U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 March 29, 2019 MR. ADI KAMDAR KNIGHT FIRST INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SUITE 302 475 RIVERSIDE DRIVE NEW YORK, NY 10115 THE COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS C/O MR. TIMOTHY K. BEEKEN DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, LLP 919 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK, NY 10022 Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, et al. v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al. Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-02709 FOIPA Request Nos: 1420624-000 and 1422759-000 Subject: Khashoggi, Jamal Dear Mr. Kamdar and Mr. Beeken: The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find checked boxes under applicable statutes for the exemptions asserted to protect information exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the processed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions. An Explanation of Exemptions is enclosed to further explain justification for withheld information. Section 552 Section 552a (d)(5) (b)(1) (b)(7)(A) (b)(2) (b)(7)(B) (j)(2) (b)(3) (b)(7)(C) (k)(1) (b)(7)(D) (k)(2) (b)(7)(E) (k)(3) (b)(7)(F) (k)(4) (b)(4) (b)(8) (k)(5) (b)(5) (b)(9) (k)(6) 50 USC § 3024(i)(1) (b)(6) (k)(7) 33 pages were reviewed and 32 pages are being released. Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, checked boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully. Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA]. This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you. We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed. In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions. Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request. See additional information which follows. Sincerely, David M. Hardy Section Chief Record/Information Dissemination Section Information Management Division Enclosure(s) The enclosed documents, Bates-numbered FBI 18-cv-02709-1 thru FBI 18-cv-02709-33, represent the FBI’s final release of information responsive to Item 1 of your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) requests and subsequent civil action case pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. In response to Items 2 and 3 of your records requested, the FBI is a criminal law enforcement agency as well as an intelligence agency. The records located, processed and released to you pertain to the FBI’s criminal law enforcement mission and functions. In its capacity as an intelligence agency, the FBI compiles records while carrying out its responsibilities to investigate threats to national security and gather foreign intelligence. The nature of your request implicates records the FBI may or may not compile pursuant to these national security and foreign intelligence missions and functions. Accordingly, the FBI cannot confirm or deny the existence of any records about your subject as the mere acknowledgment of such records existence or nonexistence would in and of itself trigger harm to national security interests per Exemption (b)(1) and/or reveal intelligence sources and methods per Exemption (b)(3); 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). It is unnecessary to adjudicate your requests for a fee waiver as no responsive main files were located. This material is being provided to you at no charge. EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order; (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding; (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals; (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods; (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056; (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process; (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence. FBI/DOJ (Rev. 5-8-10) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic communication Title: Duty To Warn Operational Date: 06/28/2016 Guidance From: COUNTERTERRORISM Contact: I I ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Approved By: HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 03-07-2019 BYI INSICG Drafted By: Case ID I I DUTY TO WARN CONTROL FILE Synopsis: To provide the field with guidance regarding CTD's DTW procedures. Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items: 1. DTW Victim List 05-02-2016 2. DTW Victim List 06-21-2016 Details: CTD is cognizant of the significant operational demands these DTW operations entail, and is striving to provide the most thorough victim information possible. To further clarify CTD expectations regarding DTW operations, the field is expected to complete the following tasks with respect to current and ensuing DTW operations: 1. Provide suggested language for the Agents to utilize as a guide when conducting these in person contacts. CTD will assist in this prove by including suggested language in the indiVLduai - 5 leads set for the Field. 2. The Field will find and notify the exact oexson specified. FBI 18-Cv-02709 Title: To Warn Operational Guidance Re: 06/28/2016 b3 -1 b7E -3 that person has moved out of the Division?s AOR then that Field Office will cut a lead to the new Division where that per relocated with a cc to FBIBQ. 3. The exact address en any ef the liete will be vieited and the oceupant?s eL that addrese provided BTW. team has 4. Names and addresses on "r . . .he list will ?e Office to both the State and Local LE au jurisdiction over that addrees rov?ded by the field . . . . thorities With local 5. Names and addresses vh ch are lecatei in a specific 1 1 st also be provided by the responsib Field Office to the Stat 7? Intelligence Fusion Centers covering that respective Please direct questions regarding these procedures b7E -1 I land/or CTD Executive Management. .0 @9115 2 FBI 18-cv-02709-2 W?g .