IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, 
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF NO. 
VS. 
Gray 2004 Mercedes Benz CLK, PA LIC BMORE C, 
and all contents in vehicle, RED 1996 Dodge Neon, PA LIC JMV9768, VIN
and all contents in vehicle, $924.10 Cash, Phillips TV, Visio
TV, Amt .0380 Cal Pistol Ser A70895, Black Safe
RE: Christopher IVIichael Hawkins
OPINION AND ORDER

On October 30, 2018, Defendant Christopher Michael l-Iawkins pled guilty in the
Court of Common Pleas of York County, Judge Craig T. 'I?rebilcock presiding, to Delivery
of Heroin, Possession with Intent to Deliver Heroin, and Possession ofHeroin. He also 
guilty to being a Person not to Possess a Firearm. Subsequently, the Commonwealth
initiated a forfeiture action pursuant to the guilty plea against the property enumerated in the
caption above. A forteiture hearing was held on December 17, 2018, with the parties
permitted to submit supplemental briefs and argument. This opinion follows.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The Commonwealth seeks forfeiture of the above referenced property pursuant to 42
5802 et seq. The legislature enacted this statue, as amended, to "eliminate
economic incentives of drug-related activity and thereby deter such activity.?
v. Heater, 899 A.2d l126, 1132 (Pa. Super 2006). Civil forfeitures are a
quasi-criminal proceeding that is a penalty for engaging in wrongdoing prohibited by statute.

Property is forfeited not as a result of criminal conviction, but through a separate

proceeding, civil in form but quasi-criminal in nature, in which the agency seeking

the property must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the

property sought and the possessor's illegal 
v. Jackson, 53 A.3d 952, 956 (Pa. melth 2012).

In order to prevail in a forfeiture action the Commonwealth must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that a nexus exists between the pertinent illegal activity and
the property subject to forfeiture; when that burden is sustained, the burden of proofshil'ts to
the preperty owner to disprove the evidence or establish statutory defenses to avoid
forfeiture. M92 Chevrolet, 844 A.2cl 583 (Pa. melth 2004). The
forfeiture statute grants the police extensive powers to seize the personal property of
citizens, without prior judicial approved or order when the police claims establish a nexus
between the possessionfownership of property and illicit drug activity.

Under the statute, upon an order of the court forfeiting property, the property is sold
at auction {hearing transcript of December 17, 2018 at page 40, hereinafter Tr. 40).
Proceeds from the auction are then utilized to help ?nance the operations of the Drug Task
Force through the District Attorney?s Of?ce (Tr. 43). The Drug Task Force is the police
entity whose of?cers are involved in the seizure of the property involved in this case (Tr. 2,
40).

FACTS OF THE CASE

Claimant, Christopher Hawkins, is a convicted drug dealer. On March 22, 2016,
Of?cers of the York County Drug Task Force set up a purchase of heroin from Mr. Hawkins
at his home at 298 Rathton Road, York The purchase was conducted through
a con?dential informant. Mr. l-lawkins resided at 298 Rathton Road with his girlfriend,
Christina ()liveras. His adult son sometimes resided at the residence as well. Mr. l-lawkins

was the owner of 4 to 5 vehicles at the time of the relevant drug transactions. The exact

2

number is not important to the ultimate disposition of this case and there was conflicting
testimony on that point. Amongst the vehicles that the Defendant did own were two of the
vehicles the Commonwealth seeks to forfeit in this case. specifically a gray 2004 Mercedes
Benz CLK. and a red 1996 Dodge Neon 


On March 22. 2016, Detective S. of the York County Drug Task Force watched Mr.
Hawkins exit from his residence at 298 Rathton Road to meet with the con?dential
informant for the sale of heroin. Mr. Hawkins performed the sale. then returned into his
residence. The informant returned to the police surveilling the transaction and turned over
the heroin he hadjust purchased from Hawkins.

