead to dysregulation in the home where families lack
sufficient resources to address their students’ individual needs.
F. Students Receiving Mental Health Services: DPS mental health providers
often provide significant expertise to evaluate suicide risks, threat
assessments, and develop Individual Supervision and Management Plans
(ISMPs) (e.g. safety plans for juveniles on pretrial release or
probation). School-based staff are often the first line of defense in these areas
and offer critical mental health services to address significant threats that
impact the student and the community. Both the identification of students
who could benefit from these services and the provision of services to students
already identified as needing these services will be drastically affected by the
strike.
G. Students Receiving Medical Care Services: DPS provides nursing services
to students in our moderate/severe center-based programs as well as students
with chronic health issues. Many of the services provided to these students
are unavailable in the home and a strike may force those students to go
without critical care.
H. Students Dependent on Schools for Food and Nutrition: Many DPS
students rely on the free breakfast and free or reduced price meals available
each day in their school; for some of our students, these are the only meals
they may have access to throughout the day. A strike which could result in

5
 

 closing DPS schools or otherwise disrupting Food and Nutrition services will
deny kids these vital opportunities.
I. Students Dependent on Schools for Shelter from the Elements: We are in
the coldest season of the year, and families who are experiencing
homelessness or unable to afford heat will rely on our schools as a place of
warmth for their students during these cold January and February days.
J. Gifted and Talented Students: Currently, DPS serves approximately 7,960
gifted and talented students as well as an additional approximately 3,113
magnet eligible/talent development students (collectively GT Students). GT
Students receive services from the District through an Advanced Learning
Plan (ALP). ALPs require certain Supports and Services to meet GT students’
specific educational needs, very similar to students with disabilities. If DPS
fails to meet those needs through a protracted strike, DPS would be forced to
re-evaluate those students to ensure it is meeting Colorado’s Exceptional
Children’s Educational Act (ECEA) requirements. Under ECEA, DPS may
be obligated to provide similar compensatory services and/or may lose its
funding under ECEA for failing to provide services required by an ALP.
K. Student Athletes Seeking Scholarships: National Signing Day for our
Student Athletes is February 6th. Many of our teachers are also coaches;
students who have worked extremely hard for the last four years or more to
move on to college-level athletic opportunities will not have their coaches and
mentors available to support them on this incredibly special occasion.
L. Students Taking Concurrent College Classes: High school students taking
concurrent enrollment classes or receiving college credit will have
opportunities compromised if we are unable to locate a substitute adjunct
teacher. Filling concurrent enrollment positions is already a tremendous
challenge, and the likelihood that we would be able to find qualified
substitutes is low, leaving these students who may be relying on the college
savings at a loss.
M. Financial Hardship on Families: Families of our youngest students rely on
school to not only be a place for great instruction but also safety and
supervision. Should our elementary schools in particular not be able to stay
open, not all families will have a safe space for their students while they are at
work. Should these families need to then take personal, sick, or vacation time
to care for their children, there will be a financial impact on families, leading
to severe consequences not unlike those we are seeing in the current
government furlough.
N. Absence of Childcare for Families: Parents may feel compelled to keep their
students home; families of younger children are not likely to be able to skip
work or arrange childcare for multiple days, and so older children may need to
6
 

