US. Department of Justice Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election Volume I of II Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, 111 Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 59 600.8(0) Washington, DC March 20 19 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I 4 I. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 1 1 II. RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN 14 A. Structure Of the Internet Research Agency 15 B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin 16 C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections 19 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 19 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts 22 3. U.S. Operations Through acebOOk 24 4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter 26 a. Individualized Accounts 26 b. IRA Botnet Activities 28 5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies 29 6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons 31 7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign 33 a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials 33 b. Contact with Trump Campaign Of?cials in Connection to Rallies 35 RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS 36 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 36 1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign 36 2. Intrusions into the and DNC Networks 38 a. Initial Access 38 b. Implantation of Malware on and DNC Networks 38 c. Theft of Documents from DNC and Networks 40 B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials 41 l. DCLeaks 41 2. Guccifer 2.0 42 3. Use of WikiLeaks 44 a. WikiLeaks?S Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign 44 b. WikiLeaks?s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks 45 US. Department of Justice A?efneydc??e-rlePfeduet c. The Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks 45 WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials 48 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations 49 1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims 49 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of US Elections 50 D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials 51 1. m? 51 a. Background 51 b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks 52 .. 54 d. WikiLeaks?s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Pedesta Emails 58 e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks 59 2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials 61 a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) 61 b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails 62 IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN 66 A. Campaign Period (September 2015 November 8, 2016) 66 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project 67 a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) 67 b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi (Summer and Fall 2015) 69 0. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015- January 2016) 70 i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization 70 ii. Post-L01 Contacts with Individuals in Russia 72 (1. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen 0r Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016) 76 i. Sater?s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia 76 ii. Candidate Trump?s Opportunities to Travel to Russia 78 2. George Papadopoulos 80 a. Origins of Campaign Work 81 b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts 82 c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting 85 ii US. Department of Justice Attemey?We?ePEed-ue?/ d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has ?Dirt? in the Form of Clinton Emails 86 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign 89 f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of ?Dirt? 93 g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact 94 3. Carter Page 95 a. Background 96 b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work 97 0. Carter Page?s July 2016 Trip To Moscow 98 d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign 102 4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest 103 a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign 103 b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the May?ower Hotel 105 0. Jeff Sessions?s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI 107 d. Jared Kushner?s Continuing Contacts with Simes 108 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 110 a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting 110 i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr 110 ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign 114 b. The Events of June 9, 2016 116 i. Arrangements for the Meeting 116 ii. Conduct of the Meeting 117 c. Post-June 9 Events 120 6. Events at the Republican National Convention 123 a. Ambassador Kislyak?s Encounters with Senator Sessions and .D. Gordon the Week of the RN 123 b. Change to Republican Party Platform 124 7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak - 1 27 a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites .D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador?s Residence 127 b. Senator Sessions?s September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak 127 8. Paul Manafort 129 a. Paul Manafort?s Ties to Russia and Ukraine 131 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WerleP-reduef . . . . i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work 131 ii. Political Consulting Work 132 Konstantin Kilimnik 132 b. Contacts during Paul Manafort?s Time with the Trump Campaign 134 i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign 134 ii. Paul Manafort?s Campaign-Period Contacts 135 Paul Manafort?s Two Campaign?Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States 138 c. Post-Resignation Activities 141 B. Post-Election and Transition?Period Contacts 144 1. Immediate Post-Election Activity 144 a. Outreach from the Russian Government 145 b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels 146 2. Kirill Dmitriev?s Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration 147 a. Background 147 b. Kirill Dmitriev?s Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration 149 c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles 151 i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev 15 1 ii. The Seychelles Meetings 153 Erik Prince?s Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles 155 d. Kirill Dmitriev?s Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.-Russia Relations 156 3. Ambassador Kislyak?s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael in Trump Tower Following the Election 159 4. Jared Kushner?s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov 161 5. Petr Aven?s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team 163 6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich 166 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. 167 a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements 167 b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia 168 V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS 174 A. Russian ?Active Measures? Social Media Campaign 174 iv US. Department of Justice A?Ftemey?WerlePreduet Mammal?[Watnde?ed?KQ?m?P??f? B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 175 1. Section 1030 Computer?Intrusion Conspiracy 175 a. Background 175 b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter 176 2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By? 179 C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts 180 1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion 180 2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (PARA and 18 U.S.C. 951) . 181 a. Governing Law 181 b. Application 182 3. Campaign Finance 183 a. Overview Of Governing Law 184 b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting 185 i. Thing-of-Value Element 186 ii. Willfulness 187 Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information 188 0. Application to WikiLeaksw 188 i. Iuestions over Harm to Ongoing Matter 189 ii. Willfulness 190 Constitutional Considerations 190 iv. Analysism 190 4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation 191 a. Overview Of Governing Law 191 b. Application to Certain Individuals 192 i. George Papadopoulos 192 ii. 194 Michael 194 iv. Michael Cohen 195 v. 196 vi. Jeff Sessions 197 vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation 198 US. Department of Justice INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 1 This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. which states that, the conclusion of the Special Counsel?s work, he . . . shall provide the Attorney General a con?dential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.? The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials?hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government?began that same month. Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in October and November. In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks?s first release of stolen documents, a foreign government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities. That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government ?directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political organizations,? and, ?[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.? After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were examining Russia?s interference in the election. Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate ?the Russian government?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,? including any links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel?s investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also identi?ed numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would bene?t US. Department of Justice electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel?s charging decisions, and we then provide an overview of the two volumes of our report. The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel?s Of?ce found to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out the absence of evidence or con?icts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Of?ce to reach a conclusion with con?dence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts. In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of ?collusion.? In so doing, the Of?ce recognized that the word ?collud[e]? was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General con?rming certain aspects of the investigation?s scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a speci?c offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons, the Of?ce?s focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as de?ned in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign term that appears in the appointment order?with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, ?coordination? does not have a settled de?nition in federal criminal law. We understood coordination to require an agreement?tacit or express?between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other?s actions or interests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. The report on our investigation consists of two volumes: Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel?s investigation of Russia?s interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section sets forth the Special Counsel?s charging decisions. Volume 11 addresses the President?s actions towards the investigation into Russia?s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel?s investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation. U. S. Department of Justice WNM?aW-NWe?ed?amFM?R?emw EXECUTIVE SUMMARY T0 VOLUME I RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identi?ed by the investigation?a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled. Priozhin is Widel resorted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Harm to Ongoing Matter In mid-2014, the IRA sent emolo ees to the United States on an intelli mission with instructions Harm to Ongomg Matter ence- _atherin_ The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed ?information warfare.? The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the US. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of US. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as US. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign of?cials in the United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any US. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II of this report details the Of?ce?s investigation of the Russian social media campaign. RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government?s role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the ?ctitious online personas ?DCLeaks? and ?Guccifer The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks. The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (?Trump Campaign? or ?Campaign?) showed interest in WikiLeaks?s releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton. WikiLeaks?s ?rst release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server of State he later said that he was eakin; sarcasticall Harm to Ongoing Matter WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta?s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a US. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section of this Report details the Of?ce?s investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign of?cials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Of?ce investigated whether those contacts re?ected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would bene?t electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign of?cials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order. 2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the of?ce of Russian government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump. Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had ?dirt? on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 5 US. Department of Justice W?h?W?N?e?f??d?Urmm of emails. One week later, in the ?rst week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place. Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign of?cials Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as ?of?cial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary.? The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as ?part of Russia and its government?s support for Mr. Trump.? The written communications setting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate Trump?s electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer?s presentation did not provide such information. Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity ?rm and the DNC announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence of?cers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page?s July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks ?rst released emails stolen by the GRU from the DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that US. intelligence agencies had ?high confidence? that the Russian government was-behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel?s Of?ce was a ?backdoor? way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump?s assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the US. Department of Justice AtterneyA??erleP?reduet Trump Campaign and Manafort?s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting. Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta?s emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other US. government institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence issued ajoint public statement ?that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations.? Those ?thefts? and the ?disclosures? of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, ?are intended to interfere with the US election process.? Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government of?cials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President?Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive of?cer of Russia?s sovereign wealth fund, was among the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump adviser Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner?s friend collaborated on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael called Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, ?Great move on delay (by V. Putin).? The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result of request. On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment?drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and US. Department of Justice National Security Agency?that concluded with high con?dence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means to assist Trump?s candidacy and harm Clinton?s. A declassi?ed version of the assessment was publicly released that same day. Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees?the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJ C)??announced that they would conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the election. Director James Comey later con?rmed to Congress the existence of the investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated: I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to con?rm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia?s efforts. . . . As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed. The investigation continued under then-Director Corney for the next seven weeks until May 9, 2017, when President Trump ?red Comey as FBI Director?an action which is analyzed in Volume II of the report. On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had con?rmed in his congressional testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within the scope of 28 CPR. which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the investigation. President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel?s appointment. He told advisors that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in efforts to curtail the Special Counsel?s investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it, including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions are described and analyzed in Volume II of the report. THE SPECIAL CHARGING DECISIONS In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Of?ce determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual 9-27.000 et seq. (2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if so, whether admissible evidence would probably be suf?cient to obtain and sustain a conviction; U.S. Department of Justice and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual 9- 27.220. Section of the report provides detailed explanations of the Of?ce?s charging decisions, which contain three main components. First, the Of?ce determined that Russia?s two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election?the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations? violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign in?uence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet Research Agency, et at, No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence of?cers who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of individuals af?liated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and the have been so char_ed. See United States v. ksho, etaZ.,No. 18-cr-215 D.D.C. . Harm to Ongoing Matter Second, while the investigation identi?ed numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not suf?cient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not suf?cient to charge any Campaign of?cial as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks?s releases of hacked materials was not suf?cient to charge a criminal campaign-?nance violation. Further, the evidence was not suf?cient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. Third, the investigation established that several individuals af?liated with the Trump Campaign lied to the Of?ce, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-af?liated individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election interference. The Of?ce charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false- statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen leaded _uilt to making false statements to Con_ress about the Trum- Moscow ro'ect. Harm t0 Ongoing And in February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that US. Department of Justice WHWW Manafort lied to the Of?ce and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine. The Of?ce investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign of?cials both at the candidate?s April 2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, DC, and during the week of the Republican National Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that one Campaign of?cial?s efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016 at Sessions?s Senate of?ce included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign. The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Of?ce?s judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Of?ce limited its pursuit of other witnesses and information?such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the media?in light of internal Department of Justice policies. See, Justice Manual 9-13.400, 13 .410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a ?lter (or ?taint?) team. Even when individuals testi?ed or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges described above. And the Of?ce faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well?numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States. Further, the Of?ce learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we investigated?including some associated with the Trump Campaign?deleted relevant communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In such cases, the Of?ce was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared inconsistent with other known facts. Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Of?ce believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identi?ed gaps, the Of?ce cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report. 10 US. Department of Justice I. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein?then serving as Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016?appointed the Special Counsel ?to investigate Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters.? Of?ce of the Deputy Att?y Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) (?Appointment Order?). Relying on ?the authority vested? in the Acting Attorney General, ?including 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 515,? the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel ?in order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General?s] responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.? Appointment Order (introduction). ?The Special Counsel,? the Order stated, ?is authorized to conduct the investigation con?rmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017,? including: any links and/0r coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and (ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and any other matters within the scope of 28 CPR. Appointment Order 11 Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel ?the authority to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel?s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.? 28 CPR. The authority to investigate ?any matters that arose . . . directly from the investigation,? Appointment Order 11 covers similar crimes that may have occurred during the course of the con?rmed investigation before the Special Counsel?s appointment. ?If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate,? the Order further provided, ?the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters.? Id. 11(c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable ?Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations.? Id. 11 The Acting Attorney General further clari?ed the scope of the Special Counsel?s investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017, explained that the Appointment Order had been ?worded categorically in order to permit its public release without con?rming speci?c investigations involving speci?c individuals.? It then con?rmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that three Trump campaign of?cials?Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George Papadopoulos??committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government of?cials with respect to the Russian government?s efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.? The memorandum also con?rmed the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate certain other matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans 11 US. Department of Justice from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael the former National Security Advisor to President Trump. On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General con?rmed in amemorandum the Special Counsel?s investigative authority as to several individuals and entities. First, ?as part of a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,? the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate ?the pertinent activities of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates,?, Roger Stone, and ?Con?rmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals,? the memorandum stressed, ?does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has committed a crime.? Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate ?leads relate[d] to Cohen?s establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alta, receive funds from Russian-backed entities.? Third, the memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate individuals and entities who were possibly engaged in ?jointly undertaken activity? with existing subjects of the investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation opened before the Special Counsel?s appointment into ?allegations that [then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States and con?rmed the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate that matter. The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority ?to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.? 28 C.F.R, ?600.6. Like a US. Attorney?s Of?ce, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce considered a range of classi?ed and unclassi?ed information available to the FBI in the course of the Of?ce?s Russia investigation, and the Of?ce structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identi?ed that warranted prosecution). There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel?s Of?ce exercised its judgment regarding what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact between the Trump Campaign and Russian-af?liated individuals and entities. The Of?ce has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated with the Of?ce?s Work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Of?ce has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix lists those transfers. Two district courts con?rmed the breadth of the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C. 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F. Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Of?ce periodically identi?ed evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel?s authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with 12 US. Department of Justice Attemy?We?eflred-uet the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Of?ce referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI. Appendix summarizes those referrals. To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys??ve of whom joined the Of?ce from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice components. These attorneys were assisted by a ?lter team of Department lawyers and FBI personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the Department?s Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget, ?nance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence forensic accountants, a paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel?s investigation. Those ?assigned? FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.1 During its investigation the Of?ce issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants; obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. 2703(d); obtained almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governments pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses, including almost 80 before a grand jury. From its inception, the Of?ce recognized that its investigation could identify foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the broader national security mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Of?ce established procedures to identify and convey such information to the FBI. The Counterintelligence Division met with the Of?ce regularly for that purpose for most of the Of?ce?s tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also embedded personnel at the Of?ce who did not work on the Special Counsel?s investigation, but whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send?in writing?summaries of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Of?ces. Those communications and other correspondence between the Of?ce and the FBI contain information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This Volume is a summary. It contains, in the Office?s judgment, that information necessary to account for the Special Counsel?s prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation?s main factual results. 1 FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel?s Of?ce were required to adhere to all applicable federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on FBI-related matters for the Of?ce, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI legal supervision, not the Special Counsel?s supervision. 13 U.S. Department of Justice II. RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The first form of Russian election in?uence came principally from the Internet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (collectively The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These operations constituted ?active measures? meponpnarna), a term that typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.4 The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these social media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and photographs for use in their social media posts. IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the staging of political rallies.S The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the interference operation. By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and 2 The Of?ce is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports, and the Of?ce has shared that evidence with other of?ces in the Department of Justice and FBI. 3Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains additional law enforcement sensitive information. 4 As discussed in Part below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. See Volume 1, Section V.A, infra; Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, et at, 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. 1 (?Internet Research Agency Indictmen 5 Internet Research A Indictment 52, 54, 55 a 56, 74; Harm t0 Ongoing 14 US. Department of Justice - t1; . I . . . Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of US. participants. IRA?controlled Twitter accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple US. political ?gures who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testi?ed that Facebook had identi?ed 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000 posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Facebook accounts.6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it had identi?ed 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and noti?ed approximately 1.4 million people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account? A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency Harm to Ongoing Matter 8 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter The or Harm to Ongoing Matter The rowth of the oranization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure. Harm to Ongoing Matter 6 Social Media In?uence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) (?We estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the 80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period?). The Facebook representative also testi?ed that acebook had identi?ed 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately 120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via Instagram. 7 Twitter, Update on Twitter?s Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31, 2018). 3 See SM-2230634, serial 92. 9 Harm to Ongoing Matter 10Harm to Ongoing Matter See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter 12Harm to Ongoing Matter 15 U. S. Department of Justice Atterney?Werk?P-reduet Harm to Ongoing Matter Two individuals headed the IRA mana;ement: its general director Mikhail strov and its executive director, Mikhail Burchik. Harm t0 Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter As earl as the 3 ring of 2014, the IRA be_an to hide its fundin'and activities. Harm to Ongoing Matter The U.S. oerations are art of a lar oerations known as ?Pro'ectLakhta,? Harm to Ongoing Matter _er set of interlocking ?Harm to Ongoing Matter B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord. 13 arm to Ongoing Matter I 14 See, serials 9, 113 180 Harm to Ongoing Matter 15Harm to Ongoing Matter 16Harm to Ongoing Matter See SIM-2230634, serials 131& 204. 17 Harm to Ongoing Matter 13 arm to Ongoing Matter 16 U.S. Department of Justice WWUWWMW Harm to Ongoing Matter Pr1_ozhin was sanctioned the U.S. Treasu Deartment in December 2016, Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Numerous media sources have reported on Prigozhin?s ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public photo graphs.22 Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter "Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 19 U.S. Treasury Department, ?Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with Russia?s Occupation of Crimea and the Con?ict in Ukraine? (Dec. 20, 2016). 20 Harm to Ongoing Matter 21 Harm to Ongoing Matter 22 See, Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhz?n, Russian Oligarch Indicted by US, Is Known as ?Putin ?3 Cook?, New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018). 23 Harm to Ongoing Matter 33? Harm to Ongoing Matter 25 Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM- 2230634, serial 113 HOM l7 US. Department of Justice W/lkm?w?m?d?EWW Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 Harm to Ongoing Matter 27Harm to Ongoing Matter 23 The term ?troll? refers to internet users?win this context, paid operatives?who post in?ammatory or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites. 18 U.S. Department of Justice Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 2016, IRA employees claiming to be U. S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups, recruited U. S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read ?Happy 55th Birthda Dear Boss,? as an homa to Fri - ozhin Whose 55th birthda was on June 1, 2016 .3 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 The U.S. operations sought to in?uence public opinion through online media and le forums. By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a sin _eneral deartment, known intemall as the ?Translator? Harm to Ongoing Matter IRA subdivided the Translator Department into different responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to 29 nvestigative Technique See SM-2230634, serials 131 204. 3? See SM-2230634, serial 156. 31 Internet Research Agency Indictment 1[ 12 b; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) 32 Harm to Ongoing Matter see aiso SM-2230634, serial 189. Harm t0 Ongoing Matter 19 US. Department of Justice graphics and IT. Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 33 Harm to Ongoing Matter See SM-2230634, serial 205. 34 See SM-2230634, serial 204 Harm t0 Ongoing Matter 20 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States, while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.38 Ultimately, two IRA employees?Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova?reoeived Visas and entered the United States on June 4, 2014. Prior to travelin_, Kr lova and Bo_acheva com - iled itineraries and instructions for the tri o. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 35 arm to Ongoing Matter 35 Harm to Ongoing Matter 37Harm to Ongoing Matter 33 See SM-2230634, serials 150 172 Harm to Ongoing Matter 39Harm to Ongoing Matter 21 U.S. Department of Justice Work?Product Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 2. U.S. Operations ThrOugh IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social media accounts as ?specialists.?42 Starting as early as 2014, the U.S. operations included social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA later added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44 Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, purported to be connected to the Tennessee Republican Party.46 More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of ?ctitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti- immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and political activists. The IRA close] monitored the activit of its social media accounts. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 4? Harm to Ongoing Matter 41 Harm to Ongoing Matter 42 Harm to Ongoing Matter 43 Harm to Ongoing Matter 4? See, 6. ., SM-2230634, serial 179 Harm to Ongoing Matter 45 See, eg, Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204 (Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID 100013640043337 (Lakisha Richardson). 46 The account claimed to be the ?Unof?cial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans? and made posts that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. See, 4/3/16 Tweet (?Tennessee GOP backs @realDonaldTrump period #makeAmericagrea?ragain #tngop #tennessee 22 Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to su ort for the Trump Campaign and opposition to candidate Clinton.? For examle, HOM directions to IRA nerators Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Main idea: Use any opportunit to criticize Hillar Clinton and the rest exce Sanders and Trum _?50 Harm to Ongoing Matter The focus on the US. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. In 2016 internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group ?Secured Borders,? the 47 Harm to Ongoing Matter 48 See, serial 131 49 The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton of?cially announced her presidential campaign. IRA?controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton?s record as Secretar of State and romoted various critiues of her candidac . The IRA also used other techniues. Harm to Ongoing Matter See SM-2230634, serial 70. 50Harm to Ongoing Matter 23 lemma author criticized the ?lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton? and reminded the Facebook specialist ?it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton.? 1 IRA employees also acknowle_ded that their work focused on in?uencin_ the U.S. iresidential election. Harm t0 Ongomg Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook Man IRA oerations used Facebook accounts created and Onerated its Suecialists. Harm to Ongoing Matter I I I Harm to Ongoing Matter IRA Facebook groups active during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative 51 Harm to Ongoing Matter 52 arm to Ongoing Matter 53 arm to Ongoing Matter 5? arm to Ongoing Matter 24 Atterneydv?ulerk?Pfeduet/W. groups (with names such as ?Being Patriotic,? ?Stop All Immigrants,? ?Secured Borders,? and ?Tea Party News?), purported Black social justice groups (?Black Matters,? ?Blacktivist,? and ?Don?t Shoot groups United?), and religious groups (?United Muslims of America?). Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the operational account ?Matt Skiber? began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to help plan a ?pro?Trump rally near Trump Tower.?55 To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately $100,000.56 During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA?purchased advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA (discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, ?If one day God lets this liar enter the White House as a president that day would be a real national tragedy.?57 Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account ?Black Matters? calling for a ??ashmob? of U.S. persons to ?take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or iinohillary2016.?58 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions, negative.59 IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his campaign. The ?rst known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account ?Tea Party News? asking U.S. persons to help them ?make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters? by uploading photos with the hashtag In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the acebook groups ?Being Patriotic,? ?Stop All Invaders,? and ?Secured Borders.? 55 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 10000992290846] (Matt Skiber) to 1D 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 56 Social Media In?uence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (1 1/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of acebook). 5?7 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575. 58 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. 59 See serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by Facebook). 60 4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235. 25 US. Department of Justice Wl/W?mwm??e} Collectively, the social media accounts reached tens of millions of US. persons. Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example, at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid?2017, the ?United Muslims of America? Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the ?Don?t Shoot Us? Facebook group had over 250,000 followers, the ?Being Patriotic? acebook group had over 200,000 followers, and the ?Secured Borders? Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts reached at least 29 million US persons and ?may have reached an estimated 126 million people.?62 4. US. Operations Through Twitter A number of IRA emlo ees assi_ned to the Translator Deartment served as Twitter Soecialists. Harm to Ongoing Matter The lRA?s Twitter operations involved two strate ies. First IRA secialists oerated certain Twitter accounts to create individual U.S. personas Harm to Ongomg Matter Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts (commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content on Twitter. a. Individualized Accounts Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 6? See Facebook ID 147993689565674?7 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID 1157233400960126 (Don?t Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein_ Patriotic; Facebook ID 757183957716200 Secured Borders). Harm t0 Ongomg Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 62 Social Media In?uence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook). 63 arm to Ongoing Matter 6? Harm to Ongoing Matter 65 arm to Ongoing Matter 26 US. Department of Justice AtterneWerk?P?red-ue?/ Harm to Ongoing Matter 66 The operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with US. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter?s private messaging). The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to in?uence U.S. audiences on the election. Individualized accounts used to in?uence the US. presidential election included (described above); @jenn_abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moorel3 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); and @America;1st_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers)? In May 2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march?forjrump, which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below .63 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media. Multiple IRA-posted tweets gained popularity?0 US. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons?1 Similarly, numerous high- Harm to Ongoing Matter 67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material). 68 See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (?rst post from account). 69Harm to Ongoing Matter 70 For example, one IRA account tweeted, ?To those people, who hate the Confederate ?ag. Did you know that the ?ag and the war wasn?t about slavery, it was all about money.? The tweet received over 40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37 pm.) Tweet. 7'1 Josephine Lukito Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain #NewYorkVa/ues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming the CIA for Claiming Russia ried to Help Donald Trump, US. News World Report (Dec. 12, 2016). 27 U.S. Department of Justice HtemeHZe-rlePfed-uet pro?le U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaulf2 Roger Stone,73 Sean Hannity,74 and Michael retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA- controlled accounts. Multiple individuals af?liated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets (discussed below). b. IRA BotnetActt'vt?tt'es Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter In January 2018, Twitter publicly identi?ed 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the IRA.jig According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, ?approximately 8.4% of which were election- 72 @McFaul 4/3 0/ 16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams). 73 @RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moore13); @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16 Tweet (same). 74 @seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @PamelagMooreU). 75 6/22/ 17 Tweet @Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto Video of SJWs. . 76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send speci?c automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish (?retweet?) speci?c tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences. 77 Harm to Ongoing Matter 73 Harm to Ongoing Matter 79 Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to ell 6 77, 000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some St'gns Show the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019). 28 U.S. Department of Justice related.?80 Twitter also announced that it had noti?ed approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies The IRA organized and promoted political rallies inside the United States while posing as U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas (F acebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest in attending, the IRA then sought a U.S. person to serve as the event?s coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting con?ict or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further promoted the event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.83 After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the social media accounts.3 The Office identi?ed dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of a rally was a ?confederate rally? in November 2015.85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to have drawn few (if any) participants, while others drew hundreds. The reach and success of these monitored Harm to Ongoing Matter 3? Twitter, ?Update on Twitter?s Review of the 2016 US Election? (updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election. 31 Twitter, ?Update on Twitter?s Review of the 2016 US Election? (updated Jan. 31, 2018). 82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 83 See, 7/21/16 Email, 'oshmilton024 gmail.com to 7/21/16 Email, joshrnilton024@gmail.com to 34 @march_for_trurnp 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). 85 Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post (?Good evening buds! Well I am planning to organize a confederate rally . in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people to attend?). 29 US. Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign, almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016; and a i" . "a series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in The MINERS Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which posted about the M1am1 rally on candidate Trump 3 Facebook BRING BACK OUR JOBS account (as discussed below).86 Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the HELP MR. TRUMP FIX social media accounts also conducted the day-to-da recruitin_ for WHEN: oolitical rallies inside the United States. WHERE Harm to Ongoing Matter 5.1131 I :1 T1. it Hi. 1'I-l 11 Li" IRA Poster for Rallies organized by the 6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons As early as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to target U.S. persons who could be used to advance its operational goals. Initiall recruitmnt focused on U.S. ersons who could am-lif the content osted the IRA. Harm t0 Ongomg Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter IRA employees frequently used Investigative Technique Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. ersons from across the olitical ectrum. For example, the IRA targeted the family of and a number of black social justice activists 86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. See, Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 16016856934323 89 (Being Patriotic); Twitter Account @march_f0r_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in New York on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and on October 2, 2016.) ?7 arm to Ongoing Matter 33 arm to Ongoing Matter 31 while posing as a grassroots group called ?Black Matters In February 2017, the persona ?Black Fist? (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generated content,90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).91 Harm to Ongoing Matter "Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter as the online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked with tasks ran_in_ from or anizin; rallies to takin_ ictures with certain olitical messa_es . Harm ?70 Ongoing Matter 89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks). 9? 8/19/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 91 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic@gmail.com (con?rming Craigslist advertisement). 92 8/18-19/16 Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump 9 3 See, 6. ., 11/11-27/16 Facebook Messa es, ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) bull horn). 94 See, 6. ., 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) I (discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM, @march_for_trump to (discussing payment for construction materials). 95 Harm to Ongoing Matter 32 Harm to Ongoing Matter 7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign The investigation identi?ed two different forms of connections between the IRA and _members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign promoted?typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of reposting? pro?Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA?controlled social media accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as US. persons to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States. a. Tramp Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials Among the US. ?leaders of public opinion? targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign af?liates promoted dozens of tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA. Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric 9? See, 10/26/16 Tweet BREAKING Thousands of names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #VoterFraud. 11/2/16 Tweet BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida?); 11/8/16 Tweet This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump. Here he is in his hat. #voted Trump Jr. retweeted additional content subsequent to the election. 33 U.S. Department of Justice Trump,97 Kellyanne Conway?8 Brad Parscalef9 and Michael T. These posts included allegations of voter fraud,101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled classified information.102 - A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled ?ymj-"W Twitter account @Pamela_Moore13 was retweeted by 103 TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY. yesterday! I love you - and lhere is no question D011 Ell Cl . Trump Jr. . TOGETHER. WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT - On September 19, 2017, President Trump?s personal account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account @10_gop (the backup account of which had already been deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: ?We love you, Mr. President!?104 IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump Campaign and, later, Trump Administration of?cials to their tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the IRA- controlled persona ?Matt Skiber? Facebook account sent a message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that ?Mr. Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!?105 00'} Wu _h.1 3121K hirer: L?nCnnumc - The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate Wm. Trump?s Facebook account, which included a post about the screenshot of Trump Facebook August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA. (from 97 @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet BREAKING Hillary shuts down press conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpB?). 93 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet Mother of jailed sailor: ?Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classi?ed info? #hillarysernail 99 @parscale 10/ 15/ 16 Tweet (?Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: ?Tell The Truth!? RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! #FridayFeeling?). 10? 11/7/ 16 (retweeting post that included in part ?@realDonaldTrump @mike_pence will be our next POTUS 10? 10/11/16 Tweet (?North Carolina ?nds 2,214 voters over the age of ?02 11/6/16 Tweet (?Mother of jailed sailor: ?Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on classi?ed info #hillaryemail 1 1/7/ 16 Tweet @Pamela_Moore 1 3: Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary democrats . . . @realDonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7:33 pm.) Tweet YOU for your support Miami! My team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you and there is no question TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 10000992290846] (Matt Skiber) to ID 34 US. Department of Justice Harm to Ongoing Matter b. Contact with Tramp Campaign Of?cials in Connection to Rallies Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be US. political activists working on behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The lRA?s contacts included requests for signs and other materials to use at rallies,107 as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate logistics.108 While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identi?ed evidence that any Trump Campaign of?cial understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals. In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the ?active measures? social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume 1, Section VA, in?a, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and IRA employees violated US. law through these operations, principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign in?uence in US. elections. 106 Harm to Ongoing Matter 107 See, eg, 8/ 16/16 Email, joshrnilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com (asking for Trum [Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com (askin for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to i@donaldtrump.com (asking for ?contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates? in various Florida cities and signs). 108 8/15/16 Email,?to joshmilt011024 mailcom askin to add to locations to the ?Florida Goes Trump,? list); 8/16/16 Email, to joshmilton024@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers). 35 US. Department of Justice 111. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation?s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees, and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks.109 The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online personas, ?DCLeaks? and ?Guccifer and later through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with the 2016 US. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. The Trum Camai_n showed interest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and fall of 2016, Harm to Ongoing Matter WikiLeaks?s first Clinton-related release HOM the Trump Campaign sta ed in contac about WikiLeaks?s activities. The investigation was unable to resolve Harm t0 Ongoing Matter WikiLeaks?s release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7, 2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language about women. A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton Campaign, DNC, and Military Units 26165 and 74455.110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia, including in the United Statesm The unit was sub-divided into departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized malicious software ?malware? while another deoartment conducted large-scale spearphishing campaigns.H2 a bitcoin mining operation to 109 As discussed in Section below, our Office charged 12 GRU of?cers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ??1030 and 371. See Volume 1, Section V.B, in?a; Indictment, United States v. No. (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 Indictment?). ?0 Neg/ksho Indictment 11 1. ?1 Separate from this Of?ce?s indictment of GRU of?cers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in the Western District of returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with hacking the US Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport associations. United States v. Ale/(set Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa). ?2 A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to 36 US. Department of Justice 113 secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations. Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU. Of?cers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and US. companies that supplied software and other technology related to the administration of US. elections.114 Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the 115 and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals af?liated with the Clinton Campaign: to learn about Investigative Technique democrats.or hilla clinton.com, dnc.or- and -3 -3 Unit 26165 used different Democratic websites, includin_ Investigative Technique began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access to these networks, indicating that the later and DNC intrusions were not crimes of opportunity but rather the result of targeting.116 - GRU of?cers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March 15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email accounts at hillaryclintoncom. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org email accountsm The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign?s advance team, informal Clinton Campaign advisors, and a DNC employee.118 GRU of?cers stole tens of thousands of emails from spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications. download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Indictment 11 10. ?3 Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems. kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform To make purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source of funds. Indictment 1] 62. ?4 New/{she Indictment 1] 69. ?5 Indictment 9. ?6 See SM-2589105, serials 144 495. 117 Investigative Technique 118Investigative Technique 37 U. S. Department of Justice 2. Intrusions into the and DNC Networks a. Initial Access By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the computer network using the credentials stolen from a employee who had been successfully spearphished the week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network, identifying different computers connected to the network. By stealing network access credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the network.119 Approximately six days after first hacking into the network, on April 18, 2016, GRU of?cers gained access to the DNC network Via a virtual private network (VPN) connection120 between the and DNC networksm Between April 18, 2016 and June 8, 2016, Unit 26165 compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and shared file server.122 I). Implantation ofMalware on and DN Networks Unit 26165 implanted on the and DNC networks two types of customized malware,123 known as ?X-Agent? and ?X?Tunnel?; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool; and rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for ex?ltration. X-Agent was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather other data about the infected computers (cg, file directories, operating systems).124 Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an connection between the victim computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the and DNC networks that was capable of large-scale data transfers.125 GRU of?cers then used X-Tunnel to ex?ltrate stolen data from the Victim computers. ?9 Investigative Technique 120 A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public networks (such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network. The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of employees access to certain databases housed on the DNC network. Therefore, while the employees were outside the private network, they could access parts of the DNC network from their computers. 121 Investigative Technique serial 5. 122 Investigative Technique M-2589105-HACK, serial 5. 123 ?Malware? is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer?s user or operator. 124 nvestigative Technique 125 nvestigative Technique 38 US. Department of Justice To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the and DNC networks, Unit 26165 of?cers set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted malware.126 The ?rst set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as ?middle servers,? sent and received messages to and from malware on the networks. The middle servers, in turn, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-cntrolled comuters, labeled internally by the GRU as an Panel.? The AMS Panel Investlgatlve served as a nerve center through which GRU of?cers monitored and directed the malware?s operations on the networks.127 The AMS Panel used to control X-A_ent during the and DNC intrus1ons was housed on a leased com uter located near Arizona.123 Investigative Technique Investigative Technique 126 In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks, dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all over the world. The investiation identi?ed rental a reements and payments for computers located in, inter alia, Investigative Technique all of which were used in the operations targeting the US. election. 127 Indictment 1] 25. 123 Newksho Indictment 24(0)- 129 Indictment 1] 24(13)- 39 The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of ?les containing keylogging sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU of?cers monitored and DNC employees? work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June 2016. Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications between employees, banking information, and sensitive personal information. c. Theft of Documents from DNC and Networks Of?cers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the and DNC networks, including signi?cant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U.S. federal elections. Stolen documents included internal strategy documents, fundraising data, opposition research, and emails from the work inboxes of DNC employees.130 The GRU began stealing data shortly after it gained access to the network. On April 14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU of?cers downloaded rar.exe onto the document server. The following day, the GRU searched one compromised computer for ?les containing search terms that included ?Hillary,? ?Cruz,? and ?Trump.?13 1 On April 25, 2016, the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents from folders on the shared ?le server that pertained to the 2016 election.132 The GRU appears to have compressed and ex?ltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from this ?le server.133 The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access. On April 22, 2016, the GRU copied ?les from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen documents included the opposition research into candidate Trump.134 Between approximately May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016, GRU of?cers accessed the mail server from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.135 During these connections, ?30 Mary/(She Indictment 27-29; Investigative Technique ?31 Investigative Technique ?2 '"Vestiga?ve Te?hnique 133 Investigative Technique 134 Investigative Technique SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5. Investigative Technique 135 Investigative Technique See serial 649. As part of its investigation, the FBI later received images of DNC servers and copies of relevant traf?c logs. Indictment 28-29. 40 US. Department of Justice A?crney?WerleP?red-uet? Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later released by WikiLeaks in July 2016.136 B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials The operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the anonymous release through two ?ctitious online personas that it created?DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0?and later through the organization WikiLeaks. 1. DCLeaks The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165 registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant?? Unit 26165 paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined. ?38 The dcleaks.com landing page pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other dcleakscom pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public. Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleakscom, including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and computer networks. DCLeaks victims included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign employee, and four other campaign volunteers.?9 The GRU released through dcleakscom thousands of documents, including personal identifying and ?nancial information, internal correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising ?les and information.140 136 Indictment ii 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May 25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the email server. Newksho Indictment ii 45. 137 Indictment ii 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com, the same actors attem ted to re _ister the website electionleakscom using the same domain registration service. Investigative 138 See SM-2589105, serial 181; Indictment 1] 21(a). 139 Investigative Technique 14" See, eg, Internet Archive, ?htt archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally, DCLeaks released documents relating to emails belonging to and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name ?The United States Republican Party?). ?The United States Republican Party? portfolio contained approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns, state parties, and businesses dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same 41 US. Department of Justice GRU of?cers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily used to promote releases of materials.141 The acebook page was administered through a small number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.142 GRU of?cers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_, and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and other US. persons. GRU of?cers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked ?les by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU of?cers operating under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non?public DCLeaks webpage to a US. reporter via the Facebook account.143 Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU of?cers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks.com website.144 The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017. 2. Guccifer 2.0 On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as ?Fancy Bear?) were responsible for the breach.145 Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016, GRU of?cers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU of?cers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of speci?c words and phrases in English, including ?some hundred sheets,? ?illuminati,? and ?worldwide known.? Approximately two hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its ?rst post, attributing the DNC server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that the GRU of?cers had searched for that day.146 Tennessee-based web?hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone, RNC E?Mail Was, In Fact, Hacked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016). Indictment 1] 38. 142 See, e. 3., Facebook Account 10000882562354] (Alice Donovan). ?3 7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793053100795341 (DC Leaks) to ?4 See, 6. ., 9/14/16 Twitter DM, dcleaks_ to 9/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to . The messages read: ?Hi QcOx pass: enjoy 145 Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic: National Committee, Blog (June 14, 2016). updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer 2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion. 146 Indictment 111] 41?42. 42 U.S. Department of Justice That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and computer networks. The Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.147 Released documents included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states Florida and that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Speci?cally, on June 27, 2016, Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide ?exclusive access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton?s staff??8 The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 261 65 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.149 That the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people.150 The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress documents related to the candidate?s opponent.15 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida?related data stolen from the to a U.S. blogger covering Florida politics.152 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S. reporter documents stolen from the pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.153 '47 Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June 21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31, 2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016. '48 6/27/16 Email, iuccifer20@aol.fr to? (subject ?leaked 149 6/27/16 Email, uccifer20@aol.fr to ?(sub'ect ?leaked emails? see also 6/27/ 16 Email, uccifer20@aol.fr to (subject ?leaked emails?); (claiming DCLeaks was a ?Wikileaks sub project?). ?0 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an apparent effort to de?ect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a ?Wikileaks sub project? and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with ?closed access? to give reporters a preview of them. 151 Indictment 11 43(a)- 152 Indictment ii 43 ?53 Indictment ii 43 43 U. S. Department of Justice I ersona with HOM The GRU was also in contact throu_ the Guccifer 2. 0 a former Trum- Cam-ai 11 member Harm to Ongoing Matter In early August 2016, HOM Twitter?s suspension of the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote Via private message, ?thank for writing back . . . do find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?? On August 17, 2016, the GRU added, ?please tell me if i can help anyhow . . . it would be a great pleasure to me.? On September 9, 2016, the ain posing as Guccifer 2.0?referred to a stolen document posted online and asked ?what do think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign.? responded, ?pretty standard.?155 The investigation did not identify evidence of other communications betweenm and Guccifer 2.0. 3. Use of WikiLeaks In order to expand its interference in the 2016 US. presidential election, the GRU units transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU of?cers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through channels, including possibly through WikiLeaks?s private communication system. a. WikiLeaks?s Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that believe it would be much better for GOP to win . . . Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities, dems+media+neoliberals will be mute. . . . She?s a bright, well connected, sadisitic sociopath.?156 In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation.157 While designing the archive, one WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: 155 Harm to Ongoing Matter '56 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et a1. Assange also wrote that, will generate a lot oposition [sic], including thi ough dumb moves. Hillary will do the same thing, but 00- opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence hillary has greatel f1 eedom to start wars than the GOP and has the will to do so. Id. 157 WikiLeaks, ?Hillary Clinton Email Archive,? available at 44 U.S. Department of Justice W?hme?mm?e?d?W [W]e want this repository to become ?the place? to search for background on hillary?s plotting at the state department during 2009-2013. . . . because its useful and will annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.158 b. WikiLeaks?s First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks Shortly after the ?rst release of stolen documents through dcleakscom in June 2016, GRU of?cers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks_ sent a direct message to @WikiLeaks, noting, ?You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary?s emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her ?nancial documents. Let?s do it to ethr. What do ou think about ublishin our info at the same moment? Thank iou.?159 anGSt'Qatwe Technique Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22, 2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0?s ?rst releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used Twitter?s direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that Guccifer 2.0 ?[s]end any new material [stolen from the here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing.?160 On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter?s private messaging function, writing, ?if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after.? The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, ?ok . . . i see.? WikiLeaks also explained, ?we think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary . . . so con?ict between bernie and hillary is interesting.?161 c. The GR ?5 Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the Of?ce?s ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that the stolen DNC and Pedesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks, Investigative Technique 158 3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to? Less than two weeks earlier, the same account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton ?in whitehouse with her bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal?interventionist appointees.? 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 59424293785 8486276, @WikiLeaks et al. 159 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks. 16" Neiyksho Indictment 47(a). 151 7/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks @guccifer_2. 