COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 1 2 3 4 EXECUTIVE SESSION 5 Committee on the Judiciary 6 joint with the 7 Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 8 U.S. House of Representatives, 9 Washington, D.C. 10 11 12 13 INTERVIEW OF: TRISHA B. ANDERSON 14 15 16 17 Friday, August 31, 2018 18 19 Washington, D.C. 20 21 22 23 The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, commencing at 10:02 a.m. 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 2 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Mr. Parmiter. Good morning. This is a transcribed 2 interview of Trisha Anderson. 3 Chairman Gowdy requested this interview as part of a joint 4 investigation by the House Committee on the Judiciary and the 5 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform regarding 6 decisions made and not made in 2016 and 2017 by the 7 Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 8 regarding the 2016 Presidential election. 9 Chairman Goodlatte and Would the witness please state her name, her last 10 position at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and her 11 current position for the record. 12 Ms. Anderson. Trisha B., as in boy, Anderson. My last 13 position with the FBI was Principal Deputy General Counsel 14 within the Office of General Counsel, and I am currently a 15 lawyer at Covington & Burling. 16 Mr. Parmiter. Thank you. On behalf of the chairman, I 17 want to thank you for appearing today, and we appreciate your 18 willingness to appear voluntarily. 19 Parmiter, and I am the Majority Chief Counsel For Crime and 20 Terrorism at the House Judiciary Committee. 21 My name is Robert I will now ask everyone else who is here in the room to 22 introduce themselves for the record, starting to my right 23 with Art Baker. 24 25 Mr. Baker. Arthur Baker, Investigative Counsel, Majority Staff, House Judiciary Committee. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Mr. Breitenbach. 2 House Judiciary, majority. 3 4 Mr. Castor. Mr. 6 Counsel. 7 Mr. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Steve Castor with the Government Reform , FBI, Office of the General , Associate General Counsel, FBI, OGC. Mr. . , Associate General Counsel, FBI, OGC. Ms. Arkell. Elizabeth Arkell, Steptoe & Johnson, private counsel for Ms. Anderson. Mr. Herrington. Matt Herrington, Steptoe & Johnson, private counsel for Ms. Anderson. Ms. Hariharan. Arya Hariharan, Judiciary Committee, minority. Mr. Morgan. Matthew Morgan, House Judiciary Committee, minority staff. Mr. Hiller. Aaron Hiller, Judiciary Committee, minority staff. 21 Mr. 22 Mr. Buddharaju. 23 Mr. Ventura. 24 Mr. Parmiter. 25 Ryan Breitenbach, Senior Counsel, Committee. 5 8 3 . , FBI Congressional Affairs. Anudeep Buddharaju, Mr. Gowdy's staff. Chris Ventura, House majority legal staff. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in this setting, but there are some guidelines that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 4 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 we follow that I'll go over. 2 rounds. 3 and then the minority will have an opportunity to ask 4 questions for an equal period of time if they so choose. 5 will go back and forth in this manner until there are no more 6 questions and the interview is over. 7 short break at the end of each hour of questioning, but if 8 you would like to take a break apart from that, please let us 9 know. 10 point. 11 Our questioning will proceed in The majority will ask questions first for an hour, We Typically, we take a We will also take a break for lunch at the appropriate As I noted earlier, you are appearing today voluntarily. 12 Accordingly, we anticipate our questions will receive 13 complete responses. 14 questions or if counsel instructs you not to answer, we will 15 consider whether a subpoena is necessary. 16 To the extent you decline to answer our As you can see, there is an official reporter taking 17 down everything we say to make a written record, so we ask 18 that you give verbal responses to all questions. 19 understand that? Do you 20 Ms. Anderson. Yes, I do. 21 Mr. Parmiter. So that the reporter can take down a 22 clear record, it is important that we don't talk over one 23 another or interrupt each other if we can help it. 24 committees encourage witnesses who appear for transcribed 25 interviews to freely consult with counsel if they so choose, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Both 5 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 and you are appearing today with counsel. Could counsel please state your name and position for 2 3 the record. Mr. Herrington. 4 5 Matt Herrington and Elizabeth Arkell from Steptoe & Johnson, representing Ms. Anderson. Mr. Parmiter. 6 We want you to answer our questions in 7 the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we will 8 take our time. 9 understand one of our questions, please let us know. If you have any questions or if you do not If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or 10 11 do not remember, it is best not to guess. Please give us 12 your best recollection, and it is okay to tell us if you 13 learned information from someone else. 14 you don't know or can't remember, just say so and please 15 inform us who, to the best of your knowledge, might be able 16 to provide a more complete answer to the question. If there are things Ms. Anderson, you should also understand that although 17 18 this interview is not under oath, you are required by law to 19 answer questions from Congress truthfully. 20 that? Do you understand 21 Ms. Anderson. Yes, I do. 22 Mr. Parmiter. This also applies to questions posed by 23 congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand this? 24 Ms. Anderson. Yes. 25 Mr. Parmiter. Witnesses who knowingly provide false COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 6 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for 2 perjury or for making false statements. 3 that? Do you understand 4 Ms. Anderson. Yes. 5 Mr. Parmiter. Is there any reason you are unable to 6 provide truthful answers to today's questions? 7 Ms. Anderson. No. 8 Mr. Parmiter. Finally, I'd like to note that, as 9 Chairman Goodlatte stated at the outset of our first 10 transcribed interview in this investigation, the content of 11 what we discuss here today is confidential. 12 Goodlatte and Gowdy ask that you not speak about what we 13 discuss in this interview to anyone not present here today, 14 to preserve the integrity of our investigation. 15 confidentiality rule applies to everyone present in the room 16 today. Chairman That is the end of my preamble. 17 Do you have any questions before we begin? 18 Ms. Anderson. No, I do not. 19 Mr. Parmiter. Okay. 20 25 We'll EXAMINATION BY MR. BAKER: 22 24 The time is now 10:07 a.m. get started with the first round of questions and Mr. Baker. 21 23 This Q Again, thank you for coming in today. longer with the FBI. A Is that correct? That is correct. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE You are no 7 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 2 And when you left, you were the Principal Deputy General Counsel? 3 A That's right. 4 Q What position did you enter on duty at the FBI 5 with? What was your title when you joined? 6 A 7 Law Branch. 8 Q 9 10 Deputy General Counsel for the National Security For the National Security Law Branch. And was there a period of time when you were also the Acting General Counsel? 11 A For a short period of time, yes. 12 Q And what period of time would that have been? 13 A Roughly the month of January 2018. 14 Q So as the Acting General Counsel, that would be you 15 were acting in the capacity of the highest legal officer for 16 the FBI. Is that correct? 17 A For that month, yes. 18 Q For that month. And then as the Principal Deputy 19 General Counsel -- how many Deputy General Counsels are there 20 or were there? 21 A There are three. 22 Q There are three. 23 So the legal Department or the General Counsel's Office is divided into three branches or -- 24 A That is correct. 25 Q Okay. And you were in charge of the National COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 8 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 Security Law Branch? A Yes. It was renamed to the National Security and Cyberlaw Branch. Q National Security and Cyberlaw Branch. So, in that 5 capacity, answering to the General Counsel, you were in 6 charge of national security law matters and cyber matters? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q Okay. 9 A Three years. 10 Q Three years. 11 So you were at the FBI for how long? And prior to the FBI, you were employed where? 12 A At the Treasury Department. 13 Q When you joined the FBI -- so your whole tenure 14 essentially was in national security law? 15 any -- 16 A My whole tenure at the FBI? 17 Q At the FBI. 18 A That is correct. 19 Q Okay. You didn't do So in your capacity as the Deputy General 20 Counsel, National Security Law Branch, National Security Law 21 Cyber Branch, did you have occasion to be associated with the 22 investigation known as Midyear Exam? 23 A Yes. 24 Q And what was your role in Midyear Exam at a very 25 high level? We're going to have other questions to get a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 little deeper, but at a high level what was your role in 2 Midyear? 3 4 5 6 A I was a supervisor within the legal chain of command. Q Okay. And your involvement would have been involving legal aspects of the investigation? 7 A At a supervisory level, yes. 8 Q At a supervisory level. 9 9 So you would not necessarily have been making legal decisions by yourself, you 10 would in most instances be reviewing legal work done by 11 others and supervising and signing off on legal products? 12 A That is correct. 13 Q Okay. That is correct. Just to be clear, because some folks aren't 14 familiar with the FBI rank and structure, in your capacity as 15 a Deputy General Counsel, you were a lawyer for the FBI, not 16 a special agent, correct? 17 A That is correct. 18 Q And your contribution to really any case, Midyear 19 included, would not be to make investigative decisions or to 20 decide what would be investigated, although you could, in 21 theory, make a legal recommendation as to whether something 22 was an appropriate technique or a legal technique or 23 something of that nature? 24 A That's exactly right. 25 Q Okay. So, in your capacity as a Deputy General COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 10 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Counsel -- and that would be the role you had during the 2 pendency of Midyear, correct? 3 A That's right. 4 Q Okay. So who would you have answered to? My guess 5 is the General Counsel, who at the time would have been a 6 gentleman named James Baker? 7 A That's right. 8 Q And would there be someone -- who would he answer 9 10 to? So he's above you in the chain of command. Who would he answer to? 11 A He reported to the Deputy Director. 12 Q And then the Deputy Director would, in turn, report 13 to the Director? 14 A That is correct. 15 Q So during your time as the Deputy General Counsel, 16 who would the Deputy Director have been? 17 A At the time I joined the FBI, it was Mark Giuliano. 18 Q Okay. 19 A And then it became Andy McCabe. 20 Q Would McCabe have been there the longest for 21 Midyear, or how would you break it down as between the two 22 deputies? 23 24 25 A I don't remember the precise date that Mark left and Andy became the Deputy Director. Q Okay. You've indicated you would supervise lawyers COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 11 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 in the National Security Law Branch. 2 embedded in other FBI units or components, or would the 3 lawyers that are making decisions or doing national security 4 law work be concentrated in an area somewhere near you? 5 A They're mostly within the Office of General 6 Counsel. 7 support key executives within the FBI. 8 9 10 11 Q Are there lawyers On rare occasions, we have detailed lawyers to Okay. part of Midyear? So in your -- who did you supervise as a Who directly was supervised by you that had some role in Midyear Exam? A I supervised an attorney who was the Unit Chief of 12 the Counterintelligence Law Unit, I've been instructed by the 13 FBI not to use her name; and then another attorney that was 14 under her supervision in a line attorney capacity. 15 16 17 Mr. Baker. naming, they're not SES employees? Mr. That is correct. BY MR. BAKER: 18 19 Is the objection or the basis for not Q So did you supervise any SES employees that would 20 have been involved in Midyear? 21 be the section chief or someone below you. 22 A Like, I think your rank would There was a section chief in between the attorney I 23 supervised -- the Unit Chief and my position. 24 section chief at the time was on detail to another agency, 25 and so there were personnel who were serving on an acting COMMITTEE SENSITIVE However, that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 basis. 2 person was not involved in the case. 3 4 Q And given the sensitivity of the investigation, that Okay. So you had you said two employees that were primarily involved? 5 A That is correct. 6 Q The Unit Chief and then someone below the Unit 7 Chief? 8 A That is correct. 9 Q Okay. 10 A No. 11 Q Okay. 12 Were any of these agent attorneys? So were they full-time on Midyear or they still had other -- 13 A They had other responsibilities. 14 Q Other responsibilities. 15 A In particular, the Unit Chief did. 16 Q Okay. So your role as the Deputy General Counsel 17 would be to supervise their work, but were you also 18 officially on the Midyear Exam team? 19 12 A I wouldn't have considered myself to be part of the 20 investigative team, but if you're using the word "team" in 21 the sense of the group that met with Director Comey, that's a 22 group that I was a part of. 23 Q Okay. So you were a part of the group that would 24 meet with the top-level executives at the FBI, including 25 Director Comey? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 13 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 A That's right. My involvement was more at the executive and supervisory level. Q Okay. How often would you meet with Director Comey about Midyear? A At the beginning of the investigation, it was less 6 frequent, maybe every few weeks or so. 7 investigation, we were meeting with a greater degree of 8 frequency, at least once a week if not more regularly. 9 Toward the end of the And I wanted to back up to your last question with 10 respect to who I supervised. 11 on our FSL chart. 12 means. 13 on my roster of attorneys, but the supervision was less 14 clear. 15 the detail arrangement that we had entered into. 16 among those attorneys who had been detailed to key 17 executives, as I mentioned a few minutes ago. 18 for practical purposes, she was supervised by the General 19 Counsel, because of her role in advising the Deputy Director. 20 But she was on my books. 21 Q Lisa Page was somebody who was I think you know what the word "FSL" But she was technically one of the attorneys who was She reported directly to Andy McCabe as a result of Okay. She was And she was -- It's interesting, because Lisa Page was my 22 next question. Just to make a full record, you indicated an 23 acronym FSL. 24 A That is correct. 25 Q Okay. Is that full staffing level or -- So that's just a number of bodies that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 14 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 you're allowed in your -A 2 3 She was on my list of FSL, of employees filling my FSL. Q 4 5 Yes. So she's on your roster, for lack of a better word, but she physically sat somewhere else? 6 A That is correct. 7 Q Who actually supervised Lisa Page, because she is 8 an attorney also. Is that correct? 9 A That's right. 10 Q And assigned on the books to your FSL as an OGC 12 A That's right. 13 Q But she physically sat somewhere else? 14 A Yes. 11 15 body? And she was -- she was supervised by the General Counsel -- 16 Q Okay. 17 A -- in her role supporting Andy McCabe. Before 18 that, she was a line attorney within the unit that the Unit 19 Chief I referred to a few minutes ago supervised. 20 Q And what was her title in Mr. McCabe's office? 21 A I believe it was Special Counsel to the Deputy 22 23 Director. Q Okay. So you say she was supervised by OGC, but 24 she did work for Mr. McCabe. 25 all were done by OGC? So her performance ratings and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 15 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A That is correct. 2 Q And they were done by whom? 3 A I think it was a combination of me and Jim. 4 Q Okay. 5 A Because you need to -- in the FBI, you have a So -- 6 rating official and a reviewing official. 7 may have been her rating official with Jim as her reviewing 8 official. Q 9 And so I believe I And would Mr. McCabe have any input to her ratings 10 or any other reviews, or how would you and Mr. Baker know how 11 her performance was or what her duties were? A 12 Informally, Mr. Baker and Mr. McCabe spoke a great 13 deal about Lisa, how she was doing, what her performance was 14 like. 15 manner. 16 And so the input was taken into account in that Q Okay. And it's my understanding that she might 17 have done, as would be consistent with other FBI employees, 18 something called a self-assessment, where she documents what 19 she did, kind of evaluate her own work, and then she would 20 give that -- 21 A That is correct. 22 Q -- to her superiors for your consideration? 23 A That's right. 24 Q Did she participate in that opportunity to do 25 self-assessments? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 16 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A That's right. 2 Q Okay. You indicated that her title, you believe, 3 was Special Counsel. 4 title was or what she wanted her title to be? 5 A Were there any issues with what her None that I was aware of. We were -- we made an 6 effort to be consistent in how we -- in the titles that were 7 being used by those attorneys who were being detailed to 8 those key executives. 9 the title that was used by all of them. 10 Q Okay. And so I believe Special Counsel was Are you aware of her title being Special 11 Assistant and her wanting the title Special Counsel, and 12 maybe there was some issue with OGC wanting to only give 13 Special Counsel titles to people that were actually 14 elsewhere, not detailed out? 15 A I don't recall. My understanding was that we -- 16 that we -- we thought she should hold the same title as the 17 other detailees to the other key executives, those executives 18 being some of the Executive Assistant Directors. 19 all referred to as Special Counsels. 20 Q Okay. They were So the title Special Counsel was not new or 21 something that was being created for her. 22 others were using from OGC that were embedded, for lack of a 23 better term, in other executives' office? 24 25 A That is correct. It was the title Although we didn't -- it wasn't a long practice that we had had, and so at some point we did COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 17 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 have to figure out what those titles would be. 2 only applicable to a very small number of people. 3 Q And it was And these other Special Counsels, they similarly 4 answered to and were reviewed by superiors in the General 5 Counsel's Office? 6 A That's right. 7 Q It may have been another Deputy General Counsel, 8 but a similar arrangement. They're sitting elsewhere, but 9 they belong to OGC and they're rated and reviewed by OGC. 10 A That is correct. 11 Q Was there any issues that you recall in having 12 Ms. Page in the Deputy Director's Office, specifically 13 relating to Midyear, where there may have been -- were there 14 any issues with her being in the Director's Office -- in the 15 Deputy Director's Office that you recall? 16 A What do you mean by issues? Do you mean -- 17 Q Was there any difficulty in other members in the 18 team or other members in the chain of command getting or not 19 getting information, because she would either get stuff 20 directly from Mr. McCabe and relay it to Peter Strzok, or she 21 would get information from Peter Strzok and relay it to 22 Mr. McCabe? 23 And maybe not so much in OGC, but certainly I'm aware of 24 instances in certainly the investigative chain where folks 25 thought they were being cut out or they weren't aware of COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 18 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 things because this sort of hot-lining information was in 2 some instances bypassing either an Assistant Director or 3 maybe even an Executive Assistant Director. 4 experience that in the OGC chain? A 5 Did you There were times -- did I experience that within 6 the OGC chain? There were times when Lisa would talk 7 directly with Jim Baker when I felt that she should be 8 talking in the first instance directly with the attorney who 9 reported to me. So -- but that was not unexpected. I see 10 that as part of the, you know, not atypical kind of 11 bureaucratic awkwardness or tension that sometimes arises 12 from the type of position that Lisa held, sort of a 13 staff-type position versus somebody who is housed back within 14 OGC. 15 It was sort of appropriate in a way for her to have a 16 lot of direct communication with Jim Baker, given that she 17 supported the deputy director of the organization, who was 18 one of Jim's chief clients, if you will. 19 to time, I did think that it would have been helpful if Lisa 20 had started with lawyers who were at a lower level within our 21 organization. 22 23 Q But -- so from time But it never caused any great difficulty. Okay. So it never rose to a level where you counseled her about it -- 24 A No. 25 Q -- to include other people? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Okay. 19 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I don't recall counselling her on it. 2 Q So how did you come to know or learn about Midyear 3 4 5 Exam? When did you learn it was open? Mr. Breitenbach. Actually Mr. Baker, can I just step in real quick? BY MR. BREITENBACH: 6 7 How were you told -- Q Just going back, Ms. Anderson, to you mentioned 8 that there was an attorney that you would have preferred 9 Ms. Page to have reported to before providing legal guidance 10 11 12 to Mr. McCabe. A Is that how I understand? That's not what I -- that wasn't my testimony. Before talking to Jim Baker. 13 Q Okay. 14 A Lisa had a lot of direct communications with Jim 15 Baker, and so there were times on certain issues where it 16 might have been preferable for Lisa to start by talking with 17 our attorneys at a lower level, but it never caused any 18 significant problems or issues for us. 19 20 21 22 Q Okay. So the attorney that was reporting to you would have been the acting section chief. A Is that correct? The acting section chief did report to me, but that person was not involved in the Midyear Exam investigation. 23 Q Okay. 24 A I'm referring to the Acting Unit Chief at the time, 25 who reported to -- COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q I see. So it would have been the Acting Unit Chief 2 who Lisa would have reported to prior to speaking with 3 Mr. Baker regarding the Midyear Exam? 4 A 20 Correct. Those two attorneys worked together quite 5 well, and so it was not a significant issue or one that came 6 up that created a lot of tension. 7 Q And who was that Unit Chief? 8 A I've been instructed not to name her. 9 Mr. Baker. 10 11 different name or code in the IG report. Ms. Anderson. She was FBI Attorney 1, if that helps. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 12 13 Can you say if they're referenced by a Q Okay. In the Office of General Counsel, is there a 14 particular rule with regard to providing formal legal 15 guidance to, as you called them, your clients inside the FBI? 16 A What kind of a rule are you referring to? 17 Q I presume there are other -- there are attorneys 18 outside of the General Counsel's Office inside the FBI? 19 A That's right. 20 Q Is it proper for those attorneys to provide FBI 21 22 legal guidance to their clients, or do they have clients? A So it depends on whether they sit on attorney 23 positions, position descriptions. 905 is the classification 24 series under the OPM rules for persons who are authorized to 25 provide legal guidance within an agency. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 21 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 So my understanding of the rules is that anybody who 2 sits on an attorney billet -- or persons who do not sit on 3 attorney billets should not be providing legal guidance 4 within an agency. 5 whether that happened within -- happens within the FBI. 6 There are a lot of persons who have JDs and who are lawyers 7 who sit across the agency. As a practical matter, I don't know 8 Q Was Ms. Page sitting on an attorney billet -- 9 A Yes, she was a member of -- 10 Q -- as she was detailed to McCabe's office? 11 A That is correct. 12 13 14 15 She was a member of the Office of General Counsel. Q So formally, she's still permitted to provide legal guidance to whom at that point? A We envisioned that the Special Counsel roles would 16 not frequently provide direct legal guidance to their -- to 17 the persons to whom they were detailed. 18 those capacities largely to serve as facilitators and 19 coordinators of legal issues and reach back to appropriate 20 parts of the Office of General Counsel in order to resolve 21 those issues. They were there in 22 In other words, in order to preserve that relationship 23 between the General Counsel and the Deputy Director in this 24 particular instance, Lisa was not the person who was expected 25 to provide legal guidance directly to Andy McCabe, but she COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 22 1 might identify or spot legal issues and bring them back to 2 the Office of General Counsel, find the right experts and tee 3 them up, up the chain of command and help resolve those 4 issues. 