No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT

PETER B. DAVIDSON
General Counsel
DAVID DEWHIRST
Senior Counsel to the
General Counsel
Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Assistant Attorney General
JEFFREY B. WALL
Deputy Solicitor General
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
SOPAN JOSHI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
GERARD J. SINZDAK
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217

(Additional Caption Listed on Inside Cover)

 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
NEW YORK IMMIGRATION COALITION, ET AL.

 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court erred in enjoining the
Secretary of Commerce from reinstating a question
about citizenship to the 2020 decennial census on the
ground that the Secretary’s decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
2. Whether, in an action seeking to set aside agency
action under the APA, a district court may order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental processes of the agency decisionmaker—including
by compelling the testimony of high-ranking Executive
Branch officials—without a strong showing that the
decisionmaker disbelieved the objective reasons in the
administrative record, irreversibly prejudged the issue,
or acted on a legally forbidden basis.

(I)

 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners (defendants in the district court) are the
United States Department of Commerce; Wilbur L.
Ross, Jr., in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce; the United States Census Bureau, an agency
within the United States Department of Commerce; and
Steven Dillingham, in his official capacity as the Director of the United States Census Bureau.
Respondents are the State of New York; the State of
Connecticut; the State of Delaware; the District of
Columbia; the State of Illinois; the State of Iowa; the
State of Maryland; the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
the State of Minnesota; the State of New Jersey; the
State of New Mexico; the State of North Carolina; the
State of Oregon; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
the State of Rhode Island; the Commonwealth of
Virginia; the State of Vermont; the State of Washington;
the City of Chicago, Illinois; the City of New York; the
City of Philadelphia; the City of Providence; the City and
County of San Francisco, California; the United States
Conference of Mayors; the City of Seattle, Washington;
the City of Pittsburgh; the County of Cameron; the
State of Colorado; the City of Central Falls; the City of
Columbus; the County of El Paso; the County of
Monterey; and the County of Hidalgo (collectively
plaintiffs in the district court in No. 18-cv-2921).
Respondents also include the New York Immigration Coalition; CASA de Maryland, Inc.; the AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee; ADC Research
Institute; and Make the Road New York (collectively
plaintiffs in the district court in No. 18-cv-5025).

(II)

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 2
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 2
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved...................... 2
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 13
A. The questions presented warrant this Court’s
immediate review ........................................................... 13
B. The decisions below are incorrect ................................ 17
C. The Court should order expedited petition- and
merits-stage briefing so that it can consider and
decide this case this Term ............................................ 28
Conclusion ................................................................................... 29
Appendix A — Findings of fact and conclusions of law
(Jan. 15, 2019) .............................................. 1a
Appendix B — District court opinion and order
(July 26, 2018) .......................................... 354a
Appendix C — District court opinion and order
compelling deposition of Secretary
of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.
(Sept. 21, 2018)......................................... 437a
Appendix D — District court order compelling deposition
of Acting Assistant Attorney General
John M. Gore (Aug. 17, 2018) ................. 452a
Appendix E — District court oral order expanding
discovery (July 3, 2018)........................... 456a
Appendix F — Notice of appeal (Jan. 15, 2019) ................ 539a
Appendix G — Constitutional and statutory provisions .... 540a
Appendix H — Supplemental memorandum by
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross,
Jr. regarding the administrative record
in census litigation (June 21, 2018) ........ 546a

(III)

 IV
Table of Contents—Continued:

   Page

Appendix I — Memorandum from Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.,
Secretary of Commerce, to Karen Dunn
Kelley, Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs (Mar. 26, 2018) ............................ 548a
Appendix J — Letter from Arthur E. Gary,
General Counsel, Justice Management
Division, to Dr. Ron Jarmin, Director,
U.S. Census Bureau (Dec. 12, 2017) ...... 564a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) ....................................... 27
Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell,
824 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 24
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971).......................................................... 6, 27
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) .......... 18
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) .................. 16
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502 (2009)........................................................ 21, 23
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) ........................................................... 24
Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) ............ 25
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ............................... 19
Jagers v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179
(10th Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 26
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................. 11
NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .................. 25
Quirin, Ex parte, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) ..................................... 16
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)........................... 11

 V
Cases—Continued:

Page

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) .................... 18
Tucker v. United States Dep’t of Commerce,
958 F.2d 1411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 953 (1992)........................................................ 19, 20
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) .............. 26
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).................... 27
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)....................... 16
Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002)...................................... 15
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ..................................... 19
Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996) .................... 19, 21
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).............................................................. 16
Constitution, statutes, and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Art. I, § 2, Cl. 3 ........................................................ 2, 540a
Enumeration Clause ............................................... 5, 6
Art. III .......................................................................... 9, 19
Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 5(a),
90 Stat. 2460 ........................................................................ 15
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 5
5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)............................................................. 19
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .............................................. 9, 24, 540a
Census Act, 13 U.S.C. 1 et seq. ............................................... 2
13 U.S.C. 6.............................................................. 15, 542a
13 U.S.C. 6(a) ......................................................... 15, 542a
13 U.S.C. 6(b) ......................................................... 15, 542a
13 U.S.C. 6(c) ..........................................9, 15, 24, 25, 542a
13 U.S.C. 141(a) ................................ 3, 14, 19, 21, 25, 543a
13 U.S.C. 141(f )...........................................10, 15, 25, 543a
13 U.S.C. 141(f )(1) ..................................9, 10, 24, 25, 543a

 VI
Statutes and rules—Continued:

Page

13 U.S.C. 141(f )(2) ........................................... 10, 25, 543a
13 U.S.C. 141(f )(3) ................................................. 25, 543a
13 U.S.C. 221 ............................................................ 3, 544a
13 U.S.C. 221(a) ..................................................... 18, 554a
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301 et seq.
(Supp. V 2017):
52 U.S.C. 10301 (§ 2) ......................................................... 3
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) ................................................................... 13
28 U.S.C. 2101(e) ................................................................... 13
Sup. Ct. R.:
Rule 10(c) ................................................................... 14, 17
Rule 11 .............................................................................. 13
Miscellaneous:
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice
(10th ed. 2013) ..................................................................... 16

 In the Supreme Court of the United States
No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
NEW YORK IMMIGRATION COALITION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States
Department of Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce,
the United States Census Bureau, and the Director of
the United States Census Bureau, respectfully petitions
for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion and order of the district court (Pet. App.
1a-353a) is not yet published in the Federal Supplement
(1)

 2
but is available at 2019 WL 190285. A prior opinion of
the district court (Pet. App. 354a-436a) is reported at
315 F. Supp. 3d 766. A prior opinion and order of
the district court (Pet. App. 437a-451a) is reported at
333 F. Supp. 3d 282. A prior order of the district court
(Pet. App. 452a-455a) is not published in the Federal
Supplement but is available at 2018 WL 5260467. A
prior oral order of the district court (Pet. App. 456a538a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the district court was entered on
January 15, 2019. The government filed a notice of
appeal on January 17, 2019 (Pet. App. 539a). The court
of appeals’ jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1291. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1) and 2101(e).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are
reprinted at Pet. App. 540a-545a.
STATEMENT

1. The Constitution requires that an “actual Enumeration” of the population be conducted every ten
years to apportion Representatives in Congress among
the States, and vests Congress with the authority to
conduct that census “in such Manner as they shall by
Law direct.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, Cl. 3. The Census
Act, 13 U.S.C. 1 et seq., delegates to the Secretary of
Commerce the responsibility to conduct the decennial
census “in such form and content as he may determine,”
and “authorize[s] [him] to obtain such other census information as necessary.” 13 U.S.C. 141(a).

 3
Exercising that delegated authority, the Secretary
of Commerce, Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., determined that the
2020 decennial census questionnaire should include a
question requesting citizenship information. Pet. App.
548a-563a. Questions about citizenship or country of
birth (or both) have been asked of at least a sample of
the population on all but one decennial census from 1820
to 2000, and have been (and continue to be) asked on the
annual American Community Survey (ACS) questionnaire, sent to approximately one in 38 households, since
the ACS’s inception in 2005. Id. at 361a-368a. The decennial census includes many demographic questions,
including about sex, Hispanic origin, race, and relationship status. See id. at 26a-27a. Individuals who receive
the census questionnaire are required by law to answer
fully and truthfully all of the questions. 13 U.S.C. 221.
2. The Secretary explained the reasons for reinstating the citizenship question to the decennial census in a
March 26, 2018 memorandum. Pet. App. 548a-563a.
The Secretary’s decision and memorandum responded
to a December 12, 2017 letter (Gary Letter) from the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Id. at 564a-569a. The
Gary Letter stated that citizenship data is “critical” to
DOJ’s enforcement of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 (Supp. V 2017), and that
“the decennial census questionnaire is the most appropriate vehicle for collecting that data.” Pet App. 565a;
see id. at 567a-568a. DOJ thus “formally request[ed]
that the Census Bureau reinstate into the 2020 Census
a question regarding citizenship.” Id. at 569a.
After receiving DOJ’s formal request, the Secretary
“initiated a comprehensive review process led by the
Census Bureau” that included “legal, program, and policy considerations,” Pet. App. 548a-549a, and asked the

 4
Census Bureau to evaluate the best means of providing
the data identified in the letter. The Census Bureau initially presented three alternatives: do nothing; reinstate the citizenship question to the decennial census;
or rely solely on federal administrative records to estimate citizenship data in lieu of reinstating the citizenship question. Id. at 551a. After reviewing those alternatives, the Secretary asked the Census Bureau to consider, and he ultimately adopted, a fourth option: reinstating a citizenship question to the decennial census
while also using federal and state administrative records
(i.e., a combination of the second and third options). Id.
at 555a. The Secretary concluded that this option “will
provide DOJ with the most complete and accurate CVAP
data in response to its request.” Id. at 556a.
The Secretary considered but rejected concerns that
reinstating a citizenship question would reduce the response rate for noncitizens. Pet. App. 552a-554a, 556a559a. While the Secretary agreed that a “significantly
lower response rate by non-citizens could reduce the accuracy of the decennial census and increase costs for
non-response follow up * * * operations,” id. at 552a,
he concluded from his discussions with Department of
Commerce personnel, Census Bureau leadership, and
outside parties that, to the best of everyone’s knowledge, there was an insufficient empirical basis to conclude that reinstating a citizenship question would, in
fact, materially affect response rates. Id. at 552a-554a
(reviewing the available data); id. at 557a. The Secretary further concluded that “even if there is some impact on responses, the value of more complete and accurate [citizenship] data derived from surveying the entire population outweighs such concerns.” Id. at 562a.