45 U. S. Department of Justice W?m?an?M?mewd?EWHn?P?e) The Of?ce was able to identify when the GRU (operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set up by the GRU. Assan_ had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London, . Investigative Technique On July 14, 2016, GRU of?cers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject ?big archive? and the message ?a new attempt.?163 The email contained an attachment with the name ?wk link1.txt.gpg.?164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account, GRU of?cers sent WikiLeaks an ?le and instructions on how to open it.?55 On July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks con?rmed in a direct message to the Guccifer 2.0 account that it had ?the le or so archive? and would make a release of the stolen documents ?this week.?166 On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC computer networksm The Democratic National Convention began three days later. Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, ?hi there! I'm from DC Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via your secured chat but getting no response. I?ve got something that might interest you. You won't be disappointed, I promise.?168 The WikiLeaks account responded, ?Hi there,? without further elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately. The same day, the Twitter account @guccifer?2 sent @dcleaksg a direct message, which is the ?rst known contaCt between the personas.169 During subsequent communications, the 162 Investigative Technique This was not the ?rst attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks email account. 6/29/16 Email, guccifer2@mail.com (The email appears to have been undelivered.) ?34 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis). 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks. 7/18/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 @WikiLeaks. Email Archive,? WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at ?63 9/ 15/ 16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ t0 @WikiLeaks. "39 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer_2 to @dcleaks_. 46 US. Department of Justice Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through emails.170 An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016.?1 Based on information about Assange?s computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the DNC The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by WikiLeaks on its site.173 Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject ?Submission? and the message ?Hi from DCLeaks.? The email contained a PGP-encr ted message with the filename Investigative Technique The email, however, bears a number of similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU of?cers used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC ?les. On September 22, 2016 (the same day of DCLeaks? email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account I dcleaks sent a sin_le messa_e to I WikiLeaks with the strin; of characters aneStiQative Technique The Of?ce cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified Andrew M?ller?Maguhn as a WikiLeaks associate who ma have assisted with the transfer of these stolen documents to WikiLeaks.175 Investigative Technique ?0 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 23; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 @WikiLeaks. ?1 See serials 63 64 Investigative Technique ?2 Investigative Technique At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a downloaded file?s creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks?s version of the ?les was still September 19, 2016. See 2284941, serial 62 Investigative Technique 173 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system appears to have treated each attachment as a new ?le and given it a new creation date. See SM-2284941, serials 63 64. 174 See 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject@gmail.com? ?5 Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker O?ers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018). 47 U.S. Department of Justice Investigative Technique On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton;177 internal communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign;173 and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation.179 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 documents stolen from Podesta?s personal email account. The last-in-tirne email released from Podesta?s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU. d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials As reports attributing the DNC and hacks to the Russian government emerged, WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The ?le-transfer evidence described above and other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks?s claims about the source of material that it posted. Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016, the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich.?180 Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, ?Why are you so interested in Seth Rich?s killer?? and responded, ?We?re very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks sources.? The interviewer responded to Assange?s statement by commenting, know you don?t want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you?re suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered.? Assange replied, ?If there?s someone who?s potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious 176 Investigative Technique ?9 Indictment 43. 18? @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet. 48 U.S. Department of Justice circumstances, it doesn?t necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter. . .that type of allegation is very serious, as it?s taken very seriously by us.?181 After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an ?inside job,? and purported to have ?physical proof? that Russians did not give materials to Assange.132 C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU of?cers continued to target and back victims linked to the Democratic campaign and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states. 1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat?Linked Victims On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton?s personal of?ce . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: ?Russia, if you?re listening, I hope you?re able to ?nd the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.?183 The ?30,000 emails? were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State. Within approximately ?ve hours of Trump?s statement, GRU of?cers targeted for the ?rst time Clinton?s personal office. After candidate Trump?s remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain including an email account belonging to Clinton aide? The investigation did not ?nd evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.184 Unit 26165 of?cers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate function designed to allow users to produce backups of as ?snapshots?). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving copies of the DNC data usin databases (referred to 131 See Assauge.? ?MurderedDNC Sia?er Was WikiLeaks Source, Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly). 132 M. Raju Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman ?5 Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN (May 23, 2018). 133 ?Donald Trump on Russian Missing Hillary Clinton Emails,? YouTube Channel Posted 7/27/16, available at (starting at 0:41). ?34 Investigative Technique 49 U.S. Department of Justice them to - account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU- controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud- based account.185 2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU of?cers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.186 The GRU also targeted private technology ?rms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations?? The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identi?ed evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Of?ce did not investigate further. The Of?ce did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Of?ce understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. By at least the summer of 2016, GRU of?cers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU of?cers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as injection,? by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as ex?ltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identi?ed.190 GRU of?cers Investigative Technique scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilites. For examle, over a two-da eriod in July 2016, GRU of?cers for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states. Investigative '35 Indictment ii 34; see also SM-2589 05-HACK, serial 29 Investigative Technique 136 Indictment 1] 69. Ne ksho Indictment 1 69; Investigative Technique 183 Investigative Technique 139 Investigative Technique 19? investigative Technique 50 U.S. Department of Justice I Atterney?We-rlel?feduet? Investigative Technique Similar IT for vulnerabilities continued through the election. Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public of?cials involved in election administration and personnel at com anies involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU of?cers targeted employees of i, a voting technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida county of?cials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election.191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software (commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.192 The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government. The Of?ce did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so. D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks?s releases of hacked materials throu bout the summer and fall of 2016. Harm to Ongomg Matter a. Background Harm to Ongoing Matter 191 Ne ksho Indictment 75' Investigative Technique ?92 Investigative Technique 51 US. Department of Justice Weed-net b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to ?have emails relating to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,?194 but provided no additional context. In debriefins with the Of?ce, former deut cam ai chairman Rick Gates said that, Harm to Ongoing' Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Gates recalled candidate Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found.196 Paul Manafort, who would later become cam-ai .197 Harm to Ongoing Matter 193 Harm to Ongoing Matter 194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Reiease for Democratic Convention, Time (July 27, 2016) (quoting the June 12, 2016 television interview). 195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard Gates 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Dec. 195 (?Gates Superseding Criminal Information?); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates HI, (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205 (?Gates Plea Agreement?). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Of?ce has deemed to be reliable. 1'96 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 1-2. 197 As explained further in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, in?a, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his statements are suf?ciently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort?s untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort?s explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account appears here principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses. 52 US. Department of Justice ?ttefne?e?ellred-ue-t Wed-Ham Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump,199 told the Of?ce that he recalled an incident in which he was in candidate Trum?s of?ce in Trum Tower Harm t0 Ongomg Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Cohen further told the Of?ce that, after WikiLeaks?s subsequent release of stolen DNC emails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of, 202 Harm to Ongoing Matter According to Gates, Manafort expressed excitement about the 203 Manafort, for his part, told the Of?ce that, shortl WikiLeaks?s Jul 22 release, Manafort also oke with candidate Trum - Harm to Ongoing Matter mHarm to Ongoing Matter Manafort also HOM wanted to be kept apprised of any 199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single?count information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a) He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the US. Attorney?s Of?ce in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Of?ce. In the months leading up to his false?statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Of?ce on multiple occasions for interviews and provided information that the Of?ce has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report. 20' Harm to Ongoing Matter Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 53 US. Department of Justice developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch about future WikiLeaks releases.206 According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a press strategy, a communications camai_n, and messanin based on the ossible release of Clinton emails WikiLeaks?? Harm t0 Ongoing Matter _208 Harm to Ongoing Matter while Trum. and Gates were drivin to LaGuardia Airport. Harm t0 Ungomg Matter shortly after the call candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming.209 Harm to Ongoing Matter c, Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Corsi is an author who holds a doctorate in olitical science. In 2016, Corsi also worked for the media outlet WorldNetDail WND . Harm to 011901"?! Matter 206 Gates 4/10/13 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/13 302, at 1?2 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2. 208 209 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. 210 211 212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Un?t for Command: Swg'?? Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United States. Corsi told the Of?ce that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3. 2? Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; Corsi was ?rst interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel?s of?ces in Washington, DC. He was accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17, 2018; September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November 1, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was 54 US. Department of Justice AHomw?We?epfeduet Harm to Ongoing Matter Corsi told the Of?ce durin_ interviews that he ?must have? reviousl discussed Assan_e with Malloch.215 Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter According to Malloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the ?orbit? of U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them. Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect Corsi with Assange.218 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter present for all interviews, and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to a proffer agreement that precluded af?rmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances. 214 2'5 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 4. 216 217 218 Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange or WikiLeaks, stating that he did not ursue the re uest to contact Assange because he believed he had no connections to Assange. 219 i 22? Harm to Ongoing Matter US. Department of Justice a. Malloch stated to investigators that beginnin_ in or about Au_ust 2016, he and Corsi had multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks Harm t0 Ongoing Matter had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or around August 01? September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was coming, after which ?we? were going to be in the driver?s seat?? Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter "Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 222 Harm to Ongoing Matter 223 arm to Ongoing Matter 224 Harm to Ongoing Matter 225 arm to Ongoing Matter 226 arm to Ongoing Matter 227 arm to Ongoing Matter 228 229 Harm to Ongoing Matter 56 U.S. Department of Justice Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter If? ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongomg Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 23? arm to Ongoing Matter 231 i I arm to Ongoing Matter 232 233 Harm to Ongoing Matter 234 arm to Ongoing Matter 235 arm to Ongoing Matter 236 arm to Ongoing Matter 233 Harm to Ongoing Matter 57 d. WikiLeaks?s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails On October 7, 2016, four days after the Assange press conference the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video?s publication, WikiLeaks released the ?rst set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta. Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Corsi said that, because he had no direct means of communicating with WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WND?who were participating on a conference call with him that day?to reach Assange immediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was Harm to Ongoing Matter I 239 Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about womenlater November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm t0 onQOinQ Matter that he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused on other individuals who were on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic ?ight). Corsi at one point stated that after WikiLeaks?s release of stolen emails on October 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. 58 U.S. Department of Justice enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether anyone could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing.247 The Of?ce investigated Corsi?s allegations about the events of October 7 2016 but found little corroboration for his alle_ations about the da .248 Harm t0 Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter However, the phone records themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the Access Hollywood sto and the Of?ce has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of the conversation. Harm '30 Ongoing Matter . However, the Of?ce has not identi?ed any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi. e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks 9 ii the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump 5 unprecedented and dangerous? ties 245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Of?ce was unable to ?nd evidence of any such tweets. 246 Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. 24" Harm to Ongoing Matter 249 Harm to Ongoing Matter zsoHOM Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter I Harm to Ongoing Matter 59 US. Department of Justice AttemeWerl-ePred-uet to Russia, PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: ??Let?s bomb lraq? Progress for America PAC to launch ?PutinTrump.org? at 9:30am. Oops pw is ?putintrump? putintrumporg.? Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., PAC run anti-Trump site putintrumporg is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We have guessed the password. It is ?putintrump.? See ?About? for who is behind it. Any comments??253 Several hours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it?s really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it?s a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.254 Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the ?About? page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: ?Off the record, 1 don?t know who that is but l?ll ask around. Thanks.?255 On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking ?you guys? to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already ?had done so,? and asked, ?what?s behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about??256 WikiLeaks did not respond. On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was ?great to see you and your dad talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us wlsearch.tk.?257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in ?digging through? leaked emails and stated, ?we just released Podesta emails Part 4.?258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly tweeted the link.259 252 9/20/ 16 Twitter DM, JasonFishbein to @WikiLeaks; see JF 005 87 (9/21/16 Messages, Fishbein 9/5/ 18 302, at 4. When interviewed by our Of?ce, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the participants discussed US. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password that Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks. 253 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to 254 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject ?Wikileaks?)). 255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, to @WikiLeaks. 256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks. 257 At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents. 258 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to 259 10/14/16 (6:34 am.) Tweet. 60 U. S. Department of Justice 2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton?s private email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been permanently destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and other stolen material 1n support of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met with skepticism, and nothing came of them, others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did not ?nd evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails, or that these contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign. a. Henry Oknyanslg/ (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Florida- based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. Caputo noti?ed Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky. Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in?person meeting.260 Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate involved in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton?s involvement in money laundering with Rasin?s companies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer, stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research.261 Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin?s motivation was ?nancial. According to Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold.262 Rasin is noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton. The Office found no other evidence that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities. In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and provided an introduction, whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he was never told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware Oknyansky sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact.263 26? Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1. 26? Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1-2. 262 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 2. 263 Caputo 5/2/13 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/13 302, at 1. 61 U.S. Department of Justice The Of?ce did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Of?ce con?rmed Rasin had been issued a Florida driver?s license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian interference efforts. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would ??nd the 30,000 emails that are missing,? Trump asked individuals af?liated with his Campaign to ?nd the deleted Clinton emails.264 Michael would later serve as National Security Advisor in the Trump Administration?recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.265 Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Ledeen, a long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to about her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.266 Smith, an investment advisor who was active in Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails?? Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before request, as early as December 2015 .263 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails, stating, ?Here is the proposal I brie?y mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1. Were classi?ed and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be demonstrated.?269 Attached to the email was a 25 -page proposal stating that the ?Clinton email server was, in all likelihood, breached long ago,? and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services could ?re-assemble the server?s email content??0 The proposal called for a three-phase approach. The ?rst two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with certain intelligence sources ?that have access through liaison work with various foreign services? to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, ?Even if a single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it'would be catastrophic to the Clinton Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and 26? 4/25/18 302, at 5-6; 5/1/18 302, at 1?3. 265 5/1/18 302, at 1-3. 256 4/25/18 302, at 7; 5/4/18 302, at 1-2; 11/29/17 302, at 7?8. 26" 11/29/17 302, at 7. 268 Szobocsan 3/29/ 17 302, at 1. 269 12/3/ 15 Email, Ledeen to Smith. 270 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment). 62 US. Department of Justice wrote, ?we can discuss to whom it should be referred.?271 On December 16, 2015, Smith informed Ledeen that he declined to participate in her ?initiative.? According to one of Smith?s business associates, Smith believed Ledeen?s initiative was not viable at that time.272 Just weeks after Trump?s July 2016 request to ?nd the Clinton emails, however, Smith tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates. Smith made claims to others involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers with ?ties and af?liations to Russia? who had access to the emails, and that his efforts were coordinated with the Trump Campaign.273 On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an account with the subject ?Sec. Clinton?s unsecured private email server? to an undisclosed list of recipients, including Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was ?[i]ust ?nishing two days of sensitive meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the Clinton?s home-based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players, and private mercenaries. Parties with varying interests, are circling to release ahead of the election??4 On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails.275 One of the purposes of KLS Research was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative.276 KLS Research received over $30,000 during the presidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even more money?? Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for and authenticate the emails.278 In early September 2016, as part of his recruitment and fundraising effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was ?in coordination? with the Trump Campaign, ?to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization/?r?9 The document listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Clovis, Bannon, 27] 12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan Safron. 272 Szobocsan 3/29/ 18 302, at 1. 273 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 274 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 275 Incorporation papers of KLS Research LLC, 7/26/17? Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2. ?6 Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 3. 277 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC, 10/31/17 - 10/1 1/ 16 Email, Smith to ?8 Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7/12/17 302, at 12; York 11/22/17 302, at 1. 279 York 7/13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research, LLC, ?Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiative,? Sept. 9, 2016). 63 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WerlePred-uet and Kellyanne Conway.280 The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,281 but the Office did not identify evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith?s efforts. In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, ?wondering if you had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we last visited. . . . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you ?your eyes only??282 Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the ?dark web?) that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that the emails were not authentic.233 A backup of Smith?s computer contained two ?les that had been downloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on Smith?s computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect when the ?les were downloaded to Smith?s computer. (It appears the creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume 1, Section supra.284) The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the ?les before their release by WikiLeaks. Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton?s deleted emails until shortly before the election. For example, on October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a ?tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days,? and that WikiLeaks ?has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this allows little time for response prior to the US. election November 8.?285 An attachment to the 23? The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under ?Independent and described him as an ?established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec. Clinton.? 231 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/ 15/ 16 Email, Smith to et al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith (bcc: Clovis et 232 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith. 233 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5. 284 The forensic analysis of Smith?s computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded (no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume 1, Section supra. The Of?ce tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two ?les found on Smith?s computer from WikiLeaks?s site using the same Apple operating system on Smith?s computer; both files were successfully downloaded and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62. 235 10/28/ 16 Email, Smith to Smith. 64 US. Department of Justice Wed-nef? email claimed that WikiLeaks would release ?All 33k deleted Emails? by ?November lst.? N0 emails obtained from Clinton?s server were subsequently released. Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties with ?ties and af?liations to Russia.?286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such connection.287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton emails. In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons af?liated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and The GRU then ex?ltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and disseminated that data through ?ctitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0) and latel through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trum interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that Harm t0 Ongomg Matter explained in Volume 1, Section V.B, in?a, the evidence was suf?cient to support computer- intrusion and other char_es a_ainst GRU of?cers for their role in election-related hackin. Harm to Ongoing Matter 286 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith. 237 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6. 65 US. Department of Justice IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN The Of?ce identi?ed multiple contacts??links,? in the words of the Appointment Order? between Trump Campaign of?cials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Of?ce investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available information, the investigation did not establish such coordination. This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with Campaign of?cials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and extending through the post-election, transition period. A. Campaign Period (September 2015 November 8, 2016) Russian?government?connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump?s campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015 .233 Because Trump?s status as a public ?gure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings, this Of?ce investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period?the Trump Tower Moscow project, see Volume 1, Section IV.A.1, infra?led to or involved coordination of election assistance. Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, when Trump was moving toward?and eventually becoming?the Republican nominee for President. As set forth below, the Of?ce also evaluated a series of links during this period: outreach to two of Trump?s then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russia had ?dirt? on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume 1, Sections IV.A.2 dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government (Volume 1, Section a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was ?part of Russia and its government?s support for [Trump]? (Volume 1, Section events at the Republican National Convention (Volume 1, Section post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign of?cials and Russia?s ambassador to the United States (Volume 1, Section and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro?Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume 1, Section IV.A.8). 238 For example, on August 1.8, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication?s founder (and former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites?Trump2016.ru and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place. 66 U. S. Department of Justice 1. Trump Tower Moscow Project The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership (through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases, the Trump Organization has executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the country where the project was located.289 Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project, commonly referred to as a ?Trump Tower Moscow? or ?Trump Moscow? project, anticipated a combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then- president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization?s pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the project?s status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.290 a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia?based real estate project shortly after the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.291 Donald J. Trump Jr. served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras Agalarov) and Irakli ?Ike? Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,292 with the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone.293 In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of 2?39 See, e. g, Interview of." Donald Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52 (Sept. 7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of speci?c projects). 290 As noted in Volume 1, Section supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project. See Information 11 United States v. M'chael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (?Cohen Information?). 291 See Interview of: Donald Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, 2017) (?Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov?s company, Crocus Group, began preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow?). As has been widely reported, the Miss Universe pageant?which Trump co?owned at the time?was held at the Agalarov?owned Crocus City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras Agalarov?s son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended. Kaveladze mm 302, at 2. 4-6; osc- 85 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze E. Agalarov). 293 67 US. Department of Justice an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.295 The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014.296 From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a BOO-unit, 194-meter building to be - constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called ?Crocus City,? which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.298 From March 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed ?design standards? and other architectural elements.299 For example, in July 2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the ?demographics of these prospective buyers? in the Crocus City area, the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building.300 In August 2014, the Trump Organization requested speci?cations for a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in Crocus City.301 Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.302 Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the last communication is dated November 24, 2014.303 The project appears not to have developed past the planning stage, and no construction occurred. 295 (12/23/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze E. Agalarov). 296 See, eg, (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. E. Agalarov); OSC- (1 /20/ 14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et 211.). 297 See, (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et a1.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about speci?cations); (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et 298 See 14 Email, E. _alarov to Ivanka Trum, Trump Jr. Kaveladze); Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01 am.) 299 See, rag, (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; 10/ 14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et a1); 16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et 300 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et 302 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee Kaveladze (noting last response was on August 26, 2014)); (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea McGee (suggesting silence ?proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project?)); (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et a1.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development speci?cations)). 3?03 (11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et 68 U.S. Department of Justice AtterneWerIeP-red-uet Whamw) b. Communications with I. C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi (Summer and Fall 2015) In the late summer of 20 5, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New York- based real estate adviser, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.304 Sater had previously worked with the Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump Organization and therefore knew of the organization?s general interest in completing a deal there.305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid- 2000s.306 Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of LC. Expert Investment Company (I.C. Expert), a Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov-7?07 Sater had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of Rozov during Rozov?s purchase of a building in New York City.308 Sater later contacted Rozov and proposed that LG. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I.C. Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another employee of LC. Expert.309 Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with LC. Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with LC. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him the project was continuing}10 Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project31 1) and Donald J. Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the projectm) during the fall of 2015. I 304 Sater rovided information to our Of?ce in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer agreement? 306 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5. 3m Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3. 308 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1. 309 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at see also 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent). 31? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6. 3? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5. 69 U. S. Department of Justice W?h?m??e?m Also during the fall of 201 5, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with Giorgi a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia.313 Cohen stated that he spoke to in part because had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.314 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to adding look forward to your reply about this spectacular project in Moscow.? forwarded Cohen?s email to an associate and wrote, we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr. Trump this project would de?nitely receive the worldwide attention.?315 On September 24, 2015, sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed ?[1]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org,? explaining that need to send this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support.?316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, provided a translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a ?symbol of stronger economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian Federation.?317 On September 27, 2015, sent another email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with ?Global Development Group which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze.318 Cohen told the Of?ce that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to work with LC. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater.319 c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government October 2015-January 201 6) I7. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the rump Organization Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization (through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and LC. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) for a Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov on behalf of LC. Expert, was ?intended to facilitate further discussions? in order to ?attempt to 3'3 was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to build a Trump?branded property in Batumi, Georgia. was also involved in discussions for a Trumi-branded irol?ect in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Of?ce twice interviewed 3? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also 5/10/18 302, at 1. 315 9/22/15 Email, to Nizharadze. 316 9/24/15 Email, to Cohen. 3? 9/24/ 15 Email, to Cohen. 318 9/27/15 Email, to Cohen. 3'9 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12. 70 US. Department of Justice enter into a mutually acceptable agreement? related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.320 The contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and of?ce components, and called for ?[a]pproximately 250 ?rst class, luxury residential condominiums,? as well as ?[o]ne first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 ?oors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms.?321 For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales,322 plus 3% of all rental and other revenue.323 For the project?s hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the ?rst five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate incentive fee of 20% of operating pro?t. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would receive a $4 million ?up-front fee? prior to groundbreaking.325 Under these terms, the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming signi?cant liabilities or ?nancing commitments.326 On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the L01, Sater emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate Trump?s chances at being elected, writing: Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process. . . . Michael, Putin gets on stage with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns the republican nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in. . . . We will manage this process better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly. That the game changer?? Later that day, Sater followed up: Donald doesn?t stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. ?Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal? 32? 1 1/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter see also 10/ 13/15 Email, Sater to Cohen Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent). 32? LOI, p. 2. 322 The called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million; 4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million; 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500 million; 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1% of all gross sales over $1 billion. LOI, Schedule 2. 323 L01, Schedule 2. 324 L01, Schedule 1. 325 L01, Schedule 2. 326 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3. 3? 1i/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 71 U.S. Department of Justice Atterney?WerleP-roduet I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. If he says it we own this election. Americas most dif?cult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate. . . . We can own this election. Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people, we can pull this off. Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really good.328 According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or anyone af?liated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidate suggested that his campaign would be a signi?cant ?infomercial? for Trump-branded properties.329 ii. Post-L01 Contacts with Individuals in Russia Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including from the Presidential Administration of Russia.330 Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.331 In early negotiations with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to set up meetings with Russian of?cials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote to Cohen that ?all we need is Putin on board and we are golden,? and that a ?meeting with Putin and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of this meeting was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian government?33 Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka Trump on behalf of Erchova?s then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov?s assistance to the Trump Campaign.334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Uni?ed Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission 328 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:40 pm). 3?29 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. 330? Sater 12/15/17 302, at 2. 331 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 3-4. 332 10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 333? 334 Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identi?ed herself as ?Lana E. Alexander,? which said in part, ?If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you?ll see who he is close to and that he has done Putin?s political campaigns.? 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to 1. Trump. 72 US. Department of Justice Attemw?We?ePfeduet WW company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia?s energy minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.33S He told the Of?ce that, after receiving this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov?s name and concluded (incorrectly) that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.336 Between November 18 and 19, 2015,?Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a ?trusted person? who could offer the Campaign ?political synergy? and ?synergy on a government level,? Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidenti?ed intermediary. Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual Klokov described as ?our person of interest.?337 In an email to the Of?ce, Erchova later identi?ed the ?person of interest? as Russian President Vladimir Putin.338 In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local . developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidenti?ed intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump? including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin?would need to be ?in conjunction with the development and an of?cial visit? with the Trump Organization receiving a formal invitation to visit.339 (Klokov had written previously that ?the visit [by candidate Trump to Russia] has to be informal?)340 Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a possible meeting between Trump and ?the person of interest? from any existing business track.341 Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have ?phenomenal? impact ?in a business dimension? and that the ?person of ?most important support? could have signi?cant rami?cations for the ?level of proj ects and their capacity.? Klokov concluded by telling 335 11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen. 336 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Of?ce, Cohen still appeared to believe that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above. 337 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 am). 338 In July 2018, the Of?ce received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which she wrote that the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex?husband to contact Ivanka Trump . . . and offer cooperation to Trump?s team on behalf of the Russian officials.? 7/27/18 Email, Erchova to Special Counsel?s Of?ce. The email claimed that the of?cials wanted to offer candidate Trump ?land in Crimea among other things and unof?cial meeting with Putin.? Id. In order to vet the email?s claims, the Of?ce responded requesting more details. The Of?ce did not receive any reply. 339 11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 am). 340 'l 1/ 18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 am). 11/ 18/ 15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 am.) would suggest separating your negotiations and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be completely different, having the most important support?). 73 US. Department of Justice Atterne?e?ePde-uet Cohen that there was ?no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of interest.?342 Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that ?[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks with Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet.?343 This email appears to be their ?nal exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov?s initial offer of assistance to the Campaign?s attention or that anyone associated with the Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government?? By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government of?cials. Cohen told Sater that he was ?setting up the meeting myself.?345 On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed the of?ce of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government?s press secretary, indicating that he desired contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin?s chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address instead of ?Pr so the email apparently did not go through.346 On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address (info@prpress.gov.ru) with the following message: Dear Mr. Peskov, Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. Without getting into speci?es, the communication between our two sides has stalled. As this project is too important, 1 am hereby requesting your assistance. I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the speci?cs as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon?? Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr _peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak with Sergei lV8.1?l0V.348 Cohen testi?ed to Congress, and initially told the Of?ce, that he did not recall receiving a response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In 342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 am). 343 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 344 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12. 345 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr _peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9:12 am). 347 1/ 14/ 16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 am). 348 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to (10:28 am). 74 U.S. Department of Justice fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016.349 On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova, Peskov?s personal assistant. Writing from her personal email account, Poliakova stated that she had been trying to reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided.350 Shortly after receiving Poliakova?s email, Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes.351 Cohen described to Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to build the project and with ?nancing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and took notes, stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia.352 Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other representative of the Russian government, nor did the Of?ce identify any evidence of direct follow-up. However, the day after Cohen?s call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to ?[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat . . . It?s about Putin they called today.?353 Sater then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project}54 along with a note to ?[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me.?355 After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016, Sater sent Cohen an invitation?signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company travel to ?Moscow for a working visit? about the ?prospects of development and the construction business in Russia,? ?the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower,? and ?the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump.?356 According 349 Cohen Information 1111 4, 7. Cohen?s interactions with President Trump and the President?s lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume 11. See Vol. II, Section ll.K.3, z'n?a. 350 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5:57 am.) (?Mr Cohen[,] 1 can?t get through to both your phones. Pls, call 351 Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova?s contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 am). 352 Cohen 9/12/13 302, at 2-3. 353 1 (1/21/ 16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen). 354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing ?nancing. (12/3 1/ 15 Text Messages, Sater Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found in?a. 355 (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (6:49 356 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 pm.) (attachment). 75 U.S. Department of Justice Wmdu??wewtm?i??med?Urme?mm to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project?? d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016) i. Safer ?s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia The late January communication was neither the ?rst nor the last time that Cohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015, Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government of?cials and possible ?nancing partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for meetings}58 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote: Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other 1ine.[359] He needs a copy of your and Donald?s passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss ?nancing for Trump Tower Moscow. Politically neither Putins of?ce nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia?s 2 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite have visa issued.360 In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.361 Cohen told the Of?ce that at one point he requested a copy of candidate Trump?s passport from Rhona Graff, Trump?s executive assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump?s passport to Cohen?s 3?57 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7. 358 See, 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 pm.) (?Please scan and send me a copy ofyour passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs?). 359 Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this ?nancing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to U.S. government sanctions, see Rassia/Ukraine?relaied Sanctions and Identi?cations, Of?ce of Foreign Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015), available at Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, ez? 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003). 360 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 300002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen, (10:53 am.) 36' (12/ 19/ 15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); (12/ 19/ 15 Text Messages, Cohen Sater). 76 US. Department of Justice of?ce.362 The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater.363 Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, ?[t]he People _wanted to know when you are coming??364 On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up: I had a chat with Moscow. AS SUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that?s it?s probably after the convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would con?rm and revert. . . . Let me know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly ?y over.365 Cohen responded, ?My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.?366 The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen?s travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (?Forum?), an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Of?ce that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum?? On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen: Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia?s Davos it?s June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel; Cohen wrote back, ?[w]orks for me.?369 3'62 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 363 On December 21, 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text message that read, ?They need a copy of DJT passport,? to which Cohen responded, ?After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him.? (12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen Sater). 36? (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 365 F800015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 366 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 pm?. 367 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 4. . F800016 16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 6:27 am?. 3?59 16 Text Messages, Cohen Safer). 77 Atte?reydv?eleflePfed-uet? On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for the Forum, adding, ?Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well.?370 On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum.371 Sater also sent Cohen a Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos. According to Cohen, the invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned that Russian of?cials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.373 On June 14, 2016, Cohen met Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be traveling at that time};14 372 ii. Candidate rump ?3 Opportunities to Travel to Russia The investigation identi?ed evidence that, during the period the Trump Moscow project was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts. First, in interviews with the Of?ce, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016.375 According to Cohen, Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project signi?cantly. On one occasion, Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the candidate?s schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate?s preexisting commitments to the Campaign.376 Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma?a contact of Ivanka Trump?s from the fashion industry??rst passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation?? On January 14, 2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was ?honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious? Forum event, but that he would ?have to decline? the invitation given his ?very grueling and full travel schedule? as a presidential candidate.?8 Graff 37? F800018 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater Cohen). 37] 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (2:10 pm). 3?72 (6/13/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (2:20 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen. 373 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6?8. 374 FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen Sater (12:06 and 2:50 375 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2. 376 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 377 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 am.) (attachments); (1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff (9:18 37* 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira. 78 U.S. Department of Justice asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff ?send a formal note to the Deputy Prime Minister? declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be ?great.?379 It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers from President Trump,380 Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg.381 Two weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump?s signature a two?paragraph letter declining the invitation?? The letter stated that Trump?s ?schedule has become extremely demanding? because of the presidential campaign, that he ?already ha[d] several commitments in the United States? for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise ?would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event.?383 Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead for Trump to sign.334 At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert oresman?a New York-based investment banker?began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting with candidate Trump. According to oresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the Forum.385 Foresman ?rst emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show he Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early ?private channel? between Vladimir Putin and former US. President George W. Bush, and an ?approach? he had received from ?senior Kremlin officials? about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, Corey Lewandowski, or ?another relevant person? to discuss this and other ?concrete things? Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over ?unsecure email.?386 On April 4, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman?s meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant to Trumpm 379 1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff. 380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written questions to the President?s counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to those questions through counsel. 38' Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation?). 382 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part see also (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016). 383 (unsigned letter). 384 (3/31/16 Email, Graffto Macchia). 335 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4. 386 See (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graft); see also Foresman 10/ 17/ 8 302, at 3-4. 337 See (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia). 79 U. S. Department of Justice With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff?first on April 26 and again on April 30, 2016.388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26 email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski.389 On May 2, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman?s April 30 email?which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that ?should be conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts??to policy advisor Stephen Miller}90 No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration?? When interviewed by the Of?ce, Foresman denied that the speci?c ?approach? from ?senior Kremlin officials? noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov?s invitation to Roscongress. According to Foresman, the ?concrete things? he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman?s personal perspectives on the invitation and Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest Institute). Foresman told the Of?ce that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the other politician?s participation did not work out.392 Finally, Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials to the Campaign. Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced as Trump?s foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in?person meeting with the candidate to share his professional background and policy views, including that Trump should decline Kobyakov?s invitation to speak at the orum.393 2. George Papadopoulos George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March 383 See (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graft); (4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff). 339 See (4/27/ 16 Email, Graff to Foresman); (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski). 39? (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also 16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman). 391 Foresman?s contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume 1, Section IV.B.3, in?a. 392 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4. 3?93 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 8?9. 80 US. Department of Justice 2016 to early October 2016.394 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud?s return from a trip to Moscow, that the Russian government had obtained ?dirt? on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to candidate Clinton. Papadopoulos shared information about Russian ?dirt? with people outside of the Campaign, and the Of?ce investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign of?cial. Papadopoulos and the Campaign of?cials with whom he interacted told the Of?ce that they did not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never came to pass. a. Origins of Campaign Work In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.395 As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors.396 In late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson?? Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.398 At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP), which billed itself as a ?unique institution . . . comprising high-level professional international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law.?399 Papadopoulos said that he had ?nished his role with the Carson 3'94 Papadopoulos met with our Of?ce for debrie?ngs on several occasions in the summer and fall of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a). 3?95 A Transcript of Donald Trump?s Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). 39:5 7/15/15 Linkedln MeSSage, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 am); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner t0 Papadopoulos (7:42:21 am). 397 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. 3?98 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to ldris. 399 London Centre of International Law Practice, at (via web.archive.org). 81 US. Department of Justice WNWW campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.400 In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join LCILP and arrived in London to begin work.401 As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign of?cial Michael Glassner about his interest in joining the Trump Campaign.402 On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner another message reiterating his interest/'103 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos?s interest to another campaign of?cial, Joy Lutes, who noti?ed Papadopoulos by email that she had been told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign?s national co- chair and chief policy advisor.404 At the time of Papadopoulos?s March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.405 To address that issue, senior Campaign of?cials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice.406 After receiving Papadopoulos?s name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and believed that he had credibility on energy issues.407 On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke.408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the Campaign?s foreign policy.409 At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer.410 19. Initial Russia-Related Contacts Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled 400 2/4/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. 401 2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 pm); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (5:34:15 402 2/4/16 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:28 pm); 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 403 3/2/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner(11:17:23 am.) 404 3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos (10:08:15 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of2), at 4. 406 Clovis 10/3/497 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis Papadopoulos (6:05:47 4'33 3/6/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 409 Statement of Offense 11 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 (?Papadopoulos Statement of Offense?). 41? Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. 82 U.S. Department of Justice to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with The purpose of the trip was to meet of?cials af?liated with Link Campus University, a for-pro?t institution headed by a former Italian government official.412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also af?liated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts was IT ,415 a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media campaign (see Volume 1, Section II, supra). In January and February 2016, Mifsud and IT discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not identi evidence of them meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016, IT was also in contact that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military- controlled acebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section supra). According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at ?rst seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met in Rome.416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign, however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417 The two discussed Mifsud?s European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government.418 Papadopoulos told the Of?ce that Mifsud?s claim of substantial connections with Russian government of?cials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.419 4? Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 5. 4?2 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et 311., Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) (?Link Campus University . . . is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti?). 413 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 5. ?4 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. Investigative Technique Harm to Ongoing Matter ?6 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 5. 4'7 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1i 5. 413 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. ?9 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 5. 83 rtment of Justice . U.S. Depa AtterneyAVerk?P?Fed-aet? On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.420 Four days later, candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as ?an oil and energy consultant? and an ?[e]xcellent guy.?42] On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.422 Mifsud was accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin.423 Papadopoulos understood at the time that Polonskaya may have been Putina niece but later learned that this was not true.424 During the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers.4325 Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that did not occur.426 Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump Campaign?s foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was ?Meeting with Russian leadership--including Putin.??m The message stated in pertinent part: Ijust finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin?s niece and the Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.428 The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a ?neutral? city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone?s thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue.429 420 Papadopoulos 8/ 10/ I 7 302, at 2. 42] Phillip Rucker Robert Costa, Trump Questions Need for NAT 0, Outlines Noninterventionist Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). 422 Papadopoulos 8/ 10/ 17 302, at 3; 3/24/ 16 Text Messages, Mifsud Papadopoulos. 423 Papadopoulos 8/ 10/ 17 302, at 3. 424 Papadopoulos 8/ 10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2?3; Papadopoulos Internet Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for ?putin?s niece,? ?Olga putin,? and ?russian president niece Olga,? among other terms). 425 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. 426 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1i 8 n. 1. 427 3/24/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et a1. (8:48:21 am). 423 Papadopoulos?s statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was not Putin?s niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also serve as Russia?s Deputy Foreign Minister. 429 3/24/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 am). 84 US. Department of Justice Papadopoulos?s message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign?s approach Clovis?s response to Papadopoulos, however, did not re?ect that shift. Replying to Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial email, Clovis wrote: This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance anything With Russia until we have everyone on the same page. More thoughts later today. Great work.431 c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, DC.432 The meeting?which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign433??took place at the Trump International Hotel.434 Papadopoulos ?ew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other. As re?ected in the photograph below (which was posted to Trump?s Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between the two, two seats to Sessions?s left: 43?? 431 3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et a1. (8:55:04 am). 437' Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. 433 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17. 434 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. 85 US. Department of Justice March 2 016 Meeting of are ign Policy Team, with Papadopo uios {Fourth from Right of Candidate Trump) During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced themselves and brie?y described their areas of experience or expertise.435 Papadopoulos spoke about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian officials.436 Speci?cally, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help arrange that meeting?? Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos?s statement. Papadopoulos and Campaign advisor JD. Gordon?Who told investigators in an interview that he had a clear? recollection of the meeting?have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin.438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts to arrange a meeting.439 Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength of the opposition he expressed.440 d. George Papadopoulos Learns hat Russia Has ?Dirt? in the arm of Clinton Emails Whatever Sessions?s precise words at the March 31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from 435 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. 436 Papadopoulos 3/10/17 302, at 4. 437 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1] 9; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14; Carafano 9/ 12/ 17 302, at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1. 438 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 4-5. 439 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. 44? Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/ 17 302, at 5; Hoskins 9/14/ 17 302, at 1; Carafano 9/12/17 302, at 2. 86 US. Department of Justice Atterneyd?erk?Predttet making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Of?ce that he understood the Campaign to be supportive of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.? Accordingly, when he returned to London, Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.442 Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.?43 For example, within a week of her initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message? which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud?addressing Papadopoulos?s ?wish to engage with the Russian Federation??44 When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another meeting.?45 Polonskaya responded the next day that she was ?back in St. Petersburg? but ?would be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos?s] initiatives between our two countries? and ?to meet [him] again.?446 Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought ?a good step? would be to introduce him to ?the Russian Ambassador in London,? and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, ?or anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia.?447 Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11, 2016. He wrote, ?This is already been agreed. I am ?ying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow.?448 The two bodies referenced by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative assembly,?9 while ?Valdai? refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that ?is close to Russia?s foreign-policy establishment.?450 Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him ?tomorrow.?451 For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had ?already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request,? that ?we are all very excited the possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,? and that ?[t]he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced.?452 44' Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1] 10. 443 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1111 10-15. 444 3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3:39 am. and 5:36 445 4/ 10/ 1 6 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 pm). 446 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:11:24 447 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos t0 Polonskaya (9:21 :56 ?8 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11:43:53). 449 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 10(0). 45? Anton Troianovskl, Putin Ally Warns ofArms Race as Russia Considers Response to US. Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018). 451 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11:51:53 452 4/ 12/ 1 6 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 87 U. S. Department of Justice Papadopoulos and Mifsud?s mentions of seeing each other ?tomorrow? referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning, April 12,2016, at the Andaz Hotel 1n London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Of?ce, 453 and records from Papadopoulos?s UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the meeting took place.454 Following the meeting, Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow.455 On April 18, 2016, while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council Mifsud had described Timofeev as having connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the executive entity in Russia responsible for Russian foreign relations.458 Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting ?the groundwork? for a ?potential? meeting between the Campaign and Russian government of?cials.459 Papadopoulos told the Of?ce that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an of?cial manner and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line.460 Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April 25, 2016 email that he had just spoken ?to Igor Ivanov[,] the President of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia,? and conveyed Ivanov?s advice about how best to arrange a ?Moscow visit.?461 After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016.?62 The next day, Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last 453 Papadopoulos 9/ 19/ 17 302, at 7. 454 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a. (forwarding Libya-related document), 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos Obaid (10: 28: 20 a. m. Papadopoulos Internet Search History (Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 pm.) (search for ?andaz hotel liverpool street?), 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud Papadopoulos. 455 See, 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (8:04:54 am). 45? Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5. 457 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 11. 458 During the campaign period, Papadopoulos connected over LinkedIn with several MFA- af?liated individuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko, publicly identi?ed as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov, publicly identi?ed as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he connected with Ser ei Nalobin, also identi?ed as an MFA of?cial. See Papadopoulos LinkedIn Connections 459 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 11. 46? Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 10. 4? 4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8: 16:35 am). 462 4/22/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (12:41:01 am). 88 U.S. Department of Justice Attemey-WerlePfed-uet meeting)?63 During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government of?cials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip, he learned that the Russians had obtained ?dirt? on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the ?dirt? was in the form of ?emails of Clinton,? and that they ?have thousands of emails.?464 On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.465 e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign of?cials with Russian government of?cials, Papadopoulos kept campaign of?cials apprised of his efforts. On April 25, 2016, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that ?[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready,? and that ?[t]he advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in ?neutral? cities.?466 On April 27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that ?some interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right.?467 The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had ?been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right.?468 Papadopoulos?s Russia-related communications with Campaign of?cials continued throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, be forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski whether that was ?something we want to move forward with??69 The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email ?Russia update??0 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaign of?cial Paul Manafort, under the subject line ?Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump,? stating that ?Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ii 14; 4/25/ 16 Text Messages, Mifsud Papadopoulos. 46? Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1] l4. This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. The disseminst?i-en? The foreign government conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, 2016, a few days after WikiLeaks?s release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information. 466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8: 12:44 467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55:58 ?68 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 469 5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 am). 470 5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 89 AtterneyJNerlePfed-uet? H: to discuss.?471 Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign of?cial, without including Papadopoulos, and stated: discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signal.?472 On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski ?want[ed] to have a call about this topic? and whether ?we were following up with it.?m After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to ?connect with? Clovis because he was ?running point,? Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that ?the Russian was asking him ?if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point.?474 Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he ?[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what?s best to do with it and what message I should send (or to After several email and Skype exchanges with Tirnofeev,?6 Papadopoulos sent one more email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski?s last day as campaign manager.477 The email stated that ?[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs? had contacted him and asked whether, if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings.?8 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was ?willing to make the trip off the record if it?s in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet speci?c people.?479 Following Lewandowski?s departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off- the-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government of?cials or with Papadopoulos?s other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.480 Papadopoulos also interacted 471 5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30:14 pm). 472 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 19 n2. 473 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 47? 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 pm); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 pm). 475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 Papadopoulos?s email coincided in time with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David Klein? a distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt?emailed Clovis about a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was ?a very close con?dante of Putin.? (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 The investigation did not ?nd evidence that Clovis responded to Klein?s email or that any further contacts of significance came out of Klein?s subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. 476 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1] 21(a). 473 6/ 19/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11 pm). 479 6/ 19/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11 pm). 480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense $1 21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11:57:24 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 pm). 90 US. Department of Justice directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary general.481 On July 16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, DC, where he sat next to Clovis (as re?ected in the photograph below .482 George Papaa'opou/os O?ar right) and Sam Clovis (second?'om right) Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit,483 Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares during the event.484 Papadopoulos?s recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat,485 and a July 12 message in the same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees ?are very nervous about Russia. So be aware.?486 Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other ?participants? in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy.487 Finally, Papadopoulos?s recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a 48' Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. 432 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. 484 Papadopoulos 9/ 19/17 302, at 16-17. 435 7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos. 4? 7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29). 487 7/27/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18). 91 U.S. Department of Justice A?crney?Werk?Pfed-uet journal that he kept at the time.488 Those notes, which are reprinted in part below, appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the ?office of Putin,? and suggest that Phares, Clovis, and Papadopoulos (?Walid/ Sam me?) would attend without the of?cial backing of the Campaign (?no official letter/no message from September: 63(an Have an exploratory meeting - 4h 1w] mam? to or lose. In September if allowed 61r- b: they will blast Mr. Trump. 1" 53? - 171' '71: We want the meeting in it?? w? fav- London/England . 1w lm?iir? M7 Lqu3/ ?nd/V I Walid/Sam me i No of?cial letter/no message from Trump We? ?w I They are talking to us. ?39? MGM: ?10? -It is a lot of risk. . we . at, -Of?ce of Putin. {?4-1 -Explore: we are a campalgn. 0km up (din/1 ?prqt: ?t a (?1?V16h. off Israel! EGYPT I Willingness to meet the FM sp {Gig with Walid/ am tulip. 14,51? law/:0: f/W J. -FM coming Useful to have a sessmn With PM a. 9229:? him. swam? Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel. On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign governments, ?even for ?closed door workshops/consultations abroad,? and asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos ?to go on that trip.?490 Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not ?travel before the election? but that he ?would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible.?491 433 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 3. 489 Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes, telling investigators that he could not read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 21. The notes, however, appear to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above. 490 8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11:59:07 am). 491 8/15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01:45 pm). 92 Atterne?er?lePred-uet? Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity.492 j? Trump Campaign Knowledge of ?Dirt? Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign? speci?cally, the then-Greek foreign minister?about Russia?s obtaining Clinton?related emails.493 In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with Mifsud in late April 2016, Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.494 (This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and the GRU hacked into the and DNC, see Volume 1, Sections 111B, supra.) Such disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign of?cial about the emails. When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign of?cials who interacted with him told the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos?s sharing the information that Russia had obtained ?dirt? on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought ?they have her emails??95 The Campaign officials who interacted or corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty, that he did not tell them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate Clinton.496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, including Papadopoulos, having given him non-public information that a forei overnment mi ht be in ossession of material dama in to Clinton?? 492 George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Thar: to Turn Russia Towards China, Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016). 493 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45. 494 See footnote 465 of Volume 1, Section supra. 495 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/1 1/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. 496 S. Miller 12/14/17 302, at 10. 497 93 U. S. Department of Justice No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other communications facilities reviewed by the Of?ce, shows that Papadopoulos shared this information with the Campaign. g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact The Of?ce investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue?Sergei Millian?remained out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of the Of?ce despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview. Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shortly after Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.500 Millian, an American citizen who is a native of Belarus, introduced himself ?as president of [the] New York-based Russian American Chamber of Commerce,? and claimed that through that position he had ?insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics.?501 Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether he had heard of Millian.502 Although Timofeev said no,503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York City.504 The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016.505 Afterwards, Millian invited Papadopoulos to attend?and potentially speak at?two international energy conferences, including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016.506 Papadopoulos ultimately did not attend either conference. On July 31, 2016, following his ?rst in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos emailed Trump Campaign of?cial Bo to say that he had been contacted ?by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump,? and to ask whether he should ?put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce)?507 thanked Papadopoulos ?for taking the initiative,? but asked him to ?hold off with 50? 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos. 501 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos 5:32 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 pm); 7/26/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (3:08:57 pm). 503 7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31:37 am); 7/26/ 16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37: 16 pm). 7/ 16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos Millian (7:55:43 pm). 505 7/30/ 16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos Millian (5:38 6:05 pm); 7/3 1/ 16 Text Messages, Millian Papadopoulos (3:48 4:18 pm); 8/1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 pm). 506 8/2/16 Text Messages, Millian Papadopoulos (3:04 3:05 pm); 8/3/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos Millian (4:07:37 am. 1:11:58 pm). 507 7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to (12:29:59 pm). 94 outreach to Russian-Americans? because ?too many articles? had already portrayed the Campaign, then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as ?being On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would ?share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign.?509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.?0 On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian ?billionaires who are not under sanctions.?511 The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump Hotel and Tower in Chicago.512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian?s attitude toward him changed when Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested in ajob in the Administration.513 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia.514 The two also arranged to meet at a Washington, DC. bar when both attended Trump?s inauguration in late January 2017.515 3. Carter Page Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March 2016.516 Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence of?cers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the Campaign, Page advocated pro?Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his personal capacity. Russian intelligence of?cials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Russian of?cials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his af?liation with the Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. 508 7/31/16 Email, to Papadopoulos (21:54:52). 509 8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 51" Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. 5? 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 512 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1:32:11 am). 513 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19. 5? 11/29/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos Millian (5:09 5:11 pm); 12/7/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 5? 1/20/ 17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos Millian (4:37?4:39 am). 515 Page was interviewed the FBI durin ?ve meetin in March 2017, before the Special 95 a. Background Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007, Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Moscow of?ce.517 There, he worked on transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom?s deputy chief ?nancial of?cer, Sergey Yatsenko.518 In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment mana ement and adviso ?rm focused on the ener sector in emerging markets.519 H20 The company otherwise had no sources of income, and Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business venture.521 Pa asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin enc In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government of?cial who worked at the Russian Consulate in New York.523 Pa later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelli ence of?cer, .524 In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence of?cer working covertly in the United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page.525 Podobnyy met Page at an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.526 Podobnyy and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy businessm In a recorded conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobnyy told another intelligence of?cer that Page was interested in business opportunities in Russia.528 In Podobnyy?s words, Page ?got hooked on 5? Testimony of Carter Page, Hearing Before the US. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit). 513 Page 3/30/17 302Complaint 1111 22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov, 1:15- mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015), Doc. 1 (?Baryakov Complaint?). 526 Buryakov Complaint 1 34. 3 4 5 527 Buryakov Complaint 1 34. 528 Buryalcov Complaint 1 32. US. Department of Justice Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could . . . rise up. Maybe he can. . . . [I]t?s obvious that he wants to earn lots of money.?529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by ?feed[ing] him empty promises? that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page.530 Podobnyy told the other intelligence of?cer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them.531 In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.532 The criminal complaint detailed Podobnyy?s interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identi?ed only as Based on the criminal complaint?s description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was the individual described as Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations General Assembly and identi?ed himself so that the of?cial would understand he was ?Male-1? from the Podobn com laint.?5 Pa told the of?cial that he ?didn?t do ?r In interviews with the FBI before the Office?s opening, Page acknowledged that he understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel.537 Page told investigating agents that ?the more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country.?538 I). Origins of and Early Campaign Work In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party of?cial, introduced Page to Trump Campaign of?cials.539 Page told the Of?ce that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate Trump improve relations with Russia.540 To that end, Page emailed Campaign of?cials offering his thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and 529 Buryakov Complaint. 53? Buryakov Complaint. 531 Bum/altar} Complaint. 532 See Buryakov Com laint; see also Indictment United States v. Buryakov, 1:15-cr-73 (S.D.N.Y. in 32-34: nun/n non an nun/n non an 4n? 537 Page 3/30/17 302, at 6; Page 3/31/17 302, at 1. 538 Page 3/31/17 302, at 1. enemas/17302,,? 540 Page 3/10/17 302,. at 2. 97 US. Department of Justice Atte?reyJNe?eProduet h?WWe?ed?E?W?m?Pr?f? proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow/.541 In communications with Campaign of?cials, Page also repeatedly touted his high?level contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior Russian governmental of?cials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior Campaign of?cials stating that he had ?spent the past week in Europe and ha[d] been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin? who recognized that Trump could have a ?game-changing effect . . . in bringing the end of the new Cold War.?542 The email stated that ?[t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts,? Page believed that ?a direct meeting in Moscow between Trump and Putin could be arran ed.?543 Pa 8 closed the email criticizin US. sanctions on Russia.?4 On March 21, 2016, candidate Trump formally and publicly identi?ed Page as a member of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector.?6 Over the next several months, Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign of?cials. For example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the candidate gave at the May?ower Hotel,547 see Volume 1, Section 1V.A.4, infra. In May 2016, Page prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck, North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech.548 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis expressed appreciation for Page?s work and praised his work to other Campaign of?cials.549 c. Carter Page ?3 July 2016 Trip To Moscow Page?s af?liation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher pro?le and drew the attention of Russian of?cials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor. As a result, in late April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremony at the See, 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching 21 ?President?s Daily Brief? prepared by Page that discussed the ?severe de radation of U.S.?Russia relations following Washington?s meddling? in Ukraine); 542 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 543 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 544 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al. 546 A Transcript of Donald Tram Meen'n with the Washington Post Editorial Board, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016);- 54'? I 548 549 See, 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et al. (forwarding notes'prepared by Page and stating, wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisers are capable 98 US. Department of Justice Atteme?e?eP-red-uet? New Economic School (NES) in Moscow.550 The NES commencement ceremony generally featured high-pro?le speakers; for example, President Barack Obama delivered a commencement address at the school in 2009.551 NES of?cials told the Of?ce that the interest in inviting Page to speak at NES was based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the candidate?s Russia expert.552 Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page?s and assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign.553 Denis Klimentov, an employee of NES, said that when Russians learned of Page?s involvement in the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was palpable.554 Weber recalled that in summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow, and he felt that bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be bene?cial.555 Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from Trump Campaign of?cials to make the trip to Russia.556 On May 16, 2016, while that request was still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, .D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.557 On June 19, 2016, Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate that NES ?would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration? in Page?s place.558 Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, ?If you want to do this, it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr. Trump will not be able to attend.?559 In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,560 emailed Maria Zakharova, the Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Information and Press Department, about Page?s visit and his connection to the Trump Campaign.561 Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to draw the Russian government?s attention to Page?s visit in Moscow.562 His message to Zakharova 55" Page 3/16/17 302, at 2-3; Page 3/10/17 302, at 3. 551 s. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 552 Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4-5; s. Weber 7/23/17 302, at 3. 553 See Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 554 De. Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at 2. 555 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3. 555 See 5/16/ 16 Email, Page to Phares et a1. (referring to submission of a ?campaign advisor request form?). 557?; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al. 558 6/ 19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et al. 559 6/19/16 Email, Lewandowski to Page et al. 56? Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant. 561 7/5/ 16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). 562 7/5/ 16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). 99 continued: ?Page is Trump?s adviser on foreign policy. He is a known businessman; he used to work in Russia. . . . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him.?563 Dmitri Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page?s visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government of?cials.564 The following day, Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email thread. Peskov wrote, have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin.?565 On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the ?rst of his two 'speeches in Moscow at NES.566 In the speech, Page criticized the US. government?s foreign policy toward Russia, stating that ?Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.?567 On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement.568 After Page delivered his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES.569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony, and Weber recalled that Dvorkovieh made statements to Pa about workin to ether in the Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company.572 Page stated that he and Baranov talked about ?immaterial non-public? information.?3 Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned 563 7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated). Dm. Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2. 565 7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated). 565 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3. 567 See Carter W. Page, he Lecture of ramp ?3 Advisor Carter Page in Moscow, YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides from the speech. See Carter Page, ?The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential,? Speech at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016). 568 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3. 569 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 570 S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4. 572 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2. Page 3/30/17 302, at 3. 100 U. S. Department of Justice WW the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.574 Page recalled mentioning his involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the conversation.575 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant?? On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and stated he would send ?a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I?ve received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here.?577 On July 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part: Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at all levels of government.578 Desite these re resentations to the Camai n, The Of?ce was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page?s activities in Russia?as described in his emails with the Campaign?were not fully explained. 57? Pa 3/30/17 302 at 9. 575? Page 3/30/17 302, at 3. 576 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2. 577? 7/8/16 Email, Page to Dahl Gordon. ?8 7/9/16 131112111, Page to Clovis 579 580 581 582 101 APEerney?WerlePreduet? d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak; that interaction is described in Volume 1, Section infra.584 Page later emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton?s world views.585 Following the Convention, Page?s trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign policy drew the media?s attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an ?informal foreign policy advisor? who did ?not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign.?587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News reported that US. intelligence of?cials were investigating whether Page had opened private communications with senior Russian of?cials to discuss US. sanctions policy under a possible Trump Administration.588 A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had ?no role? in the Campaign and that the Campaign was ?not aware of any of his activities, past or present.?589 On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.590 Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a position in the Trump Administration.591 On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to the Transition Team that in?ated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with ?top world leaders? and ?effectively 533 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 534 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. 535 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email, Page to Gordon Schmitz. 537 See, Steven Mufson Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor?s Public Comments, Ties to Moscow Stir Unease in Boil; Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016). 583 Michael Isikoff, U.S. Iniel O?ieials Probe Ties Between rump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! News (Sept. 23, 2016). 589 Michael Isikoff, U.S. Intel Of?cials Probe Ties Between rump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! News (Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/ 16 Email, Hicks to Conway Bannon (instructing that inquiries about Page should be answered with was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has had no role or of?cial contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and he now of?cially has been removed from all lists etc?). 590 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon S. Miller (discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign). 591 ?Transition Online Form,? 11/14/16 (- 102 U.S. Department of Justice Atteeney?WerleP?red-uet responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government of?cials in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas.?592 Page received no response from the Transition Team. When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one Russian government of?cial. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in Volume 1, Section IV.B.6, infra. 4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Of?cer, Dimitri Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 19703. In April 2016, candidate Trump delivered his ?rst speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted by the National Interest, a publication af?liated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in relation to Sessions?s con?rmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia. Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or from the Russian government through CNI or Simes. a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the ramp Campaign CNI is a Washington-based non?pro?t organization that grew out of a center founded by former President Richard Nixon?? CNI describes itself ?as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. foreign policy,? and publishes a foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.594 is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an adviser to candidate Trump on national security and foreign policy issues.595 Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National Im?erest.596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early 19705, and joined predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International ?Transition Online Form,? '1 1/14/ 16 593 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1?2. 594 About the Center, CNI, available at 595 Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16. 5-96 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2. 103 US. Department of Justice Peace?? Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government of?cials,593 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie Corporation in 2015, CNI has ?unparalleled access to Russian of?cials and politicians among Washington think tanks,?599 in part because CNI has arranged for US delegations to visit Russia and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called ?Track diplomatic 'effortsfo? On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.601 The idea behind the event was to generate interest in work and recruit new board members for CNI.602 Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate Trump.603 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result, he decided to seek Simes?s assistance during the March 14 event.604 Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call,605 three days after Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short notice.606 On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on?one meeting in Kushner?s New York of?ce?)? During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with Trump?s voice.608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion.609 Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign regarding the Campaign?s foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent J.D. Gordon an email with a ?memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting? 597 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 19. 59" Simes 3/27/18 302, at 10-15. 599 C00011656 (Rethinking [ZS-Russia Relations, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015)). 600 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29?30; Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 3. ?01 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 pm); cf. Zakheim 1/25/ 18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNl?s ?Honorary Chairman of the Board?); Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5. ?02 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 2. Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/13 302 at 2. 69? Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 2. 605 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6-7. 606 see Volume 1, Section IV.A.2, supra. ?07 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-9. Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-3. 609 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8; see also Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2. 104 US. Department of Justice and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building a ?small and carefully selected group of experts? to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating under the assumption ?that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign policy issues.? The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign, including a ?new beginning with Russia.?610 b. National Interest Hosts Foreign Policy Speech at the May?ower Hotel During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in?person meeting, Simes and Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump.611 Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI of?cials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including Sessions?s chief of staff, Rick Dearborn.612 ln mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared.613 Simes sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt.614 Simes received subsequent draft outlines from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive changes to the speech.615 It is not clear, however, whether CNI of?cials received an actual draft of the speech for comment; While Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Simes did not, and the emails that CNI produced to this Of?ce do not contain such a draft.616 After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNl?s hosting the speech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication, the National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club.617 Kushner later requested that the event be moved to the May?ower Hotel, which was another venue that Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns about security and capacity.6l8 61? C00008187 (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45 pm?. 611Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7. 612 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8-1 1; C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7. 513 C00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 C00006759 (4/14/16 Email Kushner to Simes S. Miller (12:30 6? Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7?8. 615 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7?8. 616 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8. 6? Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12; C00003834-43 (4/22/16 Email, Simes to Boyd et a1. (8:47 618 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12, 18; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11. 105 U.S. Department of Justice On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the May?ower to host both the speech and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand.619 Saunders understood that the reception? at which invitees would have the chance to meet candidate Trump?would be a small event.?520 Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of invitees to the speech itself and then choosing a subset for the reception.621 invitees to the reception included Sessions and Kislyak.622 The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump.623 When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized so that attendees could meet Trump.624 Sessions ?rst stood next to Trump to introduce him to the members of Congress who were in attendance.625 After those members had been introduced, Simes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, including Kislyak.626 Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thought it clear that Kislyak and Trump had just met for the ?rst timem Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre? speech reception. The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying, ?we like what your candidate is saying . . . it?s refreshing.?628 Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time.629 Sessions stated to investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation.?0 Nor did anyone else af?liated with CNI or the National Interest speci?cally recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception.631 It appears that, if a conversation occurred at the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view, similar to the exchange between Kushner and Kislyak. 619 Saunders 2/ 15/ 18 302, at 11-12; (May?ower Group Sales Agreement). 620 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12-13. 621 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12. 622 C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53 :45 623 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 19-20. 624 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 625 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 626 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 627 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21. 628 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 4. 629 See, e. g, Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting With Russian?, NBC News (June 1, 2016); Julia Ioffe, Why Did Jeff Sessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak, The Atlantic (June 13, 2017). 63" Sessions 1/17/13 302, at 22. 631 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 14, 21; Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 3-4; Heilbrunn 2/1/ 18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump ?s April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the enter for the National Interest, CNI (Mar. 8, 2017). 106 The Of?ce found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions?s whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed for Capitol Hill.633 Saunders recalled, based in part on a food?related request he received from 21 Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the airport.634 c. Jeff Sessions?s Post-Speech Interactions with CNI In the wake of Sessions?s con?rmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about whether Sessions?s campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the May?ower speech included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters. With respect to Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended Distinguished Service Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, DC.635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.?6 A seating chart prepared by Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.637 Sessions, however, did not remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.638 Although CNI board member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner,639 Simes, Saunders, and Jacob Heilbrunn?editor of the National Interest?all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May 23 event/540 Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Of?ce obtained. In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, DC. for Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals.641 The dinners included CNI- af?liated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former US. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign? 632 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. 633 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 4. 634 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15. 635 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17. 636 Saunders 2/ 15/ 18 302, at 17; C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders Hagberg (9:30:12 am); C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et (2:02:32 am). 637 C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et a1. (2:02:32 am). 633 Sessions 1/ 17/ 1 8 302, at 22. 639 Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4. 64? Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18, Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5. 107 US. Department of Justice Madam/WW policy speech.642 Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from thedinnersfi?43 At the dinners and in the meetings, the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including how US. relations with NATO and European countries affected US. policy toward Russia.644 But the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia.645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing ?nation?building? and violent extremism with Sessions.646 In addition, Sessions asked Saunders (of CNI) to draft two memoranda not speci?c to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton?s foreign policy shortcomings and another on Egypt.647 d. Jared ushner ?s-Continuing Contacts with Simes Between the April 2016 speech at the May?ower Hotel and the presidential election, Jared Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes.648 Those contacts consisted of both in?person meetings and phone conversations, which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes had proposed.649 Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia, and that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians.650 According to Simes, after the May?ower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with Kushner, advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle any contacts with Russians with care.651 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his interactions with Simes.652 - Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016, at Simes?s request, in Kushner?s New York of?ce. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign?s Russia-related attacks on candidate Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 1-2, 5. 643 Khalilzad 1/9/13 302, at 5-6. 64? Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9?10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5. 645 Saunders 2/ 15/ 8 302, at 20. 646 Khalilzad 1/9/ 18 302, at 6. 647 Saunders 2/ 15/ 1 8 302, at 19-20. 643 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 649 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 65? Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. 65? Simes 3/ 8/ 1 8 302, at 27. During this period of time, the Campaign received a request for a high? level Campaign of?cial to meet with an of?cer at a Russian state?owned bank ?to discuss an offer [that of?cer] claims to be carrying from President Putin to meet with? candidate Trump. NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Dearborn to Kushner (8:12 Copying Manafort and Gates, Kushner responded, ?Pass on this. A lot of people come claiming to carry messages. Very few are able to verify. For now 1 think we decline such meetings. Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain importance for themselves. Be careful.? NOSC00005653 (5/17/16 Email, Kushner to Dearborn). 652 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 11-13. 108 U.S. Department of Justice Trump.653 In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a ?Russia Policy Memo? laying out ?what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia.?654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned ?a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton? and the Russian government, ?parts of [which]? (according to Simes) had even been ?discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 19908 and shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.?655 Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign of?cials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick Gates, with the note ?suggestion only.?656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.657 (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner). During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information that he had romised.658 Simes told Kushner that, Simes claimed that he had received this information from former House of?cial Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. 660 CIA and Reagan White intelligence sources, not from Russians. Simes perceived that Kushner did not ?nd the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was, in Simes?s words, ?old When interviewed by the Of?ce, Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public ?gures, and that he never received from Simes information that could be ?operationalized? for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner?s ?53 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269 (8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et a1); DJTF P00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manaf01t (5:57:15 ?54 C00007981-84 16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 The memorandum recommended ?downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time? and suggested that ?some tend to exaggerate Putin?s flaws.? The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian- related questions in the framework of ?how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national interests? and that a Trump Administration ?not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.? The memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine?related questions, including questions about Russia?s invasion and annexation of Crimea. 655 C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 656 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to s. Miller et a1. (11:30:13 am?. 657 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 658 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. 659 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. 6?50 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. 661 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. 662 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. 109 US. Department of Justice reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.663 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert Goldstone, at the request of his then?client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the ?Crown prosecutor of Russia . . . offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some of?cial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia? as ?part of Russia and its government?s support for Mr. Trump.? Trump Jr. immediately responded that ?if it? what you say I love it,? and arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior adviser Jared Kushner to attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting?or its Russian connection?before it occurred. The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian of?cials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr. suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected. After the election, Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump Transition Team did not engage. a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of the Russian government, including Russia?s Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and that?as discussed above, Volume 1, Section IV.A. 1, supra 653 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. Goldstone 2/3/18 302, at 4. 110 ?worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a potential Trump Moscow real-estate project.665 The relationship continued over time, as the parties pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016.666 .For example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten note.667 Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump?s campaign, passed on ?congratulations? for winning in the primary and?according to one email drafted by Goldstone?an ?offer? of his ?support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] especially with reference to U.S./Russian relations.?668 On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin?s then-publicist.669 Goldstone is a music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until late While representing Emin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact between the Trumps and the Agalarovs?includin an invitation that Trum sent to Putin to attend the 2013 Miss Universe Pa eant in Moscow.671 . Goldstone understood Russian political connection, and Emin Agalarov indicated that the attorney was a prosecutor. Goldstone recalled that the information that mi ht interest the Trum 5 involved Hilla Clinton ?674 665 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2~3; 666 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 10; Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone. 73 667 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment)). 668 DJTIR00008 2/29/ 16 Email, Goldstone to Trum Jr. et al. don Record of Rodeo doddodo Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6. 57? Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, 6? Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-5; (2/29/ 19 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr); Beniaminov 1/6/ 18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2; (6/21/ 13 Email, Goldstone to Graft); (6/24/13 Email, Goldstone to Graft); (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart); (6/26/13 Email, Graff to Goldstone); 8_001022 (6/27/ 13 Email, Graff to L. Kelly); (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart); MU000004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart). mood?doddonomd?-v- 111 at 3. The mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia Veselnitska ya. From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor?s Of?ce,677 and she continued to perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her departure.678 She lobbied and testi?ed about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian of?cials and which was named for a Russian tax specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison.679 Putin called the statute ?a purely political, unfriendly act,? and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. of?cials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens.680 Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv,681 the son of Russian businessman Peter Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd., which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky.682 She also 676 In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prevezon litigation discussed in the text above. See Indictment, United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictment alleges, among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian Prosecutor General?s Of?ce and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the Russian government. 677 Veselnitskaia 11/20/ 17 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2; 678 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at 33; Keir Simmons Rachel Elbaum, Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn?t Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 1 1, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer Who Met Trump Jr. Had Russian Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer Sharon LaFraniere, Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On, New York Times (Apr. 27, 2018). 679 See Pub. L. No. 1 12-208 402, 404(a)(1), 126 Stat. 1502, 1502?1506. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia. Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian of?cials, and Magnitsky was charged with helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress to pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e. Andrew E. Kramer, Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia Accuses Nemesis of Murder, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017); Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray, Bill Browder ?s Testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017). 68? Ellen Barry, Russia Bars 1 8 Americans After Sanctions by US, New York Times (Apr. 13, 2013); Tom Porter, Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They?ve Been Targets of Russian Assassination and Kidnapping Bids, Newsweek (July 16, 2017). ?1 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), at 21. - 632 See Veselnitskaya Decl., United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd, No. l3-cv-6326 see Prevezon Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prevezon Holdings, Mem. and Order; Prevezon Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie. 112 U.S. Department of Justice appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a US. congressional delegation in Moscow offering ?con?dential information? from ?the Prosecutor General of Russia? about ?interactions between certain political forces in our two countries.?683 Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump haw? The email stated: Good morning Emin just called/and asked me to contact you with something very Interesting. The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this momlng and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support tor Mr. Trump - helped along by Area and Emin. What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly? I can also send this into to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first. Best Flob Goldstone Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: ?Thanks Rob I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment but perhaps ljust speak to Emin ?rst. Seems we have some time and if it?s what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call ?rst thing next week when I am back??5 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr?s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing that Trump Jr. ?wants to speak personally on the issue.?686 On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was ?[a]ny news,? and Goldstone explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the ??nal elections . . . where [T]rump will be ?crowned? the of?cial nominee.?687 On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and asked when Trump Jr. was ?free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info.?688 Trump Jr. asked if 633 See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an of?cial with broad national responsibilities in the Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor ?s O?ice of the Russian Federation (1992, amended 2004). 68? RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Donald Trump 07/1 1/ 17 (l 1 :00) Tweet. 635 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); 07/11/ 17 (11:00) Tweet; 16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone). (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone Trump 687 RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 16 Email, Goldstone to A. Agalarov). (?38 RG000065 16 Email, Goldstone to Trump (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump 113 US. Department of Justice they could ?speak now,? and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.689 On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls.690 Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized US. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras Agalaroy.692 Kaveladze told the Of?ce that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalaroyr asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting and Veselnitskaya?s business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to translate.693 ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that ?Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is ?ying over from Moscow.?694 Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identi?ed as the ?campaign boss?), Jared Kushner, and Trump Jr. would likely attend.695 Goldstone was sur rised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner would attend.?396 Kaveladze ?puzzled? by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov?s assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey ?negative information on Hillary Clinton.?697 Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.698 Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 pm. ?89 6/6/ 16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr); 16 Email, Goldstone and Trump 69? Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. . 692 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 1?2; Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 2?3; ?93 Kaveladze 11/ 16/17 302, at 6. ?94 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum Jr. Jr 07/11/17 11:00) Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr); 695 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); 07/1 1/ 17 (11:00) Tweet; 6/7/16 Email, Trum Jr. to Goldstone); 16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); Goldstone 2/3/13 302, at 7; Kaveladze 11/16/17 302 at 7: osc- 16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze). ?98 Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3. 114 U.S. Department of Justice A?erney?We-rk?Pred-uet meeting the following day with Trump Jr.699 Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line Russia - Clinton private and confidential,? adding a note that the ?[m]eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices??00 Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the ?[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm Manafort responded, ?See you then. Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.703 Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group in and that he was introduced to the group by a friend:104 Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful/1'05 Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,7013 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week.707 Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump?s of?ce on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.708 Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.709 From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation?110 In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the 699 NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas). 700 NOSC00000039-42 16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner Manafort); (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner Manafort). 71? NOSC0000004 8/ 16 Email, Kushner to Vargas). 702 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr. - 703 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to ?June 19,? that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et 704 Gates 1/30/ 18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in See Neil MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He (2 Conduit to rump?, New York Times (July 16, 2017). 705 Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. 706 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6. 707 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8. 703 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6. 709 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5. 710 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16. 115 US. Department of Justice emails or the upcoming meeting.711 Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jam President Trump has stated to this Of?ce, in written answers to questions, that he has ?no recollection of learning at the time? that his son, Manafort, or ?Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton??13 I). The Events af?rm: 9, 2016 i. Arrangementsfor the Meeting Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civil forfeiture liti ation.l14 That da Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin, a Soviet-born U.S. lobby/isn?and when she learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch. Akhmetshin told the Of?ce that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation.716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a 7? Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate Judieiary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95 (Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised that it is a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation. Id. at 10-11. 712 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10. 713 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question 1, Parts We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June 9 meeting. On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give ?a major speech? ?probably Monday of next week??which would have been June 13?about ?all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons.? See, e. g, Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting, Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting, Trump changed the subject ofhis planned speech to national security. But the Of?ce did not ?nd evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse shooting on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President?s written answers to our questions state that the speech?s focus was altered light of? the Pulse shooting. See Written Responses, supra. As for the original topic of the June 13 speech, Trump has said that ?he expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons,? and that the draft of the speech prepared by Campaign staff ?was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer.? Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt, drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See all Transcript: Donald ramp NY Speech on Stakes of the Election, politico.com (June 22, 2016). 7? Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017) at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US for Trump Tower Meeting? Reuters, (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); 16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Lieberman 12/ 13/17 302, at 5; see also Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016). twain;? 116 Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska a with Ma nitsky-related lobbying and the Prevezon case, also attended the lunch?? Veselnitska a said she was meeting and asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him. According to several participants in the lunch, Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging ?nancial misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia and those individuals subse uentl makin olitical donations to the DNC.719 The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting?21 ii. Conduct oft/re Meeting Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze, Samochornov, Akhrnetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskayaf?.22 The Of?ce spoke to every participant except Veselnitska a and Trum the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril interviewed the Of?ce The meetin lasteda roximatel 20 minutes.723 Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not say anything about the subject of the meeting?"25 Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their pro?ts to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign,"26 She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering 7? Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 2, 4; 719 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7; Samochornov did not recall the lanned subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. Samochornov 7/ 12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press, Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting. 720 721 Samochornov 7/ 12/ 17 302, at 4. .722 E. g, Samochornov 7/ 12/ 17 302, at 4. 723 Samochornov 7/ 12/ 17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9. 724 725 726 117 US. Department of Justice Atterney?Werlellred-uet in both the United States and Russia,727 728 According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow?up questions about how the alleged payments could be tied speci?cally to the Clinton Campaign, but Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States?"29 Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked ?[w]hat are we doing here??730 Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and Russia?s response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.731 Several participants recalled that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at that time.732 Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in government?33 Notes that Manafort took on his phone re?ect the general ?ow of the conversation, although not all of its details.734 At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating ?waste of time,? followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that ?9 ?A1Manafort (Ukr Russia, not campaign)?; ?Carter Page game)?, and ?Greek Guy? (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18 U. S. C. 1001 for lying to the FBI). (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson 1 1/6/ 17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 4. But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as ?targets?; the notes on their face reference the FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the FBI for Comey?s brie?ng to the Gang of 8 on March 9. See SNS-Classi?ed?0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et see also Donaldson 1 1/6/ 17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had told McGahn those individuals were the targets). Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017). 311Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1. 312 Boente1/31/18 302, at 5; Comey 1 l/15/17 302, at 16-17. 52 U.S. Department of Justice In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had ?been authorized by the Department of Justice to con?rm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia?s efforts. As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.?313 Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was ?doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining? because the investigation was ongoing and classi?ed?but he observed that he had ?taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department of Justice of briefing this Congress?s leaders . . . in a classi?ed setting in detail about the investigation.?314 Corney was specifically asked whether President Trump was ?under investigation during the campaign? or ?under investigation now.?315 Comey declined to answer, stating, ?Please don?t over interpret what I?ve said as?as the chair and ranking know, we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we?re doing, but I?m not gonna answer about anybody in this forum.?316 Comey was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer?? According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.318 The President had previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information to the media?19 McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like ?his own branch of government.?320 3'3 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (con?rming that the Department ofJustice authorized Comey?s remarks). 314 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey I 3'5 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell). 3'6 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). 317? Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). 3'3 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. 319 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 6-9. 32" McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. 53 U.S. Department of Justice Press reports following Comey?s March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was investigating the President, contrary to what Comey had told the President at the end of the January 6, 2017 intelligence assessment brie?ng.32l McGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen Miller recalled that the President was upset with Comey?s testimony and the press coverage that followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation.322 Notes from the White House Counsel?s Of?ce dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was ?beside himself" over Comey?s testimony?23 The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was ?getting hotter and hotter, get rid??324 Of?cials in the White House Counsel?s Of?ce became so concerned that the President would ?re Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.325 At the President?s urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2017, to seek Boente?s assistance in having Comey or the Department of Justice correct the misperception that the President was under investigation.326 Boente did not speci?cally recall the conversations, although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.327 Boente said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern .323 Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and attempting to do so could erode con?dence in the investigation?s conclusions.329 Boente said McGahn agreed and dropped the issue.330 The President also sought to speak with Boente directly, but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request 32? E. g, Matt Apuzzo et al., FBI. Is Investigating Trump ?s Russia Ties, Carney Con?rms, New York Times (Mar. 20, 2017); Andy Greenberg. he FBI Has Been Investigating Trump ?5 Russia Ties Since July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is being investigated by FBI, Comey con?rms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at 2. 322 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7. 323 (Donaldson 3/21/ 17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the President referred to the ?Comey bombshell? which ?made [him] look like a fool.? (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). 3?24 (Donaldson 3/21/ 17 Notes). 3?25 (White House Counsel?s Of?ce Memorandum). White House Counsel?s Of?ce attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel?s Of?ce to begin this research. Dhillon 1 1/21/17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document, which was provided by the White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017. 326 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16?21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7. 