 take on the caretaking and supervision of younger siblings. This is not ideal
for either the younger or older child, both of whom need to be in school.
O. Fewer Resources for New American Families: Many of our families in our
newcomer centers, which are specially designed centers to support students
and families who have emigrated from other countries, do not speak English
and have experienced interrupted access to education. They deeply rely on the
language and expertise of our newcomer center teachers and support staff. If
these teachers are not available, these vulnerable families will be less likely to
successfully navigate community services, including housing and healthcare,
and their students will be unable to effectively access the educational
opportunities in our buildings.
13.
A strike will also substantially affect the public interest because a strike will deeply
affect the culture of our schools long after the strike is over. Our superintendent, one of our current
Board members, and other current DPS leaders were teachers with DPS after the strike in 1994.
They recall the scars that it left on our schools: high teacher and school leader turnover, challenges
with recruiting, and high levels of tension in buildings between those who participated in the strike
and those who crossed the picket lines. As we have heard from our teachers in negotiations, a
strong and supportive school culture is critical to teacher retention. The impact on our students
resulting from the tension and division between staff in buildings will be long lasting. A strike is
an extremely serious measure that should be undertaken only if the parties have worked in good
faith to take advantage of every opportunity and every resource available to them in order to reach
agreement.
14.
A strike also affects our ability to hire teachers for the 2019-20 school year. Hiring
season is currently underway and we have already seen a decline in our recruitment numbers
during the final stages of negotiations that led to this strike vote. DPS anticipates that the negative
impact on our ability to recruit strong teachers could last for years after a strike occurs.
15.
A strike will also substantially affect the public interest by negatively impacting the
community as a whole. Such negative impacts, both direct and indirect, are difficult to anticipate
in their entirety. However, the most significant community impact is that, if DPS were forced to
close schools, there will be seventy thousand students that may not have supervision or structure
during those days. Unstructured time absent supervision will increase the likelihood that students
make choices that are damaging to both their own and the community’s health, safety, and future
well-being.
16.
Another threat to the public interest is the potential for all DPS teachers and SSPs
to see a decrease in their compensation, even if they choose not to strike. ProComp mill levy funds
collected from tax payers reside in a trust, which is governed by a Trust Agreement. According to
legal counsel for the ProComp Trust Board, that agreement does not allow disbursement of funds
to pay for ProComp incentives unless it is pursuant to an agreement. This could immediately affect
all teachers/SSPs, but particularly educators who are receiving monthly payments for the hard-toserve, hard-to-staff, and Title I incentives under the ProComp Agreement. Even more significant,
the failure to come to agreement quickly could threaten the ability of DPS to collect the ProComp
7
 

 mill levy. The language of the mill levy states that the mill levy shall terminate when ProComp
terminates. The loss of this $33 million per year from the 2005 ProComp mill levy would
significantly impact what DPS could pay its teachers and SSPs. If the state accepts jurisdiction
and the status quo remains in place, there is less risk that the ProComp trust will be barred from
making payments from the trust and less risk that DPS could lose access to the 2005 ProComp mill
levy funding.
17.
The Department of Labor has previously intervened in disputes between DPS and
its union based on the impact to the public interest. DCTA previously filed notices to strike in
1991 and again in 1994. Then-Executive Director John Dolan specifically determined in both
cases that a teachers’ strike affected the public interest.
18.
In his 1991 Order, the Executive Director determined that “public education is a
public trust and the state a primary provider of this trust.” Ex. A. He further determined that “the
State of Colorado has a significant financial investment in the Denver schools in that it will provide
in excess of $65 million in 1991 to help pay for the education of Denver Children.” Id.
Accordingly, he found that the “dispute between DPS and DCTA affects the public interest” and
took jurisdiction of the dispute. Id.
19.
In accordance with their statutory authority to intervene in matters that affect public
interest, then-Executive Director Dolan and then-Governor Roy Romer conducted an investigation
and held hearings during which they heard testimony and received exhibits from witnesses for
DCTA, DPS, parents, the community and experts on educational issues. Id. They subsequently
issued a final order regarding the disputed issues and, through the exercise of jurisdictional powers
other than mediation, were successful in helping the parties to reach an agreement. Id.
20.
In response to DCTA’s 1994 notice of strike, Executive Director Dolan again
determined that the dispute between DPS and DCTA affected the public interest, again noting that
“public education is a public trust” for which the state is a “primary provider.’ Ex. B. He further
found that the State had a “significant financial investment in the Denver schools.” Id. Executive
Director Dolan subsequently assumed jurisdiction of the dispute. Id.
21.
Public education remains a matter of public interest, particularly in the largest
district in the state. It is, as Director Dolan determined, a public trust for which the state is a
primary provider and in which the state has a very significant financial investment. In fact, the
State will provide in excess of a billion dollars to help pay for the education of Denver children in
2019-20. Accordingly, the Director should take jurisdiction of this dispute and exhaust every
avenue available in order to protect the public interest in educating tens of thousands of Denver
children.
22.
Because the current employment dispute substantially implicates the public
interest, the Director can and should immediately exercise jurisdiction over the dispute before
January 28.
23.
DCTA does not dispute that a teachers’ strike affects public interest. Rather, DCTA
requests that the Director decline jurisdiction because it asserts that the Director’s intervention
8
 

