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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:17-cv-60426-UU
ALEKSEJ GUBAREV, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BUZZFEED, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon intervenor The New York Times Company’s
(“The Times”) Motion for Access to Judicial Records (D.E. 254). 1
For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted as prescribed below.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The salient facts of this case are set forth in the Court’s Order on the cross-motions for
partial summary judgment on public figure status (D.E. 385) and the Court’s Order on Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 388), both of which are incorporated by reference herein.
“For obvious reasons, courts have uniformly approved the practice of provisionally sealing
documents pending assessment of justification for a request to seal.” In re Reporters Comm’ee for
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.3d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (collecting cases).
Consistent with this practice, the Court permitted the parties to file documents provisionally under
seal, pending a later document-by-document determination.

1

On December 18, 2018, the Court granted the Motion in part, granting The Times’s request to intervene,
and deferred ruling on unsealing. D.E. 392. Further, on January 30, 2019, the Court ordered the unsealing
of certain documents or portions of documents by consent of the parties and those non-parties who had
designated material as confidential. D.E. 421. This Order addresses all remaining issues on unsealing.

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The Court has issued final judgment in this case, has followed the procedures required for
potential unsealing (see, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253–54 (4th
Cir. 1988) (district court must give adequate notice of potential sealing/unsealing and provide
interested persons an opportunity to object before the court rules 2)), and is prepared to state its
findings below.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD ON SEALING JUDICIAL RECORDS
A. As to Civil Pretrial Matters, Generally
“The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public

concern.” Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978). “The common-law
right of access to judicial proceedings, an essential component of our system of justice, is
instrumental in securing the integrity of the process.” Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). “This preference for public
access is rooted in the public's first amendment right to know about the administration of justice.”
Video Software Dealers Assoc’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24,
26 (2d Cir. 1994). “Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments
based on public records. . . . Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public
view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification.” PerezGuerrero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 717 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2013) (ellipses in original) (quoting
Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006)).
The right of access is not absolute. For example, the right of access does not apply to
discovery. Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007). Once the discovery
is used “in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial resolution of the merits,” however,

2

See D.E. 384; D.E. 398; D.E. 407; D.E. 410; D.E. 411; D.E. 415; D.E. 416; D.E. 417.

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the filed material becomes “subject to the common-law right.” Id. (quoting Chicago Tribune, 263
F.3d at 1312)); see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)
(even though protective order provided some confidentiality to discovery, once the materials
become part of a motion, they “lose their status of being ‘raw fruits of discovery’”). “Once a matter
is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s
case.” Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). It makes no difference
whether the pretrial motions are dispositive: “A motion that is ‘presented to the court to invoke its
powers or affect its decisions,’ whether or not characterized as dispositive, is subject to the public
right of access.” Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050
(2d Cir. 1995)).
The right of access creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of openness of court records.
Rossbach v. Rundle, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 3 “The common law right of
access may be overcome by a showing of good cause, which requires balancing the asserted right
of access against the opponent’s interest in keeping the information confidential. Whether good
cause exists is decided by the nature and character of the information in question.” Romero, 480
F.3d at 1246 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Courts conducting a “good cause”
balancing test consider, among other factors:
(1) whether allowing access would impair court functions or harm legitimate privacy
interests,
(2) the degree of and likelihood of injury if made public,

3

This presumption is further embodied in the Local Rules of this District. Local Rule 5.4(a) reflects a
“General Policy” that “Unless otherwise provided by law, Court rule, or Court order, proceedings in the
United States District Court are public and Court filings are matters of public record.” As such, any motion
to seal materials “must set forth the factual and legal basis for departing from the policy that Court filings
be public.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 5.4(b)(3). The motion also must “describe the proposed sealed filing with as
much particularity as possible without revealing the confidential information[] and specify the proposed
duration of the requested sealing.” Id.