327 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. ?3 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. 329 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. 33? Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. 54 US. Department of Justice to intervene with Comey.33' McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which McGahn said he conveyed to the President.332 Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or anyone else the idea that Comey should not continue as FBI director.333 - 3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No Connection to Russia In the weeks following Comey?s March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a connection to the Russian election-interference effort. On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Of?ce after a Presidential Daily Brie?ng.334 According to Coats, the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no link existed between him and Russia.335 Coats responded that the Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public statement on the Russia investigation.336 Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind after the March 22 brie?ng, but he recalled that the President regularly urged of?cials to get the word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia.337 Coats told this Of?ce that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI investigation.338 Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coats described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI of?cial Michael Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation, get it over with, end it, or words to that effect}39 Dempsey said that Coats described the President?s comments as falling ?somewhere between musing about hating the investigation? and wanting Coats to ?do something to stop it.?340 Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI investigation.34l Edward Gistaro, another ODNI of?cial, recalled 33? (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 19. - 332 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Burnham ll/O3/l 7 302, at 11. 333 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3. 33" Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2. 335 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3. 336 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3. 3'37 Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1?3. 333 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3. 339 Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2. 34? Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2?3. Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3. 55 US. Department of Justice Aaer?eyAVerlePfed-uet that right after Coats?s meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Of?ce back to the Eisenhower Executive Of?ce Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask him what he could do to ?help with the investigation.?342 Another ODNI staffer who had been waiting for Coats outside the Oval Of?ce talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.343 On Saturday, March 25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Of?ce, the President called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, can?t do anything with Russia, there?s things I?d like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they?re all over me with this.?344 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.345 Coats later testi?ed in a congressional hearing that he had ?never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and shape?with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . to an ongoing investigation.?346 On March 26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers.? The President expressed frustration with the Russia investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians dif?cult.343 The President told Rogers ?the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.349 The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.350 Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett, who was present for the call, said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40 years of government service.351 After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President?s request, and they placed the memorandum in a safe.352 But Rogers did not perceive the President?s request to be an order, and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia 342 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 2. 343 Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2-3. Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4. 345 Coats 6/ 14/ 17 302, at 4; Dempsey 6/ 14/ 7 302, at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked several times what Coats could do to help ?get [the investigation] done,? and Coats had repeatedly told the President that fastest way to ?get it done? was to let it run its course). 346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CO Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director of National Intelligence). 347 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 3-4. 3?48 Rogers 6/ 12/17 302, at 4. 34? Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1-2; see Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. 35? Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. 35' Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. ?2 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2?3; Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. 56 U.S. Department of Justice investigation itself.353 Rogers later testi?ed in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had ?never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or inappropriate? and did ?not recall ever feeling pressured to do so.?354 In addition to the speci?c comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community of?cials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.355 On at least two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Brie?ngs by stating that there was no collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.356 Pompeo recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him?? Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he ?vent[ed]? about the investigation, said he had done nothing wrong, and said something like the ?Russia thing has got to go away.?358 Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he ?nally told the President that Coats?s job was to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations.359 4. The President Asks Comev to ?Lift the Cloud? Created by the Russia Investigation On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the Russia investigation.360 According to Comey?s contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said ?he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making 353 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. 354 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115'11 Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency). 355 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3; Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2?3. 355 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1. 357 Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2. 353 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 6. 359 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4. 360 (President?s Daily Diary, 3/30/17, re?ecting call to Comey from 8: 4 8:24 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 (?The President called me on my CMS phone at 8:13 am today . . . The call lasted 1 1 minutes (about IO minutes when he was connected)?; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6). 57 US. Department of Justice that dif?cult.?361 The President asked Corney What could be done to ?lift the cloud.?362 Comey explained ?that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great bene?t, if we didn?t ?nd anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do our work.?363 Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI was not investigating the President personally.364 The President said several times, ?We need to get that fact out.?365 The President commented that if there was ?some satellite? (which Comey took to mean an associate of the President?s or the campaign) that did something, ?it would be good to ?nd that out? but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Corney ?would ?nd a way to get out that we weren?t investigating him.?366 After the call ended, Comey called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation?? On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Comey again.368 According to Comey?s contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was ?following up to see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time#getting out that he personally is not under investigation.?369 Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to 3?61 Comey 3/30/ 17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testi?ed before Congress about this conversation and described it to our Of?ce; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum. Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at Comey 11/15/17 302, at 18. 362 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 18. 363 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at l; Comey 11/15/17 302Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6). 3?65 Comey 3/3 0/ 1 7 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6). 366 Comey 3/3 0/ 7 Memorandum, at 1 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6-7). 357 Corney 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 2; Boente 1/3 1/ 18 302, at 6-7; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 7). 363 (President?s Daily Diary, 4/1 1/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27 8:31 am); Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1 returned the president?s call this morning at 8:26 am EDT. We spoke for about four minutes?). 369 Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testi?ed before Congress about this conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 7). 58 US. Department of Justice have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership.370 The President said he would take that step.371 The President then added, ?Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.?372 In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was asked if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down; the President responded, ?No, it?s not too late, but you know, I have con?dence in him. We?ll see what happens. You know, it?s going to be interesting.?373 After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President?s comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual?74 Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks?75 The President acknowledged that McGahn would not approve of the outreach to Comey because McGahn had previously cautioned the President that he should not talk to Comey directly to prevent any perception that the White House was interfering with investigations.376 The President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department of Justice approved that action.377 After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with Boente to relay the President?s understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if the Department of Justice cleared it.378 McGahn recalled that Boente said Comey had told him there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but they made Comey uncomfortable.379 According to McGahn, Boente responded that he did not want to issue a statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political rami?cations and did not want to order Comey to do it because that action could prompt the 37? Corney 4/11/17 Memorandum, at 1. 3?71 Comey 4/ l/ 17 Memorandum, at l. 372 Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at I. In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Comey wrote, ?His use of these words did not ?t with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away from any request of me, but I have recorded it here as it happened.? 373 Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017); (President?s Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55 37? Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. 375 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. 3? Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon l/21/ 17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations). Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel?s Of?ce that he had called Comey even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 1 1/21/ 17 302, at 2 (recalling that the President said, know you told me not to, but 1 called Comey anyway?). 377 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. 379 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9; see Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6 (recalling that Comey told him after the March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive). 59 US. Department of Justice appointment of a Special Counsel.380 Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with McGahn, but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Comey were a problem.381 Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to address that issue.382 Analysis In analyzing the President?s reaction to Sessions?s recusal and the requests he made to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 3. Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Comey?s March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. Some ODNI of?cials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Of?ce meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and ?stop? the investigation. But the ?rst-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no memory of the speci?c meeting, but generally recalled the President urging of?cials to get the word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russiaspeak with Comey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the President during this period were similar in nature.' The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to make a public statement that would ?lift the cloud? of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests, while signi?cant enough that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not interpreted by the of?cials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation. b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President?s outreaches to leaders of the intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the Russia investigation did not yet involve grandjury proceedings. The outreaches, however, came after and were in response to Comey?s March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Comey testi?ed that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign of?cials and would ?include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.? c. Intent. As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the Russia investigation? and the President af?rmatively told Comey that if ?some satellite? was involved in Russian election interference ?it would be good to ?nd that out.? But the President?s intent in trying to prevent Sessions?s recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey following 33? McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9?10. 331Boente l/3l/18 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. 3?82 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7. 60 US. Department of Justice AttemethorlePred-uet Comey?s public announcement of the Bl?s Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to understanding what motivated the President?s other actions towards the investigation. The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation?s implications for his presidency?and, speci?cally, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or had links to Russia. in early March, the President attempted to prevent Sessions?s recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After Sessions recused, the White House Counsel?s Of?ce tried to cut off further contact with Sessions about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The President continued to raise the issue of Sessions?s recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. The President made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, ?You?re telling me that Bobby and Jack didn?t talk about investigations? Or Obama didn?t tell Eric Holder who to investigate?? After Corney publicly confirmed the existence of the Russia investigation on March 20, 2017, the President was ?beside himself? and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation. On March 30 and April 1 1, against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to ?lift the cloud? of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under investigation. Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true based on Comey?s representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished. Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia. The President told Coats he ?can?t do anything with Russia,? he told Rogers that ?the thing with the Russians? was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that ?he was trying to run the country and the cloud ofthis Russia business was making that difficult.? 61 U.S. Department of Justice D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Conley Overview Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Corney declined to answer questions about the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was going to ?re Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his of?cial termination letter to make public that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. The President decided to ?re Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the Department of Justice, but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey?s handling of the Clinton email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the ?ring to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to ?re Comey regardless of the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, ?1 just ?red the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That?s taken off I?m not under investigation.? Evidence 1. Comev Testi?es Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under investigation On May 3, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee?? McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the President said that it would be the last straw if Corney did not take the opportunity to set the record straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation.384 The President had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.385 At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating ?[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to con?rm that [the Russia investigation] exists,? but that he was ?not going to say another word about it? until the investigation was completed.386 Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had ?ruled 333 Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017). 384 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-11. 385 McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to the President for being under investigation); (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) Called Comey Day we told him not to? ?You are not under investigation? NK/China/Sapping Credibility?). 336 Hearing an FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Comey repeated this point 62 U.S. Department of Justice out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target ofth[e] criminal investigation,? including whether the FBI had ?ruled out the president of the United States.?387 Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.383 Comey stated that it made him ?mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election,? but added that ?even in hindsight? he ?would make the same decision.?339 He later repeated that he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had ?done the right thing at each turn.?390 In the afternoon following Comey?s testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions, and Sessions?s Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.391 At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how Comey. had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer questions about whether the President was under investigation.392 The President became very upset and directed his anger at Sessions?93 According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, ?This is terrible Jeff. It?s all because you reeused. AG is supposed to be most important appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you reeused yourself. You left me on an island. I can?t do anything.?394 The President said that the recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his authority with foreign leaders.395 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.396 Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was ?not going to say another peep about [the investigation] until we?re done?); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about the status of investigation ?before the matter is concluded?). 337 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). 3'33 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein). 389 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017) . (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 17) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). 39? Hearing an FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). 391 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. 392 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6. 393 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8?9. 394 Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/ 1/ 17 302, at 2. 395 Hunt?000021-22 (Hunt 5/3/ 17 Notes) have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being investigated?); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. 396 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt?000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). 63 US. Department of Justice Atte-me?lorleProd-uet some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President should consider replacing Comey as FBI director?97 According to Sessions, when the meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey.398 Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May 3 and May 4, 2017.399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: ?He told me three times I?m not under investigation. He?s a showboater. He?s a grandstander. I don?t know any Russians. There was no collusion.?400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comey because ?that ship had sailed.?401 Bannon also told the President that ?ring Comey was not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could ?re the FBI director but could not fire the FBI.402 2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey The weekend following Comey?s May 3, 2017 testimony, the President traveled to his resort in Bedminster, New Jersey.403 At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller, the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used to make the announcement.404 The President dictated arguments and speci?c language for the letter, and Miller took notes.405 As re?ected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter should start, ?While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American public including Ds and Rs have lost faith in you as Director of the Following the dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the President?s arguments.4m Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of 39? Hunt?000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). 398 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9. 399 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 40? Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 401 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. 4?32 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; sec Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28. 403 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4-5; (President?s Daily Diary, 5/4/17). 40? s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5. 405 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6. 406 S. Miller 5/5/17 Notes, at 1; see S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6. 64 US. Department ofJustice edits on the draft letter.408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks.409 In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open with a reference to him not being under investigation.410 Miller said he believed that fact was important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such investigation/?l According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Comey had been under a ?review period? and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep his job.412 The ?nal version ofthe termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: ?Dear Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump?Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated.?413 The four?page letter went on to critique Comey?s judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold leakers accountable.414 The letter stated that Comey had ?asked [the President] at dinner shortly after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director?s role, and [the President] said that [he] would consider it,? but the President had ?concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to ?nd new leadership for the Bureau a leader that restores con?dence and trust.?115 In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Of?ce with senior advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate Comey.416 The President read aloud the ?rst paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with 408 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6?8. 409 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on Sunday night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the ?Comey situation? and there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 7. 4'0 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at S. 4? S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. 4'2 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 10. 4?3 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Corney). 41" (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushner said that the termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to ?re Comey and was the truest representation of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 25. ?5 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). 4?5 McGahn12/12/17 302, at 24; s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 1 1; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 6; Eisenberg 1 1/29/17 302, at 13. 65 US. Department of Justice WUWWM Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.417 The President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the authority to terminate Comey without cause.418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making process, McGahn told the President that leadership was currently discussing Comey?s status and suggested that White House Counsel?s Of?ce attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod Rosenstein, who had recently been con?rmed as the Deputy Attorney General.419 McGahn said that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity to ?nd out what they thought about ?ring Comey.420 At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel?s Of?ce attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.42l McGahn said that the President had decided to ?re Comey and asked for Sessions?s and Rosenstein?s views.422 Sessions and Rosenstein criticized Comey and did not raise concerns about replacing him.423 McGahn and Dhillon said the fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind that the President?s decision to ?re Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice.424 An Oval Of?ce meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the issue with the President.425 At around 5 pm, the President and several White House of?cials met with Sessions and Rosenstein to discuss Corney.426 The President told the group that he had watched Comey?s May 4'7 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 1 1 (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, ?I?m going to read you a letter. Don?t talk me out ofthis. I?ve made my decision?); Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 6 (the President announced in an irreversible way that he was ?ring Comey); Eisenberg 1 1/29/17 302, at 13 (the President did not leave whether or not to fire Corney up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12. ?3 Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 11. ?9 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7. Because of the Attorney General?s recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. 508(a) (?In case of a vacancy in the of?ce of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office?). 42? McGahn 12/12/17 302,211: 12. 42' Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar?000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); see Gauhar-000056?72 1 1/ 19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) (?Ms Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May 16, 422 McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 13; see Gauhar?000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 423 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7-9; Sessions 1/17/13 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13. 42? McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 9. 425 Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). ?6 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 66 US. Department of Justice 3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was ?not right? with Comey.427 The President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their views.428 Hunt, who was in the room, recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously recommended that Comey be replaced.429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his concerns about Comey?s handling ofthe Clinton email investigation/130 The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller, and the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to ?re Corney and whether the President?s letter should be used.431 McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Comey to resign, but the President was adamant that he be fired.432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed/133 The President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first thing the next morning/?34 Hunt?s notes re?ect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to con?rm that the President was not personally under investigation.435 According to notes taken by a senior DOJ of?cial of Rosenstein?s description of his meeting with the President, the President said, ?Put the Russia stuff in the memo.?436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his recommendation, so he did not think Russia should be mentioned.437 The President told Rosenstein he would appreciate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway.433 When Rosenstein 427 Hunt-000026-27 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 42" Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 10; see Gauhar?000058 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) to AG: What is your 429 Hunt?000027 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 43? McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7. 43? Hunt-000023 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 432 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13. 433 Hunt-000028?29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes). 43" McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; see Gauhar?000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) tells DAG to write a memo?). 4'35 Hunt?000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) asked if Rod?s recommendation would include the fact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under investigation. . . . So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey refuses to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times?). 436 Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 43? Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 433 Gauhar?000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/ 16/ 17 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13. 67 left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his own reasons for replacing Corney were ?not [the President?s] reasons.?439 On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Comey?s removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled ?Restoring Public Confidence in the McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.4?? Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 re?ected the view of the White House Counsel?s Of?ce that the President?s original termination letter should ?[n]ot [see the] light of day? and that it would be better to offer other rationales? for the ?ring than what was in Rosenstein?s and Sessions?s memoranda.442 The President asked Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.443 McGahn, Priebus, and Dhillon objected to including that language, but the President insisted that it be included.444 McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to 439 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) reasons not their reasons Gauhar?00006O (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (?1St draft had a recommendation. Took it out b/c knew decision had already been made?). 440 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; 5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (?Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the attached memorandum, have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the 5/9/17 Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, ?The way the Director handled the conclusion of the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions?). s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). 442 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote this the beginning of the end?? because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it was carried out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 1 1/6/17 302, at 25. 443 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt?000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). 68 U.S. Department of Justice Attemethe?ePreduet the President.445 Dhillon made a ?nal pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to resign, but the President refused.?6 Around the time the President?s letter was ?nalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the press team to the Oval Of?ce, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions.447 To announce Comey?s termination, the White House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.448 In full, the statement read: ?Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that he has been terminated and removed from of?ce. President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions??49 That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the President at the White House.450 The President told McCabe that he had ?red Comey because of the decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.451 The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that he was not under investigation.452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the ?resistance? that had disagreed with Comey?s decisions in the Clinton investigation.453 McCabe told the President that he knew Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively about Comey, and that McCabe worked ?very closely? with Comey and was part of all the decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.454 445 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 15 (providing the view that the President?s desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the ?driving animus of the whole thing?); Burnham 1 1/3/ 17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was the line that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under investigation). According to Hunt?s notes, the reference to Comey?s statement Would indicate that ?notwithstanding? Comey?s having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated Comey because the President was under investigation. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15. 4? McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25; see (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes) (?Resign vs. Removal. Spicer10/16/17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/12/17 302,31216. 44? Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28. 449 Statement oft/7e Press Secretary, The White House, Of?ce of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017). 45? McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; (President?s Daily Diary, 5/9/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. 451 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. 452 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1?2. 453 McCabe 9/26/ 17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/ 10/ 17 Memorandum, at 1-2. 45? McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. 69 U.S. Department of Justice AttorneyLWerlePred-uet Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the press coverage of Comey?s termination and ordered them to go out and defend him.455 The President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting ?killed? in the press over Comey?s termination.456 The President asked what he should do.457 Christie asked, ?Did you ?re [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo??, and the President responded, ?Yes.?458 Christie said that the President should ?get Rod out there? and have him defend the decision.459 The President told Christie that this was a ?good idea? and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away.460 That night, the White House Press Of?ce called the Department of Justice and said the White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein?s idea to ?re Corney.461 Rosenstein told other DOJ of?cials that he would not participate in putting out a ?false story.?462 The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.463 Rosenstein responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that Comey?s ?ring was not his idea.?64 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel?s Of?ce that evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being portrayed as the reason for Comey?s termination.46S In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, ?It was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision.?466 That evening and the next morning, White House of?cials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the 455 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12/8/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 2. 456 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 4? Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 45" Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. 459 Christie 2/ 13/19 302, at 6. 46? Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes); Page Memorandum, at 3 (recording events of 5/ 1 6/ 1 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14. 462 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). 463 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar?000071 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 Notes). 464 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Comey?s ?ring indicate that Priebus was ?screaming? at the DOJ public affairs of?ce trying to get Rosenstein to do a press conference, and the DOJ public affairs of?ce told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not doing it. Gauhar?000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). ?55 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26-27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. 466 Jenna Johnson, After Trump ?red Comey, White House sra? scrambled to explain why, Washington Post (May 10, 2017) (quoting Spicer). 70 US. Department of Justice WHWW President?s decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President received from Rosenstein and Sessions?67 In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Of?ce.468 The media subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the prior day to terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nutjob. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That?s taken off. . . . I?m not under investigation.?469 The President never denied making those statements, and the White House did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: ?By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation into Russia?s actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, ?he is crazy?? When McGahn asked the President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was ?red because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he could get more work done.472 That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.473 According to a memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to the White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to 467 See, Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017); 10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et a1.) (internal White House email describing comments on the Corney termination by Vice President Pence). 453 (5/9/17 White House Document, ?Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia?); 10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et The meeting had been planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the meeting date was con?rmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. 10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et 469 Matt Apuzzo et a1., Trump Told Russians Thai Firing ?Nut Job Carney Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017). 47? (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); see Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 13 (noting he would have been told to ?clean it up? if the reporting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19 (recalling that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the?record meeting with reporters on May 1 8, 2017, calling Comey a ?nutjob? and ?crazy?). 471 Hicks 12/3/17 302, at 19. 472 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18. 473 (President?s Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/ 10/ 17 Memorandum, at 1. 71 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WeHeI-?Lredaet employees.474 The President said he had received ?hundreds? of messages from FBI employees indicating their support for terminating Conley.?5 The President also told McCabe that Comey should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington, DC on the airplane after he had been terminated and that he did not want Comey ?in the building again,? even to collect his belongings.476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential election.477 In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the President about his decision to ?re Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press conference.478 Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan members of Congress had lost con?dence in Comey, ?[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position.?479 In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided ?on his own? to review Comey?s performance and that Rosenstein decided ?on his own? to come to the President on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the ?vast majority? of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, ?Look, we?ve heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things.?480 Following the press conference, Sanders spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in her comments.481 Sanders told this Of?ce that her reference to hearing from ?countless members ofthe was a ?slip of the tongue.?482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made ?in the heat of the moment? that was not founded on anything?83 Also on May 10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to 47? McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. 475 McCabe 5/ 1 0/17 Memorandum, at 1. 476 McCabe 5/10/ 17 Memorandum, at 1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting the Los Angeles of?ce when he found out he had been terminated. Comey l/15/17 302, at 22. 477 McCabe 5/ 10/ 7 Memorandum, at 1?2. McCabe?s memorandum documenting his meeting with the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel?s Office. See (Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes). 473 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017). 479 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. 480 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (May l0, 2017). 43' Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. 482 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. 433 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 3. 72 U. S. Department of Justice Attem-ey?WeHeP-red-uet ?re Comey.?84 The White House Counsel?s Of?ce agreed that it was factually wrong to say that the Department of Justice had initiated Comey?s termination,485 and McGahn asked attorneys in the White House Counsel?s Of?ce to work with the press of?ce to correct the narrative.?86 The next day, on May 1 1, 2017, the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt. The President told White House Counsel?s Of?ce attorneys in advance of the interview that the communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really happened. 437 During the interview the President stated that he had made the decision to ?re Comey before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, ?1 was going to ?re regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But regardless of recommendation, I was going to ?re Comey knowing there was no good time to do The President continued, ?And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself?1 said, you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It?s an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that they should?ve worn.?489 In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, the President said, ?As far as I?m concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly. ?490 The President added that he realized his termination of Comey ?probably maybe will confuse people? with the result that it ?might even lengthen out the investigation,? but he ?ha[d] to do the right thing for the American people? and Comey was ?the wrong man for that position. ?49? The President described Comey as ?a showboat? and ?a grandstander,? said that ?[t]he FBI has been in turmoil,? and said he wanted ?to have a really competent, capable director.?492 The President af?rmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.493 On the evening of May 11, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President tweeted, ?Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election.?494 The same day, the media reported that the President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly ?34 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16?17; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. 435 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 27. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17. 43" Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. 488 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 2. 439 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 2. 490 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 3. 491 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 l, 2017) Transcript, at 3. 492 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5. 493 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 7. 49? @realDonaldTrump 5/11/17 (4:34 pm. ET) Tweet. 73 US. Department of Justice Attemey?We?t?Preduet after being sworn in.495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, ?Again, the story that there was collusion between the Russians Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse for losing the The President also tweeted, ?James Comey better hope that there are no ?tapes? of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!? and ?When James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is no collusion, when does it end??497 A nalysis In analyzing the President?s decision to ?re Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. The act of ?ring Comey removed the individual overseeing the Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the investigation based on Comey?s brie?ng of the Gang of Eight, Comey?s March 20, 2017 public testimony about the investigation, and the President?s one-on-one conversations with Comey. Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of interfering with or impeding the investigation?for example, if the termination would have the effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether the President?s actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or other law enforcement of?cials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The President ?red Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, and criticized him publicly, calling him a ?showboat? and claiming that the FBI was ?in turmoil? under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after ?ring Comey, the President referred to the investigation as a ?witch hunt? and asked, ?when does it end?? Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director?s conduct of the investigation. The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could ?re the FBI director, but could not ?re the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was ?red that said, ?The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it.? In addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the President stated that he understood when he made the decision to ?re Comey that the action might prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even 495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey-Demurredw New York Times (May 1 1, 2017). 496 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 am. ET) Tweet. @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 am. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:54 am. ET) Tweet. 74 U. Department ofJustice Attemey?Werlepreduet though McCabe told the President he had worked ?very closely? with Comey and was part of all the decisions made in the Clinton investigation. b. Nexus to a proceeding. The nexus element would be satis?ed by evidence showing that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Comey. Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At the time the President ?red Comey, a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury subpoenas had been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia?s interference in the election, including ?an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.? It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation, was investigating the hacking of the computers?a clear criminal offense. In addition, at the time the President ?red Comey, evidence indicates the President knew that was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the President?s February 14, 2017 request that Comey ?let[] go.? On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel?s Of?ce was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation, to ?nd out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that remained in legal jeopardy by tweeting that ?Mike should ask for immunity? before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong, further demonstrating the President?s awareness of criminal exposure. c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President?s decision to ?re Comey was Comey?s unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation, despite the President?s repeated requests that Comey make such an announcement. In the week leading up to Comey?s May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May 3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being investigated. Comey?s refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him isolated and exposed, saying ?You left me on an island.? Two days later, the President told advisors he had decided to ?re Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: ?While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship . . . The President later asked Rosenstein to include ?Russia? in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under investigation. And the President?s ?nal termination letter included a sentence, at the President?s insistence and against McGahn?s advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three separate occasions that he was not under investigation. The President?s other stated rationales for why he ?red Comey are not similarly supported by the evidence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster 75 US. Department of Justice Attemey?Werk?Preduet cited Comey?s handling ofthe Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he ?red Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey?s handling of the Clinton email investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed of?ce, and the President had made it clear to both Comey and the President?s senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted Comey to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey?s handling of the Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to ?re Comey. The President?s draft termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all?time low and Sanders told the press after Comey?s termination that the White House had heard from ?countless? FBI agents who had lost con?dence in Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told Comey at their January 27 dinner that ?the people of the FBI really like no evidence suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything. We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that the ?cloud? of ?this Russia business? was making it dif?cult to run the country. The President told Sessions and McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues. The President complained to Rogers that ?the thing with the Russians [was] messing up? his ability to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, can?t do anything with Russia, there?s things I?d like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they?re all over me with this.? The President also may have viewed Comey as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that the President was not under investigation. Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an investigation into his campaign. The day after learning about the interview of the President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey he needed Comey?s ?loyalty.? When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make - public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying ?Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.? After the President learned of Sessions?s recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General ?who to investigate.? In addition, the President had a motive to put the Russia investigation behind him. The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume I, the evidence uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian of?cial. But the evidence does indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen, 76 U.S. Department of Justice Attemey?Werk?Preduet was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on the ro _ress of those efforts.?8 In addition, some witnesses said that Trum was aware that Harm t0 Ongoing Matter . at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence of?cials were behind the hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.?9 More broadly, multiple witnesses described the President?s preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his election.500 Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the press and the public for Comey?s termination. In the immediate aftermath of the ?ring, the President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had decided to ?re Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to ?re Comey regardless of the Department ofJustice?s recommendations, he did so only after of?cials made clear to him that they would resist the White House?s suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey?s termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justi?cation could support an inference that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the ?ring, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. E. The President?s Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel Overview The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had con?icts of interest, but they responded that those claims were ?ridiculous? and posed no obstacle to the Special Counsel?s service. Department of Justice ethics of?cials similarly cleared the Special Counsel?s service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets 493 See Volume II, Section II.K.1, in?a. 4'99 See Volume I, Section supra. 50? In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia?related matters that an FBI investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President?s intent in ?ring Comey was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the Russian-interference investigation. In particular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia investigation, which our Of?ce referred to the U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the Southern District of New York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign??nance offenses related to payments be said he made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section II.K.5, in?a. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President ?red Comey, he was considering the possibility that the investigation would uncover these payments or that the President?s intent in ?ring Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light. 77 US. Department of Justice criticizing the Special Counsel?s investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest. McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President did not follow up with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed. Evidence 1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President?s Reaction On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, 111 as Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose from the investigation.501 The President learned of the Special Counsel?s appointment from Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI Director.502 Sessions stepped out of the Oval Of?ce to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the news.503 According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, ?Oh my God. This is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I?m fucked.?504 The President became angry and lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, ?How could you let this happen, Jeff?"505 The President said the position of Attorney General was his most important appointment and that Sessions had ?let [him] down,? contrasting him to Eric Holder and Robert Kennedy.506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him, ?you were supposed to protect me,? or words to that effect.507 The President returned to the consequences of the appointment and said, ?Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins your presidency. it takes years and years and I won?t be able to do anything. This is the worst thing that ever happened to me.?508 50' Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 391 5-201 7, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017). 502 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 503 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 50? Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). 505 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13-14. 506 Hunt?000040; see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 508 Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/ 17 Notes); see Sessions 1/ 17/ 1 8 302, at 14. Early the next morning, the President tweeted, ?This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!? @realDonaldTrump 5/18/17 (7:52 am. ET) Tweet. 78 US. Department of Justice Atternethe?ePred-uet' The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.509 Sessions agreed to submit his resignation and left the Oval Of?ce.510 Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel?s appointment.511 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.512 The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that discussed an investigation related to Comey?s termination and directed the White House to preserve all relevant documents.513 When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while he sorted things out.514 Also on May 18, Sessions ?nalized a resignation letter that stated, ?Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation.?515 Sessions, accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President.516 The President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he wanted to continue serving as Attorney General.517 Sessions ultimately told the President he wanted to stay, but it was up to the President. 513 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay.519 At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shook Sessions?s hand but did not return the resignation letter.520 When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions?s resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to in?uence the Department of Justice.521 Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it 509 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 51? Hunt?000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 5? Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. 517' Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as discussed in Volume 1, Section supra. 5'3 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House Staff). 5'4 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House Staff). The White House Counsel?s Of?ce had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017. 17/17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Of?ce of the President Staff). 515 Hunt?000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/1 8/ 17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as Attorney General). 5?6 Hunt?000047-49 (Hunt 5/ 18/ 7 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 5'7 Hunt-000047?49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 513 Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 519 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. 520 Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 52? Hunt-00005061 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 79 US. Department of Justice would function as a kind of ?shock collar? that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus said the President had by the throat.?522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting Sessions?s resignation.523 On May 19, 2017, the President left for a trip to the Middle East.524 Hicks recalled that on the President?s ?ight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions?s resignation letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do about it.525 During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the residence.526 It was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, ?Not accepted.?52? 2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest In the days following the Special Counsel?s appointment, the President repeatedly told advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interest.528 The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position shortly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law ?rm that represented people af?liated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump golfcourse in Northern Virginia.529 The President?s advisors pushed 522 Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21. 523 Hunt?000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). 52? (President?s Daily Diary, 5/19/17). 525 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 22. 526 Priebus 10/ 13/ 17 302, at 21. Hunt?s notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the President ?slapped the desk? and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes, undated). 527 Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the President returned from the Middle East trip, the President took Sessions?s letter out of a drawer in the Oval Of?ce and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at S. 523 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 529 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. In October 201 l, Mueller resigned his family?s membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that ?we live in the District and ?nd that we are unable to make full use of the Clu and that inquired ?whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee,? which was paid in 1994. 10/ 1 2/ 1 1 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded that the Muellers? resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be ?placed on a waitlist to be refunded on a ?rst resigned ?rst refunded basis? in accordance with the club?s legal 80 US. Department of Justice back on his assertion of con?icts, telling the President they did not count as true con?icts.530 Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported con?icts were ?ridiculous? and that none of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special Counsel.531 As for Mueller?s interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White House had invited Mueller to Speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBI.532 Bannon said that, although the White House thought about beseechin Mueller to become Director again, he did not come in looking for the job.533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm position did not amount to a con?ict in the legal community.534 And Bannon told the President that the golfcourse dispute did not rise to the level ofa con?ict and claiming one was ?ridiculous and petty.?535 The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated con?icts of interest.536 On May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics officials had determined that the Special Counsel?s prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports that Mueller had been cleared to serve.? McGahn recalled that around the same time, the President complained about the asserted con?icts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein about the issue.533 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue.S39 Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President re?ect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest that the President not make such a call either.540 McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue with his personal attorney but it would ?look like still trying to meddle in [the] investigation? and ?knocking out Mueller? would be ?[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further contact with the club. 53? Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13 (con?rming that he, Priebus, and McGahn pushed back on the asserted con?icts). 53' Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12-13. 532 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 533 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 534 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 535 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13. 536 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. 537 Matt Zapotosky Matea Gold, Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller to Zead Russia probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017). 533 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12. 539 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/ 14/ 1 7 302, at 7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 54? (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes). 81 U.S. Department ofJustice just[ice]. ?541 McGahn told the President that his ?biggest exposure? was not his act of ?ring Corney but his ?other contacts? and ?calls,? and his ?ask re: ?542 By the time McGahn provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President request for Comey?s loyalty, which the President publicly denied; his request that Comey ?let[] go,? which the President also denied; and the President?s statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved ?great pressure? related to Russia, which the President did not deny.543 On June 8, 2017, Comey testi?ed before Congress about his interactions with the President before his termination, including the 1equest for loyalty, the request that Comey ?let[] go,? and the request that Comey ?lift the cloud? over the presidency caused by the ongoing investigation. 54? Comey testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President had obst1uctedjustice. 545 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel 5 Of?ce informed the White House Counsel?s Of?ce that investigators intended to interview intelligence community of?cials who had allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation. 546 On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive of Newsmax Media and a longtime friend of the President 5, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon. 547 Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering ?ring the Special Counsel 54' (Donaldson 5/3 1/ 17 Notes). (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes). 543 See, Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Carney Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Carney Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ?Nut Job? Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017). 5?44 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at Comey testi?ed that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017 meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12, 2017, that stated ?James Comey better hope that there are no ?tapes? of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!,? and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter ?might prompt the appointment of a special counsel.? Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CO Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI). 545 See, e. g, Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice, Washington Post (June 8, 2017) (?Legal said Comey?s testimony clari?ed and bolstered the case that the president obstructed justice?). 546 6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the White House Counsel?s Of?ce. This Of?ce made the noti?cation to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the intewiews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel 5 Office interviewed Admi1a1 Rogers in the presence of agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 1 On June 13, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce interviewed Ledgett. Ledgett 6/ 13/ 17 302, at 1. On June 14, the Of?ce interviewed Coats and other personnel from his of?ce. Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 1. Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5. 82 US. Department of Justice AttornevaVLerlePred-uet and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration of?cials.548 Ruddy asked Priebus ifRuddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could.549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen.550 Later that day, Ruddy stated in a televised interview that the President was ?considering perhaps terminating the Special Counsel? based on purported conflicts of interest.551 Ruddy later told another news outlet that ?Trump is de?nitely considering? terminating the Special Counsel and ?it?s not something that?s being dismissed.?552 Ruddy?s comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President was considering ?ring the Special Counsel.553 White House of?cials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from friends that the President was upset with him.554 On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible ?ring of the Special Counsel.555 The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that ?[w]hile the president has every right to? ?re the Special Counsel, ?he has no intention to do so.?556 Also on June 13, 2017, the President?s personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel?s Of?ce and raised concerns about possible con?icts?? The President?s counsel cited Mueller?s previous partnership in his law ?rm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted personal relationship he had with Comey.558 That same day, Rosenstein had testi?ed publicly before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special'Counsel, including for con?icts of interest.559 Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel?s 548 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5-6. 549 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6. 55? Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6. 551 Trump onfidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has ?real con?icts as special counsel, PBS (June 12, 2017); Michael D. Shear Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). 552 Katherine Faulders Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer ?s ?bizarre? statement doesn ?t deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing, ABC (June 13, 2017). 553 See, Michael D. Shear Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump ls Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). 55? Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6?7. 555 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6?7. 556 Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Stews, Sta? Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now, New York Times (June 13, 2017); see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to the press on Air Force One and the anSWer she gave is the answer the President told her to give). 557 Special Counsel?s Of?ce Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. 558 Special Counsel?s Of?ce Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. 559 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, 1 15th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CO Cong. Transcripts, at 14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General). 83 US. Department of Justice Atterney?Werk?Pred-uet Of?ce informed the Acting Attorney General?s of?ce about the areas of concern raised by the President?s counsel and told the President?s counsel that their concerns had been communicated to Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action.560 3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel Removed On the evening of June 14, 2017, the Washington Post published an article stating that the Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstruct justice.?51 This was the ?rst public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special Counsel?s Of?ce, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.562 The Post story stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey?s March 20, 2017 testimony; that the inquiry into obstruction marked ?a major turning point? in the investigation; and that while ?Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director James B. Comey starting in January that he was not personally under investigation,? say that changed shortly after Comey?s ?ring.?563 That evening, at approximately 10:31 the President called McGahn on McGahn?s personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15 minutes.564 McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed the stories reporting that the President was under investigation.565 Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: ?They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for obstruction ofjustice on the phony story. Nice?;566 ?You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history?led by some very bad and conflicted and ?Crooked destroyed phones w/ hammer, ?bleached? emails, had husband meet days 550 Special Counsel?s Of?ce Attorney 6/15/17 Notes. 56' Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction effustice, a?cials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017). 562 CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m. that stated: POST: MUELLER TRUMP FOR DESTRUCTION OF CNN, (June 14, 2017, published online at 7:15 p.m. ET). 