 would be “futile.” DCTA asserts that the Director can “employ strategies including voluntary
arbitration, mediation, or conciliation of the dispute” but that these measures would be “futile”
because the parties have already “engaged in a combination of negotiation and mediation for
approximately 14 months.” DPS respectfully disagrees with the assertion that the parties have
utilized all available tools to reach agreement.
24.
Once the Director assumes jurisdiction, the Director can implement several
strategies to resolve an employment dispute. As DCTA points out, some of those strategies involve
voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation. However, contrary to DCTA’s implication,
those are not the only strategies that may be employed. The Director can also directly intervene
with his own fact-finding process and/or require the parties to participate in a “final hearing”
regarding the dispute and enter a “final award” regarding the disputed issue. C.R.S. § 8-1-125(1);
Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Re-1, 841 P2d 237, 249 (Colo. 1992).
25.
At this point, the parties have only engaged in nonbinding mediation, which has
occurred in the public in front of large audiences and news crews filming all conversations. Such
a setting does not encourage genuine conversations on hard questions that involve tradeoffs and
highly complex financial modeling. The parties have not tried confidential mediation, arbitration,
or fact-finding. Thus, contrary to DCTA’s implication, the parties have not exhausted all the
interventions that can be employed by the Director.
26.
It is also important to note that mediation has been helpful, but only just began in
November. With the support of the mediator, DPS and DCTA were able to come to agreement on
several ProComp issues. As DCTA notes, the parties have made substantial progress in
negotiating ProComp issues such as “how to incentivize ‘hard-to-staff’ positions.” Implementing
additional interventions, including fact finding with the Director, arbitration, and/or confidential
mediation would likely not be futile. Rather, it would further the negotiations process and enable
the parties to reach agreement as it did during the 1991 dispute. DPS has made significant
movement in regards to the ProComp issues and has repeatedly expressed its willingness to
continue to negotiate with DCTA regarding how those voter-approved ProComp funds will be
distributed pursuant to the ProComp Agreement. The Director’s intervention will only serve to
further the negotiations process.
27.
Finally, it must be noted that Susana Cordova is in day 12 in her role as
Superintendent. From day one, she was committed to participating fully in negotiations and
putting forward every effort to reach agreement. She engaged immediately in the process to make
deep cuts to central office spending and personnel. As a former DPS teacher, DCTA member, and
child of a union steward, she feels deep empathy for the concerns of our teachers. She is committed
to reaching agreement with the teachers union, but needs additional time in her role and the support
of the state to help close the gaps.
28.
Given the very substantial public interest in ensuring continuing education for more
than seventy thousand Denver children, fulfilling the needs of families and parents of those
children related to education, and protecting the $33 million in funding received from the ProComp
mill levy, DPS and DCTA should exhaust every available avenue to resolve this dispute. This
includes seeking assistance from the Director.
9
 

 WHEREFORE, the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Denver Public Schools,
through their undersigned counsel and lead negotiator, respectfully request that the Director
assume jurisdiction of this employment dispute prior to January 28.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 2019





