The Law Office of
Michael L. Lambert

369 Lexington Ave
2nd Floor, PMB#229
New York, NY, 10016
Ph: (917) 743-7071
Email: mariel.colon8@gmail.com
May 9, 2019
The Honorable Brian M. Cogan
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Re:

United States v. Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera
Case No. 09-CR-0466 (S-4)(BMC)

Your Honor:
I am writing on behalf of defendant Joaquín Guzmán Loera to respectfully request
that the Court order the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to allow Mr. Guzmán to have at least
two hours of outdoor recreation a week, access to general population commissary, the
ability to purchase six water bottles every week, and access to a set of earplugs in order to
alleviate his ear pain, and to assist his ability to sleep.
Recognizing the difficulty in dealing with MCC’s administrative process, the
Court advised, “If defendant encountered similar problems in the future, he may bring
those issues to the attention of the Court.” See Dkt. No. 71, at p. 8. Therefore, we are
seeking an order directing the BOP to grant Mr. Guzmán access to outdoor exercise,
earplugs, general population commissary privilege, and that he be permitted to purchase
of six water bottles every week.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Guzmán has been detained for 27 months at the Unit 10 South of the Special
Housing Unit of the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York (“MCC”) in solitary
confinement, in conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment, as well as fundamental norms of human decency. See Apodaca v. Raemish,
139 S. Ct. 5, 8 202 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2018) (“Courts and corrections officials must
accordingly remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by keeping
prisoners…in near-total isolation from the living world...”)

 

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 Even when Mr. Guzmán was a pretrial detainee, and, therefore, presumed
innocent, he was placed and has remained in the MCC’s Special Housing Unit (“SHU”)
despite not having committed a single violation of the prison’s rules. As per the Court’s
order, the Special Administrative Measures (“SAMs”) were imposed on Mr. Guzmán
because of, “a legitimate government objective…of preventing defendant from running
the Sinaloa Cartel from prison, coordinating any escape from prison, or directing any
attack on individuals that he may believe are cooperating with the Government.” See Dkt.
No 71, at p. 5.
Presently, pursuant to the SAMs, Mr. Guzmán is confined to a small, windowless
cell, of approximately 10 x 8 feet. Mr. Guzmán is permitted a single hour of solitary
exercise from Monday through Friday in another indoor cell that contains one stationary
bicycle. On the weekends, he is not permitted any exercise. Mr. Guzmán has been over
two years now without any access to fresh air or natural sunlight. Furthermore, the light
in his cell is always on, leading to serious issue of sleep deprivation.
As your Honor pointed out, “defendant’s conduct during what are surely difficult
proceedings and conditions of confinement for him has been exemplary, and he has
displayed considerable grace under pressure.” See Dkt. No 426, at p. 1. Mr. Guzmán has
behaved in an exemplary fashion in the 27 months that he has been in custody. Mr.
Guzmán has never been disrespectful, disruptive, or violent, towards any MCC staff
member, and has never had a single write up. Yet, his detention is far more onerous than
that of detainees being punished for acts of violence within the prison, and other
infractions of the rules. These conditions are excessively punitive given his established
track record of behavior thus far.
One of the most damaging conditions is the lack of sunlight and fresh air. This
deprivation of sunlight and fresh air, over an excessive 27-month period, is causing
psychological scarring. He has complained to his attorneys that he is suffering many
symptoms of distress as a result of this lengthy unwarranted punishment. As previously
mentioned before in a letter asking the Court to modify the SAMs, “Mr. Guzmán was
showing signs of mental fatigue” see Dkt. No 426, at p. 1, and it therefore was, and still
is, necessary to repeat things to him many times, because it appears that he has trouble
understanding things that have just been explained to him.
Mr. Guzmán has also complained of daily headaches and ear pain. The ear pain
has progressed to the point that, during Mr. Guzmán’s three-month trial, he was not able
to use the earphones provided to him, and instead, the Spanish translators had to sit next
to him and whisper to translate. In order to ease the pain, Mr. Guzmán has been using
toilet paper as makeshift earplugs. Additionally, the air conditioner system in his cell is
so loud, that he is unable to sleep through the night.
Food and other commissary items are routinely withheld without apparent reason
or explanation. While other inmates in the SHU unit receive water bottles and
comestibles every week, or every other week, that is not the case for Mr. Guzmán. Mr.
Guzmán gets a commissary list once a week, and every week, Mr. Guzmán attempts to
 

