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--- A TROTSKYIST ORGANISATION ---

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IN THIS ISSUE

Before discussing the events in Poland which have overshadowed everything else this last month, a brief introduction to this issue. It is otherwise devoted entirely to an analysis of China's foreign policy which we hope our readers will find comprehensive and convincing. In our last issue we carried an article on "The Indo-Soviet Connection". A news item on India's trade with the USSR which appeared in The Statesman, Calcutta of 24/12/81, points out that the value of this trade will be around Rs. 2600 crores in 1981. But in 1982 it is expected to rise to Rs. 3250 crores making the USSR India's largest trading partner for that year.

But we are confident that the direction India's economy is taking will make the west, particularly the USA even more important, though there is no doubt that the USSR will remain a principal trading partner. From the point of view of foreign investment the west is already more important than the USSR. The news item also corroborates some of the other essential points in our article. Over 60% of India's exports to the USSR in 1982 will be manufactures and non-traditional items. This means that changes in the terms of trade between manufactures and primary or intermediate products will tend to strongly favour India. Furthermore Soviet switch trading of Indian exports (which has to be in bulk traditional commodities) will continue to become less and less significant relative to the total value of trading between India and the USSR.

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THE EMERGENCY IN POLAND

In the preface of our third bulletin we said "...many of the gains achieved cannot become irreversible and indeed the workers' movement cannot move forward to complete institutionalisation of workers' control without decisively defeating and overthrowing the ruling bureaucracy. Implicit therefore in the existing dynamic is the

question of political power".

But we certainly did not expect the showdown to come so soon. We had stressed the importance of political preparation for this showdown and even insisted that there would soon be a great need for "The development of revolutionary political parties and formations which can pose the question of political power most sharply....." But we had believed that there would be more time for the movement for self-management councils to gather greater momentum and thus shift the relationship of forces further in favour of workers. This would then create even better conditions for the emergence of an alternative political authority to the ruling party.

In the event, things moved too fast. General Jaruzelski imposed emergency, arrested Solidarity's leaders and activists, ruthlessly broke strikes and rounded up many of the resisting workers. The party members who support Solidarity are being purged. But just before this declaration of war against the Polish working class, there were clear signs that workers were wanting to establish a new political authority to replace the existing regime. Solidarity though very important could only be a part of this new political framework. Thus a growing number within the union itself, led by a left-wing were for holding a referendum in January 1982 to decide how Poland should be governed ie. they were demanding a system of free elections and multi-parties. The vision of a new socialist democratic system involving free unions, self-management councils, a workers' parliament, free elections and multi-parties was becoming clearer and clearer.

This was too much for the ruling bureaucracy. But it would be wrong to see this as the reason for the imposition of emergency. In hindsight it is clear that the emergency was carefully planned in advance in close collaboration with the Kremlin. The countrywide deployment of troops two months ago for "administrative" purposes was really a trial run to get the public used to the army presence and the army ready for later on enforcing martial law. The last resort of a Russian invasion has so far been avoided. The Polish army of 250,000 is a conscript army and therefore the bureaucracy remains uncertain how it will respond to orders to shoot workers. But before using them to directly repress workers, the bureaucracy can and is calling on the 60,000 odd police and special security forces to do the dirty work of breaking strikes and arresting people.

Solidarity has been taken by surprise and its organisation has received a severe jolt. It remains to be seen how effectively the union can regroup its forces and raise morale sufficiently to hit back with mass general strikes. So far its resistance has been sporadic, limited and uncoordinated. The bureaucracy knows that this is a life and death struggle for it. Solidarity was challenging this bureaucracy's monopoly of political power. This the bureaucracy can never tolerate. Which is why although Poland cannot go back to what it was before August 1980, although the bureaucracy might be prepared to allow Hungarian style freedoms once the situation "stabilises" in the way it wants, it will never allow the re-emergence of a genuinely independent trade union structure.

At this stage there is only one real hope for the Polish workers if they are to preserve their gains. And that is to resist as fiercely as they can in the way they know best-- by launching mass general strikes. They must try and do this even though it means risking civil war and a Russian invasion. It is the duty of revolutionaries, the trade union movements, and workers' parties everywhere to extend as much Solidarity as it can to the Polish masses in this time of crisis.

The role of the Catholic Church in Poland has been shabby. When emergency was first imposed, it called on the Polish workers not to resist by striking. Only a few days later when it condemned the emergency did it retrieve some of its moral authority. But even then it appealed to workers not to strike and risk bloodshed-- a pretty meaningless piece of advice when they were in the process of being bloodily repressed. The Church is now trying to get miners to end their strikes. It is also trying to "negotiate" a "peaceful solution" to the crisis with the government.