Michelle M. Berge
General Counsel
Denver Public Schools

10

APPENDIX A: DETAILED HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS
1.
DPS and DCTA renegotiated the Master Agreement in 2017 and signed a five-year
deal in the early hours of the morning on September 1, 2017. That deal included financial terms,
which covered new investments in teacher compensation for a three-year term (the “Financial
Agreement”). DPS committed to invest an estimated $45 million new dollars to fund this financial
agreement, which guaranteed pay increases for the 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20 school years
(total average 15% pay increase over the three years). Most of those dollars have already been
invested in the pay increases for 2017-18 and 2018-19; some of them remain earmarked for 201920 pay increases. Regardless of what occurs with the ProComp negotiations, DPS teachers/SSPs
are guaranteed an increase for the 2019-20 school year, in accordance with the financial terms of
the Master Agreement.
2.
After DPS and DCTA finished the Master Agreement and Financial Agreement in
September 2017, they started interest-based bargaining with respect to the ProComp Agreement.
They utilized the support of Kayla Mack from Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services. They
began building off the work that was completed in an extensive Visioning Group Task Force that
included teachers, school leaders, bargaining team members, and DPS and DCTA leadership. In
order to provide more time to complete interest-based bargaining, they extended the expiration
date to March 14, 2018.
3.
In February 2018, DCTA provided DPS with its first proposal regarding the
ProComp Agreement. The proposal included a near-elimination of ProComp incentives for highpoverty schools and proposed that the money be reinvested in a new step and lane schedule for all
DCTA members with twelve salary lanes. On a step and lane schedule, steps are the increments
on the y axis of a schedule, generally associated with years of experience. Lanes are the columns
on the x axis of the schedule, generally associated with advanced degrees and credit accumulation.
When DCTA proposed the schedule, DPS spoke with DCTA’s financial modeler and discovered
that DCTA’s model was missing approximately 400 educators. These educators are still on the
district’s traditional salary schedule rather than ProComp because they had never opted in.
However, since both DCTA and DPS were proposing that traditional salary teachers would be
included on the new system, they had to be included in order to capture the total compensation
cost for the DCTA bargaining unit. This made the price tag of the first proposal significantly higher
than DCTA originally intended. DCTA’s February 2018 proposal cost more than $30 million new
dollars with this calculation error, and DCTA did not adjust their proposal afterward in order to
cover that additional cost. This $30+ million dollars was on top of the estimated $45 million new
dollars that were required to meet the pay increase obligations of the financial terms of the Master
Agreement.
4.
On March 14, 2018, DPS provided DCTA with a proposal that simplified the
ProComp system by eliminating the requirement to complete Professional Development Units
(PDUs), added a new way to grow base pay through multiple years of Distinguished evaluation
ratings, and created the framework for a new salary schedule. Because DPS had been operating
under the existing ProComp system for over ten years without a salary schedule, this proposal
constituted a significant move forward in the negotiations.

11

 5.
The March 14, 2018 DPS proposal did not include any further financial investments
in the ProComp system above the $33 million that the ProComp mill levy provides annually and
beyond what had been agreed to in the financial provisions of the Master Agreement. At that time,
DPS was taking the position that the financial components of the Master Agreement would not be
reopened (because both parties have to agree to re-open a contract), that those provisions covered
all new investments in teacher compensation through 2020, and that the parties needed to work
within that budget. Only six months had passed since the parties had signed the Master Agreement
with the financial provisions. That agreement had been signed after over one hundred hours of
negotiations, with the key financial provisions being worked out around 2am on September 1, 2017
after the agreement had already expired. DPS was hesitant to reopen the financial discussions
when the ink of the agreement was barely dry and when the district and DCTA had agreed in
contract that those discussions would not happen until 2020.
6.
On March 14, 2018, DCTA gave DPS a revised proposal, which included the same
near-elimination of high-poverty incentives and a ten-lane salary schedule. However, the price
tag of the revised proposal was still more than $30 million new dollars. In the ten months since
they first submitted the revised proposal, as explained further below, DCTA has not made any
significant changes to the cost of their proposal. Their best-and-final proposal would cost $29.2
million new dollars to implement and would still require the near-elimination of the incentives for
educators in high-poverty schools.
7.
With such significant distance between the DPS and DCTA, including the question
of whether the financial terms of the Master Agreement would be reopened and additional funding
added, DCTA proposed extending the ProComp Agreement through January 18, 2019. DPS
opposed such a long extension, believing that the district and DCTA could reach agreement sooner.
DPS proposed an extension of approximately six weeks. DCTA refused, and the ProComp
Agreement expired for 48 hours. DPS ultimately agreed to extend the ProComp Agreement
through January 18, 2019 in order to continue negotiations.
8.
DPS and DCTA subsequently met on May 16, 2018, June 18, 2018 (just the small
working group on the financial model), June 21, 2018, and September 24, 2018. Large portions
of the conversations during this time revolved around Amendment 73, a statewide ballot measure
that would have significantly increased funding for Colorado school districts including DPS. On
September 24, 2018, DPS proposed that, if Amendment 73 passed, DPS would reopen the financial
components of the Master Agreement and add $36 million new dollars into teacher compensation.
DCTA responded by taking a caucus (a break where the parties meet separately) and then they
returned to the table and declared impasse on the contract.
9.
Impasse is declared when one party believes that further movement cannot be
achieved and that the parties must engage a mediator in order to close the gaps and reach agreement
before the expiration of the contract. Although DPS continued to believe that further movement
was possible, DPS welcomed the support of a mediator and began working with DCTA to select
a mediator. Before a mediator could be engaged, DCTA asked to schedule more negotiations
sessions.