563 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trumpfor possible obstruction of justice, a?icials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017). 564 (President?s Daily Diary, 6/ 14/ 17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 Call Records of Don McGahn. 565 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1?2. McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked about the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the following day. McGahn 2/28/18 302, at 2. 56? @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (6:55 a.m. ET) Tweet. 567 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (7:57 a.m. ET) Tweet. 84 U.S. Department of Justice before she was cleared_& they talk about obstruction??568 The next day, June 16, 2017, the President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: ?After 7 months of investigations committee hearings about my ?collusion with the Russians,? nobody has been able to show any proof. and ?1 am being investigated for ?ring the F131 Director by the man who told me to ?re the FBI Director! Witch Hunt.?570 On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed.? McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David.?2 In interviews with this Of?ce, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as Special Counsel.573 On the ?rst call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, ?You gotta do this. You gotta call Rodi??4 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could do.575 McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.?6 He and other advisors believed the asserted con?icts were ?silly? and ?not real,? and they had previously communicated that view to the President?? McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel?s Of?ce should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of con?icts.578 McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to ?re the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge 5? @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet. 569 @realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 am. ET) Tweet. 570 @realDonaldTrump 6/ 16/ 17 (9:07 am. ET) Tweet. 5? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1?2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. ?2 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3; (President?s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records showing President departed the White House at 11 :07 am. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at 1 1:37 am). 573 McGahn 3/ 8/ 8 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. (President?s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (re?ecting call from the President to McGahn on 6/17/17 with start time 2:23 pm. and end time 2:46 pm); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records be thought it was possible that the ?rst call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1?3. While McGahn was not certain of the speci?c dates of the calls, McGahn was con?dent that he had at least two phone conversations with the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 1-3. 574 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. 575 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. 5? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1?2. 573 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. 85 U.S. Department ofJustice Robert Bork and not ?Saturday Night Massacre Bork.?579 McGahn considered the President?s request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes.580 When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct, saying something like, ?Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has con?icts and can?t be the Special Counsel.?581 McGahn recalled the President telling him ?Mueller has to go? and ?Call me back when you do it.?582 McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by Rosenstein.583 To end the conversation with the President, McGahn le? the President with the impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein.584 McGahn recalled that he had already said no to the President?s request and he was worn down, so he just wanted to get off the phone.585 McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to follow the President?s directive but did not know what he would say the next time the President called.586 McGahn decided he had to resign?? He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson, to inform her of his decision.538 He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his resignation letter.589 Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something that McGahn did not want to do.590 McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least twice and in one of the calls asked ?have you done it??591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson the speci?cs of the President?s request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the 57" McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 53" McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 53' McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 582 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3. 533 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, 5. 584 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 535 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 5? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2. 53? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2?3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; Donaldson 4/2/1 8 302, at 4; Call Records of Don McGahn. 539 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4. 59? Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4. 591 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4. 86 U.S. Department of Justice investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President?s directive was related to the Russia investigation.592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn.?3 That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to resign.594 McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the President?s request, he decided not to share details of the President?s request with other White House staff.595 Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to ?do crazy shit,? but he thought McGahn did not tell him the speci?cs of the President?s request because McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know.596 Priebus and Bannon both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and remained in his position?? He had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, and when they next saw each other the President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through with calling Rosenstein.598 Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephonecall with the President in which the President asked what Christie thought about the President ?ring the Special Counsel.599 Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the President to ?re the Special Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress if he did 50.600 Analysis In analyzing the President?s direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction ofjustice: a. Obstructive act. As with the President?s ?ring of Comey, the attempt to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the 592 McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 3?4; Donaldson 4/2/ 18 302, at 4?5. Donaldson said she believed McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the investigation. Donaldson 4/2/ 18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3. 593 Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. 594 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10; Call Records of Don McGahn; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3?4; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6-7. 595 McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon con?rmed that McGahn did not tell them the speci?c details ofthe President?s request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. 595 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/23/19 302, at 3?4. 59" McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3. 59? Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this call, but believed it was after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7, 2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie. 60? Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. 87 US. Department of Justice A?e?aey?WerlePred-aet investigation and any grandjury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, a fact?nder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the investigation. A threshold question is whether ?the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the Department of JustiCe?s attention. See Volume 11, Section 11.1, in?a. Some of the President?s specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed. First, McGahn?s clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein not only that con?icts existed but also that ?Mueller has to go.? McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.601 McGahn spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President?s request. In response to that request, McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin to the Saturday Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his of?ce, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him to ?do crazy shit,? and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of Justice. Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues that already had been raised. Third, the President?s sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend??You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod.??support McGahn?s recollection that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn. Finally, the President had discussed ?knocking out Mueller? and raised conflicts of interest in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn, re?ecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating When this Of?ce ?rst interviewed McGahn about this topic, he Was reluctant to share detailed information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See McGahn 12/14/17 302 (agent notes). 88 US. Department of Justice Hammad-net the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his thoughts on ?ring the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was notjust seeking an examination of whether con?icts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel. b. Nexus to an of?cial proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would be necessary to establish a nexus between the President?s act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding. Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his ?biggest exposure? was not his act of ?ring Comey but his ?other contacts? and ?calls,? and his ?ask re: By early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the investigation.602 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency of?cials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for Comey?s loyalty; his request that Comey ?let[] go?; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved ?great pressure? related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, am being investigated for ?ring the FBI Director by the man who told me to ?re the FBI Director!? 0. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President?s attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel?s oversight of investigations that involved the President?s conduct?and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice. Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. As described in Volume II, Section II.D, supra, advisors perceived the President, while he was drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed ?irther concern about the investigation, saying ?[t]his is the end ofmy Presidency.? The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying ?you were supposed to protect me.? On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted See, Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI ?s Russia investigation, CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Grand Jury, The Atlantic (June 2, 20l7). 89 U.S. Department of Justice to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Department of Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel?s service and the President?s advisors had told him that the claimed con?icts of interest were ?silly? and did not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testi?ed before Congress that no good cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to Sanders saying he had no intention of ?ring the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction?spurring the President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel?s investigation. The President called McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated. There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had speci?cally told the President that the White House Counsel?s Of?ce?and McGahn himself?could not be involved in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he wished to raise con?icts. Instead ofrelying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims, the President sought to use his of?cial powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media reported on the President?s actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in Volume II, Section 11.1, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the President?s awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper. F. The President?s Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation Overview Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on?one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Of?ce and dictated a message to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about Sessions?s job security. 1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Of?ce with his former campaign 90 US. Department of Justice A?tteme?erk?Preduet manager Corey Lewandowski?ml Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a ?devotee? of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was ?close.?604 During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that, after some small talk, the President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.605 The President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.606 The President then asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said ?write this down.?607 This was the ?rst time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly.608 The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing: I know that recused myself from certain things having to do with speci?c areas. But our POTUS . . . is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn?t have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel b/c he hasn?t done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn?t do anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.609 The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit his jurisdiction to future election interference: Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States. I am going to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections.610 603 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2; SCR026 000201 President?s Dail Dia 604 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/ 18 302, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a ?comfort to the President? whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7. 5?35 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 606 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 607 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. 608 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2?3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2. 6'0 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3. 91 US. Department of Justice WW The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the ?most popular guy in the country.?611 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do.?2 Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the phone.613 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what Lewandowski described as Sessions?s turf.?4 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski?s office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a last minute conflict.615 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, DC, without having had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President?s message.616 Lewandowski stored the notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive items/517 2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn, then a senior White House of?cial, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.618 Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later con?rmed that Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.619 Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the President knew Lewandowski could be trusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a better messenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn was in the government while Lewandowski was not.620 On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.621 In the preceding days, as described in Volume II, Section II.G, z?n?a, emails and other information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the 6? Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 4. (?12 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 3. 6'3 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3?4. 5?4 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 6?5 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 6'6 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 6? Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. 6'8 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. 619 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4-5. 62? Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6. 62' Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information). 92 U.S. Department ofJustice W?h?yea?ai?m?m?rpr? President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.622 Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon.623 Lewandowski recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should tell Sessions he was ?red.624 Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the anteroom outside the Oval Of?ce and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President had dictated to be delivered to Sessions.625 Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message was from the President.626 The message ?de?nitely raised an eyebrow? for Dearborn, and he recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.627 Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him uncomfortable.628 He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him.629 3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview Within hours of the President?s meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions?s decision to recuse from the Russia investigation.630 The President said that ?Sessions should have never recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the job, and I would have picked somebody else.?631 Sessions?s recusal, the President said, was ?very unfair to the president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? If he would have recused himself before the job, I would have said, ?Thanks, Jeff, but 1 can?t, you know, I?m not going to 522 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5- 523 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. 62? Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions?s resignation. Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, ?What can I do? I?m not an employee of the administration. I?m a nobody.? Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6. 625 Lewandowski 4/ 6/ 8 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when he went in to the Oval Of?ce, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. 626 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. 627 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. 623 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. 629 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3-4. 63? Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times ?5 Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). 53' Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times ?3 Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). 93 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WerleProd-uet take you.? It?s extremely unfair, and that?s a mild word, to the president.?632 Hicks, who was present for the interview, recalled trying to ?throw [herself] between the reporters and [the President]? to stop parts of the interview, but the President ?loved the interview.?633 Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President?s New York Times interview.634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President?s request that he meet with Sessions andjoking with her about the idea of ?ring Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions would not meet with him.635 As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to do the ?right thing? and resign.636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview criticizing Sessions was playing out.?537 4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions?s Resignation Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.638 That evening, Priebus called Hunt to talk about whether Sessions might be ?red or might resign.639 Priebus had previously talked to Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quite?) According to Hunt, who took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously discussed, Sessions had no intention of resigning.64l Hunt asked Priebus what the President would 632 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times ?s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). 633 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23. 63" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at n. 635 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. 636 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the President, he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 7. 6'37 Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 6. 633 Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian ambassador, US. intelligence intercepts Show, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume 1, Section supra. 63" Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23. Hunt 2/1/13 302, at 23. Hunt 2/1/13 302, at 2324; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1. 94 U.S. Department of Justice A?erney?Werk?Pfe-d-ue?t accomplish by ?ring Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be an investigation after.642 Early the following morning, July 22, 2017, the President tweeted, new INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions. These illegal leaks, like Comey?s, must stop!?43 Approximately one hour later, the President tweeted, ?So many people are asking why isn?t the AG. or Special Council looking at the many Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted??644 Later that morning, while aboard Marine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions to resign immediately.645 The President said that the country had lost con?dence in Sessions and the negative publicity was not tolerable.646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, the President told Priebus to say that he ?need[ed] a letter of resi gnation on [his] desk immediately? and that Sessions had ?no choice? but ?must immediately resign.?647 Priebus replied that if they ?red Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General con?rmed and that the Department of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions.648 Priebus believed that the President?s request was a problem, so he called McGahn and asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was ?all wrong.?649 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions?s negative press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President?s desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President?s hatred of Sessions?s recusal from the Russia investigation.650 McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President?s order and said they should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attomey-client privilege.651 McGahn ?42 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1?2. 643 @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (6:33 am. ET) Tweet. @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minutes later, the President tweeted, ?What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset, big dollar speeches etc.? @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet. 5? Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13?14. 64? Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4?5; see (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). 6? (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). 648 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 549 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4?5. [?50 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. 651 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14. Priebus followed McGahn?s advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President?s request because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14. 95 US. Department of Justice Attorney?WeflePred-uet and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the President?s order to ?re Sessions.652 That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions?s resignation, using words to the effect of, ?Did you get it? Are you working on it??653 Priebus said that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, although the President did not directly say 50.654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out the President?s directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.655 Later in the day, Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed.656 The President agreed to hold off on demanding Sessions?s resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the shows from focusing on the ?ring/557 By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask Sessions to resign.658 Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him ?beleaguered.?659 On July 25, the President tweeted, ?Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E- mails DNC server) Intel leakers!?660 The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, ?Why didn?t A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation.?661 According to Hunt, in light of the President?s frequent public attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to the White House.662 552 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) (?discuss resigning together?). 653 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4. 654 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4. 655 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. ?56 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. ?57 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. 658 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. 659 @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 am. ET) Tweet (?So why aren?t the Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes Russia relations??). 56? @realDonaldTrump 7/25/ 17 (6:12 am. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking ?where is the investigation @realDonaldTrump 7/25/ 17 (6:03 am. ET) Tweet. @realDonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9:48 am. ET) Tweet. ?2 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25. 96 U. S. Department of Justice Attorney?Werk?Pred-ue?? Analysis In analyzing the President?s efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be con?ned to future election interference, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. The President?s effort to send Sessions a message through Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might ?ow from the inquiry. The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President ?shouldn?t have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel? and that Sessions was going to ?meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections.? The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew ?for a fact? that ?there were no Russians involved with the campaign? because he ?was there.? The President further directed that Sessions should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation ?because he hasn?t done anything wrong.? Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to ?move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections? b. Nexus to an of?cial proceeding. As described above, by the time ofthe President?s initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was ublic knowled e. the time of the President?s follow-u meetin with Lewandowski, See Volume II, Section ILG, in??a. To satisfy the nexus requirement, it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel?s investigation would have the natural and probable effect of impeding that grandjury proceeding. c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President?s effort to have Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel?s investigation to future election interference was intended to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President?s and his campaign?s conduct. As previously described, see Volume II, Section ILB, supra, the President knew that the Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel?s jurisdiction were limited to future election interference only. The timing and circumstances of the President?s actions support the conclusion that he sought that result. The President? 5 initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel?s investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that the President was personally under 97 U.S. Department of Justice investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequence of those events raises an inference that after seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign?s conduct from the investigation?s scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and senior campaign of?cials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial media coverage and investigative interest. The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather than rely on of?cial channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Of?ce. The President selected a loyal ?devotee? outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testi?ed publicly that there was no cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the Special Counsel?s investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly take any action on it. The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President?s intent. The President followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on?one meeting one month after he ?rst dictated the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. Andjust hours after Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions?s resignation. That evidence could raise an inference that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated whether to comply with the President?s direction that Sessions publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to con?ne the Special Counsel?s investigation to future election interference. G. The President?s Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Of?cials Overview By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign of?cials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary Clinton as ?part of Russia and its government?s support for Mr. Trump.? On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails, and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing the meeting as about adoption. Evidence 1. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting In mid-June 2017~?the same week that the President ?rst asked Lewandowski to pass a message to Sessions?senior Administration of?cials became aware of emails exchanged during 98 U.S. Department of Justice . the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russian attorney.663 As described in Volume 1, Section IV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the ?Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia? had offered ?to provide the Trump campaign with some of?cial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia? as part of ?Russia and its government?s support for Mr. Trump.?664 Trump Jr. responded, it?s what you say I love it,??5?SS and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the Russian attorney claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute that imposed ?nancial and travel sanctions on Russian of?cials and that had resulted in a retaliatory ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667 According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this Of?ce, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.663 The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called for the production of various information, including, list and a description of all meetings? between any ?individual af?liated with the Trump campaign? and ?any individual formally or informally af?liated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017,? and associated records.669 Trump Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the ?rst week of June 2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President?s personal counsel/5F"0 Mark Corallo, who had been hired as a spokesman for the President?s personal legal team, recalled that he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 2017.671 Priebus recalled learning about the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June 2017.672 Priebus noti?ed one 663 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2. 664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet. 565 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); 7/11/17 (11:01 am. ET) Tweet. 666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. 667 See Volume 1, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail). ?63 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question 1, Parts through The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting or other events after the election. 569 (5/17/17 Letter, $3121 to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.) 67? Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 671 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3. 672 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 99 U. S. Department of Justice Anemey?Weidepreduet of the President?s personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it. 673 By late June, several advisors recalled receiving media Inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting. 674 2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose Information About the June 9 Meeting Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.675 Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press/576 On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the President, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.677 According to Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to ?ll the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President, but the President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation down.679 On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner?s attorney?s office.680 She recalled being shocked by the emails because they looked ?really bad.?63? The next day, Hicks spoke privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails, which she understood were soon going to be shared with Congress. 682 The President seemed upset because too many people knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter. 633 The President indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak If everyone had access to them.634 573 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. 67? Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3. 675 Raffe12/8/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. 676 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2?3, 5; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 6? Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6?7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. 67? Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. 679 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney proffer that is consistent with Hicks?s account and with the other events involving Ivanka Trump set forth in this section of the report. Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 30. ?0 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1?2. 68' Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. ?3 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 63? Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. 100 US. Department of Justice Attemey?Werk?Pred-uet Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President.685 Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.686 Hicks said she wanted to get in front of the story and have Trump Jr. release the emails as part of an interview with ?softball questions.?687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the press.688 Hicks warned the President that the emails were ?really bad? and the story would be ?massive? when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not want details.689 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document production was due.690 Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President said, ?then leave it alone.?691 Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner?s attorney should give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would be leaked to the press.692 Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group not to be proactive in disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak.693 3. The President Directs Trump Jr.?s Response to Press Inquiries About the June 9 Meeting The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and lvanka Trump, among others.694 On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting.695 The next day, Hicks told the President about the story and he directed her not to comment.?96 Hicks thought the President?s reaction was odd because he usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin.? Later that day, Hicks and the President again spoke about the story.698 Hicks recalled that the President asked 635 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 687 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2?3. 63" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 68" Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 59? Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. 693 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 5. 69? Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6. 695 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. 696 Hicks 12/7/17 302,311: 10; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. 59? Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. ?93 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. l01 US. Department of Justice her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about Russian adoption.699 The President responded, ?then just say that.?700 On the ?ight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the Presidentml The draft statement began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the meeting: was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign.?702 Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be issued because it said too much?03 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief meeting and it was about Russian adoption?04 After speaking with the President, Hicks texted Trump Jr. a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read: It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at that time and there was no follow upm Hicks?s text concluded, ?Are you ok with this? Attributed to you.?706 Trump Jr. responded by text message that he wanted to add the word ?primarily? before ?discussed? so that the statement would read, ?We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian childrenf?or" Trump Jr. texted that he wanted the change because ?[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs and some other nonsense which we shot down fast.?708 Hicks texted back, think that?s right too but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.] ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] on that word Be 1 know it?s important and I think the mention ofa campaign issue adds something to it in case we have to go further.?09 Trump Jr. responded, ?If I don?t have it in there it appears as though I?m lying later when they inevitably leak something.?710 Trump r.?s statement?addin 699 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. 700 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; see Hicks 12/7/l 7 302, at 10. 7131 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4. 702 Hicks 7/8/17 Notes. 703 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 1. 704 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11. 705 la__000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump 706 17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump scum la_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). [7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). 709 SCROI 1a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump 71? 17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). 102 U.S. Department ofJustice the word ?primarily? and making other minor additions?was then provided to the New York Times.?? The full statement provided to the Times stated: It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. 1 was asked to attend the meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting with beforehand.712 The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as described in Volume 1, Section IV.A.5, supra. A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story.?3 Hicks recalled again going to the President to urge him that they should be ?illy transparent about the June 9 meeting, but he again said no, telling Hicks, ?You?ve given a statement. We?re done.?7l4 Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President?s cabin, where the President was on the phone with one of. his personal attorneys.715 At one point the President handed the phone to Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story, and that she should not talk to the New York Times.716 4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting Before the President?s ?ight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting.717 In addition to the statement from Trump Jr., the Times story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President?s legal team suggesting that the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the ?rm that produced the Steele reporting.718 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that 7? Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Mei With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017). 7'2 See J0 Becker et al., Trump Team Mei With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017). 7'3 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; Raffel 2/8/1 8 302, at 9?10. v14 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10. ?5 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7. 715 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7. 717 See Jo Becker eta1., rump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin Daring Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffe12/8/18 302, at 10. 713 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Mei With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 2017). 103 U.S. Department ofJustice A?ef?Wo?ePredu??MamemW?eWWQ questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members.719 Hicks was upset about Coral lo?s public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not approved the statement}?20 The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the President criticized Corallo for the statement he had released?? Corallo told the President the statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump r.?s statement was inaccurate and that a document existed that would contradict itm Corallo said that he purposely used the term ?document? to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know what the President knew about the emails.723 Corallo recalled that when he referred to the ?document? on the call with the President, Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said ?it will never get out.?724 Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: ?Also mention existence of doc. Hope says ?only a few people have it. It will never get out??25 Hicks later told investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phone call because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think the emails would leak."26 On July 11, 2017, Trump Jr. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9 meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so ?[a]fter being told that The Times was about to publish the content of the emails.?727 Later that day, the media reported that the President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.?s initial statement to the New York Times that had claimed the meeting ?primarily? concerned ?a program about the adoption of Russian children.?m Over the next several days, the President?s personal counsel repeatedly and ?9 See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign for meeting with Russian lawyer before election, Circa News (July 8, 2017). ?0 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 8; Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 6-7. 72' Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7. ?2 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7. 723 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7-9. ?4 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8. 725 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8; Corallo 7/9/17 Notes (?Sunday 9?1 Hope calls w/ POTUS on line?). Corallo said he is ?100% confident? that Hicks said ?It will never get out? on the call. Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 9. 72? Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 9. 721 7/11/17 (1 1:01 am. ET) Tweet; Jo Becker et a1., Russian Dirt on Clinton? Love It, ?Donald Trump Jr. Said, New York Times (July 1 I, 2017). 723 See, e. g, Peter Baker Maggie Haberman, Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 1 1, 2017) (reporting that the President ?signed off? on Trump Jr.?s statement). 104 U.S. Department of Justice Attemey?Werlepred-aet inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr.?s statement.729 After consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the media that the President ?certainly didn?t dictate? the statement, but that ?he weighed in, offered suggestions like any father would do.?730 Several months later, the President?s personal counsel stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel?s Office that ?the President dictated a short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, rim] The President later told the press that it was ?irrelevant? whether he dictated the statement and said, ?It?s a statement to the New York Times. . . . That?s not a statement to a high tribunal of judges.?732 On Jul 12, 2017, the ecial Counsel?s Of?ce_ Trump Jr. related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the June 9 meeting. On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times interview, the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting and said he ?didn?t know anything about the meeting? at the time.734 The President added, ?As I?ve said?most other people, you know, when they call up and say, ?By the way, we have information on your opponent,? I think most politicians I was just with a lot of people, they said . . . ?Who wouldn?t have taken a meeting like Analysis In analyzing the President?s actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June 9 meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9, 2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June 729 See, David Wright, Tramp lawyer: President was aware of ?nothing?, CNN (July 12, 2017) (quoting the President?s personal attorney as saying, wasn?t involved in the statement drafting at all nor was the President?); see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) (?The President didn?t sign off on anything. . . . The President wasn?t involved in that?); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) do want to be clear?-the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement?). 73? Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 9 (the President told Sanders he ?weighed in, as any father would? and knew she intended to tell the press what he said). 73' 1/29/ 18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 18. 732 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018). 734 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times ?s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). 735 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times ?s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19,2017). . 105 US. Department of Justice 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were ?really bad? and the story would be ?massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to ?leave it alone.? Early on July 8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the President rejected Trump r.?s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with ?an individual who 1 was told might have information helpful to the campaign.? The President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption (which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton. Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed at the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions, sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel. On May 17, 2017, the President?s campaign received a document request from that clearly covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have been relevant to the Special Counsel?s investigation. But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special Counsel. The series ofdiscussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only evidence .we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President acknowledging that Kushner?s attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed with his own lawyers at that time. b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President?s attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings. c. Intent. The evidence establishes the President?s substantial involvement in the communications strategy related to information about his campaign?s connections to Russia and his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections. The President became aware of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump Organization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information about the June 9 meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President 106 US. Department of Justice Atte-mey?WeelePer-uet dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the ?rst press accounts of the June 9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption. But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to prevent the Special Counsel?s Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9 meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo?that the emails ?will never get out??can be explained as re?ecting a belief that the emails would not be made public if the President?s press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to Congress and the Special Counsel. H. The President?s Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the Investigation Overview From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel?s investigation, and order an investigation of Hillary Clinton. Evidence 1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal After returning Sessions?s resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the President?s July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for recusin from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse his recusal. In particular, at some point after the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would ?unrecuse? himself.736 According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the ?gist? of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from ?all of it,? including the Special Counsel?s Russia investigation?? Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton/l38 In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand.739 Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand was good, tough, and ?on the team.?740 The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel?s investigation and whether she would want 736 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume 11, Section 11.C.1, supra (describing President?s March 2017 request at Mar?a?Lago for Sessions to unrecuse). 737 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. 73" Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. 739 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. 74? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. 107 US. Department of Justice Attemey?Werk?Pfeduet to be Attorney General one day.741 Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.742 Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to ?Keep in touch with your friend,? in reference to Brand.743 Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable with the task.744 In asking him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to ?nd someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President never said so explicitly.745 Porter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an effort to end the investigation or ?re the Special Counsel?? McGahn recalled that during the summer of 201 7, he and the President discussed the fact that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non- recused Attorney General?? McGahn told the President that things might not change much under a new Attorney General.743 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions.749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed Sessions?s recusal from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty?50 In addition to criticizing Sessions?s recusal, the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance with McGahn and Hicks.751 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions?s recusal, if Rosenstein were no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ of?cial in charge of supervising the Special Counsel?s investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. 508. ?2 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 1 1; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. ?3 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes). 74? Porter 4/13/13 302, at 1 1-12. 745 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11?12. 746 Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/19 302, at 2. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11. ?3 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1 1. ?9 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9. 75" Hicks 3/13/18 302,411; 10. 75? McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. 108 U.S. Department of Justice Work-Product 2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unreeuse or Direct Investigations Covered by his Recusal Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who would not be recused. On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the Department should be investigating.?52 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton?s emails and said, ?Don?t have to tell us, just take look.?753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the Department of Justice would comply with that request.754 Two days later, on October 18, 2017, the President tweeted, ?Wow, FBI con?rms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, including Clinton herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn?t do this-obviously a Where is Justice Dept??755 On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was over a ?lack of investigation? of Clinton and ?the Comey and concluded: On December 6, 2017, ?ve days after pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Of?ce at the end of a cabinet meeting.757 During that Oval Of?ce meeting, which Porter attended, the President again suggested that Sessions could ?unrecuse,? which Porter linked to taking back supervision of the Russia investigation and directing an investigation cf Hillary Clinton.753 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, don?t know if you could un-recuse yourself. You?d be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get involved. Can order AG to investigate. I don?t want to get involved. I?m not going to get involved. I?m not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly??59 According to Porter?s notes, Sessions responded, ?We are taking steps; whole new leadership 752 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 753 (Porter 10/16/17 Notes); see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 75? Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. 755 @realDonaldTrump 10/ 18/ 17 (6:21 am. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/ 18/ am. ET) Tweet. 75? @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 am. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02 am. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:17 am. ET) Tweet. 757 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6; see (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (?12:45pm With the President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)?); (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (?Post-cabinet meeting POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. Also COS Kelly?). 753 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12; Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6. 7'59 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12. 109 U.S. Department of Justice team. Professionals; will operate according to the Sessions also said, never saw anything that was improper,? which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not ?t with the previous discussion about Clinton.761 Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President that he was on the President?s team.762 At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was ?too bad? that Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation.763 When asked whether Holder had been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President said, don?t want to get into loyalty, but I will tell you that, 1 will say this: Holder protected President Obama. Totally protected him. When you look at the things that they did, and Holder protected the president. And I have great respect for that, I?ll be honest.?764 Later in January, the President brought up the idea ofreplacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to ?clean house? at the Department of Justice.765 In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on January 27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing Sessions as an example?66 The President raised Sessions?s recusal and brought up and criticized the Special Counsel?s investigation/67 Over the next several months, the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in the Russia investigation despite his recusa1.768 On June 5, 2018, for example, the President 760 (Porter 12/6/ 17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6. 76? (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6. 762 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6?7. 753 Michael S. Schmidt Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US. ?Look Very Bad?, New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017). 764 Michael S. Schmidt Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. ?Lao/c Very Bad?, New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017). 765 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 14. 7? Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15. Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, ?Roy Cohn (14?0) Jay Goldberg (Porter 1/27/ 18 Notes). 7137 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15-16. 763 See, @realDonaldTrump 2/28/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet (?Why is A.G. Jeff Sessions asking the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial power and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn?t the LG. an Obama guy? Why not use Justice Department lawyers? @realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52 pm. ET) Tweet (?Lawmakers of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. Slow walking what is going on? @realDonaldTrump 4/22/18 (8:22 a.m. ET) Tweet Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary Clinton.? @FoxNews Good luck with that @realDonaldTrump 12/16/18 (3:37 pm. ET) Tweet 110 US. Department of Justice tweeted, ?The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn?t tell me he was going to recuse himself. . . . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money wasted, so many lives ruined . . . and Sessions knew better than most that there was No Collusion??69 On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that'?Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now.?770 On August 23, 2018, the President publicly criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had not.?1 The President said, put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice Department, Jeff Th at day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, took control of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in . . . . While I am Attorney General, the actions of the Department of Justice will not be improperly in?uenced by political con siderations.??73 The next day, the President tweeted a response: ??Department of Justice will not be improperly in?uenced by political considerations.? Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into all of the corruption on the ?other side? including deleted Emails, Comey lies leaks, Mueller conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, PISA abuse, Christopher Steele his phony and corrupt Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by Dems and so much more. Open up the papers documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, you can do it, the country is waiting!?774 On November 7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions with Sessions?s chief of staff as Acting Attorney General?? Analysis In analyzing the President?s efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President?s efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into account the supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russia investigation. It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General?s recusal covered (?Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first @realDonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31 am. ET) Tweet. 77? @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. 77' Fox Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). Fox 8.: Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). 773 Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement. in @realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:17 am. ET) Tweet; realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6:28 am. ET) Tweet. 775 @realDonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 pm. ET) Tweet. U.S. Department of Justice Attorney?WerlePreel-uet other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not turn on what Attorney General Sessions would actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally have had the effect of impeding the Russia investigation. On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive. When the President raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, ?Not telling you to do anything. . . . I?m not going to get involved. I?m not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. [just want to be treated fairly.? The duration of the President?s efforts?which spanned from March 2017 to August 2018?and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is relevant to assessing whether the President?s efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as obstructive acts. b. Nexus to an of?cial proceeding. As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence of a grandjury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition, in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August 2017.776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the obstructive-act element. 0. lntent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President?s conduct toward Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 20 1 7, the President was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake of the disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the campaign, see Volume ll, Section ILG, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the campaign now included the President?s son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after pleaded guilty, the President spoke to Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President?s desire that Sessions take back supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The President said in that meeting that he ?just want[ed] to be treated fairly,? which could reflect his perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the Attorney General?a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their E. g, Del Quentin Wilbur Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller lmpanels Washington Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post (Aug. 3,2017). 112 U.S. Department of Justice Anemey?We-rlellreduet presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President?s actions is that the President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation. I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel Overview In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported con?icts of interest but McGahn had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his personal counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he would not refute the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President?s effort to have the Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Of?ce with only the Chief of Staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered him to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President?s direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the President challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed. Evidence 1. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel?? According to the article, ?[a]mid the ?rst wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disquali?ed him from overseeing the investigation.?778 The article further reported that ?[a]fter receiving the president?s order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel . . . refused to ask the Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead.?l79 The article stated that the president ?ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive??30 After the article was published, the President 777 Michael S. Schmidt Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Ojf When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). 778 Michael S. Schmidt Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller ired, but Backed When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). no Michael S. Schmidt Maggie Haberm an, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). 730 Michael S. Schmidt Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller ired, but Backed When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). 113 U.S. Department ofJustice A?erney?WerlePred-uet dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, ?Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story.?781 The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had not told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have the Special Counsel terminated?82 In that respect, the Post story clari?ed the Times story, which could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit, causing the President to back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired?83 2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports On January 26, 2018, the President?s personal counsel called McGahn?s attorney and said that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to ?re the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest.784 McGahn?s attorney spoke with McGahn about that request and then called the President?s personal counsel to relay that McGahn would not make a statement.785 McGahn?s attorney informed the President?s personal counsel that the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel removed.786 Accordingly, McGahn?s attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some other respects, McGahn could not comply with the President?s request to dispute the story.787 Hicks recalled relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn?s attorney about the issue.788 731 Sophie Tatum Kara Scannell, Trump denies he called for Mueller ?3 firing, CNN (Jan. 26, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018). 782 The Post article stated, ?Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had unacceptable con?icts of interest and moved to remove him from his position. . . . In response, McGahn said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move. . . . McGahn did not deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave.? Rosalind S. Helderman Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to ?re Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018). 733 Rosalind S. Helderman Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to ?re Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/17 302, at 3-4. 784 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent note). McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent note). 786 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3-4 (agent note). 73? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 (agent note). 783 Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted the story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not speak to McGahn when the article came out and did not tell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 1?2. 114 US. Department of Justice Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact McGahn about the story.789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that some of the article was accurate.790 Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the Times story. On February 4, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.791 After Priebus?s appearance, the President called Priebus and said he did a greatjob on Meet the Press.792 The President also told Priebus that the President had ?never said any of those things about? the Special Counsel.793 The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to Porter.794 The President told Porter that the article was ?bullshit? and he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel?95 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make himself look good.796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make clear that the President never directed McGahn to ?re the Special Counsel.797 Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White House communications of?ce, but the President said he wanted McGahn to write a letter to the ?le ?for our records? and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.798 The President referred to McGahn as a ?lying bastard? and said that he wanted a record from him.799 Porter recalled the President 789 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1 1. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to McGahn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 2. Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2. 791 Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018). 792 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10. 793 Priebus 4/3/l 8 302, at 10. 79? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the President. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket card dated February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: (1) Letter from DM Never threatened to quit DJT never told him to ?re (Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state Don McGahn letter Mueller resigning.? WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did not recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have ?mused? about having McGahn write a letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President?s request about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion taking place on or about February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 796 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 79? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 793 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18. 7? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18. 115 US. Department of Justice Artemey?Werk?Preduet saying something to the effect of, ?If he doesn?t write a letter, then maybe I?ll have to get rid of him.?800 Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President?s message.801 Porter told McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special Counsel.802 McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true.803 McGahn told Porter that the President had been insistent on ?ring the Special Counsel and that McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told the President he intended to quit.804 Porter told McGahn that the President suggested that McGahn would be fired if he did not write the letter.305 McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics would be terrible if the President followed through with ?ring him on that basis.806 McGahn said he would not write the letter the President had requested/?07 Porter said that to his knowledge the issue of McGahn?s letter never came up with the President again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly about his conversation with McGahn.808 The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him and the President in the Oval Of?ce to discuss the Times article.309 The morning of the meeting, the President?s personal counsel called McGahn?s attorney and said that the President was going to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the meeting.810 The President began the Oval Of?ce meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times story did not ?look good? and McGahn needed to correct its? McGahn recalled the President said, never said to ?re Mueller. I never said This story doesn?t look good. You need to correct this. You?re the White House counsel.?812 30? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. 30' Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 802 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 303 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17;McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 80? Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 305 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 306 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17?18; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 307 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 303 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 18. 309 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahn recalled that, before the Oval Of?ce meeting, he told Kelly that he was not inclined to ?x the article. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. 3?0 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special Counsel?s Of?ce (con?rming February 6, 2018 date of call from the President?s personal counsel). 3? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 812 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 116 US. Department of Justice W?mayem??n?NWWM In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate.813 The President asked McGahn, ?Did I say the word ??re"??814 McGahn responded, ?What you said is, ?Call Rod [Rosenstein], tell Rod that Mueller has con?icts and can?t be the Special Counsel.?815 The President responded, never said that.?816 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the con?icts issue with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do.? McGahn told the President he did not understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, ?Call Rod. There are con?icts. Mueller has to go.?818 The President asked McGahn whether he would ?do a correction,? and McGahn said no.?9 McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed McGahn was to what happened.820 Kelly described the meeting as ?a little tense.?821 The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel?s Of?ce investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.822 McGahn responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by attorney-client privilege.823 The President then asked, ?What about these notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don?t take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes.?824 McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a ?real lawyer? and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing.825 The President said, ?I?ve had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not take notes.?826 After the Oval Of?ce meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn and the President ?did have that conversation? about removing the Special Counsel.? McGahn recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Of?ce that McGahn 8'3 McGahn 3/8/l 8 302, at 4. 3? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 3'5 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 3'6 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 3? McGahn 3/8/l 8 302, at 5. ?8 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. ?9 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 32? McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 32' Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 322 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 823 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 824 McGahn 3/ 8/ 8 302, at 5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson?s notes, which the President thought of as McGahn?s notes. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. 825 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. ?26 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. ?27 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. 117 US. Department of Justice AttornetheHePreduef had not backed down and would not budge.828 Following the Oval Of?ce meeting, the President?s personal counsel called McGahn?s counsel and relayed that the President was with McGahn.829 Analysis In analyzing the President?s efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. The President?s repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to undermine his credibility as a potential witness ifhe testi?ed consistently with his memory, rather than with what the record said. There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. In addition, the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, never said to ?re Mueller. I never said That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own?but different?recollection of the substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn?s reaction to them. Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President?s conduct. As previously described, see Volume II, Section II.E, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn?s account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and context of the President?s directive; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the President had been told the con?icts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department of Justice, and should be raised with the President?s personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn. In addition, the President?s subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When ?rst asked about the New York Times story, the President said, ?Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story.? And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Of?ce, he focused on whether he had used the word saying, never said to ?re Mueller. I never said and ?Did I say the word The President?s assertion in the Oval Of?ce meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn?s memory of the June 17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Of?ce 828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Of?ce meeting with the President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, Mueller discussion in June. Bannon Priebus - came out okay.? WH0000 I 7685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). 829 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note). 118 U.S. Department of Justice AttemeyJNerlePreduet Wed?$9M meeting that McGahn?s account differed and that McGahn was ?rm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, the President?s counsel told McGahn?s counsel that the President wanted McGahn to make a statement denying he had been asked to ?re the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the President?s request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President?s order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the President had tried to ?re the Special Counsel. At that point, the President said he might ?have to get rid of? McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President?s counsel, that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Of?ce meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate. b. Nexus to an of?cial proceeding. By January 2018, the Special Counsel?s use ofa grand jury had been further con?rmed by the return of several indictments. The President also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.830 The President knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval Of?ce meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel?s Of?ce about the President?s effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President?s awareness that the June 17, 2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel?s investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it. To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President?s actions would have the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to in?uence his prior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics. if the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President?s efforts to have McGahn write a letter ?for our records? approximately ten days after the stories had come out?~well past the typical 330 1/29/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 1-2 (?In our conversation of January 8, your of?ce identi?ed the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice?; listing 16 topics). 119 US. Department of Justice time to issue a correction for a news story?indicates the President was not focused solely on a press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from it. c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn?s account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President?s conduct towards the investigation. Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with the President in the Oval Of?ce as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to his memory of what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to ?re McGahn if he did not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the President?s intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was suf?ciently alarmed by the prospect of the President?s meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn?s counsel and said that McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Of?ce that day. The President?s counsel was well aware of McGahn?s resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events despite the President?s request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Of?ce meeting with McGahn and criticized him for telling this Of?ce about the June 17, 2017 events. The President?s statements reflect his understanding?and his displeasure?that those events would be part of an obstruction-of?justice inquiry. J. The President?s Conduct Towards Manafort, Overview In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel?s investigation, including Manafortmand as described in the next section, Cohen. When withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President, the President?s personal counsel stated that actions would be viewed as reflecting ?hostility? towards the President. During Manafort?s prosecution and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort was bein treated and made it known that Manafort could receive a oardon. Harm t0 Ongoing Matter viden ce 1. Conduct Directed at Michael As previously noted, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for resignation on February 13, 2017. Following resignation, the President made positive public comments about describing him as a ?wonderful man,? ?a ?ne person,? and a ?very 120 US. Department of Justice A?emey?Werlef?red-uet good person.?831 The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to conveying that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.832 In late November 2017, began to cooperate with this Of?ce. On November 22, 201 7, withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President.333 counsel told the President?s personal counsel and counsel for the White House that could no longer have confidential communications with the White House or the President.?4 Later that night, the President?s personal counsel left a voicemail for counsel that said: I understand your situationcan?t state it in starker terms. . . . [l]t wouldn?t surprise me ifyou?ve gone on to make a deal with . . . the government. . . . [I]f . . . there?s information that implicates the President, then we?ve got a national security issue, . . . so, you know, . . . we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can. . . . [R]emember what we?ve always said about the President and his feelings toward and, that still remains . . . .835 On November 23, 2017, attorneys returned the call from the President?s personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.836 attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.837 According to attorneys, the President?s personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.838 The President?s personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of 33' See, e. g, Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018) (stating that is a ?ne person? and don?t think did anything wrong. If anything, he did something right . . . You know, he was just doing his job?); Interview of Donald .1 Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) (stating that is a ?very good person?). 832 See Priebus 1/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact the week he was terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him; Priebus thought the President did not want to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18 (about a month or two after was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); 1/19/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3 (describing a phone conversation between Kushner and the day after was fired where Kushner said, ?You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I?ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later,? and the President nodded his assent to Kushner?s comment promising a tweet). 833 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 1. 834 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 1. 335 1 1/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President?s Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael 336 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 1. 337? Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 1. 838 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at l. 121 US. Department of Justice Attornethe?ePred-ue?t hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.839 attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position because the President?s personal counsel believed that would be disturbed to know that such a message would be conveyed to the President.840 On December 1, 2017, pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a cooperation agreements? The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned about what might tell the Special Counsel.842 In response to a question about whether the President still stood behind the President responded, ?We?ll see what happens.?843 Over the next several days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for and indicating he had not been treated fairly.844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for by saying, don?t want to talk about pardons for Michael yet. We?ll see what happens. Let?s see. I can say this: When you look at what?s gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very angry-?345 2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort On October 27, 2017, a grandjury in the District ofColumbia indicted Manafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony 839 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek to interview the President?s personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to attorneys with the President. ?40 Counsel for 3/1/18 302, at 2. Information, United States v. Michael 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 1; Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T. 1:17?cr?232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. 342 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael ?s Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 2017). 843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael ?5 Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, 2017). 844 See @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9:06 pm. ET) Tweet (?So General lies to the FBI and his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday ?interrogation? with no swearing in and no recording, lies many times . . . and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, orjust a double standard??); President Trump Departure Remarks, (Dec. 4, 2017) (??Well, I feel badly for General I feel very badly. He?s led a very strong life. And I feel veiy badly?). 845 President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017). 122 U.S. Department ofJustice counts.846 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and continued through 2018.84? In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President?s personal counsel and they were ?going to take care of us.?848 Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that he had been in touch with the President?s personal counsel and repeating that they should ?sit tight? and ?we?ll be taken care of.?849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and Manafort said no one used that word.850 As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign.? The President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the Special Counsel?s investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be harmful to the President.852 In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June 15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day on whether Manafort?s bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, feel badly about a lot of them 846 Indictment, United States v. Paul Martafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 (?Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment?); Indictment, United States 12. Paul Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates (ED. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 (?Marzafart and Gates ED. Va. Indictment?) Manafart and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates ED. Va. Indictment. 8? Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Of?ce. Superseding Criminal Information, United States 12. Richard W. Gates 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. 849 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. 35? Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to the President?s personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President?s public comments about pardons. Manafort 10/1/18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury. Order, United States v. Martafort, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503. 35? Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. See Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 1. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort?s judgment while he worked on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 16. 352 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14. 123 US. Department of Justice W/lhmam?dl?e?wmw because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so??I tell you, I feel a little badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? . . . I feel badly for some people, because they?ve gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don?t think it?s right.?853 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel?s investigation, the President said, don?t want to talk about that. No, I don?t want to talk about that. . . . But look, I do want to see people treated fairly. That?s what it?s all about.? 854 Hours later, Manafort?s bail was revoked and the President tweeted, ?Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn?t know Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others? Very unfair!?855 I Immediately following the revocation ofManafort?s bail, the President?s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that ?[w]hen the whole thing is over, things might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons.?856 Giuliani also said in an interview that, although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel?s investigation was ongoing, ?when the investigation is concluded, he?s kind of on his own, right??8'57 In a CNN interview two days later, Giuliani said, guess I should clarify this once and for all. . . . The president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in this investigation. . . . When it?s over, hey, he?s the president of the United States. He retains his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him.?858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the President?s comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were ?certainly not intended that way.?359 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be ?excluded from [a pardon], ifin fact the president and his advisors . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly.?860 Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations but said, ?That doesn?t mean they?re going to happen 353 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 354 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). 355 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/18 (1:41 pm. ET) Tweet. 356 Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe ?might get cleaned up with ?presidential pardons in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018). 357 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction Charges, New York Times (June 15, 20 8) (quoting Giuliani). 353 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demirjian, Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort a?er Mueller ?s probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018). 359 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 860 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 124 US. Department of Justice here. Doesn?t mean that anybody should rely on it. . . . Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned yet.?861 On July 31, 2018, Manafort?s criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia, generating substantial news coverage.862 The next day, the President tweeted, ?This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally con?icted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to Minutes later, the President tweeted, ?Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn?t government tell me that he was under investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion?a Hoax!?864 Later in the day, the President tweeted, ?Looking back on history, who was treated worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and ?Public Enemy Number One,? or Paul Manafort, political operative Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary con?nementFalthough convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion??865 The President?s tweets about the Manafort trial were widely covered by the press.866 When asked about the President?s tweets, Sanders told the press, ?Certainly, the President?s been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort?s been treated unfairly.?867 On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to thejury and deliberations began. At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed to be ?done in the next two or three weeks,?868 and media stories reported that a Manafort acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.869 36? State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). 362 See, Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31, 2018); Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort?s Trial Is Donald Trump Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31, 2018); Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases, home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018). 853 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 am. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked about the President?s tweet, she told reporters, ?It?s not an order. it?s the President?s opinion.? Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 864 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34 am. ET) Tweet. 865 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (1 1:35 am. ET) Tweet. 866 See, Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution ?a hoax, says Sessions should stop Mueller investigation ?right now?, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis Nelson, Trump claims Manafort case has ?nothing to do with collusion Politico (Aug. 1. 2018). 367 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). 863 Chris Strohm Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn?t Need to Shut Down Before Midterms, O?icials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018). 869 See, e. Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict, CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); David Voreacos, What Mueller ?s Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to 125 US. Department of Justice Attemey?We?el?reduet On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from the South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel?s investigation a ?rigged witch hunt.?870 When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the President said, don?t talk about that now. 1 don?t talk about that.?371 The President then added, without being asked a further question, think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what?s going on there. I think it?s a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. And I think it?s very sad what they?ve done to Paul Manafort.?872 The President did not take further questions.873 In response to the President?s statements, Manafort?s attorney said, ?Mr. Manafort really appreciates the support of President Trump.?874 On August 21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on August 21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-?nance violation that he said had occurred ?in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for federal office.?875 The President reacted to Manafort?s convictions that day by telling reporters, ?Paul Manafort?s a good man? and ?it?s a very sad thing that happened.?876 The President described the Special Counsel?s investigation as ?a witch hunt that ends in disgrace?? The next day, the President tweeted, feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. ?Justice? took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to ?break??make up stories in order to get a ?deal.? Such respect for a brave man!?878 In a Fox News interview on August 22, 2018, the President said: ?[Cohen] makes a better deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so much is he went through that trial?you know they make up stories. People make up stories. This Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict for Martafort would mean for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018). 870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 37' President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 372 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). 373 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, (Aug. 17, 2018). 874 rump calls Manafort ?very good person, All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript); Martafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump ?s support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018) ?5 Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc. 7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript). B76 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, (Aug. 21, 2018). 377 President Trump Remarks on Martafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug.'2 l, 2018). 373 @realDonaldTrump 8/22/ 18 (9:21 am. ET) TWeet. 126 U.S. Department of Justice whole thing about ?ipping, they call it, I know all about flipping.?879 The President said that ?ipping was ?not fair? and ?almost ought to be outlawed.?380 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, have great respect for what he?s done, in terms ofwhat he?s gone through. . . . He worked for many, many people many, many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.?881 Giuliani told journalists that the President ?really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated? and that he and the President had discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.882 The next day, Giuliani told the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation concluded.883 On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators.884 Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the President following Manafort?s guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort?s attorneys regularly briefed the President?s lawyers on the topics discussed and the information Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel?s Office.885 On November 26, 2018, the Special Counsel?s Office disclosed in a public court ?ling that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by lying about multiple subjects.886 The next day, Giuliani said that the President had been ?upset for weeks? about what he considered to be ?the un-American, horrible treatment of 879 Fox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded the previous day). 330 Fox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded the previous day). 881 ox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded the previous day). 332 Maggie Haberman Katie Rogers, ?How Did We End Up Here? Trump Wonders as the White House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018). 333 Carol D. Leonnig Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers? advice on possibility of pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018). 334 Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul Manafort, Jr, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), DOC. 422. 385 Karen Freifeld Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et a1., Manafort?s Lawyer Said to Brief Trump Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018); Dana Bash, Manafort team briefed Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 1 1/28/ 18, available at see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News (Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: ?[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign. . . . Now, I know that because I?ve been privy to a lot of facts I can?t repeat?). 336 Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul Manafort, Jr, (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455. 127 US. Department of Justice Manafort.?887 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was ?very brave? that Manafort did not If you told the truth, you go tojail. You know this ?ipping stuffis terrible. You ?ip and you lie and you get?the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people to ?ip. It?s rare that they can?t. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi?I don?t know Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, Comm. It?s actually very brave.889 in response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, ?It was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table??890 3_ Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?rm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 387 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN (Nov. 29, 2018). 888 ?Corsi? is a reference to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea offer from the ecial Counsel?s Of?ce because he was ?not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray Eli Watkins, says he won ?1 agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). 339 Marisa Schultz Nikki Schwab, Oval O?ice Interview with President Tramp: Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President tweeted: ?While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses to lie about facts they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!? @realDonaldTrump 1 1/28/18 (8:39 am. ET) TWeet. 39? Marisa Schultz Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval O?ice Interview with President Trump: Trump says pardon for Paul Manafori still a possibility, New York Post (N 0v. 28, 2018). 39? Harm to Ongoing Matter 392 Harm to Ongoing Matter 393 Harm to Ongoing Matter 39 Harm to Ongoing Matter 128 U.S. Department of Justice Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 395 Harm to Ongoing Matter 396Harm to Ongoing Matter 397 Harm to Ongoing Matter 393 Harm to Ongoing Matter 39" Harm to Ongoing Matter 129 US. Department of Justice Attemey?Werk?Pred-Het Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ?Harm to Ongoing Matter "Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 90? arm to Ongoing Matter 90? Harm to Ongoing Matter 992 Harm to Ongoing Matter 90~Harm to Ongoing Matter 904 Harm to Ongoing Matter 905 arm to Ongoing Matter 906 Harm to Ongoing Matter 907 arm to Ongoing Matter 903 arm to Ongoing Matter 130 US. Department of Justice Analysis In analyzing the President?s conduct towards Manafort, w, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: a. Obstructive act. The President?s actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel?s investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement. With regard to the President sent private and public messages to encouraging him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to cooperate with the government. When attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President, signaling that was potentially cooperating with the government, the President?s personal counsel initially reminded counsel of the President?s warm feelings towards and said ?that still remains.? But when counsel reiterated that could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President?s personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as re?ecting hostility towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about the speci?c message his counsel delivered to counsel. With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President?s actions had the potential to in?uence Manafort?s decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to and cooperate with the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort?s D.C. case was considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he ?felt badly? for Manafort and stated, think a lot of it is very unfair.? And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the President said, do want to see people treated fairly. That?s what it?s all about.? Later that day, after Manafort?s bail was revoked, the President called it a ?tough sentence? that was ?Very unfair!? Two days later, the President?s personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special Counsel?s investigation could receive a pardon ?if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors . . . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly??using language that paralleled how the President had already described the treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined with the President?s commendation of Manafort for being a ?brave man? who ?refused to ?break?,? suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators. The President?s public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury deliberations, also had the potential to in?uence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for example, the President called the prosecution a ?terrible situation? and a ?hoax? that ?continues to stain our country? and referred to Manafort as a ?Reagan/Dole darling? who was ?serving solitary confinement? even though he was ?convicted of nothing.? Those statements were widely picked up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and 131 US. Department of Justice are presumed to follow those instructions, the President?s statements during the trial generated substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements or learned about them from others. And the President?s statements during jury deliberations that Manafort ?happens to be a very good person? and that ?it?s very sad what they?ve done to Paul Manafort? had the potential to in?uence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. Harm to Ongoing Matter b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President?s actions towards Manafort, appear to have been connected to pending or antici ated of?cial proceedings involving each individual. The President?s conduct towards principally occurred when both were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel?s Of?ce and press reports speculated about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel?s investigation. And the President?s conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the of?cial proceedings involving him. The President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort?s criminal trial. And the President?s comments about the prospect of Manafort ?flipping? occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. c. intent. Evidence concerning the President?s intent related to as a potential witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel?s communications with counsel stating that decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperate with the government would be viewed as re?ecting ?hostility? towards the President. And regardless of what the President?s personal counsel communicated, the President continued to express sympathy for after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that had ?led a very strong life? and the President ?fe[lt] very badly? about what had happened to him. Evidence concerning the President?s conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day alter Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a prison term, the President said that Manafort was ?a brave man? for refusing to ?break? and that ?flipping? ?almost ought to be outlawed.? At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort ?a good man? and said he had a ?wonderful family.? And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President did not respond directly and instead said he had ?great respect for what [Manafort]?s done, in terms of what he?s gone through.? The President added that ?some of the charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does.? In light of the President?s counsel?s previous statements that the investigations ?might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons? and that a pardon would be possible if the President ?come[s] to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly,? the evidence supports the inference that the 132 U.S. Department of Justice President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. We also examined the evidence of the President?s intent in making public statements about Manafort at the beginning ofhis trial and when thejury was deliberating. Some evidence supports a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to in?uence thejury. The trial generated widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel?s investigation. By publicly stating on the second day of deliberations that Manafort ?happens to be a very good person? and that ?it?s very sad what they?ve done to Paul Manafort? right after calling the Special Counsel?s investigation a ?rigged witch hunt,? the President?s statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President?s comments, including that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to in?uence the jury but to in?uence public opinion. The President?s comments also could have been intended to continue sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President made his comments about Manafort being ?a very good person? immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. Harm to Ongoing Matter 133 US. Department of Justice K. The President?s Conduct Involving Michael Cohen Overview The President?s conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media began questioning Trump?s connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a ?party line? that publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation. In an attempt to minimize the President?s connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project ended in January 2016, before the ?rst Republican caucus or primary. While working on the congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President?s personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the statement short and ?tight.? After the FBI searched Cohen?s home and of?ce in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President?s personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do ?something else? to make the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a ?rat, and suggested his family members had committed crimes. 3) Evidence 1. Candidate Trump?s Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project The President?s interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of the President?s involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project. As described in detail in Volume 1, Section IV.A.1, supra, from September 2015 until at least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.909 The Trump Organization had previously and 909 In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception, including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Of?ce, he repeated the same lies he told Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12?17. But after Cohen pleaded guilty to offenses in the Southern District of New York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again and corrected the record. The Of?ce found Cohen?s testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Of?ce?s investigation. The Of?ce?s sentencing submission in Cohen?s criminal case stated: ?Starting with his second meeting with the [Special Counsel?s Of?ce] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for 134 US. Department of Justice unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow.910 According to Cohen, in approximately September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name and brand.911 Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project.912 Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happening on it.? Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka Trump.914 In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that speci?ed highly lucrative terms for the Trump Organization.9115 In December 2015, Felix Sater, who was handling negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and Trump?s passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government of?cials and possible ?nancing partners.91? Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of Trump?s passport from Trump?s personal secretary, Rhona Graff.917 By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with Russian government of?cials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the of?ce of Dmitry his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . The information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel?s Of?ce?s] investigation. . . . The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel?s Of?ce], also corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts with Russian of?cials during the course of the campaign.? Gov?t Sentencing Submission at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen?s sentencing, our Of?ce further explained that Cohen had ?provided valuable information . . . while taking care and being careful to note what he knows and what he doesn?t know.? Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript). See Volume 1, Section WA. 1, supra (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then?president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties). 9? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. 9?2 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2, 4. 9'3 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4. 9? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, 10. 9?5 (10/28/15 Letter of Intent, signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump Acquisition, LLC and Andrey Rozov, I.C. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3; Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question 111, Parts through 9?6 MDC-H-000600 (12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen). 9?7 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 135 US. Department ofJustice A?emey?Werlepreduet Peskov, who was Putin?s deputy chiefof staff and press secretary.918 On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov?s personal assistant, and phone records con?rm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward.919 Cohen recalled brie?ng candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards.920 Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identi?ed as ?someone from the Kremlin,? and Cohen reported that she was very professional and asked detailed questions about the project.921 Cohen recalled telling Trump he wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the Kremlin.922 Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project.923 The day after Cohen?s call with Poliakova, Sater texted Cohen, asking him to ?[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat . . . It?s about Putin they called today.?924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project and on January 25, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow ?for a working visit.?925 After the outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the project forward.926 After January 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Satcr about Trump Tower Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status of the project.927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign.928 In March or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia.929 Cohen also 91" See F800004 (l2/30/ 15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); (1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr (1/14/16 Email, Cohen to 16/ 16 Email, Cohen to pr 919 1/20/ 16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Showing a 22?minute call on January 20, 2016, between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email); Cohen 9/ 12/ 1 8 302, at 2?3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova?s contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. 1/20/ 16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 am.) 920 Cohen ll/20/18 302, at 5. 92' Cohen 1 l/20/13 302, at 5?6; Cohen llI/12/l 8 302, at 4. 922 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 923 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. 92? F800011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater Cohen). 925 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5; 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment). 926 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 5. 927 Cohen 9/ 12/ 8 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohen stated that he briefed Trump on the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CO Cong. Transcripts, at 24) (testimony of Michael Cohen). 928 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6. 929 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4. 136 U.S. Department ofJustice recalled brie?ng Donald Trump Jr. in the spring?a conversation that Cohen said was not ?idle chit chat? because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal .930 Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.93' At that time, Cohen had received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip.932 On May 4, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen, ?1 had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. 1 said I would confirm and revert.?933 Cohen responded, ?My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.?93?4 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably read to Trump: Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia?s Davos it?s June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev. . . . This is perfect. The entire business class ofRussia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.935 Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there.936 Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could ?lock and load? on the deal.937 In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov.938 Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it were revived?? During the summer of 201 6, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found ?interesting.?940 At some point 93? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. 931 Cohen 9/12/13 302, at 7. 932 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 933 F8000 1 5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen). 93" (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater). 935 F800016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater Cohen). 9?36 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 937 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. 933 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7?3. 939 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8. 94? Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 137 US. Department ofJustice that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company had not secured a piece of property for the project?? Trump said that was ?too bad,? and Cohen did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that/3'42 Cohen said that at no time during the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be abandoned .943 2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a ?Party Line? Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia As previously discussed, see Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied having any personal, ?nancial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described as the ?party line? or ?message? to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.944 After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in advance of the inauguration.945 Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals to be closed out.946 In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President~Elect when those inquiries came in?? Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might not be consistent with the ?message? that the President-Elect had no relationship with Russia.948 In an effort to ?stay on message,? Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.949 Cohen recalled that this was part of a ?script? or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to 94' Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said he thought it occurred in June or July 2016. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 943 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 94? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. 945 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also 4/4/18 302, at 8-9. 946 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2. 94? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3. 943 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 949 Cohen 9/18/ 18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow ?as recently as the fall of 2015? but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen?s intended party line message, the article stated, ?Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible.? Megan Twohey Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017). 138 U.S. Department of Justice Attomey?Werlepfeeluet dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.950 Cohen said that he discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue.951 Cohen thought it was important to say the deal was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and June 2016, because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party?s presumptive nominee.952 3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow Proiect in Accordance with the Party Line In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 election.953 At that time, Cohen understood Congress?s interest in him to be focused on the allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian of?cials in Prague during the campaign?54 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned about those allegations, which he believed were provably false.955 On May 18, 2017, Cohen met with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that he should cooperate because there was nothing there.956 Cohen eventually entered into ajoint defense agreement (J DA) with the President and other individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.957 In the months leading up to his congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President?s personal counsel.958 Cohen 95? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5?6. 95? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6. 952 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. 953 P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter, to Cohen). 95? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2?3. 955 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 2-3. ?6 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 11/20/19 302, at 3. 95? Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2. 953 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 1 1/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his conversations with the President?s personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege, including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President?s personal counsel concerned what Cohen had communicated to the President?s personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described certain statements made by the President?s personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Of?ce to evaluate whether any privilege protected those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President?s personal counsel if he wished to provide information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen?s congressional testimony about 139 U.S. Department of Justice AEern-ey?We?epfed-uet said that in those conversations the President?s personal counsel would sometimes say that he had just been with the President.959 Cohen recalled that the President?s personal counsel told him the JDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on message the investigations would come to an end soon.960 At that time, Cohen?s legal bills were being paid by the Trump Organization,961 and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017.962 Cohen said that the President?s personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the DA, Cohen was protected, which he would not be if he ?went rogue.?963 Cohen recalled that the President?s personal counsel reminded him that ?the President loves you? and told him that if he stayed on message, the President had his back.964 In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit to Congress along with his document production.965 The ?nal version of the statement contained several false statements about the project.966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, ?The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued ?irther. Based on my business determinations, the Trump Organization abandoned the proposal.?967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, ?Despite overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a de?nitive agreement in place.?968 Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status Trump Tower Moscow. The President?s personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained from other parties in the IDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen?s counsel to withhold communications that could be covered by privilege, the President?s personal counsel?s uncertainty about the provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements Cohen provided in this repmt. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further analysis could be warranted. 959 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. 96" Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4. 96? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 962 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 3-4. 963 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 95" Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2. 965 P-SCO-000003680 and (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen?s Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow. Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. 9? (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 967 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 96" P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 140 U.S. Department of Justice Wl/Mayem?m?Nm?mw of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, ?Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.?969 Fourth, although Cohen?s outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had resulted in a phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement said that Cohen did ?not recall any response to my email [to Peskov], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government of?cials about the proposal.?970 Cohen?s statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA.971 Before the statement was ?nalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, ?The building project I led me to make limited contacts with Russian government of?cials.?972 In the ?nal version of the statement, that line was deleted.973 Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the DA to take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.974 Cohen recalled that he told the President?s personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA.975 Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spoke with the President?s personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia: Cohen?s efforts to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United Nations General Assembly.976 In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump, who told Cohen to reach out to Putin?s of?ce about it.977 Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian of?cial about a possible meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on the proposed meeting with Putin?78 When Cohen called the Russian of?cial a second time, she told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that 96? P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 97? (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 97' Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen also testi?ed in Congress that the President?s counsel reviewed and edited the statement. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 1 16'11 Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24?25) (testimony by Michael Cohen). Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not obtain or review all drafts of Cohen?s statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Of?ce?s ?lter process, it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and 16/ 17 Email and Attachment, Cohen?s counsel to Cohen). 972 P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 4. 973 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 4. A different line stating that Cohen did ?not recall any response to my email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government of?cials about the proposal? remained in the draft. See (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 97? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 975 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 976 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10?1 1. 9? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 4. 97? Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5. 141 US. Department of Justice message to Trump.?9 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump- Putin meeting when he testi?ed before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean Hannity?s radio show/9'80 Cohen recalled explaining to the President?s personal counsel the ?whole story? of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump?s role in it.981 Cohen recalled that he and the President?s personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative, and the President?s personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and should not be included in his statement to Congress.982 Cohen said that his ?agenda? in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the ?rst presidential primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations.983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to him by not contradicting anything the President had said/3'84 Cohen recalled he was concerned that if he told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed between Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because the deal never happened.935 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole group.986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional investigations.987 Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28, 2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records re?ect that Cohen spoke with the President?s personal counsel almost daily.988 On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen ?9 Cohen 11/12/13 302, at 5. 93" Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11. 98' Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. 982 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back). 983 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen InformatiOn). 98? Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. 935 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4, Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3, 4, 6. 936 Cohen 9/12/13 302, at 9. 937 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. 983 Cohen 11/12/ 18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen (Re?ecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds; and 10 minutes 58 seconds); two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23 (8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (1 1 minutes 59 seconds); 14 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35 142 U.S. Department of Justice AEemeWerHrodu??hWWd?Undemem submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President?s personal counsel had numerous contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.989 Cohen recalled telling the President?s personal counsel, who did not have ?rst-hand knowledge of the project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement, including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected.990 Cohen stated that the President?s personal counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and ?tight? and the matter would soon come to an end.991 Cohen recalled that the President?s personal counsel said ?his client? appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move on.992 Cohen said he agreed because it was what he was expected to dog93 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Of?ce sought to speak with the President?s personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing potential privilege concerns.994 At the same time that Cohen ?nalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported in depth for the ?rst time that the Trump Organization was ?pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow? at the same time as candidate Trump was ?running for president in late 2015 and early 2016.?995 The article reported that ?the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said.?996 Cohen recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January 2016.997 seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 1 1 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds). 939 Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Re?ecting 14 contacts on August 27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; I minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; 1 minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)). 990 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 99' Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President?s personal counsel that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President?s personal counsel responded to the effect of ?so what?? because the deal never happened. Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 5. 992 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 993 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. 994 2/8/ 19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel?s Of?ce. 995 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et a1., Trump ?s business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). 996 Carol D. Leonnig et a1., Trump ?5 business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). 997 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. 143 US. Department of Justice Attorney?WO??Pred-uet On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project to Congress.998 Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the speci?cs of what the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.999 He recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his testimony.1000 On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project ?was terminated in January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very ?rst primary.?1001 Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow the same message.1002 Cohen said his decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner?s decision to release a statement in advance of Kushner?s congressional testimony, which the President?s personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked.1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, after Cohen?s opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President?s personal counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had gone out.1004 On October 24 and 25, 2017, Cohen testi?ed before Congress and repeated the false statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow.1005 Phone records show that Cohen spoke with the President?s personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both days.1006 4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen [11 January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had 99" P-SCO-000009477 - 9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to sscr). 99" Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; see, e. g, READ: Michael Cohen ?8 statement to the Senate inteZh?gence committee, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017). ?m Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. ??03 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 6. 1004 Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President?s personal counsel called Cohen on the morning of September 20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 1 1 minutes, and that they had two more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Re?ecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2 seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds). 1005 Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US. House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 2017), at 10-11, 117?119. l006 Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Re?ecting two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8 seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds; and 6 minutes 6 seconds)). 144 U.S. Department of Justice with the President before he ran for of?ce.1007 This Of?ce did not investigate Cohen?s campaign- period payments to women.1008 However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant to the President?s and his personal counsel?s interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began to cooperate with the government. On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, ?In a private transaction in 2016, 1 used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to [the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or indirectly.?1009 1n congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testi?ed that he had discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed Cohen to say that the President ?was not knowledgeable . . . of [Cohen?s] actions" in making the payment.?010 On February 19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President?s Cohen received a text message from the President?s personal counsel that stated, ?Client says thanks for what you (10.991011 On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the Southern District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen?s home, hotel room, and of?ce.1012 That day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had ?just heard that they broke into the of?ce of one of my personal attorneys?a good man.?1013 The President called the searches ?a real disgrace? and said, ?It?s an attack on our country, in a true sense. It?s an attack on what we all 1007 See, e. g, Michael Rothfeld Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130, 000 Payment for Adult-Film Star ?s Silence, Wall Street Journal (Jan. 12, 2018). ?m The Of?ce was authorized to investigate Cohen?s establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the $130,000 payment during the campaign, based on evidence that the entity received funds from Russian?backed entities. Cohen?s use of Essential Consultants to facilitate the $130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office?s referral of certain Cohen-related matters to the U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the Southern District of New York. ??09 See, e. Mark Berman, Longtime Trump attorney says he made 8 I 30, 000 payment to Stormy Daniels with his money, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2018). 1010 Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee, 1 16?? Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CO Cong. Transcripts, at 147-148) (testimony of Michael Cohen). Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately ?ve minutes on January 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and that Cohen called Melania Trump?s cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call Records of Michael Cohen. 10? 2/19/18 Text Message, President?s personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenberg et al., Tools of Trump ?3 Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018). Gov?t Opp. to Def. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, In the Matter of Search Warrants Executed on April 9, 2018, l8-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018), Doc. 1 (?On April 9, 2018, agents from the New York ?eld of?ce of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . executed search warrants for Michael Cohen?s residence, hotel room, of?ce, safety deposit box, and electronic devices?). Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House (Apr. 9, 2018). 145 U. S. Department of Justice Mama/WW stand for.?1014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was ?an open book,? that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to ?come out,? and that his false statements to Congress were ?a big concern.?10?5_ A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen. According to Cohen, the President said he wanted to ?check in? and asked if Cohen was okay, and the P1esident encoul aged Cohen to ?hang 1n there? and ?stay strongmm Cohen also recalled that following the searches he heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President?s support for him.1018 Cohen recalled that a friend of the President?s, reached out to say that he was with ?the Boss? in Mar-a-La and the President had said ?he loves you? and not to worry.1019 Cohen recalled that for the Trump Organization, told him, ?the boss loves you.? a friend of the President?s, told him, ?everyone knows the boss has your back.? On or about April 17, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President?s personal lawyers 1022 Costello told Cohen that he had a ?back channel of communication? to Giuliani, and that Giuliani had said the ?channel? was ?crucial? and ?must be maintained.?1023 On April 20, 2018, the New York Times published an article about the President?s relationship with and treatment of Cohen.1024 The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not ?flip?: The New York Times and a third rate reporter . . . are going out of their way to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will ?flip.? They use non- existent ?sources? and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a ?ne person with a wonder?il family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always liked respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, even Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House (Apr. 9, 2018). Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at 11. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 102? Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. 1022 4/17/ 18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/ 19/ 18 Email, Costello to Cohen; (7/7/18 redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher Citron to Cohen). ??23 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. ??24 See Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take 12 Bullet for Trump. Maybe Not Anymore, New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018). 146 U.S. Department of Justice AEemey?Weflepredue-t if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don?t see Michael doing that despite the horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media!1025 In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani.1026 Costello told Cohen the conversation was ?Very Very Positive[.] You are ?loved?. . . they are in our corner. . . . Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places.?1027 Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of the team.1023 At the time, Cohen?s understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization, which he said was important to him.1029 Cohen believed he needed the power of the President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.1030 Cohen also recalled speaking with the President?s personal counsel about pardons after the searches of his home and of?ce had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon discussions were occurring at the White House.1031 Cohen told the President?s personal counsel he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him/03?2 According to Cohen, the President?s personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation was a witch hunt, and that everything would be ?ne.1033 Cohen understood based on this conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President?s personal counsel that as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a pardon or through the investigation being shut down.1034 1025 @realDonaldTrump 4/21/18 (9:10 am. ET) Tweets. ??26 4/21/13 Email, Costello to Cohen. 1027 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. Harm to Ongoing Matter 1028 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. ??30 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. ?'31 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 7. At a White House press brie?ng on April 23, 2018, in response to a question about whether the White House had ?close[d] the door one way or the other on the President pardoning Michael Cohen,? Sanders said, ?It?s hard to close the door on something that hasn?t taken place. I don?t like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything speci?c regarding that case, but we don?t have anything at this point.? Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Brie?ng, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018). ??32 Cohen 11/20/13 302, at 7; Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. 1033 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3-4. 147 U.S. Department of Justice -- .1. I. -. -. On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter?s inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen with, ?Stupid question.?1035 On June 8, 2018, the President said he ?hadn?t even thought about? pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, ?It?s far too early to be thinking about that. They haven?t been convicted of anything. There?s nothing to pardon.?1036 And on June 15, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and in a press interview and said, feel badly about a lot of them, because I think a lot of it is very unfair.?1037 5. The President?s Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government On July 2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an ?exclusive? interview with Cohen that Cohen ?strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York?even if that puts President Trump in jeopardy.?1038 That week, the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previously had worked as a legal adviser to President Bill Clinton.1039 Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existence ofa recording Cohen had made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who said she had had an affair with Trump.1040 On July 21, 2018, the President responded: ?Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer?s of?ce (early in the morning)? almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a c1ient~totally unheard of perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!?m41 On July 27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump Jr. told his father about the June 9, 2016 meeting to get ?dirt? on Hillary Clinton,1042 the President tweeted: the Fake News doesn?t waste my time with dumb questions, NO, I did NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up 1035 Remarks by President Trump and President Macrcn of France Before Restricted Bilateral Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018). 1035 President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for~ the G-7 Summit, CQ Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018). 1037 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018). 1035 EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his first loyalty?, ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, ?To be 'clear, my wife, my daughter and my son, and this country have my ?rst loyalty.? 1039 See Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis, Politico (July 5, 20l8). 104? See, e. g, Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018). 10?? @realDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8: 1 0 am. ET) Tweet. 1042 See, e. g, Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 2018). 148 US. Department of Justice stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?) He even retained Bill and Crooked Hillary?s lawyer. Gee, I wonder ifthey helped him make the On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign-?nance violations based on the payments he had made during the ?nal weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the President.1044 During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked ?at the direction of? the candidate in making those payments.1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with Manafort?s refusal to cooperate, tweeting, feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonder?il family. ?Justice? took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to ?break??make up stories in order to get a ?deal.? Such respect for a brave On September 17, 2018, this Of?ce submitted written questions to the President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen?s written statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the Presidentm?l7 Among other issues, the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the President ?at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease,? or whether the President was ?informed at any time that the project had been abandoned??48 On November 20, 201 8, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing of the candidate?s discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued.1049 Instead, the President?s answers stated in relevant part: I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. 