

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Admiral William Moran, USN
Nominee for Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations

Duties and Responsibilities

Section 8033 of title 10, U.S. Code, describes the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations and requires that the officer nominated for appointment to the position have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training and equipping forces that will be provided to combatant, fleet and component commanders; serves as the primary maritime advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense; is the senior Uniformed Leader of the Department of the Navy; and represents the Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?

Serving in the Navy for 38 years has afforded me the opportunity to gain broad naval and joint experiences. The highlight of my experiences were opportunities to command at the operational squadron, wing and group level. At the joint level, I've served as the Executive Assistant to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and in my current position I work closely with my partners from across the services. Most recently I had the honor to serve as the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, which has given me the opportunity to interact with Sailors and Marines, the other services and my navy counterparts from allied and partner nations.

Do you meet the joint duty requirements for this position?

Yes, I meet the Joint requirements for this position.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations, particularly in regard to serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assisting the Secretary of the Navy in performing certain acquisition-related functions?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions and assessments with key Navy personnel, U.S. Government agencies, and subject matter experts outside the government in preparation for this assignment. Should I be confirmed as CNO, I will commit to open dialogue with seniors, subordinates and the civilian chain of command, as well as continuous, data-driven, and rigorous assessment of our readiness and the strategic environment.

If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense in your role as a member of the Armed Forces Policy Council?

If confirmed, I will provide my best professional military advice to the Secretary of Defense whenever asked, in any venue. I do not believe any one person has a monopoly on new ideas; innovation is a team sport. I consider it my responsibility, if confirmed, to share any and all original ideas to improve the combat effectiveness of our force and with the Secretary of Defense and my counterparts in the other Services.

If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of the Navy for enhancing the organization, training, and equipping of the Navy?

In my experience, the best ideas often come from both the least expected and most expected places, simultaneously. I will continue to look for ideas, no matter the source that allow us to fully exploit the potential resident in our people, our processes and our capabilities.

What are your goals, if confirmed, for the transformation of the Navy to meet new and emerging threats?

If confirmed, I intend to continue on a path toward a more agile, more sustainable, more capable naval force. We will prioritize our readiness for high-end combat, continue the modernization of key capabilities, evolve new and existing operational concepts, and develop adaptable, sustainable, resilient methods of force employment to meet the demands of the global strategic environment and provide military options to national leadership across the spectrum of rivalry. As with any organization, the key enablers to this effort will be the creativity, talent and dedication of our uniformed and civilian workforce.

In successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 and culminating in FY 2019, Congress expanded and refined the acquisition-related functions of the Chief of Naval Operations.

If confirmed, how would you assist the Secretary of the Navy in the performance of certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring compatibility with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (as established in title 10, U.S. Code, sections 8014 and 8016)?

If confirmed, I intend to maintain a close partnership with ASN(RDA), working to identify potential improvements to requirements determination, resource allocation and acquisition management processes for the Secretary of the Navy, while ensuring the combat readiness of naval forces.

If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations—

What actions would you take to improve all three aspects of the acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

It is no secret that the requirements, acquisition and budgeting aspects of the acquisition process have not kept pace with the changing operational environment. If confirmed, I look forward to a collaborative and frank relationship within the Department of the Navy and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress and industry about how we can prudently and more aggressively get the best capabilities in the hands of our Sailors and the best value for the American taxpayer.

What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

Properly defining operational and technical requirements requires discipline. If confirmed, I will continue to review requirements policies, processes standards and practices to identify opportunities for improvement.

What specific measures would you recommend to control “requirements creep” in the defense acquisition system?

We owe the American taxpayer discipline in all aspects of the acquisition process. A disciplined requirements process, based on capabilities instead of platforms and involving a robust cycle of prototyping, experimentation, exercise, and war gaming, is critical.

How would you utilize your authority to arrest the exponential escalation in cost that, in recent history, has marked the acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms and weapons systems?

If confirmed, I will work alongside ASN(RDA) to ensure discipline and prudence in the acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms. This is an area that has my personal attention, as balance between acquisition of new technologies and current readiness of our forces is one of the most difficult tradeoffs we make in budgeting and achieving this balanced will have my full attention if confirmed.

In your view, in whom should accountability for large-scale acquisition failures and/or extraordinary cost overruns vest?

Authority and accountability must be aligned in order for leadership to succeed in any setting. I believe accountability for acquisition failures lies with those who have the authority to manage them.

In your view, are the roles and responsibilities in the acquisition process now assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations and the other Service Chiefs appropriate? Are there other acquisition-related roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Service Chiefs?

I believe the roles and responsibilities assigned to the CNO and other Service Chiefs are appropriate. Should my opinion change, I would work together with the Department and Congress to recommend changes.

A natural tension exists between the objectives of major defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications—the objective of the test and evaluation function.

Has the Secretary of the Navy assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations responsibility for those aspects of the function of research and development relating to test and evaluation? If so, how would you exercise this responsibility, if confirmed?

In Section 0405 of the United States Navy Regulations, authorized by 10 USC 6011, the Secretary of the Navy delegates authority and responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations to determine requirements of naval forces and activities including research, development, test, and evaluation.

If confirmed, as the Chief of Naval Operations, I would execute this assigned responsibility by planning and providing for testing and evaluation which is adequate and responsive to immediate requirements and long-range objectives, as balanced and prioritized by fiscal constraints and operational demands. In performing this assignment, I will coordinate with and provide assistance to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) in the review and appraisal of the overall Navy program to ensure fulfillment of stated requirements.

What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate test and evaluation?

Reducing program cycle times is important to remain technologically relevant and to provide timely solutions to our warfighters in a world of rapidly increasing and evolving threats. The right balance must be reached between cycle times, prototyping, and testing capabilities to ensure that those capabilities will not fail our warfighters and get to the field more rapidly. Important to this balance is reducing the bureaucratic burden slowing the testing community while still maintaining adequate testing to ensure data exists to make sound decisions during product development.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it appropriate to procure weapon systems and equipment that have not been demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

Thorough test and evaluation is important to capturing suitability and effectiveness of deficiencies before systems are fielded and employed in service. Test and evaluation is a crucial component of the acquisition process, and provides assurance that equipment is effective and suitable for the missions they are being procured to fulfill. I concur with Secretary Lord's (USD A&S) assessment that there are areas the Department can reduce the level of testing and rigor to expedite fielding of capability. Specifically, in the procurement of equipment where a robust and mature commercial market exists, there is an opportunity to leverage existing test and user data to support reduced government testing and expedited fielding.

What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

Congress has provided a series of management tools and authorities to include alternative and rapid acquisition pathways, better access to commercial and non-traditional suppliers, and provisions to improve acquisition agility and field new technologies more rapidly. However, these new approaches still require systems to be operationally relevant to our warfighters. Test and evaluation of all systems, regardless of acquisition approaches, is critical. The Navy continues to look for ways to get new capabilities to Sailors faster, to shorten feedback loops and rapidly iterate. If confirmed, I will support and if necessary further expand such efforts.

Are you satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and infrastructure?

I am satisfied that the Navy's test and evaluation organizations are postured correctly to provide the appropriate level of testing and testing oversight for Navy systems. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continually assess the current approach, with the goal of ensuring that the Navy's T&E infrastructure is adequately funded and managed to provide T&E infrastructure capability to satisfy high priority T&E requirements.

In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?

The fielding of new and complex capabilities will continue to rely on live, virtual, and constructive test and evaluation capabilities to ensure that the technology is ready to move forward. If confirmed, I will continue to assess and recommend the most efficient and cost effective methods to ensure we are fielding operationally relevant, suitable, and survivable capabilities.

If confirmed, how would you accelerate the development of these new capabilities?

I believe that the current live, virtual, and constructive test and evaluation capabilities support current Navy programs. However, if confirmed, I will continue to evaluate their effectiveness, especially as new technologies emerge.

What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Navy systems?

Congress established the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE) to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapon systems. As such, DOTE has a unique relationship with Congress. If confirmed, I will ensure Navy developmental and operational testing organizations, as well as Navy program offices, work closely with OSD in the testing and assessment of Navy systems.

Section 8033 provides that "subject to the authority, direction, and control of the

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations shall exercise supervision, consistent with the authority assigned to commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. . .over such of the members and organizations of the Navy and the Marine Corps as the Secretary determines.”

Over which members and organizations of the Navy and Marine Corps has the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Operations to exercise supervision and what is the scope of such supervision?

In Section 0405 of the United States Navy Regulations, authorized by 10 USC 6011, the Secretary of the Navy delegates authority and responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations to command and supervise the operating forces and shore activities of the Navy. The scope of this authority is broad and includes recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, de-mobilizing, and investigating and reporting upon the efficiency of naval forces. The scope of this authority includes matters essential to naval administration including security, intelligence, discipline, communications, and matters related to the customs and traditions of the Naval service.

In addition, the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for maintaining a high degree of competence among Navy officer, enlisted and civilian personnel in necessary fields of specialization through education and training, ensuring equal opportunities for personal advancement, and maintaining the morale and motivation of Navy personnel and the prestige of a Navy career. The Chief of Naval Operations will also plan and provide for health care for personnel of the naval service (along with their dependents and eligible beneficiaries); direct the organization administration, training, and support of the Naval Reserve; and supervise the maintenance of discipline, readiness, and effectiveness and economy of Naval forces.

If confirmed, how would you exercise meaningful supervision of such members and organizations, while ensuring compatibility with the authorities of the combatant commanders?

Within the scope of my statutory and delegated authorities, I would embrace my leadership and supervisory role with the same sense of urgency that I approach readiness, training, and lethality. Demanding accountability at all levels of the chain-of-command, I would promote a culture of continuous learning that rewards character and requires constant personal and organizational improvement. Accomplishing the mission at the expense of our values is never an option; it will not enable long-term success. In order to safeguard the trust and confidence of the Congress, the public, and the Fleet, I would foster an environment of transparent and forthright leadership that raises standards of personal and professional conduct by competing with character in everything we do. Always maintaining our collective and individual values while strengthening the Navy's moral compass, I would assertively and decisively lead the Navy team in accomplishing our mission.

In addition to the duties enumerated in section 8033, the law provides that the Chief of Naval Operations shall perform such other military duties as are assigned to him by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Navy.

In light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), what other military duties do you anticipate the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Navy will assign to you, if confirmed?

If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, I would expect the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined in Section 8033 to ensure that the Navy is appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to meet its institutional obligations and force provider responsibilities.

If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities will you assign to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations?

By law, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations is the principal deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations and is entrusted to assume the duties and responsibilities of the CNO in his or her absence. If confirmed, I will work with the incoming Vice Chief to appropriately assign additional responsibilities as necessary and appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Section 921 of the FY 2017 NDAA made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code, concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

What is your assessment of the authorities of, and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?

The authorities and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs provide military advice to civilian leaders is appropriate and sufficient to its purpose.

If confirmed, would you have any hesitance in providing your best military advice to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

No.

Use of Military Force

In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President on the use of military force?

If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice, taking into consideration the nature of the

threat to our national security and vital interests, whether non-military means have been exhausted, the importance of a defined and militarily achievable political end state, and our ability to use force consistent with U.S. and international law.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force and rules of engagement?

The appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to provide professional military judgment, advice, and opinions to the Chairman, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the President; to act as a conduit for clear guidance to our military from the Secretary and President on its operational role and its rules of engagement; and to maintain a dialogue with Combatant Commanders, who provide recommendations on the above as well as recommended courses of action.

Do you agree with the interpretations and applications of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) made by both the Obama and Trump administrations?

The United States has been in an armed conflict against al-Qaeda and its associated forces since 11 September 2001. The AUMF still serves as the legal basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these threats.

In your view, are extant policies and processes for determining which forces of other nations are eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces, and under what conditions, adequate and appropriate?

U.S. forces are required to following the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The SROE makes clear that only the President or the Secretary of Defense can authorize collective self-defense in a mission, operation, or theatre. Whether collective self-defense is authorized reflects a careful assessment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of what authorities are necessary to accomplish a mission.

Does the training of U.S. forces authorized to engage in the Collective Self-Defense of the forces of another nation accurately convey to the level of tactical execution the scope and limits of any Collective Self-Defense authorized?

Both the Services and the Combatant Commanders conduct training of their forces on the law of war and the rules of engagement. Unit commanders at all levels are required to ensure that their units are trained on and understand the rules of engagement and their application, including use of realistic problem sets during exercises and training on any authorized collective self-defense. Qualified legal advisors at all appropriate levels of command are involved in the planning and execution of such training.

According to the 2018 NDS, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) will allow for the more “flexible use [of] ready forces to shape proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.”

If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, what role will you play in authorizing the use of naval forces for DFE missions?

DFE is a planning framework that helps DoD maintain and agile and responsive military capability to respond to emerging threats. If confirmed, my role as a Service Chief would include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense on force posture, to include DFE.

Relationships

The law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chief of Naval Operations and other officials and organizations of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations to each of the following:

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. As a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will provide my best professional military advice and equivalent levels of support to the Deputy Secretary as I would to the Secretary.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

Within the functional areas under their cognizance, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, and recommend policies to the Secretary. If confirmed as CNO, I will ensure a consistent exchange of information with the Under Secretaries to inform my communications with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide my best professional military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he or she must work with and through the Chairman in the execution of their duties. If confirmed, I will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and—along with the other Service Chiefs—offering professional military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When serving as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman has the same duties and responsibilities as the Chairman. If confirmed, I will share my views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including critical issues affecting naval programs and naval readiness.

The Secretary of the Navy

The CNO is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy. CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the development of plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the Navy. The CNO, under the Secretary of the Navy, is also responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support combatant commanders' mission accomplishment. The Navy benefits from a collaborative atmosphere within the Department of the Navy, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy to preserve it.

The Under Secretary of the Navy

The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as prescribed by the Secretary. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close working relationship with the Under Secretary in furtherance of the Navy's mission.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition

The principal duty of the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition is the overall supervision of research, development, acquisition, and sustainment (including maintenance) matters of the Navy. As with the Under Secretary, he or she will also perform such other duties as the Secretary may direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition to achieve the Secretary's goals. Collaboration between the CNO and the ASN-RDA is critical to ensure the resources are applied to the fulfilling of the most critical requirements to ensure their prompt fielding.

The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy

The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercise such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.

The General Counsel of the Navy

The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and

performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

The Inspector General of the Navy

The Naval Inspector General, when directed, inquires into any matter that affects the discipline or military efficiency of the Department of the Navy. He or she also conducts such inspections, investigations, and reports as the Secretary of the Navy or the CNO may direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Naval Inspector General to ensure he or she has all the support and direction needed in order to carry out their important mandate.

The Judge Advocate General of the Navy

The Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy is the Department of the Navy's senior uniformed attorney, performing duties relating to any legal matter affecting the Department of Navy as the Secretary of the Navy may assign. Except for the services provided by the General Counsel, the JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy. It is imperative that the CNO receive independent legal advice, and if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the JAG and seeking legal counsel.

The Chief of the Navy Reserve

The Chief of the Navy Reserve serves on the CNO's staff and serves both as the CNO's principal adviser on Navy Reserve matters and as commander of the Navy Reserve Force. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the capabilities and synergies between the Active and Reserve Component forces.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Navy and Marine Corps are inextricably linked through our personnel programs, capabilities, operational requirements, and shared history. Our forces deploy together, and are ready on arrival. If confirmed as CNO, I will be committed to making every facet of the Navy-Marine Corps team better and strengthening my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force

Our Military Services must work together to recognize each other's strengths and to synergize each other's capabilities. We must achieve and maintain optimal collaboration in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service is postured for effective joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my counterparts to enhance joint interoperability, readiness, and operational effectiveness.

The Chief, National Guard Bureau

As with other active duty and reserve forces, the Navy must collaborate with the National Guard to ensure seamless joint operations. The unique authorities under which the National Guard operates makes it imperative that the Navy and the Guard work closely together to achieve and maintain competency in warfare, training, and procurement, which will ensure successful future operations. If confirmed as CNO, I will continue working with the National Guard to enhance interoperability, readiness, and operational effectiveness.

The Combatant Commanders

The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the Combatant Commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the Combatant Commanders.

The Navy Component Commanders of the Combatant Commands

The Navy is committed to providing the most capable and lethal forces—properly organized, trained, and equipped—to the Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I will ensure our Component Commanders receive the best Sailors, equipment, and training to execute their given missions.

The Secretary of Homeland Security

The Departments of Homeland Security and Defense have unique missions, with a great need for alignment in areas such as cybersecurity, maritime security, and in reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. As the threats to our homeland evolve, both Departments must work together to address those threats. If confirmed, and when properly directed, I will work with the Secretary of Homeland Security and continually examine how the Navy can best leverage our capabilities to support that goal.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard

Historically, the Navy has enjoyed a unique relationship with the Coast Guard. As with the Navy's relationship to the Department of Homeland Security, when properly directed, the Navy must closely work with the Coast Guard on important national security objectives. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commandant of the Coast Guard to ensure that our forces are prepared should an emergent situation require the Coast Guard to operate as a Service in the Navy.

Major Challenges and Priorities

What is your vision for the Navy of today? For the Navy of the future?

My vision for the Navy of today and the Navy of the future, consistent with the Code of Federal Regulations, is to deliver a combat credible maritime force, ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. Naturally, there is a near-term requirement to

deliver this force and a long-term requirement to ensure we can deliver combat credible forces in the future. The tension between current and future readiness is the primary challenge for any CNO. If confirmed, I will apply a lens of trust, balance, and stability to achieve this vision.

What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations?

As stated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition from China and Russia, amid persistent challenges to international order. In this strategic landscape, we also face an urgent imperative to adapt to rapid technological advancements and avoid further erosion of our competitive military advantage. Algorithms and machine learning have become commodities, accessible to our adversaries and with the potential to accelerate the pace of military operations beyond what our systems were built to confront. We need to get faster - across the entire service - in order to inject uncertainty into our competitors' decision cycle and become better at competing across the full spectrum of rivalry. The adaptability and agility of our people, both uniform and civilian, are key to responding to this central challenge.

What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Given the changing security environment and the increasingly multi-domain nature of threats, accelerating our Navy's digital transformation will be critical to preparing our Sailors to deter, fight and win. Digital technologies have the potential to be a force multiplier, putting data at the center of all of our decisions and transforming how we fight, stay ready, and conduct business operations. We are on the path of a fundamental cultural and behavioral shift that we need to accelerate; we cannot afford to cede the competitive space of data and technology to our adversaries. Leveraging a deliberate cycle of prototyping, experimentation, exercises, and war games, we will accelerate our ability to adapt and rapidly develop the systems and processes we need to fight at the speed of information. That information will enable new ways of doing business that will spread across the Navy, our sister services, and our partners.

If confirmed, I will work alongside the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, Congress, and my partners in the other Services to address these and any other challenges to our nation's security.

Given the major challenges you identified above, what other priorities would you set for your term as Chief of Naval Operations, if confirmed?

