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23rd July 2018

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Imran Khan Solicitors

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Dear Sirs,

RE: Blacklisting

Mick Creedon's Report dated 14th February 2016

Further to my letter of 29 June 2018, please find enclosed a copy of the report authored by Chief Constable Creedon (now retired) in relation to Blacklisting (Operation Reuben).

As alluded to in my recent letter, the MPS has taken care to ensure that your clients receive as much information as is possible to allow them to understand the report and its findings without prejudicing (a) the rights of individuals and (b) UK policing. For that reason, the MPS has applied some redactions to the report. You should note that within the report is private information relating to some of your clients, which others of them may not necessarily know. It is a matter for you how you choose to manage each client's privacy.

I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt of this. We are copying this letter to the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Yours faithfully

DAC Richard Martin

CC Undercover Policing Inquiry

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L09 D12928

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Operation

Herne

Public Complaint
PC [REDACTED]

Operation Reuben

Mick Creedon

Chief Constable Derbyshire Constabulary

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L08 D12928

Operation Herne

Protective Marking

FOIA Exemption

Suitable for Publication Scheme

Date created

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Yes

No

14th February 2016

Public Complaint Investigation - Operation Reuben

Summary Allegation that the SDS, as part of the Metropolitan Police Service Special Branch, provided intelligence which featured on The Consulting Association's Construction Industry 'Blacklist'.

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Interested Parties

Interested Party:

Blacklist Support Group

Officer(s) Concerned:

N/A

Solicitors:

Christian Khan and partners Solicitors

Federation Representative:

N/A

Independent Police Complaints Commission:

'Local' Investigation

Investigation of a public complaint made by Christian Khan and partners Solicitors on behalf of The Blacklist Support

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1 Introduction

- 1.1 **Operation Herne** is the independent investigation led by Derbyshire's **Chief Constable, Mick Creedon QPM**, into the **Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)**. The SDS was a covert unit of the **Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB)**. Operation Herne's terms of reference are to review the former SDS from its origin in 1968 to its closure in 2008, examining how it operated throughout its existence.

2 Operation Reuben

2.1 **Operation Reuben** was initiated following the receipt by the **Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)** of a public complaint made on behalf of the **Blacklist Support Group (BSG)** by **Christian Khan Solicitors (CKS)**. The BSG alleges that Police were complicit in supplying information about workers to blacklisting organisations. This personal information was then used to preclude these individuals from employment.

2.2 **THIS REPORT IS FOR THE COMMISSIONERS EYES ONLY.**

Consideration needs to be given to the preparation of a public report on our findings utilising this report.

The CKS complaint is in the public domain. Operation Herne can provide a public version of this report which can be supplied to them. However, until this report is read and digested by the MPS, no such public report has been prepared and no communication has taken place with CKS around the result of this Operation Herne investigation.

It should be noted that CKS have not engaged with Operation Herne and refused to engage in meetings on the grounds that they do not believe that there will be a thorough investigation. (Please see paragraph 4.8)

3 What is a Blacklist?

- 3.1 A **Blacklist** is defined as a list or register of entities or people who, for one reason or another, are being denied a particular privilege, service, mobility, access or recognition; a list privately exchanged among employers, containing the names of persons to be barred from employment because of untrustworthiness or for holding opinions considered undesirable.
- 3.2 The first organisation known to have coordinated "**Blacklisting**" in the UK was the **Economic League (EL)**. Established in 1919 to protect Free Trade from the growth in popularity of Marxism/Communism at the time, their blacklist recorded those deemed to be left-wing troublemakers within the whole range of industry. The EL closed in 1993, after a series of scandals regarding the accuracy of its material and a parliamentary inquiry.
- 3.3 The **Consulting Association (TCA)** was established in 1993, following the fall of the EL, and focussed solely on the Construction Industry. Its records and managing director came from an EL branch called the **Services Group**, which covered the construction industry.
- 3.4 Both organisations worked as a central repository for information about individuals. These reports could be either gathered independently by EL or TCA, or provided by member companies. It was then shared with other members when vetting prospective job applicants. It is alleged that a derogatory record on the Blacklist would have precluded that individual from work with member companies.
- 3.5 TCA's blacklist grew to incorporate campaigners with no direct link to the industry, but who were deemed to pose a risk due to their beliefs and linked subversive activities, e.g. animal rights and environmental campaigners.

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3.6 The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) is the UK's regulatory body for Data Controllers. In 2009, (following allegations in **The Guardian Newspaper**) **David Clancy**, a senior ICO investigator led a warrant on TCA premises under the **Data Protection Act 1998, (DPA)** where he seized the Blacklist along with some accompanying records.

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3.7 Operation Reuben was provided with a full copy of TCA's Blacklist by the ICO, accompanied by the individual records for 19 people on the list described as being of particular interest regarding their provenance. The list contained 3,216 names, although some of these can be discounted as they appear to be repeated files due to administrative errors.

4 Allegations

- See 2 4.1 The overarching allegation, submitted as a complaint through CKS is one of corruption, with police passing personal information to private blacklisting organisations which were then responsible for the restriction of employment of individuals. The initial complaint covers a range of organisations.
- See 2 4.2 **Allegation:** Police, including Special Branches and the Security Services supplied information to the Blacklist funded by the country's major construction firms, The Consulting Association and/or other agencies in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).
Operation Herne finds that this allegation is 'Proven'.
- 7 4.3 **Allegation:** Intelligence collected by Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) undercover officer **Peter Francis**, referring to **Lisa Teuscher** and **Frank Smith** appeared in the files of the blacklisting agency.
Operation Herne finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.
- See 7 4.4 **Allegation:** SDS officers provided intelligence regarding the involvement of 3 individuals in **Youth Against Racism in Europe's Away Team, (YRE) (AT)** which appeared on The Consulting Association's Blacklist.
Operation Herne finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.
- 8 4.5 **Allegation:** ICO Senior Investigator David Clancy stated in **The Observer** on 03/03/2012: "the information was so specific and it contained in effect operational information that would not have formed anything other than a police record". (Appendix 9)
Operation Herne finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.

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4.6 Allegation: As a member of the **Building Workers Group, (BWG) Mark Cassidy / Jenner** collected information on individuals, which was then passed to The Consulting Association (Appendix 10).

Operation Herne finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.

10

4.7 Operation Herne's (Operation Reuben's) core responsibility has been restricted to investigating a specific group within the MPS; namely the MPSB SDS. Although the investigation has crossed over to other departments and indeed forces at times, the focus remains the SDS.

See 2

4.8 Repeated attempts were made to meet representatives from the BSG and CKS in order to further qualify some of these complaints and discuss the investigation. These requests were refused due to a reported lack of confidence in Operation Herne's independence and its appetite for a full investigation.

5 Terms Of Reference

1 5.1 The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) initially designated Operation Reuben to be a "supervised" investigation in February 2013. However, in May of that year, they altered their decision to render it a local investigation.

See 10 5.2 The original Terms of Reference (ToR) agreed with the IPCC were, to:

1. Investigate allegations of collusion, corruption and misconduct in a public office.
2. Investigate breaches of the Data Protection Act and any other criminal or misconduct offences.
3. Prepare a written report on the findings of the investigation for the attention of the **IPCC Senior Investigator**, copied to the **Appropriate Authority (DCC or ACC)**. Prior to the finalisation of the report, the **Investigating Officer (IO)** will ensure that the IPCC is satisfied that the investigation has met the Terms of Reference.
4. Identify whether any person subject of the investigation, in the investigator's opinion, has a case to answer for misconduct, gross misconduct or no case to answer or whether any person's performance is, or is not, unsatisfactory. It is for the force to make determinations and recommendations with regard to disciplinary action. The IO to make recommendations on the culpability of any individual for any criminal liability and forward the report to the **Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)** where appropriate.
5. Consider and report on whether the complaint has merit as a quality of service complaint and therefore should be upheld as a legitimate grievance.
6. Consider and report on whether there is organisational learning, including:
 - whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated;
 - whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared.

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- 5.3 As expressed above, the Terms of Reference must be considered in the context of Operation Herne, which was set up to investigate the SDS. Despite this, there has been some natural merging of the investigation into the broader realms of policing and more specifically Special Branches, both within the MPS and externally. This report will therefore contain information which will not be directly associated to the SDS, however it is not within the remit or resources of Operation Reuben to pursue all of these avenues. Therefore, it is expected that any findings not related to the SDS which require further investigation will be referred back to the MPS or a relevant external body.

6 Significant Organisations & People

6.1 The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS):

This unit was formed in 1968 by the MPSB in response to mass violent Anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in Grosvenor Square, London at the request of the Home Office. Over the SDS' 40 year existence, their role was to assimilate themselves with the protesters and report back on the tactics used by demonstrators, identifying core participants and estimating numbers expected at particular events. The unit's remit expanded to incorporate both extreme ends of the political spectrum and Animal Rights campaigns.

6.2 Blacklist Support Group (BSG)

The BSG was established to pursue claims against the member companies and protect the rights of its members.

6.3 Economic League (EL)

The original "Blacklisting" organisation in the UK. Amongst other functions, EL maintained records on individuals deemed to be non-conducive to the economic well-being and growth of the UK, the so-called Blacklist. Their information was provided by a mixture of open source material (newspapers etc.), subscriber companies, union representatives and industrial espionage.