0n the following day, March 23, 2016, Detective 3. met with a 2"(1 con?dential
informant. The 2"d informant again went to the address. 298 Rathton Road, to conduct a
controlled buy from Mr. Hawkins. The 2'1d CI purchased heroin from Mr. Hawkins. The
con?dential informant immediately told the police that he had purchased the drugs from Mr.
Hawkins utilizing the official funds he had been provided. The CI turned over the heroin
that he had just purchased. The Defendant did not use any vehicles in the sale of any drugs
on the 22'?1 or :23? (Tr. 15-16)

Immediately following the second sale, Detective F. of the District Attorney?s Of?ce
obtained a search warrant for the Rathton Road residence. In the interim, Mr. Hawkins had
left his residence and was taken into custody during a traffic stop. At that time he was
driving a black Ford Escape with the vanity tag, During the apprehension Mr.
Hawkins was found to be in possession of $526.00, of which $80 were official funds that
had been used in the purchase of illegal narcotics just prior to leaving the house. This

vehicle was not sought for forfeiture.

Subsequent to his arrest, Mr. Hawkins was interviewed by Detective F.. while
Detective S. assembled a team to execute the search warrant on 298 Rathton Road. Pursuant
to the search wan'ant. Detective S. and his team entered the residence at 298 Rathton Road.
Inside they located defendant's son, Christopher Hawkins Jr. who indicated that he
sometimes stayed in the residence (Tr. The son identi?ed Defendant?s bedroom as the
northeast bedroom of the house. In the course of searching that particular room, the police
located marijuana, an AMT .380 pistol= and a black safe which contained $138.10 and 4
ecstasy pills. They also located two boxes of ammtmition for the pistol. There were other
pills, packaging materials. and digital scales throughout the room. In addition, a Visio TV
was located in that same bedroom. A Phillips TV was located and seized in the living room.
Both televisions were seized. solely because they had resale value. (Tr. 20).

Detective S. testified that they seized a 1996 red Dodge Neon. a Jeep. as well as the
2004 Mercedes Benz, which were taken back to the police station. Detective S. concluded
that that the Jeep and Ford Escape were not involved in any criminal activity and the police
could not see any nexus between the drugs and those two vehicles. so they were returned
(Tr. 12).

Detective S. testi?ed that the Dodge Neon and the Mercedes were kept by the police
because ?we thought there was clear and convincing nexus between drugs and those
vehicles? (Tr. However. no credible facts were provided by Detective S. to substantiate
these conclusionsl. During cross examination. Detective S. indicated the vehicles did not
play any role in the drug transactions on the 22"1 or (Tr. 15-16). Detective F. was the

investigator who took the lead in questioning Hawkins (Tr. 17). Detective S. only heard a

 

There was no testimony during the hearing that distinguished the NeontMercedes from the JeeptFord Escape
as far as connection to drug trafficking or drug money.

a

?very little bit of it.? (Tr. 17}. Mr. Hawkins indicated that he went to Baltimore two or three
times a week to get drugs (Tr. 17). However, he never speci?ed that he used the Mercedes
(Tr. Detective S. testified that Mr. Hawkins indicated that he did drive the Mercedes
Benz around York to ?meet people for money primary for drugs.? This is a verbal statement
that was not recorded, nor preserved in any way other than in the of?cer?s memory. 2 It is
not a statement corroborated by Detective F., and the Court finds Detective S?s memory to
be faulty on that point. Detective S. testi?ed that there was no lien on either the Neon or
Mercedes Benz (Tr. 19), the apparent sole distinguishing factor as to why they were seized.
instead of the other vehicles.

Regarding the televisions, during cross examination, Detective S. was asked ?What
is the connection between drugs and the TV, speci?cally the Phillips that was found in
the living room?? Detective S. indicated that the sole basis in seizing the TV was that ?Mr.
Hawkins wasn?t employed, therefore, not able to have money to obtain such items."3 This
conclusion was made despite not knowing the age of the TV. The detective acknowledged
that the girlfriend was working and that she could have afforded the TV, and that "it was
seized because there was value to that TV to sell it.? (Tr. 20) As further evidence in the
hearing revealed, the supposition that Hawkins had not been legitimately employed was
wrong.

