DECISION
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THEARBITRATOR
IN THE MATTEROF ARBITRATION
BETWEEN

ClassActionGrievance

Adams-Arapaho
e 2BJ School
District( the District)

Aurora.Colorado

AND
AuroraEducation
Association
(theAssociation)

BEFORE:

Jon Numair,Arbitrator

APPEARANCES:
Forthe Employer:

MichaelW. Schreiner,Attorney
Caplanand Earnest,LLC

Forthe Association:

CharlesF. Kaiser,LegalCounsel
ColoradoEducation
Association

Placeof Hearing:

Aurora,CO

Dateof Hearing:

N o v e m b e5r, 2 0 1 8

BriefsReceived:

November
16,2018

Dateof Award:

January7, 2019

Witnesses
calledby the Employer
DamonSmith

Witnesses
calledbytheUnion
FrankO'Hara
PamShamburg
Amy Nichols
SaraFitouri
BruceWilcox.

 ISSUE
The Districtproposedthe followingstatementof the issue:
Did the Schoo/ District violate the Master Agreement when it
did not bargain the one-year pilot program providing onetime sftpends to recruit and retain teaching staff in some of
the District hardesf fo fill positions?
TheAssociation
did not putfortha formalstatement
of the issue,butvoiceda similar
view. Havingheardthe openingstatements,
the presentations,
and afterreadingthe posthearingbriefs,the Arbitrator
framesthe issue(s)as follows:
properlvbeforethe Arbitrator?lf so...
1. ls the qrievance
2. Didthe DistrictviolatetheAqreement
whenthevimplemented
a pilotproqramof
"incentives
to recruitand retain staffin someof the hardestto fill positions"without
barqaininq
the proqramwiththe Association.
lf so.whatis the properremedv?
BACKGROUND
As notedat the hearingand in the briefs,thereis littleto no disputeof the factsgiving
riseto the case. TheAdams-Arapahoe
SchoolDistrictNo.28J,or AuroraPublicSchools(the
District)hassoughta way of incentivizing
teachersto workin whattheyterm"hardto staff"
positionsfor, at least,a coupleof years. ln 2015,the Districtformeda taskforceto studythe
issue.The taskforcemaderecommendations
whichwerepresented
duringbargaining
for a
successor
agreement
in the 2016negotiations
betweenthe parties,but no agreement
was
reached.In December,
2017,DistrictSuperintendent
RicoMunninformedleadership
of the
AuroraEducation
Association
(theAssociation)
thatthe District
was intending
to implement
a
stipendsystemfor the retentionof teachersin thesepositions.lt was apparentlya courtesy
noticewithno detailsprovided.
Duringa SchoolBoardMeetingon January9,2018,the Superintendent
proposed
a
modification
of the 2017-18budgetto the Boardof Education,
whichwouldprovide$1.8million
for a pilotprogramtargetinghardto staffpositions.Accordingto the Minutesof that meeting,
Superintendent
Munnstated
"...itis not
a sustainableamount. lt is to developa pilot to seeif
thereis successin addressrnghard to fillposifions. lf thereis
successthe districtwill returnto the board fo see if thereare funds
to move forwardor not."

 On January23,2018,the Boardof Education
approved
the requested
fundsfor the
program.Therewas littlediscussion
and no furtherdetailwas provided.
On February
7, DistrictChiefPersonnel
OfficerDamonSmithdisseminated
a
"Recruitment
Memorandum,
by way of an email,to Principals
and certainDistrictDirectorstitled
and RetentionPilotforTargetedRolesfor the 2018-19schoolyear." ln the Memo,Mr.Smith
providedprogramdetails,includinga statementas to revenuesource(a one-timeincreasein
revenuefor the 2017-1I schoolyear due to propertytaxes),an explanationof the program( . . .a
one-yearpilot to enhancerecruitmentand retentionof our hardesffo fill positionsby offering
incentives. Giventhat most of our neighboringdistrictsoffer incentives,fhis pilot allowsus fo
remaincompetitive).
lt also includeda chartnamingcategories
of educatorsthatwouldbe
eligibleand specificmonetaryincentives
to be offered.lt concluded
witha listof NextStepswhichwouldincludethe namingof eligibleschools,the promiseof futurecommunications,
and
a web linkthe recipients
coulduseto poseanyquestions
theyhad.
On February15,2018,Mr.Smithsenta secondMemoto the samelistof addressees,
almostidentical
to thefirst,butthe specificschoolsbeingtargetedby the pilotwerenamedfor
the firsttime. Mr.Smithsentanotheremailon February
22,2018to a longlistof recipients,
presumably
providing
administrators,
additional
mechanics
of the program.
On March15,2018,the Association
fileda grievance
allegingunilateral
implementation
of the stipend.Thegrievance
was processed
in an orderlyfashionand heldin abeyance
for a
periodof time. The Districtissueda Level2 denialon June22,2018,andtheAssociation
requested
arbitration
on July5, 2018.
The Districtpaidthe disputedstipends
to employees
eligibleundertheirguidelines
on
August31, 2018.
The Districtraisedtwo procedural
objections
at the hearing1) TheAssociation
waived
its rightto bargainoverthe programby failingto requestbargaining
overthe issue,and 2) The
Grievance
was nottimelyfiled.
Eachpartyhadfullopportunity
to presentwitnesses
andevidencein supportof their
positions.The partieschoseto summarizetheircasesin the formof writtenbriefsto be
no laterthanNovember16,2018. The briefswerereceivedin a timelymannerafter
submitted
whichthe recordwas closed. ln accordance
withArticle44, Section6.d.of the Collective
(theAgreement)1,
Bargaining
Agreement
theArbitrator's
decisionshallbe advisory.

