No.___________________
__________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
__________________________________________
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
__________________________________________
PATRICK HENRY MURPHY,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN COLLIER, ET AL.,
Respondents
__________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
__________________________________________
I certify that on the 28th day of March 2019, one copy of Mr. Murphy’s
Motion for Stay of Execution Pending Filing, Consideration, and Disposition of his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was emailed to Mr. Matthew Ottoway, Assistant
Attorney General of Texas at matthew.ottoway@oag.texas.gov. All parties required
to be served have been served. I am a member of the Bar of this Court.
s/ David R. Dow
__________________
David R. Dow
Texas Bar No. 06064900
University of Houston Law Center
4604 Calhoun Rd.
Houston, Texas 77204-6060
713-743-2171

1

 No.___________________
__________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
__________________________________________
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
__________________________________________
PATRICK HENRY MURPHY,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN COLLIER, ET AL.,
Respondents
__________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________________
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING
FILING, CONSIDERATION, AND DISPOSITION OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________________________________________
This is a capital case. Mr. Murphy is scheduled to be executed after 6 o’clock p.m.
central time today, March 28, 2019.
David R. Dow*
Texas Bar No. 06064900
Jeffrey R. Newberry
Texas Bar No. 24060966
University of Houston Law Center
4604 Calhoun Rd.
Houston, Texas 77204-6060
713-743-2171
713-743-2131 (f)
* Member, Supreme Court Bar

2

 QUESTION PRESENTED
Capital Case.
When a state allows a Christian chaplain to be present in the execution chamber for
Christian (or other) inmates during their executions, does the Constitution or
federal law also require that they allow inmates of other faiths, including Buddhist
inmates, to be accompanied by ministers of their respective faiths when those
inmates provide prison officials with notice at least a month in advance of their
scheduled executions that they wish such pastoral accompaniment?

3

 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner (plaintiff in the district court and plaintiff-appellant in the court of
appeals) is Patrick Henry Murphy. Murphy is currently incarcerated under a
sentence of death at the Polunsky Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
in Livingston, Texas. He is scheduled to be executed today, March 28, 2019.
Respondents (defendants in the district court and defendants-appellees in the
court of appeals) are Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) employees
Bryan Collier, Lorie Davis, and Billy Lewis. Bryan Collier is the executive director
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He is being sued in his official
capacity.
Lorie Davis is the director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. She is being sued in her official capacity.
Ms. Davis is the person charged by the trial court’s order to execute the judgment of
death against Murphy.
Billy Lewis is the senior warden of the Huntsville Unit, the unit at which TDCJ
executes inmates. He is being sued in his official capacity. As the warden of the
Huntsville Unit, Mr. Lewis is the TDCJ official that supervises Texas executions.

4

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 1
QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. 3
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................ 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................. 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION……. ................................................................................................... 7
OPINION BELOW…………. .......................................................................................... 8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 8
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ....................... 8
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................... 9
REQUEST FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................... 9
CONCLUSION…… ...................................................................................................... 11
APPENDIX A……………….. ........................................................................................ 12
APPENDIX B……………. ............................................................................................. 18

5

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) .............................................................................................. 9
Dunn v. Ray,
139 S.Ct. 661 (2019) ............................................................................................. 9

6

 No.___________________
__________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
__________________________________________
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
__________________________________________
PATRICK HENRY MURPHY,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN COLLIER, ET AL.,
Respondents
__________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________________
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING
FILING, CONSIDERATION, AND DISPOSITION OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Patrick Murphy is scheduled to be executed by the State of Texas
after 6 o’clock p.m. today, Thursday, March 28, 2019. In a contemporaneously filed
pleading invoking this Court’s Rule 20.3, 23, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), Murphy has
requested that this Court prohibit the State from carrying out his execution unless
it permits Murphy’s Buddhist spiritual advisor, who has been ministering to
Murphy on Texas’ death row for six years, or another Buddhist reverend of the

7

 State’s choosing, to accompany Murphy into the execution chamber. If the State
informs this Court it is unable to carry out Mr. Murphy’s execution this evening if it
is required to permit him to be accompanied by a Buddhist minister, Murphy has
requested this Court issue a stay of execution until the State of Texas is able to
carry out the execution without violating Murphy’s right to religious freedom.
If this Court neither issues an order prohibiting the State of Texas from
carrying out the execution in the absence of a Buddhist minister in the execution
chamber, nor issues a stay of execution in connection with Murphy’s request for a
Writ of Prohibition, Murphy alternatively requests that this Court issue a stay of
execution pending the filing and disposition of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denying Mr. Murphy a stay of execution is published. A copy is attached as
Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to issue the relief requested pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in relevant
part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof….”