6.4 Corporate Asset Protection and Risk Management (CAPRiM)

CAPRiM was set up on the closure of the EL by 2 of its former managers. It monitored and reported on threats to industry.

6.5 The Consulting Association (TCA)

TCA was another offshoot from the closure of EL. Focussing on the Construction Industry, it provided a central reference service (the Blacklist), industry meetings and a press collation service.

6.6 Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)

The ICO led the prosecution of TCA for breaches of the Data Protection Act. They have a duty to uphold information rights by promoting good practice, ruling on complaints, providing information to individuals and organisations and taking appropriate action when the law is broken.

6.7 Special Branch (SB)

Each individual police authority operated a Special Branch to act as the intelligence unit for political and terrorist activities affecting the UK.

6.8 Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB/SO12)

The largest SB unit in the UK, disbanded in 2006 upon a merger with the Anti Terrorist Unit.

6.9 Anti Terrorist Unit (SO13)

The MPS' investigative unit for political and terrorist activities affecting London and the UK. Disbanded in 2006 upon a merger with Special Branch.

6.10 Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command (SO15)

Formed in 2006 by amalgamating the functions of SO12 & SO13.

6.11 MPSB Industrial Unit

Formed in 1970 to monitor growing industrial unrest, officers from the Industrial Unit used various methods to report on the whole range of working life, from teaching to the docks. This included collating reports from other units (from uniform officers to the SDS), attending conferences and protests personally, and also developing well-placed confidential contacts from within the different sectors. There is no knowledge or record of the Industrial Unit using undercover officers.

6.12 Special Branch Records (SBR) now Information Management and Operational Support (IMOS)

IMOS is a department of SO15, previously known as Special Branch Records (SBR). They store, file and reference all reports compiled by SO15/SB for the MPS.

6.13 National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) now National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU)

The National Domestic Extremism Unit was formed as part of ACPO, to coordinate divergent strands of Domestic Extremism investigation and intelligence work.

6.14 National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU)

NETCU performed a Liaison role with different contacts from the Life Sciences sector, Oil, Gas and Energy, Banking, Commerce, Farming as well as other Government Agencies that connect with Industry affected by extremism. NETCU was dissolved upon reintegration into the MPS; however a similar Liaison Unit was set up within the NDEU/NDEDIU.

6.15 The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

CPNI carries out work on protective security to reduce the vulnerability of the national infrastructure to terrorism and other threats.

6.16 Scottish Affairs Select Committee (SASC)

SASC are a committee of MPs appointed to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Scotland Office and its associated public bodies. They work principally by undertaking inquiries, choosing their own subjects and seeking evidence from a wide range of groups and individuals with relevant interests and experience. They produce reports setting out their findings and making recommendations to the Government.

6.17 Imran Khan and Partners (IKP) incorporating Christian Khan and partners Solicitors (CKS).

IKP, a law firm specialising in civil liberties, is currently representing the BSG with regards to its complaint against the police.

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6.18 SO15's Operation Fairway Engagement Team.

Liaising with all sectors of industry and the community, they deliver counter-terrorism briefings to raise awareness of suspicious activity and encourage reporting to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline

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6.19 Fire Brigade Union. (FBU)

Due to claims made by Peter Francis that he reported on FBU members at protests they have been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.20 National Union of Mineworkers. (NUM)

The NUM have been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing, based on historic information suggesting that they were also subject to undercover reporting, especially during the 1980s strikes.

6.21 Union of Construction, Allied trades and Technicians (UCATT)

UCATT have been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing due to the number of its members involved in the claims.

6.22 Peter Francis

Former MPSB officer, Francis has been responsible for the majority of revelations within the press, having formed a working relationship with Guardian journalists. Francis was a member of the SDS from 1993 until 1997.

Francis has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.23 Mark Jenner

Former MPSB officer, Jenner was named in the press as a potential SDS undercover officer with links to left wing and Republican organisations through a campaigning centre, the **Colin Roach Centre (CRC)**. The revelations also link him to Union and workers rights activity, such as the BWG and the **Brian Higgins Defence Committee**. It is alleged that information he collected has appeared on the Blacklist.

6.24 Ian Kerr

Kerr joined the EL in the 1960s as a trainer. He then ran the organisation's Services Group from 1972 until the EL's closure in 1993. At that point he started The Consulting Association, acting as its Managing Director until its closure in 2009.

6.25

██████████ was an ██████████ who worked for ██████████ years in total. In this position, ██████████ regularly used both EL and TCA.

6.26

Named as a representative of ██████████ provided an alternative view of the industry to that of ██████████ making little use of the EL or TCA, and having no collaborative relationship with the police. Although ██████████ freely spoke to Operation Herne, ██████████ failed to respond to attempts to get him to sign a statement.

6.27 Steve Acheson

A former Electrician and activist who started to campaign against his supposed blacklisting in 2008. Acheson was instrumental in kick-starting the ICO's investigation. He has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.28 Dave Smith

Secretary of the BSG and co-author of Blacklisted, Smith is a key figure in the fight for the rights of those deemed to have been blacklisted. He has an extensive Blacklist record and has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.29 Brian Higgins

Mr Higgins was Secretary of the BWG and was linked directly to Undercover Officer Mark Jenner in the 1990s, as he worked as Secretary for the Brian Higgins Defence Committee, established to support Higgins in a civil case. He has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing, due to his links to Trade Unions.

6.30 Dan Gilman

A key member of the BSG and former activist for the Socialist Party, including its Away Team, he is reported on by numerous SDS officers. Gilman has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.31 Frank Smith

A named complainant from the BSG, he is mentioned by Peter Francis as a subject he reported on in relation to his political activism and relationship with Lisa Teuscher. He was also one of the subjects mentioned in a contentious Blacklist report about 4 individuals being stopped by police near the Cenotaph in 1999. He has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

6.32 Lisa Teuscher

A Socialist Party activist, Teuscher had a minimal Blacklist record, but has made a public complaint following Peter Francis' claim that he reported on her regarding her immigration status. Teuscher has been awarded core participant status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

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6.34 **Steve Hedley**

A Signal Maintenance Technician and Rail, **Maritime and Transport Union (RMT)** activist, Hedley was also linked to the **Socialist Party Away Team**. He is also linked to the Cenotaph incident. He has been awarded core participant Status in the current public inquiry into Undercover Policing.

7 Chronology of Events

7.1 **October - November 2002:** the BBC aired a series of programmes under the title 'True Spies', covering the use of Special Branch activity, undercover operatives and surveillance by organisations throughout the UK, including the police. In the programme, the police are linked to the Economic League through undercover reporting.

13 7.2 **June 2008:** The Guardian Newspaper published an article (**Enemy At The Gates, 26/06/2008**) in which a former construction industry manager admitted to blacklisting individuals. He stated that he believed Private Investigators sold lists of workers and when identifying potential staff for new contracts, a third party known to him as Ian Kerr, would be faxed all of the details to check against his "Blacklist".

7.3 This article directly led to the ICO's investigation into the flow of information between certain companies, identifying a chain of correspondence which indicated the existence of a covert Blacklist and ultimately led them to execute a warrant at the offices of TCA.

16 7.4 The ICO identified that the Blacklist contravened several principles of the Data Protection Act 1988:

1 & 2: information was placed on the list without the knowledge of the individuals.

3: the adequacy of the information was unchecked.

4: the accuracy of the information was unchecked.

5: the duration information was kept for was unknown.

6: the very fact the list was maintained in a covert manner rendered it impossible for individuals to assert their DPA rights.

17: TCA had no entry on the data protection register.

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- 7.5 **April 2009:** The ICO seized and retained the blacklist and linked index cards: these formed the basis of their prosecution of Mr. Kerr.
- 7.6 **May 2009:** TCA's Ian Kerr pleaded guilty to running an illegal blacklisting service on building workers. He was fined the maximum amount possible at that time of £5000. Fourteen of the subscribing companies were also issued with enforcement notices as a result of this case.
- 7.7 Following the trial of Mr. Kerr, the ICO formulated a plan to contact those affected, although this was hampered by inaccuracies within the files. They therefore worked with unions and employed an external contractor to research the names on the list and make contact with those identified, with a view to allowing individuals to peruse and comment on their personal file, before deciding what action to take.
- 17 7.8 **August 2009:** The BSG was founded by Dave Smith, with the backing of John McDonnell MP, to coordinate and promote the campaign.
- 18 7.9 **March 2010:** 02/03/2010, the Labour Government released new regulations, outlawing the compilation, dissemination and use of blacklists. <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2010/9780111491041>
- 19 7.10 **March 2011:** Anti-Blacklisting protestors disrupted delivery traffic to the Olympic Construction site, in what is believed to be the first large scale protest of the group.
- 20 7.11 **September 2011:** Dave Smith's Industrial Tribunal begins, with evidence given by the ICO's Senior Investigator, David Clancy.
- 21 7.12 **April 2012:** The MPS was confronted with these allegations when George Howarth MP contacted Commissioner Hogan-Howe regarding a complaint he had received from a constituent affected by 'Blacklisting'. This was passed to SO15, who instigated Operation Creel.

