Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 26 THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 CITY OF SEATTLE, 12 Defendant. 13 ) ) Case No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR ) ) CITY OF SEATTLE’S SUSTAINMENT ) PERIOD UPDATE ) ) ) ) ) 14 The second phase of the Consent Decree, the “Sustainment Period” is halfway complete and 15 the Court-approved schedule requires the parties and the Monitoring Team to provide a “general, 16 overall update to the Court on the current status of progress and sustainment of required Consent 17 Decree reforms.” Dkt. 444-1 at 29. The City of Seattle, accordingly, submits this report which 18 reviews the key reforms that have been made under the Consent Decree and summarizes the Seattle 19 Police Department’s recent progress in demonstrating that it has continued to sustain compliance. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 The City and the United States entered into a settlement agreement (the “Consent Decree”) 22 which was approved by the Court on August 30, 2012. The Consent Decree was intended to 23 address findings made by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in a 2011 investigation of the CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 1 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 2 of 26 1 Seattle Police Department (SPD). To that end, the Consent Decree imposes extensive policy, 2 operational, and training requirements on SPD, which can be loosely grouped into six main areas: 3 use of force; responding to people in crisis; stops and detentions; bias-free policing; supervision; 4 and the collection and tracking of data on policing. 5 The Consent Decree separates the City’s obligations into two distinct phases. In Phase I, 6 the City must attain “full and effective compliance.” The Court found, on January 10, 2018, that 7 the City had met this requirement. 8 9 To complete Phase II, the City must sustain compliance for two years. ¶¶ 229-30. A. Between 2013 and 2015, SPD Implemented Comprehensive Consent Decree Reforms Affecting Nearly Every Aspect of its Operations. 10 As required by the Consent Decree, SPD developed comprehensive policies to address all 11 areas of the consent decree. The policies were developed through a rigorous drafting and revision 12 process that involved the Monitor and the Department of Justice, SPD command staff and patrol 13 officers, the two police unions, the Community Police Commission, and the general public during 14 a period of public comment. This intensive process yielded new policies based on national best 15 practices and constitutional principles. The Court reviewed and approved each policy. 16 Since these policies became effective, SPD has continued to work with DOJ and the 17 Monitor to refine and improve them, with additional input from Office of Police Accountability, 18 the Office of the Inspector General for Public Safety, and the Community Police Commission. 19 Several cycles of revisions have taken effect since then, consistent with the Consent Decree 20 requirement that the Department review these policies annually. Consent Decree. ¶ 180. This 21 section highlights major changes which have occurred under the Consent Decree. 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 2 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 3 of 26 SPD also placed top priority on developing and implementing new training for all of its 1 2 employees. Describing the extraordinary training accomplishments made by SPD, the Monitor 3 wrote the following: [By the end of 2014, all officers had] received 32 hours of in-class training on the new force-related policies, at least eight hours of live training on how officers should deal with the mentally ill and others in behavioral crisis (“crisis intervention”), and eight hours of training on stops, detentions, and bias-free policing. Select SPD officers (also known as “CI Certified” officers) have received at least eight hours of related training on crisis intervention, and SPD dispatchers and communications personnel received three hours on identifying crisis situations when 9-1-1 calls come in. . . . [A]s of January 1, 2015, . . . all officers will have received the same, comprehensive picture of the new policies on force, bias-free policing, stops, and crisis intervention. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Id. 11 i. 12 13 Use of Force DOJ’s investigation found a pattern of officers using force when it was not warranted or using more force than was reasonable. Accordingly, overhauling SPD’s force policies and training 14 were the most pressing priorities and this area is where the first and most far-reaching changes 15 were made. 16 The Monitor submitted the new policies to the Court on November 27, 2013, and, after 17 hearing from the Community Police Commission, DOJ, and the Monitor, the Court approved them. 18 Dkts. 107 & 118. The Monitor highly praised the new policies, writing, “SPD’s use of force policy, 19 approved by the Court in December 2013, is the embodiment of the Consent Decree. It provides 20 21 officers with clear guidance and expectations consistent with constitutional imperatives.” Monitor’s Fourth Semiannual Rept. at 20. The Monitor also concluded that the new policies 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 3 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 4 of 26 1 contain “detailed, precise guidelines that provide line officers and supervisors alike with clear 2 guidance on performance expectations.” Monitor’s Third Semiannual Rept. at 13-16. 3 The basic use-of-force policy is four pages long, entitled “Using Force.” Under this policy 4 “[o]fficers shall only use objectively reasonable force, proportional to the threat or urgency of the 5 situation, when necessary, to achieve a law enforcement objective.” The policy sets out four key 6 principles to guide officers: 7 • Reasonableness. the reasonableness of force depends on “the totality of circumstances known by the officer at the time of the use of force”—not “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 8 • Necessity. Force may be used only in the absence of “reasonably effective alternative[s].” 