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(3) the reliability of the information,
(4) whether there will be an opportunity to respond to the information,
(5) whether the information concerns public officials or public concerns,
(6) the availability of a less onerous alternative to sealing the documents,
(7) whether the records are sought for such illegitimate purposes as to promote public
scandal or gain unfair commercial advantage,
(8) whether access is likely to promote public understanding of historically significant
events, and
(9) whether the press has already been permitted substantial access to the contents of the
records.
Id.; Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598–603 & n.11 (1978)).
A party’s privacy or proprietary interest in information sometimes overcomes the interest
of the public in accessing the information. Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at
598; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 427, 464–74 (1991)). For example, when “sensitive information pertains to nonparties who are not public figures, the balancing of interests in favor of protecting the privacy of
the non-parties and against uninhibited access to the records is strengthened.” Rossbach, 128 F.
Supp. 2d at 1352. Nevertheless, in cases involving public concerns like “the citizen’s desire to
keep a watchful eye on . . . the operation of government,” documents—even sensitive ones—may
speak to the “heart of the interest protected by the right of access,” making public disclosure
paramount. See Romero, 480 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). Additionally, if
information is or already has been out in the public domain, sealing is unwarranted. See, e.g.,
Perez-Guerrero, 717 F.3d at 1235–36 (declining to conceal petitioner’s identity in court records

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because such concealment “would do little to protect his safety” as “his name, photograph, and
identity as an informant have been widely reported in the media”).
B. Allegedly Libelous or Scandalous Material, Specifically
A district court is afforded discretion in weighing the relative interests, but that discretion
“is guided by the presumption of public access to judicial documents.” Id. at 1235; see also
Romero, 480 F.3d at 1242 (refusal to unseal reviewed for abuse of discretion); Chicago Tribune,
263 F.3d at 1309 (denial of sealing order reviewed for abuse of discretion). Plaintiffs emphasize
the “public scandal” or “libel” standard in pressing for continued sealing. As a result, the Court
finds it appropriate to expound upon when the risk of “public scandal” or “libel” may justify
sealing—and when it does not.
It is true that “court files that instigate public scandal or libel may be sealed.” See Romero,
480 F.3d at 1247; see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (noting that “courts have refused to permit their
files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption”). But the mere denial of
allegedly libelous statements is not, without more, a legitimate basis to seal evidence. See Romero,
480 F.3d at 1247.
The seminal case supporting the sealing of allegedly libelous or scandalous material is In
re Caswell’s Request, a one paragraph opinion from 1893 where the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island precluded a newspaper reporter from examining a divorce petition. 29 A. 259, 259. The
court held:
To publish broadcast the painful, and sometimes disgusting, details of a divorce
case, not only fails to serve any useful purpose in the community, but, on the other
hand, directly tends to the demoralization and corruption thereof, by catering to a
morbid craving for that which is sensational and impure.”
Id. Over the years, Caswell has been cited repeatedly for the broad proposition that “[judicial
records] should not be used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal,” id.—not for its
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narrow application. But Caswell and its progeny are unpersuasive here primarily because the
records sealed in those cases involved privacy interests of individuals either (1) not involved in
the underlying lawsuits or (2) involved in intimately interpersonal disputes (such as the divorce in
Caswell). 4 Neither of these rationales apply to the instant case. Instead, the Court finds persuasive
the case of Jackson v. Deen, cited by Plaintiffs, where the court in an employment discrimination
case unsealed all records “that directly and arguably relate to this lawsuit” while sealing only those
“matters entirely unrelated to this case (or any other litigation).” 2013 WL 1911445, at *3–4 (S.D.
Ga. 2013) (emphasis added); see also id. at *5–8. So long as material is arguably relevant, then,
the presumption of openness weighs heavily in favor of unsealing.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Court finds that continued sealing of the court filings in this case would contravene
the presumption of the common law right of access. The Court further finds that, with the limited
exception explained below, the parties and objecting non-parties have failed to show good cause
to rebut the presumption.
A. The Presumption of Access Has Attached to All the Sealed Filings
As an initial matter, the Court notes that all the sealed filings are (1) motions, (2) documents
filed in relation to motions, or (3) court orders. The motions are subject to the public right of access
because they were presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its decisions. Romero, 480
F.3d at 1246.
So too with the documents filed in relation to the motions; they also were presented to the
court to inform the court’s decisions. See, e.g., id. at 1245 (“Material filed in connection with any
substantive pretrial motion, unrelated to discovery, is subject to the common law right of access.”);

