MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

RICHARD MEYER  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International Development

RONALD J. POST  
Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Central America (U)

The NSC Staff approves the Public Diplomacy Plan submitted by the Department of State on this subject. We note that there has been considerable progress in the realization of our public diplomacy goals concerning Central America among European audiences. We must, however, continue to emphasize our comprehensive policy towards Central America at the same time that we focus on the specific question of Nicaragua. (C)

There is a need to maintain this as a high priority of our missions Europe and Latin America. The opposition is engaged in an intensive propaganda effort to sustain their point of view in these areas, and our activity must be at a high level to gain support for our policies. In addition to the continued provision of important materials to the field missions, we must keep up a flow of speakers to the target areas. We must also seek to utilize, as much as possible, Central American spokesmen to speak on their own behalf in Latin America and Europe. Posts in Europe and Latin America should find ways to encourage locals to travel to Central America to gain on-the-ground knowledge of what is happening. (C)
The limited reorganization of the SLPD function should in no way suggest any diminution of effort. (C)

The NSC requests a status report of activities undertaken to implement the action plan by August 31, 1986. (U)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
May 23, 1986

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MEMORANDUM TO VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Explaining U.S. Central
American Policy in Europe and Latin America

The Department submits herewith a public diplomacy plan
for explaining U.S. Central American policy to Latin Americans
and Europeans. Parts of the plan focus on explaining those
same policies to international political organizations such as
the Socialist International, the International Democrat Union,
and the Christian Democrats.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Public Diplomacy Plan

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN
FOR EXPLAINING U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY
IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

BACKGROUND

The Sandinistas came to power in July 1979 in a coalition with genuine democrats. However, within weeks the Sandinista National Liberation Front (PSLN) began a pattern of actions reflecting a betrayal of the revolution: internal repression of genuine democrats and of non-communist institutions such as religious organizations; aggression against fellow Latin American countries through armed subversion; ties with terrorist organizations in Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe; and a military buildup supported by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. That pattern continues today.

Under President Reagan, a balanced U.S. policy has been followed in Central America. It contains four mutually reinforcing elements:

1. Encouragement of democracy;
2. Economic aid to improve living conditions;
3. Active diplomacy for realistic political solutions;
4. Security assistance to give the people of Central America the means to defend themselves against expanded Soviet-loc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion or armed aggression.

Much progress has been made in four of the five Central American countries since 1981: Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala are democratic and are steadily strengthening their democratic institutions. The U.S. Congress has year by year provided support for the President's policy through increasing appropriations for economic and security assistance (total amounts by fiscal year 1983--$513 million; 1984--$939 million; 1985--$951 million; 1986--$1,014 million).
GOALS

-- To convince audiences in Central and South America (particularly the Contadora and Contadora Support Group countries) and in Europe that U.S. policy toward Central America is balanced, workable, and the best alternative possible.

-- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has a cohesive and credible political program and that it is a viable, democratic force worthy of the support of the U.S. and other democratic nations.

-- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Sandinistas support international terrorism and that Sandinista external subversion threatens the nascent democracies in neighboring countries.

-- To demonstrate that the Sandinistas consciously and systematically violate human rights.

-- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the United States seeks only that the Sandinistas deliver on their promises of 1979 to the Organization of American States; that we believe that the best way to do this is for the Sandinistas to engage in dialogue with the opposition; that the Contadora process, if it can meet our three requirements that it be comprehensive, simultaneous, and verifiable, is an alternative we can support.

-- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe now Sandinista ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union adversely affect U.S. and their own national security interests.

-- To persuade the internationals (Socialist International, Christian Democrats, International Democrat Union, etc.) to speak out on their concern for civil and human rights in Nicaragua, Sandinista intervention in neighboring countries, and Sandinista ties with international terrorists; and to encourage the internationals to oppose aid to the Sandinistas for the same reasons.

-- To counter Sandinista disinformation activities with facts.

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ADDITIONAL GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA

-- To convince the countries of Central America that the United States shares their political and economic goals and can be counted upon to stick with them for the long haul (the U.S. is a reliable ally).