'

A g r e e m e n tb e t w e e nt h e A u r o r a P u b l i cS c h o o l sB o a r do f E d u c a t i o na n d A u r o r a E d u c a t i o nA s s o c i a t i o n( J u n e1 - ,
2 0 1 5- J u n e 3 0 , 2 0 2 0

 2
RELEVANTNEGOTIATED
PROVISIONS
Article 2, Section 1
TheBoardrecognizesthe Associationas the exclusive
representativeof all licensedprofessional staff,includingfull-time
and regularpart-timecareerand technicalteachershired on
contract,employednow or duringthe life of thisAgreement
(excludingadministrators,
subsfr1uf
e teachers,summer school
teachers,limitedpaft-timeteachers,and hourlyposfsecondary
and/oradult careerand technicalteachers),in mattersinvolving
collectivenegotiationswith respectto wages,hours and other
conditionsof employmentaffectingany personnelin the unit.

Article 3, Section 1
Theobligationto negotiateshallariseonly whena timely request
is made in accordancewith the ArticleentitledTermof
Agreement,and the matterssubyectto negotiationshallbe only
thosepermittedby the ArticleentitledRecognition;provided,
however,this shallnot precludedthe parties,by mutualwritten
agreement,fromnegotiatingat othertimesor on other topicsnor
shallit precludeamendment,modificationor supplementation
of
thisAgreementduring its term,by mutualwrittenagreement.
(2014)
Article 3, Secfion 3
Theminimumsalariesof employeescoveredby thisAgreement
shallbe thoseestablished
in negotiations
betweenthe parties.ln
any givenyear, the partsof this agreementdealingwith
compensationshallbe subjectto negotiations,whichinclude
AppendicesA, B and C, Article11, Section16.b.(Medicat
Insurance).Additionally,eitherparty may bring up to two (2)
issuesfor negotiationunlessthe partiesmutuallyagreeto
negotiateother matters.such issues shallbe providedby each
team by November1, of the schoolyear in whichsuch issuesare
to be negotiated.Each team agreesthat it shallprovidefhe issue
and the correspondingarticleswithinwhicheach team desiresfo
addressifs respectiveissues.Each team shallspecifythe aftictes
whichit believesaddressfhe issue,but may specifynot more than
a total of nine (9) articlesin whicheach team,accordingto its
respectiveissues,desiresfo see the two (2) issuesaddressed.
For years in whicheitherparty vrzishes
to bargainmore than two
(2) issues,fhe party bringingsuch additionalissuesmust provide
fhose additionalissues,in writing,to the otherpafty, by July 1 of
the schoolyear in whichthat party desiresto bargain suchissues.
'

tbid

 The partiesagreethat eachafticle shallbe subjectto bargaining
in a periodnot greaterthan every six(6) years.ln the eventthat
an afticleis not addressedwithina six (6) year period,that article
becomesa mandatoryafticleof negotiationsinifs seventhyear.
Any such negotiationsshallbe conductedas sef forth in Article3
of thisAgreement.(2U a)

AgreementArticle 3, Section16
The Board agreesnof to negotiatewith any teacherorganization
otherthan fhe AssociationwhilethisAgreementis in effect.The
Board alsoagreesnof to negotiatematterscoveredby this
Agreementdirectlywith one (1) or more employees;provided,
however,the Boardspecificallyreseruesfhe right to communicate
with its employeesand to advisethemof Board policieson such
mattersas the Boardor the Superintendent
shalldeem
appropriate.(2014)
Agreement Article 44 - GrievanceProcedure
5. The followingshallgovernthe process/ngof all grievances:
a. No grievanceshallbe validunlessit is submittedat Step1
of the grievanceprocedurewithin30 calendardays after the
grievantknew, or shouldhave known,of the circumstanceson
whichthe grievanceis based,exceptthat any allegedviolative
practicethat is continuedbeyondthe 30-day period shall
continueto be subjectto the grievanceprocedure.(2014)
b. It is agreedthatif a grievantand/orfhe Associationfailsto
meet the deadlinefor submissionof the grievanceto the next
sfep, the grievanceshallbe consideredseff/eadverselyto
grievant. lf the questionof arbitrabilityis confestedat any
levelof the grievanceprocedure,the questionsand the
grievanceshallbe submittedimmediatelyto Sfep3 of this
procedure.(2014)
AgreementArticle 48, Section 1
Thepartiesacknowledgethat duringthe negotiationsthat resulted
in thisAgreement,each had the unlimitedright and opportunityto
make demandsand proposalswith respectto any subjector
matternot removedby law from the area of negotiations,and that
the understandingsand agreementsarrivedat by the partiesafter
the exerciseof that right and opportunityare setforthin this
Agreement(and in the Appendicesattachedhereto)betweenthe
parties.Therefore,the Boardand the Assocrafio
n, for the life of
thisAgreement,each voluntarilyand withoutqualification,waives
the right,and each agreesthat the other shallnot be obligated,to

 bargaincollectivelywith respectto any subjector matternot
specificallyreferredto or coveredby thisAgreementeven though
such subjector mattermay not have been withinthe knowledgeor
contemplationof eitheror both of the partiesat the time they
negotiatedthisAgreement.(2U a)
CONTENTIONS
OF THE PARTIES
Positionof the Association
Meritsof the case
TheAssociation
contends
the District
violatedtheAgreement
by implementing
a
condition
of employment
withoutbargaining
thatcondition
withthe Association,
the exclusive
bargaining
representative
of the District's
teachers.Theyargue,regardless
of howthe stipend
is characterized,
it is a mandatory
subjectof bargaining.
Theypointto threearbitration
decisions,
addressing
similarissues,all of whichweredecidedin theAssociations'
favor,along
withinterpretations
of the NationalLaborRelations
Act (NLRAor the Act)and Colorado
SupremeCourtdecisions
publicsectordisputesthatgivedeference
regarding
to the Act,as
substantiation
for theirargument.JeffersonCountySchoo/Districtv. Shorey,82GP.2d830,
837(Colo.1992).
Underthe NLRA,theyargue,
...courtsconsiderwhetherthe paymentis tiedto the natureand
job responsibilities,and whetherthe
'payment
scopeof the employees'
is taxedas wage.s
(RadioTechnicalSchool,lnc.v.
NLRB,4gBF2d 457,460(3'dCir.1973)3
The stipendat handmeetsthisdefinition
job
as it is tiedto the scopeof employees'
responsibilities,
it was taxedas wages,and it was conditionally
paid. Theypointout the
mandatory
negotiation
language
of theAgreement
mirrorsthe controlling
language
of the NLRA.
As such,interpretations
of the NLRAhavegreatvaluein thisanalysis.
Theyarguethe one-yearnatureof the stipendis/wasuncertain
by the initiator
of the
payment(Superintendent
Munn).Mr.Munnwas hopefulof a successful
pilotandcontinued
fundingwhichwouldallowthe programto continue.
Thus,the classification
of the programas a
"pilot"has
no bearingon the District's
obligation
to bargainit.
Finally,
theyarguethe partieshaveincludedmanyotherstipendsin theAgreement,
demonstrating
theirintentto includethemin the Collective
process.
Bargaining
-