4

Or, as in the case of Nixon, the records would become publicly available through alternative means
(there, through operation of the Presidential Recording Act). See 435 U.S. at 597–606.

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Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We hold that documents
submitted to a court in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are judicial
documents to which a presumption of immediate public access attaches under both the common
law and the First Amendment.”); see also Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049–50 (the weight to be afforded
documents filed with the court should be “largely derived from the role those documents played
in determining litigants' substantive rights—conduct at the heart of Article III—and from the need
for public monitoring of that conduct”).
Finally, “a presumption of public access attaches to a court’s decisions. ‘[A] court’s
decisions are adjudications—direct exercises of judicial power the reasoning and substantive effect
of which the public has an important interest in scrutinizing.’” Under Seal v. Under Seal, 273 F.
Supp. 3d 460, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Encyclopedia Brown Prods.,
Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Accordingly, the
presumption of public access has attached to all the sealed filings in this case.
B. With One Limited Exception, the Presumption of Access Has Not Been
Rebutted
1. The Public Should Have Full Access to the Parties’ Legal Briefings
The parties filed their papers relating to their motions for summary judgment, supporting
memoranda of law, Daubert motions, and motions in limine under seal. These matters were
submitted to the Court for adjudication, and the Court finds that unsealing of these papers is critical
for the public to be able to understand the reasoning and substantive effect of the Court’s orders
herein. 5

5

Though the Court did not rule on the Daubert motions nor motions in limine, as they were rendered moot
by the entry of final summary judgment, the public nevertheless should know what issues the parties
expected to address (or challenge) if the case had gone to trial.

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For Plaintiffs’ part, 6 their claims of good cause can be summarized as follows: (1) the
references to pornography and webmaster conferences is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and do
not relate to public officials or public concerns; (2) the references to internal private business
communications, finances, and/or personal relationships are irrelevant to public parties or
concerns; (3) references various non-parties’ testimony should be redacted to protect those nonparties or Defendants; and (4) references to alleged unlawful acts of third parties and “Methbot”
are hearsay and unreliable.
None of these grounds is persuasive. First, the Dossier at the heart of this case states, in
pertinent part, that a source:
reported that over the period March-September 2016 a company called
XBT/Webzilla and its affiliates had been using botnets and porn traffic to transmit
viruses, plant bugs, steal data, and conduct “altering operations” against the
Democratic Party leadership. Entities linked to one Alexei GUBAROV [sic] were
involved and he and another hacking expert, both recruited under duress by the
FSB, Seva KAPSUGOVICH were significant players in this operation.
Plaintiffs brought this defamation action to challenge Defendants’ report of the Dossier without
independently verifying the truth of the Dossier’s contents. Thus, the allegations and evidence
about pornography, “bots” and non-party “wrongdoing” directly flow from the Dossier and speak
to key issues in the case. Further, Plaintiffs’ alleged connections to pornography and webmaster
conferences (including sponsors and attendees of the conferences) were used by Defendants—
albeit unsuccessfully—in support of their public figure analysis. Even though Plaintiffs deny the
legal significance of these allegations (and appear to be embarrassed by them), the allegations and
evidence also help explain the Court’s Order on the cross-motions for summary judgment on
public figure status (D.E. 385). The Court is guided by Romero and the Eleventh Circuit’s caution
6

Defendants generally consent to all unsealing and defer to the Court’s balancing, pressing for continued
sealing only to the extent the Court deems it necessary to protect non-party interests. See generally D.E.
285; D.E. 378.