When asked why the Visio TV in the bedroom was taken, the officer responded

?same theory? (Tr. 21). The Defense counsel asked Detective S. to elaborate, asking ?Since

 

3 The Court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness as well as his level of certainty in his
recollection of this statement, and concludes based upon this, as well as subsequent testimony from Detective
F. that the Defendant made no such statement. In fact, the Defendant was scrupulously evasive at all times
about what speci?c vehicles he used, if any, to support his drug dealing business.

3 This conclusion was later refuted by evidence and a stipulation presented later in the hearing that the
Defendant was working until shortly before his arrest.

he wasn?t working to afford it, it must have come from ill-gotten means?" Detective S.
responded "Correct." The officer conceded once again that the Defeudantis witer?girlfriend,
Ms. Oliveras. who resides at 298 Rathton Road, does work. On further cross examination
the of?cer acknowledged that he does not know the age of the Visio TV, nor whether Mr.
Hawkins had ever worked previously. In short. there was no factual evidence to support the
conclusion that Mr. Hawkins (or another resident) could not legitimately afford a television
being present in his home. The task force seized the property simply because it had resale
value.

The Court then engaged in a brief questioning of the witness to inquire how the
police decide which items to take and which items not to take when dealing with a suspected
drug dealer. This Court has noted in numerous forfeiture proceedings initiated by the Drug
Task Force in the past year that large screen TVs are very frequently seized from the houses
of drug suspects, as are video game systems, regardless of any nexus to drug activity or
funds. Accordingly, in the instant case. the Court inquired if there was an SOP that led or
directed police towards those items. Detective S. indicated that there was not. The Court
further inquired why other items of value are not taken. such as silverware or llummels
(collectibles). or furniture. Detective S. responded can only say we may take those items
if there is value in those items. There is not typical value in furniture or typically value in
general silverware. Whereas there is value in those other items." (Tr. 25).

Detective F. then testified and indicated that his role was to assist with the controlled
purchase in the afternoon of March 23, 2016. He indicated that he observed the controlled
buy between Mr. I-lawkins and the informant. and remained at 298 Rathton where the
purchase had been made (Tr. 27). Detective F. ultimately arrested and questioned Mr.

Hawkins. Detective F. read Mr. Hawkins his Miranda warnings. which he waived. Mr.

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Hawkins revealed that he obtained his herein in Baltimore and in York, buying bundles of
gram quantity to ?take care of" a couple of people, mainly friends (Tr. 31). He also
acknowledged possession of the handgun. In short, he made credible and non-evasive
statements against his personal interest.

When asked what vehicles he drove to Baltimore, he said that he would ?take
whatever was available.? (Tr. 31). It was at that point, or just before, that Detective S.
walked in upon the conversation. (Tr. 31).

Detective F. asked Mr. Hawkins specifically if he took the Dodge Neon and the
Mercedes to Baltimore. He said that he did, but when asked if he took the Mercedes to
Baltimore to pick up heroin, he responded simply by indicating that "he took whatever
vehicle was around.? 4 The discussion between the Detective and the Defendant continued
as the police sought clari?cation. The Defendant indicated to Detective F. that it sounded to
him as if the police were seeking to get him to admit that he used the car so that they can
take it (Tr. 32}. Detective F. responded that he wanted to clarify as to what the Defendant
did with his vehicle when it came to heroin sales, and at that point the Defendant stopped
responding to questions about the Mercedes.

The Defendant made the same general statement in regard to inquiries about links
between the Dodge Neon and drug activity, that ?he would take whatever vehicle was
around." Detective F. indicated that the atmosphere in discussing matters with Mr. l-Iawkins
was not antagonistic and that he was discussing things very freely. He discussed ?his heroin
sales,. .. what he sold it for, where he purchased his heroin for resale, things like that. . (Tr.