Post-Hearing
B r i e fo f t h e A s s o c i a t i o n

 Timeliness
On the timelinessdefenseraisedby the District,the Association
argues"a violation
accrueswhena policyis implemented,
not whenit is merelyannounced,"quoting
from
Arbitrator
JohnCriswell's
decisionin a disputeinvolving
the CherryCreek,Colorado,
School
District(CherryCreekSchoolDistrict
v. CherryCreekEducation
Association
[May30, 2017]).
Sincethe implementation
datedid notoccuruntilthe DamonSmithemailsof February15 and
22,whenthefinalizedprogramwas announced,
the grievance
wasfiledwithinthe 30 day
windowrequiredby Article44. TheAssociation
alsocontends
thiswas newargumentraisedfor
the firsttimein the OpeningStatement
of the District
duringthe hearing.As such,the
Association
had no opportunity
to preparea defense.Theyargueit shouldnot be considered.
Waiverof Riqhts
CitingRadioTechnicalSchool(supra),
the Association
contendsthe District's
waiver
argument"Should
not be lightlyinferred.It mustbe clearlyand unmistakenlyestabtished
before
it can be reliedon..." Theyarguethe Association
did not waiveany rightas theyassertedtheir
rightsby way of the grievance
filing.TheAssociation
responded
similarly
to two previous
compensation/failure
to bargaindisputesin the samemanner,whichwereupheldin arbitration.
Positionof the District
Meritsof the Case
The Districtargues
The one-timesfpends paid pursuantto an experimentalone-year
pilot programare not wagesor other conditionsof employment
describedin Article2 of the MasterAgreement."a
The Districtalsolooksto theActfor guidancein interpreting
a party'sdutiesunder
collectivebargaining
agreements
and citesthe sameJeffersonCountySchoo/Districtcasethe
Association
did to supportthatreliance.However,
theythenarguetheAct wouldnot have
required
the District
to negotiate
the programbeforeits implementation.
Theyalsosupporttheir
argumentby way of a decisionreachedby the FloridaSupremeCourtin lJnitedTeachersof
Dadev. Dadecounty schoolBoard,500so.2d 508,513 (Fla.1986).
Theyarguethe stipendswerenot paidfor servicesrenderedor laborperformed.
Since
theyare notongoing,do not impactthe salaryschedule,
are not partof basepay,and not

*

Post-Hearing
B r i e fo f t h e D i s t r i c t

 subjectto retirement
withholding
underthe ColoradoPublicEmployees
Retirement
Association
(PERA)theycannotbe considered
as a wage.
Theydistinguish
the caseat barwithdecisions
citedby the Association
fromJudgeLarry
-320A,July 20,2015)
J. Naves(AuroraPublicSchoo/sv. AuroraEducationAssocration,2015
andArbitratorMichaelJ. Sullivan(DenverPublicSchoo/sv. DenverC/assroomTeachers
Assoctaf
ion, 01-15-0006-0218,
July 19, 2016)oversomewhatsimilardisputes.Citingdifferent
circumstances
in the Navescaseanda poorlyconstructed
decisionby Arbitrator
Sullivan,
they
arguethesecasesofferno supportfor theAssociation's
positionhere.
Theyalsocontendthe otherstipends,
bargained
for andcontained
in the Agreement,
aredistinguishable
in thattheyareongoingprograms
whichprovideannualpayments.The
namingof a paymentas a stipenddoesnot establish
it as a wagesubjectto negotiation.
They
"...temporary
characterize
thesepaymentsas
one-timepaymentsmadeas part of an
experimentto generatedata to informbroaderpolicy decisionsregardinghard to fitt positions."
Timeliness
The DistrictcontendstheAssociation
knew,or shouldhaveknown,of the programas
earlyas January9,2018whena requestfor fundingwas presented
to the Boardof Education
at
a publicmeeting,or by way of the January23 Boardmeetingwhenfundingwas approved- a
meetingwhichPresident
of theAssociation,
BruceWilcox,attended.Furthernoticewas
providedin the widelydisseminated
DamonSmithemailof February
8, 2018. Yet,the
grievance
was notfileduntilMarch15,outsidethe 30 daywindowfor any of theseevents,
whichshouldbe heldagainstthe Association.
Waiverof Riqhts
The Districtarguesherethatthefailureof theAssociation
to requestto bargainthe
termsof the pilotprogramconstitute
a waiverof theirrightunderthe zipperclauseof Article48.
In believing
the mattershouldbe a subjectof negotiations,
butthennot raisingthe issue,the
"knowingly
"
Association
and voluntarilywaivedthatright, (if they had it in the first place).
ANALYSISAND OPINION
Timeliness
TheAgreement
requires
partyto filetheirgrievance
the aggrieved
within30 daysof
knowing,or the datetheyshouldhaveknown,of the circumstances
givingriseto the grievance,
and rendersinvalida grievance
nottimelyfiled. Timeliness
is an affirmative
defense.