The response of the west is not surprising. Western Europe is not at all averse to General Jaruzelski's methods of "stabilisation". These countries want their loans to be paid back. What is more, if the Polish workers resist too strongly it may bring in Soviet troops which will gravely weaken detente, which the west European governments are very keen to sustain. So these governments say the main thing is that Poles be left "without outside interference" to "solve their own problems". So much for their concern for Polish workers or democracy!

The USA has taken a different position. It has blamed Moscow for Warsaw's action. Reagan wants to gain as big a propoganda victory as possible. Again what matters to the White House is not so much the sufferings of the Polish people (despite the crocodile tears) as its own competition for global influence with the Kremlin. By playing up Soviet belligerency, Reagan can justify his own increasingly belligerent behaviour elsewhere in the world eg. in Central America, against Cuba, Grenada and the ongoing struggles in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This is why Reagan has tried to make such a big thing of "linking" Moscow to Warsaw and "linking" his own reaction to the Polish crisis not so much to what Jaruzelski does as to what Brezhnev does.

The CPI and CPM in India have hailed the imposition of emergency. Most of the ML groups are only concerned that "Soviet social imperialism" should not directly intervene and are taking no sides in the internal struggle between Solidarity and the Polish government, since both according to them are "reactionary". Stalinist marxism remains as repulsive as ever!

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CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

From a revolutionary perspective, Chinese foreign policy over the last two decades has been an unmitigated disaster. It has been so blatantly counter-revolutionary that the world Maoist movement has been thrown into great disarray and confusion. There are Maoist groups which uphold the "Three World's Theory" and its corollary thesis of "Soviet social imperialism", and other Maoist groups which reject it. Some uphold the last thesis but not the first. Others uphold both but say it is wrong to make the USSR the "main enemy" when both superpowers are equally dangerous. There are groups which are pro-Deng and others which are pro-gang of four. There are those who support Chinese foreign policy in the name of Stalinist Marxism and pro-Albanian groups which oppose it in the name of Stalinist orthodoxy.

But what none of these groups are prepared to accept is that neither Maoism or Stalinism (the two are closely

linked anyway) is able to give a genuinely Marxist understanding of world politics and therefore unable to promote in a consistent manner the advance of world revolution. Mao's or Deng's foreign policy in its essence is no different from Stalin's, Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's foreign policy. First we had Sino-Soviet friendship which lasted for a few years even after Stalin's death in 1953. Then came the Sino-Soviet split at the beginning of the sixties. In the sixties and seventies, China's ideological framework for making foreign policy shifted from one set of "four principal contradictions" to another set of "four principal contradictions", to the "Three World's Theory" to present-day practice. The U.S imperialist "beast" became China's virtual ally.

But these twists and turns are not a feature of Chinese foreign policy alone. They also characterise the foreign policy behaviour of Stalin and his successors, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. So the USSR has moved from Stalin's "third period" of the "twin faces of fascism" to the "popular front" and the "great anti-fascist alliance"; to the "Hitler-Stalin pact"; to the "wartime alliance" and "Yalta peace", to the "cold war" of the fifties; to Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and Brezhnev's "detente"; to the "new cold war" of today.

Yet these crazy gyrations in Chinese and Soviet foreign policy can be easily explained. In fact the leaders of these two countries who decide foreign policy behaviour are actually following in a very consistent manner a fundamental premise of Stalinism/Maoism--- the concept of "socialism in one country".

The Methodology of Chinese Foreign Policy

The starting point is to recognise that it is bureaucracies, not classes which rule in China, the USSR and most other "socialist" countries. These bureaucracies can survive and guarantee their material privileges only if they enjoy a monopoly of political power. This monopoly of power, the bureaucratic strata will defend to its death. Which means these bureaucracies will defend in their countries, nationalised property in the basic means of production, the one-party state and basic restrictions on the democratic rights of the working masses. They will also maintain a formalistic and vulgar Marxism as ideological justification for their rule.

Furthermore, these bureaucracies are best able to

maintain their respective monopoly of power within a nati-
onal framework. These are after all, Chinese, or Vietna-
mese, or Soviet bureaucracies. Thus they all pursue, as
their guiding principle, the construction of "socialism
in one country"--- which means the subordination of ever-
ything that happens in the rest of the world to the needs
of "national development" i.e. "building socialism in the
main fortress" or the "main bastion".

But although each bureaucracy pursues this aim, they
are all subject to certain constraints. These are the lev-
-el of socio-economic development in each country; the
attitude of imperialism to each country ruled by a bure-
-aucracy; the level of mass consciousness and activity in
each country; the capacity of each bureaucracy to influen-
-ce the communist movement outside its own country, and
so on. But these constraints act differently on the dif-
ferent bureaucracies.