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 purchase water bottles among other things. Over the last six months, Mr. Guzmán has
only received a total of 22 small water bottles, even though MCC promised to sell him
six small water bottles every two weeks.
This is especially distressing considering that MCC New York was opened in
1975. The pipes are old, and Mr. Guzmán can taste and see mold coming out of the water
faucet. Clearly, this is not the best water to drink, and is likely detrimental to his health as
mold exposure can cause a variety of medical issues. Similarly, water depravation can
cause dehydration and kidney stones.
When Mr. Guzmán was represented by the Federal Defenders of New York
(“FDNY”), they faced these problems as well, and spent hours trying to address some of
these issues of confinement affecting Mr. Guzmán, and, “after over a month of litigation
within the BOP, the office secured the right of Mr. Guzmán to purchase the bottled water
that is readily available to inmates in general population.” See Dkt. No. 61, at p. 5.
However, repeated requests by counsel and our client, to have the MCC sell Mr. Guzmán
the six water bottles every two weeks that he was promised, have landed on deaf ears.
In U.S. v. Brooks, the Eastern District of New York recognized that only one hour
of outdoor exercise in a cage, no contact with other inmates, and restricted commissary,
family and religious visiting and telephone privileges, for an inmate who has not
committed a disciplinary infraction, are severe conditions of confinement. No. 07-CR00187 (CPS), 2008 WL 4693335, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2008). In Brooks, after the
defendant was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment, he filed a motion for a reduction of
his sentence based on his conditions of confinement before sentencing. The NYPD
learned that defendant’s friend was murdered and that defendant was the subject of a
death threat. Id. at 1. The NYPD passed this information on to the United States
Attorney’s Office, which in turn, informed the BOP. Id. Thereafter, the BOP determined
that defendant should be placed in protective custody and transferred to the Special
Housing Unit (“SHU”) of the MDC. Id. While defendant was in the SHU, he was not
permitted religious or family visits and was only permitted one telephone call per month.
Id. He was restricted to his cell for twenty-three hours a day. Id. The cell was unsanitary
and the food he was served was substandard, leading him to lose twenty pounds, and
develop kidney stones. Id. Shortly after sentencing, defendant filed a motion for
reduction of sentence based on the conditions of confinement in the SHU. Id. The
defendant argued that his sentence was the result of clear error, because it did not take
into account the conditions of pre-sentence confinement. Id. at 3. Defendant argued that
the conditions he suffered were dramatically harsher than the conditions of imprisonment
for the general population at the MDC. Id. The Court took into account the defendant’s
condition of confinement, and granted a reduction of sentence. Id. The Court cited the
Bureau of Prisons Policy, Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, § 5270.07, ch. 9,
p. 9., which says, “An inmate housed in administrative detention [is to be provided with]
the same general privileges given to inmates in the general population…Institutions shall
provide commissary privileges and reasonable amounts of personal property...” Id. at 3.
The Court concluded that:

 