 Althoughthe Districtdoesn'tpointto a singleeventas the datecircumstances
arose
whichshouldhavetriggered
a grievance,
if onewasto be filed,theynamea numberof events
whichshould/could
havecreateda basisfor challenging
planunderthe arguments
the District's
raisedhere- a failureto bargain.
TheAssociation
hastwo responses
1)The District
firstraisedthe issueat the hearing,
makinga defensedifficult,citingarbitralauthoritywhichrejectsthe practiceof an 11tnhour
objection
as beinguntimelyin and of itself.2) The grievance
was timelyfiledas theAssociation
is not obligated
to respondto the intentions
of the District,
onlytheiractions.The grievable
actiontookplacewhentheylearnedof the detailsof the program.
Althoughthe Association
protests
the last-minute
raisingof the timeliness
argument(and
undermanycircumstances
thiswouldbe convincing),
thisAgreement
allowsfor a timeliness
objection
at any levelof the grievance
procedure.
lf the questionof arbitrabilityor timelinessis contestedat anv level
of the qrievanceprocedure,the questionsand the grievanceshall
be submittedimmediatelyto Sfep3 of thisprocedure.5
Emphasis
added
Sincearbitration
is the 3'oStepof the procedure,
the doorappearsto be openfor such
contestat the hearing.Also,becausewe are alreadyat Step3, I havetakenthe District's
raisingof the issueto be the submission
to Step3 calledfor in the provision.I findnothing
improper
withthe District's
raisingtheirtimeliness
defenseat the hearing.Thetimeliness
issue
is properlybeforeme.
As the partyhavingthe burdenof provingthe timeliness
argument,
the Districtoffers
- the January9
multipleeventsthatcouldhavebeena precipitating
eventfor the grievance
requestfor fundsfor the program,
the January23 approvalof thosefunds,or the DamonSmith
emailof February
B. TheAssociation
pushesback,sayingnoneof theseeventscontained
enoughspecificity
to triggera grievance
andtheyweren'tawareof someof them.
ln December
2017,Superintendent
Munninformed
the Association
thatthe District
wouldbe pursuingan incentive
program.According
to the onlywitnesses
whotestified
about
thismeeting,
Association
UniServRepresentative
SarahFitouriandAssociation
President
BruceWilcox,the communication
cameduringa standingmonthlymeetingbetweenthe
Association
andthe District,
but no detailswereshared.BothMs. Fitouriand Mr.Wilcox
"informed'
testifiedtheywere
of the District'sintentto pursuea program.Mr.Wilcoxstatedthe
"aske
Association
d for a seafat the table"to helpin its development,
but one was never
(-

A g r e e m e n tA r t i c l e4 4 , S e c t i o n5 . b .

 provided.Clearly,therewas insufficient
information
sharedat thispointto generatea
contractual
challenge.
The discussions
at the JanuaryBoardof Education
meetings
werealsoincomplete.
The
minutesdo not revealadequatedetailwasdiscussed
or providedoverwhichtheAssociation
couldhavefileda grievance.In additionto a requestforfundingand approval
of funding,the
onlydetailprovidedwas capturedas follows:
Dr. Armstrong-Romero
followedup and a/soasked abouthard to
fill positionswith constrainfs
fo fill substituteteachers,her question
was to clarifythe $1.8 milliona temporaryfix. Munn sfafedif is
not a sustainableamountit is to developa pilot fo see if thereis
successin addressinghard to fillposifions. lf thereis successfhe
districtwill returnto the boardfo see if there are funds to move
forwardor not. 6
Details,suchas howthefundswereto be paid,at whatschools,to whom,when,and
howmuch,werenotdivulged,
and maybenotyet evenpromulgated.NoteMr. Munnstated"fo
developa pilot".
A grievance
overthe District's
sharingof theirintent,withno detailprovided,
wouldbe
guesswork
at best.TheAssociation
waitedto seewhatthe District
was goingto do, including
the possibility
theywouldbe invitedto participate
in theformulation
of the programas they
requested. Mr.Wilcoxtestified,"wewaitedto hear(fromthe District),
buf did not."
lf a bargaining
representative
wereto be heldto a standardof filinga grievanceover
suchscantinformation,
theywouldbe filinggrievances
overeverypossibleinfraction
to protect
theirinterests.
Thiswouldleadto chaosin the administration
process.The
of the grievance
partieswouldbe boggeddownin disputesoverpoliciesnotfullyformed,not implemented,
and/oroutsidethe scopeof the collective
bargaining
agreement.No,grievances
mustbe based
on factsnot conjecture.
In the Criswellcasecitedby the Association
(supra),Arbitrator
JohnCriswelltookthis
"...theadoption policy
conceptevenfurther,dismissing
a timeliness
challenge
by reasoning
of a
does not give riseto a grievance. lt is only when the policyis implemented,so that it actually
adverselyaffectsthe employeethat thereis a basis for a grievance."
Arbitrator
Criswellprovides
thefollowing
citationto supporthisconclusion,
For example,Elkouriand Elkouri, "HowArbitrationWorks"(ABA
f'n Edition2012),sec 5.7A. lV., at pp 5-28through5-29,says,

"
e

M i n u t e s o f t h e J a n u a r y9 , 2 0 1 8 B o a r do f E d u c a t i o nM e e t i n g p a g e4 , l t e m 5 . 8 .

10

 A party sometimes announces ifs intentions to perform
an act, but does not culminate the act until a later date.
Similarly, a party may perform an act whose adverse
effect on another does not result until a later date. In
such situations arbitrators have held that the
'occurrence'forpurposes
of applying the timeliness
limitsis fhe later date.

