EMBARGOED DRAFT - PLEASE DO NOT SHARE Report will be released on February 10, 2019 New Government for Today’s Portland: Rethinking 100 Years of the Commission System City Club of Portland Bulletin, Vol. 101, No. 2, February 10, 2019 CIT Y CLUB of PORTLAND City Club members will vote on this report between February 12 and February 24. Until the membership votes, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this report. The outcome of the vote will be reported online at pdxcityclub.org. EMBARGOED Release: February 10, 2019 Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 4 4 The First Step: Defining Equity City Government Structures Across the U.S. 5 Powers of City Government 5 Common Types of City Government 5 Strong Mayor/City Council 6 City Council/Manager 6 Commission 7 Other Systems 7 Current Structure of Portland City Government: A Modified Commission Form 8 History of the Current System 9 Charter Review Commission 10 Your Research Committee’s Analysis 11 At-Large Voting Is a Barrier to Equitable Representation in Portland At-large Versus District Elections 12 14 There Is Substantial Room for Improvement in the Bureaucratic Functioning of Portland’s Current Form of Government 14 Commission Government and Bureaucratic Efficiency 15 Citywide Planning and Problem-solving 16 More City Councilors are Required to Equitably Represent the People of Portland 17 Alternate Methods for Electing City Council Members 19 Single-member Districts 19 Multimember Districts 20 First-past-the-post Voting 20 Cumulative Voting 21 Instant-runoff Voting 21 Conclusions 22 Recommendations 23 Opportunities for Further Research 23 Appendix A: Research Methods and Activities 25 Appendix B: Past City Club Studies of Local Government in Portland 26 Appendix C: Questions Addressed 27 Appendix D: Witness List 28 Appendix E: Witness Assertions 29 Bibliography 31 EMBARGOED Release: February 10, 2019 Executive Summary This research committee was charged with analyzing what the best form of government would be in terms of representation for the residents of Portland and whether Portland’s current commission form of government equitably represents all residents of the city. In answering these questions, the research committee examined both the administrative structure of Portland’s city govern- ment (how it is run) and the method used to choose elected officials. Because an inefficient, unaccountable or unworkable government system is neither repre- sentative nor equitable, the research committee also examined questions of efficiency and accountability. The topic is broad. One research committee cannot develop a complete, legal description of an ideal form of govern- ment. For that reason, rather than providing a complete blueprint, the committee’s recommended reforms are intended to help inform the next meeting of the City of Portland Charter Review Commission, to serve as a guide for policymakers in the city, and to inspire future ballot measures. Your committee concludes that although the current commission form of local government has various merits, it is inherently inequitable and has long since ceased to be the most effective form of government for Portland. In addition to producing a council that is not representative of the city as a whole, the commission form of local government is organized such that city bureaus are run by commissioners with little, if any, regard to their managerial or subject-matter expertise. For reasons explained in the body of this report, the commission form also makes it difficult to set and pursue long-term and 1. PORTLAND MUST TRANSITION TO A MODIFIED COUNCIL/MANAGER FORM OF GOVERNMENT. Under this form, elected members of the city council would focus their time and energy on policy development, long-term strategic planning, budgeting, and constituent services. The mayor would serve as the chair of the city council (as is the case now) and would also supervise the work of the city manager. The city’s day-to-day bureaucratic administrative functions would be handled by a professional, non-political city manager whose function is to effectively implement the policies and budgets approved by the city council. Candidates for city manager would need to possess appropriate professional certifica- tions and experience and would be selected by the mayor subject to approval by the city council. This method of selecting a city manager would vest the mayor with appropriate authority to manage the city without concentrating executive power too heavily in a single office. 2. PORTLAND MUST INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE CIT Y COUNCIL. The city council should be increased from the current five members (four commissioners plus the mayor) to between nine and thirteen members (eight to twelve city councilors elected from districts, plus a mayor elected at large). This number of city councilors would put Portland more in line with other American cities of similar size and would significantly increase the ability of the city council to represent Portland’s increasingly diverse population without suffering from the excessive costs and difficult operation associated with very large city councils. citywide priorities. 3. PORTLAND MUST CHANGE HOW CIT Y COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE ELECTED. facts, your research committee submits three broad Instead of electing all city council members on an Based on our research and analysis of the recommendations. at-large basis, we recommend switching to district-based elections, preferably with multiple members per district (for example, three districts each electing three members 3 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 of the city council). Among the benefits of multi-member, and refinement. Changing the voting model to a single- representation on the city council and a lowering of the electoral process, since many more voters cast ballots in district-based elections are greatly increased geographic round system would lead to wider participation in the financial and other barriers to entry into the political November than May; could allow for increased compe- also examines various alternative voting methods and could further reduce barriers to entry into the political voting system (one in which there would be a single process for traditionally underserved groups. This report recommends transitioning to some form of instant-runoff election in November rather than the current two-stage, May and November system), subject to further research tition by reducing the advantages of incumbency; and process by traditionally underrepresented groups. Finally, the report presents suggestions for further research. Introduction Portland has changed enormously since the current Charter Review Commission will conduct its next review and has diversified from its almost exclusively white The City Club assembled this research committee only” state constitution and to racial and ethnic owner- improve our city government in terms of both equity and increased from less than 200,000 to more than 600,000 roots that trace their origins to Oregon’s initial “whites ship restrictions on a number of Portland neighborhoods Despite those monumental changes, the form of government in Portland remains largely the same, including the fact that the entire population is repre- of Portland’s 105-year-old structure of city government. to prepare for that review and to recommend how to bureaucratic efficiency. The Research Committee gathered information and perspectives to inform this report. Those methods included a comprehensive literature review, interviews sented by just five city council members, four of whom with a diverse set of witnesses—including many civic administration of city bureaus while the fifth serves reports. A more detailed description of the research also serve as commissioners directly in charge of the as mayor, city council member, and commissioner. In the face of these monumental changes, as well as the leaders, and analysis of relevant data and research methods is in Appendix A of this report. changes yet to come, the City Club of Portland has THE FIRST STEP: DEFINING EQUIT Y tioning of our city government. equity drawn from the City of Portland’s Office of Equity and Equity Research Committee from among interested tailor that definition to the specific task of assessing the charge that asked: experts, we concluded that the process of government periodically conducted reviews and analyses of the func- While the charge from City Club included a definition of and Human Rights, your research committee strove to In late 2016, City Club formed the City Government City Club members to research and report based upon a 1. In 2017, what is the best form of government in terms of representation for the citizens of Portland? a. Does the current commission form of government equitably represent all residents of the city? 2. How should we choose our representatives? 4 Sometime between now and 2021, the City of Portland City Charter was adopted in 1913. The population has City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 form of city government. Based on interviews with local decision-making needs to be examined through an equity lens that prompts one to ask key questions, not just about outcomes, but also about whether that process is itself equitable. After all, an inequitable process is much less likely to lead to an equitable outcome than a process that is itself equitable. Based upon interviews with multiple experts on equity and the use of equity lenses in public policy, we developed five broad elements of our equity allocated fairly and independently of the beneficiaries’ wealth, location or background? lens to examine whether Portland’s current system of 3. Does the process encourage greater voter participa- to l dates and policy initiatives that are meaningful 1. Does the process lead to diverse candidates and 4. Is the process responsive? Does it meet the needs of favor certain groups over others? Are city residents able all residents equally able to lobby their representatives grounds? Do candidates for office have a broad array of their race, ethnic background or place, of residence government, or any proposed alternative system, is likely ead to equitable policy results. officials? Are there barriers to running for office that to vote for and elect officials from many different back- of success stories to inspire their own entry into city tion? Do voters have the opportunity to advance candi- to them? the various city communities on a day-to-day basis? Are and city bureaus effectively and efficiently regardless within the city? government? 5. Does the process maintain equity long-term? Does to increase or decrease existing disparities between worked toward consistently? Are short-term gains inter- 2. Are policy outcomes equitable? Do policies tend different demographic groups? Are city resources the process reflect the fact that equity is a goal that must be preted as “job done” rather than a step in the right direction? Is success sustained and continually built upon? City Government Structures Across the U.S. POWERS OF CIT Y GOVERNMENT City governments in the United States exercise various city government’s other powers. powers as established through state law and constitu- Quasi-judicial authority is limited in the municipal broad categories: specialized appeals and hearings. tions. These powers fall primarily under the following Executive authority involves the implementation of city ordinances and policy, and the management of personnel and city resources. Executive authority includes, but is distinct from, administrative authority, the more day-to-day, “street-level” organi- zation and functioning of city government, especially that of city bureaus. Legislative authority is the power to approve munic- ipal budgets, pass ordinances, and create policies for the executive authority to implement. This category also includes oversight responsibilities, such as 5 holding hearings to examine the functioning of the City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 arena, but is found in land-use appeals and other COMMON T YPES OF CIT Y GOVERNMENT According to the National League of Cities, a large majority of cities in the United States, particularly those of significant size, are governed by one of two types of city government: the strong mayor/city council form, and the city council/manager form. Among cities with a popu- lation over 100,000, roughly 55 percent have selected the city council/manager system, and roughly 34 percent use a strong mayor/city council system. The National League of Cities also notes that strong mayor/city council form is “found mostly, but not exclusively, in older, larger cities or MC Seattle WA Portland is the only large city that uses the commission form of government C Portland OR MC San Francisco CA CM San Jose CA MC Denver CO CM Las Vegas NV MC Mayor-Council CM Council-Manager C Commission CM El Paso TX CM Fort Worth CM Dallas TX TX CM Austin MC TX Houston TX CM San Antonio TX MC Jacksonville FL in very small cities.1 The city council/manager form is, by Its perceived disadvantages are concentrating too much the size of Portland. Portland is the only city in the and/or administrative skills on the part of the mayor. The still uses the commission system. Elsewhere in Oregon, that city policies are more prone to sudden post-elec- a wide margin, the most common among cities roughly United States with a population greater than 100,000 that the city council/manager system is most popular. STRONG MAYOR/CITY COUNCIL Under this system, the mayor is the chief executive officer, while the council functions as the legislative body. Broad legislative policy-setting is thereby separated from day-to-day administrative responsibilities and business. power in one office and a potential lack of managerial concentration of power into a single person also means tion swings than in cities that use the council/manager system since changing the mayor alone can significantly change the entire policy orientation of the city. Seattle and New York City are examples of large cities with a classic strong mayor/city council system of government. CITY COUNCIL/MANAGER Mayors under this system are elected at large, have In a pure council/manager system, the city council budget for council consideration, and have veto power council’s policies and handle the city’s day-to-day admin- is not a voting member of the council and generally does city council and reports directly to it. The city council/ tages of this system are centralized, streamlined leader- system because the mayor does not administer the city the power to hire and fire city bureau chiefs, prepare a over council decisions. In most such systems, the mayor not attend city council meetings. The perceived advan- ship and improved pursuit of citywide policy priorities. 