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- 7.13 **June 2012:** On 27/06/2012, The SASC commenced an inquiry into Blacklisting in Employment. This has been conducted via a series of public hearings, where key individuals have provided written and oral evidence. At no point to date, has a member of the police service been called to give evidence.
- 7.14 **July 2012:** The BSG, through their lawyers **Guney Clark & Ryan** solicitors served a claim on behalf of 86 claimants for 'Tort of unlawful conspiracy' at the High Court.
- 7.15 **August 2012:** After several basic searches, Operation Creel was closed by **Commander Richard Walton** as it was concluded that there were a number of alternative sources for such information, combined with little evidence of any SO15/MPSB involvement.
- 7.16 In his report to the Commissioner's staff officer, **Commander Allan Gibson** (now retired), Commander Walton made a recommendation that any further investigation would be more suited to the **Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS)** but for an unknown reason, this was not pursued at the time.
- 7.17 **November 2012:** On 15 November 2012, CKS lodged their complaint with the IPCC on behalf of the BSG.
- 7.18 **November 2012:** On 27/11/2012, Ian Kerr, the former managing director of TCA gave evidence to SASC on his involvement in Blacklisting.
- 7.19 **December 2012:** The complaint was initially dismissed by the MPS as unsuitable for the complaints procedure under the **Police Reform Act 2002** due to a lack of a specific allegation involving a Metropolitan Police officer and the wide range of potential sources for such information. The responding officer, PS [REDACTED] suggested that the BSG report any suspected breaches of the **Data Protection Act 1998** as a crime

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7.20 **January 2013:** CKS appealed this decision in a letter to the IPCC dated 30/01/2013 in which they claimed to have documents which in their view: *"support their complaint that confidential information held by the Consulting Association must have emanated from the Metropolitan Police Service"*.

7.21 CKS added that they believed an individual identified as a former police officer and member of the SDS in an **Observer Newspaper** report from 14/03/2010, **Officer A** (later found to be *Peter Francis*), was responsible for some of this disclosure. They reinforced their claim with a quote from the Information Commissioner's Office's Investigations Manager, David Clancy, taken from the **Observer** on 03/10/2012: *"the information was so specific and it contained in effect operational information that would not have formed anything other than a police record"*.

7.22 **January 2013: 23/01/2013, Mr Chuka Umunna, Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills** raised the subject of Blacklisting in a debate in the House of Commons.

7.23 **February 2013:** On 04/02/2013 the IPCC's [REDACTED] ruled that the MPS had failed to record the allegation appropriately and was wrong to dismiss the complaint. She referred the investigation to Senior Investigating Officer [REDACTED] and directed that this be an IPCC 'Supervised' Investigation.

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7.24 **February 2013:** Former directors of the Economic League, **Jack Winder** and **Stan Hardy** gave evidence to SASC.

See 9

7.25 **March 2013: 11/03/2013 Big Issue in the North** published an article by left-wing activist **Mark Metcalf**. This piece links former UCO Mark Jenner to a campaigning network in Hackney, called the CRC, through which Jenner is alleged to have had links to numerous campaigns, including the BWG. The BWG were involved in the defence of workers allegedly victimised by the construction industry. The article also suggests that Jenner's involvement in the CRC magazine **"Revolutions Per Minute" (RPM)** was linked to extracts from it appearing on TCA files.

- 7.26 **May 2013:** The IPCC's [REDACTED] decided that primacy for an investigation should return to the MPS, and as such, the IPCC designated Operation Reuben a Local Investigation.
- See 7 7.27 **August 2013:** The Guardian published an article citing Peter Francis, alleging that he gathered information which ultimately appeared on the TCA Blacklist. Specific examples of this include the cases of Frank Smith and Lisa Teuscher and details of a group stopped on a protest near the Cenotaph in 1999.
- 7.28 **March 2015:** 12/03/2015 the **Home Secretary, Theresa May** announced that a public inquiry would be held into Undercover Policing, led by **Lord Justice Christopher Pitchford**.
- 25 7.29 **March 2015:** 27/03/2015, SASC released their Final Report for that session of Parliament. In it, they recommended that further investigation should be undertaken by their successors into the role of the Police and Security Services. To date, this has not been taken up by the new parliament's committee.
- 26 7.30 **July 2015:** 16/07/2015, Ms May announced the Terms of Reference for the inquiry.
- 27 7.31 **October 2015:** 07/10/2015, the Core Participants for the inquiry were announced, including people linked to Blacklisting. , Blacklisting has been incorporated into the inquiry as Category E, with core participant groups including the BSG and Trade unions such as the Fire Brigade Union (FBU) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The FBU are being represented by Thompsons whilst the NUM's representative is Birnberg Peirce and Partners.

8 Media Interest and Revelations

8.1 A number of revelations have been released via the media. For more detail, please see the appendix, however a summary follows:

8.1 Television:

Numerous documentaries have been broadcast covering the topic of Blacklisting, including:

BBC's Panorama (Blacklist Britain, aired 13/06/2013)

BBC's True Spies, (aired October and November 2002), and

ITV's World In Action: Boys on the Blacklist (aired February 1987).

8.2 Publications:

The Guardian has spearheaded the journalistic campaign against Blacklisting, in conjunction with their work on undercover policing. They have utilised self declared former undercover officer Peter Francis as a major source of information. Other newspapers and magazines have also included reports on linked issues.

8.3 Books:

Blacklisted: the Secret War between Big Business and Union Activists (New Internationalist, 2015, ISBN 978-1-78026-257-4) is the most comprehensive collection of material on the subject. Written by Blacklist Support Group leader, Dave Smith and investigative journalist Phil Chamberlain.

8.4 Social Media:

There are numerous internet sites dedicated to this issue. The BSG has its own Facebook page and Twitter account. The most vocal and active advocate of the campaign appears to be Dave Smith who contributes to numerous sites, whilst running his own pages.

8.5 Copies of relevant material with further elaboration are contained in the Appendices.

9 Political Interest

9.1 A number of political figures have commented publicly on the issue.

See 25

9.2 The Scottish Affairs Select Committee has led an investigation into Blacklisting. At the end of the last parliament in March 2015, they published a report covering their findings to date: this included a reference to the fact that they had neglected to investigate allegations surrounding police collusion and as such, any further inquiry should incorporate this.

10 Legal Parameters

10.1 The complaint by CKS has cited only the 1998 Data Protection Act. However, due to the timescales covered by the organisations involved and in the spirit of transparency, Operation Reuben has considered the potential offences under both the 1998 and 1984 acts.

10.2 Despite receiving royal assent on 12th July 1984, the first act did not come into full effect until 11th November 1987. In a similar vain, the 1998 act came into force on 1st March 2000.

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10.3 The Directorate of Legal Services (DLS) and Directorate of Information (DoI) have been consulted with regard to the legal situation over the relevant years.

11 Investigation

11.1 Christian Khan and Partners Solicitors Complaint

11.1.1 The initial complaint made to the MPS is as follows:

"police, security services, undercover officers, members of Special Branch and/or members of the Special Demonstration Branch (sic) and/or National Public Order Intelligence Unit supplied information to the Blacklist funded by the country's major construction firms, the Consulting Association and/or other agencies in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and contributed to keeping thousands of people, including members of Blacklist Support Group, out of work. It is believed the police forces involved are the Metropolitan Police Service and the Strathclyde Police."

11.1.2 The scope of this allegation is vast. Therefore, as per the Terms of Reference, Operation Reuben has concentrated its resources on the involvement of the SDS.

11.1.3 Despite this, there is natural cross-over into general policing and SB duties, due to the recording of the public's interaction with the police, and the SDS' use of SO12 and SO15's intelligence records.

11.1.4 Research has shown numerous areas of concern, including:

1. Inappropriate contact of SB officers with private organisations
2. DC [REDACTED] from the MPS' 1988 disclosure
3. DC [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary's 1989 disclosure
4. DS [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary's 1989 disclosure

11.1.5 Points 2-4 are discussed in the section regarding Chris Mullins' statement.

- 11.1.6 Point 1 refers to the contact between officers of MPSB's Industrial Unit and organisations such as the Economic League and private organisations.
- 29 11.1.7 The only documented incident of this found by Operation Reuben, occurred in 1978. On this occasion, it was identified that (erroneous) information emanating from Special Branch had resulted in an individual being refused work.
- 11.1.8 [REDACTED] union activist applied for a role with a television company involved in making educational videos. The company also produced work for the construction industry, and as part of the recruitment process, [REDACTED] name was passed to the Economic League to be checked. The EL representative identified [REDACTED] as a left-wing sympathiser and therefore decided to contact MPSB's Industrial Unit, due to the perceived risk of [REDACTED] involvement in education.
- 11.1.9 The receiving officer's initial enquiries revealed a potential link to the [REDACTED] which in his opinion had not been resolved satisfactorily. Amongst other strands of investigation, he returned to the EL asking for any further information, stressing the matter's importance due to the possible link to terrorism. This was recorded as fact by the EL representative and passed on to the prospective employer. [REDACTED] was initially denied employment as a direct result of the information, being informed that it was due to [REDACTED] being "Blackened by the security people".
- 30 11.1.10 Fortunately [NAME]'s relative [REDACTED] was a retired [REDACTED] Chief Superintendent who made inquiries on [REDACTED] behalf at senior levels. A thorough internal investigation was conducted and the issue corrected. Consequently, Special Branch standing orders were re-circulated, which show that policy restricted contact with any such organisations and forbade searching for and sharing of information with "commercial organisations".