 5
3. a. Respondents (plaintiffs below) are governmental entities (including States, cities, and counties) and
non-profit organizations. The operative complaints allege that the Secretary’s action violates the Enumeration Clause; is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.;
and denies equal protection by discriminating against
racial minorities. See 18-cv-5025 Compl. ¶¶ 193-212;
18-cv-2921 Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 178-197. 1 All of the
claims rest on the premise that reinstating a citizenship
question will reduce the self-response rate to the census
because, notwithstanding the legal duty to answer the
census, some households associated with noncitizens
may be deterred from doing so (and those households
will disproportionately contain racial minorities). Respondents maintain that Secretary Ross’s stated reasons in his memorandum are pretextual, and that his
decision was driven by secret reasons, including animus
against minorities. To prove their claims, respondents
announced their intention to seek extra-record discovery
before the administrative record had been filed. At a
May 9, 2018 hearing, respondents asserted that “an exploration of the decision-makers’ mental state” was necessary and that extra-record discovery on that issue, including deposition discovery, was thus justified, “prefa-

Challenges to the Secretary’s decision also have been brought in
district courts in California and Maryland. See California v. Ross,
No. 18-cv-1865 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 26, 2018); Kravitz v. United
States Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-1041 (D. Md. filed Apr. 11, 2018);
City of San Jose v. Ross, No. 18-cv-2279 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 17,
2018); La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, No. 18-cv-1570 (D. Md.
filed May 31, 2018). Bench trials are ongoing in all four cases.
1

 6
tory to” the government’s production of the administrative record. 18-cv-2921 D. Ct. Doc. 150, at 9 (May 18,
2018).
b. At a July 3, 2018 hearing, the district court
granted respondents’ request for extra-record discovery over the government’s objections. Pet. App. 521a528a. The court concluded that respondents had made
a sufficiently “strong showing of bad faith,” Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971), to warrant extra-record discovery. See Pet.
App. 526a. Following that order, the government supplemented the administrative record with thousands of
pages of documents, including materials reviewed and
created by direct advisors to the Secretary, and even
including materials created by indirect advisors that
were shared with the direct advisors.
c. On July 26, 2018, the district court dismissed respondents’ Enumeration Clause claims because the “nearly unbroken practice” of Congress’s including or authorizing questions about citizenship, along with the “longstanding historical practice of asking demographic questions generally,” meant that asking about citizenship “is
not an impermissible exercise of the power granted by the
Enumeration Clause to Congress.” Pet. App. 418a-419a;
see id. at 408a-424a. The court did not dismiss respondents’ APA and equal protection claims, concluding that
respondents had alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate
standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage, id. at 371a391a; that respondents’ claims were not barred by the
political question doctrine, id. at 391a-398a; that the
content of the census questionnaire was not committed
to the Secretary’s discretion by law, id. at 398a-408a;
and that respondents’ allegations, accepted as true,

 7
stated a plausible claim of intentional discrimination, id.
at 425a-434a.
d. On August 17, 2018, the district court entered an
order compelling the deposition testimony of then-Acting
Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for DOJ’s Civil Rights
Division, John M. Gore. 2 Pet. App. 452a-455a. The
court concluded that Acting AAG Gore’s testimony was
“plainly ‘relevant’ ” to respondents’ case in light of his
“apparent role” in drafting the Gary Letter, and concluded that he “possesses relevant information that cannot be obtained from another source.” Id. at 453a.
e. On September 21, 2018, the district court entered
an order compelling the deposition of Secretary Ross
himself. Pet. App. 437a-451a. The court recognized
that court-ordered depositions of high-ranking governmental officials are highly disfavored, but nonetheless
concluded that “ ‘exceptional circumstances’ ” existed
that “compel[led] the conclusion that a deposition of
Secretary Ross is appropriate.” Id. at 438a-439a (citations omitted). The court reasoned that exceptional circumstances were present because, in the court’s view,
“the intent and credibility of Secretary Ross” were
“central” to respondents’ claims, and Secretary Ross has
“ ‘unique first-hand knowledge’ ” about his reasons for
reinstating a citizenship question that cannot “ ‘be obtained through other, less burdensome or intrusive
means.’ ” Id. at 444a, 446a (citation omitted).
4. On October 22, 2018, this Court granted a stay as
to the September 21 order compelling Secretary Ross’s
deposition, to “remain in effect until disposition of ” a
“petition for a writ of certiorari or a petition for a writ of
On October 11, 2018, the Senate confirmed Eric S. Dreiband as
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. Mr. Gore
was, however, the Acting AAG at all times relevant to this dispute.
2

 8
mandamus,” as long as it was filed “by or before October
29, 2018 at 4 p.m.” 18A375 slip op. 1. The Court denied a
stay as to Acting AAG Gore’s deposition and further extrarecord discovery into Secretary Ross’s mental processes,
but did “not preclude the [government] from making arguments with respect to those orders.” Ibid.
The government filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, for a writ of certiorari before
the Court’s deadline. See 18-557 Pet. On November 16,
the Court treated the petition as a petition for a writ of
certiorari and granted it, ordering expedited briefing
and scheduling oral argument for February 19, 2019.
The government moved the district court and the court
of appeals to stay further trial proceedings in light of
this Court’s grant of the government’s petition. Both
courts declined to stay further trial proceedings. 18-cv2921 D. Ct. Doc. 544 (Nov. 20, 2018); 18-2856 C.A. Doc.
93 (Nov. 21, 2018). On November 26, 2018, the government lodged a letter with this Court suggesting that it
reconsider staying trial proceedings. Meanwhile, Acting AAG Gore was deposed on October 26, trial commenced on November 5, and closing arguments were
delivered on November 27.
5. On January 15, 2019, the district court entered an
opinion and order memorializing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Pet. App. 1a-353a. Determining that
the Secretary’s decision violated the APA, the court vacated the Secretary’s decision to reinstate the citizenship question to the 2020 decennial census and enjoined
the Secretary from reinstating the question “based on
[his] March 26, 2018 memorandum or based on any reasoning that is substantially similar to the reasoning contained in that memorandum.” Id. at 346a.