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that a party’s “denial” of allegations “is not a legitimate basis for sealing the evidence.” 480 F.3d
at 1247; see also Deen, 2013 WL 1911445, at *2 (“personal embarrassment and general,
reputation-damaging information typically do not justify sealing” (collecting cases)).
Moreover, as Defendants correctly point out, many of the sealed briefings are Plaintiffs’
own filings. Plaintiffs framed the issues and brought to the Court’s attention subjects they now
object to as irrelevant or inflammatory. It is only natural that Defendants referenced these subjects
in their opposition papers and their primary filings—Plaintiffs themselves placed the subjects at
issue. The relevance of these subjects cannot be disputed in good faith.
As to the claim that publication would taint the potential jury pool, this claim is moot
because this Court has already entered final judgment. True, the final judgment is pending appeal.
But even if the judgment were reversed and the case were to be tried, the Court would follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Romero: (1) pretrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated,
cannot be regarded as leading automatically to an unfair trial; and (2) because the media has
already reported on the sealed information, sealing could not remedy any of the highly unlikely
harms that could be caused by pretrial publicity. See 480 F.3d at 1247; see also Deen, 2013 WL
1911445, at *2 (“Even a casual internet search immediately reveals that the jury-taint horse has
already left the barn.”). Additionally, Plaintiffs have recourse to correct any alleged
misinformation. See Romero, 480 F.3d at 1247 (“If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring))).
Next, as to the briefings’ references to non-parties’ testimony, the Court has been advised
that only Messrs. Kramer and Steele designated their testimony as confidential and objected to the

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unsealing of this testimony. Fusion GPS failed to timely file a position statement on unsealing,
despite receiving notice of its right to do so. Any claim by Fusion GPS of a continued
confidentiality interest, then, is waived. The objections of Messrs. Kramer and Steele are discussed
in more detail below. For now, it suffices to say that any alleged harm to non-parties is conclusory
and speculative.
Finally, the parties’ exhibit lists and pretrial stipulations should be subject to public
inspection. The trial would have been open to the public anyway. There is no good cause to conceal
these critical parts of the pretrial process.
2. The Public Should Have Full Access to the Materials Filed in Support of the
Parties’ Legal Briefings, Particularly Where Those Materials Were Claimed to Be
Confidential by Only a Party or Parties
Applying the good cause balancing test for the materials filed along with the parties’
briefings, the balance tips in favor of disclosure. As to the Times’ motive for seeking access to the
sealed documents, news reporting is a “legitimate purpose” for granting access to sealed court
records, as it tends to “promote the public’s understanding of the proceedings.” United States v.
Abegg, 1993 WL 246145, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 1993). And as explained above, refusing public access
would impair public understanding of judicial decision-making. Granting public access is likely to
promote public understanding of historically significant events—not only this lawsuit, but also the
evidence of the events underlying the Dossier (even if such evidence is disputed or only arguably
relevant).
On the other side of the scale, the degree and likelihood of potential injury is negligible,
particularly where the parties have had, and continue to have, ample opportunity to respond to the
information in the court of public opinion. Further, the media has already reported on much of the
underlying information. Indeed, many of the sealed filings are internet publications (even if not
currently publicly accessible)—for example, articles by CNN, Gizmodo, BBC News, Slate,
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Newsweek, Forbes, and the Washington Post; archived AWM Open webpages; and a “year in
review” publication by PornHub. Others are publicly-available government reports or press
releases; it makes no sense for this Court to seal something that other government actors have
made public.
Additionally, the “private information” cited by Plaintiffs is not, in the Court’s view, so
sensitive as to warrant shielding from the public’s view. 7 Exposure comes with the territory of
seeking court intervention: if a plaintiff claims harm to his personal and professional reputation
(see, e.g., D.E. 1-3 ¶¶ 5, 46–51), his business and personal relationships may be publicly
scrutinized. If a corporate plaintiff seeks damages for business or reputational harm (see, e.g., id.),
the corporation’s finances may be publicly scrutinized. Again, Plaintiffs mostly rely on claims of
relevance and scandal to support continued sealing. As explained in the prior section, these claims
lack merit and do not overcome the weighty presumption of public access. If Plaintiffs wanted to
keep these matters private, they should have opted to resolve their dispute out of court. See Union
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.) (“When [litigants]
call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by
public (and publicly accountable) officials.”).
3. The Court Overrules the Objections of Non-Parties Christopher Steele and David
Kramer, But Sustains in Part the Objections of Non-Party Bitly, Inc.
a. Christopher Steele’s Objections Are Overruled
Non-party Christopher Steele objects to unsealing his deposition testimony for two reasons.
D.E. 407. First, he argues that unsealing his testimony in this case would allow Plaintiffs to avoid
certain procedural and substantive discovery limitations in their parallel lawsuit against Mr. Steele
in Britain. He argues that British law forbids Plaintiffs from taking and using Mr. Steele’s
7