-- To persuade Central American government, political, church, and labor leaders to be more active in telling the Central American story in Europe, South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

ADDITIONAL GOAL IN EUROPE

-- To convince European publics that the U.S. is responding in a constructive manner to the desires of Central American nations for political and economic reform.

THEMES

-- Stress positive aspects (economic development, promotion of democracy, security) of U.S. policy in Central America.

-- Set record straight on U.S. policy toward negotiations with Nicaragua and on Contadora, including Nicaraguan refusal to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

-- Emphasize democratic background and objectives of the Nicaraguan resistance, while reiterating totalitarian nature of the Sandinista regime. Point out militaristic and undemocratic Sandinista educational system; exploit existence of neighborhood committees and internal repression. Remind audiences of Sandinista efforts to crush internal opponents, especially the Catholic Church, political parties, and labor unions not controlled by the government. Focus on new Nicaraguan constitution when it is unveiled by the Sandinistas and on totally controlled process in which constitution will be subjected to "public discussion."

-- Reemphasize progress and successes in El Salvador, while publicizing the destructive and totalitarian nature of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

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-- Explain that the United States supports those people and governments who are furthering the democratic process—in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador—and seeking to foster reconciliation and the democratic process in Nicaragua.

-- Remind audiences of Sandinista and Salvadoran guerrilla ties with terrorists in Latin America (example, M-19 in Colombia) and elsewhere (including Middle East), arms and drug runners, and of their Soviet-Cuban ties. Mention Sandinista practice of giving Nicaraguan passports to terrorists.

-- Continue to present U.S. position on, and rationale for, withdrawal from Nicaraguan case before the International Court of Justice. Note: The ICJ decision on the merits of the Nicaraguan case, expected in May, will spark Nicaraguan attempts to garner support for calls for the U.S. to comply with the Court's rulings, likely including a Nicaraguan approach to the UN Security Council for enforcement of the ICJ's ruling under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter.

ADDITIONAL THEME IN CENTRAL AMERICA

-- Europeans do not have a clear understanding of progress toward democracy in Central America, nor do they understand the threat to democracy posed by the Sandinistas. The United States government cannot alone convey that story to Europeans. The Central Americans should take on a share of that task.

AUDIENCES

Political and government leaders in Latin America and Europe
Media in Latin America and Europe
The Internationals
Religious leaders
Academics

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Note: The following three audiences have ready access to the American news media and to U.S. public opinion data. This will affect their willingness to accept materials and information aimed directly at them.

European and Latin American delegations to the United Nations
Latin American and European diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C.
Latin American and European journalists in the United States

ACTIONS

-- Make increased use of WORLDNET as an interactive medium for explaining U.S. policy in Central America (among officials to be sought as spokesmen on Central America are Vice President Bush, Ambassador Walters, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and Ambassador Habib).

-- Speech by President Reagan describing his positive vision for Central Americans. This should note our greatly increased economic assistance, including scholarship programs, and our identification with the hopes of the people of the region for a better life. The speech should also note that the door is open for Nicaraguans to share in this prospect—if their Sandinista leaders will allow them the freedom to pursue it. This speech should be a major event delivered on some appropriate occasion, preferably during the June 10-11 visit of the four Central American democratic presidents. Other possibilities might be to have the President speak to the OAS or during either the President Sanguinetti or President Azcona visits.

-- A senior Administration official, perhaps Secretary Schultz, should publicly unveil the second annual report on the implementation of the Kissinger Commission (or Jackson Plan) findings. This can be an opportunity to demonstrate that we recognize the North-South dimensions of the problem, and to stress the affirmative part of our strategy.

-- For Socialist International in Lima, June 20-23, State will instruct embassies in the countries represented to make demarches to party leaders. USIS Lima will try to place material on Central America in the Peruvian media at that time, and will also distribute AKA/LPD pamphlets presenting U.S. views on Central America.

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-- USIA will maintain a steady flow of AFRPARTS to Europe and Latin America to speak about Central America. These will be arranged according to the needs identified by posts in their country plans.

-- In addition to continuous reporting by its own media, USIA will distribute abroad increased numbers of copies of studies produced by ARA/LPD. USIA will encourage its posts in Europe to translate more ARA/LPD documents into local languages.

-- DOD will continue its series of research/study seminars in Latin America on the Strategic Challenges to Regional Security.