9 • Proportionality. “To be proportional, the level of force applied must reflect the totality of circumstances surrounding the immediate situation, including the presence of an imminent danger to officers or others.” Officers “should assess and modulate the use-of-force as resistance decreases.” • De-escalation. Officers must attempt de-escalation tactics when safe and feasible. “[O]fficers shall attempt to slow down or stabilize the situation so that more time, options and resources are available for incident resolution.” The policy identifies de-escalation techniques, such as creating distance, cover, [or] concealment” and “using verbal techniques” to gain compliance.” (Effective January 1, 2019, de-escalation has been pulled out and made into a stand-alone policy.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 In addition to these principles, force is expressly prohibited in some circumstances—such as a 16 means of retaliation and against individuals who only verbally confront officers. 17 DOJ also determined in 2011 that, although officers were required to report using force, 18 they often did not do so. When officers did report force, the chain of command frequently failed 19 to adequately review or investigate it. To address those findings, the Department now has two 20 policies that contain detailed requirements and direction for how and when to report, investigate, 21 and review force. SPM §§ 8.400 & 8.500. As described below, depending on the type of force, 22 one or more supervisors in the officer’s chain of command must rigorously screen, investigate, or 23 review it. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 4 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 5 of 26 1 After using low-level, Type I force, an officer must screen the incident with a sergeant and 2 complete a report. The sergeant begins the investigation of the incident and elevates the review up the 3 chain of command.1 4 For intermediate-level, Type II force, a sergeant must respond to the scene in person. The 5 investigation of the force incident is conducted by a sergeant and reviewed by the chain of 6 command. The sergeant must conduct a thorough, impartial investigation, and complete a Use of 7 Force Report that summarizes the incident, documents evidence, and presents witness accounts of 8 the force. Type II uses of force are reviewed in depth first by an administrative lieutenant, through 9 the chain of command to the captain. They must ensure that the sergeant’s investigation was 10 thorough and determine whether the force was consistent or inconsistent with SPD policy. 11 To investigate Type III (most serious) force, SPD worked with DOJ and the Monitor to 12 create the Force Investigation Team (FIT), an independent, inter-disciplinary team of specialized 13 detectives who investigate the most serious uses of force, including officer-involved shootings and 14 in-custody deaths. FIT is comprised of experienced detectives who conduct these investigations 15 from both a criminal law and SPD policy perspective. FIT must interview all witnesses whether 16 civilian or officer, a departure from previous policy which allowed officers to submit written 17 statements. See Dkt. 231 at 5. 18 The Force Review Board (FRB) provides an additional layer of review for all Type III uses 19 of force, to include officer involved shootings. The FRB also reviews Type II cases when certain 20 factors are present—such as the use of a dog or less-lethal tools. The FRB is a select group of SPD 21 22 23 1 Subsequent revisions, approved by the Court in July 2015, provide for an additional review by the Force Review Unit of all Type II force. The Force Review Unit, comprised of a captain, a lieutenant, a sergeant, and two detectives, reviews all Type I and Type II uses of force. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 5 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 6 of 26 1 personnel who are specially trained to investigate officer uses of force which meets regularly to make 2 determinations as to (1) whether a use-of-force investigation is thorough and complete; (2) whether 3 the force was compliant with SPD policy, and consistent with training, and core principles; and (3) 4 whether any broader, systemic issues need to be addressed with respect to policy, tactics, equipment, 5 or otherwise. 6 The new force-related policies took effect on January 1, 2014. Dkt. 231 at 4. Throughout 7 2014, SPD’s Education and Training section undertook a “herculean” effort to train all of the 8 Department’s approximately 1300 officers on the use of force policies. Monitor’s Third 9 Semiannual Rept. at 7. Highlights of the training include drill and role-playing scenarios for less 10 lethal weapons, a module on de-escalation, including role playing and watching video footage of 11 police-community interactions, and instruction for how to safely and effectively take someone into 12 custody from certain high-risk positions. Monitor’s Fourth Semiannual Report at 23. 13 The Department also developed and implemented specialized training for FIT. Monitor’s 14 Fourth Semiannual Rept. at 37. In notifying the Court that it had approved SPD’s FIT training 15 program, the Monitor reported that the diversity of the training courses provided to FIT detectives 16 “reflects the Department’s attempt to provide specialized training specific to investigations not 17 just of force, but of force used by officers” and that “the training plan provides a method for 18 continual learning based on national practices and conversations.” Dkt. 254 at 6-7. 19 ii. Crisis Intervention 20 The Consent Decree required extensive reforms regarding how officers interact with 21 members of the community who are experiencing behavioral crisis. DOJ concluded that SPD used 22 a disproportionate amount of force against people in crisis. The Consent Decree requirements in 23 this area address training officers and dispatchers in how to safely and effectively engage CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 6 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 7 of 26 1 individuals in crisis and staffing requirements so that officers with advanced certifications (“CI 2 certified officers”) are available to respond and lead in crisis incidents as appropriate. The Consent 3 Decree also required SPD to establish a Crisis Intervention Committee—a regional interagency 4 coalition of social service providers, mental health experts, law enforcement and judicial 5 representatives. 6 The crisis intervention policy governs officers’ interactions with people who are exhibiting 7 signs of mental illness, suffering from a substance abuse issue, or experiencing a personal crisis. 