5 6 7 Q And that's the role that we envisioned for Lisa. Are you aware whether she did provide legal guidance to Mr. McCabe? A I don't know whether she provided any direct legal 8 guidance to Mr. McCabe that wasn't previously -- wasn't 9 coordinated with anybody else in OGC. 10 Q So if she were providing legal guidance, her duty, 11 so to speak, was to return back to the General Counsel's 12 Office, to either you or the Acting Unit Chief that you 13 mentioned, in order to inform you of the legal guidance that 14 she envisioned providing to Mr. McCabe? 15 A Certainly, if it was a significant issue, if it was 16 something that as to which it was appropriate for somebody at 17 a higher level to be weighing in on. 18 of minor issue, I wouldn't -- you know, I would expect that a 19 staff member could resolve it. 20 If there were some sort But we didn't have any written rules on it and it was a 21 position that was of relatively recent creation, and so -- 22 but we were trying to work out our practices and ensure that 23 OGC maintained appropriate supervision and involvement in the 24 legal guidance that was being given at that high level within 25 the FBI. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 23 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q I see. 2 Mr. McCabe? 3 A Was she the first Special Counsel for She was -- it depends -- so she was -- she actually 4 served in a detail capacity to support him when he was 5 Executive Assistant Director overseeing the National Security 6 Branch. 7 position had been created. 8 Counsel, to my knowledge, who came from within the FBI Office 9 of General Counsel who supported the Deputy Director. And I believe that was the first time such a And she was the first Special Mark 10 Giuliano, for example, had had other lawyers supporting him, 11 but, as I understand, they had been detailed from outside of 12 the FBI from DOJ. 13 14 Q Not lawyers inside of the General Counsel's Office, as Ms. Page had been? 15 A That is correct. 16 Q Okay, thank you. BY MR. BAKER: 17 18 Q When you would have these meetings with Director 19 Comey, besides the two lawyers that worked for you that may 20 or may not have gone to them, who else would have been in 21 regular attendance at those high-level meetings? 22 A The persons who were in regular attendance, 23 although the particular slate of attendees did fluctuate a 24 bit, depending on who was absent for travel or other related 25 reasons. That list would include the Deputy Director, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 24 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 sometimes the Associate Deputy Director, the Executive 2 Assistant Director for the National Security Branch, the 3 Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, the two leads on 4 the Midyear case, one being the lead investigative person, 5 who was Pete Strzok, the other being the lead analytical 6 person, which was 7 myself, Jim Rybicki, who was the Chief of Staff to the 8 Director. 9 1, as identified in the IG report, she was also part of that 10 group. 11 Q Jim Baker, the General Counsel, And the attorney who worked for me, FBI Attorney So you had indicated the Deputy Director had turned 12 over at least once, Mark Giuliano and then Andy McCabe. 13 about the Associate Deputy Director who was that during this 14 time and did that change over? 15 A What It was -- when the Midyear Exam case started, it 16 was Kevin Perkins, but I don't recall him being involved. 17 became Dave Bowdich, and I do recall him attending a meeting 18 too from time to time. 19 20 Q And Mr. Bowdich is now the Deputy Director is your understanding? 21 A That is correct. 22 Q Okay. 23 A When the case started, I believe it was John 24 25 It Giacalone. And then who would the EADs have been? Then it became Mike Steinbach. Mr. Herrington. And there were two EADs at that time? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Ms. Anderson. 2 first. 3 position. No, one EAD. John Giacalone was the He retired from the FBI, and Mike Steinbach took his BY MR. BAKER: 4 5 Q And then who would have been the AD? 6 A The AD was -- when the case started, it was Randy 7 Coleman. 8 different role within the FBI, and the AD became Bill 9 Priestap. 10 Q He retired from -- or he was promoted to a Did you -- this is going back to a question we 11 asked earlier. 12 Mr. Giacalone or Mr. Steinbach complain about the role of 13 Lisa Page, not necessarily her role in what she had 14 responsibility for, but because she had access to Mr. McCabe 15 and she also would get information from Strzok, that those 16 people, Steinbach or Giacalone and I guess Priestap to a 17 certain extent, they would probably be the ones most affected 18 by information not coming through them. 19 any one of them specifically complain about that? 20 A Did you ever hear specifically either Did you ever hear I didn't have any -- I don't believe I heard either 21 of them -- neither of them personally complained to me, but I 22 was aware of their concerns. 23 Q So you were aware there were concerns with them, 24 but you don't recall anything directly from them to you about 25 the issue? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 26 A I don't remember them either raising concerns with 3 Q What had you heard about the concerns? 4 A That there were concerns about Lisa bypassing the 1 2 me. 5 chain of command. 6 command organization. 7 Q As you know, the FBI is a very chain of Do you know if Mr. McCabe was aware that some of 8 his agent executives were concerned that they were being 9 bypassed on information on what, by all accounts, was a 10 sensitive, critical investigation? 11 A My understanding was that he was aware. 12 Q And did he do anything to ensure that those 13 executives, the agent executives of his would get the 14 information that they felt they were being denied by her 15 bypassing them, or he was aware but didn't do anything, your 16 opinion? 17 A My understanding was that he did talk to Lisa on 18 several occasions, that he and she talked about it, because 19 Lisa was interested in -- she didn't want to create tension 20 or cause problems, and so she wanted to find a way to work 21 amicably with those executives. 22 Q And did you indicate earlier that you would have 23 been, I think you made a distinction between a rating 24 official and a reviewing official, and you were the rating 25 official for Lisa Page? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 27 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I recall that's how we handled it, yes. 2 Q So what was your assessment of her as a lawyer? 3 I mean, did she get good ratings, good reviews? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Okay. 6 A I did. 7 Q Okay. Lisa was a terrific lawyer. And you got along with her? So we now have an idea who from the Bureau 8 was at these meetings. Who from the Department of Justice 9 would have either come to the meetings you were at or been on 10 a phone or conference call or video, or who from the 11 Department would have been representing the Department at 12 these meetings? 13 A The meetings with Director Comey? 14 Q Yes. 15 A They were internal FBI meetings. 16 17 18 They did not include the Department of Justice. Q So did you go to meetings where there were representatives from the Department there? 19 A Yes, from time to time I did. 20 Q So were these a higher -- at the same level that 21 the Director and Deputy Director would be, or were these a 22 lower level employee from the Department? 23 A I recall -- there were -- well, it depends on the 24 meeting. There wasn't a particular -- it wasn't always the 25 same with respect to every meeting. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 28 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 So who -- if you were asked who from the Justice 2 Department was on the Midyear team, what names did you see at 3 these meetings, whether they were always there, occasionally 4 there, big meeting, little meeting? 5 participated in any capacity on Midyear? A 6 Who from the Department The two main prosecutors who were -- who I would 7 say were involved in the case at a line level from a -- that 8 really had the day-to-day responsibility were 9 and 10 There were prosecutors from EDVA who were also involved. was the other. 11 And then David Laufman was supervisor, and David reported to George Toscas. 12 13 was one of them. Q So were the meetings just general like progress, 14 where are we at meetings, or were there specific tasks and 15 issues to address at different meetings or -- 16 A I presume that there were such meetings that 17 occurred. 18 progress updates or things that the people with more 19 immediate responsibility for the case would -- those types of 20 meetings that those people would have. 21 in meetings with DOJ when there were specific issues that 22 came up that required high-level supervisory or executive 23 engagement. 24 Q 25 I would not be involved in the sort of general I was more involved And the ones you were at, they would be more law-related, or you could have been at others just as a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 29 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 lawyer? 2 A I could have been at others as a lawyer. 3 Q But were you ever at meetings where the topic of 4 the meeting was law, specifically what charges might be 5 appropriate, if any charges would be appropriate? 6 ever meetings you were at where different statutes were 7 discussed? 8 Mr. Herrington. 9 Mr. Baker. Were there Meetings with the DOJ or anyone? Either or. Internal to FBI, with DOJ, a 10 mixture, any time where the topic of the meeting was a lawyer 11 focus, was a legal focus. 12 going. 13 Washington field. 14 resources are from other places. 15 be some meetings at some point. 16 going on. 17 We've got this big investigation My understanding, resources were pulled from You've indicated some of the prosecutor I'm assuming there had to We've got this big thing Are there laws that may have been violated here and, if 18 so, what are they? 19 Ms. Anderson. 20 Mr. Any meetings like that? So I never -Ms. Anderson, before you answer. For this 21 line of questioning for today, our understanding of the 22 Department's position as of right now is that if you know 23 someone not to be an SESer at the Department of Justice that 24 you discuss that person but not identify them by name. 25 If the committee had a -- if the committees have a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 30 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 different understanding of the Department of Justice's 2 position at this time, please let us know and we will do our 3 best to check on that. 4 ask you to bear that in mind. BY MR. BAKER: 5 6 But going forward for today, we would Q My interest right now is just were there 7 discussions of possible statutes that could have been 8 violated or that if the investigation went on things to look 9 for that maybe there's a statute that looks like it might be 10 close but the facts don't show that. 11 there was a discussion about a statute that might be applied 12 should charges be warranted. 13 A I presume there were such meetings with DOJ, but I 14 was not a part of such meetings. 15 consistent with my role in the case. 16 Q Just anything where Okay. That would not be So what kind of product would you review 17 from the two lawyers that you supervised? 18 contribute to the Midyear team? 19 A What did they So the Acting Unit Chief that I referenced earlier, 20 FBI Attorney 1, she -- the role she played was that she 21 provided legal guidance directly to the investigative team 22 within the FBI on issues such as the investigative strategies 23 that might be pursued, means by which different types of 24 evidence might be acquired, applications of the DIOG and 25 whether certain thresholds were met that would allow for the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 31 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 use of particular investigative techniques. 2 issues. 3 Those types of If there was a search warrant that was being obtained, 4 she would help develop the search warrant affidavit, would 5 review it, would help review arguments for probable cause, 6 things like that. 7 those types of questions. 8 9 She worked very closely with the team on And she also worked with the prosecutorial team on legal issues that would arise. I'll give you an example of one 10 that came up with some frequency. We had lots of 11 negotiations, as I think you're aware, with outside counsel 12 representing various parties who had material that at one 13 point contained emails that might have been relevant to our 14 investigation, such as laptops or Blackberries. 15 And so my attorney was involved with the prosecutorial 16 team in negotiating the term -- not -- she was not directly 17 negotiating, but involved in discussing the parameters of the 18 search, of the consent that might be given and what that 19 would allow us to do and that sort of thing, and then in 20 memorizing it with the outside counsel. 21 Q So it sounds like she gave a wide variety of legal 22 advice to this team, I mean, anything that -- it sounds like 23 she was kind of just a general resource for legal things that 24 they might be doing, because it sounds like they discussed 25 investigative strategy, search warrant strategy. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Who would 32 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 she have interacted with at the Department? A You'd want to talk to her directly about that. 3 don't want to -- I can make presumptions about who it was, 4 but I don't know to a certainty. 5 6 Q Okay. I But she would be the one to ask who she worked with at the Department? 7 A That's right. 8 Q So when you reviewed or rated her, did you have any 9 10 11 outside input from the Department about what she was doing on Midyear for purposes of rating? A No. That would not be something that would be 12 consistent with our practice in completing the evaluation 13 process. 14 Q Okay. So it sounds like this attorney is giving a 15 wide variety of legal advice. Did she ever express an 16 opinion to you of frustration with any aspect of the 17 investigation where her advice was not being heeded in any 18 capacity or advice she was giving? 19 A Not being heeded by whom? 20 Q By the people she's giving the advice to, people on 21 the team. 22 she's being overridden on it. 23 again, it could be the Department or it could be internal to 24 the Bureau -- that's not taking her advice. 25 A She's making a recommendation of something and There's somebody else -- and I don't recall any specific instances, but COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 33 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 absolutely, in the course of any sort of investigation you're 2 going to have disagreements within the team and instances in 3 which lawyers who are participating in conversations aren't 4 necessarily going to have the prevailing view on different 5 issues. 6 Q But none of these issues or disagreements were so 7 tense or intense that you got involved to mediate anything, 8 as her supervisor? 9 A I don't recall there being anything. 10 Q Okay. 11 12 Did she ever express frustration about the pace of the investigation? A There was -- yes, she probably did to me. As is 13 discussed in the IG report, there was some tension between 14 the FBI investigative team and the DOJ prosecutors and 15 disagreements about the methods by which evidence was 16 pursued. 17 through consent, whereas the FBI team felt in certain 18 instances that compulsory process would have been warranted. 19 In general, the DOJ prosecutors preferred to work However, from what I saw and from what -- I'm 20 sorry, from what Attorney No. 1 told me, it fell within the 21 ambit of the natural type of tension that arises in any case 22 between prosecutors and investigative personnel. 23 Q Have you ever been a prosecutor? 24 A No, I have not. 25 Q But you -- certainly in your capacity at the FBI, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 34 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 you are aware of or maybe worked with prosecutors? 2 A That is correct. 3 Q Is it fair to say that tension or disagreements 4 that sometimes exist between prosecutors and investigators or 5 even between the FBI and the DOJ, it's sometimes a very 6 healthy tension? 7 A That is correct. 8 Q And why would it be a healthy tension? 9 10 What happens with that kind of dynamic, in your opinion? A It means that all viewpoints are aired, options are 11 fully considered and explored, and often the best -- the best 12 option will rise to the top of a healthy disagreement among a 13 group of smart people who have differing viewpoints on an 14 issue. 15 Q And do you think it would be fair to say that in 16 that environment where, as you indicate, all the different 17 viewpoints are taken, put on the table, debated, and 18 ultimately one decision or an idea floats to the top, even 19 the people that's view or opinion is not the prevailing one, 20 sometimes in that atmosphere where everything is vetted and 21 aired, those people ultimately think and agree that maybe 22 their idea wasn't the right one and that the one that 23 prevailed was the right decision? 24 A Sometimes, yes. 25 Q Do you have any reason to believe that in any COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 35 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 aspect of Midyear, when those types of dynamics occurred or 2 group discussions occurred, that there were a group of people 3 that didn't think the right decision came out? 4 A I don't know that everybody agreed about every 5 decision that was made. 6 generality with respect to a group of multiple people. 7 were lots of different investigative decisions, and I don't 8 know what the personal viewpoints were of everybody involved 9 in those decision points. 10 Q That would be drawing quite a large There Did you ever hear anything from subordinates that 11 you supervise that were actually more active in Midyear, any 12 decision that was made that they were in such disagreement 13 with the final outcome that they brought it to you or you 14 heard rumblings or ramblings about it? 15 A No. The biggest issue that was of -- that created 16 the greatest degree of tension -- this is all I think pretty 17 accurately depicted in the IG report -- was the question 18 about how and whether to obtain access to the Mills and 19 Samuelson laptops. 20 At the end of the day, I do believe everybody was 21 satisfied with the access to the evidence that we were able 22 to obtain, but it took some time for everybody to come to 23 that point of view. 24 quite the right thing I mean to be saying. 25 for us to work through the issues with DOJ, and I do know It took some -- and that's not really COMMITTEE SENSITIVE It took some time 36 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 that the attorney who worked for me was among those who was 2 frustrated over the course of that series of events. 3 4 5 6 7 Q Was that attorney ultimately satisfied, or did they remain -A She was ultimately satisfied that we got access to the evidence that we needed. Q Okay. Did you and Mr. Baker -- I'm sure in the 8 course of business, for purposes of ratings, you've indicated 9 he was a reviewing official to people you rated, and I'm 10 assuming there were things that you would forward to him that 11 he was the ultimate sign-off and approver on. 12 ever have like just informal discussions with him about the 13 law, this case, just as -- was your relationship with him one 14 of -- in addition to a superior, would you consider him a 15 friend, somebody you could go into his office and talk to him 16 about an issue, or what kind of relationship did you have 17 with the General Counsel? 18 19 20 A But did you I think the relationship that you just described is the one that I had with him. Q Did he ever express to you -- in this very high 21 level is all I'm asking. 22 opinion of this -- the reason how Midyear got started, did he 23 ever express an opinion to you at how shocked he was about 24 the careless transmission of classified materials? 25 A Did he ever express to you his I've read his statement in the IG report, that he COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 37 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 was -- I don't remember the precise words that were used, but 2 he did have some language to that effect about the nature of 3 the use of the email server. Q 4 Did he ever discuss that with you personally, like 5 I can't believe this or any conversations he had with you 6 directly about it, or your recollection is from the IG 7 report? 8 A My recollection is from the IG report. 9 Q Did any of the two attorneys you had on the Midyear 10 team, did they express shock, really one way or the other? 11 Did they think, oh, you know, this is nothing, did they 12 express that to you? 13 they, you know, on the other side of the spectrum, there's a 14 lot of potential classified information that's been put out 15 on a personally set-up server, I've never seen anything like 16 this. 17 Why are we looking at this? Or did Did they express anything one way or the other to you? A Shock isn't really quite the right word, but we all 18 held a sense that -- that it was a pretty stupid thing to do, 19 that anybody who has held a security clearance, anybody who 20 has worked in the government understands that you have -- the 21 cardinal rule that you have to do your work on a government 22 system. 23 So we all recognized from the outset that from a 24 commonsense perspective from somebody who has worked -- from 25 the perspective of somebody who has worked in the government COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 38 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 that it seemed like a pretty dumb thing to do. Q 2 If one of your employees -- and this is a 3 hypothetical. 4 server and had emailed national security law materials back 5 and forth that were classified amongst each other or to 6 anybody, really, what would be your reaction to that and what 7 would be the official reaction of the FBI to that? A 8 9 If one of your employees had set up a private Well, my initial reaction would be that I presume it would violate numerous internal policies governing the 10 systems on which we are required to do our work-related work, 11 meaning the work systems. 12 that there could be some penalty associated with violations 13 of agency policy, whether it's FBI or another agency. Q 14 And so my presumption would be What would happen just in the normal course of 15 business, someone during the workday I assume in the capacity 16 you were employed at the FBI and other attorneys and other 17 agents that are dealing with national security matters, I 18 would imagine a lot of the materials you deal with in the 19 course of just a regular day are classified. 20 true? Would that be 21 A That is correct. 22 Q What would happen if just inadvertently employee A 23 needs to send something to employee B over an FBI system, 24 over an approved system, but say it's marked wrong and they 25 don't identify it as classified. What happens? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I mean, it's COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 39 1 my understanding that even a single innocent spillage or 2 inappropriate transmission requires some kind of mitigation. 3 There's a notice. 4 -- 5 A There's a security officer that's called If somebody comes to learn that they have 6 inadvertently transmitted classified information on a system 7 that's not cleared to receive classified information, yes, 8 there's a spill procedure that is required to be used in 9 circumstances where somebody becomes aware that the 10 11 12 13 information is, in fact, classified. Q Are you aware of any employees, not by name, that have had accidental spillage of information? A Yes. It has happened with some frequency, and 14 it's -- people are encouraged to report to the security 15 division and to have -- then the security division takes the 16 appropriate steps. 17 It's not something that -- it's not regarded as a -- as 18 a big deal except that the -- from the standpoint of employee 19 discipline unless somebody does it with a great deal of 20 regularity knowingly, but it's something that is addressed to 21 ensure that the classified information is secured 22 appropriately. 23 24 25 Q But if it did happen with any regularity, there would potentially be discipline? A There could potentially be discipline, yes, I would COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 40 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 imagine. 2 about exactly what would trigger that sort of review. 3 Q But I don't know the precise rules within the FBI If someone -- if an employee had transmitted the 4 amount of documents that Secretary Clinton did on a server 5 that was not approved for that sort of thing, would you 6 imagine the employee would be disciplined? 7 A I have no idea. 8 Q Is it more likely than not that an employee that 9 was caught doing that, there would be some discipline? 10 Mr. Herrington. 11 Ms. Anderson. You'd be guessing -I have no idea. I'm not in charge of 12 attorney discipline. 13 something analogous has happened within the Bureau. 14 simply don't know. 15 question raised whether it would violate FBI internal policy. 18 So I But there are -- there would be a BY MR. BREITENBACH: 16 17 I'm not aware of any circumstance where Q Are you aware whether it would violate anything other than internal policy? 19 A No, I don't know. 20 Q But you are -- 21 A Is there something specific -- 22 Q Well, I guess what I'm wondering is, you were the 23 top national security -- you were head of the National 24 Security and Cyberlaw Division at the FBI. 25 understanding of the national security and cyber laws COMMITTEE SENSITIVE That would entail 41 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 governing spillage of classified information. 2 said you would presume that it would violate agency policy, 3 but are you aware whether it would violate any particular 4 law? 5 6 7 A So I think you I'm sorry, what is the "it," though, the particular content you guys are -- that you're referring to? Q Sure. I think going back to Mr. Baker's line of 8 questioning, the sending or transmittal of classified 9 information over a private server, a private email address, 10 11 any type of nonsecured server. A It could -- I mean, that was the question that was 12 presented by the Midyear Exam investigation. 