1 6 MC Boston MA MC New York NY MC Philadelphia PA MC MC Baltimore Washington MD DC CM MC Charlotte Nashville-Davidson NC TN MC Memphis TN MC Los Angeles CA CM MC Phoenix San Diego AZ CA MC Milwaukee MC Detroit WI MI MC MC Chicago Columbus IL MC OH Indianapolis IN hires a professional city manager to implement the city istrative needs. The position is typically selected by the manager system is sometimes called the “weak mayor” government on a day-to-day basis, and there are often National League of Cities (http://www.nlc.org/forms-of-municipal-government) based on data from surveys conducted by the International City Council/ Manager Association (https://icma.org/). City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 relatively few formal powers that distinguish the mayoral position from those of other city council members. While the mayor often has some specific roles, such as presiding over city council meetings, repre- commissioner’s role, it is useful to consider that a single commissioner could conceivably draft an ordinance, lobby for the city council to approve it, vote in favor of the senting the city at events, or nominating city council ordinance in a city council meeting, enforce it in their mayor shares both executive and legislative authority uent protesting some aspect of the ordinance. At the members to serve on specific committees or boards, the with the rest of the city council. In some cities with a city council/city manager system, the mayor is chosen by the own bureau, and then decide an appeal from a constittime the system was introduced more than 100 years ago, there was no professional civil service, and one perceived city council rather than being directly elected, although advantage of the system was that it would reduce The perceived advantages of the city council/city officials with expertise in certain areas (planning, police, responsiveness by placing both legislative and policy- functions. Over time, however, some of those perceived this form is less common among larger cities. manager system are that it increases representation and rampant cronyism and corruption by placing elected or parks, for example) directly in charge of running those making power in the hands of elected representatives advantages proved not to be true and many cities day-to-day administration and implementation of those corruption and inefficiency. A more complete history of while increasing administrative efficiency by delegating policies to career professionals who do not engage in politics. Its perceived disadvantages are a lack of strong leadership and centralized responsibility when compared to the strong mayor system. Some cities have abandoned the commission form of government due to the commission form of government is included later in this report. Most cities that once had the commission form also experienced problems with a high city manager of government differed themselves in politics or otherwise try to influence that commissioners ran example of a large city with a city council/city manager to oversee specific parts or commission form of government. The mayor of Austin is ment. Someone would run, serve as Chair of the city council, but has few additional Commissioner of Public turnover rate or a tendency for city managers to involve policy, although many other cities avoid that problem. An system is Austin, Texas, a city that previously used the directly elected by the voters to represent their city and to powers beyond those of other members of the city council. COMMISSION The commission form of government places all or most government functions into the hands of commissioners. Commissioners, who also serve as city council members, exercise executive functions (as the heads of city bureaus and departments), legislative functions (as city council members who vote on ordinances and budgets), and administrative functions (by directly implementing city policy in their respective bureaus). The commissioners may also exercise quasi-judicial powers by making decisions in zoning appeals or related matters governed 7 by strict legal procedures. To understand the breadth of a City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 from Portland’s system in for office and were elected bureaus of the city governfor example, to become Works, and then serve in that position, running the water and sewer agencies, while in office. Portland’s To understand the breadth of a commissioner’s role, it is useful to consider that a single commissioner could conceivably draft an ordinance, lobby for the city council to approve it, vote in favor of the ordinance in a city council meeting, enforce it in their own bureau, and then decide an appeal from a constituent protesting some aspect of the ordinance. system is quite different than the “standard” model because the mayor assigns bureaus to commissioners. In most other cities that once used the commission system, there was often no elected mayor. Instead, the commissioners would select one of their ranks to serve as chairman or mayor, a role that typically did not involve additional powers beyond those exercised by the other commissioners. The mayor’s principal role was to chair meetings. However, some cities with the commission form, including Portland, have an elected mayor with the authority to assign or withdraw executive responsibilities from other commissioners. OTHER SYSTEMS officer, and nominates and supervises a city manager whose hiring and termination must be approved by the city council. Under such a system, the mayor and city council together work with the city manager to develop the budget. The city council’s primary role under such The strong mayor and weak mayor models are part of a a system is legislative, including the power of the purse many cities incorporate elements of both systems in their ties, while the mayor’s role is chiefly as chairperson of continuum. In the U.S. today, as well as around the globe, municipal government. For example, in a fairly common variant that could be called a “relatively strong mayor” system, a mayor serves as the city’s chief executive and the power to establish policy directions and priori- the city council and the day-to-day supervisor of the city manager. There are many other variations in use in the United States today. Current Structure of Portland City Government: A Modified Commission Form Under the current city charter, Portland uses a unique may hire and fire both that administrator and top bureau The city’s particular commission is composed of four five-member commission is also the legislative body, and in citywide nonpartisan at-large elections. policies. The commission exercises its quasi-judicial variant of the commission form of city government. commissioners and the mayor, all of whom are elected All five members serve as executive heads of city bureaus. As typical in the commission system, the mayor passes city ordinances, sets the budget, and decides city powers when it hears land-use or other appeals, which require it to make formal findings and conclusions, is fairly weak in many respects, because commissioners, controlled by various legal requirements. In addition to The mayor has one vote on the city council, like the other powers include chairing city council meetings, and rather than the mayor, directly oversee most bureaus. commissioners, and shares executive authority with all commission members. Perhaps the most important way making bureau assignments, the mayor’s other special preparing a proposed budget for review by the full commission. that Portland’s particular form of commission govern- to appoint or remove commissioners from their assigned of city government. Portland voters recently voted to ment is unusual is that Portland’s mayor has the power bureaus and departments. In fact, mayors can—and occasionally do—reassign responsibility for all city bureaus The sixth elected position in the city is the auditor, charged with conducting financial and efficiency audits amend the city charter to grant the office of the auditor greater freedom from the bureaus it oversees. The to themselves, leaving the other commissioners with amendment further allows the auditor’s office to seek uniquely powerful in the commission system. Even if a used by bureaus under audit. The city auditor is not a of reforming policing, utilities, parks, or any other single vote on measures, instead serving as a source of objec- mayor would match that individual to that bureau. bureau by the mayor, that commissioner may choose a elections staggered to prevent complete turnover of the no bureaus to supervise. This makes Portland’s mayor candidate for commissioner were to run on a platform aspect of city governance, there is no guarantee that the Once a commissioner is assigned to a particular professional manager to run its daily operations, and 8 managers at will (subject to civil service rules). The City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 independent legal counsel, rather than the same counsel member of the city council and does not have the right to tive evaluation, advice, and data on city functions. The mayor, the four commissioners, and the city auditor are each elected to four-year terms, with the council. The mayor and two commissioners are elected in one election year, while the city auditor and the remaining commissioners are elected two years later. Portland’s city council includes four elected commis- sioners and the mayor—the same size as in 1913. Since Portland’s population has more than tripled in the time since, from 200,000 to 639,000, this now works out to slightly fewer than 128,000 constituents per commissioner. Almost without exception, other cities with 2 alternate means to increase the odds that elected officials would hire staff with appropriate expertise. Portland first shifted to the commission form of government in 1913, during a nationwide reform movement that arose due to widespread dissatisfaction with the “ward system” and resulting spoils system found in most cities. During this period, many cities moved to the commission form to try to escape the problems of similar populations have larger city councils. corruption, inefficiency and civic paralysis that had come HISTORY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 500 cities had adopted the commission form, after which The commission form of government was first introduced in Galveston, Texas in the wake of a hurricane disaster. It “appealed to business and professional men who deemed the older ward style of governance as corrupt.”3 Commissioners were elected to oversee specific func- tions. The popular thinking was that while aldermen had used their power to hand out jobs to whoever supported them (so-called “spoils”), professionals elected based on their expertise in specific areas—such as infrastruc- ture, business development, schools, or public security— would be more motivated and more able to choose city to define American city government. By 1917 more than it gradually began to decline as cities switched to mayor/ council or city manager/council systems. Today, Portland is the only city of significant size in the country to retain the commission form of government. While the commission form of government remained widespread in the country until the 1950’s, over time it proved to be as susceptible to corruption and abuse as the models it had replaced. Public outrage over corruption was one of the main factors that drove Galveston to abandon the commission form in 1960 in favor of the city council/city manager model still in use there today.5 employees based on their actual abilities. Meanwhile, cities continued to abandon the “spoils U.S. cities—did not yet have a civil service system. While This reliance on career professionals whose positions did In the early 1900’s, Portland—like nearly all other the civil service system began to be implemented at the federal level by the end of the 19th century, progress at the municipal level was much slower, with some U.S. cities relying on the spoils system until as late as the 1950’s.4 Instead of career professionals staffing city departments, nearly every city employee would often be replaced following each election. Public distrust of the resulting “spoils system” and the corruption it engendered, along with the need for experienced professionals in local government, eventually led to adoption of the modern civil service system. Prior to its existence, however, the commission system was viewed as an system” in favor of a professional, career civil service. not depend on their allegiance to a politician or party was both a step toward more effective and efficient govern- ment and a means of decreasing the prevalence of corruption. Not always obvious to the casual observer is the fact that the commission system of municipal govern- ment is inextricably tied to at-large voting—where voters across the jurisdiction all vote for each elected position. Combining the commission system with district- or ward-based voting would lead directly to a situation in which a representative elected by just one part of the city 2 “7 Key Questions About How to Change Portland City Government,” Kristen Eberhard, Sightline Institute, 14 June 2017, http://www.sightline.org/2017/06/14/7-key-questions-about-how-to-change-portland-city-government 9 3 Texas Historical Association, The Handbook of Texas, chapter on the “Progressive Era” at https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npp01 4 Fredrickson, Johnson and Wood, “The Changing Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of Innovation,” Public Administration Review, May/June 2004, Vol. 64, No. 3. 