If confirmed, my priorities flow from the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. To meet my responsibilities as Chief of Naval Operations, I intend to focus on ensuring our Sailors are warfighters first, well equipped and confident in their training, leadership and capacity to meet all tasking in service to our nation. Developing the confidence and decisiveness of our Navy team is critical to fielding a combat credible maritime force. As CNO, I would focus on ensuring our teams have all that they need to develop that confidence, which comes naturally when equipment, processes and decisions are rigorously tested in the most challenging operational environments.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus the Navy's efforts on each of these priorities?

If confirmed, my approach to these priorities will be consistent with the method I've employed throughout my career. First, we must maintain trust through transparency, accountability and clearly defined goals. This trust is critical to our ability to work within the Navy team, with our Joint partners and allies, with civilian leadership and ultimately with the American public. Second, I will focus on stability – stable funding, predictable schedules, fair opportunities and principled decision making. Stability provides a platform from which our Navy Sailors and civilians can best compete amidst a changing international environment. While prioritizing trust and stability, I will also seek balance between maintaining today's readiness and developing tomorrow's emerging capabilities and future readiness.

If confirmed, focusing on our warfighters first is an important priority. To remain competitive for talent in the economy and to help our Sailors compete against the adversary, we will continue the modernization of our personnel management and training systems. Our Sailors and civilians deserve mobile, modernized systems that allow us to target retention efforts, deliver training at the point of need and make better use of the resources we have to take care of our people. Warfighters are trusted, resilient, and decisive in action; professionals who lead with character and competence. Our mission is building a Navy that outthinks, outmaneuvers and out fights every rival. Our people are key to this endeavor.

I am proud of the capable force we deliver on station around the world, but believe we have work to ensuring our platforms are connected and interoperable as part of the Joint Force. Our Distributed Maritime Operations operational concept depends on resilient networks and rapidly shared information. We must rapidly deliver an operational architecture, including networks, data standards and analytic tools that allow for faster and more accurate decisions, even in the fog of war. Innovative new platforms, new technologies that facilitate integration, and new capabilities are all critical to providing a Navy ready for any challenge.

As VCNO, one of my central responsibilities is assessing and reforming the readiness of our naval forces. We have made important advances in the safety and effectiveness of our operations, but I am not satisfied that we have institutionalized the lessons learned from developing those advances. As we have discovered through our efforts with the Readiness Reform Oversight Council, our Naval Sustainment System and our Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, among other initiatives, we have many opportunities to use resources more effectively, to better serve our Sailors and our mission.

To the extent the Navy has functions that overlap with those of other DOD Components, what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?

If confirmed, I will work alongside my counterparts in other DoD Components to evaluate, consolidate and reduce redundancies, where appropriate and prudent.

2018 National Defense Strategy

The 2018 NDS moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DOD on a “2 + 3 framework.” That framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally, the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S. and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the NDS is an accurate reflection of what we as the Navy are seeing every day. It focuses our efforts and provides the Navy with clear objectives. The United States is in a strategic competition for global influence with China and Russia. This great power competition is the central security challenge for the United States. At the same time, North Korea and Iran continue to threaten the security and stability of their respective regions while VEOs remain a persistent problem.

Does the 2018 NDS properly focus the United States on preparing to compete, deter, and win against the range of threats it identifies? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the NDS identifies the reemergence of long-term strategic competition as the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security and acknowledges the challenges that China and Russia pose to our military advantage.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS specify the correct set of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its security objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential military conflict with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

The NDS focuses on modernizing capabilities to maintain our competitive advantage in areas such as space and cyber warfare, nuclear forces, missile defense, and autonomous systems. Our areas of risk are where we perceive our advantages eroding, and I would be happy to discuss that in more detail in a classified setting.

Is the Navy adequately sized, structured, and resourced to implement the 2018 NDS and the associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.

The FY 2020 President’s Budget provides for a Navy that is right-sized and structured to implement the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans. This funding, if stable and predictable will help us fulfill our responsibilities by building a balanced force that will increase America’s naval power and safeguard our economic, diplomatic, and military interests around

the world.

If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls in the Navy’s ability to meet the demands placed on it by the 2018 NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?

If confirmed, my priority will be to continue our progress towards higher levels of readiness, personnel retention, and high-quality training that prepares the force to implement the 2018 NDS. Restoring readiness and advancing our lethality through modernization is essential. In addition, growing our fleet is paramount for competing in great power competition. Congress made a 355-ship Navy the law of the land, and increased capacity in our fleet will strengthen our ability to prevail in any warfighting contingencies, meet demand signals from Combatant Commanders, expand global influence, and support American prosperity by safeguarding access to critical markets, waterways, and chokepoints.

If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Secretary of the Navy to make in the Navy’s implementation of the 2018 NDS?

If confirmed, I will continue to restore readiness, while establishing a path for improving capabilities, and strengthening our network of alliances and partners. Any adjustments or changes from that path will come from future analysis of our implementation progress.

Does the Navy have the requisite analytic capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, in developing and implementing the force structure, sizing, and shaping plans required to position the Navy to execute the operational plans associated with the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

Ensuring that the Navy has the requisite force structure, size, and shaping plans to execute the NDS requires a strong analytic foundation. We continue to invest in our analytic capabilities (e.g., people, skill sets, and tools) to look across our portfolios and make the data-driven decisions needed for force design, development and allocation.

Overall Readiness of the Navy

How would you assess the current readiness of the Navy—across the domains of material and equipment, personnel, and training—to execute the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?

The current readiness of the Navy is improving. For example, we have moved shipboard readiness from “safe to operate” to achieve “effective operations.” We have been able to leverage the additional funding provided by Congress for readiness since 2017 to enhance ship and aircraft depot maintenance, buy more spare parts, and increase manpower to improve fit and fill while also hiring critical civilian personnel. We are in the process of aligning shipyard throughput to capacity to get more maintenance availabilities completed on time and ships sent back to the operational Fleet. We are seeing an increase in mission capable strike fighter aircraft and are modifying our processes to get improved performance to specific readiness recovery

plans across naval aviation. Still, readiness recovery is a long term effort. It is too early to declare victory. We depend on Congress for stable, predictable funding to achieve our current readiness goals and the appropriate balance between current and future readiness.

In your view, what are the priority missions for which *current and future* Navy forces should be trained and ready in the context of day-to-day activities, as well as for contingencies?

The character of modern warfare is changing to a multi-domain battlespace with significant emphasis on space, electronic, information and cyber domains. Consequently, the need to conduct increased and different missions in these domains drives a requirement to increase our associated skills. The priority missions for the current and future Navy are: sea control, power projection, deterrence, and presence.

In what specific ways has the Navy utilized its increased budgetary authority over the past two years to foster readiness recovery across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training?

With the additional FY 2017-2019 funding and FY 2019 budget stability, Navy has halted the decline in readiness and is working towards recovery. Increased funding for aviation spares and air depot maintenance, in combination with process improvements have begun to move the needle on aviation readiness. We are on track to meet the Secretary of Defense's 80% Mission Capability (MC) goal for F/A-18 E/F by the end of FY 2019. With additional funding, we accelerated hiring at the Naval shipyards, meeting the FY 2020 goal of 36,100 Civilian Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) one year early in FY 2019. We have significantly decreased parts backlogs in Operating Target (OPTAR) accounts, and added tens of thousands of additional repair parts to our afloat storerooms. With increased funding we have invested in Live-Virtual-Construction (LVC) support of Fleet training wholeness, providing enhanced in-port or at-sea synthetic training against high-end threats. Surface warfare reforms and training improvements following the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions were assigned the highest funding priority. As a result, we are closing manning gaps at-sea, increasing fleet skills and expertise by expanding and improving trainers and simulators, and better managing force generation and force employment through the reestablishment of 2nd Fleet and stand-up of Naval Surface Group Western Pacific.

We are seeing important initial indicators of progress, readiness remains a long-game, and will require years of run-time, and stable and predictable funding to fully recover readiness.

If confirmed, what would you do to restore full spectrum Navy readiness, and under what timelines?

With three years of increased stable funding levels, we have halted the decline in readiness and are beginning to see signs of progress. If confirmed, I would continue to press for stable and sustained increased funding, which are essential drivers to maintain the steady path to full readiness recovery by the mid-2020s. I will continue to use a holistic approach by balancing investments in personnel, equipment, supply, ordnance, networks, and infrastructure, while also employing reforms to improve performance and effective use of resources.

If confirmed, how would you oversee compliance by the Navy with your timelines to ensure that readiness goals are met?

If confirmed, I would oversee compliance through already existing boards and readiness reporting means. The Navy has a series of three and four Star Flag Officer review boards such as the Fleet Commanders Readiness Council that meet on a routine basis to review and discuss readiness standards, goals and degraders. In addition to these forums, Navy has initiated a new effort, Performance to Plan (P2P). P2P is focused on readiness issues and developing specific plans to improve specific readiness elements. Through quarterly four Star-level forums, Navy leadership assesses and measures performance to readiness plans, identifies barriers to recovery and swarms the problem to improve performance. An important enabler to the success of P2P is architecting a data environment of authoritative, verifiable and easily accessible readiness data. If confirmed, I intend to continue P2P and other standing readiness forums, while evaluating whether other oversight mechanisms might be appropriate.

Does the Navy have the requisite analytic capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, in measuring readiness to execute the broad range of potential Navy missions—from low-intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted high intensity fights—envisioned by 2018 NDS and associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.

Analytic capability is comprised of people, skill sets, and tools. Recognizing the need to increase the pace and transparency of decision making and reduce the cost of generating readiness, we intend to grow all three of these pillars in the quickest and most efficient way possible. Building broad analytic capability across the Navy in support of sustainable readiness will allow us to fully leverage the potential inherent in networked digital systems, and technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning across warfare, readiness and business functions.

National Security Budget Reductions/Sequestration

The discretionary caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be in effect for FYs 2020 and 2021. Absent a budget agreement, the Department will not receive adequate or on-time funding. Continuing resolutions are likely and sequestration remains a possibility.

How does this budget uncertainty affect the Navy, in your view?

Budget uncertainty is highly detrimental to the Navy. We must outpace our competition, but budgetary uncertainty and the persistent threat of Continuing Resolutions (CRs) slows our ability to compete across all domains and disrupts our modernization plans. Typically, CRs lock the Department, which is tasked with acting in real time to defend our nation's interests in a rapidly changing global security environment, into last year's budget with last year's priorities. CRs prohibit new starts and production rate increases above previous year levels, and the movement of funds between appropriations is constrained. This induces risk in our readiness to conduct

operations. O&M funding held to prior-year spending levels forces the Navy to make decisions to prioritize the use of available funding to meet urgent and critical needs. Maintenance is deferred and the purchase of repair parts is delayed, disrupting sustainment and training schedules and resulting in increased costs and inefficiency from sub-optimized work schedules.

In your assessment, what would be the effects of continued application of the BCA discretionary caps through 2021 on the Navy? What would be the specific implications for the Navy's implementation of the 2018 NDS?

If BCA caps are left in place, and sequestration were to occur in FY 2020, without OCO increases, there would be severe impacts to the Navy's readiness recovery and its path to a larger, more capable fleet. This will result in a smaller, less lethal force requiring a revision of the National Defense Strategy. In short, the Navy would be hard pressed to meet current operational requirements or plan for future contingencies.

The President's Budget for FY 2020 requests \$576 Billion in base DOD funding, coupled with \$174 Billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Together, the proposed base and OCO request reflect a total budgetary increase of less than 3% in *real growth* over the FY 2019 defense budget. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission—supported by then-Secretary of Defense Mattis and Chairman Dunford—recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Do you believe that the Navy requires 3-5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP in order to implement effectively the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

Stable, predictable funding is the most important key to fulfilling Navy's responsibilities as outlined in the National Defense Strategy. As we build to a threat-based Force Structure Assessment requirement of 355 ships, consistent annual funding in the shipbuilding account is needed to support steady growth. Additionally, funding is needed for operations and sustainment accounts as each new ship is delivered. The fully burdened cost of constructing, manning, operating, and maintaining a larger Fleet is not possible without real growth in Navy's topline.

At proposed FY 2020 funding levels, is the Navy adequately funded to fight one major power rival, while maintaining deterrence and stability in other regions of the world? Please explain your answer.

The FY 2020 President's Budget provides for a Navy that is the right size and structured to implement the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans; this includes NDS direction to "prioritize preparations for war." Navy can provide additional details in an appropriately classified forum.

Is the proposed FY 2020 Navy budget adequate to execute operations, maintain readiness, procure needed weapons and equipment, modernize capabilities, and sustain Sailor and family quality of life? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the proposed budget is adequate. PB20 is a strategy-driven budget that resources the force required to implement the NDS and aligns people, capabilities, and processes. Our budget builds on prior year investments to deliver increased readiness and lethality – today, in the future and is synchronized for the joint fight across all domains. In terms of capacity, our budget provides for a larger overall force – we deliver more people and platforms, as well as enablers that make us whole. We deliver a better and more innovative force through investments that improve our legacy platforms and provides for a more robust and lethal mix of next-generation opportunities. The funding increases in the FY 2020 budget submission provide stability, supports our readiness, increases our combat capabilities while growing our capacity where it makes sense.

If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of Navy funding going forward?

In this strategic environment, as the demand for naval forces as an integral component of the Joint Force continue to grow, we will measure ourselves and the adequacy of funding by the ability to fulfill our responsibilities in the NDS. Funding should support building a balanced force that will increase America’s naval power and safeguard our economic, diplomatic, and military interests around the world.

Should OCO funding not be available, what impact would a \$576 Billion budget have on Navy readiness, in your view?

The PB20 requested is at the funding level is required to execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS). A \$576B budget would reverse readiness gains and would result in a smaller, less ready and less lethal force, requiring a revision of the National Defense strategy.

Should OCO funding not be available, what recommendations would you make for cuts to Navy operations and programs in FY 2020?

The recommendation for specific programs and operations is dependent on the topline value. If OCO is unavailable, once a final topline for FY 2020 is received, the Navy would make hard choices by balancing capacity, readiness, and investment to best support the NDS.

Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code provides that not later than 10 days after the President’s submission of the defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force or combatant command.

If confirmed, do you agree to provide your unfunded priorities list to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with the FY 2021 budget request?

Yes.

Alliances and Partnerships

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2018 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in all of these relationships. Interactions between the naval and marine forces of different countries are often conducted at the Chief of Service-level, including through international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges, and establishing protocols for operations.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and exploit opportunities in international cooperation?

If confirmed, I intend to continue our current security cooperation efforts to strengthen our network of allies and partners, attract new partners and deepen current key partnerships to ensure we maintain global access and sustainment capabilities. Consistent with current policy, I would look for opportunities increase interoperability while also working with partners to help their navies remain relevant to countering aggression. Most importantly, I will continue to build on trust with nations who participate with us in exercises and maritime sponsored events.

How would you characterize your familiarity with the Navy and Marine leaders of other nations, regional consultative forums, and processes for enhancing the interoperability between allies and partners of naval and marine operational concepts, communications, and equipment?

In my capacity as VCNO for the US Navy, I have had a number of opportunities to meet with leaders across the globe and develop closer relationships. If confirmed, I will continue this and seek to strengthen our network of allies and attract new partners. Forums like The International Seapower Symposium (ISS), Bilateral and Trilateral Staff Talks with our closest Allies and various regional seapower symposiums are important forums for relationship building between military leaders and if confirmed, I intend to continue Navy’s participation in these events.

Lessons Learned from Post-Mishap Investigations

The report of the post-mishap investigation into the 17 June 2017 collision between the *USS Fitzgerald* and a Philippine-flagged container ship found that the collision was avoidable and resulted from an accumulation of “smaller errors over time,” ultimately resulting in a lack of adherence to sound navigational practices. Similarly, the report of investigation into the collision of the *USS John S. McCain* and merchant vessel *Alnic MC* on 21 August 2017, also was avoidable and resulted primarily from crew complacency, over-confidence, and lack of procedural compliance.

What has the Navy done to counter the “smaller errors over time” and the “complacency, overconfidence, and lack of procedural compliance” that resulted in these otherwise “avoidable” collisions?

In the aftermath of the collisions, we took immediate actions to ensure our fleet was safe to operate. Longer term actions were focused on ensuring more effective operations and establishing a culture of excellence, focused on setting high standards instead of complying with minimums. Many of these recommendations will take time to fully assess their effectiveness, determined when measurable outcomes are achieved. My greatest interest is in achieve outcomes and while significant improvements have been made, we are urgently focused on how we can do things better.

If confirmed, specifically what more would you do to correct for the deficiencies that were found to have caused these two collisions?

The Readiness Reform Oversight Committee will remain as an oversight vehicle for sustained evaluation of all implementation actions across the force and ensure deficiencies found are addressed at the right level. The RROC will continue to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the recommendations implemented to this point, incorporating fleet feedback and constantly monitoring new, best practices from industry, academia, and government. We will focus upon outcomes, and not merely the implementation of initiatives.

The John S. McCain NDAA for FY 2019 included 10 provisions related to the readiness of Navy surface ships, each of which require action by the Secretary of the Navy and/or the Chief of Naval Operations: sections 322, 323, 334, 335, 524, 525, 526, 527, 911, and 915.

To date, what actions has the Navy taken to implement these 10 provisions of law?

Sec 322 - Examination of Navy Vessels. INSURV provided annual report on summary of material readiness, number and types of vessels inspected and material readiness of trends for in-service vessels, dated 26 February 2019.

Sec 323 - Limits FDNF Deployment to no more than 10 years. The current Strategic Laydown and Dispersal (SLD) plan begins rotating FDNF ships covered under this provision back to US ports in FY 2019. The requirements of this provision will be met by FY 2021. Future FDNF ships will rotate every 5 to 8 years.

Sec 334 - Surface Warfare Training Improvement. On 28 March 2019, Navy provided a Report to Congress addressing comparative analysis of SWO, USCG, and Merchant Marine Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) training/assessment requirements; summarizing all USCG and STCW training standards that have been incorporated into SWO training; and providing a gap analysis of SWO training versus STCW certification and USCG 3rd Mate unlimited license requirements.

Sec 335 – Optimizing Surface Navy Vessel Inspections and Crew Certifications. CNSF provided an audit of all surface vessel inspections with an analysis of inspections, recommendations to streamline and recommendations for congressional action on 31 January 2019. A follow on report will be provided by 13 August 2020.

Sec 524 - Navy Standard Workweek. In November 2018, the Navy completed an afloat workweek report designed to establish accurate fleet manpower requirements and inform manning level changes. This report subsequently informed the revision to the Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures directive and the revised OPNAVINST 1000.16 was released 9 January 2019 ahead of the February 2019 deadline. This change reduced the afloat productive work week from 70 to 67 hours, which affords Sailors 3 more hours per week for administrative requirements and mission-specific training.

Sec 525 - Manning of Afloat Naval Forces. USFF providing quarterly reports on Fit/Fill on all ships.