13 depending on the particular fact patterns that emerged, there 14 could theoretically be criminal activity that -- that might 15 arise, based on the particular facts that might be developed 16 through the investigation. 17 Q And certainly, So if you found that that was happening inside the 18 Bureau, similar activity that you learned of Mrs. Clinton's, 19 and that person was under your supervision, would you not 20 recommend some level of discipline for that activity? 21 A I'm not in the business of recommending discipline. 22 Certainly, I would refer that person to the Inspection 23 Division for review. 24 Q Okay, thank you. 25 A The inspection division within the FBI handles a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 42 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 broad range of different violations, including FBI internal 2 policy. BY MR. BAKER: 3 Q 4 5 When you -- you were already employed at the FBI when Midyear was opened, correct? 6 A That is correct. 7 Q When did you know that you would be on the team or 8 that it would be your lawyers that would be on the team? 9 soon from the opening of that case were you or your team, 10 How your employees brought into it? A 11 Very quickly. In fact, I believe -- I think I was 12 involved very early on, because there was a question that 13 came to me, as the lawyer in charge of the national security 14 area within the FBI, from the ODNI counsel who supported the 15 IC IG when they were -- they asked -- they called to ask me 16 who within the FBI should receive the 1811(c) referral. Q 17 18 So you actually got the call from the IC Inspector General? 19 A From his counsel, yes. 20 Q And who was the counsel? 21 A I don't recall -- 22 Mr. Herrington. 23 Ms. Anderson. Is that person an SES? I assume so. 24 DOJ or FBI, within the DOJ or FBI. 25 name. And they're not within the Jeannette is her first I don't recall her last name. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 43 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE BY MR. BAKER: 1 2 3 Q But that's who you received a call from. They asked who within the FBI should get the referral -- 4 A That is correct. 5 Q -- or did you take the referral and pass it on? 6 A I did not take the referral. They had not yet sent 7 it over. They were asking to whom they should send it. I 8 immediately looped in FBI Attorney 1, who I understood to 9 have responsibility for counterintelligence matters within 10 our organization. 11 And I believe that FBI Attorney 1 was included in the 12 conversation with me in which we responded to the counsel for 13 the IC IG. 14 15 16 Q And then from there, what happened? opened from there? A I had only been on the job about a month. How did it get Who else at the FBI got involved in it? After we received -- the referral I believe came in 17 to Randy Coleman, who was the AD for the Counterintelligence 18 Division. 19 were that were taken immediately after that. 20 21 Q And I don't know precisely what the next steps But sometime subsequent to that, a case was opened, obviously? 22 A That is correct. 23 Q So you initially took this call. 24 Attorney 1. 25 up as the counterintelligence matter in the You consult with Was there ever any discussion about why it ended COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 44 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Counterintelligence Division as opposed to maybe being 2 something on the criminal side of the house? 3 A No. The Counterintelligence Division had the 4 relevant expertise within the FBI. 5 where the case appropriately resided. 6 7 Q Organizationally, that's Because of the facts that were presented, that's where CD or Counterintelligence's work fell? 8 A That is correct. 9 Q So are there similar cases that you have been 10 involved or were involved subsequent to this? 11 is a spillage case, it ended up in Counterintelligence? 12 made it a Counterintelligence case? 13 A 14 information. 15 Q Because this What Because it involved the handling of classified Okay. And is it fair to say the potential 16 violations would be Espionage Act violations that would be 17 matters that would be looked at by the Counterintelligence 18 Division? 19 A That is correct. 20 Q So the facts and the laws that potentially the 21 facts would violate were violations that were worked by the 22 Counterintelligence Division? 23 A Right. 24 Q Okay. 25 Do you know if there was any -- after the case is opened -- my last question really related to the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 45 1 genesis of how it was opened -- were there folks, agents from 2 other field offices, other places at headquarters that felt 3 it should have been a criminal matter and not -- in the 4 criminal division somewhere, not a Counterintelligence 5 matter? A 6 BY MR. BREITENBACH: 7 Q 8 9 I was not aware of any such concerns. If we can go back to your supervision over Ms. Page. I think in the public news, everybody is aware 10 that she was engaged in an extramarital affair with 11 Mr. Strzok. 12 A No. 13 Q So you had no knowledge that there was any Were you ever informed of that affair? 14 impropriety between the two at any point during your 15 employment at FBI in supervision of Ms. Page? A 16 17 I had no knowledge of the affair until it was publicly disclosed. Q 18 Did you have any -- I think then, by extension, you 19 would not have had a knowledge that the affair would have 20 ever been reported to anyone else inside the Bureau? 21 A I'm sorry, could you repeat the question? 22 Q I presume that since you did not have knowledge of 23 the affair, you would not have known whether the affair was 24 reported to anyone else in any supervisory chain inside the 25 FBI? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I don't know. 2 Q You don't know? 3 Mr. Herrington. 4 You're asking if she came to know that it had been reported to someone else? 5 Mr. Breitenbach. 6 Ms. Anderson. 7 Mr. Herrington. 8 46 Correct. If I came to learn that it had been -After it became public, did you learn that it had been reported internally? Ms. Anderson. 9 No, I have never -- I don't have any 10 knowledge, sitting here today, about whether there was 11 anybody within the FBI to whom the affair was reported or if 12 any others had knowledge of it. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 13 Q 14 15 the FBI ever had the affair reported to him or her? 16 17 18 Are you aware at this point whether anyone inside A No. At this point, sitting here today, I do not Q So at the time that Ms. Page was transferred to the know. 19 special counsel's team, did you have any awareness of the 20 affair? 21 22 Mr. Herrington. serve as special counsel to Andy McCabe? 23 Mr. Breitenbach. 24 Mr. Herrington. 25 Do you mean when she was detailed to Yes, sir. Did you have any awareness of the affair? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 47 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Ms. Anderson. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 2 3 4 5 6 7 No. Q What is the process internally in the FBI when such a matter may become known? A To be honest, I don't know. It never came up in my 3 years at the FBI. Q In your time leading the National Security 8 Division, is an affair, in terms of the effect on 9 Counterintelligence, at all a concern for you, any affair? 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 48 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 [10:58 a.m.] Ms. Anderson. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 3 4 Could you repeat your question? Q Yes. As head of the National Security Branch 5 inside the General Counsel's Office, do you believe that an 6 extramarital affair is of concern for an employee to be 7 engaging in at the FBI? 8 9 A I do believe that that would be one of the indicators that somebody who specializes in insider-threat 10 matters might look at. 11 is the kind of thing that persons who have responsibility for 12 insider threats might review, depending on the facts. 13 Q Depending on the particular facts, it So can you explain what kind of insider threat you 14 envision with regard to the effect that an extramarital 15 affair might have? 16 A I am just simply -- so we've all within the Bureau 17 received training on insider-threat issues. 18 the training that I've received, it would be my understanding 19 that that would be the kind of general information that might 20 make somebody vulnerable to blackmail or recruitment by a 21 foreign intelligence service. 22 of personal issue could be used against them, and so it might 23 be something that would be the subject of further review. 24 25 Q And so, based on And so, therefore, that kind And you mentioned training. So I presume that Mr. Strzok, as one of the top counterintelligence agents, and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Ms. Page, serving in the capacity that she was in terms of 2 advising the Deputy Director, would have also received such 3 training? 4 A 5 Bureau-wide. 6 Q 49 I'm referring to training that was providing And the training itself was discussing various 7 types of activity that might encourage a foreign intelligence 8 service to begin to target someone? 9 A The training was for -- it was geared toward 10 employees understanding what indicators they might see in 11 their coworkers that might be reflective of an insider 12 threat. 13 could arise that could be used against somebody, such as 14 financial trouble or other issues. 15 And there's a whole host of different issues that And so, based on the training that I received, it's my 16 understanding that something like, you know, a personal 17 affair could be something that might be used against somebody 18 if they were vulnerable to blackmail. 19 Q Are you aware whether the personal affair at any 20 point -- I understand you said you were not aware of it 21 before it was made public. 22 whether that affair was taken advantage of by any foreign 23 intelligence service? 24 A I have no idea. 25 Q All right. But at any point are you aware Thank you. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 Mr. Parmiter. first hour. We've just got a few minutes left in the I just wanted to ask a couple of questions. We talked a little bit earlier, when you were speaking 4 to my colleague Mr. Baker, about meetings at the Bureau 5 involving charges or other things like that. 6 7 What I'd like to do is show you what we're going to mark as exhibit 1. 8 [Anderson Exhibit No. 1 9 was marked for identification.] BY MR. PARMITER: 10 11 Q It's just a single page. And I can represent to 12 you that this was produced as part of the Bureau's ongoing 13 production to our two committees of relevant documents. 14 15 And looking in particular -- well, first of all, do you recognize this document or the form of this document? 16 A I've never seen this document before today. 17 Q Okay. 18 50 If we're looking down at not the first -- what does the document appear to be? 19 A An email exchange. 20 Q Okay. And if we're looking at not necessarily the 21 most recent email at the top but the one in the middle, this 22 refers to secret meetings between Trisha and Jim. 23 Trisha is presumably you. Would you agree with that? 24 A Yes. 25 Q And Jim would be Jim Baker? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 51 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I assume so. 2 Q Okay. 3 A I presume so. 4 Q Okay. 5 This email appears to complain about, quote/unquote, It also refers to TBA. Would TBA be you? 6 "secret" meetings you were having regarding MYE. 7 agree that's the Midyear Exam? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Okay. 10 this email? 11 A 12 13 14 Can we Do you have any idea who may have written I don't know. It presumably was one of the attorneys who worked for me. Q Okay. And do you know that because the email signature contains "Assistant General Counsel" in NSLB? 15 A Yeah, that's among the reasons. 16 Q What are some of the other reasons? 17 A There's a reference to, quote, "her own people." 18 And the complaint is obviously about somebody who feels cut 19 out of something that they feel they should be involved in. 20 21 Q Do you recall any of the attorneys you supervised ever complaining to you about being excluded from meetings? 22 A No. 23 Q Okay. 24 25 What are these meetings that they're referring to? A It's not clear from the face of the email, but I COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 52 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 believe that it was -- based on the identity of the 2 participants, I believe this relates to a classified matter 3 that's discussed in the appendix to the IG report. Q 4 5 Okay. Do you recall who else was at those meetings from either DOJ or FBI? A 6 There was a series of meetings on this topic. 7 not sure that there were -- I'm not sure this really 8 accurately characterizes the meetings that occurred. 9 suggests a large number of meetings -- quote, "all these I'm This 10 'secret' meetings." I'm not sure exactly what that refers to 11 because there were only a small number of meetings on the 12 matter to which I just referred. 13 different groups of people. 14 classified appendix, I believe. Those meetings were with And that's all documented in the But some of those -- I'm referring, for example, to a 15 16 meeting at DOJ with George Toscas and David Margolis that Jim 17 Trainor, Jim Rybicki, and possibly Andy McCabe and I had with 18 those two individuals. 19 that same group. We also had a conference call with 20 We had a subsequent meeting then, also at DOJ, with that 21 group minus David Margolis, who had passed away by that point 22 in time, but with George Toscas, John Carlin, Sally Yates, 23 and 24 time, so it presumably would've been just been Jim Rybicki, 25 Andy McCabe, and myself. Jim Trainor had retired by that point in COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 And then a subsequent -- this doesn't seem to be encompassed, though, by the timeframe. So I'm not really quite sure what "all these 'secret' 4 meetings" are, but that's sort of the basic series of 5 meetings that I believe to be reflected here. 6 7 53 Q Okay. And, as you indicated, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss classified material? 8 A That's correct. 9 Q Okay. 10 You mentioned Mr. Margolis. 11 was his title at the Department? Just for the record, what 12 A I believe it was Associate Deputy Attorney General. 13 Q Okay. 14 A Jim Trainor was the Assistant Director for the 15 16 Cyber Division at the FBI. Q 19 Okay. BY MR. BAKER: 17 18 And Mr. Trainor? Q In your capacity at the Bureau, did you have a security clearance? 20 A Yes, I did. 21 Q And to get a security clearance, were you subjected 22 to a background investigation? 23 A Yes, I was. 24 Q Were you also given a polygraph exam? 25 A Yes, I was. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 54 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 Q This might not be in your lane, but I'll ask you. What does it mean when a polygraph is, quote, "out of scope"? A My understanding is that polygraphs are required to 4 be given every 5 years, and so when somebody is out of scope, 5 it means that somebody is beyond that 5-year reinvestigation 6 point. 7 Q So "out of scope" in your understanding is, for 8 lack of a better term, it's an administrative thing. 9 haven't done the reinvestigation or the polygraph exam. 10 11 You It's not an indication of deception. A Oh, no, definitely not. And the responsibility 12 does not lie with the individual. The responsibility to 13 reinitiate the investigation lies with the Security Division 14 of the FBI. 15 Q Okay. 16 A And many individuals, actually, are frustrated that 17 they are out of scope because it affects their status with 18 respect to their ability to attend meetings or discuss 19 classified information with people outside of the FBI from 20 time to time. 21 bearing on the individual, him- or herself. 22 Q And so somebody being out of scope has no Would it be fair to say, if you know, that a lot of 23 people, a good number of people, at any given time are out of 24 scope due to other backgrounds and polygraphs that need to be 25 given? If there's a surge in new hires, new agents, the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 55 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 resources that are polygraph-intensive are put on those, and 2 people that are already on board would potentially slip out 3 of scope? A 4 5 Yes, that's my understanding. It affected the work within our branch from time to time. Q 6 But, again, it's not an indication of deception or 7 inconclusive or anything negative as a result of a polygraph 8 exam. 9 A That's correct. 10 Q And then, finally, for our time, you answered this, 11 but I want to be absolutely clear: 12 bring to your attention the relationship between Ms. Page and 13 Mr. Strzok? 14 A No. 15 Q Thank you. 16 Mr. Parmiter. 17 [Recess.] 19 Mr. Morgan. 21 I think we're out of time, so we'll take a short break and come back with the minority. 18 20 Did any of your employees It is now 11:20 a.m., and we are back on the record for the minority round of questioning. Ms. Anderson, before we begin, I just want to say some 22 of these questions might be a little redundant, maybe even 23 obvious, but I would just ask for your patience. 24 trying to make certain that the record is clear and complete. 25 We're just So my colleague would like to start off, actually, with COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 56 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 some of the discussion that we left off with in the last 2 round. 3 Ms. Anderson. Okay. EXAMINATION 4 BY MS. KIM: 5 6 7 8 9 Q Ms. Anderson, I'd like to return to the document introduced as exhibit 1. Are you generally familiar with Director Comey's book, "A Higher Loyalty"? 10 A I read it. Yes. 11 Q Are you aware of the unclassified discussion he 12 makes of a classified matter about unverified documents, 13 alleging that Loretta Lynch may have had a conflict of 14 interest -- 15 A Yes. 16 Q -- in the Clinton investigation? 17 18 19 20 Is this document referring to that matter? A I believe so, but I don't know to a certainty, given that I wasn't the drafter of this email. Q And with regard to that matter, did the FBI ever 21 find credible evidence that Loretta Lynch was somehow 22 conflicted out of the Midyear investigation? 23 24 25 A No. My understanding was that she did not recuse herself. Q My understanding from Director Comey's book is that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 57 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 the allegations in that classified matter remain unverified. 2 Is that also your understanding? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Did you ever face a conflict of interest regarding 5 the Midyear investigation? 6 A No. 7 Q Did Jim Baker ever face a conflict of interest 8 regarding the Midyear investigation? 9 A Not that I'm aware of. 10 Q Did George Toscas? 11 A Not that I'm aware of. 12 Q Did Stu Evans? 13 A Not that I'm aware of. 14 Q Are you aware of any individual who staffed the 15 Midyear investigation on the Justice Department side or on 16 the FBI side who had a conflict of interest with the Midyear 17 investigation? 18 A I don't know if there was anybody. I wasn't aware 19 of anybody with a conflict of interest, although, at some 20 point in time, Andy McCabe did recuse himself from the 21 matter. 22 Q He did so voluntarily. Is that correct? 23 A Uh -- 24 Q Sorry. 25 The Inspector General's report represents that Let me be more precise with that question. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 58 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Mr. McCabe had ethical obligations reviewed by counsel at the 2 FBI and was advised that his recusal was not mandatory. 3 that also your understanding? 4 A That's my understanding, yes. 5 Q And yet he did so to avoid the appearance of 6 7 8 9 impropriety at Director Comey's suggestion. A Is that correct? My understanding was that it was a prudential recusal, yes. Q Thank you. BY MR. MORGAN: 10 11 Is Q Ms. Anderson, just returning to some kind of 12 general questions about the Midyear investigation, what kind 13 of decisionmaking authority did you hold regarding 14 investigative decisions? 15 A None. 16 Q So you held no authority to make investigative 17 decisions like how to acquire evidence or what order in which 18 to interview subjects or decisions of that nature? 19 A That's correct. 20 Q What decisionmaking authority did you have for 21 22 legal decisions in the Midyear Exam case? A I was responsible for the legal advice that was 23 given to -- responsible in a supervisory sense. 24 words, I oversaw the lawyers who provided legal guidance to 25 the Counterintelligence Division and other national security COMMITTEE SENSITIVE In other 59 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 components of the FBI. 2 same was true for my role with respect to the Midyear Exam 3 investigation. 4 Q And so that would have been -- the And the lawyers you're referring to would be the 5 ones referred to in the IG report as FBI Attorney 1 and FBI 6 Attorney 2. 7 A That's correct. 8 Q Can you describe the process by -- I know that you Is that correct? As well as filter team attorneys. 9 discussed a little bit about your role in terms of charging. 10 But are you familiar with or can you describe the process by 11 which the Midyear team narrowed down the range of relevant 12 statutes in the case? 13 discussions? 14 A Were you a party to any of those I don't recall any specific discussions, but I 15 don't think it was the subject of much debate. 16 clear from the outset what statutes were at issue that we 17 were looking at. 18 broader team of prosecutorial and investigative personnel. 19 Q It was pretty By "we," I don't mean me personally but the So then, generally, based on your general knowledge 20 of the process, was it kind of an organic process that was, 21 you know, informed by the experience of the Justice 22 Department prosecutors familiar with cases involving 23 mishandling of classified information? 24 A I'm sorry, could you repeat the question? 25 Q Sorry. Let me -- was it -- pardon me. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 60 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE To your knowledge, was the process informed by 1 2 independent legal research by FBI lawyers, or was it an 3 organic process in which FBI lawyers and the prosecutors 4 handling the case kind of discussed the issue? A 5 The personnel both on the DOJ side as well as the 6 lawyers who reported to me were seasoned counterintelligence 7 personnel with experience in cases analogous to this 8 involving the mishandling of classified information. 9 there wouldn't necessarily be research that was required And so 10 because these are people who have a great deal of experience 11 in dealing with cases and investigations involving these 12 statutes. Q 13 At any point, did any improper consideration such 14 as political bias enter the discussion on what statute to 15 apply? 16 A I'm not aware of any such improper considerations. 17 Q Did any political appointee at DOJ direct your team 18 to use or not use a particular statute in this matter against 19 the prevailing opinion of the Midyear team? 20 A No. 21 Q What was your professional relationship like with 22 Lisa Page? A 23 I had a very good professional relationship with 24 her. We worked together very closely insofar as she 25 supported the Deputy Director and was therefore involved in a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 61 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 number of different national security issues at a high level 2 within the FBI. 3 Q In your time working together with her, did you 4 ever witness Lisa Page take any official actions based on 5 improper motivations, including political bias? 6 A No. 7 Q What was your personal relationship like with Peter 8 9 Strzok? A I didn't know Peter quite as well. I knew him only 10 through my work on the Midyear Exam investigation. 11 knew him -- and as well as by reputation within the FBI. 12 he had a very good reputation as somebody who was one of the 13 most experienced, smartest counterintelligence professionals 14 within the FBI. 15 Q But I And Well, based on your interactions with him on the 16 Midyear and otherwise, did you ever witness Peter Strzok 17 taking any official actions based on improper motivations, 18 including political bias? 19 A No. 20 Q My apologies. Did you ever witness Peter Strzok 21 taking any official actions based on improper motivations, 22 including political bias? 23 A No. 24 Q What was your professional relationship like with 25 Jim Baker? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 62 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE A 1 I had a close relationship with Jim. I had known 2 Jim for a long period of time in a professional context 3 before I came to the FBI. Q 4 And in your time working with him, did you ever 5 witness Mr. Baker taking any official actions based on 6 improper motivations, including political bias? 7 A No. 8 Q What was your professional relationship like with 9 Andrew McCabe? A 10 I didn't know Andy quite as well, given the rank 11 that he held within the organization. 12 the investigation, I came to work with him more closely and 13 had relatively frequent contact with him. Q 14 But over the course of Again, based on your time working together, are you 15 aware or did you ever witness Andy McCabe taking any official 16 actions based on improper motivations, including political 17 bias? 18 A No. 19 Q What was your profession relationship like with 20 21 22 23 Director Comey? A My contact with him was limited to these large group meetings concerning the Midyear case. Q And, again, based on your contact with him, did you 24 ever witness Mr. Comey taking any official actions based on 25 improper motivations, including political bias? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 63 1 A No. 2 Q In your experience with the Midyear Exam, was there 3 any improper political interference -- or did you witness any 4 improper political interference? 5 A I did not. 6 Q Is it consistent with your experience that the case 7 was investigated by the book? 8 A Yes. 9 Q In your experience, did any political appointees at 10 DOJ improperly intervene or attempt to intervene in the 11 Midyear investigation? 