8 See SPD Manual Title 16.110.2 It was written primarily by the Crisis Intervention Committee, with 9 input from the Monitor and DOJ. Monitor’s Third Semiannual Rept. at 18. Important goals of the 10 policy are to treat people experiencing a behavioral crisis with dignity and respect and to minimize 11 the use of force in crisis incidents. 12 The policy goes beyond simply establishing guidelines for one-on-one interactions 13 between officers and community members. It established a new Crisis Intervention Program that 14 instilled major changes to organization, operations, and training. The program contains three main 15 components. 16 First, it made organizational changes to give more support to patrol from the Department’s 17 experts in crisis intervention. The unit with specialized knowledge of crisis response was moved 18 out of the Special Operations first to the Patrol Operations Bureau and, ultimately, to the 19 Collaborative Policing Bureau, so that it could be more community focused and more connected 20 to patrol. These officers now take on a more active role in responding to in-progress calls and in 21 providing training and consultation to patrol officers. Monitor’s Third Semiannual Rept. at 18. The 22 Crisis Response Unit has specialized teams who “respond to in-progress calls, when available, in 23 2 https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-16---patrol-operations/16110---crisis-intervention CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 7 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 8 of 26 1 an effort to support Patrol, and conduct outreach with identified individuals. They also are 2 available to respond, at the request of the incident commander, to critical incidents that involve 3 subjects who are in extreme states of behavioral crisis.” SPM § 16.110. CRU also has teams who 4 conduct follow-up after incidents in order to connect people in crisis with community services that 5 can provide long-term stabilizing support. 6 Second, the Department introduced a new position to centralize and coordinate crisis 7 intervention across the entire Department. The Department also introduced the position of Crisis 8 Intervention Team (CIT) coordinator, a sergeant who is appointed by the Chief of Police and 9 provides oversight of the Crisis Intervention Program. The CIT Coordinator is located within the 10 Collaborative Policing Bureau, coordinates crisis intervention training, serves as an expert 11 resource for the precincts, and acts as the SPD’s primary point of contact for the mental health 12 provider and advocacy community. Monitor’s Third Semiannual Rept. at 18. The CIT Coordinator 13 works to support the Department in its goal of connecting people with the resources they need, 14 including services from the King County Mobile Crisis Team, the Crisis Clinic, and the Seattle 15 Municipal Mental Health Court. The CIT coordinator is also a non-voting member of the FRB, 16 acting as its subject matter expert on crisis intervention. 17 Training is the third component of the Crisis Intervention Program. All officers are now 18 required to receive a minimum of eight hours of basic training on crisis intervention. The training 19 covers crisis intervention techniques (emphasizing de-escalation and active listening skills), 20 relevant SPD policies, and the King County mental health system. Monitor’s Third Semiannual 21 Rept. 22 In addition, on a voluntary basis, officers can receive additional, advanced certification by 23 taking a 40-hour crisis intervention course with a certification exam and satisfying an annual CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 8 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 9 of 26 1 training requirement thereafter. Previously, officers with this advanced training were concentrated 2 within the Special Operations Bureau. By offering the advanced certification to patrol officers, the 3 Department is able to consistently dispatch highly trained officers to respond to crisis incidents. 4 Training for 911 dispatchers was also implemented. All dispatchers must receive a “three- 5 hour training that prepares them to recognize individuals experiencing a crisis event or who are in 6 need of a CIT trained officer; communicating with the individual in crisis; locating CIT officers; 7 and identifying community mental health resources that can be of assistance.” Monitor’s Fourth 8 Semiannual Rept. 9 iii. Stops and Detentions 10 In 2011, DOJ concluded that SPD officers were confused about interactions with 11 pedestrians, specifically the difference between a Terry stop (when the person is not free to leave) 12 and a voluntary, social contact (when the person is free to leave).3 13 The distinction is an important one. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 14 protects people from being arrested without probable cause. In addition to arrests, the Fourth 15 Amendment also governs Terry stops. A “Terry stop” is a temporary, investigative detention. See 16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It occurs when an officer briefly detains a person for the purpose 17 of investigating a crime. A Terry stop falls short of an arrest and does not require probable cause, 18 but it does require that the officer be able to identify specific, objective facts which support a 19 reasonable suspicion that the person committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. 20 The Department worked with the DOJ and the Monitor as well as community stakeholders 21 to formulate a new policy governing Terry stops. SPD’s policy on voluntary contacts, Terry stops, 22 23 3 Terry stops also occur when an officer pulls over a car in traffic based on reasonable suspicion, but DOJ’s specific finding related to officers stopping pedestrians. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 9 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 10 of 26 1 and detentions provides clear, specific guidance to officers about the difference between a 2 voluntary contact and a Terry stop. It directs that Terry stops must be restricted to a reasonable 3 scope and reasonable duration, and makes it clear that officers may conduct a frisk, or pat-down, 4 as part of a stop only if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the subject is armed and dangerous. 