Thus different countries in the "socialist bloc" will
be at different levels of socio-economic development. Di-
-fferent bureaucracies will have different relations with
imperialism. There will be different levels of mass cons-
-ciousness and therefore of mass influence on the differ-
-ent bureaucracies. Thus there are bound to be clashes of
interest between the bureaucratically ruled countries.
Each bureaucracy will have different ideas about national
economic development, differences over the "proper" ide-
-ological orientation towards imperialism on the one hand
and revolutionary struggles on the other.

What is more since these bureaucratically ruled coun-
-tries all have one-party states, these ideological differ-
-ences do not remain at the party level to be debated in
a fraternal manner. These differences automatically get
translated to the state level, and the bureaucracies can-
-not resist the temptation to use state power in defence
of their particular political-ideological orientation.

Bearing all this in mind, it now becomes possible to
explain the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent evolu-
-tion of Chinese foreign policy.

The Sino-Soviet Split

After Stalin's death, it was not Khrushchev but Mao
who was the most prestigious figure in the world communist
movement. Thus there were pro-Mao as well as pro-Khrushchev
currents in the various communist parties of the world.

There was even a pro-Mao tendency in the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) and a pro-Kruschev tendency led by Marshall Peng Tehuai in the Chinese Communist party (CCP). Thus internal factional struggles within each bureaucracy also got linked to external policy differences. The need to maintain a monolithic party at home meant that inter-bureaucratic conflicts over foreign policy became more serious than they otherwise would have been.

Now let us look at how the constraints we outlined earlier acted differently upon the dominant Mao current in the Chinese bureaucracy and the dominant Kruschev current in the Soviet bureaucracy.

In the late fifties, the Soviet bureaucracy wanted to pursue its "national development" in line with building "socialism in one country". Accordingly Kruschev at that time stood for peaceful coexistence with the USA; alliance with "national bourgeoisies" in "third world" countries with less emphasis on fighting the anti-colonial revolution; greater consumerism within the USSR; intensified technological competition with the west; the Soviet pattern of development in other "socialist" countries; Soviet monopoly of nuclear weapons.

Mao's China, also trying to build "socialism in one country", however, faced different political and economic constraints, both externally and internally. U.S. imperialism was then much more hostile to China than it was to USSR. China was economically and socially much more backward than the USSR. In China the relationship between the masses and the bureaucracy was much closer than it was in the USSR. While China had much greater influence over Asian communist parties (where the anti-colonial liberation struggles were still unfolding), the USSR had greater influence over European communist parties, with the Latin American communist parties more or less equally divided.

Thus Mao wanted "armed struggle" against imperialism. Since technologically Mao's China could not hope to match the armed might of imperialism, he relied on the strategy of "people's war" for China's defence and demanded that the USSR "share" its nuclear stockpile with the other "socialist" countries. The CCP being technologically more backward and having a closer relationship with the rural masses emphasised a "labour-intensive", de-centralised pattern of industrialisation without Stalin's "forced-

march" development of heavy industry. For the same reasons Mao emphasised mass mobilisations and moral incentives (putting "politics in command") as the way to build the Chinese economy.

It is Khrushchev who bears the principal responsibility for allowing these basic differences to degenerate into bitter conflict at the state level. He cut off economic aid to China, initiated a steady reduction in trade, refused technology and nuclear armaments to China, massed troops on the Sino-Soviet border, aimed missiles at Chinese cities and industrial installations and even toyed with the idea of joining forces with the USA against it.

Thus we see that in the decade of the sixties, Chinese foreign policy began to evolve in the direction of emphasising "self-reliance" and "hostility to the superpowers". This was nothing but a rationalisation of China's economic and political isolation at the time. (Later on we will look in more detail at the foreign policy frameworks --- the "four contradictions" and the "Three World's Theory" --- which the Chinese bureaucracy formulated to rationalise its situation and justify its practice.).

But at the same time Mao's China kept careful watch for ways in which he could end China's isolation, if needed by moving towards imperialism on the basis of "peaceful coexistence".

The "opening" to the west emerged in 1971, when Nixon and Kissinger looking for a way to end the Vietnam war on terms favourable to the U.S. began to make feelers to China. Even they never expected the "overwhelmingly positive" response they got from the Chinese bureaucracy. The "Three World's Theory" with its growing emphasis on the USSR as the "main enemy" served as ideological justification for the new turn.

From Four Contradictions To Three World's Theory

In the early sixties, China formulated the famous "four contradictions". The principal contradiction was between the "socialist camp" and the "capitalist camp". The other three contradictions were the one between the capitalist world and the "third world", that between capitalist countries themselves, and finally the one between the bourgeoisie and workers in capitalist countries. Though this claimed to be a Marxist theory, only the last was a contradiction between classes. And there was no re-

ference in this set of basic contradictions to the class struggle in "third world" countries.

As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, a new set of "four contradictions" emerged. Now the principal contradiction was between the two superpowers on the one hand and the "third world" on the other. The other three contradictions were the one between the superpowers themselves, that between the capitalist countries, and finally the one between the bourgeoisie and workers in the capitalist countries.

