Tempe Police Department Automated License Plate Recognition Program (ALPR) Training PART I November 4th, 2013 Introductions Who are you? How long have you been with TPD and/or other policing experience? What is your current assignment? What is your favorite thing to do on vacation? Why LPR? Big Brother or Smart Policing? I. T1: ALPR Training Goals Understand ALPR as a useful law enforcement tool Safeguard Privacy Ensure database security Retention Access Usage ALPR Training Objectives  Provide a real time investigative tool to aid law enforcement agents in criminal apprehensions  Provide an overview on:  The technology and issue with the technology  The available analytics  The concept of “hotlists” and BOLOs  Provide required department Operational Orders training  OPS 17.102  Provide an individual LEARN user account  Provide Target Alert Service (TAS) client for laptop users What is ALPR? No personal information – it is the investigation process that identifies individuals Past vs Present Past = Auto Theft Present = Intel Led Policing  Hardware  Hardware      Cameras laptops Processors Server(by owner) Wi-Fi  Basic Software  Plate searches  Mapping  Back Office     Cameras/Processors Laptops Server (hosted) Air Cards  Advanced Software     Plate searches Mapping Analytics Audits  Web-Based  Smartphone App  Data Sharing Law Enforcement Archival Reporting Network (L.E.A.R.N.) "Elerte, Reports? Audits Hotlist. Queries Co'?m?r' - LEARN Server Workstations: Intelligence Patrol Communications Detections Investigations Specialty 5?17) Hotlist Ca era." Deployment: ., mes?:- Mobile Portable Fixed Detections Banal-i NVLS Detections Private Data DRN Texas 70 Million Detections! Month Over 1.6 Million in PHD-C. area What does a successful ALPR program look like? Automated License Plate Recognition Support System Arrests VIP Reports Recovered paw? Stolen Audits Data Security Training Alert Updates Service Intel Administrmive Policies and Procedures Tempe Police Department ALPR Program What are the capabilities?  Advanced Analytic and Data Queries  Geo fences, time frames, property types, wildcards  Stakeout, Location Analysis, Associate Analysis, Common Plate Analysis  Reports, Audits, Mapping  Secured Hosted Service  Data Sharing  Private  Other Agencies  Controlled and Managed by each Agency  Latest updates, programming and support What are the capabilities?  Smartphone App  Detectives, Bike units, foot patrols, mounted units  Manage multiple Hotlists  NCIC, BOLOs, Offender Watch, CIs…  Real Time Deployment with actionable Intel  Desktop Ready – web based investigative tool  LEARN – Law Enforcement Archival & Reporting Network  Cameras  Fixed - strategic  Mobile – tactical – Socially Involved Report  Portable – strategic and tactical Common Plate Analysis  Interstate Narcotics Trafficking – using Stakeout and Associate Analysis Agency Detections ILjan?elback MAS Search - Encanto a last Village Village Select View: Scan Density Map .: Phoenix 9,157: (202! searCh Cl'ltEl'la Maricopa Fwy Phoenix Sky Harbdr 3 International I I n?rnort l_ - - g4- wrap-1:. PH -Hl'133ll Brown ?le'l ?3 ?5 plaguaors 953W nolrlzar I1 ?remit"; [Jr Mrllil 53' Data Type: Detections Data Source: lAgency Data I South .. 21.; 353.. my): . Superstition i-w Contributor: Entire Agency Mn'Lmtair] ?we 3. .. . . ?fillage Guid?lui"? - Dobbins 1 I . . (a pa ?un?iH Date Range: Start Date: 11-01-13 Aim-awn "3 South . - . .?nd End Date Time Frame. Alrwalukee 1 a; ?l 2 Foothills Village cI-anrlier uI-i-d pH .{eepuij 1: Higley 91%? run 5; Chandler 3009 Rd . c3 3 . 5 bantan Fwy 202 em t'l'l'r??tan Pecos rm 3' Map data ?2014 Google Terms of Use Ou ut Re ort Total Records: 330,094 Transparency Scale Zone Selected: No LPR Record Count Greater PHX area Private Data Detections Density Map Search Criteria Data Type: Detentions Data Ssurse: Pill Date Range: Start Date: End Date: Time Frame: Record Count Tatal Placards: Eane Selected: Ants efre - Neal 1 fer-ht: ul'E?tif Carefree Sun City: West 33" Hesse-felt Surprise . . . .5 auntarn Hills Penna [lGlendaIE I lat Scottsdale.93) Gendyear I ape-ere u- (E) Gilbert Hold Canyon Chandlq Mesa 1' 1 Iale terse mm ?l RTE I l' I Dana-L's: data sac-'5 33:; ll nil Output Report Scan Densityr lmage Overlay: Transparent; Seals Sean Concentration: Normalize Green 1 Yellow 2 Orange: 3 Stolen Vehicles, plates and subjects with warrants Deployment and Implementation Establish Policies and Training Volunteers in Policing Communications 8: Investigations Increase Apprehensions Efficiencies Portable Stationary Units Patrol Intel Private Data Law Data Share with other Enforcement Agencies Investigative uses and Success Tempe PD LPR Detections 250000 200000 LPR Detections 150000 100000 LPR Queries/month 50000 May-15 Mar-15 Jan-15 Nov-14 Sep-14 Jul-14 May-14 Mar-14 Jan-14 Nov-13 0 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 LPR Log in LPR Success at Mall Shooting  December 2013 AZ Mills Mall Shooting  Victim shot in the arm  6 suspects, 3 vehicles  2 arrests 12/2013 & 3/2014 (both gang members)  Charges include:  3 counts of aggravated assault  1 count of misconduct using a firearm  1 count possession of marijuana for sale  LPR provided:  Locations on two suspect vehicle just prior to incident  Key link to 2nd suspect, little to no follow up, except license plate info provided by private data What?s the issue? IPrivacy Security Retention of data IAccess to data IUses of data UNDER ATTACK: Headlines & Court Cases  Headlines  ACLU – You are being tracked – 7/13  Boston Police halt license