8

 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.: Appendix B
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts and procedural history are contained in Murphy’s Original
Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Murphy requests that this Court issue an order staying his execution pending
the filing and disposition of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which will raise the
following question:
When a state allows a Christian chaplain to be present in the
execution chamber for Christian (or other) inmates during their
executions, does the Constitution or federal law also require that they
allow inmates of other faiths, including Buddhist inmates, to be
accompanied by ministers of their respective faiths when those
inmates provide prison officials with notice at least a month in advance
of their scheduled executions that they wish such pastoral
accompaniment?
A stay of execution is warranted where there is: (1) a reasonable probability
that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issues sufficiently
meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; (2) a
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and (3) a likelihood
that irreparable harm will result if no stay is granted. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 895 (1983).
Mr. Murphy satisfies these criteria. First, a reasonable probability exists that
four members of the Court would consider the underlying issues as presenting
important questions that warrant guidance from this Court, as is evidenced by this
Court’s recent decision in Dunn v. Ray, 139 S.Ct. 661 (2019).

9

 Specifically, the underlying issues involve: (1) whether, if a State permits a
Christian death row inmate to be accompanied in the execution chamber during the
execution by a Christian minister, must it also allow inmates of others faiths, who
so request, to be accompanied by ministers of their faith during the execution; and
(2) is a request for such accompaniment timely when made a month in advance of a
scheduled execution?
Second, given the inattentiveness of the lower court’s ruling to the fact that,
to this very day, the State of Texas has not informed Murphy whether it intends to
permit him to be accompanied by a minister of his faith, there is a significant
possibility this Court will conclude that the court below erred in denying Murphy
relief based entirely on its conclusion he waited too long to bring this action.
Finally, Murphy will suffer irreparable injury if a stay is not granted because he
will be executed.

10

 CONCLUSION
Mr. Murphy respectfully requests that the Court stay his execution currently
set for March 28, 2019, pending the filing and disposition of his Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ David R. Dow
_____________________________
David R. Dow*
Texas Bar No. 06064900
Jeffrey R. Newberry
Texas Bar No. 24060966
University of Houston Law Center
4604 Calhoun Rd.
Houston, Texas 77204-6060
713-743-2171
713-743-2131 (f)
* Member, Supreme Court Bar

11

 Appendix A

12

 Case: 19-70007

Document: 00514891400

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/27/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

No. 19-70007
PATRICK HENRY MURPHY,

FILED
March 27, 2019
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRYAN COLLIER, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice;
LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division; BILLY LEWIS, Warden,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before SMITH, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Murphy is scheduled for execution on March 28, 2019, for the
murder of police officer Aubrey Hawkins on December 24, 2000. His execution
date was set on November 29, 2018. Murphy complains that the state of Texas
permits only religious clerics who are employees of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to be physically present in the execution chamber at
the time of an execution. He further complains that the TDCJ at present only
employs chaplains who are Christian or Muslim, while acknowledging that the
TDCJ contracts to bring chaplains and spiritual advisors of other religions into
the prison facilities. Under the state’s procedures, chaplains and spiritual
advisors who are not employees of the TDCJ may meet with an inmate on the
13

 Case: 19-70007

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Date Filed: 03/27/2019

No. 19-70007
execution date prior to entering the execution chamber and they may watch
the execution from a viewing room, but they may not physically enter the
execution chamber itself.
On March 20—eight days before his scheduled execution—Murphy
petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of prohibition
seeking to prohibit his execution until the state allowed his preferred spiritual
advisor—a Buddhist priest—to be physically present in the execution chamber
at the time of execution. That petition was denied on March 25. On March
26—two days before his scheduled execution—Murphy filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint and a motion for stay of execution with the federal district court,
again seeking to prohibit his execution until the state allows his preferred
spiritual advisor to be physically present in the execution chamber.