- .N I FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8- 10) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic communication Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty Date: 02/24/2017 to Warn b6 -1 cc: FIELD OFFICES (Route) ALL INWTION CONTAINED b7C _1 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONS (Route) mm 03-07-2019 LEGATS (Route) b7E -1 From: COUNTERTERRORISM Contact: I I b6 -1 Approved By: b7C _1 SC SANBORN JILL SC MCPHERSON MICHAEL DAD MENDENHALL BRADLEY MENDENHALL BRADLEY EAD Michael B. Steinbach b6 -1 b7C -1 Drafted I Case ID Duty to Warn b3 '1 b7E -3 Synopsis: This Electronic Communication sets forth guidance for how the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) should implement its Duty to Warn responsibilities, consistent with Intelligence Community Directive 191. Details: Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 191 sets forth a consistent, coordinated approach for how the Intelligence Community (IC) will provide warning regarding threats to specific individuals or groups of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, and kidnapping. This includes threats where the target is an institution, place of business, structure, or location. As discussed below, the Duty to Warn procedures address, among other things, such matters as designating separate senior officers who shall be responsible for making the determination FBI 18-Cv-02709-3 Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn Re: I I 02/24/2017 b3 -1 b7E '3 and for determining whether to waive that duty; setting forth appropriate justifications for waiver; and coordinating with other IC elements or U.S. government agencies, as appropriate. CTD manages the Duty to Warn process, which includes evaluating the credibility and specificity of the threat, normalizing the released information, disseminating victim information and notification guidance to the field, and memorializing Duty to Warn notifications. 0 Evaluation of Duty to Warn Obligations (U) Per ICD 191, the duty to warn is mandatory, with limited exceptions, if the designated senior officer of the relevant IC element here, the FBI -- determines the information collected or acquired indicating an impending threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed at a person or group of people is credible and specific. If a duty to warn is found, a separate designated senior officer of the FBI may determine if the duty may be waived after the credibility determination has been made. (U) Specifically, ?[the shall designate senior officers responsible for reviewing threat information initially determined to meet duty to warn requirements to affirm whether the information is credible and specific, so as to permit a meaningful warning. [The shall also designate senior officers responsible for making waiver determinations based on criteria identified in this Directive. The senior officers designated for affirming that duty to warn information is sufficient for a meaningful warning and for making waiver determinations should not be the same individual.? See, ICD 191, Section F.2. (U) CTD has established that the Deputy Assistant Director b7E '1 of CTD, in consultation with the Special 2 FBI 18-cv-02709-4 Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn Re: I I 02/24/2017 Agent in Charge (SAC) of the impacted area of responsibility (AOR), shall make the Duty to Warn determination. The Assistant Director (AD) of CTD shall make any waiver determinations. The determination duties of the DAD, AD, and SAC may be handled by a senior officer acting in each of their respective positions. The Duty to Warn procedures establish a non?inclusive list of justifications for waiver: a. The intended victim, or those responsible for ensuring the intended victim?s safety, is already aware of the specific threat; b. The intended victim is at risk only as a result of the intended victim?s participation in an insurgency, insurrection, or other armed conflict; c. There is a reasonable basis for believing that the intended victim is a terrorist, a direct supporter of terrorists, an assassin, a drug trafficker, or involved in violent crimes; d4 or f. There is no reasonable way to warn the intended victim. The AD may rely on any of the above, or similar, considerations in justifying a waiver determination. Issues concerning whether threat information meets the Duty to Warn threshold should be resolved in favor of informing the intended victim if none of the justifications determined to be acceptable are present. Should the FBI decide to waive the duty to warn, this must be documentedFBI 18-cv-02709-5 Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn Re: I 02/24/2017 b3 -1 b7E -3 Duty to Warn Notification Procedures Notifications may be conducted in several forms. Under the DIOG l4.7.3.l.1.2., the FBI ?must determine the means and manner of the warning, using the method most likely to provide direct notice to the intended victim.? The DIOG also states that notification to warn the intended victim of the nature and extent of the threat must be expeditious. Depending on the circumstances, the FBI may implement its Duty to Warn process by issuing letters to the last known address of the targeted individuals containing a number to call with any questions or concerns, and providing a website for guidance in awareness and safety precautions, assuming no emergency or imminent threat exists requiring more immediate notice. See, DIOG l4.7.3.l.l. Letters may be written or tailored to specific threats. 0 Leveraging Local and State Partners The FBI does not need to serve as the sole agency providing Duty to Warn notifications. It may, instead, coordinate notifications with local and state partners, including the local and state fusion centers. As per DIOG 14.7.3.1.1.2, and as permitted by ICD 191, the FBI ?may seek the assistance of another law enforcement agency to provide the The FBI field office can pass the information to state and local fusion centers and leverage local law enforcement partners to conduct in-person notifications, within legal and policy guidelines. Under DIOG l4.7.3.l.1.2., ?[t]he determine the means and manner of the warning, using the method most likely to provide direct notice to the intended victim. In some cases, this may require the assistance of a third party.? Similarly, under DIOG 14.7.3.2.l.1., ?when an employee has information that a person is subject to a credible threat to his/her life or of serious bodily 4 FBI 18-cv-02709-6 Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn b3 -1 Re: I 02/24/2017 b7E -3 injury, the employee must attempt expeditiously to notify other law enforcement agencies that have investigative jurisdiction concerning the threat.? Pursuant to ICD, and as discussed above, the ?employee? authorized to make these decisions is a senior officer. Specifically, the DAD in consultation with the SAC of the impacted AOR, b7E ?1 shall make the Duty to Warn determination. The AD of CTD shall make any waiver determinations 0 (U) Documentation of Duty to Warn determination and notification (U) The Duty to Warn determination and any subsequent notification must be documented. Specifically, ?