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 Having reviewed BOP policy and crediting defendant’s statements about
the conditions of his confinement, I conclude that the restrictions placed
on him were severe relative to the conditions of confinement for the
general population at the MDC. For approximately ten months, defendant
was confined to his cell for 23 hours a day, only permitted one hour per
day of outdoor exercise in a cage, had no contact with other inmates, and
had restricted commissary… even though he had not committed a
disciplinary infraction. While the extent of defendant’s physical
deterioration may not have been extreme, the impact on his mental health
has been severe. Defendant’s descriptions of the negative psychological
consequences he has suffered comport with cases and studies addressing
the harsh impact that prolonged solitary confinement may have on
an inmate’s mental health…Given the length and nature of defendant’s
confinement in the SHU, I conclude that the conditions defendant suffered
were severe and fell upon him in a disproportionate manner relative to the
MDC general population. Accordingly, defendant’s motion is granted…
Id. at 4.
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Guzmán is on administrative segregation, which is not
meant to be a form of punitive segregation. However, he has restricted commissary.
Counsel has repeatedly asked MCC staff to provide Mr. Guzmán with general population
commissary list, but that request has also been ignored.
These types of restrictions have no relation to the security concerns and they only
serve to punish Mr. Guzmán, and further his sense of frustration and isolation. This has
resulted in a profound effect on his general health and wellbeing, which in turn affects his
ability to help in his own defense.
In Wilson v. Beame, Judge Weinstein stated,
The need to equalize the conditions of those administratively
segregated is recognized by the Department of Corrections itself, for
Order 33 mandates that equality. It provides in part: 4.45C An individual
in an Administrative Segregation status shall not be deprived of any right
guaranteed by law, nor shall he be deprived of any privilege enjoyed by
the general inmate population at large, except that the head of the
institution may, in his discretion, permit these privileges at a different time
and at a different place than is permitted to the general inmate population.
380 F. Supp. 1232, 1237–38 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
In this case, Mr. Guzmán is being deprived of privileges enjoyed by the general
population, specifically general population commissary, outdoor exercise, and the
opportunity to purchase bottled water, even though he is in administrative segregation.
MCC officials are not permitting any of these privileges to Mr. Guzmán.

 

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 The Court advised, “if the defendant encountered similar problems in the future,
he may bring those issues to the attention of the Court.” See Dkt. No. 71, at p. 8.
Consequently, we see no alternative but to bring these issues to the attention of the Court.
ARGUMENT
THE MCC’S REFUSAL TO PERMIT MR. GUZMÁN ANY OUTDOOR
EXERCISE AND TO TREAT HIM ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH OTHER
DETAINEES WHO HAVE VIOLATED NO REGULATIONS CONSTITUTES
IMPERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATES A CONVICTED
PRISONER’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.
Mr. Guzmán is singled out for punishment, isolation and disparate treatment,
including an abject denial of fundamental access to basic outdoor exercise. As set forth
below, his treatment clearly violates the Eighth Amendment standards applicable to
convicted prisoners.
A. Applicable Standards
1. Eighth Amendment Standards of Review
As a convicted prisoner, but not yet sentenced, Mr. Guzmán’s constitutional claim
falls under the Eighth Amendment Clause, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment
by depriving him of outdoor exercise. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “It is well
established, and the majority does not dispute, that pain or other suffering that is part of
the punishment imposed on convicted criminals is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny
without regard to an intent requirement.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
The United States Supreme Court has noted “no static test can exist by which
courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419
(2008). “Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity
of the person, and the punishment of the criminals must conform to that rule.” Id. at 420.
The Southern District of New York has also recognized that “rather than provide
courts with a fixed formula to determine whether particular conditions constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment requires courts to look to the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” Davidson v. Coughlin,
968 F. Supp. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F. 3d 252, 249
(2d Cir. 2015).
2. Outdoor Exercise
The Supreme Court of the United States, and courts across the nation, have long
recognized the importance of outdoor exercise for a prisoner’s health and well-being, and
that unreasonable imposition of isolation violates constitutional rights.
 