 9
a. The district court first held that most respondents had Article III standing. Pet. App. 194a-239a. The
court concluded that some private respondents had associational standing because some of their members
“receive funds from federal programs that distribute
those funds on the basis of census data.” Id. at 198a.
The court reasoned that if census data were inaccurate
as a result of adding the citizenship question, those
members could potentially suffer monetary injury. The
court also concluded that the alleged “degradation in
data quality” could injure all respondents. Id. at 208a219a. The court further determined that respondents
New York and Illinois each alleged an impending
injury-in-fact because each faced a “substantial risk” of
losing at least one congressional seat in the 2020 decennial census. Id. at 202a. The court rejected the government’s argument that these and other purported injuries would not be fairly traceable to the inclusion of a
citizenship question on the decennial census form because each would materialize, if at all, only because of
the independent and unlawful actions of third parties.
Id. at 226a-239a.
b. The district court then held that the Secretary’s
decision was “not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A), because it violates 13 U.S.C. 6(c) and
141(f )(1).
Section 6(c) of the Census Act requires the Secretary
to “acquire and use information available from” federal
and state administrative records “[t]o the maximum extent possible” “instead of conducting direct inquiries”
on the census form, but only if doing so is “consistent
with the kind, timeliness, quality and scope of the statistics required.” 13 U.S.C. 6(c). The district court
found that the Secretary violated subsection (c) because

 10
his March 26, 2018 decisional memorandum did not cite
the provision. Pet. App. 265a-267a. The court rejected
the government’s argument that the Secretary in fact
considered all of the factors listed in subsection (c) in
his memorandum, even though he did not cite the provision. Id. at 267a-270a. Instead, the court deemed the
Secretary to have “misunderstood his own options” because, in the court’s view, reinstating the citizenship
question and using federal and state administrative records “would produce less accurate citizenship data”
than relying only on the administrative records. Id. at
269a-270a.
Section 141(f )(1) of the Census Act requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress containing “the
subjects proposed to be included” and “the types of information to be compiled” in the census to the appropriate congressional committees at least three years before the census date. 13 U.S.C. 141(f )(1). Section
141(f )(2) requires a similar report containing “the questions proposed to be included” in the census at least two
years before the census date. 13 U.S.C. 141(f )(2). Secretary Ross timely submitted both reports; although
the first report did not include citizenship as a “subject”
area, the second report did include the proposed citizenship question. See Pet. App. 272a-273a. The district
court nevertheless concluded that Secretary Ross violated subsection (f )(1) by not including citizenship as a
“subject” in a report to Congress. The court rejected
the government’s argument that the contents of the
Secretary’s reports to Congress under Section 141(f )
are not judicially reviewable. See id. at 276a-283a.
c. The district court further held that the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because his
decisional memorandum included what the court viewed

 11
as inaccuracies, and because the Secretary failed to consider “important aspect[s] of the problem,” Pet. App.
294a (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))
(brackets in original). An example of the inaccuracies
was the Secretary’s statement that adding the question
is “no additional imposition” for millions of households
containing citizens or lawful immigrants; in the court’s
view, “common sense” dictates that adding the question
would impose “an additional burden—one question’s
worth, per person, per household—on every respondent.” Id. at 286a-287a. An example of an “important
aspect” the court thought that the Secretary failed to
consider was “whether it was necessary to respond to
DOJ’s request at all.” Id. at 294a (citation omitted).
In the district court’s view, the Secretary also had
failed to comply with various statistical quality standards, including OMB Statistical Policy Directive Number 2, which requires the Census Bureau to “ ‘design
and administer’ the census ‘in a manner that achieves
the best balance between maximizing data quality and
controlling measurement error while minimizing respondent burden and cost.’ ” Pet. App. 304a (citation
omitted). According to the court, the Secretary’s decision to use both administrative records and a decennial
census question to gather citizenship data, instead of
administrative records alone, was not the “best” balance of benefits and costs. Id. at 302a-305a (citation
omitted).
d. The district court also concluded that the Secretary violated the tenet of administrative law that “the
grounds upon which the . . . agency acted be clearly
disclosed.” Pet. App. 311a-312a (quoting SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)). In the court’s

 12
view, it was “clear that Secretary Ross’s rationale was
pretextual” and thus not the “real reason for his decision,” id. at 311a, because the Secretary had “made the
decision [to add the citizenship question] months before
DOJ sent its letter,” id. at 118a (¶ 167) (emphasis omitted). The court so found based on language in a few internal emails. For example, Secretary Ross sent a May
2017 email asking about his “ ‘months old request that
we include the citizenship question,’ ” id. at 118a (¶ 168)
(citation omitted); but because the Secretary did not refer to it as a “ ‘months old’ request to analyze inclusion
of the question,” the email showed prejudgment. Id. at
119a (¶ 168).
e. The district court rejected respondents’ equalprotection claim, finding no evidence of any discriminatory animus on the Secretary’s part. Pet. App. 331a334a. Although the court stated that respondents might
have found such evidence if they had been able to obtain
“sworn testimony from Secretary Ross himself,” it held
they had in effect waived their right to that testimony
by “decid[ing] to press ahead to trial rather than waiting to see if the Supreme Court eventually lifts the stay”
of Secretary Ross’s deposition. Id. at 334a-335a.
f. As a remedy, the district court vacated the Secretary’s decision to reinstate the citizenship question to
the 2020 decennial census and remanded to the agency.
The court also enjoined the Secretary “from adding a
citizenship question to the 2020 census questionnaire
based on Secretary Ross’s March 26, 2018 memorandum or based on any reasoning that is substantially similar to the reasoning contained in that memorandum.”
Pet. App. 346a. The injunction operates nationwide. Id.
at 347a-350a. Finally, the court vacated its September