-- DOD and USIA will distribute the 80-piece slide presentation "The Challenge and Response" to posts in Europe and Latin America. USIA will consider translating the show into local languages.

-- Put ARA/LPD sponsored "Arms Display" exhibit at key points in U.S. and overseas.

-- ARA/LPD will work closely with IO/UNP to prepare U.S. statements and rights of reply in multilateral fora to counter Sandinista disinformation.

-- ARA/LPD and USIA will be prepared to exploit any Nicaraguan intransigence at the Esquipulas, Guatemala, summit (May 24-26), and at the June 6 Contadora meeting (possible Contadora conclusion), and at Contadora negotiating sessions leading up to June 6. ARA/LPD and USIA will also prepare to support positions taken by the Central American democracies.

**ACTIONS (Latin America)**

-- During President Duarte's travel to Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil, May 9-22, USIS posts at each stop promoted media coverage; USIA media covered in depth.

-- At the Costa Rican Inaugural, May 8, the U.S. delegation took the opportunity to meet with Contadora and Contadora support country leaders to demonstrate U.S. support for their goals.

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-- During visit of Uruguayan President Sanguineti to Washington in June, Administration leaders will underscore U.S. support for democracy and economic progress, emphasizing a positive vision, rather than reiterating well-known American opposition to oppression. USIA media will cover in full and also assist Uruguayan media traveling with the president.

-- USIA will provide full media coverage and assistance to the working visit of Honduran President Azcona to Washington May 26-29. Appropriate quotes by Azcona will be played into Europe and Latin America.

-- ARALPD will prepare a cable to Embassies in Central America instructing them to discuss with government officials, political, church, and labor leaders the need to tell the Central American story in Europe. A special effort will be made to persuade President Duarte to begin a public affairs effort in Europe.

-- DOD Policy Support Staff prepared special briefing and display materials on Central America for use at the meeting with air force chiefs of staff from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries May 5-9. Similar materials and briefings will be given to air force intelligence chiefs from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries when they meet at Homestead AFB, Florida, in August 1986.

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Reply to note of 07/03/86 12:15
NOTE FROM: Walter Raymond
Subject: OTTO REICH

After much discussion, Bob Kagan, who was Elliot Abrams' Special Assistant, was named as Otto's replacement. Kagan's office was folded under ARA for command and control but continues to have a reporting responsibility to the IPC and the SPG as part of my effort to give it an interagency mandate. It remains to be seen if this will weaken the effort. One key will be the need for people to be assigned from an interagency pool.

Meanwhile, I continue to chair weekly meetings to sustain the public diplomacy effort. They are attended by Kagan, Speakes rep, Buchanan rep, DOD, CIA, USIA and NSC LA officer. (When there is a Sitrm mtg of the Centam coordinating group for Hill strategy we get a feed from that group). Our brief is much broader. We seek to lay out and implement broader international strategies, particularly in LA and EUR. We approved a new strategy paper on 16 June which was sent out over Rod McDaniel's signature. This basically calls for a sustained effort to garner support for our overall Centam policy, increase understanding of the issues and, in the specific case of Nica, concentrate on gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on UNO. We have requested a community report on the level of activity sustained under the latest NSC PD tasking by 31 Aug.

The group has produced an outstanding collection of materials to support our policy. It is also light years ahead of where it was three years ago, but much work needs to be done. At our most recent weekly Centam mtg the following items were covered:

--Senate strategy: Focus on key Senators who can be brought over to increase victory margin and show momentum.

--Maximize exposure for Bishop Bismarck Carvallo and La Prensa to highlight Nic internal crackdown. Lousy coverage to date in foreign press and not much better in US.

--Play on key themes in Europe which will strengthen our case:

- Popularize Centam support for UNO. Note USIA poll which showed popular support for armed opposition to Nics in Honduras and Costa Rica.

- We are on the winning side. The House vote can help convince the Europeans that we will see this through...we are not going to be blown away by the Hill. It is always politically easier to support a winner.
- Arms Display - use on Hill or at UN. This does not mean to say everything is perfect, but there is a process under way and world opinion, often fluctuating because of many reasons including the East-West Relationship, has been gradually moving. We have to sustain it.