12 13 14 A I was not aware of any such improper interventions by DOJ personnel. Q Did any political appointees at DOJ give 15 inappropriate instructions or attempt to give inappropriate 16 instructions about the conduct of the Midyear investigation, 17 to your knowledge? 18 A Not to my knowledge. 19 Q Did any political appointees at DOJ ever attempt to 20 inject improper considerations, including political bias, in 21 the conduct of the Midyear investigation? 22 A Not to my knowledge. 23 Q Are you aware of any conduct of any member of the 24 Midyear team that had the effect of invalidating the outcome 25 of the investigation? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I'm sorry, could you repeat that? 2 Q Are you aware of any conduct of any member of the 64 3 Midyear team that had the effect of invalidating the outcome 4 of the investigation? 5 A What do you mean by "invalidating the outcome"? 6 Q Meaning, did they engage in any conduct that 7 altered the outcome of the investigation based on 8 considerations other than the facts, the evidence, or the 9 law? 10 A No. 11 Q In your view, was the Clinton email investigation a 12 thorough and fair investigation? 13 A Yes. 14 Q In your view, did the Justice Department and FBI 15 take all necessary and prudent investigative steps in this 16 investigation? 17 A Yes. 18 Q Did you ever feel the Justice Department and the 19 FBI had to compromise its investigative strategy because of 20 time pressures or political pressure? 21 22 23 A No. But there was compromise, but not for considerations of time or partisan considerations. Q Yeah, I suppose by "compromise" I mean compromised 24 by improper -- were these improper, not that certain 25 compromises had to be reached, but was it ever compromised by COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 65 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 any kind of improper -- 2 A No. 3 Q -- behavior? 4 Personally, did you investigate the Midyear Exam case as Thank you. 5 aggressively as you would any other? 6 weren't an investigator, but -- I understand that you 7 A I was not an investigator. 8 Q But in terms of your role in the Midyear Exam case, 9 10 11 did you treat this case as any other case? And did you do your best to -A In my capacity as a legal supervisor, I treated 12 this case as I did any other case in which I was involved in 13 the same manner. 14 Q To your knowledge, did anyone on the team attempt 15 to ignore or bury relevant, probative evidence of Secretary 16 Clinton's intent? 17 A No. 18 Q I'm going to turn now to some questions regarding 19 the search for evidence of intent in the Midyear examination. 20 A Okay. 21 Q In most investigations, even before the last 22 witness has been interviewed, do investigators and 23 prosecutors discuss whether there's enough evidence to charge 24 a case, you know, where you search for additional evidence, 25 and whether searches for additional evidence have been COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 successful? 2 A Could you say that again? 3 Q Just generally speaking, even before the last 4 witness is interviewed in a case, do investigators and 5 prosecutors have discussions about is there enough evidence 6 to charge the case or do you need to -- 7 A In my experience, yes. 8 Q When in the lifecycle of a case do these 9 discussions generally start? 10 11 66 A Sometimes early on, depending on the nature of the Q And even before the last witness has been case. 12 13 interviewed in a case, do investigators and prosecutors 14 typically discuss the chances of success for a potential 15 case, not just in terms of obtaining an indictment but 16 whether or not there might be a successful prosecution at 17 trial? 18 A Yes. 19 Q Was Secretary Clinton's knowledge and intent key to 20 the FBI's recommendation not to charge Secretary Clinton? 21 A Yes. 22 Q Why was the lack of evidence on intent fatal to the A Because intent was a necessary element of the 23 24 25 case? statute. And with respect to gross negligence, we understood COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 67 1 that even though the standard was gross negligence, that 2 there were reasons in this particular context to construe it 3 in a way that was something akin -- almost willfulness, 4 something short of willfulness but higher than what one would 5 think of in terms of a negligence standard, stemming from the 6 legislative history and other potential constitutional 7 considerations with respect to due process. 8 9 10 Q Did the FBI ultimately find sufficient evidence of Secretary Clinton's knowledge and intent to recommend charging a criminal case against her? 11 A No. 12 Q Did the FBI investigate this matter as aggressively 13 as it would any other? 14 A Yes. 15 Q When did the Midyear team complete the review of 16 the emails? 17 A 18 Ms. Kim. 19 Ms. Anderson. Do you recall? Which emails are you referring to? The emails on the server. Well, so it's a little bit complicated by 20 the fact that there was what we referred to as unallocated 21 space that did not contain complete emails but rather email 22 fragments. 23 were just literally millions of email fragments in that 24 unallocated space. 25 And so there was a process that was -- and there And so I don't know to a certainty that that review was COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 68 1 ever completed in the sense of all of the emails, you know, 2 reviewed. 3 this process -- of devising those rules that we were going 4 through in terms of attacking the review of that unallocated 5 space. 6 There was a process -- and I was not involved in So, roughly, when we -- so I'm just going to -- I assume 7 your question is when did we reach that point where we felt 8 that we had done the review of the emails that was necessary 9 to complete the investigation? 10 Ms. Kim. 11 Mr. Morgan. 12 Ms. Anderson. 13 occurred. 16 Correct. I don't recall precisely when that Sometime in the spring. BY MR. MORGAN: 14 15 That's correct. Q After this review, did those emails yield any smoking-gun evidence of Secretary Clinton's intent? 17 A No. 18 Q When the Midyear team interviewed individuals who 19 have sent Secretary Clinton classified information -- or, 20 pardon me. 21 To your knowledge, do you know when the Midyear team 22 interviewed the individuals who had sent Secretary Clinton 23 classified information in her emails? 24 25 A I don't recall, sitting here today, when those interviews took place. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 69 Do you know if those interviews, however, yielded 2 any smoking-gun evidence regarding Secretary Clinton's 3 intent? 4 A No. 5 Q To your knowledge, did the investigation ever yield 6 smoking-gun evidence of Secretary Clinton's intent? 7 A No. 8 Q The Inspector General report states, quote, "Our 9 review found that the Midyear team concluded beginning in 10 early 2016 that evidence supporting a prosecution of former 11 Secretary Clinton or her senior aides was likely lacking. 12 This conclusion was based on the fact that the Midyear team 13 had not found evidence that former Secretary Clinton or her 14 senior aides knowingly transmitted classified information on 15 unclassified systems because, one, classified information 16 exchanged in unclassified emails was not clearly or properly 17 marked, and, two, State Department staff introducing 18 classified information into emails made an effort to 'talk 19 around it,'" end quote. 20 21 Is this conclusion consistent with your experience in the case? 22 A Yes. 23 Q To be clear, at this point in early 2016 -- you 24 said earlier that the review had been concluded sometime 25 around the spring of 2016. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 70 1 A Uh-huh. 2 Q When the Midyear team had examined much of the body 3 of evidence but had not found evidence of intent, did the 4 team stop looking for evidence of intent at that point? 5 A No. 6 Q Again -- 7 A Evidence -- 8 Q I'm sorry. 9 A Evidence of intent, for example, could have been 10 11 I didn't mean to interrupt. obtained in Secretary Clinton's interview. Q And to that point, did the team stop examining the 12 evidence or interviewing pertinent witnesses after having 13 reviewed the emails sometime in the early spring? 14 A No. 15 Q At this same point, did the team stop conducting 16 effective and aggressive interviews to solicit evidence of 17 intent? 18 A No. 19 Q In fact, according to the report, quote, "The 20 Midyear team continued" -- the IG report, I should say -- 21 "The Midyear team continued its investigation, taking 22 investigative steps and looking for evidence that could 23 change their assessment." 24 Is that your understanding? 25 A That was consistent with my experience, yes. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 71 At any point in the investigation, if the team had 2 found any evidence of intent, would the Midyear investigative 3 team have pursued that lead? 4 A Yes. 5 Q And that includes in the actual interview of 6 Hillary Clinton? A 7 8 Yes, or in the review of the Huma Abedin emails that we acquired from the Anthony Wiener laptop. Q 9 I want to turn now to questions regarding -- you 10 mentioned there were kind of disagreements about compulsory 11 process earlier in the last round. 12 questions on that subject matter. I'd like to return to In the Midyear investigation, did the investigative team 13 14 generally advocate for aggressively seeking and compelling 15 evidence? 16 A The FBI team, yes. 17 Q Correct. 18 Did Peter Strzok or Lisa Page advocate for or against 19 the use of compulsory process? 20 did? 21 22 A And why did they, if they Generally speaking, yes, they often favored compulsory process over consent. 23 Q And why is that? 24 A Well, I'll just speak -- my clearest memory is of 25 the instance involving the pursuit of the Mills and Samuelson COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 72 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 laptops and their testimony related to the culling process. 2 The reason that -- we were interested in getting that 3 evidence as efficiently and effectively as we could. 4 because consent was not being given as a result of objections 5 being made on attorney-client-privilege grounds, we felt that 6 the compulsory process needed to be explored. Q 7 And So would you then say that there were disagreements 8 in when to use or not use compulsory process among members of 9 the Midyear team and then also between the Midyear team and 10 the DOJ prosecutors that were handling the matter? 11 12 A Yes, generally, disagreements came up from time to Q Would you generally say that -- let me take a step time. 13 14 back. 15 compulsory process? 16 17 Generally, why did the FBI advocate for the use of A As a general matter? Or are you speaking about any particular decision point? 18 Q As a general matter. 19 A There were certain arguments that were made in 20 favor of compulsory process, including the completeness of 21 the information that would be obtained, the timeliness of it, 22 those types of considerations. 23 Q Okay. Generally, why did the -- well, I'll say, 24 generally, did the career prosecutors in the case favor 25 obtaining evidence through consent? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 73 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Yes. 2 Q Why is that, in your experience? 3 A So we're talking about generalities, which is -- 4 you know, there were specific decision points with respect to 5 different devices and different laptops and different witness 6 interviews and things like that. 7 question to mean sort of at a very -- 8 Q Yes. 9 A -- high, general level. 10 11 12 13 And so I'm taking your I'm sorry, so you were asking -Q Why did the career prosecutors in this case generally favor obtaining evidence through consent? A As a general matter, there were 14 attorney-client-privilege issues that were implicated with 15 respect to certain devices and interviews and materials. BY MS. KIM: 16 17 18 Q So let's take that generality and make it specific to the culling laptops. 19 A Okay. 20 Q With regard to the culling laptops, did the FBI and 21 the Justice Department have a strategic disagreement about 22 how to obtain the evidence on the culling laptops? 23 24 25 A At a certain point in time, yes. But we worked through that issue. Q At the point where the Justice Department and the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 74 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 FBI disagreed, can you explain why the FBI -- why certain 2 persons in the FBI advocated for the use of compulsory 3 process to obtain the culling laptops? 4 5 A I mean, the -- if you're asking why, it was because we wanted to get access to the information -- 6 Mr. Herrington. 7 Ms. Anderson. When you say "we," you mean -We, the team, the investigative team, the 8 FBI writ large. 9 up to the Deputy Director, if not the Director. 10 And this was something that went all the way Access to witness testimony about the culling process 11 and to the culling laptops. 12 important, in order to conduct a complete and thorough 13 investigation, to have access to that information. 14 couldn't simply just rest on the attorney-client-privilege 15 objections and the failure, unwillingness at that point in 16 time of the individuals to give consent either to sit for 17 interviews on that process or to provide the laptops. And so we BY MS. KIM: 18 19 The FBI team felt that it was Q We have heard from Justice Department lawyers also 20 that they generally agreed with the need to obtain the 21 culling laptops. 22 A Is that your understanding as well? At some point in time, yes, they came to agree with 23 that, but I don't believe they necessarily -- that everybody 24 agreed at the outset with that proposition. 25 Q When there were disagreements between the FBI and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 the Justice Department on how to seek the culling laptops, 2 was that disagreement based on legitimate strategic 3 differences between -- 4 A Yes. 5 Q -- the Justice Department and the FBI? 6 A Yes. BY MR. MORGAN: 7 8 9 75 Q Do you think that the DOJ prosecutors were making these decisions based on political bias -- 10 A No. 11 Q -- or any other improper considerations? 12 A No. 13 Q In your experience, did any senior political 14 leaders at DOJ intervene on decisions to seek or not seek 15 compulsory process? 16 A I was not aware of any such circumstances. 17 Q Okay. Are you aware if Attorney General Lynch ever 18 intervened in any of the matters involving -- disagreements 19 involving compulsory process? 20 A Not to my knowledge. 21 Q What about Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates? 22 A Not to my knowledge. 23 Q 24 A Not to my knowledge. 25 Q John Carlin? ? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Not to my knowledge. 2 Q Did any of the disagreements on how to obtain 3 76 evidence affect the thoroughness of the investigation? 4 A No. 5 Q In your experience, is it common to have 6 disagreements between FBI agents and DOJ prosecutors working 7 on a case? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Is it common for the FBI to want to move more 10 quickly or aggressively and for DOJ to ask for more evidence 11 or take a more cautious approach? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Based on your answers we just discussed, is it fair 14 to say that you believe the FBI was aggressive in suggesting 15 that the Clinton email investigation make use of compulsory 16 process? 17 A Yes. 18 Q And is it also fair to say that you believe the 19 prosecutors disagreed with the FBI's suggestion based on 20 legitimate differences related to approach on strategy -- 21 A Yes. 22 Q -- not because of any political bias? 23 A Correct. 24 Q I want to turn now to the events surrounding the 25 editing and drafting of the July 5th statement that Mr. Comey COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 77 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 made, announcement of declination of -- or the decision not 2 to pursue charges against Secretary Clinton. 3 a lot of allegations regarding this July 5th statement that 4 Director Comey drafted. 5 detail. There have been I'm going to walk you through it in Who drafted the -- or I want to discuss in detail. 6 Who drafted the statement initially, to your knowledge? 7 A The former Director, Mr. Comey. 8 Q Do you know who held the authority to approve the 9 final language of the statement -- July 5th statement? 10 A The former Director. 11 Q Did Peter Strzok or Lisa Page have the authority to 12 approve the final language of the July 5th, 2016, statement 13 recommending not to prosecute Secretary Clinton? 14 A No. 15 Q Did you ever make edits or suggestions to the 16 statement with the purpose of helping Secretary Clinton or 17 damaging the Trump campaign? 18 A No. 19 Q Do you know if anyone else did? 20 anyone else? 21 A I am not aware of anyone else. 22 Q Were members of the Midyear FBI team free to 23 Are you aware of express their concerns during the drafting process? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Do you recall any member of the team expressing COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 78 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 significant disagreements about the statement's final 2 wording? 3 4 A Disagreements ever through the course of the drafting process? 5 Mr. Herrington. 6 Mr. Morgan. 7 Ms. Anderson. 10 11 Q Oh, the final words. No. Why was the official statement drafted before the FBI officially closed the investigation in July 2016? A 12 look like. 13 straw man. 14 The final wording. BY MR. MORGAN: 8 9 The statement's final wording. Q To begin the thought process of what the end might I think the former Director referred to it as a And do you believe that Director Comey acted 15 improperly by prematurely drafting an initial statement 16 before Secretary Clinton's interview and others were 17 interviewed in the case? 18 A No. I very much understood his mind to be open to 19 the possibility we might receive additional evidence that 20 would change our assessment in the case. 21 Q If the FBI's interviews of Secretary Clinton and 22 others produced new evidence that supported prosecuting 23 Secretary Clinton, would the FBI have ignored that evidence 24 and stuck with the existing drafted statement? 25 A No. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 79 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q In other words, did the initial draft statements in 2 the spring of 2016 lock in the FBI's recommendation not to 3 prosecute, regardless of any new evidence? 4 A No. 5 Q But the FBI did not actually receive new evidence 6 in these interviews that supported prosecuting Secretary 7 Clinton, correct? 8 A Correct. 9 Q I now want to talk about the editing process. 10 to do so, I would like to introduce an exhibit, which I 11 believe would be exhibit 2. 12 [Anderson Exhibit No. 2 13 was marked for identification.] BY MR. MORGAN: 14 15 And Q This is House Resolution 907, which was introduced 16 by Republican Members of Congress in May of this year, 17 May 22nd, 2018. 18 appoint a second special counsel to investigate the 19 Department of Justice and the FBI. And it requests that the Attorney General 20 A Okay. 21 Q So I would like to just first begin by asking you 22 to turn to page 4. And the first clause begins, quote, 23 "Whereas Director Comey, in the final draft of his statement, 24 allowed FBI Agent Peter Strzok to replace 'grossly 25 negligent,' which is legally punishable under Federal law, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 with 'extremely careless,' which is not legally punishable 2 under Federal law." 3 Do you with the characterization that Director Comey, 4 quote, "allowed" FBI Agent Peter Strzok to replace "grossly 5 negligent" with "extremely careless"? 6 80 A To be more precise about it, I understand that the 7 investigative team suggested to Mr. Comey the elimination of 8 the use of the word "grossly negligent" from the public 9 statement and that Mr. Comey accepted those changes. 10 Q Do you know why? 11 A Why -- 12 Q Why did they? 13 A Why did they make the recommendation? 14 Q Correct. 15 A The team felt that there was not evidence of gross 16 negligence as it's been interpreted in this particular 17 statute. 18 Q At the time "grossly negligent" was used in the 19 initial draft, did Director Comey's statement conclude that 20 the FBI recommend the prosecution of Secretary Clinton? 21 A I'm sorry. Say that again. 22 Q At the time "grossly negligent" was used in the 23 initial draft, did Director Comey's statement conclude that 24 the FBI recommend prosecution of Secretary Clinton? 25 A No. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 81 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q The Inspector General's report actually makes clear 2 that the change in Director Comey's statement was not 3 Mr. Strzok's doing; it was based on legal discussions by you 4 and attorneys in your office. 5 6 A Is that correct? I was not involved in the discussion that led directly to the edit that was made in the speech. 7 Q Were any attorneys under your supervision involved? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Would you say, though, that, based on your 10 understanding, that FBI attorneys -- however, not Peter 11 Strzok -- would have made the substantive decision to change 12 "grossly negligent" to "extremely careless"? 13 14 15 A Would have made the decision? provided input to? Q Yes. Or would have Could you clarify what you're asking? Based on our kind of earlier question, 16 Mr. Strzok didn't have final decision on what the statement 17 looked like, correct? 18 A Correct. 19 Q That was Director Comey, correct? 20 A Correct. 21 Q But the decision to change that, was that based on 22 recommendations made by attorneys -- to your understanding, 23 made by attorneys under your supervision? 24 25 A Based, in part, on recommendations from attorneys under my supervision, yes. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 So it wasn't Mr. Strzok making -- it wasn't based 2 purely on Mr. Strzok's recommendation that that change was 3 made? 4 5 6 A 82 No, it was not based exclusively on Mr. Strzok's recommendation. Q According to the IG report, after reviewing a draft 7 of the report, you told the OIG that you raised concerns 8 about the use of the phrase "extremely careless" to describe 9 former Clinton's conduct as being unnecessary to the 10 statement and also likely to raise questions as to why the 11 conduct did not constitute gross negligence. 12 13 14 15 16 To be clear, did you believe that Secretary Clinton's conduct did not constitute gross negligence under 793(f)(1)? A I did not believe it amounted to gross negligence within the meaning of that statute. Q In fact, the "gross negligence" provisions were 17 considered by the Justice Department to be potentially 18 unconstitutionally vague, correct? 19 A Yes. 20 Q And the Justice Department -- 21 A That's my understanding, yes. 22 Q And has the Justice Department -- it's also my 23 understanding that the Justice Department hasn't used that 24 statute once to charge an individual in the past 99 years. 25 Is that correct? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 83 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A That's my understanding, yes. 2 Q Do you and other FBI attorneys -- pardon me. Did 3 you and other FBI attorneys undertake your own independent 4 research of the issue to ensure that Secretary Clinton's 5 conduct did not constitute gross negligence under 793(f)(1)? A 6 I believe the attorney who reported to me, yes, 7 that she undertook some additional legal research on her own 8 on that particular issue. 9 10 11 Q And do you know what the result of that research A She was not able to identify any case that was was? 12 analogous to this one in which there were -- she was not able 13 to identify any case in which charges were brought. 14 Q Can you describe why you and others in OGC believed 15 Director Comey should not use the phrase "grossly negligent," 16 a phrase with a separate legal meaning than if he was using 17 it in a colloquial sense, not as a legal term of art? 18 Let me rephrase. Is it your understanding that when 19 Director Comey initially included the term "gross negligence" 20 he was using it in the colloquial sense, not as a legal term 21 of art? 22 23 24 25 A I don't know exactly what he intended with respect to that initial draft. Q But did you believe that he should not use it, however, because "grossly negligent" has a separate legal COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 meaning that's different from a colloquial understanding of 2 that -- the colloquial sense of that term or the potential 3 colloquial sense of that term? 4 A 84 I did not believe he should use the term "grossly 5 negligent" given the conclusion that we were reaching in the 6 case, yes. 7 Q Did the edit of replacing "grossly negligent" with 8 "extremely careless" change the FBI's substantive legal 9 conclusions in any way? 10 A No. 11 Q Do you recall specifically whether the edit was 12 13 made by Lisa Page, Peter Strzok, or someone else? A My understanding, although I was not in the room at 14 the time, is that the edit that was suggested or recommended 15 to former Director Comey was the product of a discussion 16 among Pete Strzok, 17 Q Lisa Page, and FBI Attorney 1. So it was not any one of -- it was not Peter Strzok 18 or Lisa Page who individually -- is it your understanding 19 that no one person in the meeting that you just described was 20 responsible for making that edit? 21 A That's correct. 22 Q To your recollection, was the edit made because of 23 any -- or, to your knowledge, let's say, was the edit made 24 because of any inappropriate considerations, including trying 25 to help Hillary Clinton avoid prosecution? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 85 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Not to my knowledge. 2 Q And did anyone ultimately disagree with the 3 decision to omit the phrase "gross negligence" and instead 4 use "extremely careless," a phrase that the Director had 5 already used in his draft? 