Plaintiffs’ conclusory claims of “trade secret,” see D.E. 378, are not supported by the record evidence.

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testimony in their British lawsuit. Unsealing the deposition here, he argues, would amount to an
“end-run” around this limitation. Second, Mr. Steele argues that unsealing his deposition would
invite unwanted attention and potential danger.
Mr. Steele’s first argument is without merit and does not overcome the presumption of
public access. See Perez-Guerrero, 717 F.3d at 1235. In denying Mr. Steele’s motion to intervene
to oppose the issuance of letters rogatory, the Court explained that it trusted the British courts to
adequately protect Mr. Steele’s rights under British law. D.E. 60, p. 2. Mr. Steele has not explained
how unsealing his deposition would allow Plaintiffs to then use his testimony against him in their
British lawsuit. Moreover, Plaintiffs were able to take Mr. Steele’s deposition because a British
court authorized it. D.E. 156-1. And in so doing, that court considered and rejected his argument
that the deposition would prejudice his defense in Plaintiff’s British lawsuit. See id. Accordingly,
Mr. Steele’s first argument against unsealing fails to overcome the presumption of public access.
Mr. Steele’s second argument is similarly unavailing. He conclusorily states that unsealing
his deposition testimony would subject him to unwanted attention and potential danger. He
explains that in the wake of the publication of the Dossier, he received death threats and went into
hiding. He fails, however, to explain how unsealing his deposition testimony here would expose
him to further danger. Confronted with a similar situation, the Eleventh Circuit in Perez-Guerrero
refused to conceal a plaintiff’s identity. 717 F.3d. 1224. There, the plaintiff was an informant for
Mexican and American law enforcement, and the Board of Immigration Appeals had found that
he faced danger in Mexico. Id. at 1236. But the Eleventh Circuit refused to conceal his identity
because “his name, photograph, and identity as an informant have been widely reported in the
media.” Id. The same goes for Mr. Steele. Since the publication of the Dossier, Mr. Steele’s name,
photograph, and identity as its author have been widely and constantly reported in the media.

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Accordingly, his second argument fails to overcome the presumption in favor of public access. See
id. Mr. Steele’s objections to unsealing, therefore, are overruled.
b. David Kramer’s Objections Are Overruled
Non-party David Kramer objects to unsealing his deposition testimony and declaration
because it would expose him to danger. D.E. 411. One year ago, Magistrate Judge O’Sullivan ruled
that Mr. Kramer’s deposition testimony should remain sealed because Mr. Kramer faced potential
danger if he was exposed as “the cause-in-fact of the publication of the Dossier.” D.E. 144, p. 7. 8
Mr. Kramer advances no new arguments in support of unsealing but relies exclusively on
Magistrate Judge’ O’Sullivan’s order.
Circumstances have changed since Judge O’Sullivan entered his order. When Judge
O’Sullivan sealed Mr. Kramer’s testimony, Mr. Kramer’s role in disseminating the Dossier was
not known. See id. Now, however, his role as the cause-in-fact of the Dossier’s publication is
known. The Court discussed Mr. Kramer’s role in detail in its order on the motions for summary
judgment. D.E. 389, p. 5–7. But even before then, the media had reported it. See, e.g., John
Haltiwanger, John McCain describes how he received the Steele dossier that contains the most
salacious allegations about Trump and Russia, Business Insider (May 22, 2018)
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-john-mccain-received-steele-dossier-trump-russia-2018-5.
And it has continued to do so since. See, e.g., Gregg Re, McCain associate shared unverified Steele
dossier