[u]pon determination by [the that a duty to warn exists and will not be waived, [the shall generate statements documenting the threat information and the basis for the duty to warn determination and include an unclassified tear line, where possible, for use in delivering the threat information to the intended victim." In keeping with ICD 191, Section F.13., the FBI shall document and maintain records on the following duty to warn actions: a. The method, means, and substance of any warning given by the b. Senior officer reviews of threat information and determinations; c. Justifications not to warn an intended victim based on waiver criteria identified in this Directive; d. Coordination with the CIA, if the intended victim is located outside the U.S. and its territories, consistent with Section F.10, to determine how best to pass threat information to the intended victim; e. Decisions to inform the intended victim in light of exigent circumstances that preclude prior consultation; f. Communication of threat information to another IC element or U.S. Government agency for delivery to the intended victim; and g. Notification to the originating IC element of how and when threat information was delivered to the intended victim. 5 FBI 18-cv-02709-7 Title: Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn Re: I I 02/24/2017 b3 -1 b7E -3 99 6 FBI 18-Cv-02709-8 FBI INFO. CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG b6 -1 REASON: 1.4 (C) EM -1 DECLASSIFY cm: 12-31-2043 - . - - - .. .. DATE: 03-07?2019 Counterterrorism Diyision b7E -1 Washington. DC November 14, 2018 CTD Dutv to Warn Standard Operating Procedures (ID Pu_rpose. (WM The purpose of this document is to articul te standard operating procedures for Duty-to-Wam (DTW) noti?cations. substantive units are responsible for 1?73 '1 ensuring ?eld o?ices notify threatened persons. (U) Backgound. b1 -1 b3 -1 ill} ){mzj The Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 191 and the FBI Domestic Investigaiom_ b1 _1 Operations Guide (DIOG) 14.7.] stipulate the dutv to warn (DTW) responsrbilitiesresponsibility to notify persons of threats to their life ort hrezls I ha may result in serious bodily injury and to notify ot her law enforcement agencies of such (Extracted from DOJ Of free of m'cstigative Policies. Reso lut ion 20. dated 1 6/96). Depending on the exigelcy of the situation an enployee. through his or hersmen'isor. must notify the appropriate operational divisionat IQof he existence of the threat and he plat for notification. That plan may be folloned unless advised to thecontrary by FBII IQ. FBI 18-Cv-02709-9 A. Source of Threat Information. (WM The source of the threat information has a signi?cant impact on both the approval authorities for the tear-line language used to verbally notify potential victims as well as the appropriate handling and noti?cation procedures(WM Threat Noti?cations Duty to am Standard Operating Procedures Page 2 FBI 18-cv-02709-10 (Triage of threat informationl I b7E -1, 2 will assess the information collected and determine whether it is terrorist-related and i it reasonably appears to meet the de?nition for DTW as de?ned in 191 ?credible and speci?c.?3 The following considerations are recommended in making credible and specific determinations: Credible b7E -2 IC element that collects or acquires credible and speci?c info nnation indicating an impending lirea of intentional killing. serious bodily injury. or kidnapping directed at a person or group of people i.e. victims) shall Ira\'e a dut to wan: the intended ictirn(s) orthose responsible for protecting he intended ictiln(s). as appropriate. his incluchs threats ?here the target is an institution. place of busi ness. s1 ruct ure. or location. The tenn intended ict iin includes both USP ERs. as de?ned in E0 12 333 . Sect ion 3. and non-USP ERs. Duty to am Standard Operating Procedures Page 3 FBI 18-Cv-02709-1 1 Specific b7E -2 . C- (WM Appropriate Vetting Procedures b3 -1 3. (UM If I: determines the threat information does meet the ?credible and eci?c? criteria under Iwill document the result of the analysis and provide results to [will document the results of the analysis and provide a recommendation whether or not to conduct DTW to the Deputy 13751 2 Assistant Director dele ted o?icial. If the DA determines the FBI will conduct DTW notifications, D. (U/MNoti?cation Procedures to the Field b7E -1, 2 l. Iwill determine the Field Of?ce (PO) associated with each threatened addressl I IT?li?Hl Any identi?ed military personnel and/or addresses will be ?agged, and any up cate 1 enti?ers will be consolidated into one line item. b7E -1, 2 Duty to I am Standard Operating Procedures Page 4 FBI 18-cv-02709-12 2. (WWI Iwill document the details of the incident via EC b7E -1, 2 and provide lead-taskings to the affected ?eld of?ces to locate the threatened individuals and provide DTW.I Iwill provide support as requested] 3. (U/Eeec?l b7E 4. 0 if any individuals are identified as havmg amllitary nexus. b7E 2 I (UM Military nexus is de?ned as the intended victim having (1) DOD- a?iliated email address (2) military installation, APO, or FPO residential address; or (3) military rank in front of their name. . E. (U/MNoti?cation Procedures Field to Victim 1. (WM The Field Of?ce (F0) must acknowledge receipt of any DTW lead-tasking b7E -2 2. (WWI b7E ?2 3. The F0 will notify occupants of addresses even if the intended victim no longer lives at the residence. If the intended victim has moved, the FO will transfer the lead-tasking to the relevant FBI o?ice. 4. Upon completion of the DTW, the FO will appropriately document and close- out the lead-tasking. F. (WM Noti?cation Recommendations 1. (WM Verbal Recommendations to victims during the noti?cation: a. (WM If you notice anything suspicious that makes you feel threatened, call 9- or your local emergency services immediately. Make a secondary noti?cation to local law enforcement. b. (WM If you notice anything suspicious that is not immediately threatening, notify FBI as soon as possible. Duty to am Standard Operating Procedures Page 5 FBI 18-cv-02709-13 c. (WW NE -2 2. (UN Examples of threatening or suspicious activity includes(Wm (U/Igeeqi (Central Tracking of Noti?cations. I Iw?l create and mamtaln a centralized record of all intended and collateral USPER intended victims. H. (WM Reporting Updates (WM Iwill coordinate with the appropriate F0 and provide 1373 2 regular lead updates to CTD executive management on the status of DTW noti?cations and bring attention to any ?eld level issuesI I The designated program management unitI Iwill be responsible for tracking all process progress from receipt of information through memorialization. I. Glossag CTD Counterterrorism Division Duty to Warn FO Field Of?ce i b7E -1 1CD lntelhgence Community Directive P11 Personallv Identi?able Info ion TFO Task Force O?icer Duty to am Standard Operating Procedures Page 6 FBI 18-cv-02709-14 Appendix A (WM Current DTW Language (MM Public Releases: Identities obtained from Public Releases of PHI I b7E -2 (UN Intelligence Reporting Operations: Names not publicly released. I I b7E -2 (WM De?nitions Der ICD 191 Duty to Warn means a requirement to warn USPERs and of impending threats of intentional killing serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. Intentional Killing means the deliberate killing of a speci?c individual or group of individuals. 