Sec 526 - Navy Watchstander Records. Navy provided a brief to Congress on 1 February 2019 summarizing: Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Mariner Skills Logbook content, its distribution plan/status, the manner in which the tracking of training/operational experience aligns with the training/assessment continuum that defines the revised SWO Career path, and the short/long-term use of Mariner Skills Logbook data.

Sec 527 - Qualification Experience Requirement for Certain Navy Watch standards. Navy reported to Congress on 26 February 2019 regarding the qualification requirements for the following Surface Warfare watchstations: OOD, CICWO, TAO, EOOW, CONN.

Sec 911 - DoN Report to Congress on Operational and Admin Chain of Command. HQMC and N3/N5 reported status on 21 February 2019.

Sec 915 - expands the principal duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, The ASN RDA has actively taken on this additional role. He has directed revisions to the Gate Review process to ensure a focus on sustainment and readiness in acquisition programs, revamped approaches in ship and aviation sustainment contracting, and partnered with VCNO to measure and improve readiness through the Perform to Plan (P2P) Forum.

If confirmed, what further actions under the purview of the Chief of Naval Operations will you take to implement these provisions?

If confirmed, I intend to continue utilizing the Readiness Reform Oversight Council to ensure oversight over readiness reform across the fleet. We will continue implementing, assessing and forging the recommendations of the CR/SRR and implement the provisions outlined in the John S. McCain NDAA for FY 2019 to incorporate governance, command and control, material readiness, operations, training, manning and culture.

Joint Operations

Naval operations are becoming increasingly joint as Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.

Which other Service doctrines and capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy with the Navy in joint operations?

The Navy meets with other services and SOCOM at Warfighter Talks to focus on warfighting, share innovative ideas and align our concepts. We collaborate with the Army on mission defense and multi-domain operations and with the Air Force on strike and space mission areas. The Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) concept provides a shared framework for the Navy and Marine Corps team to pursue innovative solutions to operations affected by anti-access and area denial networks. The USN-USMC concept for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) is complementary with the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), both of which focus on maintaining freedom of action as a precondition for power projection. Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps hold monthly Naval Boards, where senior leaders from each Service discuss warfighting policy and guidance, make recommendations regarding naval forces and capabilities, and align Service efforts.

What innovative ideas are you considering to increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of DOD objectives in joint operations?

The Navy has discussed common C4ISR systems, including the Joint Tactical Grid, and increased integration and collaboration through exercises, war games, experimentation, modeling, simulation, and analysis with the other Services. Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps team have engaged in ongoing discussions on joint implementation of the Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) concept and the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept.

Recapitalizing the Fleet

Despite the Navy's 355-ship requirement, it is currently operating with only 289 battle force ships. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for its FY 2019 30-year shipbuilding plan by approximately 30 percent.

Do you consider the 355-ship force structure requirement to be appropriate given the current and future strategic environment? If not, please describe what changes need to be made.

The 355-ship force structure requirement, informed by the 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA), was the appropriate future (circa 2030) battle force structure based on 2016 strategic guidance, warfighting concepts and operating constructs, intelligence estimates and approved defense planning scenarios. Navy is conducting a 2019 FSA to reflect changes to strategic guidance, warfighting concepts and operating constructs, etc., that have occurred since 2016. If confirmed, I will ensure Congress is briefed on the results of the 2019 FSA.

Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with the Navy's shipbuilding plan?

Although there is cost risk in any procurement program, the CBO's estimates are higher than the Navy's because the CBO and the Navy made different assumptions about the design and capabilities of some future ships, used different estimating methods, and treated growth in shipbuilding labor and materials costs differently. Much of the difference between these estimates stems from uncertainty about the design and capabilities of large ships being built 10 or 20 years from now; especially for two large shipbuilding programs in the 2030s and 2040s: the new attack submarine and the next large surface combatant. These cost variances widen over time due to differences in applied inflation factors.

What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?

Consistent annual funding in the shipbuilding account is foundational for an efficient industrial base in support of steady growth. Equally important is the properly phased, additional funding needed for operations and sustainment accounts as each new ship is delivered. Further, Navy is partnering with industry to define and establish workable requirements and working with Congress to sustain predictable profiles. These supportive relationships will continue to promote efficiency through capital improvement and expansion, research and development, and sustainment of a world-class workforce.

How would you characterize the risks to national security posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical aircraft?

The 355-ship force structure requirement was informed by the 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA). An updated Force Structure Assessment is underway and will help to better characterize any gap that might exist relative to the current environment and strategy. Once that assessment is complete, I look forward to discussing risks and potential mitigations with leaders and the Congress, in appropriately classified environments.

What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce the risk of erosion in cost, schedule, or performance? To reduce the operational risk?

Predictable, sufficient funding to include properly phased funding in operating and sustainment accounts as new ships are delivered will be required for the Navy to fund serial production of the *Columbia*-class SSBN and maintain its planned shipbuilding profile. Stable and predictable funding solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our commercial partners, strengthens our industrial base and safeguards our Sailors.

What additional adjustments would you consider if the Navy's shipbuilding program comes under further fiscal pressures, either due to reduced total resources or cost growth in individual programs?

Should the shipbuilding program come under further fiscal pressures, I would consider additional adjustments using a deliberate, strategy-driven approach that balanced investment in additional capacity with readiness and wholeness of the Fleet.

Improving Government Technical Control in Shipbuilding

A June 2018 Government Accountability Office report found that the last eight combatant lead ships cost a total of \$8 billion more than the initial budget; were delivered at least six months late; and were marked by dozens of deficiencies. As an example, the first procurement dollar for the *Ford*-class was spent in 2001. Nineteen years later, procurement dollars continue to be spent to finish construction on the lead ship, which is \$2.5 billion over budget, was delivered 20 months late, and remains incomplete.

Do you believe acquisition performance on recent lead ships has been satisfactory?

The lead ship in any class comes with complex challenges, particularly in the areas of technology development and integration, design, ship construction and testing – all of which were correctly identified by the GAO. Our requirements and acquisition communities have taken significant steps to reduce overall risk and improve business cases for upcoming lead ships. If confirmed, I will continue to work with industry to deliver reliable capability to the warfighter, faster.

In a 27 March 2019 hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition acknowledged the challenges of building lead ships and highlighted four initiatives to improve performance: (1) better integration of requirements and acquisition; (2) improved sub-system prototyping; (3) matching necessary government talent to program needs; and (4) investing in the right technologies.

Do you agree with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition that these four initiatives are worth pursuing to improve performance on lead ships? Please explain your answer.

Yes. In particular, integrating our requirements and acquisition processes will lead to sound investments that provide the Fleet with the ships and systems needed. Progress has already been made by using warfighting requirements-derived tools like our Capability Evolution Plans to ensure common understanding of how future ships and capabilities will be fielded, and where we'll need flexibility in future ship classes to accommodate evolving technologies.

What other initiatives do you believe should be explored to improve on recent lead ship performance?

With Congress's help, the Navy is utilizing incremental funding approaches along with multi-year procurement, block-buy, and economic order quantity contracting approaches that provide stability within the industrial base while also providing the industrial base with the confidence to invest in their people and facilities, allowing for more efficient and affordable ship construction.

Ford-class Aircraft Carriers

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's FY 2018 Annual Report again cited the reliability of four systems: the electromagnetic aircraft launching system; advanced arresting gear; dual band radar; and advanced weapons elevators, as the most significant risks to the performance of the *Ford*-class program. Only 2 of the 11 elevators on the *USS Gerald R. Ford* (CVN-78) have been turned over to the Navy due to ongoing technical issues, notwithstanding the Navy's acceptance of the ship in May 2017. The Annual Report also noted that the demonstrated reliability of the catapults, arresting gear, weapons elevators, and radar is either orders of magnitude below the requirement or remains unknown.

What is your understanding of the current capability and reliability of each of the key systems on CVN-78?

The Navy is committed to its decision to build the Ford-class CVN, as demonstrated by the recent two-ship buy of CVN 80/81. The capabilities of survivability, maintainability, and power projection in the high-end fight have been designed into our FORD-class CVNs. Every system was designed to allow for evolving carrier air wings, reduced manpower requirements, adaptability for future threat environments and greater reliability over existing, legacy systems. Performance and reliability has increased with each of these key systems during every underway period. Reliability will improve with additional runtime at sea.

The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) have the capability to recover and launch faster, with improved safety margins while allowing for the capability to launch heavier aircraft carrying more fuel for longer range and heavier weapons payloads. AAG/EMALS are being upgraded during the current maintenance period to correct previously identified deficiencies and improve system reliability.

Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) carry more than double the load of NIMITZ class elevators and moves 50% faster. The shipbuilder has turned over 2 of 11 AWE which have been certified by the Navy and are in the hands of the ship's company. All weapons elevators are scheduled for turnover to the crew following the ship's current post-shipyard availability.

Dual Band Radar (DBR) addresses capability requirements for current and future missile threats, ship navigation, and Air Traffic Control surveillance with modern, solid-state design. A ratio of reliability for the system improved steadily from 85% of the time during the early at-sea periods to 99.8% of the time during the final underway event.

What is your understanding of the measures being taken to ensure these key systems are stable for the next *Ford*-class aircraft carrier, *USS John F. Kennedy* (CVN-79), and those that follow?

We are applying lessons-learned from each of these systems on CVN 78 and incorporating them into CVN 79. The reliability growth of those systems will continue as those systems are put through their paces when the ship returns to sea. For the AWE, a land-based test site is currently

under construction and will serve to provide software verification and improve sustainability. All of CVN 78's AWEs will be completed and certified before work starts on CVN 80/81. In lieu of DBR, CVN 79 and follow-on ships will receive the Enterprise Radar Suite, which includes the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (a variant of the Air and Missile Defense Radar (SPY-6)).

Early Retirement of the *USS Harry S. Truman*

The FY 2020 budget request includes a proposal to cancel the mid-life refueling of *USS Harry S. Truman* and to decommission this ship instead. Failing to refuel the *Truman* will result in a reduction of one aircraft carrier in the Navy for about 25 years, until its replacement is delivered in 2049. During this time, the Navy would have 10 or fewer aircraft carriers.

What is the Navy's current requirement for aircraft carriers?

The requirement remains 12 CVNs per the 2016 FSA, and is still supported by the FORD class new construction plan. An FSA will be completed in 2019 to reassess the requirement.

In your view, what would be the warfighting and peacetime presence risk of reducing the number of operational aircraft carriers by one from 2025 through 2048?

This question best be answered appropriately in a classified forum.

In your view, what options could replace the combat power and reach of the *Truman* with an embarked air wing, and to what extent have such options demonstrated such capability in a relevant environment?

The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) provides the Nation unique and flexible options to employ significant combat power, forward. It is not envisioned that any new technologies will solely replace the need for the CSG, but will instead, augment CSGs to make them more lethal, effective, and survivable in the future.

Nuclear Enterprise Review

In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The report included recommendations to improve personnel management, enforce security requirements, increase deliberate senior leader focus and attention, enact and sustain a change in culture, and to address numerous other concerns identified. Almost five years later, responsibility for addressing these recommendations and monitoring implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to the Military Services.

Based on your recent experience, is the Navy maintaining appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions related to the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Yes, the Navy maintains a consistent focus on the entire nuclear enterprise through continuous and recurring self-assessments of all portions of the strategic mission. The results of the internal self-assessments, continuous performance evaluations and corrective actions for identified issues are reported to and validated by the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission Oversight Council (NNDMOC), held bi-monthly. With NNDMOC validation and concurrence, the results of the assessments are briefed to the OSD led Nuclear Deterrence Senior Oversight Group and Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group to inform senior leaders of the health of the Navy nuclear mission.

If confirmed, what will be your role in ensuring that the Navy continues its efforts to improve the morale, welfare, and quality of life of the Sailors charged to execute and support the Navy's nuclear mission?

Nuclear deterrence will continue to be Navy's top priority. If confirmed, I will actively oversee the nuclear enterprise as a whole to ensure that it is properly manned, trained, equipped, and resourced. I will continue to reinforce the importance of deterrence to ensure our Sailors who execute this vital mission are valued for their role in our nation's defense.

Columbia-class Submarines

Navy leaders have testified that the *Columbia*-class program will require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions within the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is not provided.

What is your recommendation for funding the *Columbia*-class program?

The COLUMBIA class program is fully funded at this time. Continuing to fully fund the program will be essential to ensuring on time delivery of the COLUMBIA Class, so that the nation's sea based strategic deterrent requirements continue to be met. The fiscal impact of the new SSBN begins in FY 2023 with advanced procurement, and then increases in FY 2026 with full annual procurements.

What additional authorities do you believe are necessary to make acquisition of the *Columbia*-class program more efficient and effective?

At this time, the Navy requires no additional authorities.

Navy leaders have testified that the Navy needs to procure 12 *Columbia*-class submarines and avoid schedule delays in the *Columbia*-class program in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in 2031.

Do you agree that the Navy must buy 12 *Columbia*-class submarines to meet requirements?

Yes, as revalidated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the COLUMBIA program must deliver a minimum of 12 SSBNs to replace the current OHIO fleet to provide required deterrence capabilities.

In your view, what are the most significant risks associated with meeting established cost, schedule, and performance requirements for the *Columbia*-class program?

The most significant risks to cost, schedule, and performance requirements for the COLUMBIA Class is the strength of the Submarine Industrial Base and shipbuilder performance. The Navy and shipbuilder teams are focused on supplier improvement and oversight as well as shipbuilder execution as Advance Production continues and ship construction begins in FY 2021.

Do you agree with the view that there is no room for delay in the *Columbia*-class program schedule?

Yes, any further delays to COLUMBIA will impact the Navy's ability to meet minimum USSTRATCOM requirements in FY 2031 and on.

In your view, are there additional authorities Congress could provide to the Navy to ensure the *Columbia*-class remains on schedule?

At this time, the Navy requires no additional authorities.

Do you assess that *Columbia*-class submarines will have the capabilities and attributes needed to perform their unique mission in the 2030s?

Yes, COLUMBIA will be built with the necessary capabilities to execute the sea-based strategic deterrence mission through the 2080s.

What is your understanding of the current cost estimates for the *Columbia*-class lead ship and follow-on ships, respectively?

The COLUMBIA Class is on track to stay within its Milestone B Affordability Caps. The Navy updates and refines the COLUMBIA Class Program cost estimate annually including savings from National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) authorities and risk analysis.

How confident are you that the program will be able to produce *Columbia*-class submarines that meet current cost and schedule estimates?

If confirmed, I will be heavily engaged in understanding cost and schedule risks, but based on my current understanding of the program, I am confident the COLUMBIA Class will meet current cost and schedule efforts.

What is your understanding of mitigation options DOD should consider in the event the *Columbia*-class program incurs schedule delays that prevent the lead ship from deploying in 2031?

The FY 2013 two-year delay to COLUMBIA authorization resulted in the removal of any schedule margin available to meet USSTRATCOM deterrent patrol requirements in FY 2031. All hedges against COLUMBIA delivery delays must be focused on removing risks to the on-time delivery of COLUMBIA SSBNs.

Attack Submarine Force Levels

The Navy’s current requirement for attack submarines is 66. However, the Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as 42 boats in 2028 and remain below the 66-boat requirement until 2048.

What options, including improved maintenance and life extensions of current submarines, as well as increased new construction, exist to ensure the Navy deploys attack submarines sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?

The Navy’s attack submarine target was increased from 48 submarines to 66 submarines with the 2016 Force Structure Assessment. The March 2018 Report to Congress, “Extending the Service Life of Select LOS ANGELES Class Submarines,” identified seven reactor cores for potential LOS ANGELES Class refueling. PB19 funded the first of the 7 potential refuelings. In addition to the refuelings, the Navy conducts a comprehensive technical assessment on each submarine to evaluate if the ship can be extended beyond its original planned service life. The Navy is also relying on a steady state production of at least 2 SSNs per year with VA Class being delivered within contractual requirements to reach the force structure requirement of 66 SSNs. In addition to steady state production; PB-20 adds \$3.2B for a third submarine in FY 2020 taking advantage of the available labor resources in the industrial base prior to the start of Columbia construction in FY 2021.

What risks are incurred by allowing the attack submarine force levels to remain below 66 boats until 2048?

This question is most appropriately answered in a classified forum. In the short term, we assess this is manageable risk.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The Navy plays an important role in defending the nation against the threat of long-range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats.

Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?

Yes, ballistic missile defense is one of the Navy’s core missions.

What is the Navy’s current requirement for ships equipped with BMD capability?

The current requirement for BMD Ships is 54, based on the 2016 Force Structure Assessment.

What is the Navy's current inventory of ships equipped with BMD capability?

The FY 2019 BMD inventory is 41 ships, including both CG-47 class Cruisers and DDG-51 class Destroyers.

To the extent there is a shortfall between ships with BMD capability and the associated requirement, what options should be explored to reduce this shortfall and when does the Navy anticipate meeting the requirement?

With the current inventory of BMD-capable ships, the Navy is able to meet all global BMD tasking through careful management of deployment and ship maintenance schedules. Based on the PB-20 budget, we will meet the 54 ship requirement in FY 2023, and we will continue to upgrade our planned force of 88 DDG-51 class destroyers until all are BMD capable in 2030.

Amphibious Fleet Requirements

What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy's amphibious fleet?

In support of the National Security and Defense Strategies, our Navy requires at least 12 big deck and 26 LPD Flight I, LPD Flight II, and LSD smaller deck amphibious multi-warfare ships to meet the needs of the future fight.

What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would you envision these alternatives being necessary and appropriate?

The Navy and Marine Corps team continually works together to improve the survivability, and capabilities of our amphibious warfare ships as part of the Joint Maritime Force. The dynamic strategic environment requires us to continually review our operational concepts to effectively employ Naval forces. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure the Navy and Marine Corps team remains a capable and lethal joint force.

Frigate

The FY 2020 budget request includes the competitive award of a new Frigate in 2020.

Do you support the Navy's acquisition strategy for the new Frigate—a full and open competition leading to an award in 2020?

Yes.

What is your understanding of when the detailed design and construction request for proposals will be released?

The Navy is on track for releasing a Request for Proposals no later than the fourth quarter of FY 2019.

Ready Reserve Force (RRF) recapitalization

DOD has developed a three-pronged recapitalization strategy for the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and Military Sealift Command surge fleet consisting of a combination of new construction, extending the service life of certain vessels, and acquiring used vessels. The range of the Department's cost estimates varies from \$30 million for a used vessel to more than \$1 billion for a newly constructed vessel, known as the Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-Mission Platform (CHAMP).

What is your understanding of the Navy's recapitalization strategy for the RRF and the affordability of acquiring more than 40 sealift vessels as outlined in the latest 30-year shipbuilding plan?

The Navy's Sealift Recapitalization Strategy is a comprehensive approach to maintaining required sealift capability in support of the Joint Force. This strategy aligns to the *Sealift the Nation Needs Report to Congress*, the FY 2019 NDAA buy used authorities provided, and is reflected in the "Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Plan" Appendix to the PB20 30-year shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing to work with our joint partners and Congress to ensure we acquire the right capability, at best value for the taxpayer, as we proceed with our three pronged approach to extend the service life of selected ships, buy used, and acquire new construction.