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 In her opinion in Apodaca v. Raemish, Justice Sotomayor recognized the dangers
of depriving an inmate of outdoor exercise:
I write to note, however, that what is clear all the same is that to deprive a
prisoner of any outdoor exercise for an extended period of time in the
absence of an especially strong basis for doing so is deeply troubling—and
has been recognized as such for many years. Then–Judge Kennedy
observed as much in 1979, ruling that, “in the absence of an adequate
justification from the State, it was cruel and unusual punishment for a
prisoner to be confined for a period of years without opportunity to go
outside except for occasional court appearances, attorney interviews, and
hospital appointments.” See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th
Cir. 1979). And while he acknowledged that various security concerns—
including the safety of staff and other prisoners and preventing escape—
could justify not permitting plaintiffs to mingle with the general prison
population, he observed that those generalized concerns did “not explain
why other exercise arrangements were not made.” Ibid. The same inquiry
remains essential today, given the vitality—recognized by the Tenth
Circuit in other cases —of the basic human need at issue. It should be clear
by now that our Constitution does not permit such a total deprivation in
the absence of a particularly compelling interest.
139 S. Ct. 5, at 8. The facts in Apodaca are simple; defendants Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe
were all in administrative segregation, also known as solitary confinement. Id. at 251.
They were all allowed only an hour a day of exercise in an indoor designated area for
between 11 and 25 months. Id. In 2015, all three filed lawsuits seeking damages in the
District of Colorado, alleging that this deprivation of outdoor exercise and sunlight
violated their Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
Respondents, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of and the Warden of
the Colorado State Penitentiary moved to dismiss both cases. The District Court denied
the motions to dismiss. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
denials, concluding that its prior precedents allowed reasonable debate on the
constitutionality of disallowing outdoors exercise for two years and one month in Lowe’s
case,1 or, moreover, 11 months in Apodaca and Vigil’s case.2 The petitioners sought
certiorari, arguing “that the Tenth Circuit had diverged from the common practice among
the Courts of Appeals of allowing a deprivation of outdoor exercise only when it was
supported by a sufficient security justification.” See Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–1284, at pp.
2–3; Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–1289, at pp. 2–3. Justice Sotomayor recognized,
…the petitioners were correct that the presence (or absence) of a
particularly compelling security justification has, rightly, played an
important role in the analysis of the Courts of Appeals. But the litigation
before the lower courts here did not focus on the presence or absence of a
valid security justification, and therefore the factual record before this
                                                        
1
 864 F.3d 1205, 1209 (2017) 
2
864 F.3d 1071, 1078 (2017)
 

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 Court—as well as the legal analysis provided by the lower courts—is not
well suited to our considering the question now.
Id. at 251.Consequently, the Court was inclined to deny the writs of certiorari.
The debate in Apodaca was not about whether such solitary confinements
conditions are cruel. Instead, the issue focused on whether access to outdoor recreation
for inmates is established clearly enough as a constitutional right that not providing it
means corrections officers can be sued. Even though the Supreme Court denied the writs
of certiorari, Justice Sotomayor made an important point against depriving a prisoner of
any outdoor exercise for an extended period of time; “We are no longer so unaware.
Courts and corrections officials must accordingly remain alert to the clear constitutional
problems raised by keeping prisoners like Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe in near-total
isolation from the living world...” Id. at 251.
The Second Circuit has not fully explored the issue of outdoor exercise, but other
courts have decided on this matter and are in agreement that some form of outdoor
exercise is necessary for inmates. “There is substantial agreement among the cases in this
area that some form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the
psychological and physical well-being of the inmates.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d
1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court should therefore use its discretionary powers to
grant this relief.
However, in Anderson v. Coughlin, the Second Circuit did note that one hour per
day of “outdoor” exercise is constitutionally sufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes.
757 F.2d 33, 36 (2nd Cir. 1985). In Anderson, petitioners confined to the SHU in two
different state prisons (Green Haven and Sing Sing) brought an action challenging
conditions of confinement. Id. at 33. The prisoners were confined to the SHU serving
time in segregation as punishment for violations of prison rules. Id. at 34. Inmates in
SHU in both prisons have access to outdoor exercise, but are not afforded access to any
indoor exercise area. Id. The prisoners claimed that they were entitled to indoor exercise
areas and also entitled to recreational equipment at the outdoor exercise areas. Id. “With
outdoor recreation space provided and opportunity for its daily use assured, the absence
of additional exercise space indoors and of recreational equipment for use in the outdoor
space is not a denial of constitutional rights” Id. at 36.
Years ago, then-Judge Kennedy recognized the importance of outdoor exercise
for inmates, noting “the substantial agreement among the cases in this area that some
form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical
well-being of the inmates.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Seventh Circuit has established a guideline that outdoor exercise privileges
cannot be denied for longer than 90 days. In Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F. 2d, 1310,
1315-16 (7th Cir. 1988), the Court upheld the district court’s injunction mandating that
prisoners held in segregation longer than 90 days must be given at least five hours of
outdoor exercise weekly.