- 11.1.11 Evidence also exists of Special Branches' legitimate widespread involvement with private organisations and institutions, again mainly through MPSB's Industrial Unit and their regional counterparts.
- 11.1.12 These officers maintained relationships with key figures from all sectors of the working world who provided insight into issues affecting their specific areas, both professionally and geographically. Some of these people would have been considered to be Sources, whilst others were simply referred to as "Contacts". The individual officers closely guarded the identity of these people, and thus retained a sense of ownership.
- 11.1.13 An individual's reasons for providing information to the police differ for each person; ranging from a desire to assist with national security to personal advancement within a group.
- 11.1.14 The introduction of the **Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)** changed Source Handling, with strict registration and monitoring criteria enforced throughout the police service. Only specifically trained officers are sanctioned to perform these roles, and contact is closely monitored.
- 11.1.15 Under the 2000 Act, a person is a **Confidential Human Information Source (CHIS)** if:
- (a) they establish or maintain a personal or other relationship with a person for the covert purpose of facilitating the doing of anything falling within paragraph b) or c);
 - (b) they covertly use such a relationship to obtain information or to provide access to any information to another person; or
 - (c) they covertly disclose information obtained by the use of such a relationship or as a consequence of the existence of such a relationship

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Reference

11.1.16 A **Contact** would now be defined as a **Public Volunteer** under **Home Office** guidelines. The information these people provide is without specific prompting or tasking and it is not expected to have been gained via a relationship which has been established or maintained for a covert purpose.

11.1.17 The modern equivalents of MPSB's Industrial Unit would be **Operation Fairway** and the **National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU)**'s Industrial Liaison section (please see section 7 for further explanation of these groups). Although operating within ostensibly secret departments, their role is much more open, with officially sanctioned **Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs)** completed for each organisation since 2007. ISAs are agreed when sharing personal information (data) with an outside, non-police organisation to achieve a common aim (i.e. public protection, preventing crime and/or reoffending).

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11.1.18 Operation Herne has found one example of SB's liaison with an external organisation through [REDACTED] worked for several years within the construction industry with roles ranging from [REDACTED] before becoming [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] project [REDACTED] then took over the wider role of [REDACTED] for the firm.

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11.1.19 [REDACTED] explained the delicate nature of the role on such a high profile project as the [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] was faced with union, sectarian [REDACTED] racist (e.g. BNP and National Front groups) and criminal activity [REDACTED]

11.1.20 The fact that [REDACTED] job brought [REDACTED] into close contact with such disparate factions on a regular basis goes some way to explaining why [REDACTED] might have been considered to be a good source of information for general policing and Special Branch.

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11.1.21 [REDACTED] became involved with SB in [REDACTED]
gradually expanding [REDACTED] contacts to include officers from around the
country until [REDACTED] retirement [REDACTED]

11.1.22 [REDACTED] has stated to Operation Herne that [REDACTED] both provided and
received information. It has not been possible to isolate reporting from
[REDACTED] into SB due to the secrecy involved in contemporary reporting
standards. Similarly, [REDACTED] was not able to identify any data which
was passed to [REDACTED] by Special Branch officers.

11.1.23 It has not been possible to establish any specific breach of the Data
Protection Act although on the balance of probabilities information
was shared between the police and [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED] retirement as
per paragraph 4.2 above.

11.1.24

[REDACTED]

11.2 Investigative Procedure for Blacklisting

- 11.2.1 Due to the scale of the Blacklist database (3,213 names), it was decided that a review would be conducted of a sample of entries.
- 11.2.2 The ICO had previously highlighted 12 records which they deemed to be of interest. SO15's Operation Creel had also picked a selection of 8 other records. As they had been picked independently of Operation Herne, it was decided that the 20 records would pose a suitable test batch.
- 11.2.3 Checks were conducted using all available resources to compare the entries on the Blacklist to police records. This included the **Police National Computer (PNC)**, **Criminal Intelligence Plus (Crimint plus)**, **Crime Report Information System (CRIS)**, **Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)**, **Missing Persons and Related Linked Indices (Merlin)** and **National Special Branch Intelligence System (NSBIS)**.
- 11.2.4 A full schedule identifying the individuals and records held within police, SDS or Special Branch records is attached.
- 11.2.5 12 of the people mentioned had a PNC record, 5 of these entries are shown as having addresses within the MPS at one time. 4 are shown as victims or witnesses on MPS intelligence/crime recording systems. None of the 20 is featured as a suspect for MPS crimes.
- 11.2.6 In total, 3 of the 20 have SB files (1 of whom does not appear to have a PNC record).

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11.2.7



- 11.2.8 There is no evidence to suggest that the SDS were involved in the collection or provision of this information. Although not attributed in the file, due to the nature of the material found (e.g. an application for a job on the Jubilee Line), some of the information may have come from industry sources.
- 11.2.9 This data reveals a large proportion coming into contact with the police for a variety of normal reasons. Although at 15% the rate of SB interest appears to be relatively high from such a dip-sample, their interest was for very specific reasons. None of the SB files refer to links with the SDS.

11.3 Chris Mullin's statement

- 35 11.3.1 Mr Mullin was the **Member of Parliament (MP)** for Sunderland South when, on 17th May 1989, he made a statement to parliament to the effect that several police officers had been disciplined for data protection act offences, as a direct result of the World In Action documentary.
- 36 11.3.2 Mr Mullin was unable to provide any further information to assist with this inquiry.
- 37 11.3.3 In order to explore this avenue, Mr. Creedon sent a request to each police authority's Chief Constable to conduct searches to identify any cases which might fit the criteria: Data Protection Act or information sharing offences by police officers between 1987-1989.
- 38 11.3.4 Due to Public Services retention protocols, generally set at 7 years, several areas were unable to provide any records for the era.
- 39 11.3.5 The only records returned, included:
1. DC [REDACTED] from the MPS
 2. DC [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary
 3. DS [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary
 4. PC [REDACTED] from British Transport Police (BTP) in Glasgow
 5. PC [REDACTED] from BTP in Glasgow
- 11.3.6 Each of these cases was reviewed. Due to a combination of standardised court retention periods and a lack of record keeping within BTP, it has not been possible to identify the BTP officers.
- 11.3.7 Although each of the others reveals improper disclosure of personal information to organisations, none can be linked to the Blacklist.

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
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- 11.3.8 The World In Action programme also includes the covert filming of **Alan Harvey**, North East Regional Director of the Economic League based in Skipton, talking openly about police collusion, whilst also warning that such activity is illegal. Harvey specifically mentions a reciprocal relationship with Special Branch officers where the EL provides information to them, and they in turn "are not unfriendly back". These revelations led to an investigation by the home force, **North Yorkshire Police**, which concluded that there were no detrimental findings and the claims were dismissed. The show's reporters insinuate that this was a whitewash. Enquiries conducted with North Yorkshire Police show that they have no trace of this report. They stated that they had a 7 year retention policy for paperwork.

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11.4.13 The first mention of her "marriage of convenience" was on 21/03/1995 in folio [REDACTED] a comprehensive report compiled by DC [REDACTED] on C Squad at the request of [REDACTED] manager. The report refers to information about her marriage to [REDACTED] being simply for convenience. No mention is made of a relationship with Smith. Although not cited, it is believed that this information came from the SDS.

11.4.14 Militant Labour file [REDACTED], folio [REDACTED] dated 24/05/1995 is a linked report from Francis, in which he explains that [REDACTED] was romantically linked to another ML activist, [REDACTED]. Folio [REDACTED] (10/07/1995) of the same file is another report from Francis, in which he states that Teuscher and Smith are living together as a couple.

11.4.15 The last report by an SDS officer was folio [REDACTED] on 25/11/1996. This mentions both the marriage of convenience and Smith.

11.4.16 The final report in her file was entered on 17/07/1997 and refers to the end of the **Immigration and Nationality Department's** attempts to remove her from the country.

11.4.17 Frank Smith. In total, there are 23 entries in Smith's file, which begins in 1996 and ends in 2004. [REDACTED]

11.4.18 Smith's SB record begins on 02/05/1996, with information sheet 1A, from the SDS: this is the only SDS record on him. He is shown as a member of ML, in a long term relationship with Lisa Teuscher. His membership of YRE is not mentioned.

11.4.19 Apart from the submission of a photograph in July of 1996, there are no further entries in his file until March 1999, when his activity with the Socialist Party and the Away Team is mentioned, sparking a request for a comprehensive report to be written.

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11.4.20 The Comprehensive report was requested in March 1999 and completed by C Squad DC [REDACTED] in September of that year. It mentions that there is no up to date information on Smith's relationships.