12

 10.
In response to DCTA’s request, the district and DCTA subsequently met on
October 29, 2018 and again on November 13, 2018 without the intervention of a mediator. At the
October 29, 2018 session, DCTA provided the same salary schedule and incentive structure that
the union had provided on March 14, 2018 with an additional request for $50 million new dollars
if Amendment 73 passed.
11.
During the November 13, 2018 meeting, DPS again offered a transparent salary
schedule. In addition, DPS proposed a $3 million reduction of certain non-base incentives and
reinvestment of that money into the base salary for teachers, a move that DCTA had been
requesting. DCTA provided DPS with the same salary schedule it provided on March 14, 2018
and again on October 29, 2018 – only with the additional $50 million request removed because
Amendment 73 was not approved by voters. The cost of DCTA’s proposal remained above $30
million new dollars on top of the estimated $45 million that DPS had agreed to fund in the financial
components of the Master Agreement.
12.
The parties agreed to enter into mediation and jointly selected Jon Numair as the
mediator. Mr. Numair’s first mediation session with the district and DCTA was on November 27,
2018. DPS and DCTA met with Mr. Numair twice more on December 4, 2018 and December 12,
2018.
13.
At the December 12, 2018 meeting, DPS presented a new proposal with a highly
significant change. In order to encourage continued negotiations and demonstrate a good faith
willingness to reach agreement, DPS proposed to re-open the financial components of the Master
Agreement and add $11 million new dollars into teacher compensation if DPS and DCTA could
come to an agreement on the ProComp issues. The $11 million would be funded by $7 million of
central administration budget cuts and $4 million from the Governor Hickenlooper’s thenproposed buy-down of the budget stabilization factor. This new money would be in addition to
the $45 million DPS previously agreed to in the Master Agreement and the $3 million dollars DPS
agreed to shift from non-base incentives into base pay. Additionally, DPS proposed a structural
change to its transparent salary schedule in order to respond to DCTA’s request for more
investment in DPS’ veteran teachers. DPS added a lane change (a $3,500 base-pay increase) for
educators that spent fifteen continuous years in DPS classrooms (the “Longevity Lane Change”).
The proposal also agreed to DCTA’s request to eliminate any lane changes connected to teachers
who received multiple years of “distinguished” evaluation ratings. DPS also proposed a 25%
increase to tuition reimbursement, another change that was responsive to what DCTA was
requesting. Last, DPS proposed a simplified ProComp incentive structure for the District’s highpoverty schools by consolidating three incentives into two tiers of incentives, responding to
DCTA’s request for fewer incentives. In response, DCTA made no significant movement in their
proposal. DCTA again proposed the same salary schedule it proposed in March 2018 – same
number of lanes, same values in every cell of the salary schedule. DCTA also added a request for
longevity payments for educators who have more than 20 years in DPS to their proposal, actually
increasing the overall cost of the proposal.
14.
DPS and DCTA met again on January 8, 2019 with the mediator. At that meeting,
DPS continued to improve upon its previous proposal by bringing more money to the schedule and
making structural changes. DPS proposed $11 million of recurring dollars to increase base salaries
13