Once again, only the last named was a class contradiction. And this time the "national liberation" struggles became the principal contradiction, although by the late sixties the post-war era of the anti-colonial revolution was drawing to a close. Furthermore, in many parts of the world it was not the U.S. but other capitalist nations which were the principal exploiters --- Japan in southeast and far-east Asia, Britain in southern Africa, and France in much of north, west and central Africa. There was, however, no reference to these powers, only to the superpowers.

There was also no longer any mention of the "socialist camp". In other words the struggle between capitalism and socialism had ceased to be a central feature in the Chinese view of world politics. The way had thus become clear for the emergence of the "Three World's Theory" to rationalise Mao's obsession with the Sino-Soviet conflict. Foreign policy doctrine had naturally to be tailored to fit China's "national development" needs at the time, as perceived by the bureaucracy.

According to this theory, the world is divided into three parts. There is the first world of the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. There is the second world of developed capitalist countries like Japan and those of western Europe. And there is the "third world" of underdeveloped countries of which China is a part. It is not clear where countries like Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Albania etc. fit, but presumably they are part of the second or third world depending on their internal level of industrialisation. Strange Marxism this! For now it is GNP statistics, not property relations that should be used as the criterion of classifying societies.

Not only is there no longer any attempt to distinguish between capitalism and socialism but class contradictions have disappeared from the basic foreign policy

framework. According to the "Three World's Theory" it is the responsibility of the second and third world to come together to fight the first world of superpowers. Japan and western Europe are capitalist, but this is a secondary matter. The Chinese bureaucracy insist that though these countries may be hesitant allies against the U.S. (which is why the third world must be the "leading partner") they can nevertheless be allies!

At first the two superpowers were considered equally dangerous and it was necessary to remain equidistant from both. But as Sino-US ties became closer, then unsurprisingly, the USSR became the greater danger because it was a "rising" social imperialism, whereas the U.S. was a "declining" imperialism. Once upon a time the Chinese bureaucracy had said (with some truth) that detente was bad because it represented collusion between the superpowers. Then when China led by Mao moved towards a de facto alliance with the U.S. against the USSR, detente was deemed bad not because of "collusion" but because it was a "ploy" by the crafty Russians to "pull the wool over the eyes" of the simploton Americans to "weaken" their much-needed resistance!

Soviet Social Imperialism

And in order to portray the Russians as the "main enemy", the Chinese bureaucracy has had to paint the USSR as "social imperialist" because it is "state monopoly capitalist". But Chinese attempts at proving that the USSR is some form of a capitalist society is so pathetic that it has been left to Western intellectual sympathisers like Sweezy-Magdoff in the USA, Samir Amin in Africa, and Charles Bettelheim in France to prepare the most sophisticated theories in this respect.

Mao's crudities are the best the Chinese can offer. According to this bureaucracy, the decisive turn of the USSR to state monopoly capitalism took place at the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956 when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Up to then the USSR was in the forefront of the "socialist camp". This reveals more clearly than anything else the unmarxist character of Chinese theorisation. When a "socialist" country (it was "socialist" in Stalin's time) makes a "decisive turn" towards capitalism then what has occurred is a counter-revolution.

But unless one is a reformist no country gradually has a revolution or counter-revolution. Trends in one or

the other direction can be accelerated but that is altogether different from saying that a decisive turn has been made in the course of a few short days of a party congress. Or is it that this event revealed what had hitherto been hidden--- namely that the USSR had had a counter-revolution after Stalin's death in 1953? But then how does one hide a counter-revolution?

A counter-revolution means that the basic socio-economic structure of a society which is post-capitalist had been replaced by one with essentially capitalist relations of production. So a society which had a great revolution in 1917 involving the mobilisation of millions of people to establish it and defend it during the civil war; which under the "guidance of the great Stalin" remained "socialist" for almost 40 years: which withstood the devastation caused by the most vicious assault in history by Nazi Germany (having three-fourths of its industrial might destroyed) still remained "socialist". But somehow in the course of a few days during the 20th. CPSU congress made a decisive turn towards a form of capitalism! This is incredible Marxist theorisation!

What did happen under Khrushchev at the 20th Congress was an important, or so it seemed so at the time, ideological shift in the CPSU's orientation and policies. But can one forget Stalin's sudden shift from anti-fascism to the Hitler-Stalin pact and their cynical carve-up of Poland, or Mao's own shift from strident anti-Americanism to warm embrace of the U.S.? Are we to conclude from China's present ideological orientation that it is no longer a post-capitalist society? In fact Marxist analysis starts by establishing whether a decisive social and economic transformation has taken place, not by concluding from an ideological shift that a decisive structural transformation has taken place. Indeed such ideological shifts are characteristic of the behaviour of all bureaucracies who pursue the building of "socialism in one country".