To what extent do you believe the Navy has identified the appropriate mix of used and new ships to continue to meet sealift and auxiliary requirements?

Based on the strategy and Business Case Analysis to date, I believe our strategy for Sealift Recapitalization is sound. In order to arrive at this plan, the Navy reviewed previous vessel acquisition options and requirements in order to set forth the details reflected in the "Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Plan" Appendix to the Fiscal Year 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I will remain personally involved to ensure that we maximize the Navy's capability within available resources.

Tactical Fighter Programs

The Air Force Research Laboratory's "Loyal Wingman" program seeks to pair unmanned aircraft with a fifth generation fighter. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment report on Future Carrier Air Wings makes recommendations as to the use of unmanned aircraft to augment 5th Gen fighters.

How do you envision such manned-unmanned teaming manifesting in naval aviation and with strike-fighters in particular?

The addition of unmanned fixed wing aircraft such as the MQ-25 Stingray will increase the range of the Carrier Air Wing and provide the potential for additional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. Navy is working with the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) in integrating unmanned/manned systems to reduce risk to the force, provide access to areas previously denied to manned platforms, increase force capability and capacity at lower costs, and provide distributed intelligent battlespace awareness.

The Navy intends to divest all Legacy Hornets (F/A-18C/D) from its active component squadrons by the end of this year, with full divestiture to be completed by 2030.

Please explain the rationale for the Navy's Legacy Hornet divestiture plan.

To provide the most capable warfighting force, the Navy accelerated the F/A-18 Legacy Hornet Divestment Plan in Q3FY 2017. Legacy Hornet aircraft were plagued with readiness challenges and provided limited complementary capabilities when paired with F/A-18E/F and F-35C. Accelerating transition to Super Hornets provides the Navy substantial flight hour cost savings and reduced depot maintenance workload. This decision assisted with USMC readiness by providing "best of breed" legacy Hornets and also depressurized depot throughput.

What priority has the Navy set for transition to the Super Hornet (F/A-18E/F) (i.e., in what order will Reserve squadrons, Naval Aviation Warfare Development Center, test squadrons, and the general fleet inventory be transitioned)? What is the rationale for this order of prioritization?

Fleet squadron transition to F/A-18E/F will be completed this fiscal year. The Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels), the Naval Aviation Warfare Development Center, and Reserve Component squadrons will follow in order. The Blue Angels will transition to the F/A-18E/F Block 1 Super Hornet first. These Block 1 F/A-18E/F aircraft are less capable than the 'best-of-breed' F/A-18C/D Legacy Hornets currently residing at NAWDC and U.S. Navy Reserve (USNR) squadrons. DoN chose to leave more capable aircraft with USMC, NAWDC, and USNR squadrons. NAWDC will continue to operate Legacy Hornets through FY 2024, but will gradually replace these aircraft with F/A-18E/F Super Hornets as new procurement deliveries and fleet transitions to the F-35C make Super Hornets available. Our USNR squadrons will start transition from F/A-18 Legacy Hornets to F/A-18E/F Super Hornets in FY 2024, with a target completion by FY 2025.

What is the Navy is doing to improve depot throughput for Legacy Hornets and to apply lessons learned to the looming service life extension program for the Super Hornet?

The Naval Sustainment System (NSS) leverages industry best practices to reform how the Navy generates and sustains aviation readiness. NSS focuses on seven reform areas: Surge capability, Fleet Readiness Center optimization, Unit-Level Maintenance, Supply Chain, Engineering, and

overall Governance. NSS will serve as the foundation for other Type/Model/Series aircraft beyond F/A-18 E/F sustainment systems.

One area which NSS has paid dividends is by reforming how our Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) manage maintenance. Specific tasks included increasing organic depot capacity and speed, streamlining policy, and establishing effective governance of component and end item work-in-process. Through NSS, the Navy has increased Contracted Field Teams to accelerate flight line maintenance, augmented the workforce in the depots to include establishing apprentice programs to train and retain our artisans, and procured modern repair equipment to decrease depot component repair time and improve reliability of our repaired parts once they return to the fleet.

What is the Navy's plan and timeline for upgrading its Super Hornet fleet? What capabilities are being added to maintain the Super Hornet's relevance in the high end fight?

The Department's FY 2020 budget procures 84 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and continues the FY19 NDAA authorized (FY 2019-FY 2021) MYP contract. Block III is designed to be complementary to the capabilities resident in F-35 and E-2D.

F/A-18E/F Block III capability upgrades consist of Advanced Cockpit System (ACS) for improved situational awareness, Digital Networking Infrastructure for advanced targeting and growth, Low Observable (LO) signature enhancement for improved survivability, Conformal Fuel Tanks for increased range and on station time and a 10,000 flight hour service life to sustain capacity and lower lifecycle costs.

Block III capability will be incorporated into production aircraft starting in FY 2019 (for FY 2021 delivery). Beginning in FY 2023, F/A-18E/F Block II aircraft will be inducted into Boeing facilities for Service Life Modification (SLM) to increase service life from 6,000 to 10,000 flight hours while incorporating the Block III capabilities. Block II aircraft inducted for the structural portions of SLM prior to FY 2023 will receive the remainder of the Block III upgrade at a later time.

The Air Force is moving to a disaggregated architecture for Air Battle Management. The Navy, on the other hand, is investing heavily in the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and P-8 Poseidon.

Why are the Air Force and the Navy pursuing different strategies?

The Air Force and the Navy share a common operational requirement to synchronize the execution of multi-domain operations in time, space and purpose to achieve military objectives. Our services have shared the command and control of operational air forces in combat environments for nearly 18 years and are committed to developing fully integrated systems and processes to operate jointly in contested environments. The Navy has coordinated with the Air Force during the development of their Air Battle Management System through the Joint C4 and Cyber Battlespace Awareness Functional Control Boards and looks forward to further collaboration in the future.

What is the Navy's approach to airborne battle management and how do the Navy and Air Force intend to execute joint airborne battle management in a high-end fight?

Battle Management is not just about airborne sensors, it is fusion of information across a wide set of distributed sensors on the battle field that allows timely and accurate decision making. Investments into data link architectures, beyond line of sight capabilities, and track management allow the E-2D to act as an elevated airborne sensor component to complement other maritime and joint tactical sensors, achieving a common operating picture across the force. Our systems are integrated with the Air Force and we continue to train to and operate with Joint and Coalition command and control of our forces in the high end fight.

Given the new capabilities the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye will bring to the battlespace, and the new tactics and concepts of operation it will enable, does the Navy perceive a need for expeditionary squadrons of E-2Ds? Why or why not? In your view, what would be the benefits and/or drawbacks of establishing expeditionary E-2D squadrons, similar to those for the EA-18G Growler?

Navy does not believe an expeditionary force of E-2Ds is required for Naval Forces to conduct their mission set. Our distributed approach to information sharing across the Naval Force will allow us to conduct maritime operations around the world.

The current E-2D inventory program of record and Navy Force Structure do not support expeditionary operations. Establishing enduring dedicated expeditionary capacity drives significant additional costs to stand-up the capability. If operationally required, E-2Ds could potentially support short-duration expeditionary operations given the availability of suitable airfields.

There has been much discussion about the importance of networking and connecting all Navy and Marine Corps capabilities across air, land, and sea platforms.

What is the Navy/Marine Corps team doing to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple domains, a reality?

The Navy and Marine Corps is applying advanced technologies, including automation, machine-to-machine collaboration and coordination, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to command and control functions. The Office of Naval Research, is currently developing technologies to exchange, fuse, and analyze data in support of human decision making in areas like force allocation across domains, as well as to enable decentralized action by machines in areas like tactical sensor coordination across domains.

Have the Navy and Marine Corps developed and refined the joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?

Yes, Navy and Marine Corps specifically developed and align our operational concepts to describe a fleet-centric approach to employ our forces as integrated, yet distributable, naval

formations enabled by a common tactical grid. These concepts are applicable to naval warfighting in and across all theaters and guide future capability development to ensure Navy and Marine Corps can project power and attain and sustain power projection, sea control and maritime access in highly contested environments.

What is being done to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer competitors—not only with each other—but with the Air Force and Army platforms as well?

The Navy was designated as the Link-16 and Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) waveform sponsor by DoD Chief Information Office in April 2017. The Link-16 waveform is utilized by all U.S. Services and 50 nations to include NATO. OSD has designated the Navy as the lead service for Link-16 and the Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS-J) to synchronize the fielding of modernized networking solutions across the Joint Force for the contested environments we expect to face.

Current technologies allow “low probability of intercept/low probability of detection” datalinks to connect 4th and 5th generation aircraft. As well, other platforms, operating across multiple domains can be networked.

Who is leading this effort for the Department of the Navy, and what progress is being made?

The Director for Information Warfare Integration, (OPNAV N2N6F) is leading this effort for the US Navy, and is coordinating this effort with OSD and the Joint services.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program

The follow-on modernization for the F-35 is scheduled to bring key warfighting capabilities to the fleet, but the budget and schedule remain in flux.

Are you concerned about the affordability and executability of the Department’s plan for Block 4 Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2)? Why or why not?

The Navy is constantly focused on the costs associated with modernizing any of our warfighting platforms. As we modernize the F-35C through the C2D2 process we will continuously work through the Joint Program Office (JPO) and with industry to deliver the required capabilities to maximize the combat effectiveness of the Carrier Air Wing at the most affordable cost possible. The C2D2 plan is aggressive and will require oversight and communication to be successful.

What do you view as the biggest challenges to successful integration of the F-35 into the carrier air wing?

Fully integrated F-35C ensures critical battlespace awareness and enhanced warfighting lethality across all spectrums of naval operations. Our focus is leveraging the complementary capabilities

of the F-35C with 4th generation tactical aircraft in the carrier air wing (CVW), and surface platforms in the maritime battle forces supporting distributed maritime operations. The biggest challenge is effectively and efficiently sharing the information gathered by the F-35C across distributed platforms and warfighting networks.

If confirmed, what will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy?

As unmanned and autonomous systems become more available and affordable, I have no doubt we will continue to leverage unmanned capabilities now and in the future. This includes providing communications relay nodes; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting (ISR&T); refueling; and logistics. Integration of such systems with manned systems will reduce risk to the force, provide access to areas otherwise denied to manned platforms, increase force capability and capacity while lowering costs and providing distributed intelligent battlespace awareness. If confirmed, I am committed to fully assessing the potential for unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy.

What do you envision as the balance between manned and unmanned combat aircraft in the Navy's future force structure?

We are completing our Next Generation Air Dominance Analysis of Alternatives. This analysis in addition to our re-occurring capability based assessments will inform our aviation force-mix approach over the next several years to better leverage unmanned systems and increase our lethality.

Considering the addition of the MQ-25, Unmanned Surface Vessels, and Unmanned Undersea Vessels to an already growing fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (i.e., TRITONS, FIRESCOUTS, SCAN EAGLES, BLACKJACKS), how will the Navy train personnel to operate and maintain these systems inside the current Fleet?

The Department of the Navy has identified cost savings to personnel, infrastructure, and training that can be achieved by developing a common hardware and software configuration for unmanned platforms across all domains and eliminate proprietary control solutions. The Navy has focused acquisition and industry to incorporate Common Control System (CCS) as part of their new development plans, and legacy platforms must provide an integration plan that will transition to CCS by FY 2022. CCS is currently being reviewed by the Joint Staff as a Department of Defense solution, which will further reduce fielding, training, and sustainment costs.

Equipment Readiness

What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Navy equipment, particularly ships and aircraft?

We currently use legacy models to estimate work and the funding to execute this work. Through our Performance to Plan effort and other initiatives across the Navy, we are beginning to develop the data analytics necessary to improve our models, leveraging industry and other Service insights where feasible. If confirmed, I am committed to more fully leverage data analytics in order to achieve better fidelity in budgeting for program sustainment costs.

Do you believe that increased investment is needed to reduce the backlog in equipment maintenance that has accrued over the last several years?

Yes. Over the past decade we have added about 10,000 employees to the naval shipyards and aviation depots. Further investments in training and retaining our workforce reduce delays and backlog. Process improvement will also help alleviate maintenance backlogs.

How important is reduction of the materiel maintenance backlog to improvements in readiness?

Readiness is impacted by delays in getting maintenance and modernization performed on our ships, submarines and aircraft, though material maintenance is only one aspect of the entire readiness picture. We need to use maintenance periods to ensure our ships and aircraft are maintained to established standards, but we must also be mindful of capacity and throughput to ensure efficient use of resources.

In your view, is the Navy's continued receipt of OCO funding necessary to ensure all equipment is reset?

While operating under the Budget Control Act of 2011, OCO is necessary to ensure equipment is reset and available for operational requirements in a timely manner. Additionally, due to deployment schedules from prior years that deferred maintenance into the future, the Navy continues to require OCO funding to reset specific hulls and associated aircraft that operated in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

If confirmed, how will you prioritize maintaining readiness in the near term, while modernizing the Navy to ensure future readiness?

Maintaining the right balance between readiness, capacity, and lethality is crucial to providing options to decision-makers. Near-term readiness will be paramount to ensuring our deployed and deploying forces are prepared for any challenges they may encounter. Still, we must field the future fleet, the ships, aircraft, and systems with the technology necessary to maintain the edge on our adversaries in a rapidly evolving world. If confirmed, I intend to make strategy-driven, data-informed decisions in balancing the near-term capacity with future capability requirements.

Navy leaders assert that continued implementation of an improved deployment framework—the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP)—will stabilize rotational deployments and render them more predictable.

What is your understanding of the O-FRP?

OFRP is the model Navy uses to generate (supply) forces and employ (demand) forces. It consists of a maintenance, training, deployment and surge phases. OFRP is based on Navy's concept of tiered readiness, maximizing employability of our forces for the high-end fight, given investments in maintenance and training.

To what extent has O-FRP been successful in stabilizing rotational deployments and making them more predictable?

OFRP has been successful at stabilizing deployments and creating more predictability for our Sailors and their families. There is always more work to do, but we are moving in a positive direction.

To what extent will O-FRP need to adapt to meet the demands of DFE?

OFRP will not require significant changes to adapt to meet the demands of DFE.

To what extent has O-FRP improved, maintained, or degraded the material readiness of the fleet?

OFRP has provided the anticipated benefit of a long-term schedule that preserves allotted maintenance times, and improves the material condition and readiness of the Fleet. While we see that some shipyard availabilities go longer than planned, the impact is generally to reduce the duration of the sustainment phase of OFRP.

What metrics should Congress use to track the material readiness and material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as the effectiveness of O-FRP?

Some of the most useful metrics are the Navy's ability to meet the force element requirements for OPLAN response and any key limitations in achieving these goals. This information is reported in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress.

Indo-Pacific Region

What are the key areas in which the Navy must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in a potential conflict with China?

This question is most appropriately answered in a classified forum.

China has embarked on a massive shipbuilding program. By 2030, China will have almost 100 more ships than the U.S. Navy. It will have more major surface combatants and more attack submarines, most of which will be newer and more capable. And while all of China's Navy will be focused on the Indo-Pacific, the United States keeps only about 60 percent of its fleet in the Pacific.

How should the Navy adapt to this shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific?

The future of the United States depends on the U.S. Navy's ability, as part of the Joint Force, to adapt and adjust to the shifting security environment around the world. As the 2018 NDS articulates, in this environment, there can be no complacency. While we need a larger, more capable fleet, we also need to develop and test new operational concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations, in order to grow our advantages in the maritime domain, and offer military options to civilian leaders across the spectrum of rivalry.

Given the changing security environment and the increasingly multi-domain nature of threats, accelerating our Navy's digital transformation will be critical to preparing our Sailors to deter, fight, and win in the Indo-Pacific. Digital technologies have the potential to be a force multiplier, putting data at the center of all of our decisions and transforming how we deter and defeat our adversaries. Leveraging a deliberate cycle of prototyping, experimentation, exercises, and war games, we will accelerate our ability to adapt and rapidly develop the systems and processes we need to fight at the speed of information. If confirmed, I will work alongside the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, Congress, and the INDO-PACOM Commander to address existing and emergent challenges to our nation's security in the Indo-Pacific region.

The United States maintains a critical advantage in undersea warfare. What investments is China making to erode this advantage? What is your assessment of how successful these efforts have been? How should the Navy respond?

To reduce the U.S. advantage, China is investing heavily to improve its undersea warfare capabilities. China continues to invest in the construction of undersea early warning and detection systems by integrating sensors from shore, sea, space, air, electronic, and undersea assets. In order to maintain our advantage in the face of improving Chinese capabilities, it is imperative that the United States continue to fully fund the requirements of the Virginia and Columbia Class submarine programs, and continue modernizing undersea platforms and sensors, while continuing to invest in the research and development of new undersea capabilities. Any further details on how China is seeking to erode the U.S. advantage in the undersea domain would need to be discussed in a classified venue.

The 2018 NDS specifically calls out China's robust anti-access, area denial capabilities (A2/AD) capabilities—including long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced integrated air defenses, electronic warfare, and cyber—and the challenges they pose for U.S. forces.

How would you assess the threat to Navy forces and facilities from Chinese missile forces? Is it fair to say that Navy forces and facilities in the Indo-Pacific—from Japan to Guam—could face sustained missile attack from the beginning of a contingency? What does this mean for how the Navy will operate? In your assessment, have Navy investments, concepts of operations, and/or posture shifts to date sufficiently addressed this threat?

Details on threats to U.S. forces and how we are countering those threats would need to be discussed in a classified venue.

What do you believe is the reason for this disparity in investment? Are you concerned about this? Please explain our answer.

From a U.S. Navy perspective, our investment and focus remains balanced to address both China and Russia.

Do you agree that the Navy needs to invest in a wider range of primary bases as well as secondary and tertiary operating locations throughout the Indo-Pacific?

If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate our strategic laydown in the Indo-Pacific, especially as the strategic environment evolves.

In your assessment, what are the priority investments the Navy could make that would help implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the Indo-Pacific?

I support the priority investments included in the PB-20 budget request.

What is your current assessment of the risk of operational failure in a conflict with China as a result of a critical logistics failure?

This question is most appropriately answered in a classified forum.

Europe

What are the key areas in which the Navy must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in a potential conflict with Russia?

This question is most appropriately answered in a classified forum.

The United States has four destroyers based in Rota, Spain. These have been some of the most dynamically employed forces in the world—performing ballistic missile defense missions, carrying out strikes into Syria, boosting NATO’s presence in the Black Sea, and monitoring Russian naval activities. Notwithstanding, these destroyers have sustained levels of high readiness, partly because of excellent maintenance practices. General Scaparrotti and General Wolters both recently testified before the Committee that two additional destroyers in Rota would have presence, deterrence, and warfighting benefits for the Joint Force in Europe.

Do you agree with their assessment? Why or why not?

While I agree in principle that presence, conventional deterrence and warfighting could benefit from two additional DDGs in the European theater, our Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) posture must be balanced against other competing concerns including standing force structure, material readiness and preparation for high-end warfighting.