5 The policy also contains language on Washington state law which makes it illegal to use one type 6 of crime or infraction as a pretext to investigate an unrelated crime. As described in more detail 7 below, the policy requires officers to document it each time they make a Terry stop and requires 8 supervisors to review the officer’s documentation before the end of the shift. By the end of 2014, all SPD officers had received a four-hour comprehensive training on 9 10 11 the new policy. Monitor’s Fourth Semiannual Report at 90-91. iv. Bias-Free Policing 12 In 2011, DOJ investigators determined that SPD used a disproportionate amount of force 13 against people of color and other minority communities. DOJ also raised concerns that Terry stops 14 of pedestrians had a disparate impact on people of color. The investigation further indicated that, 15 when members of the public complained about bias incidents to officers or supervisors, SPD’s 16 documentation, investigation, and responses to these complaints were inadequate. 17 18 19 The Community Police Commission had significant input into the Bias-Free policing policy and was also heavily involved in developing training around it. The Department’s policy defines “bias-based policing” as “the different treatment of any 20 person by officers motivated by any characteristic of protected classes under state, federal, and 21 local laws as well as other discernible personal characteristics of an individual.” SPM § 5.140. It 22 also expands the list of personal characteristics that can form the basis for biased policing, 23 including, among others: age; disability; economic or family status; gender or gender identity; CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 10 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 11 of 26 1 sexual orientation; homelessness; mental illness; national origin; political ideology; race, ethnicity 2 or color; religion; and veteran status. Monitor’s Third Semiannual Rept. at 16-18. Under the policy, any officer who hears a complaint related to biased policing is required 3 4 to call a supervisor to respond to the scene in person. All complaints must be documented and 5 investigated. In addition, all bias allegations are forwarded to OPA for review or investigation, if 6 warranted. SPM § 5.140-PRO-1. 7 The Consent Decree requires in-depth training on bias-free policing. ¶¶ 147-49. The 8 training incorporates input and advice from the Community Police Commission (CPC). Monitor’s 9 Fourth Semiannual Rept. at 92-93. In describing the important features of the training, the Monitor 10 wrote the following: [T]he bias-free policing training begins with a section that focuses on the Seattle community’s perception of law enforcement—and the relationship of those views with concepts of procedural justice and police legitimacy. Officers discuss why it matters how the community views SPD even if officers do not agree with the entire substance or scope of those views. The training ‘emphasizes that an individual’s assessment of how she was treated during an interaction with police is substantially more important to her voluntary acceptance of police decisions than the outcome of the interaction (e.g., whether she was cited, received a warning, was arrested, or the like).’ That is, officers learn that the sense that an officer treated a subject fairly and with dignity can often be disproportionately more important than the ultimate result or formal outcome of the interaction. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Monitor’s Fourth Semiannual Rept. at 92-93. 19 v. Supervision 20 Another focus of reform was adequate supervision of officers. The Consent Decree 21 includes requirements regarding the training of supervisors, adequate numbers of supervisors, and 22 providing patrol officers with consistent, clearly identified supervisors. 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 11 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 12 of 26 1 At the time of DOJ’s investigation, SPD employed a staffing assignment system referred 2 to as “in-squad relief.” Under this system, patrol officers routinely reported to two or more 3 different sergeants during their work week. While they were supervised at all times, they did not 4 consistently report to the same supervisor. 5 Recognizing the lack of unity of command, SPD changed its patrol staffing approach to 6 require that all of the officers within a squad have the same scheduled work week and report to the 7 same supervisor. SPD also developed training specific to supervisors to prepare them for effective 8 9 leadership. The Monitor described these new training materials as “comprehensive” and observed 10 that they “captured the Department’s goals to prepare their sergeants for effective supervision and 11 leadership.” Monitor’s Sixth Assessment at 24. 12 vi. Data Collection and Tracking 13 Prior to reform, the Department’s systems for gathering data on uses of force and Terry 14 stops were inconsistent and incomplete. Reporting of force was paper based. The Department did 15 not document officers’ interactions with people in crisis at all. The Consent Decree requires SPD 16 to collect and track detailed information about its policing activities in these three core areas: use 17 of force, Terry stops, and crisis contacts. ¶¶ 78, 82-83, 87, 91-96, 100-03, 105-06, 113, 118, 136, 18 163. SPD must also track data over time, review and analyze it for trends or systemic issues, and, 19 in some instances, report it to the public. ¶¶ 90, 99, 137, 162. 20 Throughout 2014 and 2015, the Department introduced new policies in order to satisfy 21 these requirements. An officer is now required to complete a detailed, electronic report each time 22 he or she uses force, conducts a Terry stop, or interacts with a member of the community 23 experiencing a behavioral crisis. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 12 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 13 of 26 1 Under the Consent Decree and SPD policy, force reporting is required with increasing 2 levels of detail in proportion to the severity of the force used. For Type I (lowest level) force, an 3 officer’s report must include a brief narrative entry describing what occurred, a description of the 4 force used, an explanation of why the force was necessary, and documentation regarding which 5 supervisor screened the incident and where the screening occurred. The officer must attach any 6 relevant in-car video or body-worn video to the report. For Type II and III (more serious) force, reports must include the following additional 7 8 9 information: • • 10 11 12 13 • • • The names of any witness officers or civilian witnesses; a detailed description of the circumstances and the law enforcement objective that led up to the contact; a detailed description of the words, actions, or behaviors of the subject that precipitated the need for force; a detailed description of any force clearly observed being used by other officers during the incident; a detailed description of any injury to the subject, any complaint of injury, or the lack of injury, including information about medical aid or medical evaluation performed. 14 15 16 17 The Department also overhauled its data collection for Terry stops. Because of the sensitivity of this topic, the Community Police Commission was heavily involved in the process of selecting which data officers would be required to collect during a Terry stop. Dkt. 143 at 2. 18 The Department’s “Terry template” is a place for officers to fill out a consensus list of data 19 elements, including information about the officer’s status (on duty or off duty, CIT-certified, years 20 21 22 23 of service), the date, time, and location of the stop, important demographic information about the subject (such as perceived race), a description of the circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion, and the duration of the stop. The Terry template was first piloted in the East Precinct in March 2015 and then rolled out citywide. Dkt. 212 at 6. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 13 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 14 of 26 1 In order to begin gathering data about crisis incidents, the mental health clinicians, social 2 service providers, and other experts on the Department’s Crisis Intervention Committee developed 3 a form called a “crisis template,” for use by officers in the field. Officer must fill out the template 4 each time they make contact with person experiencing any type of behavioral crisis. Information 5 about the incident must be documented, including, demographic information about the person in 6 crisis, whether a supervisor responded to the scene, if the person was armed, the actions and 7 techniques used by the officer, whether injuries occurred, the name and badge number of the 8 officer, and a description of the event and its outcome. In this way, officers are required to 9 systematically document their contacts with people who are experiencing a behavioral crisis. Dkt. 10 212 at 6. 11 SPD made it possible to aggregate and synthesize much of the data in these reports by 12 introducing computerized templates that officers use to submit the required reports. Officers 13 provide basic information about the incident, the involved officer, and the involved subject by 14 choosing values from drop-down menus or clicking on check-boxes. By making selections from a 15 standardized list, this data can be aggregated, analyzed, and searched to identify trends or draw 16 comparisons. See Monitor’s First Systemic Assessment. 17 The Department also procured and implemented a customized data analytics platform 18 (called the “DAP”), which extracts data from the Department’s various systems and enables it to 19 be systemically analyzed, contextualized, and displayed. The DAP allows SPD, not only to search 20 data relating to use of force, crisis responses, and Terry stops, but also to analyze its relationship 21 to information that is stored in other databases—such as information on arrests, charges, and 911 22 calls. The Department’s researchers use the data to answer questions relevant to policy and 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 14 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 15 of 26 1 strategy. Command staff also uses “dashboards” powered by the DAP to monitor real time trends 2 in these areas. 3 4 B. Between 2015 and 2017, the Monitoring Team Conducted Comprehensive Assessments of SPD’s Performance, and the Court Found that They Demonstrated the City’s Full and Effective Compliance. 5 After years of effort developing and implementing new SPD policies and putting them into 6 practice, the parties and Monitor planned ten systemic assessments to evaluate whether those 7 dedicated efforts had resulted in compliance with the Consent Decree. Between Sept 2015 and 8 June 2017, the Monitor conducted these assessments, which comprehensively addressed SPD’s 9 progress in complying with each area of the Consent Decree. The assessments cover 100 10 paragraphs that the Decree presents as the “Commitments” of SPD. ¶¶ 69-168. 11 On January 10, 2018 the Court held that the Monitor’s ten systemic assessments 12 demonstrated that the City, specifically SPD, had achieved full and effective compliance with 13 every requirement of the Consent Decree. (Dkt. 439.) 14 II. THE CITY HAS SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATED SUSTAINED COMPLIANCE THUS FAR IN PHASE II. 15 16 A. The City Is Halfway Through Phase II, During Which It Must Conduct a Series of Self-Assessments or Audits. 17 Prior to termination of the Consent Decree, the City must demonstrate that it has maintained 18 compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree for a period of two years (the “Sustainment 19 Phase” or “Phase II”). In its Order finding the City to be in full and effective compliance, the Court 20 directed the Monitor and the parties to submit a joint plan for Phase II. Dkt. 439. The Sustainment 21 Plan was approved by the Court on March 13, 2018. See Dkt. 444 (Sustainment Plan) & Dkt. 448 22 (Order approving Sustainment Plan). 