 and $6 million of one-time funds to transition educators to the new salary schedule. This took the
starting salary for educators from $42,789 to $45,500. With the addition of one incentive of
$2,500, which 72% of our teachers receive, this would be the highest starting salary in the region
(even assuming all districts increase their schedules by 3% based on this year’s anticipated
Consumer Price Index (CPI). In response to concerns raised by DCTA around incentivizing
educators to teach concurrent enrollment classes, DPS added the potential for a $3,500 salary
increase for educators who became qualified to teach concurrent enrollment. DPS also made the
Longevity Lane Change easier to access. Instead of 15 years in the classroom, educators could get
a lane change after ten years in DPS classrooms. DPS believes that this will function as a critical
recruitment and retention tool. Last, in response to DCTA’s request for more lanes, DPS added a
sixth lane to the salary schedule.
15.
That same day, DCTA presented two changes to their March 2018 salary schedule;
however, the numbers in all the cells (starting salary all the way up to highest salary) did not
change. They eliminated one lane (the Masters plus 45 credits or “MA+45”) and added a “hold
harmless” provision for the current employees who have a higher base salary today than what
DCTA was proposing on their salary schedule. Their hold harmless would allow some current
employees to be placed on the salary schedule at a higher base pay than what future employees
would receive. Significantly, the addition of this hold harmless provision actually made DCTA’s
proposal more, rather than less, expensive. That same day, DCTA filed their Notice with the
Department of Labor and Employment stating their intent to commence a strike on January 28,
2019.
16.
On January 11, DPS once again improved upon its previous offer by bringing more
money to the table. Based on Governor Polis’ public statements about funding full-time
kindergarten, DPS believed that it could free up even more money for teacher pay by reallocating
funds that it is presently using to offset the costs of full-day kindergarten. DPS offered a total of
$17 million in new recurring dollars and $6 million to fund costs to transition educators to the new
salary schedule. Again, this is in addition to the $45 million DPS already committed to add to
educator salaries under the Master Agreement and the $3 million DPS agreed to shift from nonbase incentives to base pay. With this investment, DPS now has a path to a $100,000 teacher,
which DCTA has repeatedly indicated is a primary concern for teachers. Under DPS’ proposal,
all DPS teachers would on average receive a 10 percent base salary increase in 2019-20. DPS
also responded to DCTA’s request for additional avenues to recognize educational credits by
adding an option for a lane change based on completing 30 educational credits after a Master’s
Degree. DPS negotiators were very clear during this session that they were putting their cards on
the table regarding the amount of money available. However, the district felt that it was important
to name the full money available early so that DPS and DCTA would have sufficient time to
discuss how that pot of dollars be allocated in the system. The District also named that there was
significant risk for the District in this proposal because the governor’s budget was in the early
stages of being proposed.
17.
On January 15, DPS awaited a counter proposal from DCTA but no counter
proposal was delivered. That morning, DCTA said first that they appreciated the money that DPS
had put on the table. However, they were standing on their last proposal and the union delivered
an ultimatum: concede to the union’s proposed pay structure, which means a salary schedule that
14