Nevertheless, let us see what the most systematic of Chinese analyses on "Soviet social imperialism" has to offer. The most systematic presentation was in three articles of Peking Review (nos. 29, 45 and 49) in 1977. These were "Soviet Social Imperialism Most Dangerous Source Of World War", "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution To Marxism-Leninism", and "Soviet Social Colonialism Stands

Exposed". The second article was the most important one. Briefly the Chinese thesis can be summed up as follows: The USSR is an imperialist country because

- a) it extracts profits abroad although these are less than the U.S. It does this by "economic aid" and "military assistance" and by buying "cheap and selling dear".
- b) through Comecon it exploits Eastern Europe
- c) it has more military bases and forces abroad than the U.S. eg. in Eastern Europe, Angola etc.

Moreover the USSR is now more rapacious than the U.S. and "constitutes the most dangerous source of world war" because

- d) it arose as an imperialist power later than the U.S.
- e) since it is inferior to the U.S. in economic strength it must rely more on military power and threats of war.
- f) it can exploit Lenin's prestige and flaunt the banner of socialism to bluff and deceive people everywhere.

In our last issue ("The Indo-Soviet Connection") we put forward the basic arguments pointing out why "aid" and unequal exchange are not the defining characteristics of imperialistic exploitation. We will not repeat them here. As for point b) this assertion is plainly ridiculous. A simple comparison suffices. All the countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of Czechoslovakia were non-industrial societies before 1945. In the last 35 years despite "Soviet social imperialism" they have become industrialised societies whose people enjoy a standard of living which on the whole is higher than what the Soviet masses have. The countries of South America which have suffered Western imperialism for over a hundred years despite being in most cases politically independent for that period remain essentially non-industrial or at best semi-industrialised societies. They continue to suffer from mass poverty of the worst kind.

Since Comecon countries supply mainly manufactured goods to the USSR in return for raw and intermediate materials, they have benefitted from the changing terms of trade. As far as crude oil goes, the USSR has always supplied Comecon with oil at less than world prices. The Cuban and Vietnamese economies are being heavily subsidised by the USSR, the former to the tune of \$6million a day. Can anyone seriously say that the USSR is economically "exploiting" Cuba and Vietnam?

As for point c) it is extremely hypocritical for

the Chinese bureaucracy to point out the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and not mention that it was Stalin who first put Soviet troops there from where they have never been removed since. In the last 35 years, Afghanistan is the first time that Soviet combat troops have gone beyond the boundaries established in 1945. And this in a country which is geographically contiguous to the USSR and long considered a part of its "sphere of influence". (This is not of course a justification of the Soviet invasion which must be severely condemned). The USSR has sent military advisers elsewhere but it is Cuban troops which have done combat duty in Angola, Vietnam and Ethiopia, not because they are "puppets" of the USSR (Bulgaria is far more of a "puppet") but because the Cubans have their own tradition of proletarian internationalism. Their intervention in Angola and Vietnam was fully deserving of support. Their intervention in Ethiopia to defend it against Somalia was also praiseworthy, but their dropping support to the Eritrean struggle was much less so.

Compare the Russian record of caution with the American record. In 1951, under UN authority, American troops entered Korea. In 1953 the US marines and the CIA helped to overthrow Iran's premier Mossadegh and instal the Pahlavi Shah. In 1954 the U.S. organised the military overthrow of the duly elected government of Guatemala. In 1958 U.S. marines invaded Lebanon. In 1961, they unsuccessfully attempted to invade Cuba. In 1965, U.S. troops invaded Santo Domingo, and also replaced French troops in Indochina.

The U.S. has far more military bases outside its shores than does the USSR. It has many more military alliances with reactionary regimes and supplies much more military aid to far more countries. Between 1977-80, the USA accounted for 43.3% of all exports of major weapons, France for 10.8% and the USSR for 27.4%. Between 1970-79, the "third world" as a whole imported 45% of its major weapons from the USA, 10% from France and 27.5% from the USSR. (SIPRI or Stockholm International Peace Research Institute yearbook, 1981). Approximately 90% of Soviet military aid goes to five countries-- Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, Syria and Ethiopia. When it comes to military hardware, you don't have to tell most of the reactionary regimes of the world that their best sources are western, either private or government.

As for points d), e) and f), the problem with this attempt to paint a picture of excessive Soviet belligerency is that it is inaccurate and impressionistic. The Chinese bureaucracy present this view of the "rising" danger of "Soviet social imperialism" in order to justify its own opportunistic foreign policy. Since 1972 when Sadat kicked out the Russians it is the Americans and Israelis who have been the dominant forces in the strategically vital region of the middle-east.