 

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 Here, Mr. Guzmán is allowed five hours a week of indoor exercise only. He is not
allowed any outdoor exercise. There is no strong basis for prohibiting Mr. Guzmán any
outdoor access. The point to be made is the importance of outdoor exercise with sunlight
and not just indoor exercise. Outdoor exercise is important for the psychological and
physical well being of Mr. Guzmán, especially since he’s been deprived for far too long.
There is extensive research and scientific opinion supporting the benefits of outdoor
exercise for inmates. Therefore, based on these expert opinions and case law, it follows
that Mr. Guzmán should have access to outdoor exercise for his psychological and
physical well being. Spain, 600 F.2d at 199.
3. Safety Exception and Cost or Inconvenience
The Second Circuit has stated, “a prisoner may be denied out-of-cell exercise
under what is termed a safety exception.” Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 704 (2nd
Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit has expressly recognized that deprivations of exercise for
safety reasons “must be limited to unusual circumstances or circumstances in which
exercise is impossible because of disciplinary needs.” Id. In addition, even if a prisoner is
deemed an unusual security risk, that fact alone would not justify subjecting him to a
blanket policy denying such prisoners any opportunity for out-of-cell exercise. “[T]he
fact that an inmate is violent may justify segregating him or her from the general
population, but does not necessarily justify a prison’s failure to make
other exercise arrangements.” Id. at 704-05; see also Williams v. Goord, 142 F. Supp. 2d
416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
In Apodaca v. Raemisch, Justice Sotomayor revisited then-Judge Kennedy’s
opinion and further stated, “It should be clear by now that our Constitution does not
permit such a total deprivation in the absence of a particularly compelling interest” 139 S.
Ct. at 8.
In Spain v. Procunier, the court observed that “in the absence of an adequate
justification from the State, it was cruel and unusual punishment for a prisoner to be
confined for a period of years without opportunity to go outside except for occasional
court appearances, attorney interviews, and hospital appointments” 600 F.2d. at 200.
In Spain, the inmates in question were deemed responsible for a number of deaths
in an escape attempt and were considered both risks of violence and targets of retribution.
The prisoners were detained and deprived of all outdoor exercise for periods of up to
four-and-a-half years. Id. at 192. The court affirmed the district court finding that “[t]he
denial of fresh air and regular exercise constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, without
reaching the question of whether a denial is a per se violation of the eighth
amendment.” Id. at 199. Although the state argued that the deprivation was a security
measure to prevent violent attacks and escape attempts, the Court rejected this argument
forcefully. As then-Judge Kennedy noted:
The state argues that outdoor exercise was withheld to protect prison staff
and other inmates from violent attacks by the plaintiffs, and to
protect plaintiffs from attacks by other inmates. The state also cites the
 

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 objective of reducing the risk of escape, a risk which existed with
the plaintiffs even under conditions where security was greater than in
the prison exercise yard. These concerns justify not permitting plaintiffs to
mingle with the general prison population, but do not explain why other
exercise arrangements were not made,” noting that “[t]he cost or
inconvenience of providing adequate facilities is not a defense to the
imposition of a cruel punishment.
Id. at 200.
In this case, Mr. Guzmán has never had any issues with MCC staffers- therefore,
no unusual circumstance exists. As Mr. Guzmán is permitted indoor exercise outside of
his cell, there are no such safety concerns here. The outdoor courtyard at MCC is secured
with wire fencing and because of the SAMs, Mr. Guzmán is not permitted to
communicate with anyone but his legal team. His only two 15-minute phone calls per
month with his sister are monitored by multiple federal agencies. The argument that Mr.
Guzmán being under SAMs restrictions may justify segregating him from the general
population, but does not justify depriving him from basic human needs such as outdoor
exercise and natural sunlight.
The justification for imposition of the SAMs on Mr. Guzmán was because of:
…a legitimate government objective…of preventing defendant
from running the Sinaloa Cartel from prison, coordinating any escape
from prison, or directing any attack on individuals that he may believe are
cooperating with the Government…As the Government has recounted,
while defendant was imprisoned in Mexico the first two times, he
allegedly used third parties to further his narcotics trafficking enterprise,
to plan and execute his escapes from Mexican prisons, and to intimidate
possible cooperators.
see Dkt. No 71, at p. 5. According to this, alone, Mr. Guzmán would not be able to plan
and much less execute an escape, run a cartel, pass messages to third parties or intimidate
possible cooperators. Therefore, Mr. Guzmán’s restriction on outdoor exercise at MCC is
not rationally connected to the Government’s “legitimate purpose.” Allowing him two
hours a week of solitary outdoor exercise will not pose a security risk and therefore
exercise arrangements can be made so that he gets outdoor exercise and sunlight.
Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d at 704.
The Second Circuit has also said, “that prisons may not invoke cost
considerations in denying prisoners the opportunity to exercise.” 97 F.3d at 704–05.
Therefore, inconvenience to the staff or cost to the facility should not be determinative
factors to deny Mr. Guzmán outdoor exercise. MCC personnel already escorts Mr.
Guzmán to the indoor exercise cell, so minimal efforts can be made to escort him to the
outside courtyard on the 12th floor two hours a week at the very least, with the remaining
three hours of the week in indoor exercise. The Ninth Circuit has also noted “The cost or