0 Serious Bodily Injury means an injury that creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent dis?gurement or impairment. 0 Kidnapping means the intentional taking of an individual or group through force or threat of force. Duty to am Standard Operating Procedures Page 7 FBI 18-cv-02709-15 INVESTIGATION DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET Civi1.Action# 1:18-cv-02709 Total Withheld Page(s) =1 Bates Page Reference Reason for Withholding exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.) FBI b6?1,2; b7C?1,2; (1 page) Deleted Page(s) No Duplication Fee For this Page ?08/9108 (wonky Mow Ont) pomamwi $0 tor noti?cma gmv?doa MMWW to ma Giana! Watch Upcn receipt of can Lun.? We} Watch mama to: mm? amm?on. gamma moms. anti 9mm. pow 9x; ?56 '39va :MWwanm for Wanna 9W "Kn! Us!" um ingenuity am? can a new: 0 Bob mam}! Waters wi? 5cm?. 4mm an" to: ?Mm Mime?! k? nati?mm saxpoua mm Us!? that am not 601M 000 as a ungu- ?209 Giana! Wench no ?new groaning scmom ism. we km 000 Giobal M9 tame! om? mm? 000 {a 9. do! mi! arr-ail, m'k'mry mm: mm occupa?m Mrimn an ?may?; I Sew?ces Haw! 9! noti?cation to MCEC 9095:3225 Hi}: what an tum 091%; may comma? at Ova Giwai Watch as. oo??ca?on not) mun 99mm? Em a! command m?ica?m to 10: ?mm? slacking mam an ww??y Mom and males are 932400293?! to cozmmta pm: In or (.an 5085266021; . N638 Watch (UMWCJ Quinn-I rum Notifymu ?945"th of mm pagcg ("7012(1be u?im swam Chafing khakiun-Q FBI 18-Cv-02709-17 DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICC ON 03-07-2019 MEIW (U) Counterterrorism Policy Guide If an explosives incident is likely to receive nationwide publicity, and it is not immediately known if an actual bombing within FBI jurisdiction has occurred, furnish with available background and details using the appropriate written communication. 16.4.7.1. (U) Jurisdiction (Um Both the FBI and the ATF have jurisdiction to investigate violations of federal explosive laws The FBI and ATF havec concurr ent statutory authority to investigate violations of IS US C. ?844, as torth their respective roles. I7urtherrnore, in investigations where the FBI traditionally has exercised jurisdiction bank robberies, civil rights violations, and organized crime), the FBI will control the investigations (refer to the being investigated by the FBI or if any other problem is encountered with ATP. The deputy Attomey General will resolve all issues relating to jurisdiction over explosives investigations. (WM The ATF has primary jurisdiction for investigations involving the unlawful manufacture. possession, or transfer of a destructive device (26 USC. and the unlawful importation, manufacture, distribution, or storage of explosives (18158.0 841- 843). While case agents need to be alert for such violations, the FBI will not transfer responsibility for an otherwise substantive FBI investigation to the ATP because of the mere presence of one of these violations. 10.4.7.2. (U) Bomb Threats (LI/ml An evaluation of any suspicious item needs to be made by an FBI bomb technician, bomb squad personnel, or a military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit. Render safe responsibilities for located. bomb devices rest with the bomb squad personnel or military EOD unit. Each FO must have a bomb threat plan. See DIOG Section 14 for the threat to life policy. (U/l?l?k?j Immediately notiiy CTD by telephone. followed by a detailed EC. in the following instances: as Sanger/meals: b6 -1 1370 -FBI 18-Cv-02709-18 (U) Counterterrorism Policy Guide 0 If the identity of the subject is known alleged, or readily available. - (ll/m Ifa threat appears to be part of a pattern or plan by a particular subject or against a particular victim. FOs must notify the impacted federal, state, local, or foreign partners, in accordance with DEOG Section 14 and subsection 4.12. of this PG. PCs will also advise the USAO telephonically of all incidents or threats reported to CTD that are within FBI jurisdiction. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, such noti?cation will be made during business hours. (U/m Bombings, attempted bombings, and bomb threats constituting other substantive violations within FBI jurisdiction, such as the federal train wreck statute, destruction of aircratt or motor vehicles, civil rights, and extortion, will be handled in accordance with the rules for the particular violation involved and subsection 14.7. C1D and/or the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) must be advised of the incident under the appropriate substantive caption. (11W Note: Situations involving bombings or attempted bombings of government property and sabotage by use of explosive are handled as 174 matters. (ti/m Any talse reports or actual instances of a bomb aboard an aircraft unrelated to an aircraft hijacking incident will be investigated using the 149 - Destruction ot?Aircrafi or Motor Vehicles classification. Any bomb threats involving an aircraft hijacking incident will be investigated using the 164 - Crime Aboard Aircraft (CAA) classification. These requirements will assist in maintaining uniformity in the Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) records and clarity as to which program manages the investigation. For more information regarding the 149 and 164 classitic ations, refer to the Iranian);rarity? (Trim-es Policy (brick? (34353-?tiil. (Li/m All written bomb threats are to be submitted to the Lab for document examination and for latent ?ngerprint examination, whether or not an active iin/estigation is being conducted by the FBI. 10.4.7.3. (U) Bomb Disposal (WM FOs must maintain liaison with military EOD units and/or local law enforcement bomb squads so that assistance can be obtained if bombs or live explosives are encountered in connection with of?cial investigations. The US. Army has EOD units stationed throughout the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii. These units, which have assisted the FBI in the past, have personnel quali?ed to disarm bombs and handle and dispose of live explosives. In emergency conditions, requests for assistance from Army BOD units are usually oral. All such oral requests are to be con?rmed in writing by a letter addressed to the commanding o?icer of the BOD unit involved. Because the Army has no EOD unit in Puerto Rico. the