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11.4.21 [REDACTED] is still a serving officer and has provided a statement to the effect that [REDACTED] does not remember any contact with TCA and is not sure how the information could have come to their attention. However, [REDACTED] admits that irregular meetings were held with contacts from other organisations, and cannot rule out the possibility that someone connected with TCA was present at such a gathering.

11.4.22 [REDACTED]

11.4.23 [REDACTED] report does not mention a "marriage of convenience", simply stating that there had been no update on [REDACTED] personal circumstances since the 1996 intelligence.

11.4.24 Prior to the commencement of his personal file, Smith had come to the notice of MPSB due to his involvement with YRE and ML. He was also arrested for an offence at the Wapping riots in 1986.

11.4.25 [REDACTED] has provided a statement to Operation Herne, in which [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] did not remember Frank Smith and could not remember providing the information to the TCA.

- 11.4.26 Although interest had been reinvigorated in Smith in the preceding months of 1999 due to his increased activity, there is a clear gap between the information recorded on their SB files and those of the TCA:
- The last record in Teuscher's file was 19/11/1997. The last reference to their relationship was 21/06/1995.
 - Smith's file has a hiatus of over 2 years from the initial entry in May 1996 until his re-emergence in March 1999 and no mention of their relationship is made in that time.
- 11.4.27 It is clear that Francis did report on both Smith and Teuscher however, there is no evidence to show that the information provided by Francis was contemporaneously passed to TCA. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that the information in TCA records came from a police source. However, it is known that the documented source for the information, [REDACTED] had direct links with Special Branches.
- 11.4.28 Although he has claimed responsibility, there are no reports to corroborate Francis' assertion that he linked Smith to YRE.
- 11.4.29 It is also of note that the entry coincides with the final stages of the Identification and Passport Service's ultimately unsuccessful challenge to her stay. Operation Reuben has made no inquiries with the Identification and Passport Service.

11.5 Francis's Allegations: the Cenotaph incident

- 7
- 11.5.1 August 2013: In a Guardian article, Francis stated that he supplied information on two individuals, which he claims would only be known to police through his undercover work; namely that they were members of Youth Against Racism Away Team (YRE) (AT).
- 11.5.2 According to the article, the Blacklist records for these individuals show that they were "observed" or "apprehended" at a protest against right wing groups laying wreaths at the Cenotaph in 1999.
- 46
- 11.5.3 The SB file for YRE AT has been examined and contains a report from a uniformed officer, PC [REDACTED] regarding the stop of three individuals in **King Charles Street**, opposite the **Cenotaph**, on the day in question.
- 11.5.4 The people involved were: **Steve Hedley, Frank Smith and Dan Gillman**. PC [REDACTED] records that Hedley stated that he belonged to the Socialist Party. No further information regarding the political leanings of the individuals is noted; however the stop slip was passed to SB by the local collator and logged as YRE AT.
- 11.5.5 The report has been marked to show that the **Extreme Left Wing (XLW)** desk was made aware and it was to be transposed to the computer system. Although the individuals are obviously recognised by SBR, no note of the stop is contained in their SB personal files.
- 11.5.6 Although all three males feature within SDS records, no mention of this stop has been found within the unit's files.
- 11.5.7 The information on the Blacklist is attributed to the construction company, [REDACTED] although an individual source is not cited.
- 11.5.8 There is no evidence to suggest that the information regarding the police stop was shared outside of the organisation.

11.5.9 There is a gap of over 2 years between the end of Francis' SDS deployment in August 1997 and the appearance of the information on TCA records in November 1999.

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11.5.10 The article's claim that knowledge of the Away Team's existence was known to "only a handful of members at the heart of" YRE and Francis' claim that he could be the only source for this information is also undermined by a World in Action programme from November 1993. The show explained that the group of approximately 25 individuals were linked to YRE and used for defence and attack.

11.6 ICO's assertion that information emanated from the police

- 11.6.1 In September 2011, Dave Smith began his hearings at the **Central London Employment Tribunal**, claiming that he was denied work through illegal blacklisting. Giving evidence for Smith, ICO Investigations Manager, David Clancy stated that the TCA files included information that:
- "...could have come from the police and the security organisations."*
- 11.6.2 Clancy repeated these claims in his evidence to the Scottish Affairs Select Committee on 16th October 2012, clarifying:
- "It is the language that is contained within some of the reports."*
- 11.6.3 The instances he cites include references to arrests, registered keeper details for vehicles and in-depth reports on individuals, called 'Special Investigations' or 'Specials'.
- 11.6.4 There is no definitive evidence of police involvement in the provision of any police data in the above cases and Clancy does not appear to consider alternative sources, such as private investigators, unions [REDACTED]
- 11.6.5 Despite this, it is possible that police officers have shared information with third parties, which has then been passed on to TCA. In handwritten notes submitted to SASC by Ian Kerr's wife, there is a reference to: "one specific construction company" submitting enquiries on behalf of SB.
- 11.6.6 One potential instance of this is [REDACTED] who has stated that [REDACTED] was in regular contact with Special Branch officers (please see 11.1.18).

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11.6.7 Smith's Appeal was rejected in March 2015 on the grounds that he was employed by a contractor at the time, not the company (Carillion) against whom he was claiming. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in August. However, his legal team are adamant that an approach to the European Courts for Human Rights, under articles 8 and 11 will be successful.

51

11.6.8 Also found within the items seized by the ICO was a page of Ian Kerr's handwritten notes taken from a meeting on 6th November 2008, which has come to be known in the press as the "**Woodstock meeting**" due to it's location in Oxfordshire.

11.6.9 The Woodstock meeting was arranged by a group called the **Construction Industry Forum (CIF)**, a group of representatives from around the industry to discuss trends in business and share ideas. One item on the agenda was a presentation from National Extremism Technical Coordination Unit (NETCU) officer, **Gordon Mills** about the work of his unit.

52

11.6.10 Inquiries have shown that this was a standard presentation, consisting of open source information, designed to highlight the problems linked to protest movements and how NETCU could assist.

11.6.11 At that time, NETCU was an **Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)** unit, based in **Cambridgeshire**. It was therefore decided to try to locate the files from NETCU by consulting **Cambridgeshire Constabulary**.

11.6.12 In order to ascertain what kind of relationship and communication existed between NETCU officers and its subscribing organisations, Operation Herne approached Cambridgeshire Constabulary to obtain access to its records.

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11.6.13 Cambridgeshire's records management team have been unable to locate any paper files from the unit. Their Information Technology (IT) team have stated that all NETCU computer records were destroyed in July 2012. They have no record of any transfer or copying of information.

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11.6.14 Former members of NETCU have confirmed that the unit closed down upon the amalgamation of Domestic Extremism units in 2011. At that point, it has been suggested that all paperwork was shredded and it is believed that the computer records were copied by the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU).

11.6.15



11.6.16 TCA is mentioned only as a result of the 2009 court case and ensuing media reports. Blacklisting is mentioned in relation to strike action, specifically around the Olympic site.

11.7 Alternative Sources

11.7.1 As reported above, Operation Reuben can say that there are numerous potential alternative sources of information for many of the records on the Blacklist. They are follows:

11.7.2 [REDACTED] has confirmed that before 2006, their procedures around the sharing of information were: "quite lax". Even now, it is possible to request information from them with: "reasonable cause".

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11.7.3 **Open Source reporting:** Both the EL and TCA relied heavily on media reporting for their records. This could have included anything from stories naming campaigners, to the note of court appearances in local newspapers.

See 22, 24 & 73

11.7.4 **Private Investigators:** The Economic League appears to have commonly used Private Investigators to compile their "Special", in-depth reports. They were also employed by companies to complete checks on prospective employees, verifying their claims.

11.7.5 **Union Representatives:** There are numerous mentions of union officials being the source of information within The Consulting Association files. It is also known that they would report direct to companies and to Special Branch.

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11.7.6 **Former Military or Police officers:**
Although no records have been found to give specific details, it is known that the Economic League employed people with police and military backgrounds.

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Please see 31

11.7.7

Recommendation:

Operation Herne has found no trace of SDS officers being involved in the sharing of information.

1. There is also no direct evidence of SB officers being involved in such practices, although there are clear examples of officers having contact with and meeting representatives from industry.
2. Although Operation Herne has dealt with numerous people from outside SDS circles, the wider exploitation of this field falls outside its remit.
3. [REDACTED] contacts book could offer opportunities for the MPS and other police areas to pursue this line of investigation.

11.8 Allegation that Mark Jenner provided information held on the Blacklist

See 10

11.8.1 An article published in the March 2013 edition of **Big Issue in the North** by **Mark Metcalf** raises the question of whether information gathered by UCO Mark Jenner, under the alias of Mark Cassidy, was passed on to the Blacklist.

11.8.2 Metcalf suggests that Jenner's links to Trade organisations such as the BWG through the CRC in North East London offered him access to private information about people, which may have ultimately ended up being used to deny people work through TCA.

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11.8.3 A review of reporting linked to DC Jenner (using the SDS' Hard Drive) shows that during his tenure, he reported on over 300 individuals. For many of these 300, only the names are mentioned with no further detail: this can be due to their presence at a meeting or protest, etc. By cross-referencing all of these names with the Blacklist, Operation Herne has found 16 individuals from the Blacklist are mentioned by Jenner, some of which entailed detailed reporting.