In Latin America, Brazil, Argentina and Chile are the dominant nations and they are all much closer to the U.S. than to the USSR. In western Europe the communist parties have continued to move further away from Soviet influence. In eastern Europe, Poland has shown how fragile the Soviet empire is. If the Polish bureaucracy does succeed in weakening Solidarity and maintaining its hold on the country, the economic burden on the USSR to help Poland will become greater. The price the Soviets have to pay for keeping the empire they have had since Stalin's time is getting higher and higher as future revolts by the masses of eastern Europe become more likely.

In central Asia the Soviets have "gained" Afghanistan but at the price of alienating the Iranian and Pakistani masses. The invasion of Afghanistan also gave the U.S. the excuse to strengthen its military presence in the Gulf region with the agreement of the Gulf states. In southeast Asia, through Vietnam, the Soviet influence has increased. But this must be balanced against the hostility of China, the rising strength of Japan, and the de facto China, Japan, U.S. alliance.

In the Horn of Africa, the USSR "gained" Ethiopia but "lost" Somalia. In southern Africa, the USSR "gained" in Angola. But Mugabe's Zimbabwe is not pro-Soviet, and western-backed South Africa is still the strongest power in the region.

The point one is making is that the world situation is far more complex than the Chinese make out. The idea that Soviet domination on the world scale is growing is erroneous. Nor is it true to say that U.S. imperialism is becoming more dominant. The Chinese leaders with their obsessive pre-occupation with the superpowers often treat world politics like a "zero-sum" "zero-sum game". That is to say, what is "lost" to one superpower is supposed to be "gained" by the other. This is simply not

true. The reality is that there has been a decline in the influence of imperialism on the world scale, and also a decline of Stalinism i.e. of the influence of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies on the world scale. Objective developments have favoured and will continue to favour the rise of revolutionary struggles against both imperialist and Stalinist forces.

The central difference (politically) between imperialism and Stalinism (not "social imperialism") is that regarding all struggles with a basic revolutionary content, the former is always counter-revolutionary, whereas the latter is not. The Soviets, for example, have supported the Arab struggle against Israeli zionism, the black liberation struggles against white colonial and minority rule, and Vietnam's struggle against U.S. imperialism which was truly the most heroic struggle in human history. Never has there been an anti-imperialist struggle of such historic significance. After the famous Tet Offensive in 1968 which marked the beginning of the end for the USA in Vietnam, the Americans have not dared to send their troops into another country, though they often did this before. Thus they did not use their troops in Angola in 1975, nor to save the Shah in 1978, nor to save Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979.

Of course, this does not mean the U.S. will not send in its troops in the future. U.S. imperialism desperately wants to recover from the trauma of that historic defeat in Indochina. This makes China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 all the more reprehensible. Deng said he wanted to crush the "myth of Vietnamese invincibility" and in doing so convince the Americans that they must intervene more actively in that region and elsewhere in the world. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea does not justify China's invasion of Kampuchea. Vietnam to support the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, just as China's invasion of Vietnam would not justify a Soviet invasion of China to support Vietnam.

It can never be disclaimed that the Russians (or the Chinese) act consistently, wholeheartedly or unequivocally in support of revolutionary struggles. When the USSR does support such struggles it is because of the dictates of "socialism in one country" operating at the time. But the fact that the Soviet bureaucracy does sometimes act in support of such struggles is what gives it greater prestige than the U.S. imperialism in the eyes of the world's oppressed masses. It is not a question of the USSR "bluffing"

the people of the world that they are more progressive than western imperialism. They are more progressive!

The "Three World's Theory"

The "Three World's Theory" does not even depict the world realistically. The "second world" of western Europe and Japan are indissolubly linked to American power. They are themselves vital pillars of the world imperialist system. Despite differences of nuance here or there over all vital revolutionary struggles they have sided with the American ruling classes. They know that they sink or swim with American capitalism. Any fatal blow to U.S. imperialism will be a fatal blow to them. Can the Chinese bureaucracy really believe the "second world" has more in common with the "third world" than with America of the "first world"?

Even in the "third world", countries like South Korea and those of ASEAN have more in common with the advanced west than they have with the rest of the underdeveloped "third world". Though the regimes in the "third world" are incorporated into the world capitalist market, they are the poor relations in this global family. The richer nations form a club of their own and try and keep the poorer "third world" nations in their place. All the fuss about the "rich-poor divide" and the "north-south" struggle is really about how to divide the world capitalist cake. The "third world" bourgeoisies want a bigger slice and the advanced capitalist bourgeoisies are trying to resist giving it. This struggle has nothing to do with the struggle for socialism.

But the "Three World's Theory" has been used to justify China's counter-revolutionary support to "third world" bourgeoisies. The Chinese have given support to some of the most repressive regimes in the world. The Shah of Iran was one example, Chile's Pinochet another. Beijing supported Mrs. Bandaranaike's repression of the JVP in 1971. It supported Numeiri's massacre of the (pro-Soviet) communist party in Sudan, as well as Pakistan's repression of Bangladeshi nationalism. It also first supported the western-backed UNITA and FNLA against the MPLA in Angola in 1975 before eventually taking a neutral position between these warring groups. There are many more such examples of China's counter-revolutionary behaviour.