San Juan Field Of?ce must maintain liaison with the appropriate US. Navy facility for any necessary assistance. Bombs are to be rendered safe by qualified bomb disposal personnel. Render safe is the responsibility of public safety bomb squads and military BOD units. FBI bomb technicians 69 Sargent/Wt FBI 18-cv-02709-19 DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG b6 -1 ON 03?07-2019 b7C -1 (U) Counterterrorism Policy Directive and Policy Guide (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (U) Counterterrorism Division (U) 077SDPG (U) Published Date: April 1, 2015 (U) Review Date: April 1, 2018 Derived l'r NS ICG 20130301 Classi?cdh . F48MS7K72, Dcciassify m: (U) Note: This document incorporates the Policy Directive and the Policy Guide. SF. REIW FBI 18-cv-02709-20 s?sgum (U) Countert rorism Policy Guide 4. (U) General Provisions for Counterterrorism Investigations 4.1. (U) National Management of Counterterrorism Investigations (Li/55080:) Counterterrorism investigations involving both DT and lT are nationally managed by CTD. As the national program manager. the AD of CTD may provide direction for all matters within the CT Program to include operational matters. Disagreements between F05, legal attaches (Legat), and/or FBIHQ will be worked out at the lowest appropriate level. As necessary, the AD of CTD may resolve the matter between F0s and/or FBIHQ by making a ?nal decision, consulting, as appropriate, with other FBll-lQ programs. All unresolved disagreements with Legats and CTD shall be resolved by the AD and CTD AD. During the course of each stage of an investigation it is essential for F03 to coordinate with the appropriate CTD operational, analytical reports dissemination, and operational support units. lfan IT or DT investigative opening or closing is denied by FBIHQ. the AD of CTD, the F0 SAC. and the DOC deputy general counsel (DGC) must confer. The AD of CTD will be the ?nal arbitrator and will make all appropriate noti?cations. If an lT investigative opening is denied by FBIHQ for lack of predication, CTD is required to notify the deputy Attomey General and document the noti?cation to the investigative ?le, informing any a??ected F0 and CTD elements of the denial. 4.2. (U) Addressing Counte rte rroris Threats (UAW The mission of the (ITTI) is to defeat terrorism. Accomplishing this task requires the continuous monitoring and analysis of intelligence to detect and act on threats, as well as sharing the information as broadly as possible with the federal, state, local, and foreign government partners, consistent with the protection of sensitive national security infomiation, applicable federal law, memoranda of understanding (MOU), and/or FBI policies. As such, within 24 hours of the receipt of information about an immediate threat to lite, property, or national security, FOs and CTD program management units must take appropriate investigative action with the information to determine the veracity and type of threat, including, as available: . b7E -2 1 FBI 18-cv-02709-21 SNEMW (U) Counte errorism Policy Guide and CTD program management units must notify/I: atfected Legat o?ices, and, as appropriate, other law enforcement and/or intelligence service partners having jurisdiction over, or investigative interest in, the matter. Noti?cations outside the FBI must be conducted in accordance with 0.100 Section 14 regarding noti?cations involving threats to life. FOs and CTD program managers must coordinate their activities to ensure proper noti?cation is provided. (UAW Also, F05, through Weapons of Mass Destruction coordinators (WMDC), must diligently address any threat or potential threat posed by a potential weapon of mass (WMD). Situational reports and threat evaluations must be coordinated and distributed by the WMD Directorate (WMDD) via established protocols with the FBI Laboratory, Critical Incident Res onse Group (C 1R0), and. F0 WMDC. WMDD must submit all information to F03 must submit investigative reports to both CTD and. the WMDD embeds within TD, as appropriate. 4.2.1. (ml 4.2.1.1. (UM I 4.2.1.2. (U1 4.2.1.3. (ii/FBI 18-Cv-02709-22 SE BTW - (U) Counte errorism Policy Guide b7E -2 museum I b7E -2 (li/JE?le?fDI b7E -2 4.3. (U) Counterterroris Program Baseline Collection Plan 4.3.1. (U) Intelligence Collection and Reporting Strategy In an effort to standardize information and intelligence collection as well as provide investigative guidance for both DT and IT investigations, CTD has established an investigative framework collectively referred to as ?baseline collection.? The purpose ot?baseline collection is to guide investigators in obtaining intelligence and using investigative methods during the course of each DT or IT investigation. Baseline collection is ?1.91 mandatory and is not an all-inclusive listing but rather a best practice list of items that may be accomplished when legally permissible, relevant, and consistent with the DIOG during an assessment or predicated investigation. (WW Baseline collection was established to provide programmatic standards in terms of the quality and thoroughness of assessments and predicated investigations. Baseline collection can help prevent gaps in investigative efforts. PCs are reminded that all investigative efforts are subject to the and the DIOG. The least intrusive means ofinvestigation/collection must be utilized under the or DIOG (refer to the section on least intrusive methods in the tired). Baseline collection is intended to serve as a guide through the various investigative stages. Common sense will be applied when determining whether a particular item contained in the baseline collection pertains to a speci?c assessment or investigation. If there is doubt as to whether the appropriate authority exists in an individual investigation to address a baseline collection item, employees are to consult the chief division counsel (CDC), OGC, and/or the CTD program manager. (Um Supervisors may address baseline collection with case agents during investigative ?le reviews, and such reviews will inform many of the intelligence and collection matters required for review, in accordance with DEOG subsection 3.4.4.6. In addition to standardizing 3 FBI 18-Cv-02709-23 . .