 13
21, 2018 order compelling the deposition of Secretary
Ross as moot. Id. at 353a.
6. After the district court entered a final judgment,
respondents moved this Court to dismiss the writ of certiorari in No. 18-557 as improvidently granted. The
Court removed the case from the February argument
calendar and suspended the briefing schedule pending
further order. The government responded to the motion earlier this week that the Court should defer consideration of the motion while it considers this petition
for a writ of certiorari before judgment.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
A. The Questions Presented
Immediate Review

Warrant

This

Court’s

This Court has jurisdiction to review “[c]ases in the
courts of appeals * * * [b]y writ of certiorari * * * before or after rendition of judgment or decree.”
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) (emphasis added). “An application
* * * for a writ of certiorari to review a case before
judgment has been rendered in the court of appeals may
be made at any time before judgment.” 28 U.S.C.
2101(e). Certiorari before judgment is appropriate
when “the case is of such imperative public importance
as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice
and to require immediate determination in this Court.”
Sup. Ct. R. 11.
This case satisfies that standard. It involves an issue
of imperative public importance: the decennial census.
As the district court correctly recognized, the decennial
census “is a matter of national importance” with “massive and lasting consequences,” and it “occurs only once
a decade, with no possibility of a do-over.” Pet. App.
11a-12a. The district court also correctly recognized
that “time is of the essence” because the government

 14
must finalize the decennial census questionnaire for
printing by the end of June 2019. Id. at 12a. Both the
government and respondents thus need a final resolution of the issues presented in this case by that date.
It is exceedingly unlikely that the parties could obtain full review in both the court of appeals and this
Court by the end of June. Even highly expedited briefing and decision in the court of appeals likely would
leave insufficient time for petition- and merits-stage
briefing, argument, and decision in this Court this
Term. Accordingly, as a practical matter, a writ of certiorari before judgment is likely the only way to protect
this Court’s opportunity for plenary review.
The issues presented in this case also merit this
Court’s review. This Court already has granted review
of the second question presented, involving the propriety of the district court’s orders expanding discovery
beyond the administrative record and compelling the
depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials,
including Secretary Ross. See No. 18-557.
The first question presented also merits this Court’s
review. The judgment below takes the unprecedented
step of striking a demographic question from the decennial census and thereby preventing the Secretary of
Commerce from exercising his delegated powers to “take
a decennial census * * * in such form and content as he
may determine.” 13 U.S.C. 141(a). In entering its order, the district court necessarily decided several subsidiary “important question[s] of federal law that ha[ve]
not been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct.
R. 10(c). As far as the government is aware, the district
court is the first court ever to find or hold that:

 15
• state and local governments and private associations have standing to challenge the inclusion of a
question on the decennial census form (as opposed
to the method of tabulating data for reapportionment after completion of the census, cf., e.g., Utah
v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 460-461 (2002));
• state and local governments and private associations have standing to challenge the inclusion of a
question on the decennial census based on the possibility that unidentified third parties might unlawfully refuse to fill out the census form or to answer the question;
• a decision by the Secretary of Commerce, explained in a formal memorandum, to add a question to the decennial census form is irrational;
• compliance with the requirements in 13 U.S.C. 141(f )
for reports by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress about the census is judicially reviewable;
• a report by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress about the census violates 13 U.S.C. 141(f );
• the grant of powers to the Secretary of Commerce in
13 U.S.C. 6 to obtain federal and state administrative
records also creates judicially reviewable duties;
• a decision by the Secretary of Commerce to obtain
federal and state administrative records under
13 U.S.C. 6(a) and (b) and also ask a question on the
decennial census violates 13 U.S.C. 6(c); 3 and a court
The district court appears to be the first court to cite, let alone
find a violation of, 13 U.S.C. 6(c) in a published or electronically
available decision since the provision’s enactment, see Act of Oct.
17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 5(a), 90 Stat. 2460: a time span covering five decennial censuses (including 2020).
3

 16
may enjoin the Secretary of Commerce from adding
a demographic question to the decennial census because he supposedly had additional reasons—not
identified by the court—for wanting to add the question.
Any one of these questions likely would merit this
Court’s review; together, they surely do. Indeed, to the
government’s knowledge, this is the first time the judiciary has ever dictated the contents of the decennial
census questionnaire. Cf. Pet. App. 416a (acknowledging that lower courts have, until now, “universally rejected” challenges to the census questionnaire “as meritless,” and citing cases).
Absent certiorari before judgment, the court of appeals likely would have the final say on these critical issues given the June 2019 deadline for finalizing the census form. In light of the immense nationwide importance of the decennial census, if the district court’s
ruling is to stand, it should be this Court that reviews
it. This Court previously has granted certiorari before
judgment to promptly resolve important and timesensitive disputes. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 686-687 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942); cf. Stephen M. Shapiro et
al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.20, at 287-288 (10th ed.
2013) (collecting cases where “[t]he public interest in a
speedy determination” warranted certiorari before
judgment). The government respectfully submits that
the Court should follow the same course here.