The SmithMemorandum
of February
7 wasthe firsttimethe District
divulgedanydetail
of the program.Yet,eventhen,an important
elementwas notyet decided- the namingof
eligibleschools.lt is alsosignificant
thereis no evidence
the memowas sharedwiththe
Association.
Theyare notcc'don the emailand Mr.Smithcouldn'trecallif he provided
thema
copy. lt was not established
the Association
knewor shouldhaveknownof the circumstances
givingriseto thisgrievance
basedon the February
7 Memo.
TheSmithemailof February
15 updated
the February
7 email.In thisMemorandum,
schoolseligiblefor the stipendwereidentified.
TheAssociation
received
a copyof thisemail,
althoughno one couldrememberhow. Then,on February
22, Mr.Smithsentanotheremail
providing
an overviewand logistical
job titlesof whom
information
to a longlistof recipients,
werenot developed.Oneelementof thisemailwas an announcement
of nextsteps,including
"a
communication
willbe senf to allAPSteachersto announcethe Recruitmentand Retention
Pilot,eligiblepositions
and schools,"
indicating
teacherswerenot yet informed.
Article44 requiresa grievancebe filedwithin30 daysof the datethe grievantknew,or
shouldhaveknown,of the circumstances
givingriseto it. TheAssociation
filedtheirgrievance
on March15,whichwaswithin30 daysof the February15 email.The February15 email
revealed
the fulldetailsof the programandset it in motion.Althoughtherewas no showingthe
Districtsharedthisinformation
withtheAssociation,
the Association
acknowledged
seeingit.
Thisthenwasthefirstpossible
datetheyknewor shouldhaveknownof the circumstances
givingriseto the grievance.I findno meritto the District's
timeliness
challenge.The Grievance
was timelyfiledand is properlybeforeme.
Waiver
The Districtalsoarguesthe Association
waivedtheirrightto bargainoverthe program
by not requesting
suchbargaining,
contending
the "entireagreemenf'clause
in Article48
provides
thata rightto bargainovera subjectis waivedif suchissueis not includedin the
Agreement.Theypointoutthe partiesengagedin bargaining
in the springof 2018andthe
Association
did notattemptbargaining
overthe stipends"

LI

 - the same
TheAssociation
counterstheyassertedtheirrightsby filingthe grievance
methodtheyemployedwhentheychallenged
two previousunilateral
effortsby the Districtto
modifyemployeecompensation.
partof the District's
A significant
defensehereis the entireagreemenfprovision.lt is
interesting
theyraiseda similardefensein priordisputes,
in whichthe arbitrators
foundthe
argument
unconvincing.
In the Navescase(supra),betweenthesesameparties,
Arbitrator
Navesarticulated
the
District's
waiverdefenseas follows:
Afticle 47 of the CBA acknowledgesthat the CBA constitutesfhe
parties'entireagreementand is a waiverof the right to bargain
about any subjector matternot specificallyreferredto in the CBA.
TheCBA doesnot addresssa/aryincreasesas a retention
initiative. ...underthe plainlanguageof Article47, evenif
upwardsalaryadjustmentsin the natureof the ParisRetention
lnitiativewouldproperlybe the subjectof negotiation,the
Associationwaivedthat right in Arlicle 47.
ArbitratorNaveswenton to providea briefhistoryof the parties'wagenegotiations
and
concluded
the absenceof a provision
specifically
addressing
the initiative
unilaterally
implemented
by the Districtdid notamountto a waiver.He found:
Theevidencepresentedindicatesthat the partieshavehistorically
bargainedfor othersalary increasesbeyondfhoseagreedto in
the salaryschedule.
Thecourseof dealingbetweenthe partiesdemonstrates
that the
AuroraEducationAssociationhashad broadauthorityto negotiate
wage increasesof the typeat issuein thiscase,and therewas no
evidencepresentedthat the AuroraEducafionAssociation
knowinglyagreedto waive this authority.
The Districtalsomadea waiverargument,
relyingon pastacquiescence
by the
"Zipper
Association
and the Agreement's
Clause"in frontof ArbitratorCarltonSnow(Aurora
PublicSchoo/sand AuroraEducafionAssociation,AmericanArbitrafionAssociation(AAA) Case
#77 300 0066 89,July23, 1990).ArbitratorSnowanalyzedbothargumentsin greatdetail,but
rejectedthemand foundno suchwaiver.
Thewaiverargumenthasloosetiesto the meritarguments,
specifically
in howthe
stipendis classified.As Arbitrator
Navesfound,if the stipendis compensation,
the Association
couldnot havewaivedits rightas it regularly
and routinely
bargainsoverthe issue.The

1,2

 District's
unilateral
implementation
wouldbe extra-contractual,
as it was not something
they
bargained
for.
Yet,evenif the stipendis something
entirelynew,otherthancompensation,
questions
on waiverstillexist,including
who'sobligation
it is to raisethe issue- the District's,
as the
implementer
of the program,or theAssociation's,
as thejiltedpartner.The Districtargues, "Mr.
Wilcoxand Ms. Nrcholstestifiedthat they did not raisefhe issue of bargainingstipendsin the
negotiationprocesseven thoughtthey were awareof the pilot program."
Notwithstanding
thisargument,
if a partywishesto bargainoveran issueotherthan
compensation,
the Agreement
requires
thatpartyto notifythe otherof theirintentto raisean
issuein negotiations
by November1 of the preceding
year(inthiscase,2017).TheAssociation
had no knowledge
of the District's
intentuntilFebruary15,2018.Theycouldnot have
anticipated
the issuein timeto makeit oneof the two itemsto be bargained
duringthe 2018
negotiations.
Undercross-examination,
Ms.Fitouricitedtheselimitations
as to whythe
Association
did notformallyproposebargaining.
I do notfindthe District's
argument
to be compelling.Evenif the partieswerewillingto
mutuallyagree,in writing,to bargainoverthe termsof the program,
as appearsto be allowed
underArticle3.1,the Districthadalreadyfinalized
the programby thetimethe Association
becameawareof it. The detailshadbeendetermined,
announced,
andwerebeing
implemented.
TheAssociation
said,by way of thisgrievance,
youshouldnot haveinstituted
thisprogram
on yourown...you
hadan obligation
to negotiate
itstermsandyoudid not...you
are in violation
of the Agreement.A callto bargainmighthavebeenappropriate
hadthe train
not leftthe station,but it did. The chance,the opportunity,
the obligation
(iftherewas one)to
bargainwas beforethe February1Sth
email,notafterthe programwas announced,
in place,and
beingimplemented.
The Grievance
addressed
an allegedviolation
thathadtakenplace,and
askedfor retrospective
redress.lt couldhavealsoresultedin prospective
remedies.On the
otherhand,bargaining
gdy addressfutureconditions
wouldnormally
and,as such,be purely
prospective.The Association
hadthe rightto protectits interestsandfilethe grievanceoverthe
violation
theybelievehadoccurred.The remedyrequested
in the grievance
impliedan
openness
to discussdetails(to bargain,if youwill)usingthe grievance
procedure
as the
mechanism.
I findtheAssociation
did notwaivetheirrightto bargainthe detailsof the disputed
stipend.