 has lanes associated with advanced degrees and the accumulation of credit hours. That structure
also would require DPS to cut $8 million out of the district’s commitment to incentives for
educators in high-poverty schools and spread it like peanut butter to all teachers across the
district. DPS understood from these conversations that the parties were close on money and that
the number one key issue for DCTA was a salary schedule structure that looked more similar to
DCTA’s structure. DPS went to work that afternoon to see if they could come up with a structure
that looked like DCTA’s structure, but also honored the commitment to the ProComp mill levy
language and included the incentives for high-poverty schools. Due to the complexity of the
financial modeling needed to build a sustainable system to spend $450 million per years on over
5,000 educators, this work took multiple days to complete.
18.
On January 17, DCTA presented a counter proposal that they said reduced their
position by $1.8 million. After a thorough review of the counter proposal, DPS calculated that the
reduction in cost was actually much larger (approximately $8.5 million). In recognition of the fact
that this was likely not intentional, the DPS team alerted DCTA privately. DCTA acknowledged
their error, rescinded their counter proposal and returned later in the afternoon with a second
version that included a reduction in their position of just over $2 million. They removed one lane
from their proposed salary schedule. DPS also brought forth two proposals on January 17. DPS
proposed increasing our current tuition and student loan reimbursement by 50%, up to $6,000
($1,000 a year) to support our educators who pursue additional education. DPS also proposed that
teachers/SSPs who have “banked” Professional Development Units will be paid out at $850 per
PDU, with a maximum of two per year for $1,700. Under the current system, educators must
complete one PDU per year in order to receive an $833 base pay increase. If they complete more
than one PDU per year, the extra PDUs are “banked” for future years. Under DPS’ current
proposal, educators no longer have to complete a PDU to increase base pay and we are offering a
cash payout for all banked PDUs.
19.
On January 18, DPS shared that they had their own modeling error, which meant
that their prior proposal was $3.5 million more expensive than the district previously thought.
Rather than rescind their proposal, DPS committed to make the central administration budget cuts
deeper, now agreeing to fund $10.5 million of the proposal through reduction of central
administration personnel and other efficiencies. All in, the DPS proposal now invests $20.5
million in recurring dollars and $6 million one-time funds that would go toward cash payouts for
2019-20 and the costs of transitioning to a new transparent salary schedule system.
20.
At about 4 pm on January 18, DPS responded to what DCTA had indicated was the
union’s top priority: a structure that looked more like theirs with lanes based on advanced degrees
and attainment of credit hours. DPS presented a new proposal that included lanes for: bachelor’s,
bachelor’s plus 20 credits, masters, maters plus 30 credits, and a PhD. At the same time, the
proposal continued to honor the ProComp mill levy language and the district’s commitment to
incentives for high-poverty schools. It also retained a piece that was not included in DCTA’s
proposal, but which teachers had responded with enthusiasm – a lane change to honor the service
of teachers who stay in DPS classrooms for ten years, which requires no investment in further
post-secondary credits by our educators. In response to this proposal on January 18, in which DPS
thought they were responding to the top priority, DCTA negotiators and a crowd of almost 100
people responded with chants and speeches expressing anger, frustration, and tears over their belief
15
 

 that DPS was not providing a living wage. DPS negotiators felt shocked and disappointed that the
goal post had changed again and were concerned that the conversations felt more like a planned
public protest than a conversation between two groups trying to solve complex problems.
However, DPS went back to work on ways to pressure test and better express their belief that the
DPS proposal was both generous and highly competitive with other Colorado districts. See linked
Lifetime Earnings under DPS proposal for summary.
21.
At about 8:45 p.m. on January 18, DCTA presented a counter that they labeled their
best-and-final offer. It did not include any changes to their salary schedule. However, they
increased their proposed amount for the incentive for educators in Title I schools (schools with
60% FRL or greater) from $1,500 to $1,750 (as compared to the DPS proposal, which offers a
$2,500 incentive for Title I). DCTA’s proposal continued to eliminate the additional $2,500
incentive for the district’s 30 high-priority schools, which have extremely high levels of poverty
and other significant challenges. In order to fund the change for the Title I incentive, DCTA
decreased the amount of tuition reimbursement available to educators. At the same time, DCTA
added some new provisions around what qualifies for credits to move lanes and where specialized
service providers (like psychologists and school nurses) would be placed on the salary schedule.
Based on DPS’ quick analysis of the proposal, DCTA was actually increasing the cost of their
proposal by at least half a million dollars based on the placement of SSPs and likely much more
because of the significantly expanded definition of qualifying credits that could be used for a lane
change.
22.
DPS returned to the table that night with a counterproposal in order to continue
moving the conversations forward before midnight. DPS agreed to DCTA’s request to change the
expiration date of the new contract so that the ProComp Agreement and the Master Agreement
would now expire at the same time. DPS also proposed paying $3 million dollars toward cash
payouts for the 1000+ educators who had banked Professional Development Units or PDUs.
Rather than pay out two per year at $850 per PDU that DPS has previously proposed, DPS now
offers to pay out all banked PDUs on November 7, 2019 at 200% of their value or $1,700. This
would mean an additional $3 million in educators’ pockets for the 2019-20 school year. The
payout would be funded from the $6 million in transition costs that DPS previously offered to fund
through the ProComp trust fund balance.
23.
In response to DPS’ proposal to add $3 million of cash payouts for educators in the
2019-20 school year, DCTA informed DPS that they would start their strike voting the next day.
More than an hour remained on the clock before the contract expired.
24.
DCTA conducted their strike vote on January 19 and January 22 and at least twothirds of the DCTA members who voted indicated that they wanted to proceed with a strike.