- it I 2 Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide A L. L. INFORMAT ION CONTAINED HEREIN I 5 UNCLASSIFIED DATE 03-07-2019 -1 b7C -1 DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RELEASED JULY 23, 2018 UPDATED DECEMBER 28, 2018 This is a privileged document that cannot be released in whole or in part to persons or agencies outside the Federal Bureau of Investigation. nor can it be republished in whole or in part in any written form not containing this statement. including geneml use pamphlets. without. the approval of the Director of the Fedeml Bureau of Investigation. UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-Cv-02709-24 UNCLASSIFIED- I. it") i Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide ?l4 (Uil b7E -2 (U) The Attorney General has also issued revised Gm'tiefmes fm? fin: Disc-10mm: am! (he of in?irmaimn mater Ride Maj/.3) 2'13). On May 15, 2008, the Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum which provides amplifying guidance as to lawful use and disclosure of 6(e) information. See also DIOG subsections 18.6.5.1 and 12. 14.7 (U) To LIFE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 14.7.1 (U) OVERVIEW (U/fW?he FBI has a responsibility to notify persons of threats to their life or threats that may result in serious bodily injury and to notify other law enforcement agencies of such threats (Extracted from 00.] U?irre ofinvestigative Puiicies. Remaining: (lured 12 Depending on the exigency of the situation, an employee, thmugh his or her supervisor, must notify the appropriate operational division at FBIHQ of the existence of the threat and the plan for noti?cation. That plan may be followed unless advised to the contrary by FBIHQ. 14.7.2 INFORMATION RECEIVED THROUGH ISA SURVEILLANCE (ti/.T617693 If information is received through a FISA-authorized investigative technique indicating a threat to life or serious bodily harm within the scope of Section 14.7, the ?eld office case agent responsible for that FISA must immediately coordinate the matter with the FBIHQ SSA responsible for that investigation and an NSLB attorney from the applicable counterintelligence or counterteiron'sm law unit. These individuals must consult the applicable FISA minimization procedures, consider the operational posture of the investigation, and collectivei determine the appropriate manner in which to proceed. FBI executive management may be consulted, as appropriate e. g, if DIDO or declassi?cation authority is needed). The ?eld off: ce case agent must document the dissemination. if the decision is made not to disseminate the 14?8 UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-Cv-02709-25 UNCLASSIFIED- - . a .- Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide ?l4 threat information, that decision must be approved by an ASAC or higher and the reasons must be documented in the applicable investigative tile. 1 4 . 7 .3 (U) TION OF I NFORMA TION CONCERNING TI-IREA TS A GA INST VICTIMS (PERSONS) 14.7.3.1 (U) WARNING TO THE INTENDED VICTIM (PERSON) 14.7 .3 . 1 .1 (U) EXPEDITIOUS WARNINGS 1'0 IDENTIFIABLE INTENDED Vicrms (ii/m Except as provided below in Sections 14.7.3. .l.l (Exceptions) and l4.7.3.l .2 (Custody or Protectee), when an employee has information that a person who is identi?ed or can be identi?ed through reasonable means (hereafter a ?intended victim?) is subject to a credible threat to his/her life or of serious bodily injury, the FBI employee must attempt expeditiously to warn the intended victim of the nature and extent of the threat. 14. 7.3. 1.1.1 (U) EXCEPTIONS r0 WARNING An employee is n_o_t_ required to warn an intended victim the intended victim knows the nature and extent of the specific threat against him/her. 1-1. 7.3.1. 1.2 (U) MEANS, NIANNER, AND DOCUMENTATION OF WARN OTIFICATION 0R DECISION NOT TO WARN (Lamont-n The FBI employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, must. determine the means and manner of the wanting, using the method most likely to provide direct notice to the intended victim. In some cases, this may require the assistance of a third party. The employee must document on an ?79309 the content of the warning, as well as when, where and by whom it was delivered to the intended victim. The must be placed in a zero ?le or if investigative methods are used, the appropriate investigative tile. (Ur/$6609 The employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, may seek the assistance of another law enforcement agency to provide the warning. If this is done, the employee must document on an ?33922 that notice was provided by that law enforcement agency, as well as when. where and by whom the name of the other agency's representative) it was delivered. The employee must also document the other agency's agreement to provide a timely warning. The must be ?led as specified above. Whenever time and circumstances permit, an employee's decision not to provide a warning in these circumstances must be approved by an ASAC or higher. in all cases, the reasons for not providing a warning must be documented by EC in a zero tile or if investigative methods are used, the appropriate investigative file. (Li/mi b7E '2 14?9 UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-Cv-02709-26 g. I .. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 14 :17: 14.7.3.1 .2 (U) WARNINGS WHEN INTENDED Is IN CUSTODY 0R ISA PROTECTEE When an employee has information that a person described below is an intended victim, the employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, must expeditiously notify the law enforcement agency that has protective or custodial jurisdiction of the threatened person. (UHF-699) This section applies when the intended victim is: A) public official who, because of his/her official position. is provided a protective detail; B) b7E -2 C) (U1193990) detained. or incarcerated. This paragraph does not apply to employees serving on the security detail of the FBI Director or any other FBI protected persons when the threat is to the individual they protect. 14. 7. 3. 1.2. 1 (U) MEANS, ANNER, AND or The employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, may determine the means and manner of the notification. When providing noti?cation, the employee shall provide as much information as possible regarding the threat and the credibility of the threat. The employee must document on an what he or she informed the other law enforcement agency, and when, where, how telephone call, email) and to whom the notice was delivered. The must be placed in a zero ?le or if investigative methods are used, the appropriate investigative ?le. 14.7.3.2 (U) NOTIFICATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES THAT HAVE INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION I 4. 7. 3 .2. (U) XPEDITIO US No TIFICA TION 14. 7. 3. 2. 1. 1 (U) THREATS To INTENDED PERSONS Except as provided in Sections 14.7.3.2.2, when an employee has information that a person (other than a person described above in Section 14.7.3. .2) who is identified or can be identified through reasonable means is subject to a credible threat to his/her life or of serious bodily injury, the employee must attempt expeditiously to notify other law enforcement agencies that have investigative jurisdiction concerning the threat. 