11.8.4 There is no evidence to prove that any of the intelligence provided by Jenner appeared on the Blacklist.

11.8.5 Information similar to that provided by SDS operatives can be found on the Blacklist. However, no evidence exists to show that SDS information was passed to Blacklisting organisations directly. Much of this information was available to EL/TCA, via alternative sources, such as private investigators (see 11.7) and subscribing companies, [REDACTED]

11.8.6 It is of course possible that some information gathered by the SDS was passed to industry contacts on a personal basis by SB officers from other departments. For example, [REDACTED] claims to have had a reciprocal relationship with Special Branches around the country, including MPSB until [REDACTED]. However, there is no method for identifying whether this happened.

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11.8.7 It was possible for information and intelligence relevant to the geographical or topic area to be passed between regional Special Branches, when deemed necessary or upon application. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although each regional SB would work under the same national guidelines; operational practicalities, such as the number of officers, could have led to different methodology. SB files were generally only marked up on the sleeve when they were removed from the office. If an officer simply viewed them, it would not be recorded.

11.8.8 Thus, an officer from a regional SB could have called their counterpart within MPSB, who could check the information held within MPSBR. This national scope makes it difficult to investigate, and beyond the resources of Operation Herne at present.

12 Statements & Discussions

- 12.1 A series of statements has been obtained dealing with the question of collaboration. These have been taken from people within the Metropolitan Police, Special Branches, NETCU, The Economic League, The Consulting Association and companies from the construction industry.
- 12.2 Amongst other topics, the statements provide an insight into:
- The formation and operation of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch Industrial Unit
 - The relationship between Special Branches and both the Economic League and private industry
 - The relationship between NETCU and the Consulting Association
 - Private Industry's involvement with the police
 - MPSB C Squad's reporting on key individuals
- 12.3 Key statements include:
- 58 12.4 **Jack Winder:** The former Director of Intelligence and Research for the Economic League, Winder confirmed that EL had regular contact with the police in various regions. However, all discussions were general in their nature and any information flow was from the EL to police.
- 59 12.5 DC [REDACTED] worked for MPSB's Industrial Unit for several years from [REDACTED] assigned to the Engineering sector. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] knew of the EL's existence and potential use to MPSB, but did not know of any formal agreement or regular contact. [REDACTED] was responsible for a data breach in [REDACTED] where the Economic league erroneously recorded a [REDACTED] as being linked to a [REDACTED] following an inquiry with DC [REDACTED] (please see 11.1.7 - 11.1.9).

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12.6

██████████ was the ██████████ of TCA's Chief Officer, Ian Kerr. ██████████ stated that ██████████ worked on a part time basis for the company, but never playing a part in the collation or dissemination of any of the information on the lists. ██████████ stated that ██████████ only knowledge of TCA contact with police was Gordon Mills' presentation at a conference.

Appendix Reference 60

See 51

12.7

DI Gordon Mills (Retired): Mr Mills worked for NETCU from 2006 -2011. On November 6th 2008 he gave a standard industry presentation to a small meeting organised by the CIF, a group of representatives from around the industry, on behalf of a colleague: the presentation was made up of open source material. DI Mills was able to provide a copy of the generic presentation used at that time, which is included as Appendix 24. He did not know of EL or TCA and knew of no direct contact with them.

See 51

12.8

██████████ In 2008, ██████████ was a civilian ██████████ for NETCU. ██████████ was scheduled to make the presentation to the CIF, but was not available due to annual leave. ██████████ understands that Mr Kerr was a delegate at the conference, invited by one of the companies. However, ██████████ stated that there was no direct link between TCA and NETCU.

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12.9

ACC Anton Setchell (Retired): Mr Setchell was the **National Domestic Extremism Coordinator**. He stated that there was no direct link to TCA and that the presentation given by DI Mills would have been generic in nature, with only open source intelligence included. He had become aware of blacklisting since his departure from the police, as he took up the position of Global Director of Group Security for construction firm, **Laing O'Rourke** which is cited in the legal action by the Blacklist Support Group.

See 44

12.10

PS ██████████: PS ██████████ was a DC on the left wing desks ██████████ was specifically responsible for the "comprehensive" (intelligence report) on Frank Smith, completed in 1999. ██████████ has stated that ██████████ had no contact with any external organisation such as TCA.

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See 42

12.11 DCI [REDACTED] was a DC on the left wing desks [REDACTED] was specifically responsible for the "comprehensive" (intelligence report) for Lisa Teuscher, completed in 1995. [REDACTED] has confirmed that [REDACTED] had no contact with any external organisation such as TCA.

See 31

12.12 [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] who worked for [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] years in total. [REDACTED] was a regular user of the Economic League and The Consulting Association. [REDACTED] claimed that the flow of information was a reciprocal agreement. [REDACTED] has provided a statement and [REDACTED] Special Branch contacts book, which is exhibited as [REDACTED]

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12.13 [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] for approximately [REDACTED] years [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] collaboration with Trade Union contacts, the EL and TCA. [REDACTED] also met numerous Special Branch officers through social events organised by [REDACTED] did not receive information on individuals from Special Branch officers and in fact insisted that the Trade Unions were the source of much of the information passed to the Blacklist.

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12.14 DCS [REDACTED] said that the SDS had no dealings with the Industrial Section. Similarly, [REDACTED] didn't have any dealings with the EL or TCA. [REDACTED] was one of many people from industry and the unions who provided information to SB. [REDACTED] was adamant that the flow of information was one-way and that SB never shared intelligence with either private individuals or companies.

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12.15

worked for the construction firm, the [REDACTED] was mentioned by Ian Kerr as a TCA contact during his SASC interview. [REDACTED] stated that although directly involved with human resources and employment law for the company for many years, [REDACTED] had very little to do with the EL or TCA. [REDACTED] became aware of the EL due to their literature, which was passed through the management. [REDACTED] then met Ian Kerr at a "Contractors' Association" meeting. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had never passed information to either organisation, nor had [REDACTED] sought information from them. [REDACTED] had in fact helped to establish in-house vetting and employment history practices for the group, which [REDACTED] believed negated the need for an external Blacklist. Despite his original cooperation, efforts to obtain a signed statement from [REDACTED] have failed and after several months of attempts, a decision was taken in July 2015 to rely on [REDACTED] notes.

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12.16

DS [REDACTED]: DS [REDACTED] was present for the inception of the [REDACTED] stated that the EL was a "well-established" conduit for information, but reiterated that the flow of information was strictly one way. [REDACTED] admitted to meeting Jack Winder on a regular basis in pubs local to New Scotland Yard (NSY). DS [REDACTED] declined the opportunity to provide a formal statement at this stage. Amongst others, [REDACTED] named [REDACTED] as a DC whom [REDACTED] managed. [REDACTED] sought legal counsel, which resulted in [REDACTED] refusal to sign a statement.

66

12.17

DS [REDACTED]: DS [REDACTED] worked for the unit from 1971 until late 1973. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] was aware of the Economic League, but stated that [REDACTED] had no contact with them at all.

67

12.18

DC [REDACTED]: DC [REDACTED] was a Special Branch officer in [REDACTED] a much smaller unit than MPSB, leading to a greater mix of duties. [REDACTED] had been introduced to Jack Winder in the late 1960s and maintained contact with [REDACTED] a few times per year throughout his career, meeting in a pub in [REDACTED] DC [REDACTED] treated [REDACTED] as a contact only, not a source, discussing general topics, but never individuals. [REDACTED] does not remember ever committing anything discussed to a report, as it was too general in content.

Appendix
Reference

68

12.19 DC [REDACTED]: DC [REDACTED] was a career Special Branch officer who worked in the majority of SB's departments, although not the Industrial Unit. [REDACTED] was aware of the Economic League, but was warned not to liaise with them when [REDACTED] first joined SB. [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] sociably, as [REDACTED] attended the [REDACTED] and was invited to a couple of international cricket matches. However, [REDACTED] also remembers working with him on occasions during [REDACTED] time on the [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] had several contracts which involved work on sites targeted by [REDACTED]

12.20 [REDACTED] was adamant that corporate spies were very active during this time and as such there was great potential that they could be responsible for a lot of the intelligence flow.

69

12.21 DS [REDACTED]: DS [REDACTED] was employed on the Industrial Unit between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] the Industrial Section's role was to monitor subversion and infiltration of industry and the public sector by the full range of extremists. [REDACTED] focus was the transport and education sectors. [REDACTED] states that [REDACTED] did not deal with the Economic League personally and cannot say whether others did. However, [REDACTED] explained that a large part of their work was done by forging close links with significant people within their specific areas, who would be referred to as "contacts".

See 46A

12.22 PC [REDACTED]: PC [REDACTED] worked with the MPS' Territorial Support Group (TSG) in 1998. [REDACTED] was identified as the author of the stop report for the Cenotaph incident in 1999. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of the Economic League or The Consulting Association.

13 Conclusions

13.1.0 **Allegation:** Police, including Special Branches supplied information which appeared on the Blacklist, funded by the country's major construction firms, The Consulting Association and/or other agencies in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).