 

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 inconvenience of providing adequate facilities is not a defense to the imposition of a cruel
punishment.” Spain, 600 F. 2d at 200.
B. Application
Under these standards, there is no question that Mr. Guzmán’s Eight Amendment
rights are being violated by the Bureau of Prisons at the MCC New York. Despite not
violating any prison regulations, Mr. Guzmán has been housed in the SHU unit for 27
months and has been categorically denied any and all outside exercise since his arrival at
the MCC in January, 2017. He has been subjected to the extreme psychological injury
exacted by 27 months of isolation from the general population, confined to his cell most
of the day, and being only permitted to speak to his legal team. This would be a flagrant
violation in the case of an inmate with multiple prison write-ups. Clearly, then, it is a
violation in the case of an inmate who has not had a single write up in his entire 27
months of detention such as Mr. Guzmán. In numerous respects recounted above –
regarding the sale of water bottles and access to general population commissary list – he
is being singled out for unequal and harmful treatment relative to other detainees. There
is no question that MCC officials are deliberately indifferent to the consequences of Mr.
Guzmán’s detention.
The cases cited above all stand for the singular importance of outdoor exercise to
the basic health and welfare of the inmates to the point that its unreasonable deprivation
constitutes a constitutional violation.
It cannot be said that it is sufficient for Mr. Guzmán to exercise in a small indoor
room. This disregards the 27-month deprivation of sunlight and fresh air, and fails to
recognize the singular importance of exercise in fresh air and outdoors.
Nor it can be said that the MCC has some “reason” for the unconscionable
treatment of Mr. Guzmán. Some Courts have decided on this issue and have repeatedly
rejected such rationales where they did not involve serious violations of prison rules- an
argument that is completely unavailable here due to Mr. Guzmán’s exemplary behavior
during the past 27 months at MCC. In Williams v. Greifinger, the court expressly
recognized that deprivations of exercise for safety reasons “must be limited to unusual
circumstances or circumstances in which exercise is impossible because of disciplinary
needs…The fact that an inmate is violent may justify segregating him or her from the
general population, but does not necessarily justify a prison’s failure to make
other exercise arrangements” 97 F.3d at 704-05.
This issue is not a petty complaint “that can be resolved by the parties without
resort to judicial intervention such as BOP’s removal of the clock that defendant
purchased from commissary or BOP’s decision to permit defendant to watch only nature
programming or the same movie over and over.” See Dkt. No 71, at p. 8. This is a valid
complaint that is affecting Mr. Guzmán’s mental health and has to be resolved through
judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION
 

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 The Court should order the MCC New York to give Mr. Guzmán access to at least
two hours of outdoor exercise a week so that he can absorb direct natural sunlight as well
as fresh air. Furthermore, the Court should order that Mr. Guzmán be allowed to purchase
six water bottles every week, access to the general population commissary list and access
to earplugs.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Mariel Colón Miró, Esq.
Attorney for Joaquín Guzmán Loera

cc: All counsel via ECF

 

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