14. 7.3. 2. 1. 2 (U) THREATS To OCCUPIED STRUCTURES 0R CONVEYANCES When an employee has information that a structure or conveyance which can be identi?ed through reasonable means is the subject of a credible threat which could cause a loss of life or serious bodily injury to its occupants, the employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, must provide expeditious notification to other law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction concerning the threat. 14?10 UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-cv-02709-27 UNCLASSIFIED it") . a Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 14 :17: 1 4.7.3 .2. 2 (U) EXCEPTIONS T0 N0 TIFICA TION An employee need not attempt to notify another law enforcement agency that has investigative jurisdiction concerning a threat: A) 1m: ?2 B) when the other law enforcement agency knows the nature and extent of the speci?c threat to the intended victim. Whenever time and circumstances permit, an employee?s decision not to provide notification to another law enforcement agency in the foregoing circumstances must be approved by an ASAC or higher. In all cases, the reasons for an employee's decision not to provide noti?cation must be documented in writing in a zero file or if investigative methods are used, the appropri ate investigative fileMANNER, A NI) DOCUMENTATION OF NO TIFICA TION employee may determine the means and manner of the noti?cation. The employee must document in writing in the applicable investigative file the content of the notification, and when, where, and to whom it was delivered. l4.7 .4 DISSEMINA TION 0F TION CONCERNING TS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE 0R TIONS AGAINST FOREIGN ES 0R OFFICM IN THE UNITED TA TES If information is received indicating a threat to life within the scope of Section 14.7, or possible violence or demonstrations against foreign establishments or of?cials in the United States, the field office case agent must immediately coordinate the matter with the FBl'l-iQ SSA responsible for the case, who must notify the Department of State (DOS), United States Secret Service and any other Government agencies that may have an interest. See Section IV ot? the 1973 between the Hit and for the P'Bl?s information sharing responsibilities with the in such cases. 4 .7 .5 (U) DISSEMINA TION 0F INFORMA CONCERNING THREA TS A GA INST THE 0mm DESIGNA TED OFFICIALS The United States Secret Service has statutory authority to protect or to engage in certain activities to protect the President and certain other persons as speci?ed in 18 USC. 3056. An Mi?j between the FBI and specifies the FBI information that the wants to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities. (Ur/1m Detailed guidelines regarding threats against the President of the United States and other protectees can be found in "Presidential and Presidential Staff Assassination, Kidnapping and Assault.? (See the b7E -2 UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-CV-02709-28 UNCLASSIFIED . i, ., Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide. AL II-IFORMAT ION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 03-07-2019 BYENSICG b6 -1 b7C -1 DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RELEASED MARCH 3, 2016 UPDATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 ?I?his is a privileged document that cannot be released in whoie or in part to Demons or agencies outside the Fedei'a} Bureau of im-?estigmion. nor can i: be in whoie or in part in any written form out containing this statemem? including genera! use pamphlets. without the approval of {he Director of the Federai Bureau of investigation. UNCLASSIFIED FBI 18-Cv-02709-29 . Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide ?l 4 b7E -2 (U) The. Attomey General has also issued revised {Zirririeiines for the Diseiosare and Use oi" Grand .iury in'fomtatinn under Rate {it"e?it?lih? On May 15, 2008. the Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum which provides amplifying guidance as to lawful use and disclosure of 6(e) information. See aiso Part V.A.8 and DIOG subsections and 12. 14.7 U) TH To LIFE - Orr- 14.7. 3 (U) OVERVIEW (Uz??i6'b?63 The FBI has a to notify persons of threats to their life or threats that may result in serious bodiiy in ury and to notify other iaw enforcement agencies of such threats Extracted from ?30} {Tiffani of investigative Resoietion "13.0. tinted. Depending on the exigency oi" the situation, an employee, through his or her supervisor, must: notify the appropriate operational division at PB of the existence of the threat and the plan for notification. That pian may be followed untess advised to the contrary by FBIHQ. 14.7.2 INFORMA TION RECEIVED THROUGH FISA SURVEILLANCE i information is received through a investigative technique indicating a threat to iife or serious bodily harm within the scope of Section 1.4.7, the ?eld of?ce case agent responsible for that PISA must immediately coordinate the matter with the FBIHQ SSA responsible for that investigation and an NSLB attorney from the applicable connterinteliigence or countierterrorism law unit. These individuals must consait. the applicabie PISA ntinintixation procedures. consider the Operational} posture of the investigation. and collectiveiy determine the appropriate manner in which to proceed. FBI executive management may he consuited. as appropriate if DIDO or authority is needed). The. ?eld was Version Dated: March 3, 2016 FBI 18-Cv-02709-30 UNCLASSIFIED . . ??22 .. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide ?'14 of lice case agent must document the dissemination. If the decision is made not to disseminate the threat information. that decision must. be approved by an ASAC or higher and the reasons must he documented in the appiieable inv-estigttive the. 14.7 .3 (U) DISSEMI: 04 7?10; For? INFORMATION CONCERNING THREA TS A INTENDED VICTIMS (PERSONS) 14.7 3 .1 (U) WARNING TO THE [manor-:1) 14.7.3.1.1 (U) Exr?rt'wnoes Izmiv'ztnv?maw INTENDED VICTIMS Except as provided heiow in Sections (Exceptions) and 14.7.3.1.2 (Custody or Protectee), when an employee has information that a person who is identified or can be identi? ed through reasonahie means hereafter a ?intended victim?) is suhject to a credibie threat to his/her tile or of serious bodiiy injury. the FBI employee must attempt expeditiously to warn the intended victim of the nature and extent of the threat. 14. 