 17
B. The Decisions Below Are Incorrect

The district court decided “important federal question[s] in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of
this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Secretary Ross reinstated to the decennial census a wholly unremarkable
demographic question about citizenship. Questions
about citizenship or country of birth (or both) have been
asked of at least a sample of the population on all but
one decennial census from 1820 to 2000, and have been
(and continue to be) asked of a sample of the population
on annual ACS surveys since the ACS’s inception in
2005.
Respondents assert that some people in households
with noncitizens (or ties to them) might refuse to answer the question despite their legal obligation to do so;
that Secretary Ross’s decision to ask the question despite this possibility was driven by secret motives, including animus against racial minorities; that the risk of
any resulting undercount is fairly traceable to the government’s action rather than to the individual or household’s unlawful refusal to fill out and return the census
questionnaire; and that the risk of undercount is sufficient to render merely asking the question arbitrary
and capricious, notwithstanding that VRA enforcement
efforts rely on citizenship data.
Accepting respondents’ novel theory, the district
court made two overarching errors: it ordered discovery beyond the administrative record to probe Secretary Ross’s mental processes, and it ultimately enjoined
the reinstatement of the citizenship question to the decennial census. Both are contrary to this Court’s precedents.

 18
1. The district court erred in enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the citizenship question to the decennial census.
a. The district court’s holding that both private respondents and the state and local governmental respondents have standing to challenge the inclusion of a
demographic question on the decennial census contravenes this Court’s precedent requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate a “concrete and particularized” injury that
is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citation omitted). The alleged injuries here either are too
conjectural or hypothetical—such as the future loss of a
congressional seat through reapportionment, Pet. App.
201a-204a, or the future loss of funds under government
grants, id. at 204a-208a—or are not sufficiently concrete and particularized—such as the alleged harm
from the “degradation in data quality” of the census results, id. at 208a.
Nor are the alleged injuries “fairly traceable” to the
government’s actions. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. None
of the injuries will materialize if there is not a substantial undercount as a result of the citizenship question’s
presence on the census form; but such an undercount
would be attributable only to the actions of individuals
who unlawfully refuse to fill out or return the census
form, see 13 U.S.C. 221(a), and who are then able to
evade the government’s extensive follow-up efforts.
This Court has repeatedly “decline[d] to abandon [its]
usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest
on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414
(2013). That reluctance should apply with even more
force when the independent actions are unlawful.

 19
Even setting aside Article III standing, the Secretary’s decision about what questions to include on the
decennial census questionnaire is not subject to judicial
review under the APA. The APA bars judicial review of
any action that “is committed to agency discretion by
law.” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). Such actions are unreviewable
because “a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (quoting
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). That perfectly describes this case. The Constitution “vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in conducting”
the decennial census, and Congress in turn “has delegated its constitutional authority over the census” to the
Secretary. Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 19, 23
(1996). Neither the Constitution nor the Census Act
provides any standard by which to judge the lawfulness
of including (or excluding) a given question on the census form; to the contrary, the statute simply instructs
the Secretary to “take a decennial census * * * in such
form and content as he may determine,” 13 U.S.C.
141(a), with no “meaningful standard” to guide that determination, Webster, 486 U.S. at 600.
Respondents’ and the district court’s focus on the accuracy of the census does not supply the relevant standard. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the complete
absence of “guidelines for an accurate decennial census” from the Constitution, the Census Act, and the
APA strongly suggests “that these enactments do not
create justiciable rights” to any particular level of census accuracy. Tucker v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1417, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953
(1992). “So nondirective are the relevant statutes that
it is arguable that there is no law for a court to apply in

 20
a case like this.” Ibid. That same reasoning applies
equally here.
b. The district court erred in deeming the Secretary’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question arbitrary and capricious. A question asking about citizenship or country of birth (or both) has a long pedigree on
the decennial census; indeed 2010 was the first decennial census in 170 years in which such a question did not
appear on any decennial census form. As the Secretary
observed, “other major democracies inquire about citizenship on their census, including Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, Spain,
and the United Kingdom, to name a few.” Pet. App.
561a. The United States itself continues to ask about
citizenship on the ACS. Even the United Nations recommends asking about citizenship on a census. Ibid. In
light of this uniform and widely accepted practice, Secretary Ross’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question to the decennial census was hardly “irrational,” id.
at 285a n.65, and the court’s reasons for concluding otherwise do not withstand scrutiny.
i. The district court found that Secretary Ross’s
“explanations for his decision were unsupported by,
or even counter to, the evidence before the agency.”
Pet. App. 285a. Specifically, the district court found
“most significant” the fact that “Secretary Ross’s own
stated ‘priorit[y]’ was to ‘obtain[] complete and accurate data.’ ” Id. at 289a (citation omitted; brackets in
original). The court concluded, however, that using administrative records alone would result in more complete and accurate data than using administrative records and adding the question to the census, as the Secretary desired. See id. at 290a-291a. But under APA

 21
arbitrary-and-capricious review, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (citation omitted). Nor may a court set aside agency
action—in particular, a determination about the “form
and content” of the decennial census, 13 U.S.C. 141(a)—
merely because the decisionmaker “overruled the views
of some of his subordinates.” Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 23.
Secretary Ross acknowledged his subordinates’ view
that self-responses on the census can be less accurate
than imputing citizenship data from administrative records, Pet. App. 554a-555a, but deemed that risk to be
outweighed by the potential benefits of asking the citizenship question on the decennial census, concluding
that it could provide data, unavailable today, to help improve the accuracy of the imputation from administrative records in the future, id. at 556a. The Secretary
thus came to the “judgment” that combining administrative records with a direct question on the census “will
provide DOJ with the most complete and accurate
CVAP data.” Ibid. A court may disagree with that
judgment, but may not substitute its own (or that of the
decisionmaker’s subordinates) under the APA.
ii. The district court also erred in concluding that
Secretary Ross failed to consider important aspects of
the problem. Most significantly, the court questioned
whether more granular CVAP data was “necessary” for
DOJ’s VRA enforcement efforts. Pet. App. 295a. Yet
again, the court improperly “substitute[d] its judgment
for that of the agency.” Fox Television Stations, 556
U.S. at 513 (citation omitted). Despite the district
court’s belief that DOJ would not benefit from the more
granular census citizenship data (as compared to the
less granular data from the ACS), Pet. App. 295a-299a,