If confirmed, I will continually and routinely assess the strategic laydown of ships and aircraft around the globe and will ensure that our plans address combatant commanders' concerns.

Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine capability, such as the deployment of the new Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, do you believe the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare is eroding? What additional capabilities or capacity can the Navy provide in Europe to maintain the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare?

The Navy is committed to maintaining its decisive advantage in the undersea domain and denying any potential adversaries the same advantage. Undersea warfare is becoming more challenging as our adversaries continue to make improvements in their platforms. The Navy will sustain its undersea advantage through continued advances in our offensive undersea warfare forces, principally our attack submarines future unmanned undersea vehicles, and our anti-submarine warfare forces which include P-8 POSEIDON aircraft and our Integrated Undersea Surveillance family of fixed, mobile and deployable systems.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chiefs of Naval Operations, have advocated for accession by the United States to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Yes.

How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

Becoming a party to the Convention would reinforce freedom of the seas and the navigational rights vital to our global force posture in the world's largest maneuver space. Joining the Convention would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law, and strengthen our credibility with other Convention parties.

In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?

It strengthens our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. U.S. objections to these violations would have more force and credibility, and would enhance U.S. ability to respond to excessive maritime claims, land reclamation, and militarization efforts.

Unmanned Systems

The FY 2020 budget request and FYDP include significant investment in Navy unmanned aerial (e.g., MQ-25), surface (e.g., LUSV and MUSV), and undersea systems (e.g., Orca and Snakehead).

What is your vision for these unmanned systems and others in the Navy?

Unmanned systems continue to advance in capability and are anticipated to become key enablers through all phases of warfare and in all warfare domains. Significant resources were added during PB2020 to accelerate fielding the full spectrum of unmanned and optionally manned capabilities, including man-machine teaming ahead of full autonomy. These systems are now included in war games, exercises and limited real-world operations as we explore their potential contributions to the Joint force.

To what extent will these unmanned systems interoperate with manned naval platforms and utilize existing Navy communication links?

In the near term, I anticipate that all unmanned systems will interoperate with manned naval platforms and rely on existing communications links in some regards.

The Navy spent approximately \$1 billion on 10 Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMV) prior to cancelling the program in 2016, primarily due to unacceptable reliability. RMMVs were semi-submersible unmanned vehicles intended to tow sonars in minefields.

Do you believe that new unmanned systems should be prototyped and proven in a relevant environment, particularly in terms of reliability, prior to procurement?

Yes. The Navy intends to prototype new optionally manned and unmanned systems in order to establish cost, schedule, and performance trades prior to initiating Programs of Record. Test vehicles, funded through Research and Development, will allow the Navy to better iterate over its active and continuous program of studies, war games, experimentation and exercises to assess the potential of these platforms. Proven systems will then transition to Programs of Record for procurement.

Operational Energy

The Department defines *operational energy* as the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. Department of Defense energy requirements are projected to increase due to technological advances in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating distances.

If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in operational energy and link them with emerging operational concepts?

The Navy Energy Program and operational energy investments target power and energy technologies that will enable distributed operations and future weapons systems. Specific technology and capability investments include our continued investment in energy conservation measures, energy storage and power distribution investments, innovative fuel distribution technologies and concepts, and our continued investments in research, science and technology to develop new battery chemistries that further enhance capabilities and extend the endurance and reach of unmanned systems, aircraft, and expeditionary forces. Operational energy investments reduce risk to naval forces in contested operations and provide flexibility to better align energy supply to the joint force. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue innovative energy technologies that provide greater power and energy capabilities for our ships, aircraft, weapons, and unmanned systems.

Space

The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both economically and militarily—from the Global Positioning System on which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power competitors—China and Russia—are engaged in a concerted effort to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain.

If confirmed, how would you lead the Navy in improving situational awareness of space and appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?

The Department of the Navy's mission requires it to be expeditionary and maintain continuous presence in contentious regions with deployments of naval forces in regions where the United States has demonstrated national interests. Due to this global, forward deployed nature, the Navy is currently very reliant on the capabilities provided by space-based assets. As such, the Navy must and will remain an active component of the Joint Force for space operations and acquisition. If confirmed, I will ensure the Navy retains a cadre of Sailors and technical experts who understand both the capabilities of space assets and the processes to plan for and obtain space-based effects.

DOD proposes to reorganize the national security space enterprise by creating a Military Service for space; reestablishing U.S. Space Command as the unified combatant command for space; and standing up a Space Development Agency for innovative space technologies and programs.

How many members of the Navy Space Cadre—both military and civilian—and in which Additional Qualification Designators, ratings, and civilian occupations, would be consolidated in the new Space Force, as envisioned by the current DOD proposal?

The exact number of personnel from each Service component that would make up the proposed U.S. Space Force will be made at a future decision point. Pending the Secretary of Defense's decision, we expect a limited number of Navy military and civilian billets would transfer to the proposed U.S. Space Force.

How would this transfer of personnel and capability affect the Navy's ability to execute critical Service missions and tasks?

The Navy is and will remain an active component of the Joint Force for both space operations and acquisition. Pending the Secretary of Defense's decisions about the number of personnel assigned to the Space Force, the Navy will assess and mitigate the effects of any personnel moves.

Would a Service Member or civilian employees transfer from the Navy Space Cadre to the new Space Force be voluntary or involuntary? How would the Navy manage involuntary transfers, if any, to minimize adverse impact on the sailor or employee?

Pending the Secretary of Defense's decisions, the Navy will follow existing, standard procedures for obtaining qualified volunteers for potential transfer to the Space Force, while ensuring that core Navy missions can continue to be met. The Navy does not anticipate a need to involuntarily transfer personnel to the Space Force at this time.

Information received by the Committee indicates that transfer to the new Space Force may adversely affect certain members of the DOD and Navy civilian workforce.

How will the Navy ameliorate any negative effects on highly technical, space-qualified civilian employees identified for transfer to the Space Force?

I am unaware of any negative effects on employees identified for transfer to the Space Force. If confirmed, I will monitor the Space Force stand up closely and assess the need to ameliorate any negative effects at that time.

How many members of the Navy Space Cadre—both military and civilian—and in which Additional Qualification Designators, ratings, and civilian occupations, would remain a part of the Navy and why?

Navy Space Cadre, both military and civilian, number in the range of 350-400, with most of them directly or indirectly supporting fleet operational employment of space capabilities. A majority of Navy Space Cadre qualified members indirectly support fleet operational employment of space capabilities, and have separate, full-time Navy career designators (e.g. Naval Aviators, Information Warfare, etc.). Of those, only military and civilian billets that are in full-time space oriented positions directly supporting the Navy's Narrowband mission are likely to transfer to the proposed U.S. Space Force.

What savings do you estimate would accrue to the Navy by consolidating certain personnel and missions of your current Space Cadre and components in the Space Force?

The Navy does not anticipate significant savings as a result of the proposed Space Force.

Should the Navy Reserve be a component of the new Space Force? Please explain your answer?

Pending a decision by the Secretary of Defense, Navy will assess the level of participation of the Navy Reserve.

How do you expect Navy Research Labs will engage with, and contribute to the Space Development Agency?

Navy is inherently reliant on space based capabilities for offensive and defense operations and Navy Research Lab (NRL) has a long history of, designing, testing and operating scientific and operationally useful spacecraft and payloads. The NRL is an ideal partner to identify and reduce the risk on new, innovative space concepts and advanced technologies that the Space Development Agency will need to achieve its mission.

In your view, will the Space Development Agency accelerate the U.S. “leap ahead” of our great power competitors in space—or will it prove a redundant bureaucracy that slows progress? Please explain your answer.

Because the Space Development Agency (SDA) was recently established, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of the organization.

Where should the Space Development Agency reside, in your view?

The Space Development Agency has been proposed as a separate Defense Agency.

Cyber

In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full operational capability. In September, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy.

In your view, how well postured is the Navy to meet the goals outlined in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy? What actions will you take, if confirmed, to remediate any gap between Navy capacity and capability and Cyber Strategy goals?

The Navy’s cybersecurity investments and actions improve our cybersecurity posture while also supporting the DOD Cyber Strategy objective to “Secure DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including such activity on non-DoD-owned networks.” Navy continues to pursue initiatives to improve cyber defense posture, and increase the resilience of networks, weapon systems and infrastructure through the execution of cybersecurity plans.

If confirmed I will continue to ensure the Navy is postured correctly to detect, protect, and respond to cyberattacks and intrusion.

In your view, should the composition of the Cyber Mission Force be adjusted across the National Mission Teams, Combat Mission Teams, Cyber Protection Teams, and Cyber

Support Teams, better to address the requirements identified in the 2018 NDS and the goals set forth in the 2018 Cyber Strategy?

The Navy supports U.S. Cyber Command in its ongoing efforts to design a more agile and effective force designed to implement the priorities of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy by ensuring the Navy is able to compete, deter, and win in and through cyberspace in all phases of conflict against our most advanced adversaries.

Are the size and capabilities of the Navy component of the Cyber Mission Force and Navy cybersecurity service providers sufficient to meet current and future cyber and information warfare requirements?

Cyber and information warfare requirements have changed significantly over time and the speed of change will only increase. If confirmed I will ensure we continuously evaluate the size and capabilities of our cyber force to ensure we are meeting the most current requirements.

If confirmed, what will you do to enhance Navy information dominance capabilities?

If confirmed, I will continue ongoing efforts to enhance Navy information dominance so as to position the Navy to conduct operations as needed in support of USCYBERCOM and to provide assured communications and information transfer to project power abroad.

Looking outward, I will continue to strengthen our understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to combat adversarial cyber operations.

If confirmed, what would you do to improve military cybersecurity career pathways to meet the present and future needs of the Navy and U.S. Cyber Command?

The Navy has made substantial improvements in our military cybersecurity career pathways. For instance, to address the increased demand for Officers with specific Computer Network Operations-focused knowledge, skills, and abilities, the Navy established the Cyber Warfare Engineer (CWE) community in coordination with our other cybersecurity career efforts. The CWE community is the first Navy Officer designator solely focused on Cyberspace Operations. Additionally, starting in 2019, the Navy will reinstitute the Chief Warrant Officer (Grade 1) rank, specifically focused on providing leadership opportunities for junior Sailors with in-demand cyber skills. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to continue these efforts and evaluate any other steps we might take.

In March 2019, the Secretary of the Navy released his *Cyber Readiness Review*. The Report presented a scathing assessment of the Department of the Navy's approach to cybersecurity, finding that "competitors and potential adversaries have exploited DON information systems, penetrated its defenses, and stolen massive amounts of national security" intellectual property. The Report highlighted the urgent need for the Navy and Marine Corps to modify their business and data hygiene processes to protect data as a resource.

Consistent with the *Cyber Readiness Review*, what are the first actions you would direct to enhance cyber defenses in the Navy, if confirmed?

If confirmed, cybersecurity will have my full attention. As pointed out by the Cyber Readiness Review, we have an urgent need to improve Defense Industrial Base cybersecurity for the protection of controlled unclassified information. Immediate steps already underway that I would continue include increasing accountability, strengthening security and oversight and increasing network visibility.

What would you do to improve the cybersecurity culture across the Navy workforce—military, civilian, and contractor? How would you empower and hold accountable key Navy leaders to improve the Service’s cybersecurity culture?

We need to continually ensure that safe cybersecurity practices are enforced across the entire Navy enterprise to ensure the Navy military, civilian, contractor, and industry partners have a comprehensive understanding of cyber threats and actions that increase Navy’s cyber-security readiness. If confirmed, I will continue to direct initiatives regarding cybersecurity culture to determine and expand best practices across the Navy to shape the cybersecurity outlook, behavior, and accountability of our leaders.

The Air Force announced that in the summer of 2019, Air Combat Command would merge the Twenty Fourth and Twenty Fifth Numbered Air Forces to better integrate cyber effects, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, electronic warfare operations, and information operations.

In your view, are there commands and organizations that should be merged similarly to increase unity of effort across such capabilities in the Navy? Please explain your answer.

I believe that the Navy is properly organized across the C4ISR/Cyber enterprise. The Navy’s efforts to organize and operationalize Information Warfare capabilities began in 2009 with the creation of a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare (DCNO IW). Additionally, the Navy reactivated U.S. 10th Fleet in 2010 to serve as an operational, Fleet Cyber Command followed by the 2014 establishment of an Information Warfare Type Command, Naval Information Forces, responsible for the man, train, and equip functions for the Navy’s Information force. Although these organizational changes have postured the Navy to effectively respond across the entire C4ISR/Cyber spectrum, I will, if confirmed, work with Congress to address any further changes that may be necessary in the future.

Science, Technology, and Innovation

U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3;

directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these key technologies?

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines a clear approach to regaining and maintaining our technical advantage through investments in key modernization priorities: hypersonics, directed energy, space, autonomy, cyber, quantum science, microelectronics, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML), and fully-networked command, control, and communication. With the authorities granted by Congress to accelerate technology, we are widening the aperture of investment areas across industry, government and academia. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring we maximize the return in value we receive for that funding, and that our efforts are focused on critical needs of the Navy and Marine Corps.

In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in these technologies across all Services?

Competing in great competition requires the Department to maximize all assets to derive the most value from the taxpayers' dollars. Navy has a strong collaboration and teamwork across the Services and USD (R&E). If confirmed, I will ensure Navy continues to work closely with our Service and OSD counterparts to learn from each other while removing redundancies to accelerate the delivery of technologies to the warfighters.

How has the Navy prioritized limited R&D funding across your technology focus areas? Specifically, where is the Navy either increasing or decreasing focus and funding?

Naval S&T objectives are to maintain technological superiority to ensure our Sailors and Marines have the decisive technology advantage. The naval research enterprise portfolio is balanced across the following areas: strong investment in fundamental (basic and early applied) research to build the scientific foundation for future technologies; an emphasis on key “game changing” initiatives that can provide disruptive technologies to the warfighter; a critical focus on transitioning S&T programs to the acquisition community and the fleet and force through the Future Naval Capability program; and prototype development and experimentation with the Fleet and Force to rapidly learn and revise.

Specifically, Naval S&T funding is prioritized toward artificial intelligence (AI), ocean acoustics, hypersonics, autonomy and autonomous systems, and advanced manufacturing.

How is the Navy balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?

The Department of the Navy utilizes the Maritime Accelerated Acquisition, as well as authorities granted by Congress to DoD, to move technology rapidly from the lab to the fleet. Navy Future

Naval Capabilities and Innovative Naval Prototype programs deliver capability to the fleet faster than traditional programs of record and include technologies across the spectrum, such as Directed Energy Weapons, Cyber, Hypersonics, and Artificial Intelligence.

Navy Future Naval Capabilities are tied to programs of record, and deliver incremental capability to the fleet and force. Innovative Naval Prototypes are game changing or disruptive technologies with a higher risk in order to produce higher warfighting payoff.

What efforts is the Navy making to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to military and national security purposes? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and Navy?

The Naval Warfare Centers and laboratories maintain a professional staff in a technology transfer/transition office to facilitate interactions between researchers and industry. Working through this office, the Navy has made great use of licensing and cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with partners in industry and academia to bring research results into real products.

In addition, the Department of the Navy (DoN) has established an Accelerated Delivery and Acquisition of Prototype Technologies (ADAPT) office to evaluate Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) pilots that accelerate delivery of small business technologies to acquisition organizations and beneficiaries (e.g. Navy shipyards), with a focus on attracting nontraditional defense contractors and startup companies. ADAPT employs the Hacking for Defense (H4D) methodology to identify and refine operational problems for SBIR/STTR topics, thereby ensuring all topics have a DoN acquisition or beneficiary customer from start to finish. This effort uses NDAA prototyping authorities to accelerate delivery of operational prototypes and to facilitate follow-on acquisition and production of technologies.

In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and strengthen our National Security Innovation Base to ensure that critical information is protected?

As developing technologies move from basic research through applied research, to advanced technology development, the need to protect information deemed critical by the Department of Defense is vital. The Navy is taking steps to identify critical information early on in the S&T development. Once critical information is identified, the Navy proactively and aggressively adopts horizontal protection strategies across government, academia, and industry.

These protection strategies include: application and enforcement of operational security (OPSEC) principles, e.g. appropriate “need-to-know” privileges and information handling practices for controlled unclassified information; cyber protections for data-at-rest on contractor networks and IT systems; appropriate counter-intelligence partnerships; and consistent compliance with established security protocols for the National Security Innovation Base such as early assessment of developing technologies for appropriate classification under National Security guidelines.

One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.

If confirmed, what will you do to increase the interaction between Navy labs and the private sector, and between the Navy labs and the rest of the DOD innovation enterprise (i.e., the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Defense Innovation United, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the other Services)?

The Naval Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE) includes 20 commands from the Naval Air Warfare Centers, Naval Surface Warfare Centers, Naval Undersea Warfare Centers, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers, Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Naval Research Laboratory (NR). It is comprised of diverse and highly educated scientists, engineers and technicians (including more than 2,000 PhDs). The NR&DE works closely with talented individuals from industry, academia and across the government. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to successfully partner with these individuals and institutions so that our Sailors and Marines have the most advanced capabilities now and in the future.

What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record?

The Department of the Navy (DoN) uses several processes to reduce the challenges of moving evolving technologies to programs of record. DoN utilizes the Maritime Accelerated Acquisition as well as authorities granted by Congress to move technology rapidly from the lab to the fleet and force. The Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program is designed to develop and transition cutting-edge technologies to acquisition programs of record. This program delivers these technologies for integration into platforms, weapons, sensors or specifications so as to improve Navy and Marine Corps warfighting and support capabilities. The FNC process provides a strong linkage between the S&T community, the resource sponsors, and the fleet.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that a greater percentage of the technologies being developed by Navy labs transition into programs of record for deployment to the warfighter?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy continues to employ a combination of the Maritime Accelerated Acquisitions (MAA), Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs), Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs), Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology Transfers (SBIR/STTR) processes and prototyping to transition technology to programs of record and directly to the warfighter.

If confirmed, what tools would you use to ensure that appropriate technologies are transitioning more quickly into programs of record?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy leverages DoD Labs to aggressively capitalize on the authorities granted by Congress. In 2017, the Navy approved a set of pilot programs under Section 233 of the 2018 NDAA to fuel innovation through improvements in contracting, acquisition, and purchase authority. This year, the Navy significantly expanded the number and scope of pilot projects to make full use of Congressional authorities.

The current budget request for defense Science and Technology (S&T) falls short of the Defense Science Board's recommended goal of dedicating 3% of the total defense budget to S&T. As you know, robust investment in S&T underpins technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital to maintaining our military technological superiority over emerging adversaries. However, over the past few years, the Navy has prioritized near-term research and development over long-term S&T.

If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing adequately in S&T programs and whether the Navy has achieved the proper balance between near-term research and long-term S&T?