5 Id. https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/moc01 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 would have control over the entire city’s law enforcement, streets, or parks. The tendency for such a system to lead to highly inequitable and inefficient distribution of avail- able resources led to the universal use of at-large voting in cities with commission governments. While not generally discussed in public, there was another motivation for some cities preferring the commission system with its at-large voting system. As federal courts later found, in some jurisdictions racism was a motivating factor: electing commissioners like the rest of Oregon, was not subject to the special oversight provisions of the Civil Rights Act, so its commission government and at-large voting was never subject to the judicial scrutiny that has led a large swath of the country to abandon similar systems. Since the adoption of the commission form in 1913, Portland voters have rejected a total of eight proposals that would have abandoned or significantly changed the current structure of city government. The two most recent attempts were in 2002 and 2007, each of which city-wide prevented individual wards or districts with would have shifted Portland to a strong-mayor/council their own favored candidate and greatly decreased the and made recommendations for change on multiple in any campaign. In one landmark case, the Supreme included calls for creation of a city manager/council and majority-African American populations from electing likelihood that minority candidates could be successful Court found that at-large voting systems “tend to system. During the same time, City Club has reviewed occasions. Consistent in all recommendations—which a strong mayor/larger council government reform— minimize the voting strength of minority groups by City Club has expressed concern about the efficiency and tives of the district.” It is therefore not surprising that government. Appendix B permitting the political majority to elect all representa6 the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) led to a representativeness of our community’s commission form provides more detail on past Portland, like the rest of precipitous decline in the number of cities using the City Club reviews of local that at-large voting leads to systematic underrepresenta- in Portland. of government is inextricably linked to at-large voting, CHARTER REVIEW COMMISSION commission government and Since 2009, Portland’s subject to the judicial scrutiny commission system, as federal courts repeatedly ruled tion of ethnic minorities. Because the commission form legal challenges mounted under the VRA led to the elimination of commission governments in states and jurisdictions subject to its special enforcement provi- sions.7 Court rulings holding that at-large voting disad- vantages minority groups are so common that it can be hard to understand why at-large voting is still in use in Portland or anywhere else. But the Supreme Court has not found that all such systems are necessarily illegal and discriminatory because no statute generally proscribes at-large voting.8 Instead, each instance must be considered on its own merits. In practice, in every state and county where the U.S. Department of Justice was authorized to self-initiate voting rights cases under the VRA, courts found against at-large voting. Portland, 6 government structure City Charter has included a requirement that a Charter Review Commission be Oregon, was not subject to the special oversight provisions of the Civil Rights Act, so its at-large voting was never that has led a large swath of the country to abandon similar systems. convened at least every ten years. The first review was in 2011 and the next must occur no later than 2021, but it can occur earlier. When a Charter Review Commission is convened, each member of the city council nominates four commission members for approval by the full council. A general provision requires that the 20-member commission must be “reflective of the city” in terms of “racial and ethnic diversity, Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3275 (1982) 7 https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 8 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33,     reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 177, 211 10 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 age and geography.”9 The commission has broad latitude charter review commission members by the city council, be referred to Portland voters if a super-majority of 15 or recommendations directly to voters—have led to criticism to recommend amendments to the city charter, which will and the requirement for a 75% super-majority to send more of the commission members agree. If a majority, but of the charter review commission process as being too recommendations are forwarded to the city council, which review did not recommend notable changes to Portland fewer than 15 of the members recommend changes, those has the power to modify the recommendations in any way or reject them entirely. Two factors—the appointment of all easily dominated by the city council. Case in point, the 2011 city government. Your Research Committee’s Analysis The analysis below primarily compares Portland’s a tendency to increase polarization in politics due to so little support for a strong mayor system that we do sponding tendency for cities with a strong mayor system city manager system. Your committee encountered not believe a full analysis of its potential merits would 11 be justified. The downsides repeatedly cited include current commission system with a potential council/ City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 the “winner-take-all” nature of the system and a correto gyrate between opposite political approaches rather than adhering to a long-term, consensus position. Viewed have ever been elected to the city council,11and one of and inclusion or your committee’s equity lens, the strong an appointment rather than an election. Following his to grant the bulk of all political power to a single majority won re-election and when he unexpectedly resigned, a the likelihood, that minority voices are heard. Perhaps widely viewed as the “black seat” on the council. Indeed, give the mayor greater power were heavily rejected by made the run-off. The period of African-American through either Portland’s existing values of cooperation 10 mayor system fails on multiple counts due to its tendency without built-in protections to ensure, or at least increase not surprisingly, given these weaknesses, proposals to Portland voters in 2002 and 2007 (the two most recent those, Charles Jordan, initially joined the city council via appointment to the city council, Charles Jordan handily special election drew a host of candidates for what was in 1984, as in this year’s election, two African-Americans representation on the city council came to a close in attempts to change Portland’s form of government). 1992 when Jordan’s replacement, Dick Bogle, came in endorsed a strong mayor system, and several who were African-American men served as commissioners decades in general stated they would stay on the sidelines or even commissioner this year, in no way lessens the inherent None of the witnesses meeting with this committee strongly in favor of abandoning the commission system oppose a proposed reform if it included a strong mayor. Portland-based political consultant Mark Wiener’s third in the primary to two white men. The fact that two ago, as well as the fact that Jo Ann Hardesty was elected unfairness of the system. Instead, they can be viewed as the “exception that proves the rule.” testimony was particularly enlightening. Even though he to be replaced, he nonetheless opposed the last attempt but also anyone who is not from a privileged, white, male believes that Portland’s commission government needs at reform because he believes a move to a strong mayor system would be a major error. As he explained, he saw no reason to replace one bad system with another bad one and instead hopes to support a move to a better form of government in the future. AT-LARGE VOTING IS A BARRIER TO EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION IN PORTLAND Although there are several metrics by which Portland city government serves its residents well, the current at-large method of electing commissioners has consistently failed to produce a city council that is representative of the population it serves. Using either the city’s own defini- tion of equity or your committee’s equity lens, described earlier, the current at-large system of voting represents a profound failure to promote equity. Although roughly a third of Portland is non-white, only three people of color 10 The inherent bias in the current two-stage, at-large election system not only disadvantages people of color, background. Only nine women have served, and—up to now—none of them have been women of color.12 Portland residents who rent their home, who have lower incomes, and who live in the eastern and northern portions of the city are similarly drastically underrepresented.13 Though the witnesses interviewed by the committee presented a broad range of viewpoints and opinions, there was zero disagreement about this essential facet of the status quo. Among the many witnesses who spoke eloquently about the fact that Portland’s current city council does not represent the diversity of the city, Kristin Eberhard of the Sightline Institute stood out due to the wealth of concrete statistical evidence she brought. One chart, reproduced here with the permission of Ms. Eberhard and the Sightline Institute, speaks volumes. In a city that is increasingly ethnically diverse, not a single person of color had been elected since 1995 (until Jo Ann Hardesty Testimony of Masami Nishishiba. 11 “Portland City Government Doesn’t Represent Portland Very Well”, Kristin Eberhard, Sightline Institute, 13 June 2017, http://www.sightline. org/2017/06/13/portland-city-government-doesnt-represent-portland-very-well 12 12 Id. 13 Id. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 won in November 2018) and only one commissioner had lived east of 82nd Avenue.14 A second chart from the Sightline Institute further illustrates the point.15 In this map, the entire popula- tion of Portland is represented by colored dots. Each green dot represents 50 non-Hispanic white residents. by blue dots). Prior to Ms. Eudaly’s election, only Sam Adams had been elected from the far north of Portland. While it is not impossible for a city council member to fairly represent segments of the population whose background, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity do not match their own, there is also certainly no guarantee that Because non-Hispanic white residents are the majority a non-representative city council will always choose to closely, however, it becomes clear that the part of the Republican Rome, all members of the senate were in Portland, the green dots predominate. Looking more city that produces the vast majority of all successful candidates for city council is far whiter—has more concentrated green dots—than areas of the city that are underrepresented on city council or not represented at all. As shown by the red dots, Asian-American residents represent the views of all voters equally. (Note: In ancient required to be wealthy on the theory that the wealthy would be better equipped to judge what is best for everyone. That idea of representation no longer has many supporters since the modern conception of representa- tive government acknowledges that a non-representative tend to be more prevalent in East Portland, which had city council, though working in good faith, is almost elected. Thanks entirely to the successful candidacy more representative council.) While it may be possible no representation on the city council until Hardesty was of Chloe Eudaly, there is now one member of the city council (a non-Hispanic white female) from the area of the city where black residents are most prevalent, 13 although still in the minority (their population shown guaranteed to deliver less equitable outcomes than a for a wealthy, white male homeowner to honestly present the view of a poor, female renter who is a person of color, there is nothing in the process to guarantee such a 14 Kristin Eberhard and the Sightline Institute, “Portland, We Have a Problem.” http://www.sightline.org/2017/09/12/portland-we-have-a-problem/ Used with permission. 15 Kristin Eberhard and the Sightline Institute, “Could Portland Create a City Council That Looks More Like Portland” http://www.sightline.org/2017/06/15/ could-portland-create-a-city-council-that-looks-like-portland/ Used with permission. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 result. In other words, the good intentions of one or more council members elected at-large feel a responsibility maintaining equity in the long term. Instead, our current could defend a situation in which nearly all city council groups—the white, middle-aged, westside land-owners much wealthier and less diverse than Portland as a members of the city council do not satisfy the criteria of system is entirely dependent on the goodwill of those members come from the one neighborhood that is both who are systematically favored to win office. whole.17 The academic literature we reviewed came to a claimed that Portland city council members have deliber- San Francisco city government elections before and after Even though none of the witnesses interviewed ately or consciously favored the concerns of one segment of the city over another, or intentionally ignored the similar conclusion. One study, for instance, compared a transition from at-large to district elections, concluding: concerns of a particular section of the population, many This analysis … supports the idea that district tation of people of color, residents of East Portland, and campaigns, increase the participation of constituents, witnesses expressed their belief that the underrepresenother groups has effectively reduced those groups’ voices in government and tilted decision making on planning, transportation, parks, and other issues against areas of the city where no city council members live. While several witnesses stated that the council has made delib- erate, specific efforts to assist East Portland—the portion elections reduce the funds needed to run successful and especially increase minority involvement. These changes might provide opportunities for candidates representing different geographic areas, viewpoints, demographics, and levels of funding to run and be competitive.18 of the city whose residents are least represented on the To summarize, while a few witnesses expressed their made in the context of arguments that the council works one equity metric—city council members delivering equi- council across several metrics—those statements were hard to represent all of Portland equitably in spite of the lack of representativeness among its commissioners. AT-LARGE VERSUS DISTRICT ELECTIONS The aspect of Portland city government that was by far the most commonly cited as an obstacle to equity by our witnesses was at-large elections for all city council positions. No witness was willing to defend that aspect of the system in terms of producing a diverse council. Witnesses were unanimous that, in comparison to district-based elections, at-large elections are more expensive to enter, result in lower voter participation rates, and produce more homogeneous repre- sentation.16 While some witnesses did argue that city 14 to the whole city rather than a particular district, none view that at-large elections are successful according to table outcomes because of their diffuse city-wide responsibility—most witnesses who ventured an opinion held the opposite view. Other evidence indicates that at-large elections fail across other metrics, including resulting in diverse representation and broad voter participation. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE BUREAUCRATIC FUNCTIONING OF PORTLAND’S CURRENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT It is important at the outset to note that Portland resi- dents have traditionally expressed satisfaction with city government and the commission form of governance. Portland has been recognized nationally and globally as a highly livable, modern city. Our urban planning has 16 See, e.g., Testimony of Shelli Romero, stating that “It’s tough … having to run citywide and get enough votes. … If there were districts, we’d have a greater chance of getting people from diverse districts.” 17 See, e.g., Testimony of Masami Nishishiba, arguing that “commission members are supposed to think of the city as a whole—the basis of the commission form is that they would have a responsibility at-large to the city.” 18 “Comparing San Francisco’s At-Large and District Supervisor Elections’ Average Spending and Participation Rates,” Eric A. Lindgren, California Politics & Policy, June 2007, pp. 45. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 become a model for limiting sprawl, maintaining an active business sector, fostering strong local culture, and creating a wide spectrum of transportation options. In preventing the city’s day-to-day functions from being disrupted due to political grappling. recent years, the city population has grown significantly, That said, significant questions remain about the equity each other. Various witnesses heard by the committee confirming Portland’s status as a desirable place to live. A second point of contention was whether city bureaus are currently able (or willing) to coordinate with of opportunity and impact under the current commis- alleged that bureaus currently experience a “silo” effect, sion form of government. These questions motivated the in which they have little incentive to cooperate outside inquiry reported here and the recommendations to follow. with bureaus in a different commissioner’s portfolio. In COMMISSION GOVERNMENT AND stated that commissioners have a natural tendency to explaining how this situation arises, multiple witnesses evaluate a department or other city office by how well BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY Former commissioner Steve Novick offered several that department communicates and collaborates with instances where he believes that an experienced city other departments that also report to the same commis- manager would have been able to implement a better sioner. Witnesses also stated that when a dispute or solution than the one created by the Portland city council. disagreement between departments under the control of Services (BES) had historically paid the Portland defend “their” bureau. The mayor has a broader respon- 19 In one case, the Portland Bureau of Environmental Bureau of Transportation (PBOT) for various street- cleaning services. When BES attempted to discontinue different commissioners arises, commissioners tend to sibility, but has limited power to correct the situation: taking back the bureaus in question is a blunt tool that the payments, the council ultimately decided to simply would cause additional bureaucratic disruption, and decision,” in contrast to the type of policy-based deci- rest of the council. On the other hand, if all bureaus were cut the payments in half. This was a “purely political increase political friction between the mayor and the sion-making that a city manager would have been able ultimately answerable to a professional city manager be reduced, decisions might be more likely to be based to apply.20 An additional criticism voiced by a large number rather than to various commissioners, turf battles could of the witnesses is that several aspects of the current upon best practice, and leadership could be more consis- difficult. One challenge is the mayor’s broad (and manager would have time to get to know each bureau’s bureaucratic structure make long-term policy planning tent. Finally, with more consistent leadership, the city frequently exercised) discretion to assign and reassign administrator—and more consistent relationships would committee is persuaded that there is little upside to commissioners, or reclaimed en masse by the mayor as specifically how easily individual residents and civic bureaus among the various commissioners. Your bureau assignments being frequently shuffled among a bargaining or punitive tool. Despite the broad variety be more conducive to resolving conflicts. Accessibility is a key element of equity and another crucial aspect of how well a city government functions, groups are able to communicate their concerns to the of witnesses interviewed, they offered strikingly little relevant elected official. The committee heard persuasive directly to a professional city manager rather than to to retain the current commission system. On one hand, defense of this practice. If the bureau heads reported individual commissioners, we would retain the best aspect of the current system—the ability to change 19 Testimony of Steve Novick. 20 Id. 15 bureau leadership rapidly where necessary—while better City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 testimony about accessibility—on both sides of whether under the present structure, any resident can contact whichever member of the council is currently assigned to the relevant bureau. Any Portland resident with the commissioner or mayor with the Parks & Recreation ment while others disagreed. This division reflected a lives. Multiple witnesses pointed out, however, that quite explicit in expressing their concern that various concerns about the city’s parks, for example, can contact bureau in their portfolio, no matter where that resident the current system confused many residents, because structure as so seriously flawed as to warrant replace- division among our witnesses. Several witnesses were groups—including current elected officials, union officials not everyone is aware of every bureau assignment and and others who have managed to negotiate the current don’t clearly fit any bureau’s responsibilities. This diffi- also acutely aware that Portland voters have, on eight a specific issue is further exacerbated by frequent bureau form of government. because many issues either span multiple bureaus or culty identifying the proper commissioner to address on system successfully—would oppose any change. We were occasions, decided against scrapping the commission reassignments that make it difficult for city residents to competence of bureau leadership. commission system is directly tied to the inherently pretations of how a city manager/council system would and therefore that the commission system should be better responsiveness for issues that involve multiple with district-based voting, your committee believes that effective accountability to city residents), and a more We put forward this recommendation in full recogni- their elected representatives. The disadvantage would improve or narrowly worsen accessibility and that know who is responsible for what and to evaluate the Your committee heard similarly competing inter- handle resident concerns. The advantages would include: bureaus, more consistent leadership (allowing more direct connection between Portland’s residents and Despite these notes of caution, your committee reached an absolute consensus on the fact that the unrepresentative and inequitable at-large voting system, abandoned. Among city government models compatible the city council/manager system is the best alternative. tion that the exact details of the system could narrowly be that lobbying individual commissioners might be less careful attention would need to be paid to this policy be directly answerable for bureau decisions (although city charter is drafted. effective because the commissioners would no longer they could contact bureaus and/or the city manager to help resolve issues). Looking at the advantages of a city area if and when an actual proposed revision to the CITYWIDE PLANNING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING council/management government, multiple witnesses It was difficult for this committee to assess Portland’s much more effective than at present if city council tackle large-scale obstacles. On one hand, many of our argued that lobbying city council members would be current ability to set and meet citywide goals, and to members were elected by, and thus accountable to, the witnesses—including those who have personally worked city does not perform well in this area, and often cannot residents of a particular district. Given the range of views on the relative merits and shortcomings of the commission system and every alternate system of government, and also cognizant of in city government—stated in general terms that the come together to define broad goals, much less work toward reaching them. While we valued this testimony, the inherent institutional resistance to change, your we were able to identify very few specific examples of that it is necessary to undertake a wholesale change in convincingly and directly tied to the type of poor perfor- administrative efficiency or effectiveness of the attempts to “prove” how the structure of city government committee did not reach an overwhelming consensus Portland’s system of government based solely on the commission system. 