with

Buzzfeed,

court

filing

says,

Fox

News

(December

20,

2018)

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mccain-associate-gave-unverified-steele-dossier-to-buzzfeedcourt-filing-says. Accordingly, for the same reasons the Eleventh Circuit refused to conceal the

8

This Order was entered under seal. Just as there is no longer any reason to keep the Kramer information
under seal, there is no longer any reason to keep the Order under seal. The Order, D.E. 144, accordingly
will be unsealed.

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plaintiff’s identity in Perez-Guerrero, the Court overrules Mr. Kramer’s objection. See 717 F.3d.
at 1236.
c. Bitly, Inc.’s Objections are Sustained as to D.E. 275-19
Non-party Bitly, Inc. objects to unsealing the records it produced because the records
reflect Bitly’s internal processes and techniques for identifying abuses of its link shortening
platform. D.E. 416. Bitly’s records were used by Defendants’ expert Anthony Ferrante to conclude
that Plaintiffs’ infrastructure was likely used by Russian cyber-espionage groups to attack
Democratic party leadership. See D.E. 275. Specifically, as Defendants explained, Mr. Ferrante
reviewed the Bitly data and “determined that the same user account that successfully hacked [John]
Podesta created four nearly identical malicious links that were encoded to appear onscreen as a
Google security alert prompting Mr. Podesta to change his Gmail password—and that one of those
four phishing links was created using an IP address registered to XBT subsidiary Root S.A.” See
id.
This Court is unsealing the Ferrante report, but not the underlying Bitly records. The
Ferrante report itself will sufficiently explain Bitly’s investigation of the spear phishing attack.
And, as Bitly admits, media coverage already has discussed how hackers used Bitly services in
connection with the attack. D.E. 416, p. 4. But unsealing the Bitly records would not add anything
that is not generally known to the public; instead, it would reveal “additional technical detail of
how Bitly can detect potential abuses of its services.” Id. The Court finds that the need to protect
Bitly’s technical records outweighs the public’s interest in reviewing the records. 9

9

Bitly also asks this Court to continue sealing D.E. 275-21, the declaration of its CEO authenticating the
Bitly data. The declaration reveals no confidential information. The Court finds no good cause to seal the
declaration.

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4. The Court Will Unseal All Filings Pertaining to Unsealing
To help the public understand this decision, the Court will unseal all documents regarding
sealing, including the Court’s sealing orders, the inventory of previously-sealed documents (D.E.
378) and the non-parties’ position statements. The Court permitted these documents to be filed
under seal to maintain the status quo. The public has a right to access the parties’ and non-parties’
rationales for sealing to see what the Court found persuasive (and what it did not).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Times’ Motion, D.E.

254, is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to UNSEAL all filings in this case
EXCEPT FOR D.E. 212-15, D.E. 212-110, D.E. 214-13, and D.E. 275-19. To give the parties the
opportunity to seek meaningful appellate review, the Clerk SHALL undertake the unsealing not
earlier than March 14, 2019. After that date, Defendants SHALL file versions of D.E. 212-15,
D.E. 212-110, and D.E. 214-13 that redact only the personal contact information (addresses and
telephone numbers) contained therein.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida, this _28th_ day of February, 2019.

________________________________
URSULA UNGARO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record via cm/ecf

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