6 A Theres was no disagreement about the omission of 7 "grossly negligent," but there were concerns that were 8 articulated about the continued description of her conduct as 9 extremely careless. 10 Q In fact, you were one of the people who expressed 11 concerns about Director Comey publicly criticizing Secretary 12 Clinton's uncharged conduct. 13 quote, you told the OIG that you expressed concerns about 14 criticizing uncharged conduct during discussions with Comey 15 in June 2016. According to the IG report, Is that correct? 16 A Yes. 17 Q However, the IG report continued that you said of 18 the decision to include such criticism, it, quote, "was a 19 signal that we weren't just letting her off the hook. 20 conclusions were going to be viewed as less assailable at the 21 end of the day if this kind of content was included," end 22 quote. 23 24 25 Our When did you raise concerns with Director Comey about criticizing uncharged conduct? A In one of the oral discussions that we had with COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 him, in one of the in-person meetings. Q Did you ultimately agree with his decision to 3 include criticisms of Secretary Clinton's uncharged conduct 4 in the statement? 5 6 7 8 9 A I understood his reasoning, and it wasn't my role to second-guess his ultimate decision. Q So would you say then that you ultimately then agreed with his decision? A It was a reasonable decision that he made at the 10 time based on his concerns about the credibility of the 11 institution, yes. 12 Q Can you explain your reasoning for the statement 13 that including descriptions of uncharged conduct indicated 14 that -- pardon me. 15 86 Can you explain the previous statement, that you were 16 quoted in the IG report saying that including descriptions of 17 uncharged conduct indicated that, quote, "we weren't just 18 letting her off the hook. 19 viewed as less assailable." 20 A Our conclusions were going to be What did you mean by that? So what I stated was a reflection of Director 21 Comey's reasoning, as I understood it at the time based on 22 what he had articulated in those meetings in which I was 23 present, that essentially by including more facts about what 24 we identified with respect to her conduct that was 25 concerning, even if not criminal, that that would bolster the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 87 1 credibility of our conclusions, that we were not recommending 2 prosecution, when that conclusion was conveyed publicly. 3 Q The IG report concluded, quote, "We have found no 4 evidence that Comey's public statement announcing the FBI's 5 decision to close the investigation was the result of bias or 6 an effort to influence the election. 7 documentary and testimony evidence reviewed by the OIG 8 reflected that Comey's decision was the result of his 9 consideration of the evidence that the FBI collected during 10 the course of the investigation and his understanding of the 11 proof required to pursue a prosecution under the relevant 12 statutes." Instead, the 13 Is this conclusion consistent with your experience? 14 A Yes. 15 Q So, quote, "bias or any effort to influence the 16 election," end quote, was not part of the FBI's 17 decisionmaking in any way? 18 A No. 19 Q Do you have any reason to believe that Director 20 Comey's recommendation against prosecuting Hillary Clinton 21 was influenced by any improper considerations, including 22 political bias? 23 A No. 24 Q Was your opinion influenced by political bias? 25 A No. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q Was your opinion based on the law and the facts? 2 A Yes. BY MS. KIM: 3 4 88 Q Ms. Anderson, in March of 2017, Director Comey 5 disclosed in public congressional testimony that the FBI had 6 begun an investigation into the Russian Government's efforts 7 to interfere with the 2016 Presidential election, including 8 the nature of any links between individuals associated with 9 the Trump campaign and the Russian Government and whether 10 there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's 11 efforts. 12 Did you work on that investigation? 13 A Yes. 14 Q What was your role in that investigation? 15 A It was similar to the role that I played in the 16 Midyear Exam investigation. In other words, I was a 17 supervisor of the legal guidance that was given in connection 18 with that investigation. 19 Q When did you start your work on that investigation? 20 A In late July of 2016. 21 Q And when did you stop working on that 22 23 24 25 investigation? A When I went out on maternity leave, which was in March of 2017. Q I would like to ask you a series of general COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 89 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 questions about the FBI's investigative techniques. In May of 2018, the President tweeted: "Apparently the 3 DOJ put a Spy in the Trump Campaign. 4 been done before and by any means necessary, they are out to 5 frame Donald Trump for crimes he didn't commit." 6 This has been never Are you aware of any information that would substantiate 7 the President's claim that the DOJ put a spy in the Trump 8 campaign? 9 A I'm not aware of any such evidence. 10 Q Are you aware of the FBI ever placing spies in a 11 U.S. political campaign during your time at the FBI? 12 A No. 13 Q Are you aware of any information that would 14 substantiate the President's claim that the DOJ is out to 15 frame Donald Trump? 16 A No. 17 Q Have you been personally involved in any 18 investigations where the FBI did not follow its established 19 protocols on the use of human informants? 20 A Not to my knowledge. 21 Q Have you ever been a part of any DOJ or FBI 22 investigation conducted for a political purpose? 23 A No. 24 Q Have you ever been involved in a DOJ or FBI 25 investigation that attempted to frame a U.S. citizen for a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 90 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 crime that he or she did not commit? 2 A No. 3 Q On August 29th, the President tweeted: Bruce "Ohr 4 told the FBI it (the Fake Dossier) wasn't true, it was a lie 5 and the FBI was determined to use it anyway to damage Trump 6 and to perpetuate a fraud on the court to spy on the Trump 7 campaign. This is a fraud on the court." 8 To your knowledge, did DOJ official Bruce Ohr ever 9 communicate to the FBI that the raw intelligence reports from 10 Christopher Steele were untruthful or were lies? 11 A Not to my knowledge. 12 Q Have you personally ever been a part of any effort 13 to perpetuate a fraud on the FISA court? 14 A No. 15 Q Have you ever been a part of any investigation 16 where the FBI or the Justice Department used politically 17 biased, unverified sources in order to obtain a FISA warrant? 18 A No. 19 Q Are you aware of any instances during your tenure 20 at the FBI where the FBI or the Justice Department 21 manufactured evidence in order to obtain a FISA warrant? 22 A No. 23 Q Are you aware of the FISA court, again, during your 24 time at the FBI, ever approving an FBI or DOJ warrant that 25 was not based on credible and sufficient evidence? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A No. 2 Q In your time at the FBI, are you aware of any 91 3 attempts by the FBI or the Justice Department attempting to 4 intentionally mislead FISA court judges in an application for 5 a FISA warrant? 6 A No. 7 Q Are you aware of the FBI omitting evidence or 8 manufacturing evidence for a FISA warrant in your time at the 9 FBI? 10 A Not intentionally omitting evidence, but there are 11 times when we do have to bring to the court's attention 12 additional information that was omitted from the FISA 13 application. 14 Q And when -- 15 A -- robust practice of bringing that information to 16 17 the court's attention. Q And when additional information of that nature is 18 warranted, are you aware of the FBI ever attempting to 19 suppress or bury that information and not bring it to the 20 FISA court's attention? 21 A No. 22 Q In your time at the FBI, are you aware of any 23 instances of the Justice Department failing to follow all 24 proper procedures to obtain a FISA warrant? 25 A No. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 92 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 2 alliance is? 3 A 4 Can you briefly explain to us what the Five Eyes It's the Governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 5 Q 6 that right? 7 A Yes, among other things. 8 Q Are you aware of the United States having bilateral 9 10 And this is an intelligence-sharing alliance. Is information-sharing relationships with each of those countries outside of the formal Five Eyes relationship? 11 A Yes. 12 Q And so Five Eyes then is not the exclusive channel 13 that the FBI or our intelligence community uses to receive 14 information from the Governments of the United Kingdom, 15 Canada, New Zealand, or Australia? 16 A Correct. 17 Q In your time at the FBI, are you aware of the FBI 18 or the Justice Department ever investigating the Trump 19 campaign for political purposes? 20 A No. 21 Q To your knowledge, did President Obama or anyone in 22 his White House ever demand or request that the FBI or the 23 Justice Department infiltrate or surveil the Trump campaign 24 for political purposes? 25 A Not to my knowledge. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 93 If you had to guess, how would the FBI leadership 2 have handled any requests of this nature from the Obama White 3 House? 4 A They would've declined to participate. 5 Q I would like to ask you some general questions 6 about a persistent conspiracy theory involving Department of 7 Justice lawyer Bruce Ohr. 8 9 To your knowledge, did Mr. Ohr have any role in drafting or reviewing the Carter Page FISA applications? 10 A Not to my knowledge. 11 Q Was Mr. Ohr part of the decisionmaking chain of 12 command for the Page FISA application? 13 A No. 14 Q Was Mr. Ohr part of the approval process for the 15 Page FISA application? 16 A No. 17 Q Was Mr. Ohr ever a decisionmaker for matters 18 pertaining to the FBI's counterintelligence investigation 19 into Russian collusion? 20 A No. 21 Q Was Mr. Ohr involved in any way in the decision to 22 initiate a counterintelligence operation relating to 23 potential Republican collusion with the Trump campaign? 24 A No. 25 Q So he had no role whatsoever in the decision to COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 open that investigation. 94 Is that right? 2 A Correct. 3 Q Are you aware of any actions by Mr. Ohr that 4 inappropriately influenced or tainted the FBI's decision to 5 initiate the Russia collusion investigation? 6 A No. 7 Q Are you aware of any actions by Mr. Ohr that caused 8 you to doubt the legitimacy of Special Counsel Mueller's 9 investigation in any way? 10 A No. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 95 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 [12:09 a.m.] BY MS. KIM: 2 3 Q Do you believe it is important that Special Counsel 4 Mueller be allowed to complete all aspects of his 5 investigation without interference? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Why? 8 A It's important for any criminal investigation to be 9 10 11 allowed to be completed without interference from political -- for political reasons. Q Republicans have raised questions about why the FBI 12 did not provide the Trump campaign with a defensive briefing 13 about Russian attempts to infiltrate the campaign. 14 been publicly reported that on July 19th, 2016, senior FBI 15 officials gave a high-level counterintelligence briefing to 16 the Trump campaign. 17 that briefing, FBI officials warned the Trump campaign about 18 potential threats from foreign allies -- foreign spies, 19 excuse me, and instructed the Trump campaign to inform the 20 FBI about any suspicious overtures. 21 22 23 It has It has been publicly reported that in Are you generally aware of the fact of the July 19th, 2016, counterintelligence briefing to the Trump campaign? A I'm generally aware that there were general 24 counterintelligence defensive briefings that were given to 25 both -- representative of both campaigns, once they became COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 the major party nominees. 2 early to me, but I don't have any precise knowledge of the 3 date on which those defensive briefings were given. 4 5 Q 96 July 19th sounds a little bit So I take it you did not personally participate in that briefing? 6 A No, I did not. 7 Q Are you generally aware of the substance that this 8 briefing was intended to convey? 9 A At a very high level of generality, yes. 10 Q And how would you describe that content? 11 A My -- 12 Mr. 13 quick moment? . May we confer with the witness for just a Thank you. 14 [Discussion off the record.] 15 Ms. Anderson. At a very high level of generality in 16 order to avoid getting into classified information, it was a 17 general briefing about threats posed by particular countries 18 who engage in hostile activities against the United States, 19 and I presume some of the indicators of that type of activity 20 that the campaigns might want to look for in order to protect 21 themselves from those types of activities. BY MS. KIM: 22 23 Q Do you know if the Trump campaign reported any 24 contacts with foreign officials or foreign actors during this 25 briefing? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I don't know. 2 Q Would you have been in a position to know if the 3 Trump campaign had reported contact with foreign actors 4 during this briefing? 97 5 A Not necessarily. 6 Q So, as far as you're aware, did the Trump campaign 7 report any contacts between George Papadopoulos and Russian 8 individuals? 9 A Not to my knowledge. 10 Q As far as you're aware, did the Trump campaign 11 report the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting between senior 12 campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., Jared 13 Kushner, and Paul Manafort, and a Russian lawyer, and a 14 Russian lobbyist? 15 A Not to my knowledge. 16 Q Did the campaign, to your knowledge, report the 17 June 2016 email stating that the Russian Government hoped to 18 help Donald Trump? 19 A I'm sorry, which email are you referring to? 20 Q It was a June 2016 email from Rob Goldstone to 21 Donald Trump Jr., stating that the Russian Government hoped 22 to help Donald Trump's Presidential campaign. 23 A Not to my knowledge. 24 Q Two weeks after the FBI reportedly gave its 25 briefing, it has been reported that on August 3rd, 2016, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 98 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Donald Trump Jr. met with an emissary who told Mr. Trump Jr. 2 that the princes who led Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 3 Emirates were eager to help his father win election as 4 President. 5 6 Do you know if Donald Trump Jr. reported this offer from the Saudis and the Emiratis to the FBI? 7 A I don't know. 8 Q Would you say that you are a national security 9 10 expert? A National security legal expert? Yes. I hesitate 11 to call myself an expert on anything, but I've practiced in 12 the area for a number of years. 13 Q Drawing on your experience practicing in this area 14 for a number of years, why is it important for a political 15 campaign to report outreach from foreign contacts to the FBI? 16 A For a variety of different reasons. One, to better 17 protect themselves and the information that they have from 18 being a target of foreign influence or foreign 19 intelligence-gathering efforts; and two, in order to inform 20 investigative bodies of evidence that could be indicative of 21 a broader pattern, might be helpful to a counterintelligence 22 investigation, for example. 23 reasons. 24 25 Q Those would be two of the Would you agree then with my characterization that there are significant national security and law enforcement COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 99 1 implications for a political campaign to conceal or fail to 2 report outreach from foreign powers offering to interfere in 3 U.S. elections? 4 A Could you state your question again? 5 Q Are there national security or law enforcement 6 implications for a U.S. political campaign concealing or 7 failing to report offers of foreign interference in U.S. 8 elections? 9 Mr. Herrington. So if you assume all those facts, would 10 those have implications? 11 Ms. Anderson. It could, yes. BY MS. KIM: 12 13 Q Thank you. 14 So you said that you first became aware of what I'll 15 refer to as the Russia collusion investigation in the July 16 2016 timeframe. Is that correct? 17 A Correct. 18 Q So were you aware of this investigation before the 19 2016 Presidential election? 20 A Yes. 21 Q Was Peter Strzok? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Was Lisa Page? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Was Andrew McCabe? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 100 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Yes. 2 Q Was Jim Comey? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Was Jim Baker? 5 A Yes. 6 Q Do you know if any high-level Justice Department 7 officials were aware of the existence of this FBI 8 investigation before the 2016 election? 9 A Yes. 10 Q Was Loretta Lynch? 11 A I don't -- I don't know when she became aware of 13 Q Was Sally Yates? 14 A I don't know when she became aware of it. 15 Q Was John Carlin? 16 A I don't know precisely when high-level Department 12 17 it. officials were briefed on the investigation. 18 Q Thank you. 19 To your knowledge, approximately how many FBI officials 20 were aware of the existence of the Russia collusion 21 investigation before the 2016 election? 22 A 23 small. 24 Q 25 I don't know the precise number, but it was very I apologize for asking you to estimate. Would it be more -- would it be more or fewer individuals than 10? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 101 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 A Investigative personnel or any personnel in the Q I will use any investigative -- any investigative FBI? personnel and officials at the FBI. 5 A It was probably slightly more than 10. 6 Q Are you aware of any disclosures from the FBI to 7 the public or to the press about the existence of the Russia 8 collusion investigation before election day of 2016? 9 A No. 10 Q If you have to guess, how do you think a disclosure 11 to the press or to the public about the existence of the 12 Russia collusion investigation would have impacted Donald 13 Trump's electoral prospects? 14 15 16 A I have no idea. I don't consider myself to be an expert on electoral politics, and I don't know. Q If somebody at the FBI were trying to stop Donald 17 Trump from being elected President, do you think they could 18 have publicly disclosed that his campaign was under 19 investigation for potentially colluding with Russian 20 Government actors? 21 A I don't know. 22 Q But, again, to your knowledge, no one at the FBI 23 disclosed this fact to the press or to the public. 24 correct? 25 A Not to my knowledge. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Is that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 Q Are you aware of a deep state conspiracy at the FBI to stop Donald Trump from being elected President? 3 A No. 4 Q Are you aware of any evidence of any deep state 5 102 conspiracy at the FBI? 6 A No. 7 Q Are you aware of any evidence of Peter Strzok, Lisa 8 Page, Jim Baker, Jim Comey, or Andrew McCabe, attempting to 9 stop Donald Trump from being elected? 10 A No. 11 Q There are many public criticisms against former FBI 12 Director Jim Comey. 13 proven liar and leaker. 14 proven liar? 15 A No. 16 Q Are you aware of Director Comey ever lying to you? 17 A No. 18 Q Are you aware of Director Comey ever lying to 19 The President has accused him of being a Do you believe Director Comey is a Congress under oath? 20 A No. 21 Q Are you aware of any instances of Director Comey 22 lying? 23 A No. 24 Q Are you generally familiar with Director Comey's 25 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 on June 8th, 2017? A 2 3 103 I watched parts of the testimony, but I have not refreshed my recollection of what he said in that hearing. Q 4 I'll represent that in written and oral testimony, 5 he described several communications he had with President 6 Trump, details of which have now become unclassified because 7 of the release of the Comey memos. Does that sound correct? 8 A I don't recall, but -- 9 Q With regard to the Comey memos, were you one of the 10 small group of people with whom Director Comey shared details 11 about his conversations with President Trump 12 contemporaneously? A 13 I was aware contemporaneously of certain of the 14 meetings with -- that Director Comey had with the President, 15 yes. 16 Q Did you generally find that Director Comey's 17 descriptions of these events in his written and oral 18 testimony, and in his book, were consistent with the 19 contemporaneous descriptions that he shared with you? 20 Mr. 21 Ms. Kim. 22 Mr. 23 [Discussion off the record.] 24 Mr. 25 . May we confer with the witness, please? Yes, please. Thank you. . Thank you. The FBI is instructing the witness not to answer the last question asked or any other COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 104 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 questions that delve into the details or contents of what are 2 commonly referred to as the Comey memos, as we view that as 3 evidence that pertains to the special counsel's purview. 4 Thank you. 5 Ms. Kim. We would like to object to that objection on 6 three grounds: 7 multiple witnesses before, including Mr. McCabe, including 8 Bill Priestap, including several high-level FBI officials, 9 who were all subject to contemporaneous -- the ability to 10 contemporaneously confirm Director Comey's descriptions. 11 First, this question has been asked to Secondly, the details of the Comey memos are public. 12 They have now been declassified by the President. 13 been released. 14 FBI should be instructing the witness not to respond to 15 matters that are a matter of public knowledge. 16 Mr. They have We don't understand any basis on which the Thank you. The instruction stands for 17 purposes of this line of questioning right now. 18 a particular document that has been officially declassified 19 by the U.S. Government if you wish to show the witness, that 20 may help move things along. 21 Ms. Kim. If there is So the FBI would not object to our bringing 22 the Comey memos in and asking line by line if the witness 23 agrees with the Director's characterizations? 24 Mr. 25 at this time. We're going to maintain the same objection I'm going to represent to you that if you have COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 105 1 an officially declassified document by the U.S. Government, 2 that may move things along. Ms. Kim. 3 Thank you. BY MS. KIM: 4 Q 5 Ms. Anderson, do you have any reason to doubt the 6 accuracy of Director Comey's oral or written representations 7 of the facts from when he was the FBI Director? 8 A His oral or written -- 9 Q Representations of the facts from when he was the 10 FBI Director. 11 Mr. Herrington. 12 Ms. Anderson. 13 Mr. Herrington. The facts -Related to? I'm sorry. The Russia investigation or -- BY MS. KIM: 14 Q 15 I am asking if you have any evidence to doubt 16 Director Comey's characterizations of his time as FBI 17 Director, which he has detailed at remarkable length in his 18 book, Higher Loyalty? A Sorry, reason to doubt anything that he said in his 21 Q Yes. 22 A There were -- there were certainly things that were 19 20 book? 23 written in his book that I knew not to be accurate, based on 24 things that I had learned in the course of my work at the 25 FBI. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 106 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q I see. And were those -- can you describe with a 2 little more specificity what those details might have been, 3 generally? 4 A Sitting here today, I don't remember precisely what 5 they were, but my sense was that Mr. Comey had misremembered 6 a couple of different details when he was recounting certain 7 episodes within the book. 8 9 10 Q So you're aware of certain details that the Director may have misremembered. Are you aware of him purposely inaccurately representing any facts in the book? 11 A I have no evidence that that occurred, no. 12 Q Thank you. 13 questioning. 14 [Recess.] 15 Mr. Parmiter. I think that is the end of our round of Okay, let's go back on the record. The 16 time is 1:06 p.m. 17 colleagues, I want to note one thing for the record, and it 18 relates to something that was raised by our colleagues in the 19 previous hour. 20 And before I turn it over to my Our understanding, based upon conversations with the 21 Justice Department, was that the memos drafted by former 22 Director Comey, which have been largely declassified, were 23 fair game for congressional investigators to ask questions 24 about. 25 least based upon our understanding from the Justice We think that the representations to the contrary, at COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 107 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Department, are certainly inconsistent with those and are 2 incorrect. 3 with our colleagues' assessment of that point and we'll be 4 following up on it. 5 And I just want the record to reflect we agree Mr. Thank you for that. In reference to the 6 prior objection that we raised, we have consulted with 7 minority counsel and have agreed to permit the asking of a 8 single question, which we understand they intend to ask, but 9 we appreciate you expressing the committee's position and, of 10 course, we'll convey that back to our chain of command. 11 Mr. Parmiter. 12 BY MR. BAKER: 13 Q Thank you. Mr. Baker. Before we start, our process sometimes lends itself 14 to duplicity, so I apologize in advance for some questions 15 that probably touch upon things you may have answered or 16 exactly what you may have answered. 17 At the end of the last round, our colleagues from the 18 minority staff had asked you a question about Mr. Comey's 19 book, and you had indicated something to the effect there 20 were parts of it or things in it that you thought were 21 inaccurate. 22 A That is correct. 23 Q Could you elaborate on what those parts were? 24 A There's only -- I identified a couple of different 25 inaccuracies when I -- when I read the book. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE There's only COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 108 one that I remember sitting here today, though. 2 Q And what is that? 3 A That pertains to a comment that he attributed -- 4 that he attributes in the IG report to me during the meeting 5 that took place immediately preceding the October 28th letter 6 that was sent to Congress, in which he stated something to 7 the effect of that I had asked whether we should take into 8 account that sending the letter might bring about the 9 election of Donald Trump. 10 11 And that was not -- that was, to my memory and to my knowledge, not an accurate statement. Mr. Herrington. And you clarified your views on that in 12 the response to the IG? 13 Ms. Anderson. 14 Mr. Herrington. 15 Ms. Anderson. That is correct. And that's reflected in the IG report? That is correct. BY MR. BAKER: 16 17 Q Would you clarify that for us? 18 A I said -- I said something to the effect of -- and 19 this is what's in the IG report -- that I asked whether we 20 should take into account the fact that it might affect the 21 outcome of the election, given -- especially given that we 22 weren't certain what we had was material, in fact it was 23 unlikely that it would be material evidence, and given that 24 whatever we would write about it in that letter, no matter 25 how carefully, could and would likely be over-read and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 109 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 overblown. Q So the discrepancy in Mr. Comey's book was that 3 there was a specific candidate name that was attributed to 4 you rather than -- 5 A Correct. 6 Q -- just somehow affecting the election? 7 A Correct. 8 Q The other instances of inaccuracy that you don't 9 10 specifically recall, do they relate to things that were attributed to you? 11 A No. 12 Q Okay. 13 A Concerning the investigation. 14 Q Concerning the investigation. 15 A No. 17 Q Okay. 21 Q I'm sorry. Did you ever memorialize any of those concerns? A No, I did not. BY MR. BAKER: 22 23 In your role -- BY MR. BREITENBACH: 18 20 But you don't, recall even in general terms, what they related to? 16 19 Just other statements of -- Q In your role as a deputy general counsel in 24 national security law, you indicated earlier that the 25 attorneys that were working for you that were directly COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 involved in Midyear, were they also involved in the Russia 2 case? 110 3 A Yes, they were. 4 Q Were there additional employees that you supervised 5 that were involved, or just the same two from Midyear that 6 were involved in Russia? A 7 8 two. 9 sorry. 10 So for the relevant point of time, just the same I do have an additional attorney who -- well, I'm I did have an additional attorney who was embedded in the special counsel's office. 11 Q And that's below the SES level? 12 A Below the SES level, that is correct. 13 Q Okay. 14 That's someone that's in the special counsel's office? 15 A Correct. 16 Q Now, were they on the Russia case before it became 17 special counsel? 18 A No. 19 Q Okay. 20 So it's an employee of yours at the time that was eventually on special counsel? 21 A Correct. 22 Q Okay. So you had indicated earlier that, or it 23 sounded to me like the attorneys that were working on Midyear 24 were, you know, providing a wide variety of legal advice. 25 Would your office have any role in 137 -- or sources, in COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 111 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 opening or giving guidance whether a source should be 2 continued, discontinued, opened in the first place? 3 role, if any, would the general counsel's office play in 4 anything related to confidential human sources? 5 A What I am not aware of any role that we would play with 6 respect to opening sources. Sources are primarily run and 7 handled by the DI, and their validation process is handled by 8 the DI, not by the Counterintelligence Division. 9 extremely unlikely that any legal questions that might arise So it seems 10 would come to my attorneys. 11 that my lawyers never gave any advice on human source issues. 12 13 Q But I don't know to a certainty When you say DI, you're referring to the Directorate of Intelligence? 14 A That is correct. 15 Q Would your lawyers give advice as to closing a 16 17 source? A I don't know. It's certainly -- it's possible that 18 if there were concerns about a source that came up in 19 connection with a particular investigation that my lawyers 20 could be involved in conversations within the Bureau about 21 whether to continue that person as a source. 22 23 Q But you're not aware of that in the instant cases, that that happened? 24 A I assume you're referring to Christopher Steele? 25 Q Correct. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 112 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I don't know whether my attorney, who worked on the 2 matter, was involved or was not in the conversations, in the 3 consideration whether to close Mr. Steele as a source. 4 Q Do you know of any other cases, anytime, anywhere, 5 other cases that your office was involved in giving advice on 6 any aspect of informant operations? 7 8 9 A When you say "any aspect of informant operations" -Q Of whether to open someone, whether someone's in 10 compliance during the time that they're open, if they're not 11 in compliance, whether they should be discontinued? 12 A I'm not aware of any such instances. Our office 13 might and actually routinely provided legal advice on uses, 14 investigative uses of sources overseas, for example, on 15 double-agent operations is a good example of a circumstance 16 that might implicate legal considerations. 17 the types of bureaucratic issues that you're describing, 18 those would typically be handled by the DI, and if there were 19 any legal issues by the lawyers supporting the DI. But in terms of 20 Q So it sounds like -- you mentioned double-agent 21 operations. 22 advice when an issue arose from an actual operational issue? It sounds like your office might give legal 23 A Correct. 24 Q Whether then -- rather than opening or closing, 25 based on some administrative reason? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 113 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Correct. 2 Q Are you aware, in the course of your tenure with 3 the FBI, of sources, and it doesn't have to be in the cases 4 we're talking about here, are you aware of sources that were 5 closed being reopened and utilized in investigations? 6 A Yes. 7 Q So it's not unheard of for a source to be 8 9 discontinued and then reopened? A Certainly not. I saw references in documents that 10 I read with some regularity to sources having been opened and 11 closed and opened and closed over time. 12 13 14 Q Do you recall any instances or circumstances why someone might be closed and then reopened? A There are a lot of reasons why a source could be 15 closed, including that they just simply weren't providing 16 fruitful information. 17 out of contact for a while, or sources can present, you know, 18 questions that are concerning, too, in terms of their 19 willingness to be handled, their willingness to comply with 20 instructions that the FBI has given them. 21 whole host of different reasons. 22 Q Sources can go off the radar, can drop There's just a So the last point you made, their willingness to 23 comply with instructions that the FBI has given them. 24 they're not willing or they, in fact, don't comply with any 25 of the instructions that the FBI would give them, that would COMMITTEE SENSITIVE If 114 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 be a reason for someone to be discontinued? A It could be, yes. We would refer to that as a handling problem. Q Could someone be opened, reopened for a handling 5 problem if what they subsequently come to the Bureau with is 6 potentially so significant or of interest that it outweighs 7 whatever the potential handling problem was? 8 9 10 A I don't know the answer to that question. I would -- yeah, I don't know the answer. Q Would there be a process in place? If you don't 11 know that -- I'm assuming, but I don't know for sure that you 12 could be administratively closed for, you know, absent doing 13 some criminal act, you could be administratively closed for 14 the reasons you cited. 15 handler's instructions. 16 administratively closed. 17 could be someone who's been closed that was, up until their 18 closure, providing credible information that comes back to 19 the FBI, or any agency that, you know, or its sources, and 20 the information they come back with is potentially credible, 21 because they have a history of being credible, that they 22 would be re-examined for potential use and possibly reopened. 23 That's not out of the realm of possibility? It could be not following your You would be, in my words, But I would think, in theory, there 24 A I believe that is correct. 25 Q I believe you were asked in the last hour a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 115 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 question about media leaks. 2 about media leaks, and it's not about any -- it's my 3 understanding that the IG made reference to some media leak 4 issues in the Bureau. 5 of unauthorized contacts. 6 7 I have a very specific question I think very broadly, there were a lot Are you aware of any unauthorized media contacts anybody had in OGC with media? 8 A No. 9 Q Any OGC employees? 10 A No. 11 Q Are you aware or have you heard -- this is the 12 specific part that I referenced. I had just recently heard 13 that there is some assertion that the Bureau would leak 14 information about a case to the media for the purpose of 15 having the media report out there, so an analyst checking 16 public source information to try to verify a fact that 17 they're trying to verify would see this news article or 18 report that was really set in motion by a Bureau leak. 19 you aware of anything like that ever happening? 20 A No. 21 Q You had indicated earlier, you and I had a Are 22 discussion about sometimes the tension between prosecutors 23 and investigators, FBI, DOJ, having a healthy outcome. 24 your opinion that attorneys assigned to the FBI's general 25 counsel felt there was an atmosphere where they could be COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Is it 116 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 candid with their fellow attorneys, regardless of the rank of 2 those other attorneys? 3 A Yes, generally speaking. 4 Q Are there instances where in your branch that 5 anybody ever expressed a feeling that they couldn't be candid 6 or felt that their opinion would be outweighed by others? 7 A I'm not aware of any such circumstance. 8 Q Are you aware of a survey that the FBI does, a 9 climate survey? 10 A Yes. 11 Q And what is a climate survey? 12 A It's a survey that's done that asks certain 13 questions of all FBI employees that are designed to 14 illuminate the FBI's performance on certain metrics. 15 are some questions that are geared at sort of the performance 16 of the FBI generally, and then others that are geared toward 17 particular supervisors and executives within the FBI. 18 19 20 Q There And the result of these questions or this survey, what is the goal of the answers to these various metrics? A I don't recall the FBI's stated goal of doing this, 21 but my general understanding was in order to inform the FBI 22 leadership about concerns within the workforce, and in order 23 to assess areas of improvement within the FBI. 24 25 Q So it would go to things like employee morale, whether the rank and file thought recognition and awards were COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 properly given out, that sort of thing? 2 A That's my understanding. 3 Q And how, if you know, how did the Office of the 4 5 General Counsel fare in these climate surveys? A It's hard to characterize in a general way the 6 results of the survey, and I don't remember the specific 7 results. 8 9 10 117 Q Do you remember anything specifically about the National Security Branch? A No. I mean, the general sense, though, is that 11 lawyers are hard -- are harsh critics and they expect high 12 performance from their executives, and so we had some of the 13 more outspoken responders to that survey. 14 15 16 Q Was there any particular area that the outspoken people gravitated towards in expressing their thoughts? A One of the areas that I remember there being some 17 complaints about was the degree of communication from the 18 General Counsel to the office generally. 19 Q And the office being the branch? 20 A No, the Office of General Counsel. 21 Q The whole Office of General Counsel? 22 A Yeah, uh-huh. 23 Q Okay. BY MR. PARMITER: 24 25 Q I think in our first hour, we talked a little bit COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 118 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 about -- or you had indicated that you had received a call 2 from someone at the IC IG or IC IG counsel when the Clinton 3 email matter was referred to the FBI. Is that accurate? 4 A That is correct. 5 Q There was a woman named Jeannette, and you didn't 6 recall her last name. 7 A Correct. 8 Q Did the break help to refresh your memory of her 9 last name? 10 A No. 11 Q Okay. 12 Have you ever spoken to anyone else at IC IG with regard to the Midyear Exam matter? 13 A No. 14 Q Okay. Charles McCullough was the IC IG or perhaps 15 still is the IC IG, at least when the Midyear Exam matter was 16 referred to the Bureau. Is that correct? 17 A That's my understanding. 18 Q Did he ever brief you or anyone else at the FBI or 19 DOJ or meet with you about that referral, or about the facts 20 of the case or anything like that? 21 A I never met with him, no. 22 Q Are you aware whether anyone else met with him, 23 whether in OGC or elsewhere in the Bureau? 24 A I don't know. 25 Q Did you ever speak to him on a secure line, or over COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 119 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 the phone or anything like that? 2 A No. 3 Q Maybe not meet with him? 4 A No. 5 Q Are you aware whether anyone at the Bureau ever A I don't know. 6 7 did? BY MR. BAKER: 8 9 Q I'll throw in a random question. Were you ever at 10 a meeting or ever copied on an email from Peter Strzok where 11 he is asking generally for any intelligence information on 12 any Hill staffers, specifically a Senate Judiciary staffer 13 named Emilia DiSanto? 14 A BY MR. PARMITER: 15 16 No. Q You also talked maybe in the previous hour with our 17 colleagues about the 793(f) statute, the topic of gross 18 negligence and intent. 19 that, you know, your belief was that intent was not 20 required -- or was required, rather, for a prosecution under 21 793(f). Unless I'm incorrect, you had stated Is that correct? 22 A Correct. 23 Q Okay. And, you know, a plain reading of that 24 statute, you know, I believe 793(f)(2), you know, does 25 require, you know, a showing of intent. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 793(f)(1) maybe does COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 not. 2 national defense information. 3 understanding of the plain language of the statute? 120 It just requires gross negligence from someone who has Is that your general 4 A That's my recollection, yes. 5 Q Okay. So, I mean, I guess can you expand a little 6 bit on what your opinion is or what, you know, the opinion of 7 the General Counsel's Office was on that issue of intent? 8 9 10 11 A So we are not the prosecutors, and so we obviously defer largely to the views of DOJ in the interpretation of criminal statutes under which they bring prosecutions. But it was our understanding that -- that in looking at 12 the provision, number one, it had never been used before. 13 And we're talking about (f)(1), the gross negligence 14 provision. 15 Number two, there were -- there was some concern that 16 was articulated in the legislative history that might -- 17 might apply to prosecutions in circumstances where there was 18 an intent. 19 And number three, there were some constitutional 20 concerns that might have been -- that might have been created 21 by a circumstance where the Justice Department might try to 22 prosecute somebody where there was not evidence of intent. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 23 24 25 Q On the constitutional vague issue that you just cited, I'll stipulate to you that we're aware that 793 was COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 121 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 used as predication to obtain legal process. 2 wondering if the FBI, you in particular, knew that there were 3 constitutional questions as to the validity, the continuing 4 validity of that particular statute, why would the particular 5 agents obtaining legal process have used that statute as 6 legal predication to a court, in order to obtain evidence, 7 whether it's a search warrant or other legal process? 8 9 A So I'm So what I testified to a moment ago was that there might be constitutional concerns if there were a prosecution 10 brought under that provision in a circumstance where there 11 was not evidence of intent, which does not mean that -- is 12 something different from saying that the statute is 13 unconstitutional on its face, in other words, there is no 14 conceivable prosecution that could be brought under that 15 provision. 16 So I think that would be one legal rationale. 17 know if it's one that any of the agents actually held in 18 their minds about when they cited that in the predication for 19 the legal process, but that's a reason why that statute could 20 be cited in such process. 21 22 Q I don't Were you aware that 793 was used as legal predication for lawful process obtained by the FBI? 23 A Not specifically, no. 24 Q I think that's -- I mean, that strikes me as 25 slightly surprising, that in a case where you are part of the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 122 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 investigative team -A 2 3 I testified earlier that I was not part of the investigative -Q 4 I'm sorry, you're part of the Midyear investigative 5 team. 6 delineating investigative team versus being part of the 7 management of the actual investigation? 8 9 Maybe this is a good point to understand. A Right. things in the FBI: How are you So there are definitely two very different The investigative team, made up of the 10 agents and analysts and lawyers who are advising on the 11 investigation; and the people who are involved in strategic 12 decisions about the case at an executive level. 13 And so I would consider myself to have been part of that 14 executive group that weighed in on significant decisions, 15 strategic decisions with respect to the investigation, but I 16 was not part of the investigative team. 17 Q So then there were lawyers that were part of the 18 investigative team that would have weighed in on the use of 19 gross negligence, the actual legal parameters of gross 20 negligence, and using that as predication for lawful process? 21 A I don't know that to a certainty. I don't know 22 whether that determination was made by prosecutors, or 23 whether it was made by agents or whether it was made by 24 lawyers who reported to me. 25 Q But if it's an FBI affidavit, is there a process COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 that is reviewed by FBI lawyers prior to that draft legal 2 process going over to the prosecutors for eventual 3 processing? 4 A 5 6 7 123 Sometimes, yes, an FBI lawyer might review a search warrant affidavit. Q Are you aware whether the search warrant affidavit was reviewed by any lawyers under your supervision? 8 A Which search warrant affidavit? 9 Q Any search warrant affidavit in the Midyear Exam. 10 A I'm aware of two search warrants being executed in 11 the case, one with respect to the server and one with respect 12 to the Weiner laptop. 13 search warrant was reviewed at some point by FBI lawyers. 14 don't know whether it was before it went to the DOJ 15 prosecutors, or whether it was in parallel with the DOJ 16 prosecutors. 17 I do know that the Weiner laptop And with respect to the server search warrant affidavit, 18 I don't recall whether our lawyers reviewed that search 19 warrant affidavit or not. 20 I Q Would you or Mr. Baker have been privy to the 21 sign-off of that -- of either of those affidavits prior to 22 those moving over to the Department for eventual processing? 23 A Not necessarily before they went over to the 24 Department. 25 Q I do recall that -- Not hypothetically, but were you? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 124 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A No, I'm speaking actually. So I don't recall the 2 mechanics of what happened with the search warrant affidavit 3 that we obtained for one of the servers. 4 respect to the search warrant affidavit for the Weiner laptop 5 that that search warrant affidavit was circulated by email 6 and that Mr. Baker and I were both on distributions for that, 7 that search warrant affidavit. 8 9 I do recall with But because of the speed with which that process was moving, I don't know whether we approved it or exercised or 10 asserted a prerogative to approve it before it went to DOJ as 11 opposed to reviewing it in tandem with the review by the 12 prosecutors and, you know, the sort of collaborative process 13 by which that affidavit, search warrant affidavit was 14 produced. 15 Q Okay. I guess I'm trying to understand the timing, 16 too, with regard to decisions made to obtain legal process, 17 based on predication of the statute that the Department, at 18 the very least, was indicating had some level of 19 constitutional vagueness to it. 20 So at what point did you learn, or do you believe that 21 your attorneys learned, that there was a vagueness, a 22 constitutional question with regard to the Department with 23 regard to the gross negligence statute? 24 25 A I don't know. I don't know at what point the attorney working for me understood that. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE She may have 125 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 already known, because she was an experienced 2 counterintelligence lawyer within the FBI, and she had a lot 3 of experience with those particular statutes. 4 words, she may not have learned it in connection with the 5 Midyear Exam case, but with a prior case. 6 Q In other Would the attorney on the case have reviewed the 7 predication prior to whatever agent who is the affiant on the 8 application, would they have -- would the attorney have 9 reviewed the legal predication prior to submission of the 10 application? 11 A Sorry, prior to? 12 Q Submission of the application. 13 A Are you talking about a particular circumstance, or 14 in general? 15 Q On either of the two search warrants. 16 A I presume that -- I mean, it was in the search 17 warrant affidavit, so I presume it would have been reviewed 18 by -- by the attorney who -- at least with respect to the 19 Weiner laptop, you know, I know she was involved in the 20 review. 21 in which she sent the search warrant affidavit to me and to 22 Jim Baker. 23 Q She forwarded -- as I mentioned, there was an email So, yes -I guess if -- what I'm trying to understand is, if 24 there was a real problem with regard to the particular 25 statute in either the FBI's legal analysis, or the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 126 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Department's legal analysis, with respect to that particular 2 statute, why are FBI agents submitting affidavits that are 3 relying upon a particular statute that has real potential 4 legal problems, according to the DOJ analysis? 5 A So, as I explained before, there are potentially 6 specific prosecutions that could theoretically be brought 7 that might result in constitutional concerns. 8 statute is not constitutionally invalid on its face and there 9 are many prosecutions that could be brought, theoretically, However, the 10 where intent is proven that would not pose constitutional 11 problems. 12 So, for example, in this particular case, had we had 13 evidence of intent, it's theoretically possible that we could 14 have brought a prosecution, might have brought a prosecution 15 under that statute. 16 would have happened necessarily, but the statute is not -- it 17 is not the Department's view, as I understand it, the statute 18 is invalid for constitutional reasons in every circumstance. I'm not saying that's, you know, what 19 Q Did you believe that the statute required intent? 20 A That was my understanding of the Department's 21 22 interpretation, yes. Q Knowledge would not have been -- knowledge of the 23 fact that passage of classified information over unsecure 24 means would not have been one of the elements of an offense 25 under 793? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 127 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 A So I don't know. I'm not an expert in this area. I was not the lead lawyer on this case. Q But I think you had testified previously that you 4 consider yourself a national security expert. 5 particular investigation is going through the 6 Counterintelligence Division, as you indicated. 7 mishandling investigations, to my knowledge, are not few and 8 far between, that the Department and the FBI are relatively 9 accustomed to these types of investigations. 10 And this And So what I'm trying to understand is, if you have a 11 statute that is often used by the FBI, you and your 12 attorneys, I would think, would be relatively knowledgeable 13 about the use of that particular statute. 14 A So, as I testified, 793(f) has never been used, to 15 my understanding. In fact, I'm not sure it was my testimony, 16 but I think I agreed in response to a question that Mr. Baker 17 asked me. So 793(f) has never been used before. 18 Q Are you aware of other -- 19 A I really don't know how many occasions the issue 20 has ever come up where there could be a fact pattern that was 21 discussed and considered. 