1 do not remember discussing it with @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had reported that Cohen?s ?nancial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators. See, e. g, Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018). 1044 Cohen Information. ??45 Cohen 8/21/ 18 Transcript, at 23. @realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 am. ET) Tweet. 10?? 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to President?s Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President, with attachments). 1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to President?s Personal Counsel (attaching written questions for the President), Question Parts through 1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018). 149 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WerlePred-uet anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian government of?cial regarding the Letter of Intent.1030 On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.1051 In a plea agreement with this Of?ce, Cohen agreed to ?provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Of?ce deems relevant.?1052 Later on November 29, after Cohen?s guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying: I decided not to do the project. . . . I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong ifl did do it. If] did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was my businessoption thatI decided not to do. . . . I decided not to do it. The primary reason . . . I was focused on running for President. . . . I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn?t have won, in which case I would?ve gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities?1053 The President also said that Cohen was ?a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch?he is a weak person. And what he?s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he?s lying about a project that everybody knew about."1054 The President also brought up Cohen?s written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: ?So here?s the story: Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testi?ed in the House and/or Senate. It talked about his position.?1055 The President added, ?Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn?t matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.?1056 In light of the President?s public statements following Cohen?s guilty plea that he ?decided not to do the project,? this Of?ce again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he ?decided not to do the project,? who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated 1050 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question Parts through 105' Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript. ?352 Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018). ?353 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President?s remarks following'Cohen?s guilty plea, Cohen?s August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, not the President, ?decided to abandon the proposal? in late January 2016; that Cohen ?did not ask or brief Mr. Trump . . . before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal?; and that the decision to abandon the proposal was ?unrelated? to the Campaign. (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). 1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). ??55 President Trump Departure Remarks, (Nov. 29, 20] 8). ?356 President Trump Departure Remarks, (Nov. 29, 2018). 150 US. Department of Justice the decision.1057 The Of?ce also again asked for the timing of the President?s discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify ?what period of the campaign? he was involved in discussions concerning the project/053 In response, the President?s personal counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that ?the President has fully answered the questions at issue.?1059 In the weeks following Cohen?s plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Of?ce, the President repeatedly implied that Cohen?s family members were guilty of crimes. On December 3, 2018, after Cohen had ?led his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, ??Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.? You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE, unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans, Taxis, etc., and not serve a long prison term? He makes up stories to get a GREAT ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and get his wife and faiher?in?law (who has the money?) o?Scoii Free. He lied for this outcome and should, in oinion, serve a full and comlete sentence.?1060 Harm t0 Ongoing Matter On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.1062 The next day, the President sent a series of tweets that said: - I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law. . . . Those charges werejust agreed to by him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did?including the fact that his family was temporarily let o? the hook. As a lawyer, Michael has great liability to me11063 On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, ?Remember, Michael Cohen only became a ?Rat? after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable unheard of until the Witch Hunt was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN Why didn?t they break into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked?s office??1064 In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen?s ?357 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to President?s Personal Counsel. ??53 1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to President?s Personal Counsel. 1059 2/6/19 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce. ??60 @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and 10:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added). 106? @realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. 1052 Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript. 1?53 @realDonaldTrump 12/13/18 (8:17 a.m. ET, 8:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 am. ET) Tweets (emphasis added) ??64 @realDonaldTrump 12/ 16/ 1 8 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. 151 US. Department of Justice family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President was asked whether he was worried about Cohen?s testimony and responded: [I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says have an idea, I?ll ah, tell?[?11 give you some information on the president.? Well, there is no information. But he should give information maybe on his father-in-law because that ?s the one that people want to look at because where does that money?that?s the money in the family. And I guess he didn ?t want to talk about hisfather-in-law, he?s trying to get his sentence reduced. So it?s ah, pretty sad. You know, it?s weak and it?s very sad to watch a thing like that.1065 On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, ?Kevin Corke, @FoxNews ?Don?t forget, Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens ofthousands of dollars. . . Lying to reduce his jail time! Watch father-in?lawl?I066 On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against his family.1067 The next day, the President tweeted, ?So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him?Gee, how did that happen??1068 Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to con?rm Cohen?s account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January 2016. Giuliani stated that ?it?s our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow project] went on throughout 2016. Weren?t a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can?t be sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it. The president also remembers?yeah, probably up?could be up to as far as October, November.?1069 In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were ?going on from the day I announced to the day I won.?1070 On January 21 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: ?My recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow ?project? were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the president.?ml [?55 Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added). ??66 @realDonaldTrump 1/18/19 (10:02 am. ET) Tweet (emphasis added). 1067 Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen?s personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019). "168 @realDonaldTrump 1/24/19 (7:48 am. ET) Tweet. 1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019). 107? Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Talks Continued Through ?the Day I Won, Trump Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019). Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were "Hypothetical New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019). In a letter to this Of?ce, the President?s counsel stated that Giuliani?s public comments ?were not intended to suggest nor did they re?ect knowledge of the existence or timing 152 US. Department of Justice Work?Product Analysis In analyzing the President?s conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice. a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President?s conduct related to Cohen on two issues: whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen?s false statements to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government. i. First, with regard to Cohen?s false statements to Congress, while there is evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen?s false testimony. Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a ?party line? that developed within the campaign to align with the President?s public statements distancing the President from Russia. Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he would stay on message?which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen?s testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being drafted and circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about the statement, but rather communicated with the President?s personal counsel?as corroborated by phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President?s personal counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testi?ed before Congress. Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President?s personal counsel on August 27, 2017??the day before Cohen?s statement was submitted to Congress?Cohen said that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement re?ected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, the President?s personal counsel?who did not have ?rst~hand knowledge of the project?? responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen?s recollection of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen?s draft statement that appeared to come from members of the IDA. For example, Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of of conversations beyond that contained in the President?s [written responses to the Special Counsel?s Office].? 2/6/19 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce. 153 U.S. Department of Justice Atterne?erlePfed-uet the JDA to delete the sentence, ?The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials.? The President?s personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President?s personal counsel. The President?s conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence about the President and his counsel?s conversations about the drafting of Cohen?s statement precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played. ii. Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal investigators or to Congress. Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not Cohen recalled the President?s personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go ?rogue.? In the days and weeks that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen?s home and office, the President told reporters that Cohen was a ?good man? and said he was ?a fine person with a wonderful family . . . who I have always liked respected.? Privately, the President told Cohen to ?hang in there? and ?stay strong.? People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that ?the President loves you,? ?the boss loves you,? and ?everyone knows the boss has your back.? Through the President?s personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen ?thanks for what you do? after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump Organization continued to pay Cohen?s legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President?s personal counsel, who told him to stay on message and everything would be ?ne. The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that ?[m]ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble? but that he ?d[idn?t] see Michael doing that.? After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the President accused Cohen of ?mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs called Cohen a ?rat,? and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen?s family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen?s credibility once Cohen began cooperating. b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President?s relevant-conduct towards Cohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel?s Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney?s Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen?s conduct. The President acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with the government investigations. 154 US. Department of Justice c. Intent. In analyzing the President?s intent in his actions towards Cohen as a potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen?s information would shed adverse light on the President?s campaign-period conduct and statements. i. Cohen?s false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and Russia investigations#a goal that was in the President?s interest, as reflected by the President?s own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made repeated statements that he had ?no business? in Russia and said that there were ?no deals that could happen in Russia, because we?ve stayed away.? As Cohen knew, and as he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen?s pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements. In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen, because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen?s efforts to advance the project did not end in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project. The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of Cohen?s false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress?which said the project ?was terminated in January of President?s personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen?s guilty plea, the President told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being pursued. ii. The President?s public remarks following Cohen?s guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from this Office about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the President?s provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness. 155 U.S. Department of Justice AEemeWe?ePreduet The President?s concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President?s dealings with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence that the President?s concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President?s stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to ?break? and ?make up stories in order to get a ?deal.?? And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress, the President said, ?what [Cohen]?s trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he?s lying about a project that everybody knew about.? But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, ?Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn?t matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.? As described above, there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President?s connections to Russia during the campaign. iv. Finally, the President?s statements insinuating that members of Cohen?s family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen up stories? in order to get a deal for himself and ?get his wife and father-in-law . . . off Scott Free.? It also is possible that the President?s mention of Cohen?s wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and de?ecting attention away from the President on Cohen?related matters. But the President?s suggestion that Cohen?s family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen ?should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence?) and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation. L. Overarching Factual Issues Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts concerning the President?s course of conduct. 1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of- justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate the President?s constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President?s Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section 111.13, infra. A factual analysis of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President?s acts were facially lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful means of in?uencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. 156 US. Department of Justice Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose, see, e. United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that he contemplated an effect on an of?cial proceeding, see, e. United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline, that ?obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime?). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong. In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal motives animating the President?s conduct. These include concerns that continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential uncertainty about whether certain events?such as advance notice of WikiLeaks?s release of hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign of?cials and Russians? could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family. Third, many of the President?s acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view. While it may be more dif?cult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent, the President?s power to in?uence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system?s integrity is equally threatened. 2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts?e.g., the President?s statement to Comey about the investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel?it is important to view the President?s pattern of conduct as a whole. That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President?s acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the President sought to use his of?cial power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General?s recusal; to the attempted use of of?cial power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their signi?cance. For example, the President?s direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election-interference only?a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. 15?? US. Department of Justice The President?s efforts to in?uence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of which ultimately resulted in prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President?s order. Lewandowski and Dearbom did not deliver the President?s message to Sessions that he should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President?s direction to have the Special Counsel removed, despite the President?s multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President?s aides and associates beyond those already ?led. b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President?s actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President?s motives. In the first phase, before the President ?red Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a significant change in the President?s conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and campaign officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the government. Judgments about the nature of the President?s motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence. 158 US. Department of Justice Attemey?WerlePreduet LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE PRESIDENT The President?s personal counsel has written to this Of?ce to advance statutory and constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of?justice statutes to the President?s conduct.1072 As a statutory matter, the President?s counsel has argued that a core obstruction-of?justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), does not cover the President?s actions.1073 As a constitutional matter, the President?s counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate the FBI Director.1074 Under that view, any statute that restricts the President?s exercise of those powers would impermissibly intrude on the President?s constitutional role. The President?s counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve exercises of his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning perjury.1075 But counsel has made a categorical argument that ?the President?s exercise of his constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice.?1076 In analyzing counsel?s statutory arguments, we concluded that the President?s proposed interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction. As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not de?nitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the President?s position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation of powers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article 11 of the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that we investigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of?justice statutes can 1072 6/23/17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce; see also 1/29/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce; 2/6/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce; 8/8/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 4. 2/6/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 2?9. Counsel has also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. 1505, protect only pending proceedings. 6/23/ 17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 7-8. Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the person contemplated. See Volume II, Section JILA, supra. 1074 6/23/17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 1 President cannot obstruct . . . by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers?). ?375 6/23/ 17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 2 n. 1. ??76 6/23/17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 2 n] (dashes omitted); see also 8/8/ 18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 4 obstruction-of?justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to remove principal of?cers or carry out the prosecution function?). 159 US. Department of Justice Atte?aey?We?epred-uet validly prohibit a President?s corrupt efforts to use his of?cial powers to curtail, end, or interfere with an investigation. A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction?Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under Investigation The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c) provides: (0) Whoever corruptly? . (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object?s integrity or availability for use in an of?cial proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any of?cial proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be ?ned under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512(c)(2) states a broad, independent, and unquali?ed prohibition on obstruction of justice.'077 While defendants have argued that subsection should be read tocover only acts that would impair the availability or integrity of evidence because that is subsection focus, strong arguments weigh against that proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512(c)(2) con?rms that its sweep is not tethered to Section 1512(c)(l); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section 15 12(c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated? including by improper exercises of of?cial power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. 1503, 1505. Congress has also speci?cally prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. 1512(b). l. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts Several textual features of Section 15l2(c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more speci?c prohibitions in Section which focus on evidence impairment. First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unquali?ed: it reaches acts that ?obstruct[], or impede[] any of?cial proceeding? when committed ?corruptly.? Nothing in Section text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in an of?cial proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(1) explicitly includes the requirement that the defendant act ?with the intent to impair the object?s integrity or availability See US. BL, United States v. Kumar, Nos. (2d Cir. ?led Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28; United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-06-cr-80 (SD. Tex. ?led June 5,2006). 160 U.S. Department ofJustice for use in an of?cial proceeding,? a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections of Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a person to destroy an object ?with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an of?cial proceeding?); 1512(b)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object ?with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an of?cial proceeding?). But no comparable intent or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512(c)(2). The intent element in Section 1512(c)(2) comes from the word ?corruptly.? See, e. g, United States v. McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 71 1 (7th Cir. 201 l) (?The intent element is important because the word ?corruptly? is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction?) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is ?obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing]? a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) ?Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another??let alone in the very next provision?this Court ?presume[s]? that Congress intended a difference in meaning?) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018). Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2) de?nes an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different elements from Section each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains .its own ?attempt? prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction indicating that each provides an alternative basis for criminal liability. See Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357 (?ordinary use [of is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings?) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Loughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use of the word ?or? to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. ?1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be interpreted to contain an additional element speci?ed only in subsection 1344(1). Id; see also Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute ?overlap substantially? but identifying distinct circumstances covered by And here, as in Loughrin, Section ?two clauses have separate numbers, line breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation?thus placing the clauses visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings.? 573 U.S. at 359. Third, the introductory word ?otherwise? in Section 1512(c)(2) signals that the provision covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512(c)(1). See Black?s Law Dictionary 1 101 (6th ed. 1990) (?otherwise? means ?in a different manner; in another way, or in other ways?); see also, e. 3., American Heritage College Dictionary Online In another way; 1?73 The Of?ce of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in concluding that language that appeared in the ?rst clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1084, restricting its prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to ?any sporting event or contest,? did not apply to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non?Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying on'plain language); id. at 11 (?nding it not ?tenable to read into the second clause the quali?er ?on any sporting event or contest? that appears in the ?rst clause?); id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty). 161 U.S. Department of Justice A?cmetherk?Pred-uet differently; 2. Under other circumstances?); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (characterizing ?otherwise? as a ?broad term? and holding that a statutory prohibition on kidnapping ?for ransom or reward or otherwise? is not limited by the words ?ransom? and ?reward? to kidnappings for pecuniary bene?ts); Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (construing ?otherwise? in 28 U.S.C. to reach beyond the ?speci?c examples? listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the ?myriad means that human ingenuity might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court?); cf. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that ?otherwise? is de?ned to mean ?in a different way or manner,? and holding that the word ?otherwise? introducing the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. can, but need not necessarily, ?refer to a crime that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in The purpose of the word ?otherwise? in Section 1512(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word ?otherwise? does not signal that Section 1512(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive conduct than the language of the provision implies. 2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512(c)(2) Courts have not limited Section 1512(c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form. As one court explained, ?[t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover ?otherwise? obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document destruction, which is listed in United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir. 2014) (some quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States 12. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that reference to conduct that ?otherwise obstructs, in?uences, or impedes any of?cial proceeding? is limited to conduct that is similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of ?record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an of?cial proceeding.? Id. at 224. The court explained that ?the meaning of? 1512(c)(2) is plain on its face.? Id. (alternations in original), And courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e. g, United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (police of?cer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before ?outstanding warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding?); United States v. Ahrens?eld, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (of?cer disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target); United States v. Philiips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (defendant disclosed identity of an undercover of?cer thus preventing him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illustrate. that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts?including by public officials?that frustrate the In Sykes 12. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (201 the Supreme Court substantially abandoned Begay?s reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay?s analysis of the word ?otherwise? is thus of limited value. 162 US. Department of Justice commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or impair its integrity. Section 15 breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. 1503, which covers anyone who ?corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.? That clause of Section 1503 follows two more speci?c clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court of?cers. The omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be ?far more general in scope than the earlier clauses ofthe statute.? UnitedStates v. Aguilar, 515 US. 593, 599 (1995). ?The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration ofjustice.? UnitedStates v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have accordingly given it a ?non-restrictive reading.? United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 2010); id. at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause ?prohibits acts that are similar in result, rather than manner, to the conduct described in the ?rst part of the statute.? United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses ?forbid certain means of obstructing justice . . . the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the means used to reach that result.? Id. (collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2) to Section 1503?s omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions?i.e., the result of obstructing justice?rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section 1512(c)(2) serves a distinct ?inction in the federal obstruction-of?justice statutes: it captures corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct contemplated as well as pending proceedings. Section 1512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them super?uous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional proceedings, reach ?endeavors to in?uence, obstruct, or impede? the proceedings?a broader test for inchoate violations than Section ?attempt? standard, which requires a substantial step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018) (?[Ejfforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an ?endeavor? yet fall short of an ?attempt? cannot be prosecuted under United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the ?endeavor? and ?attempt? standards). And 18 U.S.C. 1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the ?nexus? showing under Aguilar, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. See, e. United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 712 (8th Cir. 2011) (?The requisite knowledge and intent [under Section 1519] can be present even if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in obstructing the United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 201 1) enacting 1519, Congress rejected any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant?s conduct and an imminent or pending of?cial proceeding?). The existence of even ?substantial? overlap is not ?uncommon? in criminal statutes. Loughrin, 573 US. at 359 n.4, see Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469; Aguilar, 515 US. at 616 (Scalia, ., dissenting) (?The fact that there is now some overlap between 1503 and 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of? 1503 and the other provisions of? 1503 itself?). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and 163 US. Department of Justice Attorney?We?eproduet WW 1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give Section 1512(c)(2) an arti?cially limited construction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469.1080 3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Text ?Given the straightforward statutory command? in Section 1512(c)(2), ?there is no reason to resort to legislative history.? United States v. Gonzales, 520 US. 1, 6 (1997). In any event, the legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its reach. Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Tit. X1, 1102, 116 Stat. 807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled ?Tampering with a Record 0r Othemise Impeding an Of?cial Proceeding.? 116 Stat. 807 (emphasis added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent effect. Section 1512(c) was added as a ?oor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a certain ?loophole? with respect to ?document shredding.? See 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10, 2002) (Sen. Lott); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen. Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted text. See Pittstorz Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 US. 105, 115 (1988) is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history?); see also Ericino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) (?Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading?). The ?oor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co, 534 US. 438, 457 (2002) (?Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text?). That principle has particular force where one of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only ?briefly elaborat[ing] on some of the speci?c provisions contained in this bill.? 148 Cong. Rec. S6550 (Sen. Hatch). Indeed, the language Congress used in Section ?corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] any of?cial proceeding? or attempting to do so? parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. While the earlier provision is not a direct antecedent of Section 1512(c)(2), Congress?s understanding of the broad scope of the 108? The Supreme Court?s decision in Marineilo v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not support imposing a non?textual limitation on Section 1512(c)(2), Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction statute, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), to require ?a ?nexus? between the defendant?s conduct and a particular administrative proceeding.? Id. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar interpretation given to ?other obstruction provisions,? id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. 1d at 1 106-1 108. The type of ?nexus? element the Court adopted in Marineilo already applies under Section 1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(c)(2) language that is not there. See Bates v. United States, 5 22 US. 23, 29 (1997) (the Court ?ordinarily resist[s] reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face?). 164 US. Department of Justice Attemey?We-rk?Pfedaet Wad?Mew earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that ?the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted? by a ?variety of corrupt methods . . . limited only by the imagination ofthe criminally inclined,? S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when a person ?corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes . . . [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal law,? ?administration of a law under which an of?cial proceeding is being or may be conducted,? or the ?exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry.? Id. at 17-19 (quoting S. 2420). The Senate Committee explained that: [T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage ofjustice cannot be fully carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses. There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice. Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct ?actually prosecuted under the current residual clause [in 18 U.S.C. 1503], which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions] without a residual clause.? Id. One prominent example was conspiracy to cover up the Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere with an ongoing FBI- investigation of the burglary.? Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (DC Cir. 1976)). The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that residual-clause language resembling Section 1512(c)(2) broadly covers a wide variety of obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental processes to obstruct justice?specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House of?cials including the President himself. See Haldeman, 559 F.3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.1081 4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of Section 1 text.1032 a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has ?exercised restraint? in interpreting obstruction?of-justice provisions, both out of respect for Congress?s role in defining crimes and in the interest of providing individuals with ?fair warning? of what a criminal statute prohibits. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 US. at 703; [03' The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-3 83 (DC. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill, Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely ?duplicative? of other obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and 1505. 1082 In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles of statutory construction relevant in that context. See Volume II, Section 111.3. 1, infra. 165 U.S. Department of Justice Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be suf?ciently connected to an of?cial proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-708; Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600?602. Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to require a similar nexus. See, United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy the nexus requirement, the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted ?in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice,? such that the statute ?excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful.? Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 (?the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice?) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that the actor ?contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding.? Petrulc, 781 F.3d at 445. Those requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind. b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. See, e. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368, 402-404 (2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime ?with sufficient de?niteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited? and ?in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.? Id. at 402-403 (internal quotation marks omitted). The obstruction statutes? requirement of acting ?corruptly? satis?es that test. ?Acting ?corruptly? within the meaning of 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct? the relevant proceeding. United States v. Garden, 710 F.3d 1 124, 151 (10th Cir. 2013) (some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the defendant?s vagueness challenge to the word ?corruptly,? 515 U.S. at 600 n. 1, but Justice Scalia?s separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ?Statutory language need not be colloquial,? Justice Scalia explained, and ?the term ?corruptly? in criminal laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.? Id. at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added that ?in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible.? Id. at 617. Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word ?corruptly.? See, United States v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Brensan, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978). This well?established intent standard precludes the need to limit the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct.1083 ?"33 In United States v. Paindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (DC. Cir. 1991), the court of appeals found the term ?corruptly? in 18 U.S.C. 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to Congress. After suggesting that the word ?corruptly? was vague on its face, 951 F.2d at 378, the court 166 U.S. Department of Justice c. Finally, the rule oflenity does notjustify treating Section 1512(c)(2) as a prohibition on evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction. Cleveland 12. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized,? however, the rule of lenity applies only if, ?after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.? Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule has been cited, for example, in adopting a narrow meaning of ?tangible object? in an obstruction statute when the prohibition?s title, history, and list of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting ?tangible object? in the phrase ?record, document, or tangible object? in 18 U.S.C. 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or preserving information). Here, as discussed above, the text, structure, and history of Section 1512(c)(2) leaves no ?grievous ambiguity? about the statute?s meaning. Section 1512(c)(2) de?nes a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of of?cial proceedings. 5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this investigation Regardless whether Section 1512(c)(2) covers all corrupt acts that obstruct, in?uence, or impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in pending proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satis?ed. As discussed above, the omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. 1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending judicial and grand proceedings.1084 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is ?far more general in scope? than preceding provisions). Section protections extend to witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See Sampson, 898 F.3d at 298-303 n.6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section 1503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). And Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressional proceedings.1035 See, United States v. Rainey, 757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2014). concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the ?core? conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person in?uencing another person to violate a legal duty. Id. at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by providing that used in [S]ection 1505, the term ?corruptly? means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by in?uencing another, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.? 18 U.S.C. 1515(b). Other courts have declined to follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the Speci?c conduct at issue in that case, see Brensan, 104 F.3d at 1280?1 281; reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct, see United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629?630 (DC. Cir. 1996); or by noting that it predated Arthur Andersen?s interpretation of the term ?corruptly,? see Edwards, 869_F.3d at 501?502. '034 Section 1503(a) provides for criminal punishment of: Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, in?uences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to in?uence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. ?385 Section 1505 provides for criminal punishment of: 167 U.S. Department of Justice WHWW Finally, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. The nexus inquiry articulated in Aguilar?that an individual has ?knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,? 515 U.S. at 599?does not apply to Section 1512(b)(3). See United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor?s intent to prevent communications to a federal law enforcement of?cial. See Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 673-678 (2011). In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction - laws lacks merit. B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to Presidential Conduct The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests the ?executive Power? in the President and enjoins him to ?take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.? U.S. CONST. ART II, l, 3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney General and United States Attorneys ?have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President?s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ?take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed?). The President also has authority to appoint of?cers of the United States and to remove those whom he has appointed. U.S. CONST. ART 11, 2, cl. 2 (granting authority to the President to appoint all of?cers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior of?cers in the President alone, the heads of departments, or the courts of law); see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 492-493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as ?owing from the President?s ?responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed?). Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with Congress?s Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings, federal investigations, the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions. Usually, those constitutional powers function in harmony, with the President enforcing the criminal laws under Article II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President?s of?cial actions come into con?ict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes, any constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis. Whoever corruptly . . . in?uences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to in?uence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being bad by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress. 168 U.S. Department of Justice The President?s counsel has argued that ?the President?s exercise of his constitutional authority . . . to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations . . . cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice.?1036 As noted above, no Department of Justice position or Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not ?nd counsel?s contention, however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation?of- powcrs issues. Applying the Court?s framework for analysis, we concluded that Congress can validly regulate the President?s exercise of of?cial duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt intent to obstructjustice. The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction would not imperrnissibly undermine the President?s ability to perform his Article 11 functions. 1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes Before addressing Article 11 issues directly, we consider one threshold statutory- construction principle that is unique to the presidency: ?The principle that general statutes must be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would arguably limit the President?s constitutional role.? OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. ?458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). This ?clear statement rule,? id., has its source in two principles: statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions, and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result. OLC, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996). The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq., not to apply tojudicial review ofpresidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992). The Court explained that it ?would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President? 5 performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion 1d. at 801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word ?utilized? in the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees established directly or indirectly by the government, thereby excluding the American Bar Association?s advice to the Department of Justice about federaljudicial candidates. Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Court explained that a broader interpretation of the term ?utilized? in FACA would raise serious questions whether the statute ?infringed unduly on the President?s Article 11 power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.? 1d. at 466-467. Another case found that an established canon of statutory construction applied with ?special force? to provisions that would impinge on the President?s foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect ?foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility?). See Application 1086 6/23/17 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel?s Office, at 2 n. 1. 169 U.S. Department of Justice of28 U.S.C. 458 to Presidential Appointments ofFederal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 353-354 (discussing Franklin, Public Citizen, and Sale). The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. See, e. g, Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Of?ce of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Con?ict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President?s Nomination ofNelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty?Fi?h Amendment to the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974) (criminal con?ict-of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C. 208, does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. See Application of 28 U.S. C. 59 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity limitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. 458, found inapplicable to ?presidential appointments of judges to the federal judiciary?); Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. 1913 on Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use ofappropriated funds for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and executive of?cials). But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule ?does not apply with respect to a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President,? such as the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201. Application of 28 U.S. C. 59 458 to Presidential Appointments ofFederal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.l l. OLC explained that ?[a]pplication of 201 raises no separation of powers question, let alone a serious one,? because [t]he Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes.? Id. In support of that conclusion, OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President?s compensation while in of?ce, ?which is what a bribe would function to do,? id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART. 1, cl. 7), and the express constitutional power of ?Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for, inter alia, bribery,? id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART II, 4). Under analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence, because those prohibitions raise no separation?of-powers questions. See Application of 28 U.S. C. 59 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.l 1. The Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would transgress the President?s duty to ?take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.? U.S. CONST. ART ll, 3. In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the President, Franklin?s holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear statement would not apply in this context. A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes only certain acts by the President?for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations for corrupt reasons?would be dif?cult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section 1512(c)(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President?s conduct of of?ce. No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the word ?corruptly? has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of of?cial power for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established de?nition states that ?corruptly? means action with an 170 U.S. Department of Justice intent to secure an improper advantage ?inconsistent with o?icial duty and the rights of others.? LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term only when applied to the President. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to ?giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory provision, different meanings in different factual contexts?); of Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462- 467 (giving the term ?utilized? in the FACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions). Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale. The principle that courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions ?is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.? Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1997). ?It is one thing to acknowledge and accept . . . well de?ned (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions.? Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998). When a proposed construction ?would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute?s] compass,? thereby preventing the statute ?from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear terms,? Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357, it is doubtful that the construction would re?ect Congress?s intent. That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes, which ?have been given a broad and all~inclusive meaning.? Rainey, 757 F.3d at 245 (discussing Sections 1503 and 1505) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, since no established principle of interpretation would exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 1512(b), and 15l2(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation?of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article II defense to the application of those statutes. 2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress Mav Validlv Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President?s Of?cial Powers When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation?s validity depends on whether the measure ?disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches.? Nixon 12. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). ?Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself, . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.? Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996). The ?separation of powers does not mean,? however, ?that the branches ?ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.? Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 3254326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues. Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptly motivated of?cial acts of the President without impermissibly undermining his Article 11 functions. 171 U.S. Department of Justice a. The Supreme Court?s Separation-o?Powers Balancing Test Applies In This Context A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine ?the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions,? and, if the ?potential for disruption is present[,] . . . whether that impact is justi?ed by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.? Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see Nixon 12. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,753- 754 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (1974). That balancing test applies to a congressional regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws. ?087 When an Article 11 power has not been ?explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President of the ?executive Power,? the Court has balanced competing constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, ., concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O?Connor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Public Citizen, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on ?the President?s power to remove Executive of?cers, a power [that] . . . is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the ?executive Power.?? Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988), and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 15?1 16 (1926)). Consistent with that statement, Morrison sustained a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior of?cer with de?ned prosecutorial responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the President?s ability to perform his Article 11 functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example, the Court evaluated the President?s claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications about his of?cial acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch?s need for evidence in a criminal case. United States v. Nixon, supra (recognizing a quali?ed constitutional privilege for presidential communications on of?cial matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over the records. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential exercises of executive power. Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President?s power is ?both ?exclusive? and ?conclusive? on the issue,? Congress is precluded from regulating its exercise. v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In for example, the Court followed ?Justice Jackson?s familiar tripartite framework? in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President?s 1037 OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal prosecution while in of?ce, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. See A Sitting President ?5 Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237?238, 244-245 (2000) (relying on, inter alia, United States v. Nixon, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton 12. Jones, and quoting the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text). OLC recognized that ?[t]he balancing analysis? it had initially relied on in ?nding that a sitting President is immune from prosecution had ?been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court.? Id. at 244. 172 U.S. Department of Justice WNWW authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Id. at 2083, 2094. See also Public Citizen 491 U.S. at 485-486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment) (citing the power to grant pardons under U.S. CONST., ART. 11, 2, cl. 1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation, U.S. CONST., ART. 1, 7, C15. 2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text). But even when a power is exclusive, ?Congress? powers, and its central role in making laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and follow? the President?s act. ZivotofSky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President?s power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-148 (1872), Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt use of ?anything of value? to in?uence the testimony of another person in a judicial, congressional, or agency proceeding, 18 U.S.C. would include the offer or promise of a pardon to induce'a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congress?s power to regulate even if the pardon itselfis not. Just as the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. 1, 6, cl], absolutely protects legislative acts, but not a legislator?s ?taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way . . . for it is taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act,? United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (emphasis omitted), the promise ofa pardon to corruptly in?uence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separation- of?powers issue. b. The [feet of Obstruction-o?Justice Statutes on the President?s Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited Under the Supreme Court?s balancing test for analyzing separation-of?powers issues, the first task is to assess the degree to which applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President?s ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential conduct that does not involve the President?s conduct of office?such as in?uencing the testimony of witnesses?is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly in?uencing witness testimony. The conduct would be equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, or promised use of of?cial powers to achieve the same result. The President?s action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging law enforcement of?cials, raises different questions. Each type of action involves the exercise of executive discretion in furtherance of the President?s duty to ?take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.? U.S. CONST., ART. 3. Congress may not supplant the President?s exercise of executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986) (?Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an of?cer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. . . . [Because t]he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws, . . . [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . is constitutionally impermissible?). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impose a discrete limitation on conduct 173 U.S. Department ofJustice only when it is taken with the ?corrupt? intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct of?cial proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume II, Section supra. The direct effect on the President?s freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited one. A preclusion of?corrupt? of?cial action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding ?nancial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibits of?cial action undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions, with no limits whatsoever, in order to carry out his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (?Congress may limit an agency?s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency?s power to discriminate am on issues or cases it will pursue?); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 read the Art. 11 powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold con?dential communications from a criminal trial]. . . would upset the constitutional balance of ?a workable government? and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch of?cials involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive departments and of?cer positions and to specify how inferior of?cers are appointed. E. U.S. CONST., ART. I, 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, 63? 2, cl. 1 (Opinions Clause); ART. II, 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the President?s removal power is an important means of ensuring that of?cers faithfully execute the law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. Id. at 493-495. The President?s removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers?that is, of?cers who must be appointed by the President and who report to him directly. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500. The President?s ?exclusive and illimitable power of removal? of those principal of?cers furthers ?the President?s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.? Id. at 493, 498 (internal quotation marks omitted); Myers, 272 U.S. at 627. Thus, ?there are some ?purely executive? of?cials who must be removable by the President at will if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role.? Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (the President?s ?cabinet of?cers must do his will,? and ?[t]he moment that he loses con?dence in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the power to remove him without delay?); of Humphrey ?s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal of?cers removable only for good cause). In light of those constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet of?cer such as the Attorney General. See 5 U.S.C. 101; 28 U.S.C. 503. In that context, at least absent circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances, even the highly limited 174 AttemetherleProduet/l regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President?s freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet. The removal of inferior of?cers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President to ful?ll his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch. ?[I]nferior of?cers are of?cers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other of?cers appointed by the President with the Senate?s consent.? Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress?s authority to place for-cause limitations on the President?s removal of ?inferior Officers? whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. U.S. CONST. ART. 11, 2, cl. 2. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (?The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior of?cers in the heads of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the of?cers so appointed?) (quoting lower court decision); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n. 27 (citing Perkins); accord id. at 723-724 n.4 (Scalia, .I., dissenting) (recognizing that Perkins is ?established? law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493- 495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). The category of inferior of?cers includes both the FBI Director and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. 509, 515(a), 531; 28 C.F.R. Part 600. Their work is thus ?directed and supervised? by a presidentially- appointed, Senate-con?rmed of?cer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, F.3d 2019 WL 921692, at (DC. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an ?inferior of?cer? for constitutional purposes). I Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good?cause limitation on the removal of an Executive Branch of?cer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the range of permissible reasons for removal to exclude a ?corrupt? purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring an af?rmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior of?cers, Congress may constitutionally restrict the President?s removal authority if that authority was exercised for the corrupt purpose of obstructingjustice. And even ifa particular inferior of?cer?s position might be of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal authority, the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid removal for a corrupt reason.1088 A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations, including disagreement over policy or loss of con?dence in the of?cer?s judgment or commitment. A corrupt-purpose prohibition therefore would not undermine the President?s ability to perform his Article 11 functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is ?whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President?s ability to perform his constitutional duty,? Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an inferior of?cer for a ??88 Although the FBI director is an inferior of?cer, he is appointed by the President and removable by him at will, see 28 U.S.C. 532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the FBI director with good-cause tenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the FBI Director, 201 1 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 201 l) (?tenure protection for an of?cer with the FBI Director?s broad investigative, administrative, and policymaking responsibilities would raise a serious constitutional question whether Congress had ?impede[d] the President?s ability to perform his constitutional duty? to take care that the laws be faithfully executed?) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691). 175 U.S. Department of Justice Attemey?We?ePreduet corrupt reason?a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than of?cial ends?does not seriously hinder the President?s performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to supervise investigations and remove of?cials, circumscribed in this context only by the requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes.1039 0. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source Where a law imposes a burden on the President?s performance of Article 11 functions, separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure ?is justi?ed by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.? Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of- justice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand jury investigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are within Congress?s authority and serve strong governmental interests. i. Congress has Article 1 authority to de?ne generally applicable criminal law and apply it to all persons?including the President. Congress clearly has authority to protect its own legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and lawmaking efforts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman v. United States, 5 App. DC. 122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system of federal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts. See U.S. CONST. ART. 1, 8, 015. 9, 18 (?The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court? and ?To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers?). The long lineage of the obstruction?of?justice statutes, which can be traced to at least 1831, attests to the necessity for that protection. See An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts ofCourt, 4 Stat. 487-488 2 (1831) (making it a crime if ?any person or persons shall corruptly . . . endeavor to in?uence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or of?cer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly . . . obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein?). ii. The Article 111 courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against obstructive acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon, a ?primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch? is ?to do justice in criminal prosecutions.? 418 U.S. at 707; accord Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004). In Nixon, the Court rejected the President?s claim of absolute executive privilege because ?the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably ??39 The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice has made clear, a claim of a con?ict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability to ful?ll his constitutional function. See, OLC, Application of 28 U.S. C. 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Of?ce of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President?s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the wenty- Fi??h Amendment to the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974)). 176 U.S. Department of Justice A?emey?WorlePFed-aet relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.? 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens ?[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public con?dence in the system?). Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from corrupt acts. Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article courts based on an indictment issued by a grandjury. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (?The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process?). And the grand jury?s function is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. person shall be held to answer? for a serious crime ?unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury?). ?[Tjhe whole theory of [the grand jury?s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,? United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), ?pledged to indict no one because ofprejudice and to free no one because of special favor.? Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all persons, its function as an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process. a: at: 4: The ?nal step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation- of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article 11 functions. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711?712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes on the President?s of?cial conduct to protect the integrity of important functions of other branches of government. A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President?s responsibility to ?take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.? U.S. CONST. ART ll, 3.1090 To the contrary, the concept of ?faithful execution? connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in the of?ce holder?s personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 763 (1755) (?faithfully? def. 3: ?[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance?). And immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of of?cial proceedings would seriously impair Congress?s power to enact laws ?to promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority,? Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 425??i.e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article 111 courts and grand juries. 109? As noted above, the President?s selection and removal of principal executive officers may have a unique constitutional status. 177 U.S. Department of Justice Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article II powers. 109? 3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties Applying the obstruction statutes to the President?s of?cial conduct would involve determining as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act, whether the act had a nexus to of?cial proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those standards to the President?s of?cial conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II duties. Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752-753 n.32 (taking into account chilling effect on the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages action based on of?cial duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence of settled legal standards, the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence of evidentiary limitations on probing the President?s motives. And historical experience con?rms that no impermissible chill should exist. a. As an initial matter, the term ?corruptly? sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an ?improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with of?cial duty and the rights of others.? LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard parallels the President?s constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of of?ce will have a clear governmental purpose and will not be contrary to his of?cial duty. Accordingly, the President has no reason to be chilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances, there will be no credible basis for suspecting a corrupt personal motive. That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal investigation into his own or his family members? conduct to protect against personal embarrassment or legal liability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct. So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the President?s ?nancial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples, '09' A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves of?ce. Impeachment would remove a President from of?ce, but would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law. Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in addressing an of?cial?s conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC has recognized. A Sitting President ?s Amenobility to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 255 (?Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President?s term is over or he is otherwise removed from of?ce by resignation or impeachment?). 178 of?cial power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President?s personal interests. In contrast, the President?s actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt. The President?s role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings. For instance, the President?s decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes. The criminal law does not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of government. And when legitimate interests animate the President?s conduct, those interests will almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because the President?s conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law, no chilling concern should arise. b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let alone prosecutions, would occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that obstruction occurred. Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent ?clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their of?cial duties.? 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14?15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any matter involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under opinion that a sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would be able to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President would have any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. There are ?obvious political checks? against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former President. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks in separation-of-powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds ?the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government,? United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694 (citing 28 U.S.C. 516), which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized investigations or prosecutions. 1092 1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts. Prosecutors are generally barred from participating in matters implicating their personal interests, see 28 C.F.R. 45.2, and are instructed not to be in?uenced by their ?own professional or personal circumstances,? Justice Manual 9-27.260, so prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by ?a defendant [who] often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions.? Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity does notjustify criminal immunity. See 0 ?Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (?Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, . . . we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights?) (citations omitted). 179 U.S. Department of Justice Attomey?Wer?lepred-uet These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court?s holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that, in part because inquiries into the President?s motives would be ?highly intrusive,? the President is absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at 756-757. As Fitzgerald recognized, ?there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions.? Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see Cheney, 542 U.S. at 384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity. 517 U.S. at 464. c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justi?es conducting an investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. Ascertaining the President?s motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he received, the circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the process he employed to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic access to con?dential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be presented in official proceedings only on a showing ofsufficient need. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712; In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754, 756-757 (DC. Cir. 1997); see also Administrator ofGeneral Services, 433 U.S. at 44 8-449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege, although successor?s failure to support the claim ?detracts from [its] weight?). In any event, probing the President?s intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably constitutional in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive a thing ofvalue in return for being influenced in of?cial action. 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2). There can be no serious argument against the President?s potential criminal liability for bribery offenses, notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent. See U.S. ART. 1, 3; ART. ll, 4; see also Application Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.1 1 (?Application of 201[to the President] raises no separation of powers issue, let alone a serious one?). d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter, Presidents have very seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through the President?s use of of?cial power. Accordingly, the President?s conduct of office should not be chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt-motive standard in this context. In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President?s counsel, we concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues, we had a valid basis for investigating the conduct at issue in this report. In our view, the application of the obstruction statutes would not impermissibly burden the President?s performance of his Article II function to supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. And the protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person?including the President?accords with the fundamental principle of our government that ?[njo [person] in this 180 U.S. Department ofJustice country is so high that he is above the law.? United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697; United States v. Nixon, supra. 181 U.S. Department of Justice IV. CONCLUSION Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President?s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President?s actions and intent presents dif?cult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had con?dence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. 182 U.S. Department of Justice Appendix A U.S. Department of Justice US. Department ofJustice (lattice of the 332ng cithttortteg (general Washington. 33.01 20530 ORDER NO, 3915-2017 APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General, including 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 515, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice? and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian govemmertt?s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. I hereby order as follows: Robert S. Mueller Ill is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States Department of usticc. The Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation continued by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017, including: any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and (ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and any other matters within the scope ot'28 C.F.R. If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising From the investigation of these matters. Sections 600.4 through 600. !0 of Title 28 ofthc Code of Federal Regulations are applicable to the Special Counsel. 2/7/31 View Date Re Likes 1: *in Acting All ncy General A-l US. Department of Justice U.rS.eaDptmen nouthstic Appendix US. Department of Justice U. S. Department of Justice APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities referenced in the two volumes ofthis report. It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report. Agalarov, Aras Agalarov, Emin Akhmetov, Rinat Akhmetshin, Rinat Aslanov, Dzheykhun (Jay) Assange, Julian Aven, Petr Bannon, Stephen (Steve) Baranov, Andrey Berkowitz, Avi Boente, Dana Bogacheva, Anna Bossert, Thomas (Tom) Referenced Persons Russian real-estate developer (owner of the Crocus Group); met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. Performer, executive vice president of Crocus Group, and son of Aras Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for Ukrainian political party, the Party of Regions. U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. Head of US. department of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election. Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities and individuals af?liated with the Democratic Party. Chairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-election sanctions. White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump (Jan. 2017 Aug. 2017); chief executive ofthe Trump Campaign. Director of investor relations at Russian state?owned oil company, Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page. Assistant to Jared Kushner. Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy Attorney General (Feb. 2017 Apr. 2017). Internet Research Agency employee who worked on ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 US. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. Former homeland security adviser to the President who also served as a senior of?cial on the Presidential Transition Team. B-l U.S. Department of Justice Boyarkin, Viktor Boyd, Charles Boyko, Yu riy Brand, Rachel Browder, William (Bill) Bulatov, Alexander Burchik, Mikhail Burek, William Bu rnham, James Burt, Richard Mikhail Calamari, Matt Caputo, Michael Chaika, Yuri Christie, Chris Clapper, James Clovis, Samuel Jr. Coats, Dan Cobb, Ty Cohen, Michael Comey, James Jr. Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. Chairman of the board of directors at the Center for the National Interest, a U.S.-based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia. Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of the Ukrainian parliament. Associate Attorney General (May 2017 Feb. 2018). Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the Magnitsky Act, which imposed ?nancial and travel sanctions on Russian of?cials. Russian intelligence official who associated with Carter Page in 2008. Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Personal attorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel. Attorney in the White House Counsel?s Office who attended January 2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn. Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa?Bank and was a board member of the Center for the National Interest. General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization. Trump Campaign advisor. Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a relationship with Aras Agalarov. Former Governor of New Jersey. Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 Jan. 2017). Chief policy adviser and national co-chair ofthe Trump Campaign. Director ofNational Intelligence. Special Counsel to the President (July 2017 May 2018). Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald Trump who spearheaded an effort to build a Trump-branded property in Moscow. He admitted to lying to Congress about the project. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 4, 2013 May 9, 2017) B-2 US. Department of Justice Conway, Kellyanne Corallo, Mark Corsi, Jerome Costello, Robert Credico, Randolph (Randy) Davis, Richard (Rick) Jr. Dearborn, Rick Dempsey, Michael Denman, Diana Deripaska, Oleg Dhillon, Uttam Dmitriev, Kirill Donaldson, Annie Dvorkovich, Arkady Dvoskin, Evgeney Eisenberg, John Erchova, Lana (a/k/a Lana Alexander) Counselor to President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign. Spokesman for President Trump?s personal legal team (June 2017 July 2017). Author and political commentator who formerly worked for WorldNetDail and InfoWars. Harm to Ongomg Matter Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, the President?s personal counsel. Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016. Harm to Ongoing Matter Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business partner of Paul Manafort, and co?founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying firm. Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions. Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled discussions with Dan Coats after Coats?s meeting with President Trump on March 22, 2017. Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine. Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009. Attorney in the White House Counsel?s Office (Jan. 2017 June 2018). Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund met with Erik Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a US.- Russia reconciliation plan with Rick Gerson. Chief of staff to White House Counsel Donald MeGahn (Jan. 2017 Dec. 2018) Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the board of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He met with Carter Page twice in 2016. Executive of Genbank in Crimea and associate of Felix Sater. Attorney in the White House Counsel?s Office and legal counsel for the National Security Council. Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of2015. B-3 US. Department ofJustice Fabrizio, Anthony (Tony) Fishbein, Jason Michael G. (a/k/a Michael Jr.) Michael T. Foresman, Robert (Bob) Futerfas, Alan Garten, Alan Gates, Richard (Rick) Gerson, Richard (Rick) Gistaro, Edward Glassner, Michael Goldstone, Robert Gordon, Jeffrey (J.D.) Gorkov, Sergey Graff, Rhona Partner at the research and consulting ?rm abrizio, Lee Associates. He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine~related polling after the election. Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on September 20, 2016. Son of Michael T. National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 Feb. 13, 2017). National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 Feb. 13, 2017), Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012 Aug. 7, 2014), and Trump Campaign advisor. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016. Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met with Michael Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr. General counsel of the Trump Organization. Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate US. laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI. New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner. During the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. Political director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign. Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange the June 9, 20] 6 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National Convention. Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state?owned bank, who met with Jared Kushner during the transition period. Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the Trump Organization. 13-4 US. Department of Justice Hawker, Jonathan Heilbrunn, Jacob Hicks, Hope Holt, Lester Hunt, Jody Ivanov, Igor Ivanov, Sergei Kasowitz, Marc Katsyv, Denis Katsyv, Peter Kaveladze, Irakli (l ke) Kaverzina, Irina Kelly, John Khalilzad, Zalmay Kilimnik, Konstantin Kislyak, Sergey Klimentov, Denis Harm to Ongoing Matter Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis Manafort International LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine. Editor of the National Interest, the periodical that of?cially hosted candidate Trump?s April 2016 foreign policy speech. White House communications director (Aug. 2017 Mar. 2018) and press secretary for the Trump Campaign. NBC News anchor who interviewed President Trump on May 11, 2017. Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 Oct. 2017). President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that Ivanov advised on arranging a ?Moscow visit? for the Trump Campaign. Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime minister, and former FSB deputy director. In January 2016, Michael Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov. President Trump?s personal counsel (May 2017 July 2017). Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd. and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya. Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv. Harm to Ongoing Matter Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov?s deputy in the United States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. Employee of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election. White House chief of staff (July 2017 Jan. 20 9). US. special representative to Afghanistan and former US. ambassador. He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put together through the Center for the National Interest. Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russian intelligence. Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian senator from Mordovia. Employee of the New Economic School who informed high?ranking Russian government of?cials of Carter Page?s July 2016 visit to Moscow. B-S US. Department of Justice Klimentov, Dmitri Klokov, Dmitry Kobyakov, Anton Krickovie, Andrej Krylova, Aleksandra Kushner, Jared Kuznetsov, Sergey Landrum, Pete Lavrov, Sergey Ledeen, Barbara Ledeen, Michael Ledgett, Richard Lewandowski, Corey Luff, Sandra Lyovochkin, Serhiy Magnitsky, Sergei Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page?s July 2016 visit to Moscow. Executive for PJ SC Federal Grid Company of Uni?ed Energy System and former aide to Russia?s minister of energy. He communicated with Michael Cohen about a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and candidate Trump. Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation who invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Professor at the Higher School of Economics who recommended that Carter Page give a July 2016 commencement address in Moscow. Internet Research Agency employee who worked on ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014. President Trump?s son-in?law and senior advisor to the President. Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States who transmitted Vladimir Putin?s congratulations to President-Elect Trump for his electoral victory on November 9, 2016. Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016 meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative of Russia to the United Nations. Senate staffer and associate of Michael who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 US. presidential campaign period. Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign policy and national security matters. Deputy director ofthe National Security Agency (Jan. 2014 Apr. 2017); present when President Trump called Michael Rogers on March 26, 2017. Campaign manager for the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 June 2016). Legislative director for Senator Jeff Sessions; attended a September 2016 meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. Member of Ukrainian parliament and member of Ukrainian political party, Opposition Bloc Party. Russian tax specialist who alleged Russian government corruption and died in Russian police custody in 2009. His death prompted passage of B-6 US. Department of Justice Malloeh, Theodore (Ted) Manafort, Paul Jr. Mashburn, John McCabe, Andrew McCord, Mary McFarland, Kathleen (K.T.) McGahn, Donald (Don) Medvedev, Dmitry Melnik, Yuriy Mifsud, Joseph Miller, Matt Miller, Stephen Millian, Sergei Mnuchin, Steven Mijller?Maguhn, Andrew Nader, George Viktor the Magnitsky Act, which imposed ?nancial and travel sanctions on Russian of?cials. Chief executive of?cer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the Roosevelt Group. He was a London-based associate of Jerome Corsi. Trump campaign member (March 2016 Aug. 2016) and chairman and chief strategist (May 2016 Aug. 2016). Trump administration of?cial and former policy director to the Trump Campaign. Acting director ofthe FBI (May 2017 Aug. 2017); deputy director of the FBI (Feb. 2016 Jan. 2018). Acting Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 2016 May 2017). Deputy White House National Security Advisor (Jan. 2017 May 201 7). White House Counsel (Jan. 2017 Oct. 2018). Prime Minister of Russia. Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., who connected with George Papadopoulos on social media. Maltese national and former London-based professor who, immediately after returning from Moscow in April 2016, told George Papadopoulos that the Russians had ?dirt? in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016. Senior advisor to the President. Founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce who met with George Papadopoulos during the campaign. Secretary of the Treasury. Harm to Ongoing Matter Member of hacker association Chaos Computer Club and associate of Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. Advisor to the United Arab Emirates?s Crown Prince who arranged a meeting between Kirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition period. Russian military of?cer in command of a unit involved in Russian hack- and-release operations to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election. B-7 US. Department of Justice Oganov, Georgiy Oknyansky, Henry (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) Page, Carter Papadopoulos, George Parseale, Bradley Patten, William (Sam) Jr. Peskov, Dmitry Phares, Walid Pinedo, Richard Podesta, John Jr. Podobnyy, Victor Poliakova, Elena Polonskaya, Olga Pompeo, Michael Porter, Robert Priebus, Reince Prigozhin, Yevgeniy Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of investment company Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017. Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. He met with Roger Stone in May 2016. Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated pro- Russian views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow. Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had ?dirt? in the form of thousands of Clinton emails. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contact with Mifsud. Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign. Lobbyist and business partner of Konstantin Kilimnik. Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration. Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co?secretary general of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on CounterterroriSm (TAG). US. person who pleaded guilty to a single?count information of identity fraud. Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU. WiltiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 2016 campaign. Russian intelligence of?cer who interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen?s outreach about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016. Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with connections to Vladimir Putin. US. Secretary of State; director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Jan. 2017 Apr. 2018). White House staff secretary (Jan. 2017 Feb. 2018). White House chief of staff (Jan. 2017 July 2017); chair of the Republican National Committee (Jan. 2011 Jan. 2017). Head of Russian companies Concord-Catering and Concord Management and Consulting; supported and financed the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 US. presidential election. B-S US. Department of Justice Prikhodko, Sergei Prince, Erik Raffel, Josh Rasin, Alexei Rogers, Michael Rosenstein, Rod Rozov, Andrei Giorgi Ruddy, Christopher Rybicki, James Samochornov, Anatoli Sanders, Sarah Huckabee Sater, Felix Saunders, Paul J. Sechin, Igor Sessions, Jefferson 111 (Jeff) Shoygu, Sergey Simes, Dimitri First deputy head of the Russian Government Of?ce and former Russian deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Businessman and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential Transition Team of?cials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles to meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017. White House communications advisor (Apr. 2017 Feb. 2018). Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton. Director ofthe National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 May 2018). Deputy Attorney General (Apr. 2017 present); Acting Attorney General for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 Nov. 2018). Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Russian real-estate development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump Tower Moscow project in 2015. Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance, LLC who communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal. Chief executive of Newsmax Media and associate of President Trump. FBI chief of staff (May 2015 Feb. 2018). Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Vcselnitskaya and Trump Campaign of?cials. White House press secretary (July 2017 present). Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project. Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on outlines and logistics of candidate Trump?s April 2016 foreign policy speech. Executive chairman of Rosne?, a Russian?stated owned oil company. Attorney General (Feb. 2017 Nov. 2018); US. Senator (Jan. 1997 Feb. 2017); head ofthe Trump Campaign?s foreign policy advisory team. Russian Minister of Defense. President and chief executive of?cer of the Center for the National Interest. 13-9 U.S. Department of Justice Smith, Peter Spicer, Sean Stone, Roger Tillerson, Rex Timofeev, Ivan Trump, Donald Jr. Trump, Eric Trump, Ivanka Ushakov, Yuri Vikto rovich Vaino, Anton Van der Zwaan, Alexander Vargas, Catherine Vasilchenko, Gleb Veselnitskaya, Natalia Weber, Shlomo Yanukovych, Viktor Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. White House press secretary and communications director (Jan. 2017 July 2017). Advisor to the Trump Campaign Harm t0 Ongoing Matter U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 2017 Mar. 2018). Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 2016 with George Papadopoulos, attempting to arrange a meeting between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. President Trump?s son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials. President Trump?s son; trustee and executive vice president of the Trump Organization. President Trump?s daughter; advisor to the President and former executive vice president of the Trump Organization. Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United 'States; identified to the Presidential Transition Team as the proposed channel to the Russian government. Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Former attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher lom, worked with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates. Executive assistant to Jared Kushner. Internet Research Agency employee who engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act and was the principal speaker at the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower with Trump Campaign officials. Rector of the New Economic School (NBS) in Moscow who invited Carter Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016. Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul Manafort. US. Department ofJustice Yates, Sally Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017? Jan. 30, 2017); Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 10, 2015 Jan. 30, 2017). Yatsenko, Sergey Deputy chief ?nancial of?cer of Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy company, and associate of Carter Page. Zakharova, Maria Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair?s Information and Press Department who received noti?cation of Carter Page?s speech in July 2016 from Denis Klimentov. Zayed al Nahyan, Mohammed bin Alfa-Bank Center for the National Interest (CNI) Concord Crocus Group or Crocus International DCLeaks Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Democratic National Committee Duma Gazprom Global Energy Capital, LLC Global Partners in Diplomacy Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces. Entities and Organizations Russia?s largest commercial bank, which is headed by Petr Aven. U.S.?based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russia. publication, the National Interest, hosted candidate Trump?s foreign policy speech in April 2016. Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting, LLC and Concord Catering, which are Russian companies controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin. A Russian real-estate and property development company that, in 2013, hosted the Miss Universe Pageant, and from 2013 through 2014, worked with the Trump Organization on a Trump Moscow project. Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen documents during the 2016 US. presidential campaign period. Political committee working to elect Democrats to the House of Representatives; hacked by the GRU in April 2016. Formal governing body for the Democratic Party; hacked by the GRU in April 2016. Lower House of the national legislature of the Russian Federation. Russian oil and gas company majority-owned by the Russian government. Investment and management ?rm founded by Carter Page. Event hosted in partnership with the US. Department of State and the Republican National Convention. In 2016, Jeff Sessions and JD. Gordon delivered speeches at the event and interacted with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. B-ll U.S. Department of Justice - - . . . . Guccifer 2.0 I.C. Expert Investment Company Internet Research Agency (IRA) KLS Research LLC Kremlin LetterOne Link Campus University London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP) Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) New Economic School in Moscow (NES) Opposition Bloc Party of Regions Pericles Emerging Market Partners LLP Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Roscongress Founda?on Rosn eft Russian Direct Investment Fund Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. Russian real?estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow property. Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that engaged in an ?active measures? social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter Smith to further Smith?s search for Hillary Clinton emails. Of?cial residence of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian government. Company that includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members. During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt?s help to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team. University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. International law advisory organization in London that employed Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos. Russian Federation?s military intelligence agency. Moscow?based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July 2016 commencement ceremony. Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct Party of Regions. Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych. It was generally understood to align with Russian policies. Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund. Russian company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging the laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky. Russian entity that organized the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russian state-owned oil and energy company. Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011 and headed by Kirill Dmitriev. U.S. Department of Justice Russian International Affairs Council Silk Road Group St. Petersburg International Economic Forum Tatneft Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism Unit 26165 (GRU) Unit 74455 (GRU) Valdai Discussion Club WikiLeaks Russia-based nonpro?t established by Russian government decree. It is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its members include lvan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven. Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing agreement to build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia. Annual event held in Russia and attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen. Russian energy company. European group that sponsored a summit between European Parliament lawmakers and U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos, Sam Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG summit in July 2016. GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia. 1t engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government officials, including President Putin. Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online, including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government entities. Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. US. Department of Justice CNI DNC FBI FSB GEC GRU HPSCI HRC IRA LCILP NATO NES NSA ODNI PTT RDIF RIAC SBOE SCO SJ SSCI TAG Index of Acronyms Center for the National Interest . Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Democratic National Committee Federal Bureau of Investigation Russian Federal Security Service Global Energy Capital, LLC Russian Federation?s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff US. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hillary Rodham Clinton Internet Research Agency London Centre of International Law Practice North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Economic School National Security Agency Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence Presidential Transition Team Russian Direct Investment Fund Russian International Affairs Council State boards of elections Special Counsel?s Office US. Senate Judiciary Committee US. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism Vnesheconombank 3?14 U.S. Department of Justice . . Appendix US. Department of Justice US. Department ofJustice APPENDIX INTRODUCTORY NOTE The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions submitted to him by the Special Counsel?s Of?ce. We ?rst explain the process that led to the submission of written questions and then attach the President?s responses. Beginning in December 2017, this Of?ce sought for more than a year to interview the President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction?of-justice. We advised counsel that the President was a ?subject? of the investigation under the de?nition of the Justice Manual#?a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury?s investigation.? Justice Manual 9-1 1 .151 (2018). We also advised counsel that interview with the President is vital to our investigation? and that this Of?ce had ?carefully considered the constitutional and other arguments raised by . . . counsel, and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking an interview.?1 We additionally stated that ?it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public for an interview to take place? and offered ?numerous accommodations to aid the President?s preparation and avoid surprise.?2 After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel?s objective of securing the President?s testimony, these accommodations included the submissions of written questions to the President on certain Russia?related topics.3 We received the President?s written responses in late November 2018.4 In December 2018, we informed counsel of the insuf?ciency of those responses in several respects.5 We noted, among other things, that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he ?does not ?recall? or ?remember? or have an ?independent recollection?? of information called for by the questions.6 Other answers were ?incomplete or imprecise?? The written responses, we informed counsel, ?demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format, as we have had no opportunity to ask follow- up questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh your client?s recollection or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection.?8 We again requested an in-person interview, limited to certain topics, advising the President?s counsel that ?[t]his is the President?s 1 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 1. 2 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 1; see 7/30/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at (describing accommodations). 3 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 1 (submitting written questions). 4 11/20/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel?s Of?ce (transmitting written responses of Donald J. Trump). 5 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 3. 6 12/3/ 18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 3. 7 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 3; see (noting, ?for example,? that the President ?did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease . . . but he has since made public comments about that topic?). 3 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel?s Of?ce to the President?s Personal Counsel, at 3. C-1 U.S. Department ofJustice Attemey?Werlepfeduet opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of the evidence we have gathered.?9 The President declined.10 Ill'l Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered whether to issue a subpoena for his testimony. We viewed the written answers to be inadequate. But at that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially constitutional litigation, with resulting delay in ?nishing our investigation, against the anticipated bene?ts for our investigation and report. As explained in Volume 11, Section 11.B., we determined that the substantial quantity of in formation we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and credibility, which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation. 9 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President?s Personal Counsel. ?0 12/12/18 Letter, President?s Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel?s Of?ce, at 2. C-2 U. S. Department of Justice QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 3. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion. b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9 2016. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? if yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance ofthe discussion(s). When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government?s support for your candidacy? Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communicationls), and why you took that action. c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the "June 9 meeting?). Other than as set forth in your answers to La and lb, what, if anything, were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed about the meeting. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s). What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the meeting. C-3 U. S. Department of Justice A?emey?W-o?epfed-uet iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion. d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day were you in Trump Tower? i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? if yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the conversation. e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication. f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place afterJune 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you learned. g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part, am going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we?re going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons." i. Why did you make that statement? ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? What did you believe the sourcels) of that information would be? iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who? vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the sourcels) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If U. S. Department of Justice WW?Mayea?a?WWed?Prefm?P?w yes, describe the sourcels) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). II. Russian Hacking] Russian Efforts Using Social Media WikiLeaks a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substance of the information. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials. i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, other representatives of WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those communications. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "Russia, if you?re listening, I hope you?re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.? i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or individual? ii. in advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with anyone else about the substance of the statement? Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. C-5 U.S. Department of Justice e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks. i. Where were you on October 7, 2016? ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts. f. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone. i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr. Stone? ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told, from whom, and when. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when. h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). i. Were you aware ofany efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content of the discussion(s). C-6 US. Department of Justice The Trump Organization Moscow Project In October 2015, a "Letter of Intent,? a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the "Trump Moscow project"). i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project? By whom? What were you told about the project? ii. Did you sign the letter of intent? In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: ?To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.? Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that decision was made. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business interests, investments, or arrangements. C-7 Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign Prior to mid?August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort?s connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning this information. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any positions Ukraine or Russia would want the US. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those positions to you and the substance of those communications. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was involved? On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: ?We?ll be looking at that. Yeah, we?ll be looking.? Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia?s annexation of Crimea if you were elected? C-8 U.S. Department of Justice i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia?s annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s). V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10, 2016? if yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about why your presence was requested? i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event Following the Obama Administration?s imposition of sanctions on Russia in December 2016 ("Russia sanctions?), did you discuss with Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince Priebus, Jared Kushner, Erik Prince, or anyone else associated with the transition what should be communicated to the Russian government regarding the sanctions? If yes, describe who you spoke with about this issue, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG had conversations with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia?s response to the Russia sanctions. i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG have discussions with anyone from the Russian government about the Russia sanctions? ii. Were you told in advance of LTG December 29, 2016 conversation that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? if yes, describe who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If no, when and from whom did you learn of LTG December 29, 2016 conversation with Ambassador Kislyak? When did you learn of LTG and Ambassador Kislyak?s call on December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told? iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and December 31, 2016 calls between LTG and Ambassador Kislyak? Who told you and what were you told? At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell you or suggest to you that Russia?s decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions was attributable in any way to LTG communications with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the substance of what you were told. US. Department of Justice E. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that LTG phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG should deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you take this step? i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016? If yes, describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the discussions. Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that took place in December 2016? i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting. Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in January 2017? i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s). Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial line of communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of such an unofficial line of communication. US. Department of Justice RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in, Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3. 2016, and June 9, 2016. i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy? iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit If yes, describe who you communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s). and why you took that action. On June 9. 2016, Donald Trump, Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the ?June 9 meeting?). i. Other than as set forth in your answers to La and lb, what, if anything, were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when. and what you were informed about the meeting. ii. When did you learn that some ofthe individuals attending the June 9 meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s). C-ll U.S. Department of Justice What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the meeting. iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? lfyes, describe who you had that discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion. For the period June 6, 20l6 through June 9. 20l6, for what portion of each day were you in Trump Tower? i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016? lfyes. did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect ofthe June 9 meeting? lfyes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the conversation. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes. describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the communication. Did you learn ofany communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort. or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian of?cial or contact that took place after June 9. 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign? lfyes, describe who you learned this information from. when, and the substance of what you learned. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said. in part, am going to give a major speech on probably Monday ofnext week and we're going to be discussing all ofthe things that have taken place with the Clintons.? i. Why did you make that statement? ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons? What did you believe the source(s) ofthat information would be? iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting? v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? lfso, who? vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016? Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian US. Department of Justice Harm?Product government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? lfyes, describe the sourcets) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader. other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If yes. describe the source(s) of the information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s). Response to Question 1, Parts through 1 have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9, 2016 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed. or that Donald J. Trump, Jr., had other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June 9. 2016. Response to Question I, Part have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of 2016 I spent in Trump Tower. This was one ofmany busy months during a fast?paced campaign, as the primary season was ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign. 1 am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that was in New York City from June 6 9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower of?ce re?ect that 1 had various calls and meetings scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken place, they do indicate that was in Trump Tower during a portion of each ofthese working days, and I have no reason to doubt that was. When 1 was in New York City, I stayed at my Trump Tower apartment. My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that was outside Trump Tower during portions ofthese days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates was scheduled to leave Trump Tower in the early evening for Westchester where 1 gave remarks after winning the California, New Jersey. New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June 8, 2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son?s school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates 1 was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a fundraising luncheon at the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, 1 do not remember on what dates these events occurred, but 1 do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as scheduled on my calendar. Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities during these days. For example, 1 am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump U.S. Department of Justice A?cme?erk?Pred-uet??: National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. I remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening. At this point in time. I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall ifthat meeting took place. It was more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily. Response to Question I, Part I have no independent recollection of any communications 1 had with the Agalarov family or anyone I understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions. I have become aware of written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you. In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emails about a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday present, and emails regarding delivery ofa book written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Service. Response to Question I, Part (1) I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative ofthe Agalarov family, Robert Goldstone, Natalia Veselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar with), or anyone I understood to be a Russian of?cial. Response to Question I, Part In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries. I said, am going to give a major Speech on probably Monday of next week and we?re going to be discussing all ofthe things that have taken place with the Clintons.? In general, I expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton?s failed policies, the Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation, Mrs. Clinton?s improper use of a private server for State Department business, the destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton?s temperamental unsuitability for the of?ce ofPresident. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for the speech I expected to give ?probably? on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments. These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff C-14 U. S. Department of Justice with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including. in particular, information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer. The Pulse terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June I2, 2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more speci?cally to national security and terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire. and, as reported, opened with the following: This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President. especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her former Secret Service Agent. who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will be plenty of opportunity to discuss these important issues at a later time. and I will deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing threat ofterrorism inside ofour borders. I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton?s failings throughout the campaign. using the information prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016. ReSponse to Question I, Part have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government ?supported" my candidacy or ?opposed? the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However. I was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements about me. Response to Question I, Part I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader had provided, wished to provide. or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign. 11. Russian Hacking Russian Efforts Using Social Media WikiLeaks a. On June 14. 2016. it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14. 20 6. were you provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or email accounts ofthe DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substance ofthe information. US. Department of Justice On July 22, 20l 6, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic party of?cials. i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussi0n(s). ii. After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, other representatives of WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those communications. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: ?Russia, if you?re listening, I hope you?re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.? i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity, or individual? ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with anyone else about the substance of the statement? Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? lfyes, describe who provided this information, when, and what you were told. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks. i. Where were you on October 7, 2016? ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were told. ll C?l6 US. Department ofJustice .- - . . - Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign. including Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? lt?yes. identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts. Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign. including Roger Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly. with Wikil.eaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? lt?yes, describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts. when you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts. From June 1, 20l6 through the end of the campaign. how frequently did you communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature ol? your communication(s) with Mr. Stone. i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist your campaign, and what requests. if any. did you make of Mr. Stone? ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or. as far as you were aware. with anyone else associated with the campaign? lfyes. describe what you were told, from whom. and when. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks. or about Forthcoming releases of information? lfyes, describe what Stone told you and when. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 20l7, regarding a potential pardon or other action to bene?t Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with, when, and the content 01' the discussion(s). Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies. including those in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when. and the content of the discussion(s). Response to Question ll, Pa rt I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked. but my best recollection is that I learned ofthe hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject of media reporting. 1 do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the hacking ofany ot?the named entities or individuals before it became the subject ofmedia reporting. 01? US. Department ofJustice net-titerney?We-rlePred-uet Response to Question Part i recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about the possible hacking and release ofcampaign?related information and there was a lot oftalk about this matter. At the time. I was generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these issues with my campaign staff or others. but at this point in time more than two years later have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred. or who the participants were. Response to Question II, Part do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals named in Question ll (0) and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of the other individuals or entities referred to in the question. Response to Question Part 1 made the statement quoted in Question in jest and sarcastically. as was apparent to any objective observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the July 27. 2016 press conference. and 1 refer you to the publicly available transcript and video of that press conference. I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement in advance ofthe press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign ofany efforts by Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media reporting and have no recollection of any particular conversation in that regard. Response to Question II, Part was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7. 2016. have no recollection ofbeing told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr. Podesta?s emails was reported by the media. Likewise. have no recollection of being told that Roger Stone. anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyone associated with my campaign had communicated with Wikileaks on October 7. 20l6. Response to Question Part I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my campaign had discussions with any ofthe entities named in the question regarding the content or timing of release ofhacked emails. Response to Question Part I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no recollection ofthe speci?cs of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June I. 20l6 and 13 C-18 U.S. Department ofJustice WHWEWW November 8, 2016. 1 do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although 1 was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at the time. Response to Question II, Part I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to benefit Julian Assange. Response to Question 11, Part I do not recall being aware during the campaign of speci?c efforts by foreign individuals or companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies. IH. The Trump Organization Moscow Project a. 1n October 2015, a ?Letter ofIntent," a copy ofwhich is attached as Exhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ?Trump Moscow project"). i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project? By whom? What were you told about the project? ii. Did you sign the letter ofintent? b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: ?To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter ofintent in 20 I Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and the substance ofthe discussion(s). 0. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government of?cials, including of?cials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned. d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s). e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project 14 C-19 US. Department of Justice AttorneWerlePred-uet should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when. the substance of the discussion(s). and why that decision was made. f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with. when, and the substance of the discussion(s). g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other prospective or actual business interests, investments. or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes. describe the business interests, investments, or arrangements. Response to Question 111, Parts through Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility ofaTrump Organization project in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project ofa general type we have done in the past in a variety of locations. signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your questions as Exhibit which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with our ongoing efforts to expand into signi?cant markets around the world. I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were not memorable. was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion oftravel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time ofany communications between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government of?cial regarding the Letter of Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr. Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to ?Mr. Peskov" at a general, public email account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia. I understand those documents already have been provided to you. I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaign staff or Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but I have no current recollection of any particular conversation, with whom I may have spoken, when, or the substance of any conversation. As I recall, neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Intent. IV. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign 3. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government? If yes. describe who you learned this information from. when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or 15 C-20 US. Department ofJustice WW Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered brie?ngs on the progress of your campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, the substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning this information. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly. any positions Ukraine or Russia would want the US. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those positions to you and the substance ofthose communications. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian of?cials to meet with you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was involved? On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: ?We?ll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking." Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia?s annexation of Crimea if you were elected? i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia?s annexation of Crimea ifyou were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s). I Response to Question IV, Parts through Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates, including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. i knew that Mr. Manafort had done international consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the 16 C-21 U. S. Department of Justice Arte-mey?Werleproduet campaign, I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do not remember the speci?cs of what I knew at the time. had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafort or anyone else associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or of?cial. I do not remember Mr. Manafort communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Response to Question IV, Part (6) I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or with senior members of my campaign. In the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I became aware that on March 17, 20l6. my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff, received an email from 3 Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress. inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg international Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The documents show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents already have been produced to you. Response to Question IV, Part (D I have no recollection of the details of what. when, or from what source 1 ?rst learned about the change to the platform amendment regarding arming Uk1aine, but I generally recall learning of the issue as part of media reporting. 1 do not recall being involved in changing the language to the amendment. Response to Question IV, Part My statement did not communicate any position. V. Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10, 2016? If yes, who asked you to attend. when were you asked, and what were you told about about [sic] why your presence was requested? i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event. C-22 US. Department ofJustice Response to Question V, Part I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala, and I did not attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of documents indicating that in March of 2016, the president of the World Chess Federation invited the Trump Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship Match to be held in New York in November 2016. I have also become aware that in November 2016, there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament, which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been provided to you. Execut on 2018 DONA J. TRUMP President of the United States 18 C-23 US. Department of Justice US. Department of Justice Appendix US. Department of Justice US. Department of Justice APPENDIX SPECIAL OFFICE TRANSFERRED, REFERRED, AND COMPLETED CASES This appendix identi?es matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel?s Of?ce, as well as cases prosecuted by the Of?ce that are now completed. A. Transfers The Special Counsel?s Of?ce has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain matters assigned to the Of?ce by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as of the date of this report. After consultation with the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Of?ce has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those transfers include: 1. United States v. Biian Ra?ekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin US. Attorney ?s O?icefor the Eastern District of Virginia (Awaiting trial) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other things, possible criminal conduct by Michael in acting as an unregistered agent for the Government of Turkey. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, The Acting Attorney General later con?rmed the Special Counsel?s authority to investigate Ra?ekian and Alptekin because they ?may have been jointly involved? with in FARA?related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. On December 1, 2017, pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States. As part of that plea, agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) documents he ?led on March 7, 2017 ?contained materially false statements and omissions.? plea occurred before the Special Counsel had made a ?nal decision on whether to charge Ra?ekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018, after consultation with the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce referred the investigation of Ra?ekian and Alptekin to the National Security Division (N SD) for any action it deemed appropriate. The Special Counsel?s Of?ce determined the referral was appropriate because the investigation of had been completed, and that investigation had provided the rationale for the Of?ce?s investigation of Ra?ekian and Alptekin. At request, the Eastern District of Virginia continued the investigation of Ra?ekian and Alptekin. 2. United States v. Michael US. Attorney Officefor the District of Columbia (Awaiting sentencing) D?l U.S. Department of Justice 3. United States v. Richard Gates U.S. Attorney ?3 Office for the District ofColtimbia (Awaiting sentencing) 4. United States v. Internet Research Agency. et (Russian Social Media Campaign) U.S. Attorney?s O?ice for the District of Columbia National Security Division (Post?indictment, pre-arrest pre-trial?) 5. United States v. Konstantin Kilimnik. U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the District of Columbia (Post-indictment, pre?arrest) 6. United States v. Paul Manafort U.S. Attorney?s O??icefor the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney ?s O?ice for the Eastern District of Virginia (Post-conviction) 7. United States v. Viktor et a1. (Russian Hacking Operations) U.S. Attorney is O?ice for the Western District of National Security Division (Post-indictment, pre-arrest) 8. United States v. William Samuel Patten U.S. Attorney?s O?ice for the District ofCotumbia (Awaiting sentencing) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of Patten?s conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Of?ce. The investigation uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the District of Columbia handled the prosecution of Patten. 9, Harm to Ongoing Matter (Investigation ongoing) The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, The Acting Attorney General One defendant, Concord Management Consulting LLC, appeared through counsel and is in pre- trial litigation. U.S. Department of Justice later con?rmed the Secial Counsel?s authorit to investi_ate Harm t0 011901119 On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for Russia?backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the payments they received for work for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. During the course of its w, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce developed substantial evidence with respect to individuals and entities that wer Harm t0 Ongoing Matter . On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi- object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were dismissed.3 Thereafter, in consultation with the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce closed the and referred them for further investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Of?ce based its decision to close those matters on its mandate, the indictments of Manafort, Gates?s plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate its resources, among other reasons; At Harm to Ongoing Matter continued the investigation of those closed matters. 10. United States v. Roger Stone U.S. Attorney is O?icefbr the District of Columbia (Awaiting trial) 1 Harm to Ongoing Matter (Investigation ongoing) B. Referrals During the course of the investigation, the Of?ce periodically identi?ed evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel?s jurisdiction established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with the Of?ce of the Deputy Attorney General, the Of?ce referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed 2 Harm to Ongoing Matter 3 Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia. See Vol. 1, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here. alphabetically by subject, are summarized below. Harm to Ongoing Matter 2. Michael Cohen During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce uncovered evidence of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was referred to the U.S. Attorney?s Office for the Southern District of New York and the New York Field Office. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 5. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher lom LLP During the course of the PARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special Counsel?s Of?ce uncovered evidence of potential ARA violations pertaining to Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher Flom LLP (Skadden), and their work on behalf of the government of Ukraine. After consultation with the NSD, the evidence regarding Craig was referred to NSD, and NSD elected to partner with the U.S. Attorney?s Of?ce for the Southern District of New York and the New York Field Office. NSD later elected to partner on the Craig matter with the U.S. Attorney?s Office for the District of Columbia. NSD retained and handled issues relating to Skadden itself. 6. rat? Harm to Ongoing Matter 13-4 U.S. Department of Justice Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 13-i?_ Harm to Ongoing Matter U.S. Department of Justice Ademey?Werk?Pred-uet Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter C. Completed Prosecutions In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel?s Office, the defendants have completed or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedings are likely in any case, responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other of?ce or component. 1. United States v. George Papadopoulos Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December 7, 2018) 2. United States v. Alex van der Zwaan Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018) 3. United States V. Richard Pinedo Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May 13, 2019) D-6