13

 On the Merits
The Districtarguestheyhaveno responsibility
to bargainfor a one-yearpilotprogram
overstipendsthatwerenotwagesor any othercondition
of employment
as described
in Article
2. Theydrawsupportfrom the UnitedTeachersof Dade(supra)and distinguish
thiscasefrom
two of the casescitedby the Association
(theNavesand Sullivandecisions).
The Association
begantheirpresentation
at the hearingby stating,"Thisis dejavu

all

overagain,"arguing
the dutyto bargainhadbeenpreviously
disputedand decidedin the
Association's
favor. Theycontendthe Districthada clearobligation
to bargainthe termsof the
programas the Association
is the recognized
exclusive
bargaining
agentandthe stipendis
compensation.
Theypointto otherbargained
for stipendscontained
in the Agreement
andthe
"hard
District's
raisingthe verytopicof
to staffposrtions"during
bargaining
in 2016,in whichthe
partiescouldnot agreeto the termsof a program.
Despitethe agreeduponfactthe Districtis not underthejurisdiction
of the NLRA,both
partiesrelyon the Act for interpretive
value. In addition,
and in supportof thatreliance,
Arbitrator
CarltonSnow,in the firstof anyof the otherciteddecisions
(supra- 1990),undertook
an in-depthexamination
of the District's
dutyto bargain,in thisrelationship,
underthe termsof
the Agreement,
usingtheAct as guide,pointing
out,
,..thearbitrator'srole in thiscaseis to determinethe contractual
intentof the partiesratherthan to explicatetheir statutoryduties
as interpretedby the NationalLabor RelationsBoardor some
comparablepublic secforentity.
He goeson to reason,
Decisionsof the NationalLabor RelationsBoard,however,may
be a relevantsourceof guidancein determiningthe parties'intent.
ln other words,decisionsby the NationalLabor RelationsBoard,
relevantjudicial teachings,and arbitrationdecisionsall providea
body of principleswhichare the contextfor collectivebargaining

:""';'li:;":i,lliii,;!f
,:ili1'"'li:,2?"r31:i:r:J":;":*::,:::"r'"
withoutregardto employmentrelationsprinciples

at work in the
largersociety.
Absentcontractualauthorityto the contrary,the partiesare
presumedto havebroughttheircontractualrelationships
into
existencewithinthe contextof establishedarbitralprinciples.

ln the absenceof contraryinstructions,
the partiesare presumed
to have expecteda readerof their collectivebargainingagreement
1.4

 to rely on establishedprinciplesof contractinterpretationand
arbitraldoctrineto construeany vagueterms or to pour meaning
into any contractualgap.
All of thatis to say,althoughthereis no precedential
valuein theseoutside
perspectives,
thereis persuasive
value. I endorseArbitrator
Snow'sreasoning
and conclusions.
Giventhisreasoning,
it is no surpriseeachpartyalsoresearched
andciteddecisions
fromother
authorities
besidesthe Act andfederalcourts.The Districtpointsto a decisionof the Florida
SupremeCourtandtheAssociation
pointsto arbitration
decisions
fromotherColorado
school
districts.
The Association
citesthreecases,two fromthis schooldistrictand one from Denver
PublicSchoolson the issueof non-negotiated
payments
stipendsor incentive
to teachers.
Afterprovidingthe foundation
for lookingto externallawfor helpwith interpretation
or
application
of the AuroraAgreement
(discussed
above),Arbitrator
Snowmovedto examine
whetherthe Agreement
embodied
a structure
similarto the Act regarding
the dutyto bargain
andconcluded
it did.
In thatcase,Arbitrator
Snowwasfacedwitharguments
similar,but not identical,
to
"extra
thosemadeby the Districthere,thata stipendfor
duties"was not a wagein the contextof
(andtherefore
the Agreement
nota subjectto be bargained).
Snowfoundthe contrary,
that
compensation
for extradutieswas coveredunderthe Agreement.
He foundadditional
groundsfor upholding
in the grievance,
as follows...
Even if the Employerwere correctin arguingthat the stipendfor
StaffingChairpersonswas not a mattercontainedin the parties'
agreement,its actions stillwouldhave breachedthe pariies'
agreement. ln Article2 of the pafties'agreement,the Employer
agreedto bargainsolelywith the Assocrafion with respectto
mattersinvolvingwages,hours,and other conditionsof
employment.Management,however,cleaflybargainedwith
individualSpecialEducationTeacherswhenit offereda stipends
(sic)to fhose willingto acceptadditionalresponsiblrfiesas a
StaffingChairperson.
Arbitrator
Snowconcluded
hisanalysisby saying:
Readas an entiredocument,the parties'agreementhas imposed
on managementan over-archingduty to notifyfhe Associationand
to offer to negotiateabout mattersinvolvingwages,hours,or
conditionsof employmentbeforemanagementmakes a changein
one of thoseareas.