 22
DOJ itself provided at least four reasons why it would.
First, DOJ “already use[s] the total population data
from the census” in redistricting efforts, so using estimated citizenship data from the ACS surveys “means
relying on two different data sets, the scope and level of
detail of which vary quite significantly.” Id. at 567a.
Second, ACS estimates “do not align in time with the
decennial census data.” Id. at 568a. Third, ACS estimates are just that—estimates, and “the margin of error increases as the sample size * * * decreases.” Ibid.
Fourth, the decennial census questionnaire would provide more granular citizenship voting age population
(CVAP) data than the ACS surveys—down to the smallest “census block” level, instead of the “census block
group” level. Ibid. “Having all of the relevant population and citizenship data available in one data set * * *
would greatly assist the redistricting process.” Ibid.
Despite acknowledging DOJ’s reasons in its findings of
fact, see Pet. App. 41a (¶ 4), the district court did not
directly address them in its conclusions of law. And the
district court entirely overlooked the submissions of
States confirming that citizenship data from the census
would be useful for their own VRA and redistricting efforts. See, e.g., Administrative Record (A.R.) 1079-1080
(Louisiana), 1155-1157 (Texas), 1161-1162 (Alabama),
1210-1211 (Oklahoma, Kansas, Michigan, Indiana, Nebraska, South Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida, and West Virginia). 4
The district court’s other examples of “important aspects” that Secretary Ross supposedly failed to consider are even further afield. For example, the court
faulted Secretary Ross for failing to consider “whether
A link to this portion of the administrative record, which is publicly available, is in 18-cv-2921 D. Ct. Doc. 173 (June 8, 2018).
4

 23
it was necessary to respond to DOJ’s request at all.”
Pet. App. 294a. But a Cabinet Secretary does not
lightly ignore a formal request from another department, particularly when the request concerns one of the
agency’s core missions. And it is hardly unusual for one
department to rely on the expertise of the other—here,
for the Department of Commerce to rely on DOJ’s assertion that more granular citizenship data would be
useful to its VRA enforcement efforts. More to the
point, it cannot possibly be arbitrary and capricious for
a Cabinet Secretary to pay respectful attention to such
formal requests.
iii. The district court concluded that Secretary
Ross’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for the further reason that he failed to comply with various statistical policies, most notably Statistical Policy Directive
No. 2 from the Office of Management and Budget. Pet.
App. 300a-305a. According to the court, that directive
“mandates that the Census Bureau ‘design and administer’ the census ‘in a manner that achieves the best balance between maximizing data quality and controlling
measurement error while minimizing respondent burden and cost.’ ” Id. at 304a (citation omitted). Secretary
Ross’s decision to use administrative records and reinstate the citizenship question to the decennial census
“did not constitute ‘the best balance’ ” of these factors,
in the court’s view. Ibid. (citation omitted). Once again,
the court improperly “substitute[d] its judgment for
that of the agency.” Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S.
at 513 (citation omitted). Secretary Ross undertook a
“thorough review of the legal, program, and policy considerations,” and concluded that the benefits of reinstating a citizenship question to the decennial census
would outweigh the costs. Pet. App. 562a. That

 24
judgment is entitled to deference under arbitrary-andcapricious review. See FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“A court is not to ask
whether a regulatory decision is the best one possible
or even whether it is better than the alternatives.”).
c. The district court further erred in finding the Secretary’s decision to be “not in accordance with law” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), on the ground that the
Secretary violated both 13 U.S.C. 6(c), which requires
the Secretary to use administrative records in lieu
of “direct inquiries” “consistent with the kind, timeliness, quality and scope of the statistics required,” and
13 U.S.C. 141(f )(1), which requires the Secretary to
submit a report to Congress containing “the subjects
proposed to be included” in the census.
The district court concluded that the Secretary violated Section 6(c) primarily because his decisional memorandum “nowhere mentions, considers, or analyzes his
statutory obligation” under that provision, and “[a]gency action taken in ignorance of applicable law is arbitrary and capricious.” Pet. App. 266a. But this Court
has never held that an agency’s mere failure to cite a
statutory provision, even while complying with its strictures, renders the agency action arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Nor do the lower-court cases on
which the district court relied (id. at 266a-267a) so hold;
instead, those cases merely reiterate the unremarkable
principle that an agency may not “apply the wrong law,”
Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell,
824 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
The Secretary’s decisional memorandum explained why
administrative records alone would not satisfy the kind,

