U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated May 14, 2019

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44572

 SUMMARY

U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress
U.S. airborne electronic warfare (EW) programs involve developing and procuring EW
aircraft and EW systems that are mounted on U.S. aircraft. The President’s FY2020
budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD) proposes funding for a number of
airborne EW programs.

R44572
May 14, 2019
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Military
Capabilities and Programs

The Role of Airborne EW in Modern Warfare
EW is a component of modern warfare, particularly in response to threats posed by potential adversaries such as
Russia or China. EW refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the “airwaves”) to detect,
listen to, jam, and deceive (or “spoof”) enemy radars, radio communication systems, data links, and other
electronic systems. EW also refers to operations that defend against enemy attempts to do the same.
The shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power
competition has led to an increased focus on EW in U.S. defense planning and programming, particularly aspects
of EW related to high-end warfare.
U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Capabilities
Airborne EW capabilities are a component of U.S. military airpower. Although dedicated U.S. EW aircraft are
relatively few in number compared with U.S. fighters, strike fighters, and attack aircraft, they play a role in
helping to ensure the combat survivability and effectiveness of other aircraft and friendly forces on the ground.
DOD’s three primary manned EW electronic attack aircraft are the Navy EA-18G Growler, the Air Force EC130H Compass Call, and the Air Force EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host. A fourth manned aircraft—the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter—has extensive, integrated EW capabilities. DOD’s primary airborne electronic attack payloads
include the AN/ALQ-99 electronic attack suite, the Next Generation Jammer, and the Miniature Air Launched
Decoy-Jammer.
EW Oversight Issues for Congress
Congress has continually shown interest in EW, and the decisions it makes regarding EW could affect future U.S.
military capabilities and funding requirements. In particular, EW programs pose several potential oversight issues
for Congress:


Whether DOD is prioritizing appropriately airborne EW programs in its planning and budgeting
relative to other U.S. military EW programs (such as those for U.S. ground forces or Navy
surface ships) and to other DOD non-EW priorities.





Whether DOD’s proposed mix of airborne EW capabilities and investments is appropriate.
The evolution of technology and how new technologies can be employed for EW operations.
The Air Force’s planned rate for procuring EC-37Bs and replacing EC-130Hs.

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 Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Electronic Warfare..................................................................................................................... 1
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 1
EW in an Era of Renewed Great Power Competition ......................................................... 2
Relationship of EW to Cyberwarfare .................................................................................. 3
EW as an Element of U.S. Airpower .................................................................................. 4
EW Aircraft ............................................................................................................................... 4
Boeing EA-18G Growler .................................................................................................... 4
Lockheed Martin EC-130H Compass Call ......................................................................... 6
EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft ............................................................................ 8
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ..................................................................................................... 9
Airborne EW Payloads ............................................................................................................. 11
AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS) ................................................................... 11
Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) ....................................................................................... 13
Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) and Jammer (MALD-J) .................................. 16
Potential Issues for Congress......................................................................................................... 18
Congressional EW Working Group (EWWG) ........................................................................ 18
Airborne EW as a DOD Priority ............................................................................................. 18
Mix of Airborne EW Capabilities and Investments ................................................................ 19
Role of Emerging Technologies .............................................................................................. 20
EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Procurement ........................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Overview of Electronic Warfare ...................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. EA-18G Growler .............................................................................................................. 5
Figure 3. EC-130H Compass Call ................................................................................................... 7
Figure 4. EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft.......................................................................... 8
Figure 5. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ................................................................................................ 10
Figure 6. F-35 EW System-Related Equipment ............................................................................. 11
Figure 7. EA-18G Growler Equipped with AN/ALQ-99F Tactical Jamming System .................. 12
Figure 8. ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods .................................................................................... 12
Figure 9. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB) ......................................................... 13
Figure 10. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB) ....................................................... 14
Figure 11. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB) ....................................................... 15
Figure 12. Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) .................................................................... 17
Figure 13. Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) .................................................................... 17

Appendixes
Appendix. Recent Congressional Action ....................................................................................... 21

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 Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 22

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 Introduction1
This report focuses on selected U.S. airborne electronic attack programs. Such programs involve
developing and procuring both the aircraft whose primary mission is electronic warfare (EW) and
the EW systems that are mounted on U.S. aircraft. The President’s FY2020 budget request for the
Department of Defense (DOD) seeks funding for a number of airborne EW programs.
These programs pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, and its decisions on
these issues could affect future U.S. military capabilities and funding requirements.
Congress has continually shown interest in EW, and airborne electronic attack in particular. Some
Members have formed the EW Working Group, and they routinely discuss improving EW
capabilities. The National Defense Authorization Acts over the past several years have included
provisions related to EW and electronic attack. Most recently the FY2019 John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act, discussed the Air Force’s acquisition strategy for a new EW
attack aircraft as well as a study to catalogue all EW capabilities.

Background
Electronic Warfare
Overview2
Electronic warfare (EW)—sometimes also called electromagnetic maneuver warfare (EMW)3—is
a component of modern warfare, particularly in response to threats posed by technologically
sophisticated potential adversaries such as Russia and China. EW generally refers to operations
that use the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the “airwaves”) to detect, listen to, jam, and deceive
(or “spoof”) enemy radars, radio communication systems and data links, and other electronic
systems. It also refers to operations for defending against enemy attempts to do the same. More
formally, DOD defines electronic warfare as “military action involving the use of electromagnetic
and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.”4
As shown in Figure 1, DOD divides EW into electronic warfare support, electronic protection,
and electronic attack. Electronic warfare support, sometimes also referred to as electronic support
measures (ESM), involves listening to an adversary’s radar and radio transmissions in order to
detect, locate, and understand how to avoid, jam, or deceive those systems. Electronic protection
involves limiting the electromagnetic signatures of one’s own military equipment and hardening

1

This report was originally authored by Ray Zuniga, then-Air Force Fellow.
For a brief overview of EW, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare, by John R. Hoehn.
3 See, for example, John Joyce, “Navy Expands Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare for ‘Victory at Sea,’” Navy News
Service, November 2, 2017; Robert K. Ackerman, “Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare Looms as New U.S. Navy
Discipline,” Signal, February 11, 2015.
4 Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms As of February 2019, p. 78, accessed
March 13, 2019, at https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. See also Department of
Defense, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, February 8, 2012, 144 pp. (including covers), accessed March
13, 2019, at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/joint/jp3_13_1_2012.pdf and
https://publicintelligence.net/jcs-ew/.
2

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 one’s own military equipment against the effects of enemy EW operations. Electronic attack (EA)
involves jamming and deceiving enemy radars and radio communications and data links.
Developing ever-better EW systems is a component of the overall competition in military
capabilities between major military powers. This issue is not frequently discussed publicly in
much detail, because the specifics of EW programs tend to be classified and are closely related to
intelligence systems and capabilities.
Figure 1. Overview of Electronic Warfare

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, February 8, 2012, Figure I-3 on p. I-5,
accessed March 13, 2019, at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/joint/jp3_13_1_2012.pdf
and https://publicintelligence.net/jcs-ew/.

EW in an Era of Renewed Great Power Competition
During the Cold War, EW capabilities supported the overall competition in military capabilities
between the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance. The end of the
Cold War and the shift in the early 1990s to the post-Cold War era—a period that featured
reduced tensions between major powers and a strong U.S. military emphasis on countering
terrorist and insurgent organizations—may have led to a reduced emphasis in U.S. defense plans
and programs related to so-called high-end warfare, meaning high-intensity warfare against
technologically sophisticated adversaries.

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2

 In recent years, the shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to
an era of renewed great power competition has increased the focus on EW in U.S. defense
planning and programming.5 In particular, attention has been given to aspects of EW related to
high-end warfare and to concerns among some observers that the United States needs to
strengthen its efforts in EW as part of its overall effort to preserve U.S. qualitative military
superiority over potential adversaries such as Russia and China.
DOD notes Russia has placed an emphasis on EW in its military modernization effort.6 For
example, Russia reportedly has employed EW as part of its military operations in Ukraine and
Syria.7 DOD similarly states that China recognizes the importance of EW in modern military
operations and is developing its EW capabilities as an integral part of its broad-based military
modernization effort.8 As China encourages greater integration between its civil and military
technological and industrial bases,9 its EW capabilities may benefit from the sophistication of its
extensive civilian electronics industry.10

Relationship of EW to Cyberwarfare
EW emerged in the early and middle decades of the 20th century with the invention and spread of
radio and radar and their use in military operations. It therefore predates cyberwarfare, which
emerged decades later with the invention and spread of computers and the internet. Today, some
overlap exists between EW and cyberwarfare, though there is a key difference between the two.
EW focuses on military operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum against radars and radio
communication and data links, while cyberwarfare activities—which occur on a day-to-day basis,
as well as during overt conflicts—target computers and servers, and involve significant use of the
wired connections between them. EW and cyberwar activities can support one another.11

5

For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS In Focus IF11139, Evaluating DOD
Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission, by Kathleen J. McInnis
6 See Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power, Building a Military to Support
Great Power Aspirations, 2017, pp. 32, 42.
7 See, for example, Yuri Lapaiev, “Ukraine as Clandestine Testing Ground for Russian Electronic Warfare,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, vol. 15, issue 157, November 5, 2018; “Russia Deploys Electronic Warfare in Syria,” Army
Recognition, October 17, 2018; Tom O’Connor, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare System in Syria Will Be Able to Track
Planes in Europe and Israel,” Newsweek, September 28, 2018 Lara Seligman, “Russian Jamming Poses a Growing
Threat to U.S. Troops in Syria,” Foreign Policy, July 30, 2018 Roger N. McDermott, Russia’s Electronic Warfare
Capabilities to 2025, Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum, International Centre for Defence and
Security, Tallinn, Estonia, September 2017, p. 39.
8 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2018, p. 74. For more on China’s military modernization effort, see CRS Report R44196, The
Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Ian E. Rinehart, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 For more on these efforts, see Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, pp. 1-2, 81, 84-85, 121.
10 For an example of these types of activities, see CRS In Focus IF10119, U.S.-China Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence,
Wayne M. Morrison, and Jonah Langan-Marmur.
11 DOD states that
[s]ince cyberspace requires both wired and wireless links to transport information, both offensive
and defensive cyberspace operations may require use of the EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] for
the enabling of effects in cyberspace. Due to the complementary nature and potential synergistic
effects of EW and CNO [computer network operations], they must be coordinated to ensure they
are applied to maximize effectiveness. Cyberspace operations may be used to force an adversary

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 EW as an Element of U.S. Airpower
Although dedicated U.S. EW aircraft are relatively few in number compared with the number of
U.S. fighters, strike fighters, and attack aircraft, they play a role in helping to ensure the combat
survivability and effectiveness of other aircraft and friendly forces on the ground. EW aircraft
detect and jam enemy radars and air defense command-and-control equipment, so that U.S.
fighters, strike fighters, attack aircraft, and bombers can more safely penetrate enemy airspace.
EA-18G Growlers (discussed below) accompany U.S. fighters, strike fighters, and attack aircraft
on missions to penetrate enemy airspace. Other U.S. EW aircraft, such as the EC-130H Compass
Call aircraft (discussed below), perform their EW missions from standoff locations in less
contested airspace.
Fifth-generation stealthy U.S. aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
are less dependent on EW support than are less stealthy, earlier-generation U.S. aircraft. Even F22s and F-35s, however, still benefit from EW support under certain circumstances.12 EW aircraft
support the Navy’s Naval Integrated Fires Counter-Air (NIF-CA) concept and help ensure the
combat survivability and effectiveness of less stealthy, earlier-generation U.S. aircraft and
friendly forces on the ground.

EW Aircraft
Although various U.S. manned and unmanned aircraft perform EW operations, this report focuses
on DOD’s three primary manned EW electronic attack aircraft: the EA-18G Growler, the EC130H Compass Call, and the EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host. It also focuses on a fourth manned
aircraft, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which has extensive built-in EW capabilities. Each of these
four aircraft is discussed briefly below.

Boeing EA-18G Growler
The Boeing EA-18G Growler (Figure 2) is a Navy carrier-capable EW aircraft. Its primary
mission is to detect and jam enemy radars. Among the 60 or more aircraft in an aircraft carrier’s
embarked air wing, typically four or five are EA-18Gs. These aircraft are also operated by the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

from wired to wireless networks that are vulnerable to EA [electronic attack]. EW may be used to
set favorable conditions for cyberspace operations by stimulating networked sensors, denying
wireless networks, or other related actions. In the defensive environment, EW systems may detect
and defeat attacks across wireless access points.
(Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, February 8, 2012, p. I-15,
accessed March 13, 2019, at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/joint/
jp3_13_1_2012.pdf and https://publicintelligence.net/jcs-ew/.)
12 The F-35 includes inherent EW capabilities, as discussed below.

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 Figure 2. EA-18G Growler

Source: Photo accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Electronic Warfare Executive Committee to Focus on Strategy,
Acquisition,” USNI News, March 18, 2015.

The EA-18G is the successor to the carrier-capable EA-6B Prowler, which was operated by both
the Navy and Marine Corps. The EA-18G achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in
September 2009,13 and EA-18Gs have gradually replaced EA-6Bs. The final operational EA-6Bs,
operated by the Marine Corps, were retired in March 2019.14
Unlike the EA-6B, which was a four-seat aircraft, the EA-18G has a crew of two. The EA-6B was
an EW variant of the Navy and Marine Corps carrier-capable A-6 Intruder attack plane; similarly,
the EA-18G is an EW variant of the Navy and Marine Corps carrier-capable F/A-18F Super
Hornet strike fighter.
The EA-18G is equipped with an airborne electronic attack (AEA) avionics suite that has evolved
from the EA-6B’s Improved Capability III (ICAP III) AEA system. As discussed below, the EA18G carries AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods, which are to be replaced by Next Generation Jammer
jamming pods. The Navy states that “the EA-18G’s electronic attack upgrades meet or exceed
EA-6B Airborne… Electronic Attack capability to detect, identify, locate and suppress hostile
[electromagnetic] emitters; provide enhanced connectivity to National, Theater and strike assets;
and provide organic precision emitter targeting for employment of onboard suppression weapons
to fulfill operational requirements.”15 The Navy further states that
13

Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, p. 11.
See, for example, Shawn Snow, “EA-6B Prowler, One of the Saltiest Warfighters in the Marine Corps, Retires,”
Marine Corps Times, March 8, 2019; Justin Katz, “Marine Corps to Complete Prowler Retirement in March,” Inside
Defense, November 1, 2018.
15 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1 of 4, Aircraft
Procurement, Navy, Budget Activity 01−04, May 2017, p. 1 (PDF page 69 of 242).
14

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 [t]he EA-18G provides full-spectrum airborne electronic attack (AEA) capabilities to
counter enemy air defenses and communication networks, most notably anti-radiation
missiles. These capabilities continue to be in high demand in overseas contingency
operations, where Growler operations protect coalition forces and disrupt critical command
and control links.16

The Air Force does not operate an aircraft directly analogous to the EA-18G. The last such Air
Force aircraft was the EF-111 Raven, an EW variant of the F-111 fighter. The Air Force retired
the last of its EF-111s in 1998.
The Navy states that “the [EA-18G] inventory objective of 160 aircraft will support ten carrierbased squadrons, five active expeditionary squadrons, and one reserve squadron.”17 A total of 163
EA-18Gs were procured through FY2016, including a final procurement of 10 in FY2016. The
Department of the Navy does not plan further procurement of EA-18Gs. EA-18Gs, like F/A18E/Fs, currently are receiving funding for a service life extension; 18 the Growler is expected to
be replaced starting in the 2030s.19

Lockheed Martin EC-130H Compass Call20
The EC-130H Compass Call (Figure 3) is an EW aircraft based on a modified version of the C130 Hercules cargo aircraft. The EW system on the aircraft is called the Compass Call system.
The Air Force states that the EC-130H “disrupts enemy command and control communications
and limits adversary coordination essential for enemy force management.” The Compass Call
system employs offensive counter-information and electronic attack (or EA) capabilities in
support of U.S. and Coalition tactical air, surface, and special operations forces.

16

Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, p. 10.
Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, p. 11.
18 Research and development efforts to improve the capabilities of EA-18Gs in coming years are funded in Program
Element (PE) 0604269N, EA-18 Squadrons—a line item in the Navy’s research and development account. In the
Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget, this PE is line 112 in the Navy’s research and development account.
19 Department of Defense Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2019-2048, p. 10. Accessed
at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062648.pdf
20 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from U.S. Air Force fact sheet, “EC-130H Compass
Call,” September 23, 2015, accessed March 15, 2019. Although this fact sheet is dated September 23, 2019, the Air
Force states that its online fact sheets contain up-to-date information and statistics.
17

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 Figure 3. EC-130H Compass Call

Source: U.S. Air Force official website, EC-130H Compass Call Fact Sheet, September 23, 2015, accessed April
1, 2019, at http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104550/ec-130h-compass-call.aspx.

The EC-130H is operated by a crew of 14, most of whom are assigned to operate the aircraft’s
EW systems. The EC-130H can be considered a so-called “low-density, high-demand asset,”
meaning a specialized asset that exists in DOD in relatively low numbers but that DOD uses
extensively. A February 2018 press report states that
[t]he small, 14-aircraft EC-130H fleet has been flying since 1981—and near-constantly in
the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syrian conflicts, because of the unique capability it offers in
communications jamming and electronic attack. It has been a key element in the fight
against ISIS, an adversary that has adapted high technology to its tactics and strategy….
EC-130Hs there have been deployed nonstop since 2002, the longest continuously
deployed Air Force unit in the Afghanistan war. 21

The EC-130H achieved IOC in 1983. EC-130Hs are being replaced over time by new EC-37B
Compass Call Re-Host aircraft (see next section). The Air Force projects in its FY2020 budget
submission that it will have 13 EC-130Hs and no EC-37Bs in service at the end of FY2019, and
12 EC-130Hs and one EC-37B in service at the end of FY2020. While EC-130Hs remain in
service, the Air Force plans to modernize them to improve their capabilities and reduce their
maintenance costs, which have been rising as the aircraft have aged.22

Brian W. Everstine, “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC-130Hs Will,” Air Force Magazine, February
2018.
22 Modernization of EW systems on EC-130Hs is funded through a line item in the Modification of In-service Aircraft
(i.e., Budget Activity 05) part of the Air Force’s aircraft procurement account, in a line item entitled “Compass Call.”
In the Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission, this is line item 53.
21

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 EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft
Air Force plans call for replacing the service’s EC-130Hs over time with a total of 10 new EC37B Compass Call Re-Host aircraft (Figure 4).
Figure 4. EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft
(Artist’s rendering)

Source: Artist rendering accompanying Brian W. Everstine, “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC130Hs Will,” Air Force Magazine, February 2018.

The first EC-37B was procured in FY2018, two more were procured in FY2019, and the Air
Force’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $114.1 million for the procurement of a fourth in
FY2020. Air Force plans call for procuring additional EC-37Bs at a rate of one per year until the
planned total of 10 is reached.
The Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission projects that the first new EC-37B will enter the Air
Force’s inventory by the end of FY2020. The first two EC-37Bs are scheduled to achieve Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) in 2023.23
L3 Technologies, a U.S. defense contractor involved in EW programs, is the prime contractor for
the EC-37B. The EC-37B is based on the Gulfstream G550 commercial business jet, an aircraft

23

Procurement of EC-37Bs is funded through the Other Aircraft (i.e., Budget Activity 04) part of the Air Force’s
aircraft procurement account, in a line item entitled “Compass Call.” In the Air Force’s FY2020 budget submission,
this is line item 15. This line item is not to be confused with the previously discussed line item 53 in the Air Force’s
FY2020 aircraft procurement account, which is also called Compass Call. Line item 15 is for the procurement of new
EC-37B aircraft, while line item 53 is for the procurement of Compass Call EW systems for both existing EC-130H
aircraft and new EC-37B aircraft.

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 that the Air Force also uses as the basis for its C-37B VIP transport aircraft. The Air Force states
that EC-37Bs
will receive Prime Mission Equipment (PME) from legacy donor EC-130H aircraft, as well
as new, upgraded PME…. The re-hosted COMPASS CALL platform will utilize 70% of
the PME off of the current airframe without modification; the remaining 30% of PME will
be new or modified (repackaged) for the re-host. [Compared to the EC-130H,] the re-hosted
COMPASS CALL aircraft will provide increased range, speed, endurance and operating
altitude for better stand-off range and survivability. This will enable the USAF to
effectively conduct Electronic Attack (EA) in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD)
environment.24

The Air Force’s acquisition strategy of replacing the EC-130H fleet by re-hosting their EW
systems on new Gulfstream G550 aircraft was a subject of debate in Congress and contract-award
protests.25

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Figure 5) is being procured in three versions for
the Air Force (F-35A), Marine Corps (F-35B), and Navy (F-35C). Another CRS report provides
an overview of the F-35 program, which is DOD’s largest single acquisition program.26
While the F-35’s primary missions are air-to-ground combat (i.e., strike operations) and air-to-air
combat (i.e., fighter operations), the F-35 has a built-in EW capability that is claimed by
Lockheed Martin officials—the prime contractor manufacturing the aircraft—to be significantly
greater than that of previous U.S. fighters and attack aircraft. Lockheed officials state that the F35’s EW system, designated AN/ASQ-239 serves as a signals collector system which provides:
radar warning, identifies the geolocation of electronic emitters, tracks multiple aircraft
simultaneously, provides high-gain (i.e. a highly focused radio antenna), high gain counter
measures, and high gain electronic attack through the radar. 27 According to Lockheed officials
these EW capabilities are designed to provide: wide-frequency coverage,28 quick reaction time,
high sensitivity and probability of intercept, accurate direction finding, track multiple aircraft, and
provide self-protection countermeasures and jamming.
24

Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification Book Volume 1 of 2
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol-1, March 2019, p. 113.
25 For press articles providing a review of the debate over the Compass Call replacement acquisition strategy, see Brian
W. Everstine, “Electronic Warfare Isn’t Going Away—But EC-130Hs Will,” Air Force Magazine, February 2018;
Rachel Cohen, “Congress Tells Air Force Not to Replicate EC-X Strategy for Other Programs,” Inside Defense,
November 17, 2017; Valerie Insinna, “L3 Gets Compass Call Contract, Names Gulfstrem As Airframe Provider,”
Defense News, September 8, 2017.
26 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
27 Greg Lemons, Karen Carrington, Dr. Thomas Frey, and John Ledyard, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, “F35 Mission Systems Design, Development, and Verification,” AIAA Aviation Forum, June 25-29, Atlanta, GA, 2018
Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, approved for public release 5/1/18, JSF18-502, p. 6,
accessed April 2, 2019, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/webt/F35_Mission_Systems_Design_Development_and_Verification.pdf. Lockheed officials state on page 7 that “the EW
system is common among the three F-35 variants, except for the forward Band 3/4 arrays, which employ longer
elements for the F-35C Carrier Variant (CV). Also differing, the distance between the inboard and outboard arrays is
less on the CV variant due to the wing fold. In addition to the EW Band 3/4 apertures, the radar MFA [multifunction] is
employed to support EW functions.”
28 LtGen Steven Rudder has stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the F-35 can providing jamming
across most frequencies, however there are deficiencies which can only be provided by the EA-18G. Statement of
Lieutenant General Steven Rudder before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower [hearing]
on Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Programs in Review, March 6, 2018, pp. 57-58.

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 Figure 5. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Source: Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), “National Cherry Festival Air Show 2018
[Image 2 of 12],” accessed April 1, 2019.

Lockheed Martin claims that due to the inherent, built-in electronic warfare capabilities the F-35
does not require a dedicated electronic attack aircraft to support it;29 this would potentially free up
other aircraft to perform electronic attack missions to protect less stealthy aircraft. To provide its
organic jamming capability the F-35uses its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar
which teamed with advanced jamming algorithm packages, can potentially provide 10 times the
jamming power of legacy aircraft. 30
Figure 6 shows the location of EW system-related equipment on the F-35. During a 2018 hearing
on the Navy and Marine Corps aviation program review, Lieutenant General Steven Rudder
stated that although the Marine Corps was retiring the EA-6B, the Marine Corps’ new F-35Bs
would have sufficient EW capability for most Marine Corps contingencies.31

Lockheed Martin, “Unprecedented Battlefield Access,” accessed April 1, 2019. See also BAE Systems, “AN/ASQ239 F-35 electronic warfare / countermeasure system,” accessed April 2, 2019, at https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/
product/an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system.
30Tyler Rogoway, “Could the F-35 Become the Biggest Electronic Intelligence Collection System Ever Devised?” The
Drive, July 6, 2016.
31 Statement of Lieutenant General Steven Rudder before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Seapower [hearing] on Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Programs in Review, March 6, 2018, pp. 57-58.
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 Figure 6. F-35 EW System-Related Equipment

Source: Greg Lemons, Karen Carrington, Dr. Thomas Frey, and John Ledyard, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics
Company, “F-35 Mission Systems Design, Development, and Verification,” AIAA Aviation Forum, June 25-29,
Atlanta, Georgia, 2018 Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, approved for public
release 5/1/18, JSF18-502, Figur 8 on page 7, accessed April 2, 2019, at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/
content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/webt/F35_Mission_Systems_Design_Development_and_Verification.pdf.

Airborne EW Payloads
DOD’s primary airborne electronic attack payloads include the AN/ALQ-99 electronic attack
suite, the Next Generation Jammer, and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer. Each of
these systems is discussed briefly below.

AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS)
The AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system (Figure 7 and Figure 8; see also Figure 2) consists of
a series of electronic jamming pods. The system was originally developed in the 1970s for the
EA-6B, and it was also used by the EF-111A. The system has been updated over time and is
currently carried by EA/18Gs. The current version of the system, called the ALQ-99F(V),
achieved IOC in 1999. Navy plans call for replacing the ALQ-99 with the Next Generation
Jammer (see next section). The Navy states that the ALQ-99 “is the only airborne tactical
jamming system in the Department of Defense inventory. [The] ALQ-99 [system] is facing
material and technological obsolescence and cannot counter all current, much less future,
threats.”32

Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, p. 27. The Navy’s use of the word “tactical” refers to how
the system is carried on a tactical fighter aircraft, as opposed to an aircraft like the EC-130H Compass Call.
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 Figure 7. EA-18G Growler Equipped with AN/ALQ-99F Tactical Jamming System

Source: Annotated U.S. Navy photo as printed in Government Accountability Office, Next Generation Jammer[:]
DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward, GAO-13-642, August
2013, p. 5.

Figure 8. ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pods

Source: Briefing slide accompanying Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Navy’s Next Gen Jammer Is Three
Pods, Not One, And Competition For One Of Them Just Heated Up,” The Drive, October 25, 2018. In this press
report, the caption for the briefing slide states: “An RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] briefing slide showing the
interior layout of the two types of AN/ALQ-99 pod.”

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 Next Generation Jammer (NGJ)
As mentioned above, Navy plans call for replacing the ALQ-99 with a new EW system called the
Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) (Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11).
Figure 9. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB)
(Artist’s rendering)

Source: Photo accompanying Sam LaGrone, “L3, Northrop Selected for Next Generation Jammer Work;
Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest,” USNI News, August 21, 2018.

The NGJ is being developed in three increments designed to jam across three radio frequency
bands to prevent adversaries from using their communications and radar systems.33 The first
increment, which is to provide EW capability in mid-band frequencies, was previously referred to
as Increment 1, but is now called the AN/ALQ-249 system or the Next Generation Jammer—Mid
Band (NGJ-MB). The next increment, which is to provide EW capability in low-band
frequencies, was previously referred to as Increment 2, is now called the Next Generation
Jammer—Low Band (NGJ-LB). The remaining increment, currently called Increment 3, is to
provide EW capability in high-band frequencies. DOD states that “the order of development [of
the increments] was determined by the assessed capabilities of the developing threat and
shortfalls of the legacy system to counter those capabilities, with Inc 1 [the Increment 1 system]
covering the most critical threats.”34

33

Radars and radios operate at different frequencies depending on what mission they are trying to accomplish. Lower
frequencies (i.e. “low-band”) provide a longer range picture of the airspace, but cannot be used to launch a missile.
Middle-band radars can provide target quality pictures for missiles, however do not have as long of a range. High-band
radars can provide high-fidelity pictures, however they shorter ranges and the radio frequencies can be disrupted by
objects and even water molecules. For more information see CRS In Focus IF11155, Defense Primer: Military Use of
the Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn.
34 Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Program Guide 2017, p. 27 and Department of Defense, Director, Operational
Test & Evaluation, FY 2016 Annual Report, December 2016, p. 303.

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 Figure 10. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB)
(Artist’s rendering)

Source: Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2016 Annual Report, December 2016,
p. 303.

Raytheon was awarded the contract for developing NGJ-MB. L3 Systems, Northrop Grumman,
and Harris were awarded the contract for developing NGJ-LB.35 The Navy’s FY2020 budget
submission states that NGJ-MB is scheduled to achieve IOC in the fourth quarter of FY2022.36
The NGJ program has been a subject of congressional oversight for several years.37 An August
2018 press report states the Navy stalled in its development of the NGJ, however with the
renewed focus of “great power competition,” particularly with Russia and China, the NGJ has
been given increased importance and priority. 38 Frank Kendall, when he served as the
Undersecretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics decided to accelerate the program.

See, for example, Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Navy’s Next Gen Jammer Is Three Pods, Not One, And
Competition For One Of Them Just Heated Up,” The Drive, October 25, 2018; Sam LaGrone, “L3, Northrop Selected
for Next Generation Jammer Work; Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest,” USNI News, August 21, 2018.
36 See also Julian Kerr, “Avalon [Airshow] 2019: Next Generation Jammer on Track for US Navy IOC in 2022,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 28, 2019; Paul McLeary, “Navy’s New EW Jammer to be Ready in 2022, Breaking
Defense, July 17, 2018.
37 See, for example, Government Account Ability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Knowledge Gaps
Pose Risks to Sustaining Recent Positive Trends, GAO-18-360SP, April 2018, pp. 102-103; Department of Defense,
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2016 Annual Report, December 2016, pp. 303-304; Government
Accountability Office, Next Generation Jammer[:] DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap
As Program Moves Forward, GAO-13-642, August 2013, 27 pp.
38 Sam LaGrone, “L3, Northrop Selected for Next Generation Jammer Work; Program Stalled After Raytheon Protest,”
USNI News, August 21, 2018.
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 Figure 11. Next Generation Jammer—Mid Band (NGJ-MB)

Source: Illustration accompanying Joseph Trevithick, “The Navy’s New Jammers For Its EA-18G Growlers Cut
Back Their Range More Than The Old Pods,” The Drive, November 28, 2018.

The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $524.3 million for PE 0604274N in FY2020.
The budget submission projects annual funding to decline in subsequent years, to $178.4 million
in FY2022 and zero funding thereafter as research and development work on NGJ-MB is
completed and NGJ-MB transitions from research and development to procurement.39 The budget
submission estimates the total research and development cost of NGJ-MB at $3,985.0 million
(i.e., about $4.0 billion), of which $2,848.2 million (i.e., about $2.8 billion) has been received
through FY2019.
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $6.2 million for PE0604274N—the first
procurement funding requested for NGJ-MB.40 The submission projects that in subsequent years,
as procurement of NGJ-MB ramps up, annual funding for this line item would increase to $144.7
million in FY2021 and $534.1 million by FY2024. The submission estimates the total
procurement cost of NGJ-MB at $4,830.9 million (i.e., about $4.8 billion).
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission requests $111.1 million for this PE in FY2020 and
projects annual funding to increase in subsequent years, to $241.5 million in FY2024.41 The
submission estimates the total research and development cost of NGJ-LB at $3,499.1 (i.e., about
$3.5 billion), of which $178.3 million has been received through FY2019.

39

Research and development work on NGJ-MB is funded in Program Element (PE) 0604274N, Next Generation
Jammer (NGJ)—a line item in the Navy’s research and development account. In the Navy’s FY2020 budget
submission, PE 0604274N is line 116 in the account.
40 Procurement of NGJ-MB is funded through a line item called Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) in the Modification of
Aircraft (i.e., Budget Activity 05) part of the Navy’s aircraft procurement account. In the Navy’s FY2020 budget
submission, it is line 59 in the account.
41 Research and development work on NGJ-LB is funded in PE 0604282N, Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment
II, another line item in the Navy’s research and development account. In the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, this
PE is line 118 in the account.

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 Impact of Next Generation Jammer on Range of EA-18G
Because the NGJ reportedly produces more drag on the EA-18G according to the Navy the Next
Generation Jammer has the potential of reducing the operational range of the EA-18G. A
November 28, 2018, press report states that the NGJ Mid-band pod produces more drag than the
current ALQ-99.42 Raytheon’s proposal for the low-band pod was partially rejected as a result of
increased drag over competing designs. These increases in drag have been reported to reduce the
operational range of the EA-18G. The specific impact on range is classified.43

Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) and Jammer (MALD-J)
DOD states that the Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD) and Jammer (MALD-J), also
designated ADM-160 (Figure 12 and Figure 13), is designed as a low-cost, expendable vehicle
that can replicate the flight and radar signatures of manned aircraft. The MALD-J adds an
electronic attack component. According to the DOD “MALD-J is designed to support an airborne
strike force to achieve mission success by jamming enemy radars and air‑defense systems by
degrading/denying detection of friendly aircraft or munitions.” 44
MALD has a reported range of about 500 nautical miles.45 It was first developed in the mid1990s, and more than 2,000 have been produced. A new version, designated MALD-X, is now
being developed. An August 2018 press report states that
MALD-X enhances the modular nature of the mini cruise missile with the ability to
accommodate different electronic warfare payloads that are more advanced than those
found on MALD-J. What is planned to come out of MALD-X is a networked decoy that
can use its adaptive electronic warfare payload to deliver electronic attacks on air defense
nodes autonomously or at the direction of operators from a afar in a semi-autonomous
fashion.46

A derivative of MALD-J and MALD-X, designated MALD-N, is being developed for use on
Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighters.47

Joseph Trevithick, “The Navy’s New Jammers For Its EA-18G Growlers Cut Back Their Range More Than The Old
Pods,” The Drive, November 28, 2018.
43 The Raytheon Company, File B-416578.1, October 22, 2018. Accessed at: https://www.gao.gov/docket/B-416578.1
44 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2017 Annual Report, January 2018, p. 265.
45 See, for example, Raytheon, “MALD Decoy, Disrupting Enemy Air Defense Systems,” undated, accessed April 4,
2019.
46 Tyler Rogoway, “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger Deal Than It Sounds
Like,” The Drive, August 24, 2018. See also Colin Clark, “Did We Put This Bug In SCO’s Ear? MALD-X Tested For
Swarm EW,” Breaking Defense, August 23, 2018; Kimberly Underwood, “U.S. Military Takes MALD-X Outfitted
with Electronic Warfare to the Air,” Signal, August 24, 2018.
47 Matthew Nelson, “Raytheon to Develop Miniature Aerial Decoy Tech for Navy,” Executive Biz, January 31, 2019;
Richard Scott, “MALD-N Programme Transitions into TMRR Phase, Splits off Jammer Payload,” Jane’s Missiles &
Rockets, October 2, 2018; Jason Sherman, “Navy Taps Raytheon to Launch Next-Generation EW Decoy: the MALDN,” Inside Defense, September 26, 2018; Tamir Eshel, “US Navy to Field a Networked Decoy/Jammer,” Defense
Update, August 26, 2018; Tyler Rogoway, “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much Bigger
Deal Than It Sounds Like,” The Drive, August 24, 2018.
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 Figure 12. Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD)
(Shown fitted to a B-52H bomber)

Source: Photo accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much
Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like,” The Drive, August 24, 2018. The caption to the photo states: “MALDs loaded
up on a B-52H.”

Figure 13. Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD)

Source: Photo accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “Recent MALD-X Advanced Air Launched Decoy Test Is A Much
Bigger Deal Than It Sounds Like,” The Drive, August 24, 2018.

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 Potential Issues for Congress
Congressional EW Working Group (EWWG)
Given their interest in, and concerns about, U.S. EW capabilities in the era of renewed great
power competition, some Members of Congress have met in recent years through the Electronic
Warfare Working Group (EWWG).48 In the 115th Congress, Representative Bacon introduced the
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Readiness Act of 2018 (H.R. 5522). This bill would
have asked the DOD to




develop a joint campaign modeling capability to model electromagnetic spectrum
effect on operations,
assess capabilities and capacities of EW platforms associated with operational
plans, and
develop an interim and annual report on programs and personnel assigned to EW
missions.49

An identical bill in the Senate was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee.50

Airborne EW as a DOD Priority
One potential oversight issue for Congress is whether DOD is giving too little, too much, or the
right amount of priority to airborne EW programs in its planning and budgeting relative to other
U.S. military EW programs (such as those for U.S. ground forces or Navy surface ships) and to
other DOD non-EW priorities, particularly in the context of renewed great power competition and
improvements in air defense and EW capabilities by Russia, China, and other potential
adversaries.
Congress may consider developments such as Russia’s deployment and sales to other countries of
advanced air defense systems. Some observers have expressed concern about Russia’s ability to
use its advanced air defense systems, such as its S-400 surface-to-air (SAM) missile system, to
establish hard-to-penetrate anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones around defended areas in
Europe and Middle East, and for countries that purchase Russian-made air defense systems, such
as China, to do something similar in other regions.51 Other observers state that the capabilities of
See, for example, “EWWG Briefing: “Electronic Warfare & Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations,” concerning a
briefing scheduled for October 3, 2017, accessed March 11, 2019, at http://dearcolleague.us/2017/09/ewwg-briefingelectronic-warfare-electromagnetic-spectrum-operations/; “AOC [Association of Old Crows] Advocacy: EW Working
Group Hosts EW/EMSO Educational Briefing Series for Congress,” March 29, 2017, accessed March 11, 2019, at
http://www.ecrow.org/articles/index-v4.asp?aid=432979&issueID=52139; Association of Old Crows, invitation to
panel discussion on the electromagnetic spectrum scheduled for June 21, 2016, accessed March 11, 2019, at
http://www.ecrow.org/pdf/EWWG_invitation_6.21.pdf; Association of Old Crows, photo of June 21, 2016, meeting,
accessed March 11, 1019, at https://www.facebook.com/aocrows/photos/electronic-warfare-working-group-ewwghosts-electromagnetic-spectrum-ems-panel-w/1056968031018192/. The Association of Old Crows (AOC) is a
professional association for those with an interest in EW. For more on the AOC, see Association of Old Crows,
“Mission & History,” accessed March 11, 2019, at https://www.crows.org/page/missionandhistory.
49 H.R. 5522.
50 S. 2949.
51 See, for example, Michael Cecire, “NATO Is Focusing on the Wrong Russian Threat in Eastern Europe,” World
Politics Review, October 26, 2018; “China’s Anti-Access Area Denial,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, August
24, 2018; Dominik Jankowski, “Six Ways NATO Can Address the Russian Challenge,” Atlantic Council, July 4, 2018;
48

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 Russia’s A2/AD air defense systems have been overrated.52 The Defense Intelligence Agency
states that Russian air defense are among the best in the world, and they continue to develop
highly-capable systems which they export to countries like China interested in acquiring long
range defensive systems.53
DOD states that China’s air force has one of the largest air defense forces, with a series of
advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles. These consist of the Russian S-300PMU, the
domestically produced CSA-9, and the recently fielded Russian S-400 system.54
An April 2018 press report stated (emphasis added):
One of the “wicked problems” [U.S.] commandos are facing now is in Syria, which [U.S.
Army General Tony] Thomas called the “most aggressive electronic warfare environment
on the planet from our adversaries. They are testing us every day, knocking our
communications down, disabling our EC-130s, etc.”55

Another factor Congress may consider is how, in a situation of finite DOD funding, devoting
more funding to airborne EW programs would affect funding for other EW priorities, or DOD
non-EW priorities, and what the resulting net change would be in overall U.S. military
capabilities.

Mix of Airborne EW Capabilities and Investments
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether DOD’s proposed mix of airborne EW
capabilities and investments is appropriate given the current and projected capabilities of
potential adversaries such as Russia and China. Specifically, what is DOD’s vision by combining
specialized tactical EW aircraft such as the EA-18G, standoff EW aircraft such as the EC-130H
and EC-37B, strike fighters with embedded EW capabilities such as the F-35, and air-launched
decoys and jammers with growing numbers of stealthy fifth-generation F-35s? What evolutions
are occurring in U.S. military operational concepts? Is it appropriate, for example, that the Air
Force and Marine Corps no longer operate their own specialized tactical EW aircraft, while the
Navy continues to operate and invest in the EA-18G and its Next Generation Jammer EW pods?
More generally, to what degree do the airborne EW capabilities of the Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps overlap, and is that overlap appropriate?

“The Baltic Dilemma: NATO Security in the Russian Anti-Access Bubble,” Royal Danish Defence College, May 3,
2018 (announcement for a conference scheduled for May 29, 2018); Ian Williams, The Russia – NATO A2AD
Environment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project), January
3, 2017.
52 See, for example, Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble, Russian A2/AD in
the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency,
March 2019, 114 pp.; David Axe, “A New Report Claims Russia’s Mighty Missiles Might Not Be So Mighty Afterall,” National Interest, March 7, 2019. See also Jyri Raitasalo, “It Is Time to Burst the Western A2/AD Bubble,” Kungl
Krigsvetenskapsakademien (Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences), June 16, 2017.
53 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power, Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 2017,
p. 79.
54 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2018, pp. 34-35.
55 Howard Altman, “SOCom Leader Wanted to Toss Google Exec from Car. Because He Was Right.” Tampa Bay
Times, April 26 (updated April 27), 2018.

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 Role of Emerging Technologies
A third potential issue for Congress is how DOD uses advances in technology. Electronic attack
platforms have evolved from the manned platforms with relatively large crew sizes, such as the
EA-6B Prowler and the EC-130H Compass Call, to the EA-8G Growler with a crew of two and
the MALD-J, which does not have crew and is a standoff weapon. Evolving A2/AD environments
potentially make traditional stand-in jamming too dangerous for manned aircraft. Therefore,
Congress may consider policy for DOD regarding developing platforms that are capable of
operating in A2/AD environments. What unmanned EW programs does DOD currently fund?
Does DOD plan to develop additional stand-in jamming systems?

EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host Aircraft Procurement
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the Air Force’s planned quantity and rate for
procuring EC-37Bs and replacing EC-130Hs. The Air Force plans to replace 14 EC-130H aircraft
with 10 EC-37Bs. The Air Force currently maintains 10 EC-130H Compass Calls for operations,
with one aircraft devoted to testing and three additional aircraft in back-up inventory. How does
the Air Force plan to use a smaller fleet of aircraft? Would 10 EC-37B aircraft be able to meet
operational demands?
Some Members of Congress have expressed an interest in procuring EC-37Bs more quickly than
the Air Force plans, so as to accelerate the replacement of EC-130Hs with EC-37Bs. The
committee and conference report language bearing on this issue for the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and the FY2019 DOD appropriations act appear
below.

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 Appendix. Recent Congressional Action
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R.
5515/S. 2987 /P.L. 115-232)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-676 of May 15, 2018) on H.R.
5515, the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, stated that
[t]he committee supports the Air Force’s efforts to recapitalize the aging EC–130H
Compass Call fleet with the more capable EC–37 type aircraft. The committee notes that
the Air Force must first comply with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91) before it can carry on with the transition plan. The Air
Force requested $108.1 million for fiscal year 2019 for one EC–37. The committee is
concerned that the Air Force plan to procure one aircraft per year over 10 years in order to
recapitalize this fleet is not the most efficient way to move the capability to the field
quickly, and may put the Compass Call mission at unacceptable risk of mission failure.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the
House Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2019, on the Compass Call transition
plan. This plan should include:
(1) courses of action to accelerate the recapitalization of the EC–130H fleet and Baseline
4 development and deployment for incoming EC–37 aircraft;
(2) attendant timelines for each course of action;
(3) cost estimates for each course of action;
(4) recommended course of action and a plan to manage both fleets while supporting
combatant commander requirements; and
(5) an assessment of the potential for future cooperative development and procurement of
EC–37B Compass Call aircraft by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom and the
Royal Australian Air Force in a way the leverages the best practices of the RC–135
cooperative program arrangement with the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom. (Pages
23-24)

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 115-262 of June 5, 2018) on S.
2987, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, stated the
following:
The committee supports the Air Force’s efforts to recapitalize the aging EC–130H
Compass Call fleet with the EC–37 type aircraft. The committee notes that before it can
carry on with the transition plan, the Department of Defense must first comply with the
related provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public
Law 114–328) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public
Law 115–91). While the committee notes that Department has submitted the certification
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–
91), delays in satisfying the requirement has led to a work stoppage on the program lasting
at least six weeks. The committee is concerned about the potential for further work
stoppages should the Secretary of the Air Force fail to make a timely determination that
the EC–37B has a high likelihood of meeting combatant requirements, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328). The
committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to make a timely determination for
this requirement to avoid further program delays and cost overruns.

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 Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, not more than 60 days after
the determination required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(Public Law 114–328) is made, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees on the Compass Call transition plan. This plan should include:
(1) Courses of action to accelerate the recapitalization of the EC–130H fleet and Baseline
4 development and deployment for incoming EC–37 aircraft;
(a) attendant timelines for each course of action;
(b) cost estimates for each course of action; and
(2) Recommended course of action and a plan to manage both fleets while supporting
combatant commander requirements. (Pages 40-41)

FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-769 of June 20, 2018) on the
FY2019 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 6157), stated the following:
The [committee’s] recommendation [of FY2019 procurement funding for the program]
includes an increase of $194,000,000 above the budget request to procure and modify one
additional EC–37B Compass Call aircraft, with the expectation that such funds will allow
the Air Force to accelerate the fielding of the fourth such aircraft to meet combatant
commander needs and mitigate performance concerns regarding the legacy EC–130H fleet.
The Committee recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force consider increasing the
procurement of EC–37B aircraft to two per year if such a pace of recapitalization can be
achieved without unduly disrupting the operational availability of Compass Call capability
for the combatant commanders. (Page 188)

In final action on the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245 of
September 28, 2018), Congress increased the requested amount for procurement of new EC-37Bs
by $108 million for “Program increase - accelerate fourth EC-37B aircraft.”56

Author Information
John R. Hoehn
Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs

Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by Ray Zuniga, then-Air Force Fellow at the Congressional Research
Service. It has subsequently been maintained by Jeremiah Gertler, Nathan Lucas, and John R. Hoehn of
CRS.

56

Joint Explanatory Statement for H.R. 6157, PDF page 203 of 559, line 15.

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