15

 ArbitratorNaveswas facedwiththe Districtunilaterally
decidingto addressstaff
retention
by payingteachersat one particular
schoola salaryincrease
equivalent
to halfof a
stepon the salaryschedule
and promising
an extrahalf-step
if theyreturned
year.
thefollowing
The Districtarguedthe Agreement
onlyestablished
a floorbeneathwhichemployees
couldnot
be paid,butthatthe Districthadthe authority
to paymorethanthe agreeduponminimums.
JudgeNavesruledin the Association's
favor,decidingthe Agreement
did not simplyestablish
minimumsandfoundthe District
violatedtheAgreement
by not bargaining
the salaryincreases
withthe Association.
The SullivandecisionfromDenverPublicSchoolsdealtwiththe DenverSchoolDistrict's
implementation
payprogramin certainhighneedsschoolswithoutnegotiating
of an incentive
the termsof the program.In findingthe DenverDistrict's
actionto be in violation
of the
Agreement,
ArbitratorSullivanwrote,
Theunilateralactionby the DPS was unprecedentedwithinthe
agreement. ManagementRighfsdo includefhosefasksnotjointly
placedinto the MasterAgreement.TheMasterAgreement
requiresthe Partiesto negotiatesalaries,wages,hours and
conditionsas specifiedwithinthe termsand conditionsof
employment.
ln drawingon interpretations
of the Act,the Association
contends,"The reasonthat
unilaterally-imposed
increasesrn compensationconstitutean unfairlaborpracticeis that such
managementconductunderminesa union'sauthorityamongstthe employeeswhose interestsit
represenfs,
and citesNLRBv. C&CPlywoodCorp.,385U.5.421,429(1967)andJ.l. Casev.
NIRB 321 U.S.332, 338(1944)to supportthatcontention.
The District's
relianceon the UnitedTeacherscaseis two-fold.Theyfirstcitea finding
of significant
differencein privatev. publiccollectivebargaining
due to the publicmanagement
prerogative
policy. Theyalsopointto the findingthata stipendpaidto teachersfor
to determine
reachinga "MasterTeacher"rankingwas not a wage,in that if wouldnot includepaymentfor
servicesrenderedor laborperformed.
ln theiranalysisin the UnitedTeachersof Dadedecision,the FloridaCourtemploys
someof the logicalreadyestablished
here,borrowing
fromdecisions
fromotherpublic
jurisdictions.
publicbargaining
Theydistinguish
fromthe privatesectoras detailedby the
Pennsylvania
SupremeCourt,
[W]e are not suggesftngthat the experiencegainedin the private
sectoris of no valuehere,ratherwe are sfressrngthat analogies
have limitedapplicationand the experiencesgainedin the private

L6

 employmentsectorwill not necessarilyprovidean infalliblebasis
for a monolithicmodel for public employment.
Pennsylvania
Labor RelationsBoardv. StateCollegeArea School
District,461 Pa. 494, 500,&_AT'"'lu,?_$_?62,
264-265(Pa. 1975).
ln addition,
the FloridaSupremeCourtpointedto the SupremeCourtof Connecticut's
findingtherewas no "unwavering
line"thatseparatedthe categories
of policydecisionsthat
impactor do not impacta teacher's
conditions
(WestHartfordEducation
of employment
Association,
lnc.v. DeCourcy,
162Conn.at 581,295A.zdat 534).
The FloridaCourtwenton to citethe lowaSupremeCourt'sexamination
of a similar
ISSUC:

ln Fort Dodge CommunitySchoolDistrictv. PublicEmployment
Relations
Board,319N.W.zd181(lowa1982),the SupremeCourt
lowa.
of
. . reasonedthat the incentivepaymentin questionwas
not a wage,as that term in its commonlyunderstoodmeaning
wouldnot includepaymentfor seryicesnot renderedor labor not
performed."Id. at 184.Similarly,the paymentwas not
supplementalpay as there were no additionalseruicesrendered
by the recipientteachers.The court distinguishedsupplemental
pay from wages,as the formercontemplafesadditionalseryices
renderedover and abovethe wagespayableunderthe teacher's
basiccontract,such as a teacherwho performsextra dutiesas a
coach.ld.
Theyconcluded
then,
We find fhis reasoningpersuasivefor determiningthe issue before
us. Underthe Master TeacherProgram,no additionalteaching
seryicesare requiredto be performedby the teacherswho
voluntarilychooseto competefor the paymentauthorizedby
section231.533.As the petitionerspointout, the existingcontracts
with the respectiveschoolboardsalreadycontainprovisions,
arrivedat after collectivebargaining,whichcompensateteachers
for extra-curricularlaborssuch as coaching.Likewise,their
contractscontainduly negotiatedprovisionsfor determining
entitlementto true merit increases.Ihe paymentin questionhere
does not replaceor interferein any way with thosebargained-for
provisions.Nofhrngin the pleadingsshowsthat the paymentsin
question,nor the concomitantdesignationof a teacheras an
assocrafe masteror masterteacher,is fo be used as criteriafor
futurepromotionsor as a basis for additionalcompensation(other
than the statutorypayment)whichwouldarguablybe withinthe
ambit of collectivebargaining.Srncewe find the paymentunder
section231.533not to be a wage,we find that the subjectarea
fesf, section231.534,and the administrativerule, as uniform
proceduresadoptedsolelyto implementthe Master Teacher
17

 l
Program,do not abridgethe petitioners'rightsguaranteedby
articlel. section6.
an act of the Floridalegislature
that
The UnitedTeachersof Dadecaseinvolved
providedeconomicincentives
for teachersin the stateto qualifyas a MasterTeacher.The
of the AmericanFederation
of Teachers)
broughtsuit
UnitedTeachersof Dade(anaffiliate
bargaining
rights.I believeit is a
on the Federation's
collective
arguingthe programinfringed
initiative.
Although
difference
thatthe underlying
actionin Dadewas a legislative
significant
mighthavevaluein thisexamination,
the
elementsof the casedealingwithwagedefinition
andthe Legislature
between
disputein the UnitedTeacherscasewas betweenthe Federation
was not a partyto the
whomno collective
bargaining
agreement
existed.The Floridalegislature
betweenDadeteachersandthe MiamiDadeSchoolDistrict.
bargaining
agreement
collective
actiondid not impingeon the teacher's
collective
The FloridaCourtdecidedthe legislative
matter.
rights- a different
bargaining
Similarly,
the decisionin the lowacasehinged,in largepart,on statelaw not relevantto
fromstatelawand potentially
moreapplicable
analysisclassified
the
thiscase. The departure
paymentto teachersoverthe age of 60 as paymentfor servicesnot renderedor labornot
performed,
fromthe
whichis akinto the FloridaCourtfinding.Yet,I distinguish
thatreasoning
caseat bar. In the casebeforeme,teachershada choice- to teachat a targetedschooland
a valuedservice)or teachin a non-targeted
schoolfor less.
earnextramoney(thusproviding
incentive
was conditional.
lt wasfor a servicerendered
and labor
TheAuroraDistrict's
performed.lf teachingat the targetedschoolswas nota neededservicethe District
wouldnot
rendering
it. Theteacherswereunambiguously
a serviceand performing
haveincentivized
valuedlabor.
fromthe earlydaysof collective
The ovenruhelming
conclusion
of theseopinions,
in the privatesectorto morerecentdisputesin thisand neighboring
schooldistricts,
bargaining
mustnegotiate
issueswiththe employees'
bargaining
agent,
is thatemployers
compensation
line",thereis a line.
Althoughthereis no unwavering
The Districtcontendsthe issuebeforeme is dissimilar
to thatdecidedby JudgeNaves
in thatcasewere(orwouldhavebeen)ongoingchangesto the salary
sincethe payments
relieduponby Naves
the currentissuefromthe Katzdecision,
schedule.Theyalsodistinguish
(NLRBv. Katz 369U.S.236[1962]),as the fulcrumof Katzwas a "materialorsubsfantial"
Theyarguethe stipendsare neither,
of the conditions
of employment.
modification
themas "...temporary
one-timepaymentsmadeas paft of an experimentto
characterizing
generatedata to informbroaderpolicy decisions."
18