16 Some members viewed the current administrative City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 notable failures of Portland city government that could be mance witnesses described. This is not surprising as or voting led to specific past outcomes tend to devolve into “what if” speculation. Also not surprisingly, previous City Club reports have run into similar difficulties.21 A complete listing of previous City Club reports on the best form of government for Portland, along with a brief synopsis of each, is included as Appendix B. Using an equity lens to analyze the overall process rather than specific past outcomes, however, leads to a much clearer conclusion. How can citywide planning and problem-solving lead to equitable results if the process for choosing elected officials is not equitable? manager form of government, city council members would serve primarily as legislators and policymakers who are directly answerable to residents of the area of the city that elected them. Your committee feels that it follows, at least from the narrow perspective of city planning, that changing the structure of government in this way would have substantial potential to improve, and little risk of harming, the status quo.23 While we cannot say for certain, for example, if policies toward roads, zoning, or other city-wide issues would have been decided differently if the city council better represented Portland residents, an at-large voting system that systematically disadvantages residents based on their race, ethnicity, neighborhood, or socioeconomic PORTLA ND IS LESS REPRESENTED THAN OTHER CITIE S PORT LA ND 1/128,000 SE ATTLE 1/67,0 00 OAKL AND 1/44 ,0 00 group is unlikely to lead to equitable results or an equitable society. In this way, our equity lens led to the same conclusion reached by the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous other federal courts when looking at the unrepresentativeness of at-large voting systems.22 More compelling evidence for improvement in Portland’s large-scale planning is the fact that there are no elected city officials under the current system whose primary duty is policymaking and strategic planning. The EUGENE 1/18,000 BEND 1/12 ,0 00 = 1 CITY COUNCI L RE PRES EN TATIVE = 4, 00 0 PE OPLE mayor and the rest of the council must divide their time between those responsibilities and the demands of their executive and quasi-judicial roles—most significantly, the task of overseeing multiple city bureaus on a day-to-day basis. Under a city manager/council system, the mayor and council would have the bulk of their executive and administrative duties delegated to the city manager, as well as to career professionals whose job it is to implement, rather than make, policies. Under a council/ 17 MORE CIT Y COUNCILORS ARE REQUIRED TO EQUITABLY REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF PORTLAND There are many competing concerns at work when assessing the ideal size of a city council. Smaller councils allow for closer relationships between council members, while larger councils encourage more robust 21 See, e.g., the Club’s 2002 report on Ballot Measure 26-30, which analyzed several problems the city had experienced (including the relocation of Columbia Sportswear headquarters, and a badly-implemented Water Bureau billing system) but was unable to conclusively connect them to the structure of city government. 22 US Supreme Court, sample of opinions on at-large voting: Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3287 n.19 (1982) (in which the Court held that an at-large election system for a large rural county with a large black population violated the Equal Protection Clause), City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980) (criticizing at-large systems for submerging minorities); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 158-59 (1971) (same). Also see US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals rulings, including, Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 528 F.2d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) and Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 361 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aIFd, 502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974). 23 However, see testimony of Nick Fish, stating that he personally would not have chosen to run for city council if executive powers were not available, as it would give council members less opportunity to personally solve problems for their constituents. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 debate.24 If city councils are too large, however, debate looking through our equity lens and the need to repre- council members can lose the ability to interact with all still moderate-sized council would help with the equity and discussion can become more difficult since city sent diverse backgrounds and experiences, a larger but of their colleagues on a one-on-one basis. (One witness concerns raised elsewhere in this report by creating Soviet Union, where city councils often consist of more cost of running for office. cited the extreme case of various cities in the former greater potential for a diverse council and lowering the than 1,000 members and are thus so large that there sions.25) Bearing in mind the downfalls of overly large believes that a council of eight to twelve members plus is both no accountability and no ability to reach decicity councils and very small city councils, moderate Although some of our witnesses endorsed a city council of as many as fifteen members, your committee the mayor represents a workable alternative.28 If, for sized (larger than Portland) city councils have a greater example, the city were divided into four districts that each policymaking work. While these benefits come with the would consist of 13 members — the 12 elected by district very small council, those costs tend to constitute a small districts, each of which elected two members of the city capacity for representing constituents and completing cost of spending more on salary and overhead than for a elected three city council members, the total city council plus the mayor. Another option would be to create five fraction of total city spending.26 Other trade-offs are hard council, for a total of 11 city council members. Assuming for a strong-willed mayor to dominate by force of person- and with no gerrymandering, switching to four or five unable to reach decisions and in which council members diversity of the city council while significantly lowering to measure. For example, smaller councils may be easier ality—a drawback shared by very large councils that are have less individual power. Despite the complexity of evaluating all these competing strengths and weaknesses in order to determine “the right number” of city council members for that districts are created based upon equal population districts would automatically increase the geographic barriers to entry for running for office. In any scenario involving eight to twelve elected city council members, the total size of the city council would still be small enough for members to get to know each other well, Portland, witnesses interviewed by your committee were while introducing a much higher potential for the Portland’s city council. One commonly-cited factor was such as East Portland. nearly unanimous in endorsing an increase in the size of election of members from underrepresented areas that Portland currently offers unusually low representa- population have roughly double the ratio of elected recommendations included in this report. Such a city tion per city resident. Most American cities with a similar officials per resident that Portland does, and most cities A city council consisting of eight to twelve members elected by district would also have synergy with the other council would, for example, be completely compatible in Oregon itself have an even higher ratio. In fact, there with a move to a council/manager system. In addition, the smaller council than Portland. Furthermore, once again system would be softened somewhat by increasing the 27 is no city in the United States of significant size that has a mayor’s reduction in authority under a council/manager 24 For the latter point see, e.g., Testimony of Shawn Fleek. 25 Testimony of political consultant Mark Wiener based upon his experiences in working with cities in the former Soviet Union. 26 “7 Key Questions About How to Change Portland City Government,” Kristen Eberhard, Sightline Institute, 14 June 2017, http://www.sightline.org/2017/06/14/7-key-questions-about-how-to-change-portland-city-government 18 27 Id. Portland has 0.8 elected officials per 100,000 residents. Seattle, Washington has 1.5, Oakland, California has 2.3, Eugene, Oregon has 5.8, and Bend, Oregon has 8.6. 28 Testimony of Steve Novick. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 power of the mayor in comparison to individual council ALTERNATE METHODS FOR ELECTING CITY would be the only member of the city council elected by While the complexity of the issue and the research city council larger than the current one. For example, if unable to conduct a comprehensive review of alterna- elected three city council members, the barriers to and compared those models based upon how well they members. This is particularly true since the mayor the entire city. There are multiple other advantages to a Portland were divided into four districts, each of which COUNCIL MEMBERS mandate meant that your research committee was tive voting systems, we did review a variety of models advanced the goals of representation and equity. While the results of this analysis clearly demonstrated that ONLY THREE PEOPLE OF COLOR AND NINE WOMEN HAVE SERVED ON CIT Y COUNCIL traditional, single-member districts are not the best option, we were unable to develop a full model for the “perfect” system for Portland and instead believe the question deserves more study. While our mandate did not extend to working out all the details of a voting system, our analysis led us to conclude that the best system for Portland would include certain key traits, including the use of multimember districts and some form of instant- runoff elections (that eliminate the need for a two-round, May and September, election cycle). The following is a summary of our analysis and findings. Single-member Districts In some communities, the city is divided into a number of geographic districts equal to the number of members of the city council. Residents of each district elect a single entry into the election process would be lowered significantly since a candidate would only need to place in the top three in their district to be successful. Given that traditionally underrepresented groups such as racial, ethnic and socioeconomic minorities have a harder time mustering the resources needed to organize a city-wide campaign, moving to district-based voting and increasing the number of seats available will also increase oppor- tunities for candidates from diverse backgrounds to be elected to the city council. representative to the city council. This system is similar to the way other representatives, such as members of the U.S. Congress, are elected and is therefore most familiar to voters. While single member districts reduce some of the systematic biases associated with at-large voting, districts can be drawn in a discriminatory manner via a process commonly referred to as “gerrymander- ing.”29 In addition to favoring one political party over the other, gerrymandering has been used to devise electoral districts that systematically disadvantage minorities and other underrepresented groups. Racial, but not political, gerrymandering has been found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.30 29 Gerrymandering is named after former Massachusetts Governor (and sixth Vice President of the United States), Elbridge Gerry, whose political party crafted new electoral boundaries in 1812 specifically designed to benefit his own Democratic-Republican Party at the expense of the rival Federalist Party. 30 See “SCOTUSblog” for a discussion of recent cases in Texas, North Carolina, and elsewhere in which the question of political versus racial gerrymandering has been considered by the Supreme Court. http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05symposium-bringing-sanity-racial gerrymandering-jurisprudence/ 19 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 The fact that federal courts frequently ordered jurisdictions subject to special monitoring under the Voting Rights Act to switch from at-large voting to single-mandate district-based voting suggests that are elected at the same time. By electing multiple representatives of one district on the same day, it becomes increasingly likely that at least one minority candidate single-member districts can increase representation. will prove successful. Your committee evaluated not improve representation only if minorities in an area are hybrid systems such as those in which some members As research has shown, however, single-member districts only single-member and multimember districts, but also sufficiently concentrated geographically so that one or of city council are elected by district while others are large number of southern and northeastern cities, the tives, your committee found a system based on all more “majority minority” districts can be drawn.31 In a geographic concentration of minorities is sufficient to allow such districts to be drawn. In Portland, however, elected at-large. After evaluating multiple such alternamultimember districts (with the mayor to be elected at-large) to be the system most likely to increase equity. ethnic and racial minorities are sufficiently dispersed a “majority minority” district. In fact, there is only one voting systems. Nonetheless, our group heard over- same research also points out, even when minorities how Portland votes for its city council members. Many throughout that it would be nearly impossible to create “majority minority” census tract in the entire city. As the Your committee’s mandate did not allow for a comprehensive, systematic evaluation of all possible whelming support from its witnesses for changing are geographically concentrated, creating a “majority of these same witnesses stated that a different voting representation since the term “minority” is used to equity than any changes to the bureaucratic structure views and who support different candidates. Multimember Districts city council member, it would have a positive impact minority” district often does not improve minority cover a wide variety of groups with different political As with single-member districting above, under this system, a city is divided into a number of geographically method would have a far greater positive impact on of city government. Our witnesses were in broad agreement that