23 In contrast to the Monitor-led assessments of Phase I, the Sustainment Plan provides that CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 15 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 16 of 26 1 the City must demonstrate the ability to independently identify and address any obstacles to 2 compliance in Phase II. Accordingly, the Sustainment Plan sets out a schedule of self-assessments 3 or “audits”, through which the City must self-evaluate whether it has continued to comply. The 4 primary role of DOJ and the Monitor during the Sustainment Phase is to verify the quality of SPD’s 5 audits through their own, independent evaluation of randomly-selected samples of the underlying 6 data. 7 The Sustainment Plan also establishes a schedule for SPD’s “Outcome Reports.” “Outcome 8 Reports”—unlike audits—are not intended to assess specific requirements of the Consent Decree, but 9 instead whether SPD has achieved outcomes consistent with the Decree’s goal of ending any pattern or 10 practice of excessive force. ¶ 187. They report out to the Court and the public the outcomes of the 11 City’s reform process. These “outcome reports” demonstrate the concrete effects of SPD’s work 12 under the Consent Decree, such as reductions in serious uses of force. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 B. The Parties and the Monitor Established a Process to Ensure Accurate, Objective Audits during Phase II. Since March, the parties and the Monitor have collaborated on developing methodologies for the Department’s audits.4 The City’s first Inspector General for Public Safety, appointed last April, contributes to developing the methodologies as well. These audits, to be performed by SPD, are designed to track the assessments conducted by the Monitor during Phase I. For quantitative findings, the audits rely on data that SPD began to gather, track, and synthesize during Phase I in order to comply with specific requirements of the Consent Decree. The 21 22 23 The audits required by the Sustainment Plan are not “audits” in a formal sense, because they do not follow auditing guidelines nor are they conducted by an outside body. The term as used in the Sustainment Plan refers to a self-analysis of data or case files from a specific sampled period of time. 4 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 16 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 17 of 26 1 robust process for supervisor review of the patrol officers’ reports ensures a high level of accuracy 2 and quality in the documentation. In addition to reporting by front-line officers, SPD’s policies also 3 address supervision with respect to the quality, accuracy, and thoroughness of documenting and 4 reporting force, crisis incidents, and Terry stops. For example, a Crisis Response Unit sergeant 5 reviews all significant incident reports and ensures that, for those that contain crisis indicators, a 6 crisis template has been completed for that subject. CI Outcome Report at 52. For reporting on 7 the use of force, the Monitor explained: 8 The [Force Review] Board has clearly communicated to the precincts that incomplete investigations are unacceptable . . . . Much of the improvement is due to the new team of sworn and civilian employees who scrutinize the incoming packets and send back those that lack required information or detail to the chain of command with instructions to complete and return promptly. 9 10 11 12 Monitor’s Third Semiannual Report at 53-54. 13 Further insurance of objectivity is provided by the Monitoring Team and DOJ. For each audit, 14 the Monitoring Team and DOJ review randomly selected samples of data underlying each report 15 and independently verify SPD’s findings of compliance. For the three audits conducted thus far, 16 they concluded that the Department has demonstrated sustained compliance with the Consent Decree. 17 A summary of their findings can be found in the Validation section at the end of each of the City’s 18 audit reports. 19 20 21 22 23 C. The First Three Audits Conducted by SPD and Validated By the Monitor and DOJ Demonstrate Sustained Compliance. Since the Court approved the Sustainment Plan on March 13, 2018, SPD has timely met all of the milestones set forth in the plan. In accordance with the Court-approved schedule, three assessments have been completed and SPD has demonstrated sustained compliance in the following areas: (1) reporting, investigation, and review of uses of force; (2) supervision; (3) CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 17 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 18 of 26 1 crisis intervention and the use of force against people in crisis; and (4) use of force outcomes. See 2 Dkts. 497-1, 497-2, & 511. 3 Type I and II Force Reporting, Review, and Investigation Audit: 4 In the first audit, the Department found evidence demonstrating that it continues to comply 5 with its reporting, review, and investigation obligations for Type I and II uses of force under 6 paragraphs 100-111 of the Consent Decree. Further, the findings of the audit demonstrate that SPD 7 has continued to improve since the Phase I assessments conducted by the Monitor. 8 In their validation, the Monitoring Team and DOJ concluded that the City “demonstrated 9 that it has sustained compliance with the reporting and investigation requirements of the Consent 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Decree as they relate to Type I and Type II uses of force” and further noted that: [T]he overall the quality of SPD’s review and investigation was high and the care that officers and their chain of command took in writing reports, reviewing information, ensuring complete reporting, probing issues of concern, and addressing shortcomings was impressive. Both DOJ and the Monitoring Team found it particularly noteworthy that when one level of the review missed an issue or failed to document something fully or appropriately, the subsequent levels of review caught the error and returned the investigation for completion, or otherwise referred it appropriately to be addressed. DOJ and the Monitoring Team believe SPD’s thorough and established system of internal checks and balances in its force process (reporting, investigation and review) will help ensure organizational accountability from the officer that uses force through the Chief of Police who is responsible for the process and its outcomes. Dkt. 497-1 at 22-23. 21 Supervision Audit: 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 18 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 19 of 26 1 The results of the second audit demonstrate sustained compliance with Paragraphs 153, 2 154, and 155 of the Consent Decree. The Department has an adequate number of first line 3 supervisors to respond to the scene of uses of force and investigate. Current staffing policy has 4 achieved unity of command (i.e., officers have consistent, clearly identified supervisors who work 5 the same scheduled work week). Finally, new sergeants receive new supervisor training before 6 they assume their supervisor role, and in no cases after more than 60 days. Pursuant to the 7 Sustainment Plan, SPD will again audit compliance with these requirements in November 2019. 