 Althoughthe intentional
ongoingnatureof the paymentsin the Navescaseis different,
I
disagreeit has no valuehere. I alsodisagreethatKatzhas no application.
ln Katz,the
SupremeCourtheldthatwherean employerunilaterally
instituted
a merit-increase
plan,while
negotiations
were pending,suchactionshould" ...be viewedas tantamount
to an outright
refusalto negotiateon thatsubiect." Katzand its progenyprovidegreatdetailof the employer's
obligation
to avoidunilateral
actionandto bargainonlywiththe recognized
bargaining
agent,
alongthe linesof the conclusion
drawnby Arbitrator
Snowregarding
the application
of Article2
in his analysispreviously
cited.
The Districtalsocontendssincethe PublicEmployees
Retirement
Association
(pERA)
decidedthe payments
werenotsubjectto stateretirement
withholdings,
it mustmeanthe
stipendswerenotwagesthatneededto be bargained.The decisionof PERAto classifythe
paymentsas a signingbonusaddslittleto thisevaluation.Salariesand otherincomesubjectto
PERAare statutorily
classified
for purposes
of retirement
creditand employer/employee
contributions.
Thefinding,underrulesof a different
authority,
is not persuasive.
In the end,the conclusion
of whetherthisstipendis a wage,althoughseemingly
apparent,
neednot be decided.ln applying
thefindingsand logicof Arbitrators
Snow,Sullivan
and Naves,and the"materialor substantial
modification"
standardof Katz,it is hardto conceive
of a representation
of the stipendotherthanas a conditionof employment,
whichmustbe
bargained
withthe exclusive
representative
of the bargaining
unit.The paymentof $2500or
manyof whommakelessthan$50,000peryear,onlyundercertain
$3000stipendsto teachers,
conditions,
is a significant
changeto the collective
pact,the Agreement.Eligibility
criteria,
the
paymentamounts,the conditions,
the locations,
all easilysettleunderthe broadumbrella
of
conditions
of employment.Theseelementswereall unilaterally
devisedand implemented
in
contravention
of the dutyto bargain.
Additionally,
the factthe Districthasbargained
for otherstipendsand raisedthe hardto
staffissueduringthe 2016negotiations
inferstheyunderstood
the obligation
to bargainthe
termsof suchan incentive.An argument
can be madetheyunilaterally
attempted
to imposea
condition
of employment
theywereunableto negotiate
for.
Lastly,the UnioncitesLinebackv.SMl/Division
of DCX-ChoiEnters,2014U.S.Lexis
*
158136at 29 (N.D.lnd. 2014)as supportfor its argumentthat thepitotprogramaspectof the
paymenthas no bearingon the outcomehere. ln Lineback,it was founda promiseof future
payments
additional
changedthe natureof a bonuspayment.Thusdurationbecamea relevant
factor.ln the caseat bar,Superintendent
Munn'sresponse
to the Board'squestionwas notthat
the pilotwas a one-yearprogram.lt wasthatfundingwas onlyavailable
for oneyear. The
19

 if sufficient
detailsof the programwereset. He was hopefulof the program'scontinuation
its continuation.
The designation
of the programas a
fundingwas available,
therebyinsinuating
"pilot"did not releasethe Districtfromits obligation
to bargain.
Remedv
The paymentshavealreadybeenmade. lt wouldbe inappropriate
to disturbthemat
originalrequest
did not requestsucha remedy.TheAssociation's
thispointandthe Association
pilot as currentlydesignated.2)
of the Hard-to-fill
was 1) The Districtceasethe implementation
The Districtbargainin good faith a// issuessubjectto negotiationper the MasterContract
requested" ...theArbitratorissuea decision
includingwages. In theirbrief,the Association
holdingthat the unilateralimpositionof the stipendat issueviolatedthe Agreement."
in theirbrief,hasthe valueand
The modifiedrequestof theAssociation,
contained
perspective
requested.We cannot,
of time,and is in concertwiththe secondremedyoriginally
lts continuation
is anothermatter.I have
at thispoint,haltthe program.lt was implemented.
no ideaif the Districtfoundthe resultsof the programto be a successor if theyhaveany plans
of it,theymustbargain
to continueit. But,if theyintendto continuethisor someotheriteration
the termswiththe Association.
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
presented,
andtestimony
alongwiththe
Afterconsideration
of all the evidence
provisions
of theAgreement,
for reasonsdetailedabove,I findthe Districtviolated
applicable
a pilotproqramof "mcenfives
fo recruifand refamsfaff
the MasterAqreementbv implementinq
barqaininq
the proqramwiththe Association.
rn someof fhe hardesffo f//posifions"without
I makethefollowing
recommendations:
o

I recommend
the grievance
be upheld.

o

I recommend
the Districtimmediately
ceaseanddesistfromfurther
program.
implementation
of the recruitment
and retention

o

I recommend,
in thefuture,the Districtmustbargainoverthisor any program
whichchangesconditions
of employment
agreeduponby the parties.

J a n u a r 7y , 2 0 1 9
20