As highlighted in the February 2018 Congressional Research Service report on this question, Defense S&T investments are highly complex and can be parsed in many ways. Using the Defense Science Board's metrics, the Naval Science and Technology budget request represents about 1.2% of the DoN's overall budget. This provides a steady funding level to the Naval Research Enterprise to promote stability and long term planning. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy's S&T portfolio utilizes a broad investment approach that leverages long-term, naval relevant fundamental research and applied research while also balancing near-term research in order to give our scientists and engineers the flexibility to pursue new discoveries and promising ideas directly relevant to increasing the Navy's lethality.

How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for basic research programs?

Long term investments in basic research fuel advanced technological development for a wide variety of breakthrough ideas that have matured into today's warfighting capabilities, such as wide band-gap semiconductor radar systems, powerful shipboard lasers, cross-domain security solutions, and highly accurate meteorological models. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the Navy's portfolio of research investments to ensure the best value for the taxpayer.

Technical Workforce

A significant challenge facing the Navy today is a shortage of highly skilled data scientists, computer programmers, cyber and other scientific, technical and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers.

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Navy Active duty military personnel trained and working as scientists, engineers, software coders, and in other technical positions across the Navy's research, development, and acquisition enterprise?

In my opinion, there are substantial benefits in having Navy Active Duty military personnel as part the Naval Research and Development Establishment (NRD&E). An effective and technically proficient military workforce provides a vital link between our warfighting communities and our researchers. These roles allow military personnel to not only contribute to NRD&E efforts, but also to stay on-track for career progression within their respective communities.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to provide the directors of national labs under the purview of the Navy with the civilian workforce management tools they need to shape their science, technology, and engineering workforces?

The Navy appreciates the tools Congress has provided for laboratory directors to manage the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will ensure that the laboratory personnel demonstration system continues to provide an effective and competitive compensation system that is appropriate to the unique needs of the technical and support workforce required at our laboratories while leveraging the additional expansion of direct hiring authorities to recruit talented personnel in a rapid and streamlined manner. Continued partnership between the Navy's Research & Development communities and Congress remains key in sustaining this effort.

Military Health System Reform

Section 702 of the NDAA for FY 2017, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the NDAA for FY 2019, transferred the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from the Military Services to the Defense Health Agency (DHA). Yet, DOD's implementation of this transfer has been delayed significantly.

Do you support the purpose and implementation of section 702 of the FY 2017 NDAA, as clarified by sections 711 and 712 of the FY 2019 NDAA?

Yes. I support the Military Health System reform legislation contained in section 702 of the FY 2017 NDAA as clarified by sections 711 and 712 of the FY 2019 NDAA. The legislation is important to our efforts in transitioning the MHS to an integrated system of readiness and health.

If confirmed, how would you ensure the rapid and efficient transfer of the administration and management of Navy military treatment facilities to the DHA?

As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I am the Navy's representative on the Senior Transition Implementation Board, driving toward expeditious transition of the military treatment facilities. If confirmed, I will continue to support Department efforts to complete the transfer of Navy military treatment facilities to the DHA.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Navy reduces its medical headquarters staffs and infrastructure to reflect the more limited roles and responsibilities of the Surgeon General of the Navy?

If confirmed, I will ensure the current plan to downsize and restructure our medical headquarters, consistent with our readiness responsibilities, is executed.

In your view, is the Navy and Marine Corps medical force properly sized to meet the joint medical requirements set forth in operational plans implementing the 2018 NDS?

Yes. I believe the medical force is currently properly sized to meet joint medical requirements set forth in operational plans implementing the 2018 NDS. As we continue to review current and future operational medical requirements the Navy will use a total force manpower mix (active and reserve) to fill military medical manpower requirements.

In your view, do Navy medical providers possess today the critical wartime medical readiness skills and core competencies required to provide effective and timely health care to Sailors and Marines engaged in combat or contingency operations?

Yes. Developing and sustaining critical wartime medical skills sets is a top priority for our medical teams. During our most recent conflicts, Navy medical personnel demonstrated tremendous skill in combat casualty care and saving lives. Going forward, our priority is to ensure that our provider teams are trained and confident to meet the demands of providing trauma care across the full range of military operations.

End Strength

The Navy's Active duty end strength has grown from an authorized 323,600 in FY 2015 to 335,400 in FY 2019. The FY 2020 President's Budget would fund an additional 5,100 Sailors. To achieve this rapid growth, the Navy has lowered enlistment standards for new recruits and relaxed retention timelines for experienced Sailors.

Do you believe Navy end strength must continue to grow?

Yes, I believe that the Navy must continue to grow our end strength to support shipbuilding, modernization and aircraft procurement authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, and supported in FY 2019 and FY 2020 President's Budgets.

If confirmed, will you ensure the Navy maintains sufficiently high recruitment and retention standards, even if such standards result in the Navy not achieving authorized end strength levels?

We must continue to locate and recruit America's best and brightest young men and women. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy maintains high enlistment standards for new recruits.

How will the decision to reprogram to the Drug Interdiction and Counter Drug Activities account, the funding surplus attributable to the Army's under execution of Active and Reserve Component end strength in FY 2019 affect Navy end strength execution in FYs 2019 and 2020?

This decision will have no impact on Navy's ability to execute the Military Personnel, Navy account as submitted in PB19 and PB20. Current analysis indicates that our Military Personnel Navy and Navy Reserve accounts are adequately funded and no realignments are proposed to these accounts.

In light of the manpower and personnel concerns raised by after-action reviews of the *Fitzgerald* and *McCain* accidents at sea, what are your greatest force management concerns?

I am confident that the work our Readiness Reform Oversight Committee has done to oversee and ensure implementation of the Comprehensive Review/Strategic Readiness review (CR/SRR) recommendations will be effective in addressing the issues they identified, including in the manpower and personnel areas. My greatest concern is ensuring that I have the right mix of people with the right proficiency, experience, and training to properly man the fleet.

How would you address those concerns, if confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations?

If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that the personnel accounts are properly funded to ensure we have the resources needed to man the Fleet. In addition, I would work to ensure that our operational forces not only have access to the training needed, but have time to conduct that training.

Is the Navy's current end strength sufficient to implement the 2018 NDS and execute the associated operational plans? If not, what end strength do you believe is necessary to meet the demands placed on the Navy by the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?

Yes, Navy's end strength supports force structure growth that puts us on pace to reach a 355-ship Navy in FY 2034 and as outlined in the Thirty Year Shipbuilding Plan.

In your view, is the balance between the Navy's institutional support base and deployable combat units correct? If not, what balance do you believe is necessary to meet the demands placed on the Navy by the 2018 NDS and the associated operational plans?

Yes. Navy deployable forces are properly balanced with institutional support billets.

If Active Navy end strength is increased in FY 2020, what specific parameters would you use to determine what the corresponding Navy Reserve end strength should be in order to support those active forces?

The end strength increase in the FY 2020 President's Budget is driven by a number of factors to include steady state and surge mission requirements, cost, readiness, timeliness of response, duration, frequency, predictability, retention, and equipment needs.

Navy has established processes to determine the proper manpower requirement for each unit. These processes address the Active, Reserve, Civilian, and contract manpower requirements. When a new ship or aircraft is procured, it is manned in accordance with the established requirement. Navy overall end strength is determined by summing all individual unit requirements. All parameters are based on the manpower requirements at the unit level.

If BCA caps on defense spending return in FY 2020, what will be the effect on Active and Reserve Navy end strengths? How would the manpower mix between the Active Navy and Navy Reserve be affected?

The return of BCA caps will jeopardize Navy's ability to attain required Active end strength growth in support of a 355-ship Navy. The current budget submission represents Navy's required resourcing to recruit and retain the talent needed for our growing fleet. If BCA caps force a reduction in force structure, Active end strength requirements will need to be reassessed and, to preserve Navy capabilities during a BCA, some capabilities and end strength may need to shift from Active to Reserve.

What additional force shaping authorities and tools does the Navy need, in your view?

Thanks to past actions by the Congress I believe we have sufficient authorities and tools for force shaping.

Navy Reserve

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between the Active Navy and the Navy Reserve?

The Reserve Component is a critical partner in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of capabilities first and then decide where the capability should reside. The value of the Navy Reserve is in both their strategic capacity to provide Sailors and units for mobilizations in support of Global Force Management requirements, as well as their operational capacity to provide daily support to the Fleet through flexible access options. Additionally, unique civilian skills are highly leveraged in advancing Navy's capabilities.

What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve? If confirmed, what new objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, force structure, and end strength?

As part of the Navy's Total Force of Active and Reserve Sailors supported by government civilians, Navy Reserve Sailors bring value through scalable utilization options to meet Navy requirements. Approximately 25 percent of the Navy Reserve delivers operational support on any given day, increasing Total Force operational capacity. The manner in which the Navy employs its Reserve Component provides responsive and flexible options to meet Navy mission requirements. If confirmed, I will support efforts to leverage our Navy Reserve capabilities in

appropriate areas where our Reserve Component could increase Total Force efficiency and effectiveness in executing the mission.

Are you concerned that continued reliance on the Reserve to execute operational missions—both at home and around the globe—is adversely affecting the Navy Reserve’s ability to meet its recruiting and retention missions? Why or why not?

No. There is no doubt that our Sailors and their families are mission focused. They are proud to do their job, making significant sacrifices, as they serve the nation. Accordingly, retention in the Navy Reserve is in excess of 85%.

In your view, does the Navy Reserve serve as an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your answer, should the Navy Reserve be supported by improved equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing for readiness going forward?

The Navy Reserve provides both confident strategic depth and valuable operational support. The Navy’s integrated approach to Total Force employment, where the Reserve Component works side-by-side the Active Component, enables Reserve Sailors and Reserve units to train for strategic requirements, while also supporting Navy’s day-to-day operations. Accordingly, if confirmed, I will ensure the Navy Reserve has the necessary resources needed for proper integration with their Active counterparts.

Do you expect to meet prior service accession goals for the Navy Reserve this fiscal year? Why or why not?

During the last five years, the Navy Reserve has met over 90% of the prior service accession goal. For FY 2018, Reserve Component members converting back to Active Component increased over 400%. Accordingly, Navy Reserve has had to increase its prior service accession goals to match this new requirement. For FY 2019, the Prior Service Recruiting goal is 5,500, the Navy Reserve is currently tracking at 85% of that goal. Prior Service recruiting has been a challenge since the Navy Reserve accepted responsibility for 80% of the Navy’s Individual Augmentees (IA). We have initiated an effort to bring IA to zero over the coming years and the Chief of Naval Personnel is in the process of increasing IA waivers for new accessions for the first 2 years of Reserve Service. These two efforts should help increase recruiting efforts.

What is your understanding and view of the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness proposal for comprehensive Reserve Component Duty Status Reform?

Comprehensive Reserve duty status reform is an important step toward enhanced personnel readiness. It increases our efficiency to provide operational support, while improving the quality of life for our Sailors, by simplifying and properly aligning compensation and benefits commensurate with type of duty.

Does the Navy have the personnel and pay information technology systems required to implement effectively this Reserve Component Duty Status Reform proposal, if enacted in law?

An integrated Navy Personnel and Pay (NP2) system will be delivered to the Navy by January 2021. NP2 will deliver a single, global pay and personnel system leveraging modern technology to meet the expectations of a millennial workforce, integrate direct to Treasury pay capability, and build-out a customer relationship management (CRM) solution integrating business processes, supporting systems, and authoritative data to manage the Navy's workforce. NP2 delivery is part of the broader Manpower Personnel Training & Education (MPT&E) Transformation. Deployment of the NP2 will serve as a key enabler for the implementation of Reserve Component Duty Status Reform.

Recruiting and Retention

The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity required, willing to serve. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only about 29% of today's youth population is eligible for military service. Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards are interested in serving. Further, in FY 2018, the Navy Reserve failed to achieve its authorized end strength.

Rather than relying solely on ever-higher compensation for a shrinking pool of volunteers, what creative steps would you take, if confirmed, to and expand the pool of eligible recruits and improve Navy recruiting?

In late 2017, Navy launched a successful rebranding campaign, "Forged by the Sea," and switched our model from 70% broadcast advertising to 70% online advertising. This effort was done to reach the Centennial market where they live: online. The Centennial generation are digital natives, meaning they are watching less broadcast TV in favor of YouTube, Instagram and other digital applications. The results of our efforts have been both dramatic and effective.

Additionally, we built a long range strategy based on community outreach and partnerships to influence the "influencers." If confirmed I intend to continue to expand in the digital arena and leverage our successes thus far into higher accessions, but also higher quality Sailors.

What do you consider to be key to your future success, if confirmed, in retaining the best qualified personnel for continued service in positions of greater responsibility and leadership in the Navy?

Attracting and retaining the best Sailors in an increasingly competitive talent market requires continued flexibility and transparency in policies and practices. We are arming our talented workforce with a modernized, agile and flexible personnel system, ready to meet the challenges and uncertainty of an era of emerging great power competition. We are aggressively working to complete the Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E) transformation effort to simplify management and curtail personnel costs for Navy military manpower. Similarly, our

Sailor 2025 initiatives are critical to recruiting the best Sailors up-front. To accomplish this mission, we will offer better talent-matching, greater career flexibility, modernized and portable training delivery, better life/work balance, and pay and incentives that keep pace with market forces. These factors will lead to higher retention and a leaner, more sustainable personnel footprint.

What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the overall recruiting, retention, readiness, and morale of Sailors?

Central to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel and maintaining readiness and morale is our ability to provide Sailors deployment predictability and the resources necessary to carry out their mission. Improving the manning on our platforms will significantly increase morale and quality of life for our Sailors while enhancing warfighting readiness. We recently implemented several initiatives to address enlisted fleet manning shortfalls, including adjusting High Year Tenure, increasing enlisted accessions, modifying our Physical Fitness Assessment separation policy, and aligning sea tours with service obligations. While we cannot control the global events that drive operational tempo, we can provide our Sailors with the necessary resources to ensure they are able to complete the mission without undue burdens.

In your view, do current recruiting standards—particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits—accurately predict recruit attrition and/or future success in the Navy?

The standards currently in place have given us a fairly consistent 15% attrition rate through Recruit Training Command and out into the Fleet. If confirmed, I will monitor this area closely to ensure that our recruiting standards deliver the workforce the Navy requires.

What impact, if any, do you believe the new Blended Retirement System (BRS) will have on recruiting and retention in the Navy?

To date, BRS has had a negligible, if any, impact on recruiting and retention. We will continue to monitor the effects of BRS as Sailors progress through their careers and face future retention decisions.

Why, in your view, did eligible Navy officers “opt in” to BRS at a rate almost double that of eligible Navy enlisted personnel (70% officer “opt in” as compared to 30% enlisted personnel “opt in)?

Initial analysis suggests that officers who opted in to BRS believed they may not stay Navy for a 20-year career and wanted to take advantage of the Thrift Savings Plan. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is studying the issue. Understanding the factors that drove this behavior will help inform future force management decisions.

What future retention challenges do Navy BRS opt-in rates portend, by officer community and enlisted rating?

Because the Blended Retirement System (BRS) has only been effect for slightly over a year, it is too early to see any measurable retention effects that can be attributed to it. In the legislation authorizing BRS, Congress provided tools, specifically Continuation Pay, necessary to maintain the current force profile, while better positioning the Department to compete with the private sector to recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force. We are monitoring behavior by officer community and enlisted rating in anticipation of the need to influence retention through judicious authorization and adjustments to targeted retention incentives and Continuation Pay.

How has the “Professional Pilot” program affected the retention of naval aviators?

The Professional Flight Instructor program has retained 26 pilots who would likely have separated from the Navy. The first board held in November 2018 generated 96 applicants for 26 selections. This program provides mutual benefits for the Service and individuals by providing the Navy with trained and experienced instructor pilots while offering career options to young Naval aviators.

Because the “all-Volunteer” military depends on a constant flow of volunteers each year, as the number of eligible and service-propensed American youth declines, it will become increasingly difficult to meet military needs.

Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of American youth eligible and interested in serving in the Armed Forces poses an existential threat to national security?

No, but we are watching this closely, and I would support policy options to address propensity for service.

What is the role of “influencers”—parents, grandparents, teachers, coaches, and clergy to whom a young person turns for advice—in a young person’s decision to join, or not to join the Navy?

Joint Advertising Market Research & Studies have proven that “influencers” play a major role in a young person’s decision to join, or not join, the Navy. They expose the Nation’s youth to the idea that military service is a valuable, honorable and rewarding career choice. They serve as a trusted resource to answer questions and address concerns about Navy service, thereby reducing a potential applicant’s anxiety about joining. Many of these “influencers” also represent a support network for the potential recruit as the move closer to joining and even through boot camp. It is important to note, that “influencers” also play a bigger role in some cultures, which supports the strengths of a diverse Navy.

Recognizing the important role that “influencers” play, the Navy targets them in our marketing efforts. On Navy.com, there is a page dedicated to family and “influencers” answering questions not just about joining, but also what life is like in the Navy. This page is a helpful guide for “influencers” to have conversations with the potential recruit who is thinking about joining the service.

Has the integrated DOD recruiting campaign, *Their Success Tomorrow Begins With Your Support Today*, been successful in increasing the willingness of youth or their influencers to consider service in the Navy?

Yes. The DoD recruiting campaign is a critical augmentation to our current marketing efforts in attracting those qualified and eligible to serve. This DoD campaign is aligned to our long term strategy seeking to influence the parents, family and friends of potential Sailors. Because these ads are largely on television it represents an effective partnership that blankets all generations. Data from DoD's recently launched (Fall 2018) campaign show that "influencers" who saw one of the DoD ads were more likely to recommend service than those who did not see an ad (54% vs. 41%).

Military Compensation

The Department of Defense has traditionally assessed the competitiveness of military pay by comparing Regular Military Compensation against salaries earned by a comparable civilian demographic.

Do you agree that the primary purpose of a competitive military pay and benefits package is to recruit and retain a military of sufficient size and quality to meet the objectives of the 2018 NDS?

Yes. In an All-Volunteer Force, a competitive pay and benefits package remains critical to our ability to recruit and retain the high quality people needed to man the Navy.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current military pay package in achieving this goal—particularly given the ever-tightening recruiting market?

The current compensation package is very competitive and continues to be essential to our ability to recruit and retain in an increasingly competitive market. Faced with record low unemployment and wage growth, we need to ensure that the compensation package remains competitive.

Do you believe the largely "one-size-fits-all" model for military pay adequately rewards individuals for their specialized skills and provides an appropriate incentive to scientists, engineers, and members of other high-value professions to access into the military?

We must be able to target incentives to ensure we attract and retain the skills and quality needed. A comprehensive compensation package that includes across-the-board baseline compensation augmented by flexible special and incentive pays will continue to be essential to recruiting and retaining a growing all-volunteer force.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current military pay and benefits package?

We recently implemented the Blended Retirement System (BRS) and need some time to evaluate its effects on retention behavior. We also need to ensure that the overall compensation package keeps pace with growing requirements in an increasingly competitive market.

What specific recommendations do you have for controlling the rising cost of military personnel?

We must continue to look for efficiencies wherever possible. Continued judicious application of targeted special and incentive pays is one of the most efficient and cost-effective means of paying for the Navy the Nation Needs.