 25
timeliness, quality, and scope requirements of the citizenship data that DOJ requested. Pet. App. 554a-556a.
That was sufficient to satisfy Section 6(c).
The district court also erred in holding that Section
141(f ) was judicially reviewable. That section requires
the Secretary to make periodic reports about the census
to Congress. 13 U.S.C. 141(f )(1), (2), and (3). If the reports are deficient, it is a matter for Congress to address—not the courts. See Guerrero v. Clinton,
157 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998) (adequacy of statutorily required report to Congress from the Office of Insular Affairs not reviewable); NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d
288, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same, for statutorily required
reports to Congress from the Secretary of the Interior).
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the adequacy of reports submitted to Congress is generally not judicially
reviewable because “it is most logically for the recipient
of the report to make that judgment and take what it
deems to be the appropriate action.” NRDC, 865 F.2d
at 319. The district court distinguished NRDC and
Guerrero on the ground that the reports in those cases
were “purely informational.” Pet. App. 277a (citation
omitted). But the Section 141(f ) reports, too, are purely
informational: although the Census Act requires the reports, nothing in the Census Act conditions the Secretary’s broad discretion to “take a decennial census * * *
in such form and content as he may determine” on his
providing a complete report under Section 141(f )(1).
13 U.S.C. 141(a).
d. Finally, the district court’s conclusion that Secretary Ross’s decision was pretextual also was erroneous.
The court improperly relied in part on extra-record evidence to support its conclusion, see Pet. App. 313a314a, and its only finding based on the administrative

 26
record was that the Secretary “had made the decision
to add the citizenship question well before DOJ requested its addition,” id. at 313a. That finding was clearly
erroneous, for the Secretary did not commence the
agency’s “hard look” or add the question until after DOJ
had made the request. In any event, because the Secretary actually believed the rationale in his decisional
memorandum, it does not matter whether he had additional reasons for supporting reinstatement of the citizenship question. See Jagers v. Federal Crop Ins.
Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2014). After all,
“there’s nothing unusual about a new cabinet secretary
coming to office inclined to favor a different policy direction, [and] soliciting support from other agencies to
bolster his views.” 18A375 slip op. 2 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).
The district court failed to apply these basic legal
principles, instead asserting that “there is no basis in
the record to conclude that Secretary Ross ‘actually believe[d]’ the rationale he put forward.” Pet. App. 320a
(citation omitted). That, too, is clearly erroneous: the
Secretary’s formal decisional memorandum itself expressly relies on the VRA-enforcement rationale set
forth by DOJ. It also turns the presumption of regularity that attaches to Executive Branch action, see United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996), on
its head; for it was respondents’ (i.e., plaintiffs’) burden
to show that the Secretary disbelieved his stated
rationale—not the government’s burden to prove the
opposite.
2. Long before entry of final judgment, the district
court erred in ordering discovery outside the administrative record to probe Secretary Ross’s mental pro-

 27
cesses, including by compelling the depositions of Secretary Ross and other high-ranking Executive Branch
officials. 5 Those orders defy decades of settled law establishing that in a challenge to agency action, “the focal
point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 142 (1973) (per curiam). And the orders defy
equally well settled law establishing that plaintiffs challenging agency action may not probe the subjective
mental processes of the agency decisionmaker, especially by compelling his testimony. United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-422 (1941). Although this
Court has recognized a narrow exception where the
plaintiffs make “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), the district court
committed clear legal error in applying that exception
here.
The district court’s rationale for its “highly unusual”
orders, 18A375 slip op. 2 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.), was
that there is strong evidence that Secretary Ross acted
in bad faith because, whether or not the reasons in the
Although the district court said it relied only on evidence in the
administrative record in reaching its ultimate decision on the merits, the propriety of its orders compelling extra-record discovery is
not moot. The court made extensive findings of fact based on extrarecord evidence, e.g., Pet. App. 78a-117a, 121a, 124a-129a, and it relied on extra-record evidence to bolster its findings and conclusions
of law, e.g., id. at 293a n.68; 313a-314a. Accordingly, as the government explained in its response to the motion to dismiss the writ of
certiorari in No. 18-557, respondents could attempt to rely on the
extra-record evidence as an alternative grounds for affirmance, so
there remains a live controversy over the propriety of that extrarecord evidence.
5

 28
administrative record are objectively valid, he allegedly
had secret motives in deciding to reinstate the citizenship question. But as long as the Secretary believed the
grounds on which he formally based his decision, and
did not irreversibly prejudge the decision or act on a legally forbidden basis, any additional subjective reasons
or motives he might have had do not constitute bad
faith. And given the absence of strong evidence that the
Secretary did not believe the basis for his decision, or
that he had irreversibly prejudged the issue or acted on
a legally forbidden basis, the district court had no authority to order extra-record discovery, much less to
compel the deposition of Secretary Ross himself, to
probe the Secretary’s mental processes. See generally
Gov’t Br. in 18-557.
C. The Court Should Order Expedited Petition- And
Merits-Stage Briefing So That It Can Consider And
Decide This Case This Term

As noted above, the Census Bureau must finalize the
census forms by the end of June 2019 to print them on
time for the 2020 decennial census. Therefore, if the
Court were to grant certiorari before judgment, the
case would need to be briefed, argued, and decided this
Term. Accordingly, as further explained in a motion for
expedition filed concurrently with this petition, the government respectfully requests the Court to enter an expedited briefing schedule at both the petition and merits stages. Such expedited briefing would allow an orderly resolution of this important case in this Court and
would avoid the need for review through emergency
stays from the court of appeals regardless of how that
court rules. Specifically, if the Court grants the petition
following either the February 15 or the February 22
conference, it should order expedited merits-stage

 29
briefing so that the case can be heard either at the end
of the Court’s regularly scheduled April sitting or at a
special sitting in May.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.

PETER B. DAVIDSON
General Counsel
DAVID DEWHIRST
Senior Counsel to the
General Counsel
Department of Commerce

JANUARY 2019

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Assistant Attorney General
JEFFREY B. WALL
Deputy Solicitor General
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
SOPAN JOSHI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
GERARD J. SINZDAK
Attorneys