scanning program - 12/13  Police won’t discuss innocent driver flagged by LPR error – 4/14 Prairie Village PD Kanas  Court Cases  Denise Green vs San Francisco PD – 5/14 continuing  Vigilant Solutions vs State of Utah – 6/14 Legislative reversal on 1st Amendment  Vigilant Solutions vs State of Arkansas – 6/14  Georgia Supreme Court – 7/14 ruling  ACLU vs County and City of Los Angeles – 8/14 ruling  Michael Robertson vs San Diego PD – 9/14 ruling ACLU publication July 2013  Page 14 Maryland 2012 • 85 Million detections = • 465 minor / misdemeanor hits per day • 10 serious crime hits per day • Land Mass (sq mi): • Maryland 10,460 • Maricopa County 9,224 • Population • Maryland 5.5M • Maricopa County 3.8M ALPR Policy Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Operations Order 17.102 A. Purpose The purpose of this Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) policy is to ensure: the privacy of the data, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, the security of the system, and the quality of data gathered. Furthermore, this policy provides employees of the Tempe Police Department with guidance on the application and management of ALPR systems. B. Policy Automated license plate recognition systems have enhanced law enforcement’s ability to detect violations of law, recover stolen property, apprehend fugitives, and assist with investigations. Employees of the Tempe Police Department will use ALPR systems in accordance with the policy & procedures, department approved training, and operational guidelines set forth. Furthermore, data captured from ALPRs will be used properly and responsibly as defined herein. ALPR Policy continued… C. Definitions 1. Aggregation of ALPR Data - referred to as “analyzed data” or data that becomes part of a case file shall be compliant with applicable laws and regulations. 2. ALPR - Automated license plate recognition. 3. ALPR Data - The images and the metadata associated with them are the primary forms of information collected by an ALPR system. Data files typically contain the following information: o Black and white plate image. o Contextual color image. o Electronically readable format of plate alphanumeric characters of license plate numbers. o Location and GPS coordinates. o Time and date of image capture. o Camera identification ALPR Policy continued… 4. GPS - Global Positioning System. 5. Hot List - Data which includes license plate numbers of stolen vehicles, stolen license plates, wanted person with a license plate associated with the record, and suspended or revoked registrations. Also includes national data (i.e. NCIC, NICB) for similar categories, for license plates associated with AMBER Alerts, terrorist watch lists and the like; also includes manually entered license plates information for crimes just occurred in a local jurisdiction, gang members, wanted persons, and other investigative targets. 6. Linkable information - Information about or related to an individual for whom there is a possibility of logical association with other information about the individual. 7. Linked information - Information about or related to an individual that is logically associated with other information about the individual. 8. LPR - License plate reader. 9. Personally identifiable information - Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, Social Security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, education, financial, and employment information. ALPR Policy continued… D. Procedures 1. General Administration a) b) ALPR data is not personally identifiable information. A license plate number identifies a specific vehicle, not a specific person. Although a license plate number may be linked or otherwise associated with an identifiable person, this potential can only be realized through a distinct, separate step. Absent this extra step, the license plate number and the time and location data attached to it are not personally identifying. Thus, even though LPR systems automate the collection of license plate numbers, it is the investigation process that identifies individuals. All installations and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access shall be managed by the Support Services Division. The Support Services Division Assistant Chief/Director will assign personnel under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. ALPR Policy continued… 2. ALPR Operations and Retention a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) j) Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department personnel shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment of database records for any unauthorized purpose. ALPR shall only be used for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department approved training. While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR equipped vehicles to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles. ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before collecting ALPR data. ALPR data may be used to investigate hits and other circumstances in which law enforcement agents reasonably believe that the plate data are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, or to protect the health or safety of others. Analyzed ALPR data that becomes part of a case file shall be compliant with applicable laws and regulations. The Support Services Division Commander or designee is responsible to ensure proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Retention of ALPR data will be stored in the Department’s ALPR Server or appointed server for a period of no more than six (6) months. Thereafter, it shall be purged unless it has become, or is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal investigation. In those circumstances, the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and impounded as evidence. Case files containing ALPR data can be shared with prosecutors as permitted by law. Hotlists should be updated as often as practicable, and/or at the beginning of each shift. Whenever a license plate reader alerts on a plate, before taking any action, officers are required to confirm visually that a plate matches the number and state identified in the alert, confirm that the alert is still active, and if the alert pertains to the registrant of the car and not the car itself. For example, in a warrant situation, develop a reasonable belief that the vehicle’s occupant(s) match any individual(s) identified in the alert. ALPR Policy continued… 3. Accountability and Safeguards a) All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Tempe Police Department will observe such safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data. b) To protect privacy rights, no ALPR data will be released on any other individuals or entities. (U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 489 U.S. 749 (1989). c) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and server shall be accessible only through a login/password protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time. d) Persons approved to use ALPR systems and access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department related civil or administration action. Access to ALPR systems and data requires completion of approved department training and is non-transferable to other users. User access violations are subject to a loss of access and discipline per departmental guidelines (refer to General Order 03.201 Code of Conduct). e) All ALPR data queries must be accompanied by the law enforcement case number corresponding with the investigation. Without a case number or identification number, the system will not allow a query of license plate data. f) Requested ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies at any time for legitimate law enforcement purposes. g) Sharing of ALPR data is permissible with other law enforcement agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes in accordance with this policy. h) ALPR systems audits will be conducted on an annual basis. Report Writing  To identify LPR’s effectiveness as a tool to address crime  Please refer to the system as a license plate reader (LPR)  For example:  …a query of the license plate reader (LPR) database provided the following information…  …a query of the license plate reader (LPR) database met with no results… Non Emergency Phone I. Numbers Location Analysis I. Locate Analysis the new standard for querying LPR data Locate Analysis - groups LPR detections around addresses - tells you how many visits to these addresses have been made by an LPR-equippt - tells you how many times a suspect vehicle has been seen at each locatic - tells you if the suspect is more likely to be seen during the day or night at each - tells you the most recent and most popular locations - provides you with an interactive and chronological map view - generates a simple Locator Score for each address Locate Analysis saves countless hours and allows you to fo efforts on locations most likely to generate results Training Videos On the web at YouTube.com  Search: Vigilant Solutions  Queries and Wildcards  Location Analysis  Associate Analysis  Stakeout  Mobile Hit Hunter  Mapping Alert Service  True Stories Access LEARN  Access LEARN web-site:  https://LEARN-NVLS.com  Select: System User  Username: John_doe@tempe.gov  OK  Change Password LEARN - profile I select' My PrOfile 0 Back -?~Home Log Out LEAR use" My Pro?le License Plalae Query Hot-List Management Mapping Tools Locate Analysis Other Functions Give Us Your Feedback! Prolec?ring Of?cers, F0 milies and Commurnilies LEARN  Analytics  License plate Query  Where, when and Quick…  Location Analysis  Where and when can I find him, how often is he there…  Stakeout  Who has been here?  Get Vehicle Info Target Alert Service TAS - 1' . South-1:511 141.111 "3 J. d-n.nvv--n? . I 1- .. BankngE'lerica - "El J1 1.3.1: .- I 31:: - .. Southernllama-2131"? 4 '1 5 P11 Eng-IJiher' .anntI'I-zln 15.1: I: 111 '54'54.2 - til} Jr.1 (El: "15:5:l 555;: Sure-1'. - Target Alert Service (TAS) I Target Alert Service Am? YL IULANT s. Heme Addressr?URL User Heme Perl . Merits Preferences TAS Servers Stored Alerts Run in Background Edit New Delete Service is currently: DH Diseenneet ?U?ersien Mobile Hit Hunter Filmr Fuller Rosull Draw Zone Search Place Search Place (30 to My Location' 0 Go to 'My Locm-on' Mod:- i Walking Mode ?3 Van Cle Mode Show List VIEW Active Location Saueo hits Map Tarp-0 A Normal Salellitu VIGILANT SDLLITICINS Protecting Officers, Families and Comm uni?es MHH Menu To the bottom right of the MHH interface, there is an expandable MHH menu, letting you customize your MHH interface. Filter results by date and alert type Draw geo?zone using shape tools Search areas of interest within map Quickly go to your location Switch between vehicle and walking modes View active location or saved hits Switch between satellite map view BE No ALPR Alert is worth a 962A Questions?  Contact Info:  Additional LPR training:  LPR basic training (3 hours quarterly)  Webinars by Vigilant Solutions  Notification via e-mail