Voluntary Education and Credentialing Programs

Do you believe that DOD and Navy Voluntary Education Programs contribute to Navy recruiting and retention, and to military readiness? If so, why? If not, why not?

Yes, off-duty education is a valuable recruiting and retention tool that empowers our Sailors to reach their full professional and personal potential. Our Voluntary Education Programs play a key role in fostering a culture of continuous learning, benefiting the entire Navy team.

Recently, the Navy rescinded the its 16-semester hour FY limit on Tuition Assistance (TA) and authorized Sailors to use TA up to the DOD FY funding cap of \$4,500—an increase from the Navy’s previous effective cap of \$4,000.

What effects have these new TA program criteria had on Sailor professional development and degree completion?

With less than a full fiscal year of data to measure so far, more time is needed to evaluate the impact on degree completions. Rescinding the FY limit correlated in increased TA participation, with about 20% more Sailors using the benefit this year than at the same point in FY 2018.

Is the Navy’s increased investment in TA justified, given the current budget environment?

We are very mindful of the current budget environment and constantly monitor TA, along with our entire voluntary education portfolio, to balance our investment in education with our other requirements.

What progress has the Navy made in identifying and leveraging credentialing programs, both to enhance a sailor’s ability to perform his/her official duties, and to qualify the Sailor for meaningful civilian employment on separation from the military?

The Navy Credentialing Program has mapped over 2,700 civilian certifications that align with Navy occupations, training and major collateral duties. Every Sailor in the Navy has the opportunity to earn at least one certification. We have expanded eligibility for credentials aligned with training Sailors may receive on or off-duty, attainment of academic degrees, previous

ratings held and Selected Reserve members' civilian occupations. These certifications both professionalize our workforce and may assist Sailors in qualifying for meaningful civilian employment upon transition.

Non-Deployable Service Members

Recently, the Department published DODI 1332.45, *Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable Service Members*.

Do you agree that Sailors who are non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from the Navy or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?

Yes. Sailors who are non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months should be considered for separation or referral into the Disability Evaluation System. This policy still allows the force to make a considered decision based on the probability of recovery coupled with the Sailor's position in their career.

How many Sailors have been separated or referred into the Disability Evaluation System as a result of this policy?

Non-deployability is not a basis for separation. The majority of Sailors are cleared of their non-deployable status and return to full duty. This policy has incentivized Sailors to return to full active duty and has enhanced our warfighting readiness. As of March 2019, there are 2,469 (AC and RC) Sailors enrolled in the Disability Evaluation System.

DODI 1332.45 provides that the Secretaries of the Military Departments may “retain. . .those Service Members whose period of non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit. . .if determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.”

In your view, under what circumstances might the retention of a Sailor who has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be “in the best interest of the Navy”?

Retention decisions for non-deployable personnel are made on a case-by-case basis using all available information. It is critical to balance the best interests of the Navy with the best interests of the Sailor, and strive for the mutual benefit of both.

In your view, how should this policy be applied to Sailors with HIV? To Sailors who identify as transgender?

The Department of Defense non-deployable policy applies equally to all Service Members, including those with HIV and those who identify as transgender.

Has the Navy established any class or group of personnel deemed “deployable with limitations,” such that the class or group is exempt from the 12-month non-deployable retention determination requirement?

Navy has not established a new “deployable with limitations” category; however, sailors who are found fit for duty by the PEB but are not world-wide deployable and sailors with Blood Borne Pathogens who can only deploy to certain areas are considered “deployable with limitations.”

What percentage of both the Active and Reserve Navy is presently non-deployable as defined by DODI 1332.45? In your view, what is the percentage of Sailors in the Active Navy and the percentage of Sailors in the Navy Reserve who can be non-deployable at any given time without adversely affecting the readiness of the force to execute the 2018 NDS and associated operational plans?

As of March 2019, 3.64% of Active Sailors and 8.71% of Reserve Sailors are currently non-deployable for an overall 4.4% of Total Force, which is below the DoD goal of 5%. The Navy continues to aggressively manage this population of Sailors to ensure we maximize Fleet readiness. While a maximum threshold has not been studied or determined, increases in the percentage of non-deployable Sailors requires additional manning actions to meet Fleet manning requirements.

If confirmed, what would you do to improve the timeliness of Sailor referral to, and processing through the Disability Evaluation System?

I support the DoD goal of reducing the Disability Evaluation System processing time to 180 days or less. If confirmed, I will work with our medical and administrative personnel to identify and eliminate unnecessary processes while streamlining the Disability Evaluation System timeline through automation and process improvement.

Service of Transgender Persons

In January of 2019, the Supreme Court issued an order allowing DOD to implement this Administration’s policy prohibiting some transgender persons from joining the military. The new DOD policy took effect on 12 April 2019.

If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing the new DOD policy on the service of transgender persons in the Navy?

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure all Sailors are treated with dignity and respect throughout the Navy, and will oversee implementation of the DoD policy to ensure it remains on track.

In your view, does allowing a Sailor who accessed into the Service in his/her preferred gender or who received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a military medical provider before 12 April 2019, to continue to serve in the Navy under policies and procedures established by then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in 2016, promote or detract from military readiness? Please explain your answer.

Navy has not experienced adverse readiness issues associated with the previous or new DoD transgender policies.

How will the Navy determined which Sailors should be “grandfathered” under the 2016 policy?

The updated DoD policy is clear that Service Members who received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and any individual who was medically qualified for military Service or was selected for entrance into an officer commissioning program prior to 12 April 2019, is grandfathered. The policy also permits Secretaries of the Military Departments to grant exemption waivers.

In your view, what would be the impact on readiness of requiring the separation of all transgender Sailors currently serving in the Navy?

Given that DoD policy does not permit the tracking of transgender service members, it would be difficult to assess the impact. That said, DoD policy does not separate currently serving transgender service members who transitioned or began transition before April 12, 2019.

In your experience, has the service of transgender individuals in their preferred gender had any negative impacts on unit or overall readiness in the Navy?

I am unaware of negative impacts on unit or overall Navy readiness as a result of transgender individuals serving in their preferred gender.

Military Quality of Life

The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family advocacy and parenting skills programs; child care; spouse education and employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) services.

If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you consider a priority?

We recruit a Sailor, but retain a family. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize Sailor and family quality of life programs, to include childcare and family support programs, and ensure we remain committed to Navy families. If confirmed, I will continue to listen and learn from our Sailors and their families and consult with industry experts to ensure highest quality and service while remaining fiscally responsible.

If confirmed, how would you work across the Navy, and with the Military Service Organizations and Congress to sustain and enrich high-value quality of life and MWR programs for Sailors and their families? What factors would you consider in assessing which MWR programs are ineffective or outmoded and thus potentially suitable for elimination or reduction in scope?

If confirmed, I will continuously seek input from our Sailors and their families to measure the value of these programs to our Sailors and their families. Navy will continue to leverage robust

accreditation processes and monitor individual locations to ensure demand remains high and our programs are financially stable.

Family Readiness and Support

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for Sailors and their families?

Each Navy family has unique needs driven by their own personal circumstances and geographic location. From pay and compensation, to deployment predictability, to healthcare, our families have unique concerns that unit leadership must address in a timely and compassionate manner. Our Sailors tell us that predictability, combined with tailored communication before, during, and after deployments helps bring families together, building bonds that improve unit readiness and cohesion.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the family readiness issues you identified are properly addressed and adequately resourced?

Most family issues are best addressed and cared for at the local level by unit commanders and senior enlisted leaders whom Sailors and their families know and trust. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to ensure local leaders have access to information and resources needed to quickly address family needs. We must encourage an environment of open and honest communication, facilitated by our Ombudsmen network, All Hands Calls and social media platforms.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that support related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness is provided to Navy Reserve families, as well as to Active Duty Navy families who do not reside near a military base?

Our Reserve and remote Active Force and their families are critical to the Navy mission and we must support them with the quality of service they deserve. We are leveraging technology to provide live and virtual support in the form of webinars, counseling services, and easy to access support information and resources. We continue to modernize our systems, processes and tools to improve the quality of service for all Navy Sailors and their families.

The Committee often hears that Active Duty families have difficulty obtaining child care on base and that there are thousands of military families on waitlists to receive infant care.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to provide Navy families with accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate cost?

The lack of accessible, affordable child care nationwide is an important Readiness issue for our Sailors and I am committed to ensuring mission readiness by addressing the child care needs of our Sailors. Although the Navy has added 7,000 child care spaces in the last decade and extended hours of operation where needed. In fleet concentration locations like San Diego,

Hampton Roads, Hawaii, and in Washington, DC. where Navy is experiencing larger waitlists, we are exploring partnerships with external organizations to expand child care availability. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and Congress to address any policy limitations that are impacting Navy's ability to provide Navy families with accessible, high-quality childcare.

What is your view of the efficacy of the Navy's implementation of the MilitaryChildCare.com system?

The implementation of MilitaryChildCare.com has made it easier for military families to find the child care they need and helps the Navy better manage and plan for present and future child care needs during surges, deployments and Permanent Change of Station seasons. Today, more than 200,000 military families are currently using the MilitaryChildCare.com as the single online gateway to access find available military child care worldwide, request care at any DoD location, and obtain anticipated placement time.

Many military families have communicated with the Committee about the significant hardships they experienced during the 2018 summer Permanent Change of Station (PCS) cycle, including: unprofessional and untrained household goods packers and movers; unannounced and extensive delays in the pickup and delivery of household goods; extensive damage to personal property; and limited engagement by the Military Services in providing oversight and taking corrective action on complaints.

If confirmed, how would you establish accountability in the Navy for high quality service and support to military families undergoing a PCS move?

If confirmed, I will continue to press for improved accountability in the PCS process. Navy is an active participant in the DoD-TRANSCOM Personnel Relocation/HHG Movement working group and I fully support the action plan which includes revised quality assurance standards and synchronization of personnel and logistics requirements. Navy is also pursuing a pilot program to increase Sailor choice and satisfaction with the PCS move process and reduce Sailor financial and record-keeping burdens and the stressors associated with a PCS move.

In your view, is it feasible to adjust military personnel policies to decrease the total number of PCS moves required across a sailor's career, without adversely affecting that sailor's career progression or military readiness?

Yes. We are always looking for better ways to balance the Sailor's career needs while meeting our operational commitments. More than 30% of our PCS orders are being issued within the same geographic location.

In your view, how can the policies enacted pursuant to the Military Family Stability Act be employed to distribute the demand for PCS moves more evenly across the entire year (rather than concentrating moves in the summer months)?

PCS orders are issued throughout the year. The Sailor has the final say regarding when their HHG shipments occur and our policies support Sailors who choose to move ahead of or after their family to best support the family's needs.

Support for Military Families with Special Needs

If confirmed, how would you ensure that a Sailor with a special needs family member is relocated only to a new duty station at which the medical and educational services required by that family member are available?

If confirmed, I will remain focused on ensuring Sailors and families understand the importance of the Navy's Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP), which is designed to assist with the special needs of their Exceptional Family Member at new duty locations. Assistance is emphasized in the assignment process, but also includes family support from Fleet and Family Service Centers. EFMP case liaisons are located throughout the fleet to provide information and referrals, individualized service plans, and case management from one duty station to the next. Additionally, EFMP coordinators are located at the medical treatment facility and serve both personnel and family support functions.

If confirmed, how would you incentivize sailor enrollment in the exceptional family member program (EFMP)?

If confirmed, I will continue Navy's educational and outreach efforts regarding the benefits of EFMP. In addition to local EFMP case liaisons, coordinators and command representatives, we are developing a mobile application to identify, consolidate and standardize information into one authoritative source. Sailors need to understand the benefits of EFMP and rest assured that they will receive equal consideration for assignment and promotion opportunities regardless of family member medical status.

If confirmed, what specific new initiatives would you suggest to assist a Sailor with a special needs family member in advocating for and accessing individualized educational programs, and other support to which their family member is entitled under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, including from local school districts in the vicinity of Navy bases?

If confirmed, I will remain focused on technological advances as well as state and local support programs that provide easier and more specialized access to government and community educational resources that support special needs families. If confirmed, I will also work with the Secretary of the Navy and the special needs support team to meet the medical and educational needs of our families through the Exceptional Family Member Program.

If confirmed, what new initiatives might you suggest for improving the ability of Sailors with a special needs family member to obtain the medical services and support their family member requires?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and other Service Chiefs on DoD-wide efforts to standardize the process ensuring adequate medical resources are available to families with special needs, easing their transition to new locations.

Military Housing Privatization Initiative

In the FY 1996 NDAA Congress established the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI), providing DOD with the authority to obtain private-sector financing and management to repair, renovate, construct, and operate military housing. DOD has since privatized 99 percent of its domestic housing. In recent months, the Committee has held two hearings to address widespread complaints that over the past several years, military families living in privatized housing have been exposed to environmental hazards, rodent and other infestations, and other conditions that render their quarters uninhabitable and, in some cases, endanger the health and well-being of their children. Certainly, some of the “private partners” charged to manage installation housing regularly tolerated shoddy repairs or closed work orders without action. Complaints to military housing management offices often remained unaddressed and, in many cases, military oversight and chain of command engagement were non-existent. Many family members expressed fears that in speaking out about the appalling condition of the quarters in which they lived, they were opening themselves and their Service Member to reprisal.

What has the Navy done to address Sailor and family member concerns regarding the untenable living conditions prevalent in certain privatized housing locales?

The Navy is aggressively addressing immediate problems in privatized housing and improving our business processes to permanently correct systemic issues. Commanding Officers have completed 100% contact with all Sailors/residents residing in Privatized or government housing to ensure our Navy families are living in safe and quality living quarters and offered an opportunity for a home visit from their chain of command. Installation Housing Offices are tracking all unresolved and outstanding housing complaints stemming from these chain-of-command contact and home visits. The Navy has also conducted town halls at each installation, issued an out of cycle third party administered Resident Satisfaction Survey, and established Housing Crisis Action Teams at headquarters and region levels to respond with alacrity to housing complaints.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to establish accountability in the Navy for sustaining the high quality housing that Sailors and their families deserve?

If confirmed, I will ensure oversight of privatized housing through routine boots-on-the-ground and resident follow-up, spot checks, continued town halls, education, increased leadership engagement, and continued communications with all stakeholders. I will also empower Navy leaders to take corrective action before it impacts the safety and wellbeing of our military families, and the readiness and effectiveness of our force. Navy will continue to actively participate in DOD-level discussions on a resident bill of rights and consideration of a standardized lease. I will aggressively continue efforts to ensure all residents know they have an advocate in their chain of command, installation leadership, and our government housing teams

with zero tolerance for reprisal against any service member or military family member that raises housing concerns.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to establish accountability in MHPI “contractors”, particularly given that, in most cases, they have public-private partnership agreements with the government that extend for as long as 50 years?

The Navy’s privatized housing partners will remain an important component of the housing solutions offered to military families, however we must never outsource our role as advocates for Sailors and their families. If confirmed I will ensure that Navy leaders know how they can forcefully and effectively assist Sailors and their families with satisfactory results in privatized housing. I will also continue to insist that base officials leverage every option available to hold PPV partners accountable, including the adjustment of incentive fees, the authority to issue cure notices, and prompting PPV Partners to replace a property management company if necessary.

Given the challenges associated with the MHPI, do you support the proposed elimination of the position of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and the Environment?

I defer to the Secretary of the Navy on the organization of his staff, but believe we need strong oversight and policy guidance from the secretariat on these issues.

Given the challenges associated with the MHPI, do you support the proposed privatization of Military Service lodging facilities?

I support efforts to improve the quality of temporary lodging to Service Members and their families during their moves to new permanent duty stations and while on temporary duty assignments. If confirmed I intend to remain involved in the Secretary of the Navy’s initiative to leverage the commercial hospitality industry to deliver high-quality, cost-effective temporary lodging to Service Members.

To what extent, if any, have the Congressionally-mandated 25% reductions in management headquarters affected the number and capability of Navy employees charged to oversee privatized military housing matters—both at headquarters-level and at Navy bases?

The congressionally-mandated reduction in management headquarters did not have a direct impact to the number of Navy employees overseeing privatized housing.

Emerging Contaminants

Perflouroctane (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) have been major concerns for DOD, Congress, military families, and communities in the vicinity of military installations. According to GAO, the Navy has identified 127 installations with known or suspected releases of PFOS and PFOA.

If confirmed, how will you further efforts to address PFOS/PFOA contamination at Navy installations?

If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that we continue our work with the Environmental Protection Agency, and adhere to the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) process which guides our responsibilities for how to address PFOS and PFOA releases both on and off Navy installations. Further, I will ensure that our cleanup activities are open and transparent with state and federal agencies, and will continue to advocate for the funding required to execute our responsibilities and ensure access to safe and clean drinking water.

What are your views of the importance of the Navy's efforts to find a replacement for Aqueous Film Forming Foam?

I fully support the Department of Defense's 2016 policy, which requires the Military Departments to destroy existing supplies of AFFF and support non-toxic replacements. We are completing disposal of all legacy AFFF in storage, and are aggressively replacing legacy AFFF where we find it in existing systems. We regularly test AFFF alternatives to identify the most environmentally preferable options, and update the MILSPEC products list based on the testing results. I also support ongoing research to find a non-fluorinated AFFF replacement that can meet MILSPEC standards. If confirmed, I commit to supporting the DOD policy, advancing research for AFFF substitutes, and working with the Congress to ensure we expedite the full replacement of AFFF in all Navy systems.

If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing public concerns—including the health concerns of Service Members and their families—regarding alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on Navy bases and in the context of performing military duties?

If confirmed, I commit to open and transparent engagement with Service Members, their families, and the local communities in and around affected areas. The health and safety of our Sailors, their families and communities are of the utmost importance. I am committed to ensuring access to clean and safe drinking water, addressing Navy's cleanup responsibilities, and working with the Environmental Protection Agency to ensure there are consistent regulatory standards to address cleanup actions under CERCLA.

Commissary and Military Exchange Systems

If confirmed, would you support the consolidation of commissaries and the Service Exchanges into a single defense resale system?

If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Secretaries of the Navy and Defense to improve services for our Sailors and their families. Regardless of the defense resale system structure, I am focused on ensuring our Commissaries and Exchanges continue to provide these important benefits with no loss in buying power or product quality.

Suicide Prevention

The number of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to maintain a strong focus on preventing suicides in the Active Navy, the Navy Reserve, and in the families of your Sailors?

Suicide prevention is an area that requires continuous scrutiny and development, and if confirmed, I am committed to leading this effort. Suicide is complex and rarely the result of a single event or stressor. We employ a comprehensive approach to suicide prevention to promote a sense of community, encourage open conversation about stress and foster a culture supportive of seeking help. If confirmed, I would continue our focus on implementing primary prevention using various public health and behavioral health models to move to the left of tragic events such as death by suicide and understanding the relationship between suicide and other destructive behaviors.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to enhance the reporting and tracking of suicide among family members and dependents of Sailors across all Components?

