



**Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives**

April 3, 2019

The Honorable Christopher Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20535

The Honorable Dan Coats
Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511

The Honorable Randolph D. Alles
Director
U.S. Secret Service
Washington, D.C. 20223

Dear Director Wray, Director Coats, and Director Alles:

I write regarding Tuesday's media reports about Ms. Yujing Zhang's apparently unauthorized access to Mar-a-Lago and to follow up on a March 15, 2019 letter regarding Ms. Li "Cindy" Yang, to which the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has not received a response. The prior letter expressed serious counterintelligence and other concerns about Ms. Yang and sought information both about her and her relationship to President Trump.

We learned on Tuesday that our concerns were well founded and perhaps even understated.

On March 30, Ms. Zhang was granted access to Mar-a-Lago carrying four cellular telephones, a laptop computer, an external hard drive, and a thumb drive, preliminary forensic examination of which turned up "malicious malware".¹ Mar-a-Lago security apparently determined that Ms. Zhang would be admitted and largely managed that process.² When Ms.

¹ Criminal Complaint at ¶ 12, U.S. v. Yujing Zhang, No. 19-8100-WM (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2019) (hereafter, "Compl.")

² United States Secret Service Statement on Mar-a-Lago Security (Apr. 2, 2019) at ¶¶ 1-2 (hereafter "Secret Service Statement"), available at https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/releases/2019/19-APR/CMR_14_19_U.S._Secret_Service_Statement_on_Mar_a_Lago_Security.pdf.

Zhang's name was not found on the club's access list, Mar-a-Lago security called the Beach Club manager, who informed security that she shared a last name with a club member.³ Due to a "potential language barrier issue"—and presumably loath to alienate someone believed to be a member of the highly exclusive club owned by the President—club security admitted Ms. Zhang to Mar-a-Lago.⁴ The Secret Service, which reports in its statement that it screens entrants at Mar-a-Lago for "prohibited items" and "does not determine who is invited or welcome" at the club,⁵ did not halt Ms. Zhang at their security checkpoints.

According to the Miami Herald, the event that Ms. Zhang claimed she was to attend was promoted by Ms. Yang, the businesswoman who founded a chain of massage parlors in Florida and, more recently, reportedly has been selling access to the President and members of his family to clients from China.⁶ Ms. Zhang further claimed to be invited by the United Nations Chinese Friendship Association (UNCFA),⁷ whose leader, Charles Lee, "worked with" Yang "to advertise Safari Night and other galas and political fundraisers featuring the Trump family at Mar-a-Lago over the past year."⁸

According to publicly available reporting, the UNCFA has troubling connections to the Chinese government. Its Secretary General, Mr. Lee, has apparent connections to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) United Front Work Department, an organization that President Xi Jinping has called a "magic weapon", which the CCP uses to co-opt and neutralize opposition to their governing authority and policy priorities.⁹ Before the UNCFA's website was taken down, it featured prominently a picture of Mr. Lee with the Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department.¹⁰

³ Compl. at ¶ 4.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ Secret Service Statement at ¶ 1.

⁶ Sarah Blaskey, Nicholas Nehamas, and Caitlin Ostroff, *Chinese Woman Carrying 'Malware' Arrested at Mar-a-Lago Heading to a Cindy Yang Event*, MIAMI HERALD, April 2, 2019, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article228738969.html>. The event was apparently canceled after press attention focused on Ms. Yang.

⁷ Compl. at ¶¶ 7-8. According to the Secret Service, Ms. Zhang referred to the event as a "United Nations Friendship Event" and a "United Nations Chinese American Association" event, run by her friend "Charles." *Id.* As noted above, Charles Lee is the President of the United Nations Chinese Friendship Association. Ms. Zhang also told the Secret Service she was at the club to go to the pool. *Id.* at ¶ 4.

⁸ Blaskey et al, *supra* note 6.

⁹ Alexander Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work Background and Implications for the United States* at 5 (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 24, 2018), available at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf

¹⁰ Matt Schrader (@tombschrader), Twitter (Apr. 2, 2019, 1:22 PM), <https://twitter.com/tombschrader/status/1113174984170594304>. In 2012, the UNCFA listed a meeting between Mr. Lee and vice director of the United Front Work Department as a "key accomplishment" for the prior six months. Business Wire, *UNCFA's New Year Greetings and Overview of Key Activities* (Jan. 16, 2012), available at <http://www.businesswirechina.com/en/news/12383.html>.

Simply put, Ms. Zhang explained her presence at President Trump's club by claiming, among other things, that she was invited to an event by an organization with troubling connections to the Chinese Communist Party.


The incident with Ms. Zhang raises grave counterintelligence and other concerns. According to the Secret Service, access to what the President calls the "Southern White House" is apparently controlled in large part by the President's own private business. Access to the club could allow agents of foreign governments to collect valuable information on those with access to President Trump or conduct any of several other intelligence collection or influence operations.

I therefore request a briefing to answer the questions posed in the March 15 letter as well as the following questions:

1. What is the status of the Yujing Zhang case? Does the FBI have information beyond press reporting about how the Mar-a-Lago compromise might relate to the Li Yang episode? Does the FBI assess that Ms. Zhang was tasked by elements of the Chinese Government or Chinese Communist Party?
2. Does the Intelligence Community have any indication that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has attempted to collect against Mar-a-Lago or conduct influence operations using the access that the property affords? What does the Intelligence Community know about the PRC's attempts to leverage United Front organizations to use President Trump's businesses as a vector for access to individuals close to the President?
3. What steps are the FBI and the Secret Service taking to screen individuals entering Mar-a-Lago to prevent intelligence collection at the club?
4. What steps is the Trump Organization taking to prevent the collection of classified or sensitive information at the club? How do the imperatives of protecting that information conflict with the revenue raising goals of the private club?
5. What guidance, if any, is the Intelligence Community providing to the Trump Organization about counterintelligence issues regarding Mar-a-Lago or the President's other properties? Is that guidance being followed?

I respectfully request that you contact the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence at (202) 225-7690 to arrange a briefing at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Adam B. Schiff
Chairman