8 Crisis Intervention and Use of Force Evaluation: 9 This audit demonstrates sustained compliance with the Consent Decree requirements for 10 how to safely and effectively respond to members of the community who are in behavioral crisis. 11 Paragraphs 130-35 imposed minimum crisis intervention training requirements for all 12 officers and provide that CI certified officers must be available to respond and lead in crisis 13 incidents. Between January 1, 2017, and June 30, 2018, the Department greatly increased its 14 number of CI certified officers. An additional 118 officers became CI certified in 2017 and more 15 than 80 became certified in 2018 by attending a 40-hour training through the Washington State 16 Criminal Justice Training Commission. Overall, staffing of CI certified personnel in the 17 Operations Bureau increased by 8.2% during this period. SPD’s robust training program has 18 allowed it to continue dispatching CI certified officers to calls involving individuals in crisis as 19 appropriate. On average, 60% of personnel assigned to and responsible for 911 response were CI 20 certified. In nearly 80% of crisis calls, a CI-certified officer was on-scene. Although crisis contacts 21 rose by 26 percent in the first half of 2018, compared to 2017, the increased number of CI certified 22 officers allows the Department to maintain consistent outcomes. 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 19 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 20 of 26 1 The Consent Decree also requires SPD to gather and track extensive data regarding 2 officers’ interactions with individuals in crisis at Paragraph 136. The data are gathered in the form 3 of “crisis templates” which officers are required to complete after making contact with a subject 4 experiencing any type of behavioral crisis. In addition to simply gathering and tracking data on 5 interactions with individuals in crisis, SPD synthesizes it into annual reports that are published on 6 its website each year. These reports provide the public with a window into the Department’s crisis 7 intervention program as well as emerging trends. 8 Finally, Paragraph 137 of the Consent Decree requires SPD to analyze the crisis 9 intervention data that it collects and use it to identify and respond to systemic issues. The work 10 required by Paragraph 137 is carried out by SPD’s Crisis Response Unit (CRU). This specialized 11 unit consists of a sergeant, five officers and a mental health professional. CRU reviews and 12 analyzes crisis data collected by the Department and uses it to inform program decisions. For 13 example, CRU has been able to identify members of the community who frequently use crisis 14 intervention services and develop profiles and response plans for them, which are shared with 15 officers in the field. The response plans include information such as, for example, case manager 16 contact numbers or specific techniques that have worked well in the past. Taken together, these 17 tools and policies minimize the need for SPD officers to use force against individuals in crisis. 18 The Department of Justice and the Monitor independently validated the Crisis Intervention 19 and Use of Force Evaluation. Based on their review of a sample of the Department’s use of force 20 reports and case files involving people in crisis, DOJ and the Monitor concluded that the Department 21 has demonstrated sustained compliance with the crisis response requirements of the Consent Decree. 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 20 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 21 of 26 1 D. The Department Has Produced Four Outcome Reports Which Show That Key Metrics Have Remained Steady Since It Achieved Full and Effective Compliance. 2 Community Engagement Outcome Report and Stops & Detentions Outcome Report: 3 4 5 6 The first report describes the Department’s community engagement initiatives, as well as efforts to recruit police officers who reflect the Seattle community. The second report contains SPD’s second annual review and analysis of all Terry stops and detentions.5 It showed that SPD does not use no-suspicion “stop and frisk” tactics that are used in some other jurisdictions. Almost 85% of 7 SPD stops occur when officers are dispatched to an incident via 911. Fewer than 10% of SPD stops 8 are conducted by patrol officers walking (or cycling) a beat without being dispatched. 9 Crisis Intervention Program Report: 10 The Crisis Intervention Program Report covers the 18-month period between January 1, 11 2017, and June 30, 2018. Over this period, SPD responded to nearly 16,000 (15,995) contacts with 12 persons believed to be in behavioral crisis; of these, more than 90% were dispatches responsive to 13 calls for service from the public. 14 These numbers reflect a 12% increase in dispatched crisis-related calls from 2016 to 2017, 15 and a 26% increase in dispatched crisis-related calls during the first six months of 2018 relative to 16 the first six months of 2017. In nearly 80% of these calls, a CIT-certified officer was on-scene. 17 Of the 15,995 crisis contacts reported, only 277—fewer than 2%—involved any use of 18 reportable force; of the 557 total uses of force across these 277 contacts, three-quarters comprised 19 20 21 22 23 5 All of the data underlying this report can be accessed and downloaded at https://data.seattle.gov/Public-Safety/Terry-Stops/28ny-9ts8 Additionally, in April 2018, SPD added to its website a new interface that allows the public to more easily review and understand the data on Terry stops: https://www.seattle.gov/police/information-and-data/terry-stops/terrystops-dashboard CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 21 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 22 of 26 1 no greater than low-level, Type I force, and just 5 (0.9%) were classified as serious force (Type 2 III). 