It is the practice of supporters of China's foreign policy to argue that there has to be a difference between

government to government relations and party to party relations or party to foreign government relations. Thus at a government level the Chinese position can be different from the CCP position. This is a perfectly valid point but it cannot be used in the way the Chinese bureaucracy wants to use it to justify its counter-revolutionary behaviour. Government and party positions need not coincide but they cannot contradict each other. That is to say a "socialist" country cannot put forward a counter-revolutionary position at the government level eg. hailing the Shah of Iran as an "anti-imperialist" fighter, and at the same time justify this by taking a revolutionary position condemning the Shah at the party level. In fact the Chinese bureaucracy does not contradict itself in such a way. When they take a counter-revolutionary position at the government level, they do the same at the party level only qualifying it somewhat at times. Thus when Hua Guofeng visited the Shah in Sept. 1978 the month when the Shah was massacring demonstrators, not once did the Chinese party publications hail and support the anti-Shah revolution that was going on at the time. When Mao in the early seventies was moving towards ever closer collaboration with the U.S., there were some ritual denunciations of U.S. imperialism in party publications, but rapidly and smoothly party policy fell in line with government policy. In a one-party state this is unavoidable.

Diplomatic compromises there have to be. But these should never be disguised as revolutionary advances instead of the necessary and temporary retreats that they are. Nor should such diplomatic compromises be elevated to the position of strategic alliances. All these wrong things the Chinese (and Soviet) bureaucracy do.

Finally the "Three World's Theory" makes no reference to the "socialist camp" allowing China to practice unbridled opportunism. Once Tito's Yugoslavia was a "renegade" country and Mao supported Khrushchev's hostility towards it in the early fifties. Then both leaders began to woo Tito. Albania was once China's ally. Now it risks being demoted in Beijing's eyes into the ranks of "capitalist nations". This is also the case now with Vietnam, which is, of course a "puppet" of "Soviet social imperialism". The "class character" of Vietnam according to the Chinese bureaucracy now stands exposed. Such "class character" in a country has nothing to do with what the relationship of classes or strata are to the basic means of production, but everything to do with what China's particular foreign policy orientation

is at the time.

The "Four Modernisations" And The Future

The four modernisations formula is nothing more than the present form in which the strategy of building "socialism in one country" is being expressed. China's socio-economic position is different from what it was twenty or even ten years ago. Its "national needs" are different. Imperialism's attitude towards the Chinese bureaucracy has changed from past hostility to amity. The relationship between the Chinese bureaucracy and the masses has become much weaker. All this means a different foreign policy orientation from the fifties and sixties.

Like Khrushchev's Russia, China now stresses peaceful coexistence with imperialism. In fact it has gone even further overboard in justifying a virtual alliance with the USA. China needs foreign technology, particularly western. Like Khrushchev's Russia it is stressing greater consumerism at home, because the bureaucracy is much more alienated from the Chinese masses. In order to keep its monopoly of power it must restrict democratic rights for the masses. So to maintain some stable control over the masses it must promise them the benefits of ever growing consumerism. It can no longer rely on calls for "sacrifice" or on Mao's advocacy of the 'socialism of austerity'. If there is no such safety-valve of expanding consumerism the anger of the Chinese masses may be precipitated sooner than otherwise and this would threaten the material privileges and the monopoly of power which the Chinese bureaucracy enjoys.

On the whole, though, the most effective pursuit of the "four modernisations" will require China to move away somewhat from the Americans towards the Soviets. In the long-run, China as a bureaucratized workers' state has more in common with the bureaucratized workers' state of the USSR than with the capitalist U.S. It would be foolish for China to rely unilaterally on capitalist countries for all the aid, credit and commerce it needs, instead of balancing its needs with respect to the "socialist countries" including above all, the USSR. The Yugoslavian bureaucracy discovered this long ago. It is also a tremendous drain on China's resources to sustain such large scale military preparedness on the Sino-Soviet border, instead of trying to defuse the tensions there. Furthermore the Chinese bureaucrats are well aware that whatever the

hostility between the American ruling class and the Soviet bureaucracy, the U.S. and USSR need some degree of accommodation with each other to contain revolutionary struggles in the world which can affect both countries adversely. In a nuclear world they also have to manage competition and the crisis that may arise between them. The USSR will remain more powerful than China for a long time to come and the U.S. will continue to give its relations with the USSR greater priority than its relations with China.