34), Detective F. conceded that the Defendant never acknowledged that he used either the

 

There is no violation of the Controlled Substance Act by a person taking a vehicle to Baltimore. [t is up to
the police to establish by preponderance oftlte evidence that the vehicle was taken to Baltimore for the purpose
of an illicit drug purchase or other action contrary to law. Cmumrmu-eai?rh v. .7992 Chevrolet. 844 A.2d 533

(Pa. melth 2004). In this case the police were not able to do that.
7

Mercedes or the Dodge Neon for drug distribution or purchases (Tr. 35). Detective F. also
admitted that the police did not have any evidence that he used either vehicle for drug
transactions (Tr. 36). The Court ?nds the testimony of Detective F. credible.

Upon questioning by the Commonwealth, Detective F. indicated that if there was
?nancial information, such as receipts or recent purchase information as to who made a
purchase of personal property, that the police will take that information, in order to
determine whether property should be thr?eited (Tr. 39). Upon questioning by the Court.
Detective F. indicated that items seized to be forfeited are sold at auction twice a year. with
the proceeds going to the District Attorney?s Of?ce to the Drug Task Force? (Tr. 40).
Detective F. clarified on recross that the funds are going to fund the Drug Task Force active
training, equipment. and overtime (Tr. 43). Forfeitures, in part, therefore, result in
additional income streams to the very officers seizing the property, a source of concern to
this Court.

Christina Oliver-as, the Defendant?s girlfriend, testi?ed at the hearing (Tr. 44). The
Court noted that her testimony would be received with doubt. because as she was walking
up to the witness stand, she paused and exchanged information in a hushed voice with the
Defendant at the Defense table. This appeared to the Court to be an attempt to either
in?uence his testimony or her own (Tr. 44). Ms. Oliveras testi?ed that the TV in the living
room belonged to her and that she purchased the TV in 2015 from Sam?s Club. She indicted
Mr. Hawkins purchased the TV in the bedroom in March 2016. She also testi?ed that the
Defendant was working just prior to his arrest to March 2016. She further testi?ed that the
Red Dodge Neon belonged to Mr. Hawkins, but that she and the Defendant bought the Gray
2004 Mercedes Benz together (Tr. 43). The Mercedes Benz was bought with a trade-in ofa

Dodge Magnum, which they previously owned, as well as a $1,500 down payment at that

8

time. and a $1500 payoff within a month or two (Tr. 49). Ms. Oliveras placed the date of
purchase at February 1. 2014. Ms. Oliveras testified that she was working at a nursing home
in 2014 making between $19.80 to $22.80 per hour on a time basis. The Court ?nds that
Ms. Oliveras statements regarding her work record and pay to be credible. as well as
information provided regarding her relationship with the Defendant. such as the fact that she
cohabitated with the Defendant at the time of the seizure. This testimony was corroborated
by other evidence in the case. The Court also ?nds her testimony credible that the
Defendant was working up until just prior to his arrest in 2016. As to any other testimony
regarding ownership of property in this case, the Court gives no weight to her testimony due
to her misconduct as she approached the witness stand.

Christopher Hawkins next testi?ed. and the Court finds that the Defendant testified
credibly. The Defendant presented employment records for the Court?s consideration to
corroborate his testimony that he had regular employment until just before his arrest. He
testi?ed that he had been dealing heroin and that he had also been employed in a series of
temporary jobs leading up to March 2016. including through a temporary agency (Tr. 57).
The Defendant testi?ed that in 2014 he was working for Ferguson Trenching Company. a
subcontractor for Baltimore Gas and Electric, and that he may have also worked for a
moving company. The Defendant testi?ed that he purchased a Gray 2004 Mercedes Benz
from and Motors for a trade in, $1500 down. and the balance payoff in 30 to 60 days.
The Court ?nds that the Defendant legitimately purchased this vehicle with lawfully
obtained funds, and there is no evidence to indicate that the vehicle was bought with the
proceeds from any drug transactions. The Court also ?nds that there is no evidence that the
Defendant bought the Dodge Neon with the proceeds from any drug transactions. The

Defendant denied ever selling drugs out of the Mercedes Benz and the Court ?nds there is

9

not suf?cient evidence either vehicle was used for drug transactions.

The Commonwealth and Defense counsel entered into a stipulation that beginning in
2014. speci?cally January 29, 2014 through April 12, 2014, Defendant was working on a
part time basis for the moving service (Tr. 61). The Defendant was also working through
February 2016 and presented bank records to substantiate that fact, that he was working
through Aerotek. (Tr. 62-62). Accordingly, the sappositions and conjecture upon which the
task force justified seizing the televisions was completely without factual basis.

ANALYSIS

This Court holds that the forfeiture statute enacted by the Legislature,
42 5802 ct seq., is not constitutionally vague, accomplishes a legitimate
purpose, and is not intended to be punitive in nature. It is within the legitimate
authority ofthe legislature and the Court to ensure that Defendants who engage in the illegal
sale of narcotics do not enrich themselves by engaging in the sale of illicit and dangerous
narcotics by removing the pro?t motive. It is also a legitimate government purpose to deter
drug dealing by prohibiting defendants from spending or investing drug proceeds into other
property to raise their quality of life. Accordingly, forfeiting such drug money or drug
money financed property is a legitimate government purpose. if done consistent with due
process and other legal precedent designed to protect the rights of citizens accused of
wrongdoing.

However, a lawful statute can be applied in a manner that is unlawful in execution.
This Court equally ?nds that the forfeiture statute, as applied in this case by the Drug Task
Force, was constitutionally impermissible. Specifically, the actions of the police in this case
constituted the illegal seizure of private property from citizens in an arbitrary manner

without due process. This seizure was conducted in violation of the United States

10

Constitution protection against illegal seizure of property under the Fourth Amendment, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as
violating. Constitution Article 1, Section 8, that protects citizens
from unreasonable seizure oftheir possessions?

This case is being decided on the facts of this case alone. It is important to note.
however. that overzealous forfeiture actions by the Drug Task Force in the time frame of
this case have not been isolated in nature. Dozens of forfeiture actions are brought before
this court each year. While the property seized may vary from case to case, with some cases
involving automobile, firearms or other property, a disconcerting pattern is evident that
Drug Task Force officers seize big screen that are present in the property regardless of
any link to drug money or illegal activity. In addition, they disproportionately seize all
game systems and video games, present in the property. The decision as to which property
to seize is driven, in the words of Detective S., by which property has resale value. The
Drug Task Force does not seize furniture or clothing, silverware, or other items that have
low resale value. (Tr. 25). They focus upon items that have high resale value. That is not a
problem in itself, until the police begin to ignore that there must be a nexus to drug dealing
or drug money to seize those higher high value assets. This nexus is essential, because
property itself cannot be considered derivative contraband merely because it is owned by or
occasionally used by a criminal drug offender for legitimate purposes. Coimnonu'eahh v.
One I 985 Dork Binc ?llercedcs Benz (for. 571 A.2d 482 (PaSuper. 1990). Objects do not
acquire a ?guilt by association? simply because they are owned by someone engaged in

criminal activity. Petition af.-Maglisco. 491 A.2d 1331, 1385 (Pa.Super. 1985). In this case.

 

5 Constitutional protection against unreasonable government seizures ofpropert?y existed in more
than ?fteen years before promulgation ofthe Federal Fourth Amendment to the US. Constitution.
Self. 504 Pa. 46, (J3, 47U A.2t?l 45? (l933).



the Drug Task Force personnel ignored the need for such a nexus and engaged in a shopping
spree. for the bene?t oftheir budget, based solely on the property?s value.

The Court finds the two televisions were seized solely because the Defendant was
involved in drug sale activities and because he possessed items of resale value (Tr. 20).
There was no nexus. The Court ?nds that the Task Force members knew or should have
known there was no evidence linking the televisions in any way to drug dealing or drug
money. They seized the property solely because the Defendant was a drug dealer and the
property had resale value. There is no law to support such an arbitrary exercise of police
power in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the US. Constitution (as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment), as well as in violation of the 
Constitution. Article 1, Section 8.

The Defendant in this case lives in a home in York County, with his girlfriend who
had a job. The defense presented evidence during the forfeiture hearing that the Defendant
was regularly employed before his arrest and conviction, and that the Defendant?s adult son
resided in the premises off and on during all dates relevant to the action. At no time related
to this case did the police takea seek, or seize any financial record of the Defendant to
support their claim he could not legitimately afford the televisions. The police did not seek
to determine whether the electronic devices had been purchased with drug proceeds or
through bona tide means. They did not seek to determine ownership of the items as being
belonging to the defendant solely, to his wife, or to his son. The officers simply saw items
of value that had a market resale value in a drug dealer?s home. and seized those items
without a valid basis in law.

The Defendant and his family were denied the use of the property for 2 1/2 years. a

period of time where the property had no evidentiary value to the police, during which it

l2

depreciated in value, and during which the Defeadant?s family had to choose to buy
replacetnent property, or to live 2 years without access to their unlawfully seized property.

There is no dispute that the Defendant in this case is a bad actor. He does not have
clean hands and is a criminal. l-lowever, the protections of the Constitution of the United
States, and that of do not create two tiers of protection against unlawful and
arbitrary seizure of private property by the police. All citizens of the United States and the
Commonwealth are protected equally from an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of their
property?. The Court linds that the police seizure and ongoing possession of the items in
this case was manifestly unreasonable.

When the taking of property from a criminal suspect has neither evidential-y
relevance to a case, nor nexus to a drug transaction or drug money, the police are not only in
violation of statute. but acting outside of the law. Such police procedures are arbitrary and
may comprise a form of pro-verdict punishment in?icted by the police, without judicial
approval. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that when private property is
{trivially seized pursuant to a forfeiture statue. then that seizure is not a taking under the law.
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 US. 442, 452 (1996]. As in this case, where private property is
am'mrfin?ty taken from a suspect and denied to him and his family. the rightful owners. for a
period of years, the police have performed an unlawful ?taking" of property under the law. If
the police target drug suspects for this disparate treatment. they are punishing a suspect who
is still presumed to be innocent under the law. They are also inflicting punishment upon the

lawful and bona tide owners of the property as well, who may be facing no charges. Such

 

At this point. the scope of this opinion does not apply to the seizure of evidence or other property by the
police that has evidentiary value to the investigation ot'a case. The police have broad discretion and authority
to seize property pursuant to a search warrant that has probative value to prove or disprove the commission ofa
crime. That is not the issue at bar in this case. This case involves the seizure of property solely for forfeiture

purposes.

13

punishment, imposed in the sole discretion of the police, is not supported by the law, anti is
in fact a violation of their duty to protect the private property of all citizens of the
Commonwealth. The Superior Court has recently held that a property owner tnay not appeal
a forfeiture of property until there is a ?nal order in his criminal case. Commonwealth v.
Bot-vet's, 185 A.3d, 358 Pa. Super 2018).

The potential consequences of police engaging in the overzealous seizure of private
property may have detrimental second and third order effects in criminal prosecutions. The
seizure of personal property, without lawful authority, becomes a potential tool of coercion
against suspects that was not in the legislature?s intent in passing the forfeiture statute. When
not restrained by the Courts, this can become a form of collateral ?nancial coercion. which
this Court will not tolerate. Luis v. US. 136 1083, 1086 (2016). An overbroad
seizure of an individual?s property, without meeting the requirements or of the forfeiture
statute, provides the police with leverage to potentially coerce suspects to become
con?dential informants in order to regain their family?s property that has been 
seized-?r.

Overbroad seizure of property further places potentially coercive influence upon plea
negotiations and the voluntarincss of pleas negotiated before the court. Commonivetn?rh v.
Forbes, 299 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1973). When property has been improperly seized and
withheld for an unreasonable period of titne, the choice to the defendant is no longer merely
whether to accept a period of probation or incarceration, but the added pressure is levied on
the defendant to accept the deal in order to retrieve his or his families? legitimate property,
of which they have been possibly wrongly deprived. Where the property is highly valuable,

or where the value of the property is substantial and the defendant is of modest means, the

 

The Court takesjudicial notice that operating as a con?dential informant is an inherently dangerous activity.
14

decision to enter into a plea might no longer be viewed by the Court as freely and
voluntarily entered into, where it is built upon a foundation of ?nancial coercion.8

This Court is not willing at this time, upon this recordhold that the
Drug Task Force has engaged in such coercive practices regarding statements ofpleas. This
particular record does not reflect that such coercion has occurred in this Defendant?s guilty
plea. However, in the absence of reform and a greater demonstration of reSponsibility in
future Drug Task Force practices, this issue will remain to be decided to the voluntariness of
plea deals, questions of double jeopardy, and the personal or institutional liabilityr?culpability
of those of?cers who seize private property unlawfully.

Finally, the Court also notes, in practical application, that as most forfeitures proceed
after sentencing, and as a defendant does not have a right to be represented by legal counsel
in a forfeiture action, many defendants are incarcerated in prison at the time of their
forfeiture action without ready access to legal counsel to defend their interests. This creates
a system where excesses in the exercise of police authority are not easily remedied. It is
also a common practice that defendants are asked to negotiate away their forfeiture claims as
a condition ofa reduced sentence in a pretrial negotiation with the prosecutor.

Accordingly, signi?cant legal hurdles and disincentives are put in the path of a
defendant to assert a claim to their own bona tide property when it is seized contrary to law.
Asserting such a claim to their own legitimate property may cause the prosecutor to
withdraw a plea offer, resulting in extended incarceration. The absence of counsel may
cause an unsophisticated or uninformed defendant to lose their claim to property, as they

have exhausted their funds on legal representation in their underlying criminal matter. The

systemic protections are meager. Accordingly, this Court will require hearings in all future

 

3 This is an issues that might impact the voluntariness of statements taken by the police as well.

4-

ID

forfeiture actions, to ensure compliance with the forfeiture statute?s intent.

Taken in its entirety, the testimony of the of?cers in this case indicates that the
police made the subjective assessment that the Defendant is too poor, absent drug dealing, to
have nice possessions. This was nothing more than a hunch, unsupported by any
investigative rigor, and clouded by an overzealous desire to forfeit the possessions.

CONCLUSION

In regard to the two vehicles, the Commonwealth has not proven their case. The
Defendant and his family owned four to ?ve cars depending on whose testimony was
presented. Two of the ears seized were the Dodge Neon and the 2004 Mercedes. No
credible evidence was presented that the Defendant used any speci?c car for drug activity or
that he used all of them. Counsel for the defense established that the police seized the two
vehicles that had no liens on them, while leaving behind vehicles that either had liens or may
have had liens. To forfeit a speci?c vehicle on this record would be nothing more than

guessing, not a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence.

Accordingly, there is no basis for the seizure of any vehicle from the Defendant. The
vehicles will be returned to the custody of the Defendant or his designated family members
and all cost of storage are placed upon the Commonwealth. The two televisions sets will be
returned to the Defendant or his designated representative in working condition within three
days, as there was no lawful basis whatsoever to seize this property.

The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a copy of this Opinion to the York County
District Attorney, Korey Leslie, Esquire, Counsel for the Defendant, and to the Defendant,

Christopher Hawkins.

BY THE COURT

CRAIG T. TREBILCOCK., JUDGE

if: ?7

 

l7