7.3.1.1. (U) Escanrtons TO WARNING An employee is not required to warn an intended victim if A) (ti/9W I 1m. -2 B) (UAW the intended victim knows the nature and extent of the speci?c threat against him/her. 14.7.3.1.12 (U) MEANS, MANNER, or on Doerszon' Nor (Hi/m The FBI employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor. must determine the means and manner of the warning, using the method most liheiy to provide direct notice to the intended victim. In some cases. this may require the assistance of a third party. The empioyee must document on an the content. of the warning. as well as when, where and by whom it was delivered to the intended victim. The FED-999 must he pieced in a zero tile or if investigative methods are used, the appropriate investigative liie. The employee. in consultation with his or her supervisor, may seek the assistance of another iaw enforcement agency to provide the warming. 11" this is done. the empioyee must document on an that notice was provided by that iaw enforcement agency, as well as when, where and by whom tie, the name of the other agency?s representative) it was delivered. The employee must aiso document the other agency?s agreement. to provide a timely warning. The FD-999 must be filed as speci?ed above. {Ii/9156891) Whenever time and circumstances permit, an employee's decision not to provide a warning in these circumstances must be approved by an ASAC. or higher. In all cases, the reasons for not. providing a warning must be documented by EEC or similar successor form in a zero tile or il?investigative methods are used. the appropriate investigative file. tux/Possl? '2 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 FBI 18-cv-02709-31 UNCLASSIFIED . . ??iI Domestic investigations and Operations Guide ?l 4 14.7.3.1 .2 (U) WHEN Worm IS IN Cosmor on IS A (Uzi/F999) When an employee has information that a person described below is an intended victim. the empioyee, in consultation with his or her supervisor. most expeditiously notify the iaw enforcement agency that has protective or custodial jurisdiction of the threatened person. (?35999) This section applies when the intended victim is: A) (tlif?l?f?Qg) a public officiat who, because of his/her of?ciai position, is provided a protective detait; B) (mil-1990? b7E -2 I C) detained or incarcerated. This paragraph does not appiy to employees serving on the security, detaii of the FBI Director or an other FBI protected persons when the threat is to the individual they protect. .14. 7.3. 1.2. 1 (ti) MEANS, MANN-ER. DOCUMENTATION or A amino/Norm carton The empioyee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, may determine the means and manner of the notification. When providing noti?cation. the empioyee shall provide as much informatitm as possihie regarding the threat. and the credibility of the threat. The employee must document. on an what. he or she informed the other law enforcement agency. and when, where, how (ego tciephonc call, emaii) and to whom the notice was delivered. The FD-999 must. be placed in a zero tile or it? investigative methods are used. the appropriate investigative fiie. 14.7.3.2 (U) ?ro Law ENFORCEMENT THAT HAVE til 14.7.3.2.1. (U) EXPEDITIOUS NOTIFICATION 14.7.3.2.1.1 (U) THREATS To PERSONS Except as provided in Sections 14.7.3.2.2, when an empioyee has information that. a person (other than a person described above in Section 14.7.3.3 .2) who is identified or can be identified through reasonable means is subject to a credible threat to his/her iife or of serious bodily in ury. the employee must attempt to notify other iaw enforcement agencies that have investigative. jurisdiction concerning the threat. 14.7.3.2].2 (U) 'I?tlnem?s TO OCCUPIED STRUCTURES on (tif?FGbG-?t When an employee has information that. a structure or conveyance which can be identified through reasonable means is the subject of a credible threat. which could cause a toss of iife or serious bodily injury to its occupants. the employee, in consultation with his or her supervisor, must provide expeditions notification to other enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction concerning the threat. "1440 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 FBI 18-cv-02709-32 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSII 1:13 . Domestic int estigntions and Optietlons Guide ?14 14.7.3 3.2.2 (U) '10 Normal now An employee need not attempt to notify another law enforcement. agency that has in vestigati ve jurisdiction concerning a threat: b7E -2 B) when the other iaw entotcement agency knows the nature and extent of the specific. threat to the intended victim. {if Whenever time and circumstances permit an empioyee decision not. to ptovide noti?cation to anothei law enforcement. agency in the tinegoing circumstances must. be apprm-?ed by an ASAC or higher. in all cases, the reasons for an employee?s decision not to provide notification must be documented in writing in a zero tite or if investigative methods are used, the appropriate investigative the 1. it 13.2 .3 Moms, AND cones-"Intros or? Norutrca now The empioyee may determine the means and manner of the notification. The empioyee must document. in writing in the applicable investigative tile the content of the noti?cation, and when, where, and to whom it was delivered. 14 7. 4 DISSEMIN 1110's! 01" I 01mm arrow Co NCE RMNG THREATS, POSSIBLE VIOLENCE 0R DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OREIGN ES TABLISHM 0R OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STA 215$ WPQU-G) :1 information is received indicating a threat. to tife within the scope of Section 1.4.7, or possibie violence. or against. foreign estabiishments or of?cials in the United States. the field of?ce case agent must immediately coordinate the matter with the FBIHQ SSA responsihie for the case, who must notify the Department: of State (DOS), United States Secret. Service and any other Government agencies that may have. an interest. See Section of the .1973 MUS the i383 and {354555; for the P'Bi?s information sharing responsibilities with the in such cases. 14.7 . 5 (U) DISS EMINA ON IN FORMA TION CONCERNING THREA 725' A GAINS THE PRESIDE VT A ND OTHER DESIGA 17? ED 01* PICIALS The United States Secret Service has statutory authority to protector to engage in certain activities to protect the President and certain other persons as speci?ed in 18 U.S.C. 3056. An Mtftii hetst-?emi the and specifies the FBI information that the wants to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities. (U Detailed guideiines regazding threats against the President oi the United States and other proteetces can be- foun - .on. Kidnapping and Assattiti.? (See the b7E '2 "144 3 Version Dated: Match 3, 2016 FBI 18- -cv- 02709- 33 UNCLASSIFIED