The Chinese bureaucracy also remains unhappy about USA's support to Taiwan. Recently the Americans made a \$97million arms deal with Taiwan, as well as promising to provide FX fighter planes. This greatly angered Beijing because it was seen as essentially a political move-- restoring the USA's "two Chinas policy" instead of acknowledging the Chinese bureaucracy's right to political sovereignty and therefore its national monopoly of power. To the extent that the existence of Taiwan is an affront to the nationalism of the Chinese masses there is pressure from this side also on the Chinese leaders. Deng has made it clear to Reagan that Taiwan will remain a major obstacle to having closer relations between China and U.S.

In fact there are already signs of China making preparations for a shift in the future towards the USSR. For many long years the Chinese have been saying that a third world war was inevitable. It could be postponed but not avoided. According to the Chinese it was Soviet "hegemonism" that made this war inevitable. But some months ago, Deng publicly declared that a third world war was no longer inevitable. It could be avoided. He was clearly implying that the USSR was not so rapacious or "hegemonistic" after all; that it was not becoming stronger but weaker. In effect it was a tentative feeler towards the USSR. A Sino-Soviet rapprochement will take some years. It will probably have to await a new post-Brezhnev and post-Deng leadership in both capitals. But the rapprochement will come.

Of course, as preparation for this new turn Chinese foreign policy doctrine will once again change. Even in recent months it is noticeable that though the Chinese leaders still talk about "Soviet social imperialism", they have been strangely silent about the "Three World's Theory". Reference to it has virtually disappeared.

When this turn to the USSR becomes obvious what then will the Maoist movement in the rest of the world say? Will Maoism/Stalinism still be hailed as legacy of "true Marxism"?

THE PROGRAMME OF THE BOLSHEVIK LENINIST GROUP

1. INDIA IS A BACKWARD CAPITALIST COUNTRY.
2. WE REJECT AS NOT APPLICABLE TO INDIA, THE THEORIES OF 'SEMI-FEUDALISM', 'COMPRADORISM', AND 'NEO-COLONIALISM:
3. NO SECTION OF THE BOURGEOISIE OR PETTY-BOURGEOISIE IS 'PROGRESSIVE'. ACCORDINGLY WE REJECT ANY STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH ANY SECTION OF THE BOURGEOISIE.
4. THE COMING REVOLUTION WILL BE SOCIALIST IN CHARACTER AND NOT BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATIC, NEW DEMOCRATIC OR PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC.
5. THE LEADING REVOLUTIONARY FORCES ARE THE URBAN AND RURAL PROLETARIAT. THE REVOLUTION WILL SEE AN ALLIANCE OF THESE FORCES WITH THE POOR PEASANTRY.
6. ALL SECTIONS OF THE WORKING CLASS ARE IN A HISTORIC SENSE REVOLUTIONARY. WE REJECT THE CONCEPTION THAT THE HIGHLY PAID INDUSTRIAL WORKER IS REFORMIST.
7. WE STAND FOR A UNITED FRONT WITH WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, SUCH AS THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS. WE ALSO STAND FOR A UNITED FRONT OF ALL COMMUNIST FORCES ON A REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMME.
8. WE SUPPORT AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENTS OF ~~WOMEN, DALITS, TRIBALS & OTHER 'OPPRESSED MINORITIES.~~ WOMEN, DALITS, TRIBALS & OTHER 'OPPRESSED MINORITIES.
9. WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL NATIONALITIES THAT DESIRE IT.
10. WE SUPPORT THE EQUALITY OF ALL LANGUAGES, RELIGIONS AND CULTURES.
11. WE STAND FOR THE BUILDING OF A DEMOCRATICALLY CENTRALISED REVOLUTIONARY PARTY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ~~WORKERS' CONTROL AND RANK-AND-FILE DEMOCRACY.~~ WORKERS' CONTROL AND RANK-AND-FILE DEMOCRACY.
12. WE STAND BY THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT BASED ON SOVIETS AND NOT THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PARTY FOR THE PROLETARIAT. IN SUCH A GENUINE SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY WORKERS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, FORM INDEPENDENT UNIONS AND MANY PARTIES.
13. WE REJECT THE THEORY OF 'SOVIET SOCIAL IMPERIALISM'. THE SO-CALLED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE ONES IN TRANSITION BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM. THESE POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETIES ARE RULED BY BUREAUCRACIES, MOST OF WHICH HAVE TO BE OVERTHROWN BY A POLITICAL REVOLUTION IF THERE IS TO BE A DECISIVE ADVANCE TOWARDS SOCIALISM.
14. SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN BACKWARD SOCIETIES AND IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES JUST AS POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS WILL OCCUR IN THE TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES. HOWEVER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM CANNOT BE COMPLETED IN ANY SINGLE COUNTRY, BUT ONLY ON THE WORLD SCALE THROUGH THE CONSCIOUS CO-ORDINATION OF REVOLUTIONARY EFFORTS. FOR THIS A REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONAL IS VITAL.