3 The data show that SPD officers are continuing to employ in practice their de-escalation 4 training and crisis intervention skills to offer meaningful support to this vulnerable population, 5 even as the demand continues to rise. 6 Use of Force Outcome Report: 7 The 2018 Use of Force Annual Report contains SPD’s review and analysis of all uses of force 8 between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018. The report demonstrates that, overall, the rate at 9 which officers use force remains extremely low. Officers reported using force at a rate of less than 10 one quarter of one percent of all dispatches. Type III force (most serious level of force), in 11 particular, is used by SPD officers so rarely that it is considered a statistically random event and is 12 not subject to trend analysis. The overwhelming majority (83%) of incidents in which officers used 13 force involved no greater than Type I force, which is the lowest level of reportable force (such as 14 minor complaints of transient pain with no objective signs of injury, or the pointing of a firearm). 15 In comparison to last year, the reported uses of Type II and Type III force decreased. By 16 contrast, reported uses of Type I force increased by 43%, from 1,272 in 2017 to 1,818 in 2018. 17 The number of out-of-policy findings by the Department’s Force Review Board and Force Review 18 Unit is consistent with last year and remains infrequent. 19 The Department is continuing to investigate the potential causes for the Type I increase 20 and has not found a definitive answer, but it expects to learn more over the next few months. The 21 primary cause appears to be officers’ overreporting of discomfort caused by handcuffing.6 Under 22 23 6 Handcuffing discomfort occurs when the handcuffs are applied properly and no injury is reported, but a subject nonetheless complains of discomfort or minor pain. SPM § 8.050. CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 22 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 23 of 26 1 Court-approved policy revisions that went into effect earlier this month, handcuffing discomfort 2 is no longer reportable as force and, going forward, will be tracked separately, which over the next 3 months will give SPD valuable insight into the reported increase. In addition, the Department 4 recently tested and deployed new handcuffs which are beveled and made of lighter-weight 5 aluminum, and which it anticipates will be equally effective and more comfortable. 6 The Use of Force Annual Report demonstrates SPD’s commitment to transparency and 7 evidence-based decision making. The report makes extensive use-of-force data and analysis readily 8 available to the community. Importantly, the Use of Force Report shows that the Department continues 9 to use force rarely and that the number of serious uses of force has declined. 10 E. CONCLUSION 11 At the halfway point of the Sustainment Period, the City thus far has successfully completed 12 all of the requirements for sustainment. SPD’s audits on supervision; use-of-force reporting, review, 13 and investigation; and crisis intervention demonstrate continued compliance with those requirements 14 of the Consent Decree. These assessments examined the SPD’s performance against the benchmarks 15 for compliance that were established by the parties and the Monitor and approved by the Court. 16 According to these agreed-upon measures, SPD’s performance has been strong. It has demonstrated 17 continued compliance in all of the areas evaluated thus far. 18 That being said, simple compliance with the Consent Decree is not the benchmark that the City 19 or the Department have set for themselves. Rather, the City is firmly committed to progress and 20 continuous improvement. Since the Court’s determination that the City was in full and effective 21 compliance, SPD has continued to make improvements in key areas, for example: increasing public 22 transparency through new user-friendly public dashboards and by partnering and sharing policing data 23 with research institutions; expanding options for crisis intervention by increasing the number of patrol CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 23 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 24 of 26 1 officers with advanced training and creating tailored profiles to help officers in the field respond to 2 people who have been involved in crisis incidents repeatedly; and continually modernizing its 3 equipment to achieve greater safety and effectiveness, such as with its recent deployments of the less- 4 lethal 40 mm launcher and beveled, aluminum handcuffs. 5 Even after the Consent Decree is complete and federal oversight has ended, the City will 6 continue to conduct the assessments, policy reviews, and outcome reports on regular cycles to ensure 7 that reform continues and that the Department remains accountable to the public. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 24 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 25 of 26 1 2 DATED this 28th day of February, 2019. For the CITY OF SEATTLE 3 4 PETER S. HOLMES Seattle City Attorney 5 6 7 8 9 s/ Kerala T. Cowart Kerala T. Cowart, WSBA #53649 Assistant City Attorney Seattle City Attorney’s Office 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Phone: (206) 733-9001 Fax: (206) 684-8284 Email: kerala.cowart@seattle.gov 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 25 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200 Case 2:12-cv-01282-JLR Document 542 Filed 02/28/19 Page 26 of 26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 I hereby certify that on February 28, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 3 Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the 4 following: 5 Annette L Hayes Annette.Hayes@usdoj.gov 6 Christina Fogg Christina.Fogg@usdoj.gov Gregory Colin Narver gregory.narver@seattle.gov Kerry Jane Keefe kerry.keefe@usdoj.gov Peter Samuel Holmes peter.holmes@seattle.gov Jeff Murray jeff.murray@usdoj.gov Rebecca Boatright rebecca.boatright@seattle.gov 10 Ronald R. Ward Ron@wardsmithlaw.com 11 Timothy D. Mygatt timothy.mygatt@usdoj.gov Carlton Wm Seu carlton.seu@seattle.gov Gary T. Smith gary.smith@seattle.gov Hillary H. McClure hillarym@vjmlaw.com Kristina M. Detwiler kdetwiler@unionattorneysnw.com 7 8 9 12 13 14 15 DATED this 28th day of February, 2019, at Seattle, King County, Washington. 16 /s/ Kerala Cowart Kerala Cowart, WSBA #53649 Assistant City Attorney E-mail: kerala.cowart@seattle.gov 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 CITY’S SUSTAINMENT PERIOD UPDATE - 26 (12-CV-01282-JLR) Peter S. Holmes Seattle City Attorney 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 684-8200