16
 

 WHEREAS:

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,

WHEREAS,



under Colorado Revised Statutes section

8-1-125, John J. Donlon, the executive director of
the Department of Labor and Employment, took
jurisdiction of a dispute between the Denver
Public Schools (DPS) and the Denver Classroom
Teachers Association (DCTA) on January 5, 1991;

public education is a public trust and the
state is a primary provider of this trust;

the State of Colorado has a significant

financial investment in the Denver schools in that
it will provide in excess of $65 million in 1991
to help pay for the education of Denver children;

the dispute between DPS and DCTA affects the
public interest;

Governor Roy Romer and Director Donlon
conducted hearings in the contract dispute between
DPS and 

the investigation and hearings in this dispute

were conducted pursuant to the authority and under
the procedures set forth in Colorado Revised
Statutes section 8-1?101 et seq.;

Governor Romer and Director Donlon heard testimony
and received exhibits from witnesses for DPS and
DCTA, parents, the community, and experts on
educational issues;

the evidence presented at.the hearings

encompassed the issues of collaborative
decision-making, scheduling of the school day and
week, teacher assignments and responsibilities,
teacher appraisal, teacher transfers, salaries and
benefits, and other issues in dispute between the
parties;

WHEREAS, after receiving and considering all the evidence,
Governor Romer and Director Donlon have ruled on
all the issues in dispute between the parties; and

WHEREAS, the rulings of Governor Romer and Director Donlon
are embodied in the attached contract for DPS and
the DCTA for the term January 1, 1991 through
August 31, 1994;

NOW, THEREFORE, Governor Roy Romer and Executive Director
John J. Donlon, of the Colorado Department of Labor and
Employment, pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section
8?1?125, DO HEREBY ORDER:

The contract attached hereto shall govern wages, hours, and
conditions of employment between the Denver Public Schools
and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association and shall
constitute the contract between the .Denver Public Schools
and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association for the term
January 1, 1991 through August 31, 1994.

Dated this 27th day of March, 1991.

  

 

 

Executive Director



Labor and Employment

 

Exhibit A

 

1
WHEREAS, under (3010me Revised Statutes section 8-1-125, John J. Donlon, the executive
director of the Department of Labor and Employment, took jurisdiction of a dispute between the

Denver Public Schools (DPS) and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) on
September 23, 1994;

WHEREAS, public education is a public trust and the state a primary provider of this trust;

WHEREAS, the State of Colorado has a signi?cant ?nancial investment in the Denver schools
in that it supports the education of Denver children;

WHEREAS, the dispute between DPS and DCTA affects the public interest;

WHEREAS, the investigation and hearings in this dispute were conducted pursuant to the
authority and under the procedures set forth in Colorado Revised Statutes section 8-1-101 et seq.;

WHEREAS, Director Donlon heard testimony and received exhibits ?om DPS and 

WHEREAS, the evidence presented encompassed the issues in dispute pertaining to
collaborative decision-making, scheduling of the school day and week, rules, salaries and
?rne?ts, and other issues in dispute between the parties;

WHEREAS, after receiving and considering all the evidence, Director Donlon has ruled on all
the issues in dispute between the parties; and

the rulings of Director Donlon are embodied in the attached contract for DPS and
the DCTA for the term September 1, 1994 through August 31, 1996;

NOW, THEREFORE, Executive Director John J. Donlon, of the Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment, pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 

The contract attached hereto shall govern wages, hours, and conditions of employment between
the Denver Public Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association and shall constitute
the agreement between the Denver Public Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers
Association for the term September 1, 1994 through August 31, 1996.

Dated this 5th day of October, 1994.

   

t:
xecutive Director 
ad I 
Color 0 eparlrnent of La or and Employmen Exhibit