if voters in each district were able to elect more than one on equity. Some of the reasons they cited included the following: increasing the breadth of voter choice, encour- defined districts. With multimember districts, however, aging voters to diversify their own votes, allowing more to the city council. For example, if there were thirteen sented groups more power to boost individual candidates. the residents of each district elect multiple members candidates to enter each race, and allowing underrepre- members of the city council (12 city councilors plus the On the other hand, such a system would come with of which would elect three members of the council. A key potentially confusing for voters. Overall, this committee mayor), the city could be divided into four districts, each strength of multimember districts is that they facilitate both majority and minority representation from each certain drawbacks, including being more complex and believes the benefits would justify switching to such a system, or at least a compromise “hybrid” system with district. As long as the system used to create districts is a mix of single- and multi-member districts. designed to deliberately dilute the vote of minorities, First-past-the-post Voting not subjected to racial- or ethnic-based gerrymandering multimember districts lower barriers to entry into the This is the most popular and familiar method of voting in the positive aspects of multimember districts, it is of candidates, and selects their single preferred choice for political process and thus increase equity. To maximize 31 20 important that all city council members from one district the United States. Each voter receives a ballot with a list Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems Source: The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Nov., 1982), pp. 144-160 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 each position. Each candidate in question then receives vote each for three of the candidates, all three votes for This is the method currently used to elect Portland city of control makes voting more complex, but also creates one vote. The candidate with the most votes is elected. council members. Because “first-past-the-post” voting one candidate, or any other combination. This extra level greatly expanded potential for strategic voting.34 only produces a single winner with majority support rely on two rounds of voting. In partisan campaigns, the them on candidates who best represent their interests, when there are two candidates, nearly all such systems first round is generally called a primary and is generally used to select a candidate from each of the two major Cumulative voting would allow minority demo- graphic groups to “plump” their votes, concentrating but would also create the potential for vote-splitting that could negate that effect. In studies, however, cumulative parties. In non-partisan campaigns such as Portland’s voting has been found to significantly increase the like- candidates; the two candidates with the most votes then past the goalpost” elections.35 current commission system, the first round is open to all lihood of minority representation over traditional “first go on to the second round of voting, which is generally other regional and national elections. In Portland’s council, they could focus their votes on a candidate or cast during the first round of voting in May, then that logic applies to the LGBT community, renters, religious held on the first Tuesday in November to coincide with case, if one candidate receives a majority of the votes candidate is declared the winner and no election is held As an example, if residents of the easternmost section of Portland felt underrepresented on the city candidates from their own region of the city. This same minorities, and other groups geographically dispersed in November. Because turnout in the first round tends around the city. uncommon for a candidate to be declared the winner Instant-runoff Voting to be much lower than during the second round, it is not following the first round of voting, even though only a Instant-runoff voting includes any system that allows the recent Portland primary) voted for the candidate. in the familiar two-round (May and November) voting small minority of eligible voters (as small as 17%, in a Cumulative Voting “Under cumulative voting, each voter has a certain number of votes to distribute among the candidates. By entire election to take place on a single day rather than system. Cumulative voting can be used as an instant- runoff system—when voters can cast multiple votes to select several city candidates, one election’s voting can serve as an accurate measure of the overall community casting more than one vote for a single candidate, voters attitude toward candidates, and those who receive the candidates. The candidates receiving the most votes thetical case of a future district in Portland from which are able to express their relative preferences among the win.” Voters are typically given as many votes as there 32 are open seats on the ballot.33 In a municipal election, most total votes are declared the winners. In the hypothree council members are elected, the top three vote-getters would be declared the winner. for example, voters might be presented with a list of six They would receive three votes, which could be distrib- allows voters to choose their favorite candidate, but also candidates running for three open city council seats. uted among the candidates however they wanted—one 32 Another approach to instant-runoff voting is known as ranked-choice or preferential voting. This system to rank the other candidates by order of their personal Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Nov., 1982), p. 153 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 21 Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Nov., 1982), pp. 144-160 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 preference, leaving them with a first choice, second choice, third choice, and so forth. There are multiple 36 “first past the post” system to either cumulative or instant- runoff elections, as a means of both improving equity and variations on instant-runoff voting, but most commonly, if overall representational effectiveness. However, each of candidate wins. However, if no candidate receives more for Portland city council elections has its own potential a candidate is the first choice of a majority of voters, that than 50 percent of the first-choice votes, the candidate the two possibilities for introducing preferential voting costs and benefits. who received the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated, distributed to the remaining candidates.37 This system that “first-past-the-goalpost” voting is the least likely and his or her voters have their second-choice votes allows voters to select candidates with less concern over “wasting” their vote on a long-shot—if that candidate After evaluating the impacts of multiple voting methods using our equity lens, your committee found to increase equity by lowering barriers to entry into the political process and increasing the chances that is eliminated, they have in effect automatically voted all voices—including minority voices—are heard. The Cumulative and other voting systems can also work as your committee has recommended that City Club consider instead for their second choice (or third, or fourth, etc.). “instant-runoff” systems. Backers state that among the main benefits of ranked choice voting is reducing the risk that “vote splitting” leads to the election of unpopular candidates. In a “first past the goalpost” system, two popular candidates that both appeal to the majority of voters can “split the vote,” question of which system is best is complex enough that establishing a separate committee dedicated exclusively to analyzing alternative voting systems for Portland. Our recommendation is therefore general in stating that Portland should adopt some alternative voting system such as ranked-choice, preferential, or cumulative voting to better achieve equity goals. throwing the election to a third candidate. Ranked choice their candidate is defeated in the first round. models, your committee recommends that City Club also allows voters to have a voice in the election even if The witnesses interviewed by your committee who offered testimony on the topic of voting methods were broadly enthusiastic about switching from the current 36 Upon review of these models, and in recognition of the complexity of issues surrounding these alternative commission a future research committee to explore the appropriateness of alternative voting models in Portland. FairVote, Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), http://archive.fairvote.org/factshts/irv.htm 37 Id. Conclusions 1. Portland’s current form of city government fails to provide equitable representation by nearly every 3. number of members. and ethnicity. The current allocation of responsibility to the mayor and the city council appears to result in poor bureaucratic performance. 22 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 current city council and would be better served across many different arenas by increasing the metric, including income, geography, gender, race, 2. Portland has long since outgrown the size of its 4. Changing to a form of preferential voting for city council members is urgently needed to deliver more equitable representation. Recommendations Executive authority should be centralized in the office OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH of mayor, but delegated in large part to a city manager. Alternate voting methods. As stated in the Executive Portland should have a professional city manager that Portland should move away from its current at-large, Summary and body of this report, we strongly believe selected by the mayor, subject to council approval. The first-past-the-goalpost system of voting because that relevant training and experience. courts) to systematically underrepresent many communi- city manager must be a qualified professional with system has been shown (in theory, in practice, and in the ties. In Portland’s case, those systematically underrepre- The mayor should serve as the permanent chairperson of the city council and cast tie-breaking votes where applicable, although this is a moot point as long as the total number of city council members (“regular” members plus the mayor) is an odd number. 38 Portland should stop electing city council members in at-large elections, opting instead for district-based elec- sented communities include everyone who does not live in SW Portland (but particularly those living east of 82th Avenue), people of color, women, ethnic minorities, young people, renters, and others. We therefore strongly recom- mend that Portland change its method of voting—whether or not Portlanders ultimately follow our recommendation to scrap the commission form of government. (We are aware that on eight separate occasions, Portland voters tions, preferably with multiple commissioners per district. have rejected ballot measures to replace the commission Portland should further explore alternative systems of recommends that the City Club of Portland should imme- form of government.) Your research committee therefore voting, using an appropriate equity lens to decide which diately undertake additional research on voting reforms Portland. While it was beyond the mandate of this government, including: system is most likely to produce the best results for committee to develop a definitive recommendation as to that could move Portland toward a more equitable Instituting a system of preferential voting. voting system, it is clear from our research that tradi- Whether instant run-off, cumulative, or ranked- system in terms of equity. preferential voting to elect our city leaders, including The size of the Portland city council should be increased are most engaged. Portland has several options tional “first-past-the-goalpost” voting is not the best to at least eight commissioners, plus the mayor. choice, Portland should institute some system of the mayor, in one election in the fall, when voters for election reform, each with pros and cons that are worthy of further study. However, all of the options can encourage engagement and success for a wider range of candidates than our current 38 23 As long as the total number of members of Portland’s city council remains an odd number, there will be no difference between a system in which the mayor always votes or one in which the mayor only votes to break a tie. Take, for example, a hypothetical city council consisting of eight members plus the mayor. If five of the eight agree, the mayor’s vote would not change the result, regardless of whether he voted always or as a tie-breaker. Instead, the mayor’s vote would only decide if the final tally was 5-4 or 6-3. Similarly, if the eight “regular” members of the city council are evenly split, 4-4, then the mayor’s vote will be the deciding voice whether or not the mayor votes all the time or only in the case of a tie. City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 first-past-the-post, single-seat primary and general elections. three commissioners could be elected each election year, again through some form of preferential voting. Expanding the City Council by at least two Office of Neighborhood Involvement / Office of council offers more chance to represent diverse view- our witnesses heaped enormous unprompted criticism commissioners. As explained above, a larger points and backgrounds. The bureau assignments would be spread more thinly, and each commissioner Community and Civic Life. In unsolicited comments, on ONI, to a degree suggesting it would be useful to examine whether the office is delivering appreciable might have fewer staff, but they might also have value to Portland residents. While ONI has recently policy and legislative functions. name to the Office of Community and Civic Life, the nature more time to focus on constituent services and their Electing a multimember slate of commissioners in one election. If there remain only four commis- sioners, all four could be elected in one election year, with the mayor elected the alternate election year. With some sort of preferential voting, the top four finishers would win the seats. (With their name undergone significant changes, including changing its of the criticisms were more fundamental and pointed to systemic problems of equity related to the fact that most neighborhood associations (which absorb the lion’s share of ONI funding) are composed of primarily white, affluent home owners. District mapping. Although the committee has recom- recognition and other advantages, incumbents mended switching from at-large to district-based voting, clean sweep and disruption that that might cause is of potential districts. In general, we endorse the creation would be likely to continue to win reelection, so a unlikely.) Alternately, with a larger council, a slate of significant work will be needed to define the boundaries of equitable, compact electoral districts, compliant with the Voting Rights Act. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, Ken Fairfax, Chair Tina McNerthney Amanda Manjarrez, Vice-chair Lynn Peterson Dillon Styke, Lead Writer Vinay Prasad Sarah Carlin Ames Mona Schwartz Christopher Bacher Thomas Worth Liang Wu 24 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 Appendix A: Research Methods and Activities Following procedures laid down by City Club’s research began with a literature review. The research committee were recruited based on a list developed by City Club who compiled an extensive initial bibliography. Since the Quickly, however, research committee members background, an annotated guide to the bibliography was during literature research as well as the suggestions of board and Board of Governors, the research committee was aided considerably in this effort by City Club staff, research committee consists of members from various setting-up interviews with witnesses. Initially, witnesses staff prior to the formation of the research committee. expanded upon that list based on leads uncovered prepared by a committee member to help others quickly witnesses. Both while reading and during interviews, directly applicable to the research charge. The bibliog- the list of witnesses included persons representing identify articles and sources with information most research committee members strove to ensure that raphy compiled by City Club staff was just the starting diverse viewpoints. Particular attention was devoted to explore relevant studies on their own and share their various aspects of Portland’s current form of govern- to facilitate discussions and document sharing viewing witnesses with deep experience but varying government. As research progressed, this resulted in point. Research committee members were encouraged thoughts within the team. A Google group was created among members. Beside literature review and in-depth decisions among members, the City Government and Equity to identifying witnesses who both support and oppose ment. Considerable effort was also devoted to inter- viewpoints on questions of equity and representation in a snowball approach to selecting witnesses as well as Research Committee employed City Club’s most common written sources, with each new data point enhancing the particular expertise related to the topic. While early inter- where expertise was needed. tool for report preparation: interviewing witnesses with views were less structured (with group members submitting questions to a facilitator prior to each interview), the group soon developed a list of key questions that were research committee’s ability to identify additional areas Over the course of its work, the research committee heard the testimony of more than a dozen civic leaders, government officials, academics, and public advocates. repeated to various witnesses in order to gather diverse Additionally, committee members reviewed extensive were always used only as a starting point, however, and analyses. Committee subgroups performed deep responses to the same question. The standard questions and both witnesses and research committee members engaged in active discussions in order to pursue key concepts. The combination of structured and unstruc- academic literature, statistical data, and current news dives into particularly complex topics such as mayoral powers and alternate voting systems. In the following discussion section, different perspectives are presented tured interviews provided a degree of consistency in data and weighed for their significance and persuasiveness, in and deeper discussions. mendations for the residents of Portland. collection while providing opportunities for both broader 25 The committee assigned a member in charge of City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 the interest of producing the strongest possible recom- Appendix B: Past City Club Studies of Local Government in Portland 1930’s through 1950’s: During this period, City Club 2002: Measure 26-30 proposed a mayor/council form both in favor of adopting a council/city manager form elected from geographic districts, and two elected at issued a recommendation in 1933 and again in 1958, of government. 1960’s: During this period, City Club completed an large. City Club assembled a committee whose majority report supported the measure, finding it would increase government efficiency and equitable representation. in-depth report concluding that Portland’s city govern- However, City Club’s membership ultimately voted to spread among the five commissioners, and that legisla- review by a charter review commission organized by ment was being weakened by having management power tive effectiveness was impaired by the inherent conflict between bureau-specific priorities and citywide needs. The research committee unanimously recommended adopt a minority report which demanded a more detailed the city. Measure 26-30 itself was ultimately rejected by Portland voters by a wide margin. adopting a strong mayor-council form, with an expanded 2007: The mayor/council system was proposed again by Following overwhelming approval of the report by the mayoral power by also strengthening the city’s chief city council whose members would be elected at large. Measure 26-91, which would have balanced increased Club’s full membership, City Club assembled a sub-com- administrative officer. The CAO would be appointed report’s recommendations. The proposed charter was oversee the city bureaus, as well as coordinating the mittee to draft a proposed city charter incorporating the the basis for a ballot measure created by a coalition of local civic and political groups. The measure itself was then endorsed by City Club, but went on to be rejected by Portland voters in 1966 by a two-to-one margin. 1990’s: City Club issued a report on city planning in 1999, titled Increasing Density in Portland. While focused on city development, the report also concluded that the commission system “inhibits more coordinated and effective management,” that the mayor and city council lacked a comprehensive plan for Portland, and that planning and development were badly fragmented across multiple bureaus. 26 with an expanded city council of nine members—seven City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 by the mayor and confirmed by the council, and would city’s overall operations and finances. Measure 26-91 also differed from the 2002 ballot measure by withholding veto power from the mayor and by leaving the number of council members at four. The City Club research committee tasked with reviewing the Measure ultimately announced its unanimous opposition, finding that the Measure’s proponents had failed to make their case, and that changing the current form risked sacrificing the “resiliency and creativity” of Portland city government. Like the 2002 attempt, Measure 26-91 was easily defeated by Portland voters. Appendix C: Questions Addressed What is the most effective form of city government for How should city council members be elected and how What is the most equitable form of city government for What is the most equitable form of voting to elect city Portland residents? Portland residents? 27 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 many should there be? council members? Appendix D: Witness List Bud Clark Former Mayor of Portland Chair, Public Administration Division, PSU Ann Curry-Stevens Steve Novick Associate Professor, PSU Former Portland City Commissioner Kristin Eberhard Ana del Rocío Nick Fish Shelli Romero Sightline Institute Portland City Commissioner Shawn Fleek Community Engagement Coordinator, OPAL Mark Frohnmayer Founder, Equal Vote Felisa Hagins SEIU Local 49 Mary Hull-Caballero Portland City Auditor Fred Miller Former CAO, Portland Office of Management and Finance 28 Masami Nishishiba City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 State Director, Color PAC President of “Rose City Chicas,” a group focusing on strategies for maximizing the potential of women of color and a previous member of the Portland City Charter Review Commission. Eugene Wasserman President, North Seattle Industrial Association Mark Wiener Co-Founder, Winning Mark Desiree Williams Rajee Founder, Kapwa Consulting Appendix E: Witness Assertions ASSERTIONS IN FAVOR OF CURRENT SYSTEM representative of Portland as a whole. (Descriptive representation versus functional representation) • “At large” council members each have official responsibility to represent the entire city—a district-based structure would be “license to ignore” districts • outside the council member’s own. • • Portland’s city government is functioning reasonably well and is reasonably popular with voters. • The current system offers protection against a weak • A larger city council would be more expensive. • Allowing commissioners to have executive control • where commissioners have less executive power. • over their bureaus allows for greater innovation than • • Current city government has various oversight mech- • Interest groups with a citywide focus—such as position would be less interesting, and would attract unions—would lose influence under a district system. ASSERTIONS IN FAVOR OF CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT Voters have consistently rejected every previous • proposal to change the form of government since the The commission system of government creates an “odd” situation in which the roles of political leader and professional administrator are comingled. The skills that enable a successful candidate to be elected Voters can currently take their concerns to whichever commissioner runs the relevant bureau, but under a to public office are not the same skills required to have influence over a particular policy area. government bureaucracy focused on specific Having representative council members who are inaccessible may mean less equitable outcomes than accessible commissioners who are less 29 If commissioners had reduced executive power, the lower caliber candidates. be successful as an administrator of a complex district-based system their council member may not • decisions that are beneficial for the city, but politpopulation, without being voted out. commission form was instituted in 1913. • An “at-large” system allows commissioners to make ically unpopular with a particular segment of the anisms in place (manager, CAO). environmental groups, real estate developers, and The current system allows Portland residents to “shop for a champion” for a particular issue, rather than only having “one bite at the apple” in a system would be the case if priorities were selected by the • force politicians to remain accountable to voters. with voter priorities would be more effective. or incompetent mayor. mayor alone. Top-level changes to a model of governance cannot Using other mechanisms to require them to check in ment and is otherwise unique and we should not • which the form of city government plays only a small role. Portland has a uniquely high level of civic engagechange to be more like every other city. Disparate outcomes have overlapping causes, of City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 substantive issues. • Portland’s population has grown too large for the current system. • Commissioners focus on their own bureaus at the • The proximity of commissioners to city bureau • Commissioners do not have the time to balance • Neighborhood Associations are unrepresentative and expense of coordinated, citywide priorities. their legislative responsibilities with the running of multiple bureaus and may lack necessary management skills. • • Commissioners may be assigned to crucial bureaus with which they have little or no experience. The residents of Portland are not well represented • Residents of Portland frequently do not know whom • Larger legislative bodies lead to more robust debate • The current bureau-based approach is fragmented • they manage. Commission system forces a small group of officials to work together closely—if personality conflicts to seek the highest levels of funding for the bureaus • Electing council members by geographic district would provide residents of Portland with a clearly A larger city council would lower the cost of running for council, allowing a more diverse and representa- A new council structure would free up council members to spend more time on long-range planning. • It is impossible for voters to know or control who will • It is difficult for community partners to exert influ- City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 leave bureaus the independence to handle minor • A city manager can resolve inter-bureau disputes on • There is little current accountability for issues that • Granting more power to a mayor or city manager a policy basis rather than a political basis. cross multiple city bureaus. would bring their capabilities into line with what Portland voters expect. • Increasing the number of members of the city council would increase the council’s capacity to represent residents and make it easier for residents to interact end up running which bureaus. ence when bureau assignments change frequently. A city manager could prioritize pressing issues and issues internally. means having to fund fewer voter contacts. 