His

Section 1983 complaint alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, the
Free Exercise Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). In a well-reasoned eleven-page Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the district court denied the motion for a stay of execution as
untimely. Murphy appeals the district court’s determination that he is not
entitled to a stay of execution, filing his appeal with this court on March 27—
one day before his scheduled execution.
“[W]e review a district court’s decision to deny a stay of execution for
abuse of discretion.” Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013). “[A]
stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of
right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing
its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.”
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). To be eligible for a stay of
execution, Murphy must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury
outweighs any harm that will result if the stay is granted; and (4) that the stay
2
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No. 19-70007
will not disserve the public interest. See Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 318
(5th Cir. 2012) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). However, “[a]
court considering a stay must also apply a strong equitable presumption
against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a
time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.”
Hill, 547 U.S. at 584 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See also
Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (“A court
may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in
deciding whether to grant equitable relief.”). The Supreme Court recently
emphasized, yet again, the importance of timeliness when moving for a stay of
execution. See Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019) (vacating a stay of
execution granted by a circuit court when the applicant waited until ten days
before the scheduled execution to file his claim).
As the district court rightfully recognized, the proper time for raising
such claims has long since passed.

Murphy’s execution date was set on

November 29, 2018. By his counsel’s admission, he waited until February 28
to first request that the state allow Murphy’s preferred spiritual advisor to not
just meet with him prior to entering the chamber and watch from the viewing
room, but actually enter the execution chamber with him. He then waited until
March 20—eight days before the scheduled execution—to raise his First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Those claims were not raised before the federal district court until March 26—
two days before the scheduled execution—and an appeal was not brought
before this court until March 27—the day before the scheduled execution.
Murphy asserts that his allegations underlying this case are almost
identical to those recently addressed by the dissenting Justices in Ray. See
139 S. Ct. at 661–62 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

However, in making that

assertion, without having timely sought factual development of his allegations
3
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No. 19-70007
and the state’s execution chamber procedures, Murphy fails to acknowledge at
least one significant difference.

Unlike the situation described by the

dissenting Justices in Ray, the policy of only permitting TDCJ-employed
chaplains into the execution chamber at issue in this case has been in place
since at least 2012 and is not ambiguous about presence in the execution
chamber as distinct from in the adjacent viewing area. The district court
determined that the policy is not confidential and that Murphy’s counsel is an
experienced death penalty litigator who knew, or should have known, about
the policy well before the weeks immediately preceding the scheduled
execution.

However, even if we were to accept Murphy’s current

representation that he and his counsel did not have access to the text of that
policy, his counsel was definitively notified of that provision by an email from
the TDCJ’s general counsel on March 5. Nonetheless, Murphy waited until
March 20 to raise any related claims before the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, and until March 26 to raise any such claims before the federal courts.
Such delays are unacceptable under the circumstances.
This court also takes note, as did the district court, of the multiple
warnings that Murphy’s counsel has received in the past for filing last-minute
motions. See In re Dow, No. WR-57,060-03, 2010 WL 2332420 (Tex. Crim. App.
Jun. 9, 2010) (finding Dow failed to show cause for his untimely filing and
warning that further untimely filings could result in sanctions). See also In re
Dow, 481 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2015) (noting that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held Dow in contempt for his untimely filings and barred him from
practicing before that court for one year).
“In response to systemic abuses by prisoners bringing dilatory claims,
the federal courts—and this circuit in particular—have been forced to develop
extensive jurisprudence resisting those requests for long-available claims
presented, for the first time, on the eve of execution.” Ruiz v. Davis, 850 F.3d
4
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No. 19-70007
225, 229 (5th Cir. 2017). See also 5th Cir. R. 8.10; Bible v. Davis, 739 F. App’x
766, 770 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished); Preyor v. Davis, 704 F. App’x 331, 344
(5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); In re Edwards, 865 F.3d 197, 209–10 (5th Cir.
2017); In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805, 826 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished);
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2013); Brown v.
Livingston, 457 F.3d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 2006); Reese v. Livingston, 453 F.3d
289, 290–91 (5th Cir. 2006); White v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 572, 573–74 (5th Cir.
2005). As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion and Murphy’s
motion for a stay of execution is DENIED.

Certified as a true copy and issued
as the mandate on Mar 27, 2019
Attest:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

5
17

 Appendix B

18

 Page 4451

TITLE 42—THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

Stat. 1488, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code,
see Short Title note set out under section 2000bb of this
title and Tables.
AMENDMENTS
2000—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 106–274 struck out ‘‘and
State’’ after ‘‘Federal’’.

§ 2000bb–4. Establishment clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws
respecting the establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Establishment
Clause’’). Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible
under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. As used in
this section, the term ‘‘granting’’, used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.
(Pub. L. 103–141, § 7, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1489.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original
‘‘this Act’’, meaning Pub. L. 103–141, Nov. 16, 1993, 107
Stat. 1488, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code,
see Short Title note set out under section 2000bb of this
title and Tables.

CHAPTER 21C—PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE IN LAND USE AND BY INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
Sec.

2000cc.