22 responsibilities included overseeing the legal support to 23 the -- to -- legal advice provided to the FBI on all 24 counterterrorism investigations, counterintelligence 25 investigations, and cyber investigations. But more broadly, my job COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 128 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE And so no, I was not an expert on -- on the specific 1 2 category of mishandling violations or the particular statutes 3 at issue. 4 lawyers, those experts who handled those issues. 5 those experts was the lawyer who worked for me on that -- on 6 the Midyear Exam case. That was not my job. My job was to oversee those And one of 7 Q So are statutes only good if they are used? 8 A I don't know what that means. 9 Q You just indicated that the statute had never been 10 used. 11 not stipulating to that. 12 presume, the statute that you are referring to in terms of 13 gross negligence had never been used. 14 is, does that mean that statutes that are never used are no 15 longer good law? 16 So does that, the fact that the statute -- and I am A No, not at all. But in the FBI's analysis, I So what I am asking That's not -- I was just trying 17 to -- you had -- I thought you had misinterpreted what I had 18 said in your question, and I was trying to -- 19 Q No. I think if part of the legal reasoning as to 20 why the gross negligence statute was not used in terms of a 21 potential prosecution of Mrs. Clinton, if one of the -- if 22 part of that rationale was that it had never been used, then, 23 by extension, one might presume that other statutes that are 24 on the books, if they aren't being used, should not be ever 25 considered as predication for a prosecution. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 129 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE A 1 2 statement. Mr. Herrington. 3 4 That's not -- that was not the intent of my That was just a speech. It wasn't a question, so -- 5 Mr. Breitenbach. 6 Mr. Herrington. 7 Mr. Breitenbach. It's not a speech. It was a speech. No, it's not a speech. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 8 Q 9 If part of the rationale of not using gross 10 negligence as an element of the prosecution in Mrs. Clinton 11 was that the statute had never been used, then I'm trying to 12 understand. 13 not been used. The reasoning is simply because the statute has So -- Mr. Herrington. 14 But the problem is that the witness has 15 testified that she did not undertake that analysis. 16 can't answer that question. So she BY MR. BREITENBACH: 17 Q 18 Okay. So, as the top lawyer for the National 19 Security Law Branch, did you feel that it was, according to 20 your attorney, having not made that analysis -Mr. Herrington. 21 22 sir. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 23 24 25 No, it's according to her testimony, Q Okay. According to your testimony, that you had not made the analysis on the gross negligence statute, that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 130 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 you relied upon whom? A I deferred to the DOJ prosecutors and to the 3 attorney who worked for me. 4 was in terms of the factors about -- that we considered, 5 there were three. 6 factors in my testimony, and it was the combination of those 7 three. 8 9 But what my testimony earlier It wasn't -- I identified three specific I didn't say that it was any one by itself. I'm not telling you that we had a circumstance before us where the 10 only -- the only factor pointing against prosecution was 11 simply that the statute had never been used before. 12 13 Q Right. And the other two factors were constitutional vagueness, and what was the third factor? 14 A What was the third one? 15 Q I think for Congress to learn that particular 16 statutes on the books that are still good law are being 17 interpreted by the FBI as essentially not good law any 18 longer -- 19 A That was not my testimony. 20 Q Okay. 21 22 23 Do you envision 793(f) ever being used to prosecute someone? A That would not be my role. I'm not a prosecutor. As a lawyer, I could tell you that -- 24 Q Which -- I'm sorry. 25 A The fact that it's -- it could be constitutionally COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 131 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 invalid in particular applications, in particular 2 circumstances, does not necessarily mean that it's 3 constitutionally invalid in every case. 4 there could be a fact pattern that would not implicate those 5 same constitutional concerns. 6 before us in this particular case. 7 8 9 Q And so conceivably But that question was not So a constitutionally invalid statute could still be constitutionally applied? A That is correct. There is a difference between 10 statutes that are facially unconstitutional and those that 11 are unconstitutional in their application. 12 13 14 Q So what was your understanding in this particular case why 793(f) was constitutionally invalid? A There was no evidence of intent. 15 little bit overstating it, too. 16 the Department -- And you're a I don't know that there -- 17 Q I was only using your phrase. 18 A That's not what I said. My understanding was that 19 there were constitutional concerns. There has never been a 20 court ruling on this issue. 21 Department's views are on this issue. 22 constitutional concerns that would have been raised by a 23 circumstance where a prosecution was brought where there was 24 not evidence of intent. 25 Department's views. I don't know how definitive the But there were That's my understanding of the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 132 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q What are some of the factors that would rise to -- 2 would have, I'm sorry, rise to the level of intent with 3 regard to this particular statute? 4 A I don't know. I'm not an expert on this statute. 5 I'm also not a prosecutor. 6 Department about that question. 7 Q So you'd have to ask the Well, I think you said -- you did testify earlier 8 that there was no smoking gun evidence as to Secretary 9 Clinton's intent. 10 11 So what would have -- what would you have considered smoking gun evidence with regard to her intent? If you said that there was no smoking gun evidence, what 12 would have been that smoking gun evidence with regard to her 13 intent? 14 that smoking gun evidence? 15 classified emails potentially have gone to showing intent? 16 What are some of the factors that might have shown Mr. Herrington. Might the -- might the number of That's a very different question. Are 17 asking what a smoking gun -- which question are you asking, 18 the first one? BY MR. BREITENBACH: 19 20 Q I think it all falls within the smoking gun. What 21 are the factors that might have been considered within the 22 so-called smoking gun rubric? 23 A An email that the Secretary sent saying, I set up 24 this server for the purpose of sending unclassified 25 information for my convenience, even though I know it's not a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 133 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 secure system. Q That's an example. My second question then, what about the number or 3 the frequency with which someone is emailing classified 4 information over an unsecure means, would that be considered 5 an element of proving intent? 6 A I don't think so, in a circumstance where we -- 7 there was no evidence that there was any knowledge that the 8 information was classified. 9 circumstance, where there isn't knowledge that the And so, in that kind of 10 information, no matter how voluminous, is classified, it's 11 not a very powerful argument that it goes to intent. 12 Q We now know that Secretary Clinton did send 13 classified information up to the Special Access Program 14 level. 15 A Yes. 16 Q Could you explain what your understanding of a 17 Are you aware what Special Access Programs are? Special Access Program is? 18 A Not in this setting. 19 Q Would -- should a Secretary of State understand 20 21 what information is classified or not? A I'm not the sort of person who would be in a 22 position to make that judgment about what a Cabinet-level 23 person should or shouldn't know about classification. 24 understanding was that the Secretary generally testified in 25 her interview to the FBI that she relied on the judgment of COMMITTEE SENSITIVE My 134 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 others who staffed her to ensure that information that was 2 received by her was appropriate for the setting in which it 3 was transmitted. 4 Q Okay. What I'm trying to understand, too, is, 5 still going back to the 793 gross negligence offense, I 6 proposed that frequency of emails could be considered an 7 element of the offense. 8 I'm asking you, could the sensitivity of emails also be 9 considered an element of an offense when considering intent, 10 11 And now what I'm proposing is, and or even gross negligence? A I don't know. In this particular circumstance, 12 our -- the testimony of these witnesses was that they 13 believed that there was -- they did not believe the 14 information to be classified. 15 talking around the classified information and, therefore, not 16 to actually be transmitting any classified information. 17 the facts that you're presenting were simply not present in 18 this particular case. 19 Q They believed themselves to be So What would you advise, as a prior FBI attorney, 20 what would you advise if you, in fact, knew that information 21 was not only classified at an extremely sensitive level, but 22 also was -- you also were aware of the frequency of the 23 emails? 24 knowledge, as the attorney on a case, where you saw both of 25 those elements, the frequency and the severity of the What would your advice be if you actually had COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 135 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 classified information, in terms of that kind of information 2 passing over an unsecured server? 3 Mr. Herrington. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 4 5 6 7 What would your advice be to whom? Q To your client, which is essentially the Bureau itself. A I would never be in that circumstance. I was not 8 the kind of -- I was not at the level within the FBI General 9 Counsel's Office where I ever would have been providing 10 advice to an operational division about whether the elements 11 of a particular statute were or were not met. 12 Specifically, in sort of complicated circumstances like 13 the one you're proposing here, it just simply would not have 14 been within the parameters of my responsibility, and I 15 don't -- I have never given advice on that particular issue 16 before. 17 Q But you were part of the executive team where the 18 decision was made to change gross negligence to extreme 19 carelessness. 20 least from a supervisory level, with regard to a change from 21 a phrase that is legally meaningful to a phrase that is not 22 legally meaningful. 23 24 25 A So you are involved in the decision-making, at These are two different questions. What -- those are two different questions. Q Well, you were involved on the executive team where COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 136 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 that change was made. 2 were involved in that decision-making, do you believe that 3 you should have known what the difference was between gross 4 negligence and extreme carelessness? A 5 So I'm trying to understand. If you Sitting here today, I don't know exactly what the 6 precise difference is between extremely careless and gross 7 negligence. 8 Q Extremely careless is not a legal term of art. Correct. But the nonlegal term of art of extreme 9 carelessness was used rather than the legal term of art of 10 gross negligence, which would have been legally culpable. So you were on the executive team that approved -- you 11 12 know, relied upon that change that Director Comey himself 13 eventually delivered as part of the final exoneration 14 statement. 15 the FBI, do you believe that you should have been aware of 16 the difference between extreme carelessness and gross 17 negligence? 18 A So if -- as the head national security lawyer for No, I don't. There are different ways that people 19 could interpret that, and Director Comey understood it in one 20 way. 21 careless" has been open to interpretation and confusion after 22 the fact. 23 have more carefully considered, we as a group. 24 saying, you know, there was anything that I did incorrectly 25 here, but -- so I don't know that there is a single meaning And obviously, the use of the phrase "extremely So, perhaps, that issue is something we should COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I'm not 137 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 of extremely careless. 2 suggesting that there's some sort of discrete delta between 3 grossly negligent and extremely careless that's susceptible 4 to some sort of legal judgment. 5 that's -- that's the case. 6 that the phrase "extremely careless" was -- has been subject 7 to several competing interpretations and confusion. 8 9 Q And, you know, you're sort of But I don't believe that I think the real concern here was It's competing, because it has no legal effect, whereas gross negligence does. So I'm not suggesting you 10 should have spent more time on understanding this, but what I 11 am saying is -- what I am asking is, with regard to the 12 definition itself of gross negligence, you saw it in one 13 draft of the statement, and then you see it -- you don't see 14 it in another draft, including the final statement of 15 Mr. Comey's, and -- 16 A Correct. I had been advised by -- 17 Q Real quick, let me just finish the question. 18 So you see it in a draft; you don't see it in the final 19 version. 20 this investigation stems, it seems, on whether she met the -- 21 her activity met the definition of gross negligence in the 22 first draft, but "extreme carelessness" is eventually used. 23 So the entire nonprosecution of Mrs. Clinton seems to revolve 24 around the decision to change that phrase. 25 A The exoneration of Mrs. Clinton with respect to I would disagree with that characterization. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE So 138 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 the decision not to prosecute Secretary Clinton rests on the 2 absence of evidence of intent in this case. 3 advised -- 4 5 6 Q We had been Even though intent is not gross negligence. You have negligence and willfulness in the law? A So we had been advised by the Department of Justice 7 that they would interpret that provision, that reference to 8 gross negligence in this particular context to require some 9 evidence of intent. And there was a unanimous view within 10 the FBI team that was involved and knowledgeable about the 11 evidence in this case that there was no such evidence of 12 criminal intent in this particular matter. 13 Q But was there evidence of negligence? Because I 14 think you would agree with me that negligence is different 15 than intent. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 139 [1:50 p.m.] Ms. Anderson. 2 That's correct. I don't know the answer 3 to your question whether there was evidence of negligence or 4 not. 5 that interpretation that had been made by the Department of 6 Justice and therefore one that was not focused on. It was not a question that was presented because of BY MR. BREITENBACH: 7 Q 8 9 So there was no review as to whether there was negligence in this case? A 10 It was legally irrelevant because the Department of 11 Justice would not have brought a prosecution in a 12 circumstance in which there was simply negligence. 13 Q Was that a unanimous view inside the FBI to -- 14 A About what? 15 Q That it was irrelevant because the Department had 16 already determined that gross negligence had constitutional 17 problems and -- 18 A I don't know if that was a unanimous view. 19 Q Was that your view? 20 A You're -- was that my view -- 21 Q Did you -- 22 A At the time? I don't know because it didn't come 23 up. It wasn't a question that we focused upon because there 24 was a absence of evidence of intent in this case, and we 25 understood that there would not be a prosecution, there would COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 140 1 not be a prosecution brought by the Department unless there 2 was some evidence of intent, and that evidence was missing 3 here. Q 4 5 Did you agree with the irrelevance of the gross negligence statute? A 6 I am telling you sitting here today that I do 7 believe that it would have been irrelevant because, because 8 of the view of the Department about the circumstances under 9 which prosecutions could be brought under that statute. Q 10 Did the FBI have any independent duty to determine 11 whether a particular statute was relevant or not in the 12 prosecution? 13 A 14 15 case. I didn't say the statute was irrelevant in the I am not sure what you are asking. Q I am asking did the FBI have, you're saying that 16 the Department of Justice made a decision that intent was 17 required, even though we have a statute on the books that 18 does not require intent that requires gross negligence. 19 Gross negligence is different than willfulness and 20 intentional conduct. 21 So my question is, did the FBI have an independent duty 22 to determine whether a statute that is still on the books and 23 good law with regard to gross negligence could have been an 24 element of an offense that could have been investigated and 25 eventually prosecuted rather than a whole separate statute COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 141 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 that was the only statute that the department was looking at 2 in terms of a potential prosecution. 3 Mr. Herrington. 4 Ms. Anderson. 5 is. I am sorry. 6 question? If you know. I don't know even know what your question I haven't been able to follow your BY MR. BREITENBACH: 7 8 Q I'm sorry, and that's probably my fault. 9 There are two mishandling statutes that we're 10 discussing, one involving intent and one involving gross 11 negligence. 12 a determination that it would only, that this particular case 13 could only be prosecuted, if at all, based on the statute 14 pertaining to intent. You have testified that the Department had made No. Is that correct? 15 A I don't think that's what I'm saying. 16 saying that. 17 understanding is that 7, in the right circumstance and, let 18 me back up. 19 one of the prosecutors on this particular case, so I don't 20 want to speak with any, I don't want to speak about what 21 their views were or were not. 22 is not consistent with what my understanding of DOJ's views 23 was. That was not my understanding. I'm not My I am not DOJ, I'm not a prosecutor. I was not But what you just articulated 24 Regardless of which provision was at issue, my 25 understanding was that DOJ believed that there had to be COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 142 1 evidence of intent whether you bring it under 793 D was it or 2 793 F. 3 Q 4 Were you aware that there was a statute on the books that related to negligence? 5 A Negligence or gross negligence? 6 Q Gross negligence in handling of classified 7 information. 8 A Yes. 9 Q Did you ever propose to any of the prosecutors with I was aware of the existence of 793 F. 10 whom the FBI was engaged with in this investigation that 11 there was a gross negligence statute that may pertain to this 12 fact pattern with regard to Mrs. Clinton? 13 14 A No, it was no secret. Everybody knew what the basic range of statutes were that we were considering. 15 Q Okay. 16 Mr. Baker. I think that's all I have. I want to go back just briefly to some 17 questioning I did earlier. And I was just trying to find out 18 that there was an atmosphere of openness and candor in OGC, 19 so dissenting voices would be heard, because I got the 20 impression from earlier testimony you gave that while there 21 were differences of opinions on various aspects of the case, 22 it sounds to me like there was a point eventually in all the 23 issues where there was some consensus had, there were 24 certainly people whose opinions were accepted and that is 25 what moved forward, and there were those that didn't have the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 143 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 prevailing view but it sounds like -- and from other 2 testimony I've heard -- other people that maybe didn't have 3 the prevailing opinion came around eventually and understood, 4 and I've heard from people that way after the fact 5 appreciated a view that dominated the day better than they 6 did because of what the results of that strategy ultimately 7 were. 8 9 I want to introduce an email, I guess this is majority Exhibit 2. It references you on line 3. 10 [Anderson Exhibit No. 2 11 was marked for identification.] BY MR. BAKER: 12 13 Q 14 pressure on. 15 option. 16 the best option, he's number 2. 17 It starts out: I'm glad you're doing it, keep the I think his special assistant is the best Actually -- and there's some redaction -- special is Yeah, pretty demoralized by the whole thing. 18 if Trisha will be there or not. 19 more frank if she's not. 20 Not sure Kind of hoping not, I can be I might possibly maybe doubtful work for you someday, I 21 might possibly maybe doubtful work for you someday, but 22 definitely not as your special assistant. 23 Don't think she would be, right? 24 Well I sort of invited it last time only because I want 25 this resolved and it's clear Jim won't decide without her. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 144 Understandably, but still. She's not formally on the invite so she or Jim would have to remember. 4 Then she won't be there. 5 Do you have any idea what this is about? 6 A No. 7 Q It sounds to me that back earlier in today's 8 session we talked about an employee that I thought had the 9 issue with what their title would be, special assistant 10 versus special counsel. 11 but I'm somewhat concerned if there is a lawyer in OGC that's 12 afraid to have a conversation or be in the room with a deputy 13 general counsel that maybe there could be instances where 14 legal advice and similar advice is stifled because of this 15 reluctance, but you're not familiar with what this might be? 16 17 18 A I thought that's what this was about No and you are sort of assuming that it refers to a legal discussion. Q No. I think it refers to a title discussion as to 19 whether someone will be called a special assistant or a 20 special counsel. 21 concern on this or other employees' parts about other lawyers 22 being in the room that the same circumstance could exist if 23 there is a discussion about legal matters and maybe someone 24 feels if others are in the room they can't be candid with a 25 legal opinion. But I am concerned that if there's a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 145 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A I have no idea what this pertains to. 2 Q Okay. 3 A But there could be many circumstances in which 4 somebody might be more frank if a supervisor is not in the 5 room. 6 Q Okay. 7 A I have no idea what this is. 8 Q Okay. 9 And then going back to the most recent discussion about various statutes and various charges without 10 regard to any particular case, without regard to any 11 particular facts, it's my understanding prior to your work at 12 the bureau and prior to your work at Treasury you were at the 13 department in the DAG's office and also in the office of 14 legal policy or legal counsel? 15 A Legal counsel. 16 Q In any of your legal experiences, and most of yours 17 it seems too me have been national security focused. Were 18 you aware just in general terms that the totality of 19 espionage statutes might not be up to date with current facts 20 in trade craft and whatnot? 21 A Yes. 22 Q And what is the basis of that understanding? 23 A I have seen legislative proposals prepared within 24 the Department of Justice over time that would address 25 various issues that have come up. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 146 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 Q And the issues would be deficiencies in current law or -- what would the deficiencies be? A I don't remember with any precision, but my 4 understanding is that there have been working groups that 5 have been convened that have studied the question whether 6 there is a need to sort of modernize if you will the 7 espionage statutes. 8 9 10 Q Do you know if that was ever advanced out of the Department in some sort of proposal that was actually advanced on the Hill or? 11 A I don't know. 12 Q But you believe that there, you don't recall any 13 specifics about what the deficiencies were? 14 A No, I do not. 15 Q But would it be fair to say the totality of the 16 espionage statutes needed maybe some revision? 17 A Yes. 18 Q Okay, well, you mentioned a working group. 19 20 That's my understanding. Was this something in your more recent times at the FBI? A No. It was earlier. I was aware of a 21 recommendation that was made to David Kris at some point in 22 time that resulted in a memo to him and some proposals being 23 put together, and then those proposals then formed the basis 24 of discussions that recurred over time, so it's over the last 25 to my knowledge 7- to 8-year period of time that there have COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 147 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 been discussions within the Department about a need to 2 modernize those statutes. 3 4 5 Q Do you know if the FBI would have been involved in those discussions or the working group? A Yes, I believe there were FBI legal personnel 6 involved in some of those discussion. 7 involved in them. 8 proposals. 9 Q I was not personally I just at some point became aware of these One of your attorneys, I think it is the attorney 1 10 that the IG references, that person I think you've testified 11 is fairly well versed in national security law? 12 A Yes and specifically in counterintelligence. 13 Q In counterintelligence. 14 15 So would they have been involved in that working group? A I don't know to a certainty but possibly. There is 16 another attorney who is involved who frequently has been 17 involved in mishandling cases who might have also been 18 involved. 19 Q Do you know in the aftermath of the Midyear 20 investigation has there been any discussion that you are 21 aware of either at the Department or the FBI of revitalizing 22 this working group or discussion about modernizing the 23 statutes? 