13.1.1 When considered within the remit of Operation Reuben, there is no evidence to suggest that the SDS set out to procure information for, or ever provided any information directly to any private company, including the Economic League or The Consulting Association.

13.1.2 However, Operation Reuben has found that sections of the policing community throughout the UK had both overt and covert contact with external organisations for reasons stemming from crime reporting and prevention to the maintenance of public order and the prevention of terrorism. For example:

- Special Branches throughout the UK had direct contact with the Economic League, public authorities, private industry and trade unions.
- The wider Police service had direct contact with private companies and institutions throughout the country
- NETCU had contact with private industry and government institutions. They are also known to have made a presentation at which Ian Kerr of The Consulting Association was present

This extensive contact means that although there is no specific evidence there is a distinct possibility that information was passed, outside of the normal procedures and agreements by individuals.

13.1.3 Despite this, it should be remembered that the police were not the only source and that Blacklisting organisations used numerous methods for collating their material (as per 11.7).

- 13.1.4 The information supplied by [REDACTED] the statement of DC [REDACTED] reveal a potentially improper flow of information from Special Branch to external organisations, which ultimately appeared on the Blacklist.
- 13.1.5 However, it must be stressed that this does not appear to be systemic and there were in fact strict guidelines in place with respect to the sharing of information. Although there were established forms of contact and protocols were in place with regard to the exchange of information, the possibility of officers passing on information without direct permission cannot be discounted.
- 13.1.6 Operation Herne's research has shown that the advent of the Data Protection Act (introduced in 1987) led to tighter policies with regard to the sharing of information for the Police Service. This is evidenced in the discussions with the former Lancashire officers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who stated that prior to the DPA, information was shared on a more ad-hoc basis.
- 13.1.7 This conclusion refers to general Policing and Special Branch only. There is no evidence that the SDS ever shared information with industry or the Blacklist. The SDS was by its very nature a secret unit, of which even some other parts of Special Branch did not know. It had strict firewalls in place with regard to its product and information would not have been passed outside of their strict circle of recipients.
- 13.1.8 Despite this, Operation Herne has clearly established that on the balance of probabilities and that based upon the extent of investigations conducted to date, the allegation that the police or Special Branches supplied information is 'Proven'.

There appears to be a case to answer for unauthorised sharing of information under the Data Protection Act 1984.

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Appendix
Reference

13.2 **Allegation:** Intelligence collected by Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) undercover officer Peter Francis, referring to Lisa Teuscher and Frank Smith (Appendix 8) appeared in the files of the blacklisting agency.

13.2.1 There is no direct evidence to link the information provided by Francis to TCA records. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that this information came from a police source. The contemporaneous reporting is shown as being linked to [REDACTED] a company with documented Special Branch links. However, it is of note that the entry coincides with the final stages of the Identification and Passport Service's ultimately unsuccessful challenge to her stay. There is a significant delay between Francis reporting and similar information appearing upon the Blacklist. Due to the untimely demise of Ian Kerr, it is no longer possible to check the veracity of TCA's records.

13.2.2 **Thus, the investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

13.3 **Allegation:** SDS officers provided intelligence regarding the involvement of 3 individuals in Youth Against Racism in Europe's Away Team, which appeared on The Consulting Association's Blacklist.

13.3.1 Searches of the Operation Herne databases and records have found that there is no SDS reporting in relation to the Cenotaph incident. A report was filed by a uniformed police officer, PC [REDACTED] regarding the stop of Smith, Hedley and Gilman. This was incorporated into a generic SB organisation file with no amendments or additions. There is no evidence to suggest that this was shared outside the organisation.

- 13.3.2 Francis claims that he provided intelligence on these individuals' involvement with YRE's Away Team. The principle argument against Francis' responsibility for this information is the time lapse. Again, there is insufficient evidence to prove or disprove this, although the insinuation that this information could only have come from the police is obviously untrue. In fact, [REDACTED] the person most closely

[REDACTED]

- 13.3.3 The claim regarding the secrecy of the Away Team itself is undermined, as the existence of the group had been public knowledge since at least 1993, when members of the group appeared on a World In Action programme called **Violence with Violence**, first aired on 13/11/1993. This was also cited in an **Independent** newspaper article by the journalist **Jojo Moyes** on 15/11/1993.

- 13.3.4 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

- 13.4.0 **Allegation:** ICO Senior Investigator David Clancy stated in the Observer on 03/10/2012: "the information was so specific and it contained in effect operational information that would not have formed anything other than a police record". (Appendix 9)

- 13.4.1 In relation to the three issues raised by David Clancy there is no evidence to substantiate his claim that the information was provided by police sources. It is evident that there are other sources from which this information could have been obtained.

- 13.4.2 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

13.5.0 **Allegation:** As a member of the Building Workers Group, Mark Cassidy /Jenner collected information on individuals, which was then passed to The Consulting Association (Appendix 10).

13.5.1 Although Jenner mentions the names of individuals who appear on the list, there is no evidence that he provided any information which appeared on the Blacklist. All available information points to the fact that the SDS had established firewalls in place, with intelligence reports being passed through different departments protecting them from any external influence. However, information similar to that provided by SDS operatives can be found on the list, although it is often accredited to other sources, for example [REDACTED]

13.5.2 **The investigation finds that this allegation is 'Not Proven'.**

14 Recommendations

- 14.1 In order to properly establish the scale of the 'information sharing' between Special Branches throughout the United Kingdom and the construction industry, further investigation is necessary; albeit this will be necessarily limited, given the passage of time and the quite proper weeding of Police Special Branch records. This is beyond the remit of Operation Reuben and Operation Herne.

It is recommended that further investigation should take place to establish the scale of the 'information sharing', utilising the information supplied by [REDACTED] address book which contains details of just under 100 people from 23 different policing areas around the UK. Amongst those names are 9 officers linked to the MPS, and it is believed that the MPS may wish to speak to these officers further.

15 Organisational Learning

- 15.1 There have clearly been many areas identified where the Police can improve on performance. Many of these areas have already been addressed with the introduction of RIPA in 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1988. The Organisational Learning from this and other operations will be the subject of a further report in due course.

Senior Investigating Officer

DCI [REDACTED]

A Indices and Search Parameters

1 Holmes/Altia

'**HOLMES**' - **Home Office Large Major Enquiry System** is an investigative tool. **ALTIA** is a system that scans and stores documents and has a search function that can include "Boolean" searches for either strings of characters or for whole words together with other words included in the same document. This also includes scanned SDS original paper documents which were generated in the pre-computer era.

2 Hard Drive

The **Hard Drive** contains electronic copies of documents that were created by the SDS. These include intelligence reports, policies and correspondence. Intelligence reports on the Hard Drive have also been found within MPS Special Branch records in a sanitised version. SDS files from the 1970's to the early 1990's do not exist in electronic format on the Hard Drive as computers were not common place at this time.

3 Forensic Tool Kit (FTK)

The **FTK** enables a more precise search method of the material held within the Hard Drive whilst preserving its integrity. Importantly the FTK can also access and display deleted or corrupted files which the Hard Drive system on Microsoft Word cannot.

4 Special Branch Records

MPS Special Branch records is an information storage system that holds intelligence handled within Special Branch unsuitable to be stored on other MPS databases. It contains documents that have a protective marking of "Secret" or below. This allows for the receipt, assessment, creation, amendment, deletion and dissemination for entry onto the **National Special Branch Intelligence System (NSBIS)**. For the purposes of this initial report, only those records identified as relating to the SDS have been scanned onto ALTIA and have been reviewed.

5 Commander's Archive

This archive contains sensitive documentation which is not stored in MPS Special Branch records. A search of the document titles contained within the Commander's Archive spreadsheet was completed and those files identified as relevant to this enquiry then examined.

6 Generic Indices

In addition to these specialist indices, Operation Reuben has conducted searches of the standard police indices, including Cris (the MPS' Crime recording system), Crimint (the MPS' Criminal Intelligence recording system), Stops database (the MPS' record of people stopped), Custody records (linked to the national system for Custody) and the Police National Computer.

7 Professional Standards records

MPS' Patriarch and Tribune databases have been searched. In addition to this, a request for each area of the UK to check their own Professional Standards department records.

Search Parameters

- 1 To identify reporting, each individual was searched across the aforementioned databases containing all documentation held by Operation Herne, along with the generic databases, using the Integrated Intelligence Platform (IIP) tool. Searches of IMOS and the "Commander's Archive" were also performed.
- 2 Across the databases there is considerable duplication of documents, and some documents were found to contain more than one variation of a name. As a result all documents identified had to be individually reviewed to establish their relevance to this enquiry. Only fully verifiable identifications of the names were considered as 'traced' based on the context of the information provided.

B Document Retention and Disposal

- 1 In common with records and information management throughout the public sector, the MPS is subject to a number of statutory regulations and controls. These derive principally from Acts of Parliament and associated Codes of Practice or powers vested in regulatory organisations such as the Office of the Information Commissioner.
- 2 A record is defined as recorded information, in any media or format, which is created or received in the course of an individual's or organisation's activity that provides reliable evidence of policy, actions and decisions. Records management is the function of creating, organising and managing records to ensure they provide evidence of activity, decision making and policy. Also that they are easily retrievable when required and are disposed of either by destruction or transfer to an archive at the appropriate time.
- 3 **Management of Police Information (MOPI)**
The code was initially developed by the Home Office under the Police Act 1996 and 1997. This developed further following the **Richard Inquiry** which looked at information availability failures relating to the Soham murders in July 2002. The Home Office produced a Code of Practice for the Management of Police Information which was published **14th November 2005**. The purpose of The Code is to ensure that there is broad consistency between police forces in the way information is managed within the law. Also to ensure effective use of available information within and between individual police forces and other agencies, and to provide fair treatment to members of the public. The Code of Practice describes policing purposes relating to information management at a high level and sets out the principles governing the management of information (including personal information). This led to the publication of the **Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)** Guidance to Management of Police Information in 2006.
- 4 The Guidance states that police information is information required for policing purposes. Policing purposes are:
 - Protecting life and property.
 - Preserving order.
 - Preventing the commission of offences,
 - Bringing offenders to justice and
 - Any duty or responsibility arising from Common or Statute law.These five policing purposes provide the legal basis for collecting, recording, evaluating, sharing and retaining police information.

5 MPS Record Management Policy

Records should be retained only for the minimum period required commensurate with policing purpose, administrative purposes and any relevant legal provisions. There are no circumstances where records may be retained on an indefinite basis. Retention periods for administrative records will normally be set by the relevant portfolio holder or lead branch after consultation with the MPS Records Management Branch, which retains a database of retention/disposal periods. The setting of sensible retention periods may involve accepting a degree of risk about the effect of destruction at a particular time. Records that support the policing purpose as set out in the Guidance on the Management of Police Information should be reviewed, retained and disposed of in accordance with the guidelines set out in Section 7 of that document or any corporate MPS Retention and Disposal Schedule that may be published.

7.6 Registered files are reviewed and, where appropriate, destroyed by the MPS Records Management Branch. The responsibility for the disposal of non-registered records rests with local management. Records over twenty years of age for which the MPS has no further policing or administrative use and which appear suitable for permanent preservation maybe transferred to The National Archives or other suitable place of deposit. All other records should be destroyed.

C Appendices

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2	Christian Khan Solicitors' complaint on behalf of the Blacklist Support Group, 15 November 2012. Includes linked correspondence.	12 - 38
3	The Economic League, according to Wikipedia.	39 - 41
4	The Consulting Association, according to Wikipedia.	42 - 47
5	The Information Commissioner's Office, according to ico.org.uk. Includes information on Blacklisting.	48 - 52
6	Summary of the Blacklist file.	53 - 54
6A	A copy of the Blacklist, as supplied by the ICO.	55 - 161
7	Guardian article dated 18/08/2013: Police "spied on activists for blacklisting agency".	162 - 164
8	Observer article dated 03/03/2012: Police are linked to blacklist of construction workers.	165 - 166
9	Big Issue in North dated 11/03/2013: There is no way of knowing how much damage Jenner caused.	167 - 171
10	Terms of Reference for Operation Reuben.	172 - 173
11	IPCC referral form, dated 26/11/2012.	174 - 182
12	Special Branch Job Description for DI in Industrial Section, from file [REDACTED]	183 - 190
13	Guardian article, dated 13/03/2015: Ex-undercover officer reveals that covert police unit spied on trade union members - full statement.	191 - 193
14	Excerpt from TRUE SPIES, episode 1: SUBVERSIVE MY ARSE. First Broadcast on BBC 27/10/2002.	194 - 199
14A	Guardian article dated 24/10/2002: Gormley and Buckton named as special branch informers.	200
15	Guardian article, dated 28/06/2008: Enemy at the gates.	201 - 203
16	ICO Case Summary: ICO v Ian Kerr, Macclesfield Magistrates Court, 27th May 2009.	204 - 212
17	Hazards Magazine, dated 06/08/2009: Britain: Workers unite against construction blacklist.	213

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18	Hazards Magazine, dated 04/03/2010: New blacklisting regulations "too weak".	214 - 215
19	Hazards Magazine, dated 03/03/2011: Anti-blacklist demo targets Olympic site.	216 - 217
20	Hazards Magazine, dated 01/09/2011: Judge backs worker against 'blacklisting' Carillion.	218 - 219
21	Operation Creel file.	218 - 396
22	Ian Kerr's Written Evidence to SASC	397 - 399
22A	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence for Mr Ian Kerr, Tuesday 27/11/2012.	400 - 469
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23	House of Commons Hansard debate for 23/01/2013: Mr Chuka Umunna	471 - 517
23A	Guardian article, dated 21/02/2013: Met police launch inquiry into construction worker blacklisting.	518 - 519
24	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence for Mr Stanley Hardy, Tuesday 12/02/2013.	520 - 553
24A	Summary of Evidence provided by Stanley Hardy to SASC, 12/02/2013.	554 - 556
24B	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence for Mr Jack Winder, Tuesday 05/02/2013.	557 - 593
24C	Summary of Evidence provided by Jack Winder to SASC, 05/02/2013.	594 - 596
25	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Blacklisting in Employment: Final Report, 18/03/2015.	597 - 635
26	www.gov.uk: Home Secretary announces terms of reference for undercover policing inquiry 16 July 2015.	636 - 638
27	ucpi.org.uk: Summary of Undercover Policing Inquiry.	
28	Legal Summary of Blacklisting.	642
28A	Counsel's advice regarding Blacklisting.	643 - 650
28B	Further advice from Counsel.	651 - 655
29	Copy of Special Branch file: [REDACTED] Complaint by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that Special Branch information had jeopardised [REDACTED] proposed employment.	656 - 740

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30	Commander's Memorandum [REDACTED] Searches in Special Branch records. Taken from [REDACTED]	741
31	Copy of [REDACTED] SB contacts book.	742 - 750
31A	Spreadsheet collating [REDACTED] SB contacts book.	751 - 755
32	Statement from [REDACTED]	756 - 759
32A	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	760
33	Spreadsheet of activists checked against MPS and Op Herne databases.	761 - 763
34	Summary of Blacklist files for named individuals.	764 - 771
34A	Copies of Blacklist files for named individuals.	772 - 810
34B	Extracts from the SB files of those people mentioned in the "dip-sample", based on relevant dates: [REDACTED]	811 - 820 821 - 828 829
35	Extract of Hansard debate from House of Commons for 17/05/1989, featuring Chris Mullins MP.	830 - 843
36	Correspondence with Chris Mullin MP.	844 - 845
37	Request for assistance to UK Chief Constables.	846 - 847
38	Spreadsheet of responses from UK Police.	848 - 850
39	Further explanation of individual disciplinary cases, including : DC [REDACTED] from the MPS - including statement.	851 - 853
39A	DC [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary DS [REDACTED] from Lancashire Constabulary PC [REDACTED] from BTP in Glasgow PC [REDACTED] from BTP in Glasgow Linked correspondence for BTP/Police Scotland.	854 - 857 858 - 865
40	Response from North Yorkshire police regarding World In Action allegations.	866
41	Blacklist entry for Frank Smith.	867 - 869
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43	Statement from DCI [REDACTED]	930 - 933
44	SB file 402/96/8 for Frank Smith.	934 - 953
45	Statement from PS [REDACTED]	954 - 955
46	Information report from PC [REDACTED] regarding Cenotaph Stop 14/11/199.	956
46A	Statement of Inspector [REDACTED] 03/10/2014.	957
47	The Independent article by Jojo Moyes, dated 15/11/1993: Hard-left violence "hurting anti-racist organisations".	958 - 959
48	Scottish Affairs Select Committee: Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence for Messrs David Smith and David Clancy, dated Tuesday 16/10/2012.	960 - 996
49	Extract from SASC website: submissions from Mary Kerr to Mr Ian Davidson, March 2015. Page 5 from Section 9 of 11. Handwritten notes by Mr Ian Kerr in preparation for the SASC hearing.	997 - 998
50	Building.co.uk article by Will Martin dated 18/03/2015: Blacklisting campaigner loses appeal against Carillion.	999
51	Copy of handwritten notes seized by ICO, written by Ian Kerr regarding the Woodstock meeting with NETCU, dated 06/11/2008.	1000 - 1001
52	Copy of the PowerPoint presentation given by Gordon Mills on 06/11/2008.	1002 - 1030
52A	Statement for Dr Gordon Mills.	1031 - 1032
52B	Copy of generic NETCU PowerPoint supplied by [REDACTED]	1033 - 1080
52C	Statement of [REDACTED]	1081 - 1082
53	E-mail trail regarding NETCU documentation held by Cambridgeshire Police.	1083 - 85
54	[REDACTED]	
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56	Spreadsheet listing all reporting by Jenner found using the FTK cross referenced with the corresponding names on the Blacklist.	1092 - 1126
57	Notes of meeting with Peter Ward of SO15.	1127 - 1128
58	Statement of Mr Jack Winder.	1129 - 1130
59	Statement of [REDACTED]	1131 - 1138
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61	Notes of meeting with Mr Anton Setchell.	1140 - 1145
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66	[REDACTED], former [REDACTED] DC.	1175
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70	Home Office Circular [REDACTED] Police Reports of Convictions and Related Information.	1183 - 1194
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