Sailors are required to report dependent deaths, including those by suicide. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Defense Suicide Prevention Office to streamline the process of capturing dependent suicide data from State and National databases. I am committed to using every technology and resource at our disposal to improve the efficiency of our process and procedures.

Mental and Behavioral Health Care

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to Sailors in theater or at sea, as well as to Sailors and families at home station locations?

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure access to behavioral health services for Sailors and family members. Across the service, our priority continues to be reducing the stigma and other barriers to seeking mental health care services. Navy is expanding our embedded mental health program, which places mental health providers directly in fleet units to provide care where Sailors both live and work.

If confirmed, what specifically would you do to ensure that sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to Reserve Component Sailors and their families who do not reside near a military base?

I recognize the unique needs of our Reserve Component Sailors and, if confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure access to needed behavioral health resources. An important initiative within Navy is our Psychological Health Outreach Program, which provides access to psychological services for our Navy reservists and families.

Although the Department has made great strides in reducing the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, many Service Members remain concerned that their military careers will be adversely affected should their chain of command become aware that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness of the Service Members under their command.

As regards the provision of mental and behavioral health care, how does the Navy bridge the gap between a Sailor's desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect the readiness of the sailor and the unit?

In alignment with DoD Instruction 6490.08, Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing Mental Health Care to Service Members, health care providers prioritize a Service Members' privacy with regard to mental health and substance abuse care and only notify a command when there is the danger of possible harm to self, others, or mission; or if the nature or severity of a condition impacts the Service Member's availability for full duty. When disclosure is necessary, providers only disclose the minimum information to the commanding officer concerned as required to satisfy the purpose of the disclosure.

In your view, do non-medical counseling services provided by DOD Military Family Life Counselors have a role in promoting the readiness of Sailors and their families?

Yes.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

In your view, are the policies, programs, and training that the Navy has put in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?

The prevention and response to sexual assault is a complex issue that requires constant re-evaluation. I am encouraged that more survivors of sexual assault are coming forward and reporting assaults as that demonstrates confidence in the system and trust in commanders. But it is dispiriting to note sexual assault continues to occur within the Navy, and to read certain reports and survey responses that indicate our adherence to existing policies needs to improve. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize command leadership and engagement at all levels to ensure that existing policies, programs, and training are followed, and to search for new ways to improve our prevention and response efforts.

Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to enhance the response to sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and to hold assailants accountable, the rate of sexual assaults in the Navy remains too high. If confirmed, what will you do to increase focus on the prevention of sexual assaults?

Sexual assault within our ranks has a poisonous effect on unit performance and cohesion, reflecting a breach of trust. If confirmed, I will focus on command leadership at every level, and demand that all leaders maintain command climates which are intolerant of all types of destructive behaviors, especially sexual harassment and sexual assault. Although the prevalence of sexual assault is too high, the increase in reporting rates over the past decade reflects survivors' trust in their command to provide them the care they need and confidence in the processes that hold offenders appropriately accountable. We must continue to do all that we can to earn and expand that trust.

What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?

Some survivors of sexual assault want to receive support resources including medical, mental health, and legal assistance without immediately having to go through the criminal justice process. The current restricted reporting option empowers them to report and provides an avenue to assist them. Sexual assault survivors always have the option to convert their restricted report to an unrestricted report and to seek justice through the military justice system later. It is my view that eliminating the restricted reporting option would discourage some survivors from reporting at all, denying them essential support in dealing with their trauma.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove from Navy commanding officers, case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

Commanders are called upon every day to make difficult decisions to accomplish their assigned missions while simultaneously protecting the wellbeing of their subordinates. The authority that commanders exercise under the UCMJ is important to achieving these goals. Military commanders, who are entrusted with the lives of their subordinates and the security of our nation, can and must be trusted to make decisions, informed by advice from military lawyers, concerning the disposition of offenses.

What is your assessment of the Navy's implementation of protections against retaliation (including reprisal; social ostracism; and acts of cruelty, oppression, and maltreatment) for reporting sexual assault?

Retaliation is unacceptable and while we have made progress, we still have work to do. Training to recognize and eliminate retaliation has been added to all leadership development curriculum and each installation-based Sexual Assault Case Management Group solicits input for any experiences of retaliation against victims, first responders or witnesses to a crime during its monthly review of open cases.

Looking at FY 2017, the last report for which we have data available at this time, there were very few reports of retaliation in the Navy, but none where the Navy had the authority or the evidence to prosecute. Victim's Legal Council report very infrequent command retaliation against those who make sexual assault reports. VLC tell us that their sexual assault clients who experience retaliatory behavior are suffering from social ostracism. VLC have had some success in

engaging commands to tamp down social ostracism but where such efforts are not effective, they assist survivors of sexual assault with other options such as switching barracks, changing units, or requesting an expedited transfer.

Although the military has more control over the workplace and social behaviors of its Sailors than a civilian workplace, social ostracism is a complex behavior that is challenging to deter. To overcome this, we continue to train on the prevention of such behaviors and to thoroughly investigate all reports of retaliation.

What is your understanding of the “continuum of harm” in the context of sexual harassment and sexual assault and their effects on the readiness of military units?

The continuum of harm is a sliding scale, in terms of severity, of negative and/or destructive behaviors. If non-criminal inappropriate behaviors are tolerated, a command climate is more likely to tolerate sexual harassment and sexual assault. The Navy’s ongoing Culture of Excellence campaign builds on our understanding of the continuum of harm and the findings of the 2016 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty members. This campaign is an integrated, holistic approach at preventing destructive behaviors, from suicide and sexual assault to excessive use of alcohol, leveraging behavioral science and analytics, and aimed at promoting signature healthy behaviors rather than focusing on behavior at the point-of-failure.

What is your view of the role of the Navy chain of command in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated?

The chain of command is responsible for ensuring each member of the Navy is treated with dignity and respect and the command must provide a safe work environment free of sexual harassment and sexual assault. All leaders, at every level, but especially commanding officers, are responsible for promoting a climate intolerant of destructive behaviors, including sexual harassment and sexual assault.

In your view, do military and civilian leaders at all levels of the Navy have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the prevention of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault? If not, what additional training, authorities, or resources do you believe are needed, and why?

Yes. The Navy is fully equipped with the required legal, medical, mental health, and other resources necessary to ensure leaders exercise their responsibilities for prevention, response, and disciplinary actions in the areas of sexual harassment and assault. Commanders have subject matter experts, response coordinators, victim advocates and legal resources available to help advise and support them on all sexual harassment and sexual assault matters. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service has increased the number of investigators specifically trained to investigate sexual assault offenses and enhanced its protocols to ensure these investigations are conducted or overseen by qualified personnel. The Judge Advocates General (JAG) Corps has similarly refined the training provided to judge advocates prosecuting or advising commanders in these cases, most notably requiring every attorney serving as lead trial counsel in a sexual assault

case to be special victim qualified. If confirmed, I remain committed to preventing and responding to sexual harassment and assault and should additional resources be required, I will work with the Department of Congress to request them.

If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for yourself in the Navy's program of preventing and responding to sexual harassment and sexual assault?

Establishing an appropriate culture where victims are treated with dignity and respect starts at the top. Leaders, from the service chief to the deck plates, are accountable for what happens in their units and are the key component of our ability to affect institutional change. Leaders at all levels must foster a command climate where sexist behavior, sexual harassment and sexual assault are not condoned or ignored. If confirmed, my role would be to emphasize as a matter of leadership that prevention of, and appropriate response to, sexual harassment and sexual assault is critical to the Navy's readiness.

Why are the number of prosecutions for sexual assault and retaliation in the Navy so low? Why are conviction rates so low?

Commanding officers make every military justice decision based on the strength of the evidence identified during an independent investigation and on legal advice from their judge advocates. I understand that for the preceding three years, there have been no instances of Naval officers declining the advice of their judge advocate to prosecute a penetrative sexual assault offense. I also understand that prosecution and conviction rates in the Navy closely mirror those of the other services and the civilian criminal justice system. These rates are not the sole measure of success in holding offenders accountable. There are a range of alternate accountability actions imposed by the services and survivors of sexual assault have expressed approval for maintaining these alternate accountability options.

The Navy remains focused on ensuring sexual assault reporting does not result in retaliation. In addition to administrative tools available to address retaliation, the new Article 132 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that just became effective this year provides a mechanism for commanders to hold Service Members criminally accountable for retaliation in certain circumstances.

U.S. Naval Academy

What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to prevent and respond to sexual harassment and sexual assault, and to ensure that those who report harassment or assault are not subject to retaliation (including reprisal; social ostracism; or cruelty, maltreatment, and oppression)?

If confirmed, I will remain committed to eradicating sexual harassment and sexual assault from the Naval Academy and our Navy. The policies and processes at the U.S. Naval Academy support some of the most robust and leading prevention and response programs in the country. We continuously assess these programs and their impact to ensure that they meet the needs of all Midshipmen making reports. The U.S. Naval Academy will continue to offer comprehensive

prevention training that emphasizes leadership at all levels to foster a professional culture that values dignity and respect for all.

If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to combat the increasing prevalence of sexual assault, sexual harassment, retaliation, and discrimination at the U.S. Naval Academy? What specific actions will you take to increase reporting by midshipmen who are the victims of sexual assault, sexual harassment, retaliation, and discrimination?

If confirmed, I will work directly with the Superintendent to bolster sexual assault prevention efforts at USNA by refining our education programs and partnering with our colleagues across college campuses nationwide. Clearly, we have to decrease alcohol misuse and continue to hold sexual assault perpetrators appropriately accountable. My priority will remain focused on taking care of our survivors, and guiding them to graduation and commissioning in the Navy and Marine Corps. Although the decision to report abuse or harassment is exclusively the victim's decision to make, I am committed to ensuring that our policies and processes are optimized to sustain the trust of our Midshipmen and Sailors.

What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to ensure the free exercise of religion and the accommodation of religious practices?

The U.S. Naval Academy has a robust and effective Command Religious Program (CRP) that supports the diverse religious beliefs and expressions of the Brigade of Midshipmen. In addition to the nine, multi-denominational Chaplains on staff, there are nearly a dozen religious extracurricular activities that support religious expression and spiritual growth.

What is your assessment of the efficacy of suicide prevention programs at the U.S. Naval Academy?

The U.S. Naval Academy utilizes a multi-tiered, integrated approach to address mental health and well-being. This includes suicide prevention and awareness training, targeted resilience outreach, and accessible mental health care provided by a comprehensive team of licensed mental health providers in the Midshipmen Development Center (MDC). This approach promotes the personal and professional development of Midshipmen into future officers who possess the psychological sensibility to combat suicide, address mental health needs, and improve well-being.

Currently, Military Service Academy graduates are required to serve on active duty for a minimum of five years following graduation. Congress last revised initial active duty service obligations for Academy graduates in 1996. Since then, the average real cost per graduate has increased by nearly 20 percent, according to the Congressional Research Service. Additionally, recent studies suggest that Service Academy graduates have the lowest junior officer retention rates of all officer commissioning sources, despite being the most expensive. Meanwhile, the increasingly technical nature of officer careers has increased the length of initial skills training courses; during the period of their initial active duty service obligation, new officers are spending less time at their duty stations.

Do you believe a five-year minimum active duty service commitment for U.S. Naval Academy graduates is sufficient return on investment for the U.S. military and the American taxpayer?

Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the five-year minimum active duty service commitment and make recommendations to the Secretary and Congress should my opinion change.

In your view, does the U.S. Naval Academy contribute to the pool of Navy officer accessions commensurate with the attendant costs? Please explain your answer.

Yes. The U.S. Naval Academy produces about one-third of the Navy's unrestricted line officers every year. Historically, U.S. Naval Academy graduates consistently retain to the 10 and 20-year marks at a higher rate than their ROTC counterparts (4-5% higher), and screen for command at levels exceeding other commissioning sources.

If confirmed, would you support increasing the active duty service obligation for all Military Service Academy graduates by one year to a six-year minimum?

If confirmed, I will work with Congress to address any concerns with minimum service obligations from our commissioning sources.

Religious Accommodation

U.S. military personnel routinely deploy to locations around the world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and belief systems may be different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a ready force is, some would argue, essential to operational effectiveness.

In your view, do current Navy policies and processes properly facilitate the free exercise of religion, without impinging on the rights of those who have different religious beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Yes. The Navy takes great care to ensure that people of all religious traditions—or none—enjoy the ability to exercise their beliefs in an environment free of coercion. The Navy protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Service Members guaranteed by the Constitution and applicable statutes, and strives to accommodate every Sailor's religious practices except when a compelling reason makes the inability to accommodate unavoidable.

Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to enlisting or accepting a commission in the Navy?

Yes.

Do you support a policy that allows a sailor's religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the sailor throughout his/her military career—no matter where he/she is stationed or the nature of his/her specific duties, unless it can be demonstrated that the accommodation adversely affects military mission accomplishment?

Yes. In a recent update to our religious accommodation instruction, we allow for a religious accommodation to continue to follow-on duty stations unless and until the next commanding officer determines that the accommodation in question conflicts with the operational needs of the unit in question. We believe this balances the legitimate needs of the Service with the religious freedoms of the individual Service Member.

In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and beliefs in a home station environment contribute to preparing U.S. forces to be more effective in overseas assignments?

Yes.

Do you believe that allowing Service Members of certain faiths—such as Sikh, Orthodox Judaism, or Islam—to maintain beards or wear turbans or other religious headwear, while in uniform, strengthens or weakens the U.S. military's standing in areas of the world where such religions predominate? Would such allowance help or hurt U.S. efforts to build alliances and partnerships with such nations?

Yes, allowing the wearing of beards and other articles of religious wear, when operational and safety demands allow, strengthens the message that the U.S. Navy values diversity – including diversity of religious faith, thought and belief.

In your view, do existing Navy policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by a military chaplain in both official and unofficial settings, strike the proper balance between a chaplain's right to pray in accordance with the tenets of his/her religious faith and the rights of other Service Members who may hold with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs, who may be present in these settings?

Yes.

Should the Department of the Navy accommodate the request of a college or university affiliated with a particular religious faith, to appoint a military officer of the same faith as the Professor of Naval Science, charged with leading the host institution's Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps unit?

No. By DoD policy, the DoN makes assignments to university ROTC programs “without regard to . . . religious preference.”

Senior Executive Service (SES) and Flag Officer Reductions

The FY 2017 NDAA limited the number of DOD SES and General/Flag Officers by about 12%.

What progress has the Navy made in reducing the number of SES and Flag Officers in accordance with plans previously provided to Congress?

As reflected in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Progress Report to Congress on the plan for general and flag officer reductions and semi-annual progress report on DoD's plan to limit the number of SES positions, Navy remains on track to comply with reductions enacted in the FY 2017 Defense Authorization Act, by 31 December 2022.

Officer Personnel Management System Reforms

The John S. McCain NDAA for FY 2019 contained several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management system. These reforms were designed to align officer career management with the priorities outlined in the 2018 NDS.

How is the Navy implementing these authorities today and to what effect?

The Navy has implemented many of the Officer Personnel Management Reforms enacted in the FY 2019 NDAA. For example, we expanded constructive credits to recruit civilians with the education, leadership, and experience for critical roles in cyber and engineering duty officer fields. The Navy also expanded spot promotion authority to designated commander and captain billets. We have permitted certain control grade officers in critical skills, e.g., flight instructors, chaplains and judge advocates, to remain on active duty beyond traditional statutory limits, while allowing original officer appointments in some communities to individuals unable to complete 20 years commissioned service before age 62.

If confirmed, how would you lead the Navy in further leveraging these new authorities?

If confirmed, I am committed to fully leverage the opportunities inherent in the authorities Congress has granted. These reforms are an important step in providing greater flexibility in how we recruit, develop and retain top officer talent.

Are there other authorities that the Navy needs in order to modernize the management of its officer personnel?

If confirmed, I will continue to assess the need for additional authorities needed to modernize officer personnel management.

Joint Officer Management

The NDAA for FY 2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system

established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition of “joint matters” to expand the types of positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from three years to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the FY 2017 modifications to the JQO system?

Both the expansion of the definition of “joint matters” and the reduction from three to two years to meet the minimum joint duty credit provides greater flexibility for officers to meet career milestones. These changes have also allowed more officers the ability to fill Standard Joint Duty Assignments, creating a greater pool of officers with joint duty experience.

In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to Flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers?

Yes.

In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that Navy officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Navy-specific leadership experience and adequate professional development?

None at this time.

Professional Military Education

The 2018 NDS asserts that Professional Military Education (PME) has stagnated—that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to enhance the Navy’s PME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with both the intellectual and military leadership acumen to merit promotion to Flag rank?

We recently restructured Navy’s talent management process to ensure our highest performing officers are placed in competitive in-residence and Joint Professional Military Education opportunities early in their careers. This approach will focus our educational investments on those with the greatest leadership potential.

In support of the Secretary of the Navy’s Education for Seapower study, Navy will appoint a new Director of Warfighting Development/N7. This new N7 will work with the Secretary’s Chief Learning Officer and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration to create a comprehensive naval education strategy, harnessing the strengths of our learning

institutions to integrate war-gaming, experimentation, exercise, and analysis into how we fight in the maritime domain.

The DOD and Navy Civilian Personnel Workforce

DOD is the federal government's largest employer of civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD and Navy civilian personnel policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S. Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of Personnel Management. Although this Committee does not have jurisdiction over title 5, over the years, it has provided numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities applicable to specific segments of the DOD and Navy civilian workforces.

In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Navy in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?

The biggest challenge facing the Department of the Navy is to effectively attract and retain a talented civilian workforce with the right mix of skills to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy.

In your view, do Navy supervisors have adequate authorities to divest of a civilian employee whose performance of duty fails to meet standards or who engages in misconduct? If so, are Navy civilian and military supervisors adequately trained to exercise of such authorities? If not, what additional authorities or training do Navy supervisors require?

Yes. The various DoD performance management systems focus on improving overall performance management through ongoing and continuous supervisor and employee involvement and there are a myriad of tools and training available related to employee performance. I do not believe additional authorities or training are required at this time.

Do you advocate the creation of a new "title 10" DOD civilian workforce and a concomitant body of title 10 personnel authorities applicable only to the DOD civilian workforce? If so, what should be the key components of this new body of personnel law, and how should it improve on title 5, in your view?

If confirmed, I will continue to support the Secretary of Defense initiatives to enhance lethality and reform business practices which enable us to recruit and retain the talent needed to perform the work required to meet mission.

Under current law, the civilian pay raise to adjust for wage inflation is set at the Employment Cost Index (ECI) minus 0.5 percent, or, about a 2.6 percent increase for FY 2020. Yet, the Department's budget does not provide funding for this civilian pay increase, despite the largest topline defense budget request in the Nation's history.

Do you personally support a pay raise for the Navy's civilian employees, consistent with current law?

Our critical advantage depends on recruiting, training and retaining talented and dedicated Sailors and civilians. Competitive pay and benefits packages serve as a key enabler in force management objectives.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes; in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes.