Doc ID: 6636915 INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE USSID FA6001 (U) SECOND PARTY SIGINT RELATIONSHIPS ISSUE DATE: 22 August 2012 REVISED DATE: (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY CONCERN (U) National Security Agency/Central Security Service Foreign Affairs Directorate (U) LETTER OF PROMULGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND AUTHORIZATION (U) Topic of USSID FA6001 provides policy and guidance to elements of the United Promulgation States SIGINT System concerning relationships with Second Party SIGINT organizations. While USSID FA6101, ?Third Patty SIGINT Relationships,? dated 31 October 2007, revised 29 September 2009, provides policy and guidance concerning other foreign relationships, SS maintains a closer relationship with the SIGINT organizations in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand by virtue of the British-US Communications Intelligence Agreement (UKUSA), dated 5 March 1946. (U) USSID Edition (U) This USSID supersedes USSID FA6001, dated 22 March 1993, which must now be I NSA Case 100386 Pa 00555 [approved for Release by NSA on 09?20?2018, FOIA Litigation Case #100386 1 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) Legal Protection of Sensitive Information (U) Handling of USSID (U) Location of Official USSID (U) Access by Contractors and Consultants destroyed. This USSID contains sensitive information that is legally protected from release to any member of the public and is to be used only for of?cial purposes of the . (U) Users must strictly adhere to all classi?cation and handling restrictions (see Policy Manual 1-52, SS Classi?cation Manual,? dated 23 November 2004, revised 8 January 2007) when: 0 (U) storing hard or soft COpies of this USSID, or 0 (U) hyperlinking to this USSID. (U) Users are responsible for the update and management of this USSID when it is stored locally. Chief, SIGINT Policy will maintain and update the current of?cial USSID on (type ?go ussi Selected USSIDs are also available on an access- controlled TNTELINK Web page. Requests for access to the INTELINK USSID Page are granted based on mission need. (See the following INTELINK site: . l. . . (U) For elements to include the SIGINT Extended Enterprise: contractors or consultants assigned to SS Headquarters or to other elements of the SIGINT Extended Enterprise are pre-authorized for access to USSIDs via INTELINK, or in hard-copy formats as needed to perform their jobs However, for those sensitive USSIDs for which access is password-controlled, all users, to include contractors, must undergo additional security and mission vetting. (U) Outside elements: (UH-1966) contractors or consultants working at external facilities are pre-authorized for soft-copy access to USSIDs via or INTELINK, if connectivity to those systems is allowed by the contractors? sponsor. Where such connectivity is not established, any hard-copy provision of USSIDs must be authorized by the Chief, SIGINT Policy Secure Telephone System (NSTS): 966-5487, Secure Terminal Element (STE): (443) 479-l489, Defense NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00556 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) Access by Third Party Partners 86?36 Switched Network (DSN): 689-5487). (U) To request a shareable version: 0 (U) Refer to USSID Annex and a (U) Contact the appropriate Country Desk Of?cer (CDO) in the Foreign Affairs Directorate (DP). (U) Executive Agent (U) The executive agent for this USSID is: (U) Sections TERESA H. SHEA Signals Intelligence Director (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1 (U) POLICY SECTION 2 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES SECTION 3 - (U) GENERAL SECTION 4 - (U) TECHNICAL EXCHANGE AND VISITS SECTION 5 - (U) COMBINED PARTIES AND INTEGRATED PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS SECTION 6 (U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION SECTION 7 - (U) SECOND PARTY SIGINT ORGANIZATIONS AND LIAISON OFFICES SA OIA Case 100386 Page 00557 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) Annexes and Appendices (U) Policy (U) Executive Agent ANNEX A - (U) SIGINT LIAISON WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ANNEX - (U) RELEASE OF US. SIGINT INFORMATION TO SECOND PARTY PARTNERS SECTION 1 - (U) POLICY 1.1. The SIGINT Director is committed to continuing foreign partner cooperation in mutually bene?cial relationships, in accordance with US. laws and policy, including Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance. The Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) establishes policy governing procedures for the overall conduct of all SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments in accordance with DC ID 5/5, ?Conduct of SIGINT Liaison with Foreign Governments and the Release of US. SIGINT to Foreign Governments.? 1.2. SIGINT relationships with foreign nations, to include close international partners Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, have in the past provided, and must continue to provide a clear bene?t for the United States and, as speci?ed in DCID 6/6, ?Security Controls of the Dissemination of Intelligence Information,? dated 11 July 2001, promote the interests of the United States, is consistent with US. law, and does not pose unreasonable risk to US. foreign policy or national defense. U.S. SIGINT technology, resources, and collection shared with foreign partners must also enhance US. national interests through contributions by the SIGINT partner, support U.S. strategy when SIGINT is to be shared, and contribute to US. defense and intelligence goals. 1.3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service executes ODNI policy guidance in the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (UK) (hereinafter referred to as Second Parties). The Second Party SIGINT organizations are the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) for Australia, the Communications Security Establishment Canada (C SEC) for Canada, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) for New Zealand, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for the UK. SECTION 2 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES NSA Case 100386 Page 00558 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) 2.1. with the approval of the ODNI, appoints a Special United States Liaison Of?cer (SUSLO) for each Second Party SIGINT organization. Each SUSLO is responsible for SIGINT liaison and exchange with the applicable accredited Second Party SIGINT organization. The SUSLO represents the ODNI and in all SIGINT relationships with that Second Party, and, in so doing, executes National Intelligence Board (NIB) policy guidance. 2.2. The SUSLO facilitates direct exchange of information to ensure that NIB members obtain SIGINT information produced by the appropriate Second Party SIGINT organization. The SUSLO also assists in arranging meetings and exchanges of information between NIB members and their Second Party counterparts. (U) 2.3. (UALFGUG) The Associate Directorate for Policy and Records (DJ) is Organizations responsible for the staff administration of the policies and procedures established in this USSID. 2.4. Mission/Resource Authorities (MRAs) and Senior Functional Authorities (SFAs) are responsible for ensuring compliance with established policy concerning the release of SIGINT materials. SECTION 3 - (U) GENERAL - . (U) U.S. - Second 3. r. collaboration (includinpi Party Collaboration I [planning for emergencies, wartime operations, and combined exercises; and de?ning and conducting needed SIGINT research) is arranged by and the Second Party involved. 3.2. SIGINT procedures, nomenclature, and terminology are coordinated with Second Parties, using liaison channels, to ensure standardization insofar as practicable. (U) Access to US. 3.3. To access U.S. SIGINT information, Second Party nationals must meet SIGIN and comply with all US legal, security, oversight, and training guidelines. Access by a Second Party national to US. SIGINT organizations or US. SIGINT information is permitted only when the individual?s clearance and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) category and subcategory access authorization have been certi?ed, using liaison channels, and the request for access has been approved by the individual's parent organization. is the ?nal approving authority for Second Party access in accordance with Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Management Directive (SMD) 121, ?Access to Data for Second Party Personnel Engaged in SIGINT Production,? dated U1 NSA OIA Case 100386 Page 00559 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) Technical SIGINT Material Exchange (U) Visits and Engagements 86-36 1 August 2009. SECTION 4 - (U) TECHNICAL EXCHANGE AND VISITS 4.1. (U/tFeUe) Technical SIGINT is exchanged between US. and Second Party centers or ?eld units in accordance with the provisions of USSID AP2402, ?Technical Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Signals Analysis, and Data Forwarding Procedures," dated 23 April 2001, and the forwarding instructions in the sites' respective unit USSID. 4.2. 4.3. (U/r?FGHefProliferation and availability of secure communications technology provides numerous opportunities to convey and exchange information that were previously unavailable. While 'visits are important, personnel will be increasingly encouraged to explore other means to convey and exchange information. When a visit is necessary, approvaltizs based on the following criteria. a. The visit ful?lls a requirement that cannot be satis?ed through other established liaison channels. size of the visiting party and duration of the visit are consistent with fthe stated purpose of the visit and can be accommodated by the host facility. c. dates of the visit are convenient to the host facility. (1. (UHFGUG) The visit is mutually beneficial. . 4.4. Visits between elements (national to tactical) and Second Parties ?must be arranged in accordance with the guidelines established below. The af?liation of the visitor AND the organization to be visited determine which procedures should be followed: . 4.5. (U) Second Party personnel visiting U.S. SIGINT organizations: a. The?visitor must propose the visit through the national SIGINT authority (GCHQ, CSEC, or GC b. national SIGTNT authority will forward the visit proposal and :Fe 9 F3 SA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00560 Doc ID: 6636915 EXCEPTION 1: (mirage; lntratheater visits should be processed locally (for example, SUSLOL handles proposed UK visits to US. facilities in Europe; SUSLOC and SUSLOW respectively handle proposed Australian and New Zealand personnel visits to US. SIGINT facilities in the Paci?c). EXCEPTION For visits to the Centers - The national SIGINT authority will forward the visit proposal and clearance certi?cation to their[ I 4.6. (U) personnel visiting ?Se?dnd Party facilities: a. (U) Visits to Second'Party facilities within Second Party national borders: 0 (U) Thevvisitor should forward visit proposal and clearance certi?cation ,rn'ess?age to: Special United States Liaison Of?cer, London (SUSLOL) and SUSLOL, Cheltenham (SUSLOL CHELT) for visits to the 0 (WW) Special United States Liaison Of?cer, Ottawa (SUSLOO) for visits to Canada; 0 (UM-1999) Special United States Liaison Of?cer, Canberra (SUSLOC) for visits to Australia; and i Special United States Liaison Of?cer, Wellington (SUSLO) ~fbrvisits to New Zealand. D15 ?should be included on distribution for all such visit proposals, but is no longer requi?redto show concurrence on each of these messages; 0 The appropriate theater SS Representative (NCR) should be ,on distribution for all such visit?proposals; . (Uh?Feb?G? The SUSLO will coordinate with Second Party Partners for these visits. b. Visits to Second Party facilities based outside the Second Party national borders: SA OIA Case 100386 Page 00561 Doc ID: 6636915 7 0 (WW The visitor should contact the appropriate Second Party country CDO in DP for guidance early in the trip planning process. 4.7. US. service personnel visiting in-theater Second Party SIGINT facilities: 86?36 0 (U7641989) or appropriate theater NCR must approve visits involving policy issues. 4.8. (U5411989) Other US. government personnel visiting Second Party SIGINT facilities: a. (LW-FGHG) Visits to Second Party SIGINT organizations: 0 (UH-F989) The visitor must propose the visit and forward the clearance to DP, who will coordinate within SS and forward the proposal to the proper and EXCEPTION: Intratheater visits should be processed locally. For example, United States EurOpean Command (USEUCOM) visits to UK facilities should be proposed directly to United States Paci?c Command (USPACOM) visits to Australia or New Zealand SIGINT facilities should be proposed directly to SUSLOC and SUSLOW respectively. 0 All visit proposals must be formally approved by the Second Party partner; the forwarding of clearances does not constitute visit approval. DP or SUSLO will notify visitors of approval when received from the Second Party. b. (U/LEO-Uga-Visits to Second Party government facilities if special intelligence certi?cation is required: 0 (UMP-GHQ) If the visit is to a military facility, visitor should forward a visit proposal and clearance certi?cation message directly to the Staff Security Of?cer (580) of the Second Party military center as follows: 0 For visits to UK military facilities, send a message to British 86?36 visits to Canadian military facilities, send a message to NSA OIA Case 100386 Page 00562 Doc ID: 6636915 For visits to Australian military facilities, send a message to For visits to New-Ze'aland military facilities, send a message 0 Ifth'e'visit is to a nonmilitary facility, the visitor should forward a visit proposal and clearance certi?cation message as follows: a 0' 86?36 0 For visits to UK nonmilitary facilities, send a message to SUSLOL with an information copy to (UHF-939) For visits to Canadian nonmilitary facilities, send a message to For Visits to Australian nonmilitary facilities, send a message to and For visits to New Zealand nonmilitary facilities, send a message to SUSLOW. 4:9; U.S. contractors visiting Second Party SIGINT facilities for SI-level discussions: a. The contractor must have an sponsor. If the contractor is working directly with a Second Party SIGINT organization and does not have an sponsor DP will ful?ll the Sponsor role; 0 (UM-7939) The sponsor is responsible for verifying clearances and forwarding the visit proposal and clearance certi?cation message to the appropriate and Include the SS Of?ce of Industrial and Acquisition Security (013) on distribution for all contractor clearance messages 4.10 (UH-F939) Second Party personnel and their contracting representatives visiting contractor facilities for 81- level discussions: a. {a 887?)i NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00563 Doc ID: 6636915 (U/iFoHea?Visit Proposal Messages lb) 86?36 b. (Uh/43980) DP will conduct any coordination required for the visit; 0. (UHF-GHQ) The sponsoring organization must complete the Clearance Certi?cation Form (form G290l) and forward it to DP for signature; and If SS is not sponsoring the visit, the appropriate liaison of?ce must complete form G2901 and forward it to DP for signature. DP will sign the form and forward it to the Special Access Office (Q23). 4 11 visit proposal messages must be forwarded and contain the following visitor information: . SECTION 5 - (U) COMBINED PARTIES AND INTEGRATED PERSONNEL (U) SIGINT Agreements (U) Second Party Integration ASSIGNMENTS 5.1. Agreements between and Second Party SIGINT directors provide for the establishment of combined operational and research efforts and integrated personnel assignments at SIGINT locations. 5.2. In accordance with Policy 1?13, ?Second Party Integrees,? dated 29 December 2010, the integration of Second Party personnel into sites will 10 NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00564 Dochz6636915 5 7 be supported when it is bene?cial to the US SIGINT or mission. The establishment of these positions must be coordinated with, and approved by prior to staf?ng more fully within SS. (U) Security 5.3. Security rami?cations I Ramifications I associated with Second Party integrees must be cons1dered prior to staf?ng any positions. In accordance with Policy 113 and' SMD 427 Second Party integrees should not be placed in positions .- .a where they might in?uence or represent the SIGINT decision? ?making process, 85"? including bothD contractual and policy deliberations. SECTION 6 - (U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION (U) SIGINT 6.1. (UALFGUQ) SIGINT security procedures and criteria are mutually agreed to by US. Security Procedures and Second Party policy authorities and are contained in USSID SP0003. (U) Classi?cation 6.2. of December 1983, the fact that has a relationship with any or all Second Party. countries, or that they exchange liaison of?cers and conduct 86?36 SECTION 7 - (U) SECOND PARTY SIGINT ORGANIZATIONS AND LIAISON OFFICES (U) Second Party SIGINT Organizations i Second Party SIGINT Organizations 7.1. Second Party locations and liaison of?ces, and liaison of?ces associated with Second Parties, that appear in correspondence are: (131111 ll 86~36 NSA Case 100386 Page 00565 Doc ID: 6636915 (1) 35?35 USSID FA6001 ANNEX A - (U) SIGINT LIAISON WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM SECTION 1 - (U) PURPOSE (U) Purpose Al. 1. (U) This Annex delineates procedures and responsibilities for conducting SIGINT 12 NSA 01A Case 100386 Page 00566 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) SUSLO (U) The Associate Directorate for Policy and Records (U) Director of Foreign Affairs (U) Commanders of the US. Service Cr?yptologic Components (SCCS) (bl 86-36 ..-- liaison with Second Party collaborating centers. SECTION 2 - (U) RESPONSIBILITIES A2.l. (U) The SUSLO, as the senior representative of to the Second Party organization, is responsible for ensuring the continued effectiveness of SIGINT collaboration. A2.2. DJ is responsible for the conduct of policy for SS. SID, the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD), and DP are responsible for the conduct of foreign relations planning. A2.3. The Director, Foreign Affairs is the principal agent of for supervising the conduct of liaison with foreign partners. Within DP, (SIGINT Operations) is responsible for Second Party SIGINT relations, and DP2 is responsible for Second Party Information Assurance relations. A2.4. The commanders of US. SCCs, and their respective service representatives, are authorized to conduct liaison with respective in?theater Second Party military colleagues on SIGINT matters relating to the interoperability of military tactical systems, SIGINT operational capabilities, tactics, training, personnel utilization, etc. This includes exchange visits between personnel attached to military units and other organizations. a. WPrior approval for liaison on non-routine SIGINT matters must be obtained by the SC from SS. Respective SCC Headquarters and the appropriate SUSLO must be included on correspondence requesting such approval. b. SCC subordinate elements must report any significant actions taken, agreements made, or subjects discussed during such liaison to the respective SCC Headquarters, DP, and the appropriate SUSLO. SECTION 3 (U) PROCEDURES 13 NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00567 Doc ID: 6636915 (U) General (U) Second Party Liaison and Collaboration WW A3.1. (U5511989) Effective SIGINT liaison between and Second Party Partners requires the use of SUSLOs as the channels to Second Party Partners. Similarly, Second Party Partner liaison of?cers are channels to liaison with A32. Headquarters elements use (vice NSA) as the addressee when cerresponding with SUSLOs or Second Party centers. A3.3. administrative-related matters (Temporary Duty (TDY), personnel actions, etc), do not include either the Second Party HQ or its liaison office at SS as an action or information addressee. A3-4. (UHFGUG) Information Assurance inquiries should be forwarded to the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) with information copies to SIGINT Operations Group (DP 1) and Information Operations Group (DPZ). Since this is a USSID (SIGINT Directive), it is SS recommendation that the information on IA be limited to what has been proposed. IAD documentation should address foreign partner engagement. A35. (UHPOUO) The SUSLOs include the SUSLOC (Canberra), the SUSLOO (Ottawa), the SUSLOW (Wellington), and the SUSLOL (London). Each SUSLO must be kept informed of developments that pertain to, or may affect, SS and Second Party relationships. (3) -P.L. 86?36 a. (UHFOUO) If it is necessary to consult these of?ces before approaching the SUSLO, advise the SUSLO as soon as possible thereafter. Whenever substantive information is passed orally to a liaison of?cer, prepare a brief Memorandum for the Record of the conversation, and forward copies to the SUSLO, and DPZ for IA, by the most expeditious means. b. (UH-F989) Send to the concerned Second Party liaison of?ce all replies to queries or actions from that of?ce, even if the correspondence responds to a communication that has been forwarded from the director or chief of a Second Party HQ. Such correspondence must be coordinated with DP prior to release. Furnish information copies to the SUSLOs concerned. SA OIA Case 100386 Page 00568 Doc ID: 6636915 7 USSID FA6001 ANNEX - (U) RELEASE OF US. SIGINT INFORMATION TO SECOND PARTY SIGINT ORGANIZATIONS (U) Purpose SECTION 1 (U) PURPOSE Bl.l. This Annex sets forth the procedures for releasing U.S. SIGINT information to the Second Party SIGINT organizations. SECTION 2 (U) GENERAL (U) Second Party Collaboration (U) SIGINT Material (U) Intelligence Information Requirements (bill) 86-36 - ?an B2.l. and the Second Party Partners collaborate on a wide range of targets. The speci?c targets and degree of collaboration may change from time to time by mutual agreement and should be documented by a Memorandum of Understanding/Memorandum of Agreement or a Division of Effort (DOE) statement. Copies of all must be provided to the Of?ce of Corporate Policy (DJ), DP and SID SIGINT Policy. If a DOE Statement between and Second Party elements is used to document efforts against similar targets, a copy of this statement must be provided to B22. Party Partners receive raw traf?c, technical material, and serialized SIGINT reports derived from the US. effort on mutual targets, in accordance with US. government policy and guidelines to include SMD 427, as applicable. B23. Second Party Partners require intelligence information on issues impacting international relations, and on events related to the partners? political, economic, military, or security interests. However, no US. SIGINT information will be used or disseminated by Second Party Partners in a way that contradicts US. government policy and national security goals and objectives or is inconsistent with US. law. In addition to serialized reports furnished to Second Party Partners to meet the speci?c intelligence requirements, consideration must also be given to: La. WWI b. Wl 15 NSA 01A Case 100386 Page 00569 Doc ID: 6636915 (1) 86?36 SECTION 3 (U) RESPONSIBILITIES (U) Senior B3. 1. Deputy Directors/Associate Directors/Chiefs are responsible Management (U) Information Sharing Services (U) Release of SIGINT Material Proceed To: for ensuring compliance with established procedures when releasing SIGINT material under their purview to Second Party Partners. They are also responsible for providing any attendant technical support. B32. (Um SS SID Information Sharing Services (812) maintains records of serialized reports, including field-produced serialized reports, that are released to Second Party Partners. Proposed distribution changes must be coordinated with 812 and DPI. 12 will review SIGINT exchanges with Second Party Partners that also involve distribution to a third nation, such as in combined exercises. SECTION 4 (U) PROCEDURES B4. 1. material relevant to the requirements of a Second Party Partner is directly forwarded to the partner location. B42. of new categories or types of SIGINT material is to be coordinated with and 12. B43. (Um If U.S. SIGINT materials are required by a particular Second Party Partner, but cannot be released because of restrictions imposed by the producing, procuring, or supplying agency, 12 will review the need and coordinate with DP 1. NSA Director SID 1 SID Sta_ff SID Policy USSID Index 16 NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00570