30 sive “stove piping,” discourages inter-bureau coor- than one bureau. tive candidate pool. Campaigning over a smaller area • The current bureau-based approach leads to excesdination, and creates incentives for commissioners identified single point of contact in city government. • and leads to irrational outcomes versus setting they should call to resolve an issue since bureau occur, system can break down entirely. • and more diversity of opinion. citywide priorities. assignments change and many issues impact more • a poor substitute for better geographic representation in city government. by the current council in terms of geography, gender, ethnicity, wealth, and other factors. employees stifles the latter’s creativity. with council members. • Bureau oversight is a challenge since each bureau is under the protection of a particular commissioner. Bibliography Adams, Greg D. “Legislative Effects of Single-Member Vs. Multi-Member Districts.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 40, no. 1, 1996, pp. 129–144. www.jstor.org/stable/2111697. Adler, Sy and Gerald F. Blake, “The Effects of a Formal Citizen Participation Program on Involvement in the Planning Process: A Case Study of Portland, Oregon,” State & Local Government Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 37-43 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “Redistricting Manual,” https://www.aclu.org/ sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/redistricting_manual.pdf Azavea Institute’s “Azavea Score” for determining the compactness of an electoral district, https://www.azavea.com/ Baqir, Reza. “Districting and Government Overspending.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 110, no. 6, 2002, pp. 1318–1354. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/342804. Bebout, John E. “Management for Large Cities.” Public Administration Review, vol. 15, no. 3, 1955, pp. 188–195. www.jstor.org/stable/973016. Benton, J. Edward, “Does Government Structure Matter?” Public Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 471-479 Caballero, Mary Hull, “City Government Structure” https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ auditor/article/9178, accessed Nov 2016. Chandler, J. A., ed. Local Government in Liberal Democracies: An Introductory Survey (1). London, US: Routledge, 2013. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 9 November 2016. Charkes, Juli S., “Hispanics Fight At­Large Voting System,” The New York Times, February 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/17electionswe.html City Club of Portland, “Changing Form of City Government (Municipal Measure 51)”, May 13, 1966, City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 46, No. 50, http://members.pdxcity- club.com/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=6 b396ef6-096a-4498-b93e-4faa9564a5c5&forceDialog=0 City Club of Portland, “City of Portland Measure 26-30: Changes the City of Portland’s Form of Government”, May 3, 2002, City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 83, No. 49, http://members.pdxcityclub.com/library/reportarchive/ viewreportresolution?DocumentKey=10963330-27d9-4256-a127-e0a38c16c383 31 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 City Club of Portland, “Report on City Government”, May 19, 1961, City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 41, No. 51, http://members.pdxcityclub.com/HigherLogic/ System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=2aec1846-efe8-4824-9054 -269f381f403b&forceDialog=0 City of Austin, Texas, description of government structure, http://www.austintexas.gov/ edims/document.cfm?id=224455 City of Beaverton, Oregon, Beaverton City Charter, http://www.codepublishing.com/ OR/Beaverton/html/BeavertonCH.html#Section 6 City of Eugene, Oregon, Eugene City Charter, https://www.eugene-or.gov/ DocumentCenter/Home/Index/262 City of Hillsboro, Hillsboro City Charter, http://qcode.us/codes/hillsboro/ City of Portland, Oregon, “Article 3 Provide for Periodic Chart Review”, Charter, Code, and Policies, City of Portland, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/49288 City of Portland, Oregon, Portland City Archives was used for a range of historical documents relating to the adoption and subsequent transformation of the Commission form of Government, including: - Portland City Government, 1851 – 1913 - 1913 Change to City Charter - Subsequent proposed changes to City Charter - Original petitions filed for initiatives on changes to the City Charter City of Seattle, city council meeting on changing form of government, https://www. seattle.gov/cityclerk/view-city-council-agendas-and-legislative-process-resources/ seattle-government-structure CVD Factbook Series, a compilation of one-page factsheets covering voting systems and voting system reforms, Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), http://archive.fairvote.org/ factshts/irv.htm DeBritto, Carlos, Mayor of Phoenix, AZ, explanation of the Mayor’s role in a Council- Manager form of government, https://web.archive.org/web/20080822212231/http:// www.phoenixoregon.net/mayorcouncil/mayorbios.htm (2008) Dixon, Robert G., Jr., Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (1968). Earls, Anita, “Symposium: Bringing sanity to racial-gerrymandering jurisprudence”, May 23, 2017, http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/ symposium-bringing-sanity-racial-gerrymandering-jurisprudence/ Eberhard, Kristin, “7 Key Questions About How to Change Portland City Government”, Sightline Institute, 14 June 2017, http://www.sightline. org/2017/06/14/7-key-questions-about-how-to-change-portland-city-government 32 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 Eberhard, Kristin, “Could Portland Create a City Council That Looks More Like Portland”, June 15, 2017, Sightline Institute, http://www.sightline.org/2017/06/15/ could-portland-create-a-city-council-that-looks-like-portland/ Eberhard, Kristin, “Portland City Government Doesn’t Represent Portland Very Well”, Sightline Institute, 13 June 2017, http://www.sightline.org/2017/06/13/ portland-city-government-doesnt-represent-portland-very-well Eberhard, Kristin, “Portland, We Have a Problem”, Sightline Institute, September 12, 2017, Sightline Institute, http://www.sightline.org/2017/09/12/ portland-we-have-a-problem/ Edwards III, George C.; Robert L. Lineberry; Martin P. Wattenberg (2006). Government in America. Pearson Education. pp. 677–678.  Fredrickson, Johnson & Wood, “The Changing Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of Innovation,” Public Administration Review, May/June 2004, Vol. 64, No. 3. Handbook of Texas Online, Lewis L. Gould, “Progressive Era”, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npp01 Governing Magazine, Congressional District Compactness, Gerrymandering By State, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/politics/gerrymandered-congressional-districts-compactness-by-state.html Griffin, Anna, “Will Portland’s charter review lead to real change? A frustrated former volunteer doubts it”, January 27, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/ anna_griffin/index.ssf/2011/01/will_portlands_charter_review.html Ihlanfeldt, Keith R., “Local government structure and the quality of minority neighborhoods,” Public Choice (2011) 147: 69–91 International City/County Management Association, definitions of types of local government, http://icma.org/en/icma/home Kleiner, Evan and Albert Schueller, “A Political Redistricting Tool for the Rest of Us,” https://www.maa.org/book/export/html/220484 Langbein, Laura I., Philip Crewson, Charles Niel Brasher, “Rethinking Ward and At-Large Elections in Cities: Total spending, the number of locations of selected city services, and policy types,” Public Choice, Sept. 1996, p. 88 League of Women Voters of Oregon, “Election Methods Study Update 2016”, http://lwvor. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Elections-Methods-Study-2016-Updated-Feb-2017. pdf Lindgren, Eric A. “Comparing San Francisco’s at-Large and District Supervisor Elections’ Average Spending and Participation Rates.” California Politics & Policy11.1 (2007): 38,46,65. ProQuest. Web. 30 Nov. 2016. 33 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 Mathekga, Ralph, “Participatory Government and the Challenge of Inclusion: The Case of Local Government Structures in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Columbia Internacional, Jan-Jun 2006, p. 88-107. Morgan, Doug with Masami Nishishiba, & Dan Vizzine, “Keep Portland Weird: Retaining the Commission Form of Government”, Chapter 15 from “MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER”, November 2010, Georgetown University Press Morris, De, Amalia Alarcon, and Paul Leistner. “From neighborhood association system to participatory democracy: Broadening and deepening public involvement in Portland, Oregon.” National Civic Review 98.2 (2009): 47-55. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund, “At Large Voting Frequently Asked Questions,” www.naacpldf.org National Civic Review • DOI: 10.1002/ncr.252 • Summer 2009 National League of Cities, “Forms of Municipal Government,” http://www.nlc.org/ forms-of-municipal-government Nicholas R. “Voting Power with District Plus At-Large Representation.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, Texas. 2008. Nunn, Samuel, “Urban infrastructure policies and capital spending in city manager and strong mayor cities,” American Review of Public Administration, 26.1 (March 1996), p. 93 Pelissero, John P., and Timothy B. Krebs. “City Council Legislative Committees and Policy-Making in Large United States Cities.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 2, 1997, pp. 499–518. www.jstor.org/stable/2111774. Rice, Bradley, “Commission Form of City Government,” Handbook of Texas Online, accessed November 16, 2016, https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/ moc01 Roberts, Michael, “Strong Mayor Form of Government,” in The Balance, March 2017. https://www.thebalance.com/strong-mayor-form-of-government-1669486 Schmidt, Brad, “Portland power axis: How the political system, voting behavior limit east Portland’s voice,” updated Sep 17, 2014, posted Jul 28, 2014, http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2014/07/portland_power_axis_how_the_po.html Stilt, Edward, “Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections,” Yale Law and Policy Review, Vol. 9, Issue 2, Art. 7, 1991. Stocker, Nathan & Michelle Thompson-Fawcett, “It’s Not Like Never-the-Twain-ShallMeet’: Politician–Staff Relationship Structures in Local Government”, Journal: Local Government Studies, Volume 40, 2014 – Issue 5, http://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/abs/10.1080/03003930.2014.887563 34 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019 Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw, “Representation in Municipal Government,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 108, No. 3 August 2014 Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. “Representation in Municipal Government.” The American Political Science Review 108.3 (2014): 605-41. ProQuest. Web. 30 Nov. 2016. Trounstine, Jessica and Melody E. Valdini, “The Context Matters: The Effects of SingleMember versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3, July 2008, Pp. 554–569Dollery, Brian with Michael Kortt and Bligh Grant, “Options for Rationalizing Local Government Structure: A Policy Agenda,” International Center for Public Policy, Working Paper 12-07, January 2012 US Department of Justice, list of jurisdictions previously covered by Section 5 at the time of the Shelby County decision, https://www.justice.gov/crt/ jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Voting Rights Act Extension, S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 177, 211 US Supreme Court, sample of opinions on at-large voting: Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3287 n.19 (1982) (in which the Court held that an at-large election system for a large rural county with a large black population violated the Equal Protection Clause), City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980) (criticizing at-large systems for submerging minorities); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 158-59 (1971) (same). Also see US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals rulings, including, Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 528 F.2d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) and Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 361 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aIFd, 502 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Yale Law Journal, “Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Nov., 1982), Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. GSB:9745479.1 35 City Club of Portland Bulletin Vol. 101, No. 2 February 10, 2019