§ 2000cc–1

fect, commerce with foreign nations, among
the several States, or with Indian tribes,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in
the implementation of a land use regulation
or system of land use regulations, under
which a government makes, or has in place
formal or informal procedures or practices
that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses
for the property involved.
(b) Discrimination and exclusion
(1) Equal terms
No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than
equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination
No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation that discriminates against
any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.
(3) Exclusions and limits
No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation that—
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies
from a jurisdiction; or
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.
(Pub. L. 106–274, § 2, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 803.)

Protection of land use as religious exercise.
Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons.
Judicial relief.
Rules of construction.
Establishment Clause unaffected.
Definitions.

Pub. L. 106–274, § 1, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 803, provided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting this chapter and
amending sections 1988, 2000bb–2 and 2000bb–3 of this
title] may be cited as the ‘Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000’ ’’.

§ 2000cc. Protection of land use as religious exercise

§ 2000cc–1. Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons

2000cc–1.
2000cc–2.
2000cc–3.
2000cc–4.
2000cc–5.

(a) Substantial burdens
(1) General rule
No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation in a manner that imposes
a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person, including a religious assembly or
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person, assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(2) Scope of application
This subsection applies in any case in
which—
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a
program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would af-

SHORT TITLE

(a) General rule
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution, as defined in
section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(b) Scope of application
This section applies in any case in which—
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a
program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes.
(Pub. L. 106–274, § 3, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 804.)

19

 § 2000cc–2

TITLE 42—THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

§ 2000cc–2. Judicial relief
(a) Cause of action
A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense
under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the
Constitution.
(b) Burden of persuasion
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to
support a claim alleging a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc
of this title, the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim,
except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of
persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the
plaintiff’s exercise of religion.
(c) Full faith and credit
Adjudication of a claim of a violation of section 2000cc of this title in a non-Federal forum
shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a
Federal court unless the claimant had a full and
fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.
(d) Omitted
(e) Prisoners
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended
by that Act).
(f) Authority of United States to enforce this
chapter
The United States may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce compliance with this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to deny, impair, or
otherwise affect any right or authority of the
Attorney General, the United States, or any
agency, officer, or employee of the United
States, acting under any law other than this
subsection, to institute or intervene in any proceeding.
(g) Limitation
If the only jurisdictional basis for applying a
provision of this chapter is a claim that a substantial burden by a government on religious exercise affects, or that removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, the provision shall not apply if the
government demonstrates that all substantial
burdens on, or the removal of all substantial
burdens
from,
similar
religious
exercise
throughout the Nation would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on commerce
with foreign nations, among the several States,
or with Indian tribes.
(Pub. L. 106–274, § 4, Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 804.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original
‘‘this Act’’, meaning Pub. L. 106–274, Sept. 22, 2000, 114
Stat. 803, which is classified principally to this chapter.

Page 4452

For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see
Short Title note set out under section 2000cc of this
title and Tables.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, referred to
in subsec. (e), is Pub. L. 104–134, title I, § 101(a) [title
VIII], Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–66, as amended.
For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see
Short Title of 1996 Amendment note set out under section 3601 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure,
and Tables.
CODIFICATION
Section is comprised of section 4 of Pub. L. 106–274.
Subsec. (d) of section 4 of Pub. L. 106–274 amended section 1988(b) of this title.

§ 2000cc–3. Rules of construction
(a) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize any government to burden any religious belief.
(b) Religious exercise not regulated
Nothing in this chapter shall create any basis
for restricting or burdening religious exercise or
for claims against a religious organization including any religiously affiliated school or university, not acting under color of law.
(c) Claims to funding unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall create or preclude a right of any religious organization to receive funding or other assistance from a government, or of any person to receive government
funding for a religious activity, but this chapter
may require a government to incur expenses in
its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.
(d) Other authority to impose conditions on
funding unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall—
(1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the activities or
policies of a person other than a government
as a condition of receiving funding or other assistance; or
(2) restrict any authority that may exist
under other law to so regulate or affect, except as provided in this chapter.
(e) Governmental discretion in alleviating burdens on religious exercise
A government may avoid the preemptive force
of any provision of this chapter by changing the
policy or practice that results in a substantial
burden on religious exercise, by retaining the
policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing
exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the
substantial burden.
(f) Effect on other law
With respect to a claim brought under this
chapter, proof that a substantial burden on a
person’s religious exercise affects, or removal of
that burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes, shall not establish any inference
or presumption that Congress intends that any
religious exercise is, or is not, subject to any
law other than this chapter.

20