24 A Not to my knowledge. 25 Q And then a final question on charging. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 148 1 understand you're not the prosecutor and these would not 2 necessarily have been conservations you would have had, are 3 you aware of any discussion about a Federal Records Act or a 4 similar violation outside of espionage like I think it's 5 2071? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Was there a discussion about that as a viable 8 9 charge? A At some point it came up. I don't remember the 10 specifics of the discussion, but, yeah had there been, we 11 certainly would have looked for evidence of a violation of 12 that criminal provision. 13 Q So would it be fair to say the reason that was not 14 pursued would be consistent with your testimony in the other 15 charges that the facts didn't lead to that? 16 A The facts did not support it no. 17 Q And that was a decision that was made by DOJ 18 prosecutors? 19 A Ultimately at the end of the day yes. 20 Q But your attorneys or FBI attorneys elsewhere in 21 22 the Bureau would have had some input into that? A BY MR. PARMITER: 23 24 25 That is correct. Q I think we just have another minute or two but just to ask a followup question to that line of questioning, my COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 149 1 colleague just referred to the criminal provision in the 2 Federal Records Act, another statute that we have discussed 3 in this context has been like the mishandling statute, 1924 4 in title 18. 5 provision? 6 A Do you recall any discussions about that Not specifically but there too there's an intent, a 7 specific intent -- I am sorry not specific intent, an 8 explicit intent requirement in that. 9 Q There's a knowingly requirement in that statute. 10 A Correct. 11 Q So would it be fair to say that that was the issue 12 you were bumping into that you know with the Federal Record 13 Act charge with the 1924 potential charge and with the 14 espionage act it was always there was an issue of intent? 15 A Correct. 16 Q And that there wasn't specific evidence that showed 17 that Secretary Clinton or anybody around her showed the 18 requisite level of intent? 19 A Correct. 20 Q Because there was no smoking gun evidence that they 21 had set up the server purposefully to transmit classified 22 information or for convenience or there wasn't an email that 23 I think you said there wasn't -- one example of that would be 24 an example email saying that she set up the server for 25 convenience? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 150 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Right. 2 Q Those were the sort os of pieces of evidence that 3 bureau was looking for in this case? 4 A Correct. 5 Q I think we are out of time. 6 [Recess.] BY MS. KIM: 7 8 Q 9 Ms. Anderson, I'd like to go back to the discussion of 10 We are now back on the record. It is 2:15. gross negligence that you were engaging in with our majority. The DOJ lawyers who were working as prosecutors on the 11 12 Midyear exam case are national security lawyers who have 13 litigated hundreds of cases relating to the mishandling of 14 classified information, is that correct? 15 A Yes. 16 Q Are you aware of those DOJ prosecutors departing 17 from their standard practice in interpreting the law relating 18 to the mishandling of classified information in the Midyear 19 exam? 20 A No. 21 Q We understand that Director Comey out of an 22 abundance of caution asked for I believe 20 years of cases 23 regarding the mishandling of classified information just to 24 confirm the Department of Justice's research in this regard. 25 Are you familiar with Director Comey's request for those COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 151 1 cases? 2 A Yes. 3 Q And after reviewing those cases, did any lawyer in 4 the Office of the General Counsel come up with a contrary 5 interpretation to the Department of Justice? 6 A No. 7 Q Thank you. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's 8 lawyers have clarified that we may ask you general questions 9 about your discussions with Director Comey's -- your 10 direction with Director Comey about his contemporaneous 11 interactions with President Trump, so I will try to phrase 12 the questions in the most general way possible. 13 Are you generally familiar with Director Comey's 14 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 15 on June 8, 2017? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And are you also generally familiar with Director 18 Comey's descriptions about his meetings with President Trump 19 in his book, A Higher Loyalty? 20 A Yes. 21 Q And did Director Comey or others share 22 contemporaneous details about his conversations with 23 President Trump with you around the time those discussions 24 occurred? 25 A Some of those discussions yes. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 152 And did you generally find that for the discussions 2 of which you had direct knowledge that Director Comey's 3 descriptions in his testimony and in his book were consistent 4 with the contemporaneous descriptions that you received? 5 6 7 A Yes, they were consistent with the contemporaneous descriptions that Director Comey gave to us. Q And do you have any reason to believe that Director 8 Comey did not accurately share with the Senate Intelligence 9 Committee his memory of his interactions with President 10 Trump? 11 A BY MR. MORGAN: 12 13 No. Q Ms. Anderson, I would like to switch gears a little 14 bit and discuss the time period roughly September, October, 15 2016 when the FBI came into possession of the, the Wiener 16 laptop through an unrelated investigation unrelated to the 17 Midyear exam. 18 According to the IG report, an attorney under your 19 supervision named in the report as FBI attorney 1 we have 20 discussed briefed you on the September 29th conference call 21 between the New York field office and members of the Midyear 22 investigative team regarding the discovery of potential 23 evidence on the laptop from the Anthony Weiner investigation. 24 25 Was this when you first learned of the existence of the laptop? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Yes. 2 Q What do you recall of this discussion regarding 3 4 that call? A I don't remember much other than the fact that 5 there were materials associated with Huma Abedine that may 6 have been identified on the laptop. 7 Q What role if any did FBI attorneys play in 8 following up with the New York field office to discuss the 9 status of the data that was being processed on the Weiner 10 11 12 13 153 laptop? A I don't think we played any role, but I don't know to a certainty. Q Would it be the responsibility of attorneys under 14 your supervision to follow up with the New York field office 15 regarding the data discovered on the laptop? 16 A I don't believe so. 17 Q Did you have any other involvement between the time 18 you were briefed on the September 29th conference call and 19 when Director Comey was briefed on the Weiner laptop on 20 October 27, 2016? 21 A I don't believe so with the one caveat that I think 22 there may have been a meeting that occurred with Andy McCabe 23 immediately prior to the meeting with Director Comey, and so 24 I believe that was the next, that meeting that was 25 immediately preceding the one with Director Comey was the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 154 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 next time that I had any involvement in the issue. Q Okay. On October 27, 2016, the FBI Midyear Exam 3 team briefed Director Comey about the emails on the Weiner 4 laptop. Were you in that meeting? 5 A Yes. 6 Q What was discussed in that meeting, broadly 7 8 9 speaking the topics that were discussed? A Broadly speaking, there was a description given to former Director Comey about what was known about what was on 10 the laptop. 11 about obtaining a search warrant in order to review 12 materials, and I believe there was a discussion about, about 13 if a search warrant were obtained what if any public 14 statements or other statements outside the FBI might be made 15 about it. 16 17 Q There was a discussion about the path forward, What was your personal opinion on whether the existence of the emails should be made public? 18 A Personal opinion at the time then? 19 Q Correct. 20 A Well, I was concerned that the disclosure of what 21 we had was -- could be viewed as affecting the outcome of the 22 election. 23 whether it would, in fact, have such an effect. 24 concerned that we certainly would be perceived as having that 25 effect. I wasn't competent to know one way or another But I was And I was especially concerned because we had no COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 155 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 idea whether what we were -- whether the emails that were 2 identified on the Weiner laptop were relevant, would be 3 material. 4 would be any materiality to those emails. 5 In fact, it seemed quite unlikely to us that there And so I was concerned that, that there wasn't, there 6 wasn't any form of a public statement that we could make that 7 would not overinflate or overrepresent the significance of 8 those emails in a way that would be unfair to an uncharged 9 subject. 10 11 12 Ms. Kim. I would like to discuss with you in some specificity what you said at that meeting. Director Comey's book and Director Comey's testimony 13 before the IG describes your statement in some detail. 14 will quote to you from his book: 15 I As we were arriving at this decision, one of the lawyers 16 on the team asked a searing question. 17 and quiet person whom I sometimes had to invite into the 18 conversation. 19 do may help elect Donald Trump for President, she asked. 20 She was a brilliant Should you consider that what you are about to Is that the portion of the book describing you that you 21 described to our majority colleagues earlier as being 22 inaccurate? 23 Ms. Anderson. 24 Mr. Herrington. 25 Correct. Except for the statement as to brilliant. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 156 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE BY MS. KIM: 1 Q 2 I would like to introduce into the Record the 3 Inspector General's report discussing this portion of 4 Director Comey's recollection. 5 Exhibit 5, is that correct? I believing we are up to Exhibit 4. Thank you. 6 [Anderson Exhibit No. 4 7 was marked for identification.] Ms. Anderson. 8 Can I have a copy of it? Thank you. BY MS. KIM: 9 10 Q I am so sorry. 11 On the first page of the section I have given to you, 12 Director Comey has a long block quote. 13 about the middle of that block quote. 14 your statement, and he says: 15 herself and said, how do you think about the fact that you 16 might be helping elect Donald Trump? 21 22 23 And then I think she spoke statement in that meeting? 19 20 He is describing in Is Director Comey representing what he remembers as your 17 18 I will direct you to A I assume he is representing what his recollection Q If you go down to the second block quote on that is. page, it is a block quote from you. You stated: I do remember saying more explicitly to Jim 24 Baker that I was worried that what we were going to do, what 25 we were doing was going to have an impact on the election. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 157 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Was that appropriate for the Bureau? 2 was concerned about that for, you know, for us as an 3 institution. 4 5 Was that, you know, I Is that a correct statement of what you told the Inspector General? 6 A Yes. 7 Q So I want to be very clear. At any point in this 8 discussion, were you ever expressing a personal political 9 preference for one candidate or another? 10 A No. 11 Q Were you expressing an institutional concern that 12 the FBI's actions could end up having an impact on the 13 outcome of a political race? 14 15 16 17 18 A Yes, or that we could be perceived as having had such an effect. Q And why did that effect or the perception of such an impact concern you? A It was not -- obviously, at the Department of 19 Justice, both as a matter of policy and tradition the 20 Department strives not to have any impact on electoral 21 politics, and so I was concerned that there would be a 22 perception that making any sort of statement whether it be to 23 Congress or to any other audience might have that impact or 24 might be perceived as having that impact. 25 And I tied my concern in my mind -- I am sorry let me COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 158 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 restate that. 2 to this idea that what we had was so uncertain at that point. 3 We had no idea whether what had been identified on the 4 laptops was material. 5 unlikely based on all of the investigative work that we had 6 done at that point that there would be anything material that 7 we would uncover, and it would take a truly remarkable 8 situation for there to be any evidence that would alter our 9 assessment of the case at that point in time. 10 In my mind, my concern was tied particularly We hadn't reviewed it. It was quite And so, in other words, you know, those two 11 considerations were tied together. 12 concerning in a context in which we had no idea whether there 13 was any significance at that point to what we had identified. 14 Q It seemed especially It seems your concerns would have applied with 15 equal force had the FBI also been considering an overt 16 investigative step or a public announcement regarding the 17 investigation into Russian collusion, is that correct? 18 A Correct. 19 Q So I just want to be crystal clear -- 20 Mr. Herrington. 21 articulated apply to that? 22 concerned about impacting an election? 23 24 25 Ms. Anderson. Well, would both of the concerns you Yes. Or were you more generally Let me rephrase, my more general concern about impacting the outcome of an election. BY MS. KIM: COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 159 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q Thank you. 2 is correct. I thank you for your precision. That 3 So you were again generally expressing an institutional 4 concern that the FBI's actions could end up having an impact 5 or being perceived as having an impact on the outcome of a 6 political race? 7 A Correct. 8 Q Did the team ever discuss the DOJ's election 9 10 sensitivity policy? A I think it came up at some point, but I don't have 11 a particularly precise memory as to when and the particulars 12 of what was discussed. BY MR. MORGAN: 13 14 Q According to the IG, you said you ultimately agreed 15 that Comey needed to supplement his testimony to Congress 16 because it quote "was such a significant issue" end quote and 17 that quote "it would have been misleading by omission" end 18 quote, and that even though Comey did not explicitly tell 19 Congress he would update them it was quote "implied" end 20 quote in his quote "his testimony overall" end quote. 21 22 23 Did you agree with Director Comey's decision to send the letter to Congress on October 28, 2016? A It is hard to say whether I agreed or disagreed, 24 but at the end of the day I found it very difficult to second 25 guess what Director Comey articulated to us, and he has said COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 160 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 publicly since then that had, he had he not disclosed the 2 information, that it would have been misleading by omission, 3 and he preferred to be in a world in which he had disclosed 4 the information prior to the election rather than being 5 accused after the fact of having hid it. 6 7 8 9 10 Q What effect did you expect the letter would have on Hillary Clinton's electoral prospects? A I didn't know. I'm no electoral expert, and I don't, in fact, follow politics all that closely. Q Would you agree, though, that you thought the 11 letter should be sent -- I know that -- would you agree that 12 the letter, at the time, even it would have the -- it could 13 potentially have a harmful impact -- it would have an impact 14 on the election, I should say. 15 A I'm sorry. 16 Q Strike that. Say that again. Let me rephrase. I would say that, 17 based on your concerns, you were concerned the letter would 18 have an impact on the election, correct? 19 A Yeah, I wasn't certain. It certainly -- 20 Q I'm sorry, strike that. No. 21 mischaracterized your concerns. 22 question. 23 You weren't -- I Let me move on to another Can you describe the process through which Director 24 Comey's October 28, 2016, letter to Congress was drafted and 25 edited? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 161 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Sure. So and my recollection is a little bit 2 unclear because we focused on two letters so close in time, 3 and so my recollection of the drafting process with respect 4 to the October 28th letter and my recollection with respect 5 to the drafting process for the November 6th letter is not, 6 those two memories are not particularly distinct. 7 engaged in similar -- actually let me take a step back. 8 9 I think we For the October 28th letter, there was a draft that was produced, a first draft that was produced by a group of 10 people that did not include me. 11 Pete and the attorney who worked for me. 12 circulated on email I believe during the evening, and it was, 13 I think, predicated on an understanding that there would be 14 in person discussion the next day. 15 I do believe it included That draft was So that draft must have been circulated on October 27th, 16 the evening of October 27th. 17 discussions with Director Comey about the content of the 18 letter on the 28th. 19 final by the conclusion of that meeting with former Director 20 Comey, although there may have been a few tweaks that were 21 made after that meeting. 22 23 Q And then there were in person And I believe that letter was all but So you said that -- so Mr. Strzok did participate in the drafting of the letter, is that correct? 24 A That is correct. 25 Q You are aware of what exactly his role was in that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 162 drafting process? A 2 I believe he provided input to that initial draft, 3 and he was a part of the oral discussion with former Director 4 Comey that occurred on the 28th. 5 Q Did Lisa Page participate to your knowledge? 6 A I don't remember. 7 Q Did anyone on the Midyear team ultimately disagree 8 with Director Comey's decision to send the letter? A 9 I don't know. As I mentioned, it was difficult to 10 second guess former Director Comey's assessment that it was 11 better to ultimately to disclose the information rather than 12 be accused after the fact of having concealed it by not 13 making a statement. Q 14 Did any information discovered in reviewing Anthony 15 Weiner's laptop change your opinion of whether Hillary 16 Clinton should be prosecuted? 17 A No. 18 Q So, I want to turn to a couple other questions 19 regarding what we kind of have offhanded call or describe as 20 the Trump Russia investigation. The Inspector General's report found that the FBI, 21 22 particularly Special Agent Peter Strzok, placed a high 23 priority on the Trump Russia investigation in the fall of 24 2016. 25 have the confidence that Strzok's decision to prioritize the However, the report concluded that quote "we do not COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 163 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Russian investigation over following up the Midyear related 2 investigative lead was free from bias" end quote. 3 What is your reaction to this conclusion? 4 A What do you mean? 5 Q Do you -- well, do you agree with the conclusion in 6 the IG report? 7 sufficient knowledge to form an opinion? 8 9 10 A Or do you have knowledge -- do you have I'm sorry. Could you just repeat the question? I just lost your emphasis. Q Certainly. The report concluded -- sorry. Let me 11 read the entire quote again to you from the IG report. The 12 report found that the FBI, particularly Special Agent Peter 13 Strzok placed a high priority on the Trump Russia 14 investigation in the fall of 2016. 15 Would you agree with that? 16 A Yes. 17 Q However, the report concluded that we did not have, 18 meaning the IG, did not have confidence that Strzok's 19 decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over 20 following up on the Midyear related investigative lead was 21 free from bias. 22 Do you agree with that conclusion? 23 A That they didn't have evidence? 24 Q I'm sorry. 25 To your knowledge do you believe that Peter Strzok -- Do you -- strike that. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 164 1 Peter Strzok's decision to prioritize the Russia 2 investigation was based on any form of improper consideration 3 including political bias? 4 A No. 5 Q To your knowledge, was the FBI's decision to 6 prioritize, the FBI generally to prioritize the Russian 7 investigation free from political bias? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Do you have any evidence that Special Agent 10 Strzok's decision to prioritize the Russia investigation was 11 due to any political bias? 12 A No. 13 Q Can you generally explain to us why the FBI counter 14 intelligence team prioritized the Russia investigation in 15 September and October of 2016? 16 A It was -- the allegations that had come to us were 17 very significant in terms of the level of threat to our 18 national security. 19 Russians that surprised us, and it was something that we felt 20 we had an obligation to pursue -- to pursue with vigor. 21 22 23 Q It represented a level of effort by the Were you personally working on the Trump Russia investigation in September of 2016? A Not on the investigation per se, but I did have a 24 role in the same way I described earlier that I was involved 25 within the legal chain of command at a supervisory level. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 Q 165 Were many of the Midyear team members working on the Trump Russia investigation in September of 2016? A I don't believe the investigative or analytical 4 personnel were the same, but at a supervisory level there was 5 a great deal of similarity between the personnel involved. 6 Q Do you believe that the Trump Russia investigation 7 team hoped to influence the election with the result -- 8 pardon me -- with the results of the investigation? 9 A No. 10 Q Do you believe that they were prioritizing the 11 investigation because of the magnitude of the threat -- 12 A Yes. 13 Q That you just described? 14 A Yes. 15 Q So it's fair to say then that the Russia 16 investigation was one with or is one with exceptional 17 national security importance? 18 A Absolutely. 19 Q How did the Russia investigation national security 20 importance compare to the importance of potentially reviewing 21 more emails in the Hillary Clinton investigation? 22 A I'm not sure there was such a comparison made 23 necessarily, but one represented an ongoing threat by a 24 hostile foreign actor, and the other simply represented an 25 investigative lead in a case where it was unlikely that lead COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 166 was likely to alter the outcome. And one thing I do want to clarify insofar as my answers 3 may have accepted the assumption that there was some sort of 4 formal prioritization of the Russia matter over the Clinton 5 email investigation, there was to my knowledge no such formal 6 prioritization. 7 investigation was important, and there was a lot of time 8 devoted to that particular investigation, but I'm not aware 9 that there was any sort of formal prioritization of one over 10 the other. BY MS. KIM: 11 12 There was an understanding that the Russia Q Are you aware of any evidence that Peter Strzok 13 tried to back burner or bury the contents of the Anthony 14 Weiner laptop? 15 A No. 16 Q Are you aware of any evidence suggesting that 17 anyone on the Midyear team sought to delay the review of 18 those emails or back burner that investigation? 19 A BY MR. MORGAN: 20 21 22 No. Q How frequently does the FBI investigate possible mishandling of classified information? 23 A I don't know. 24 Q So I am going to ask you, to press you a little bit 25 on this. Would you say that there is, that there have been a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 167 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 number of cases? Is it very infrequent? Is it -- are these 2 routine? 3 of classified information in terms of number or -- Are there routine cases oven involving mishandling 4 A I wouldn't characterize -- yeah. 5 Q I know you don't know the exact number. I know I'm 6 asking -- but it is not unusual for them to investigate cases 7 of those -- 8 A Correct and it is not infrequent. 9 Q By contrast how frequently does the FBI investigate 10 possible collusion between a major party Presidential 11 candidate and a hostile foreign power? 12 A I'm not aware of any analogous circumstance. 13 Q How frequently does the FBI investigate threats 14 that could undermine the integrity of the American 15 Presidential election? 16 A So this wasn't unique. There have been other -- 17 the Russian interference efforts that occurred with respect 18 to the 2016 election were not unique in our history. 19 have been other, other Russian and foreign power efforts to 20 intervene in our democratic process throughout history. 21 have taken different forms. 22 There They It just simply, this was an unusual set of circumstances 23 here, and I am not aware of any analogous circumstance where 24 there has been an investigation of potential linkages between 25 a major party candidates, personnel, and a foreign power. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 168 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 But there have been over time other foreign power efforts to 2 interfere in our elections, and it is my presumption that the 3 FBI has investigated those efforts over time. 4 Q Would you say though that this was unique? You had 5 previously just described a threat of this -- posed by this 6 particular instance. 7 in its magnitude and its significance? 8 A Would you say that it was unique then I would say it was unique in its intensity 9 certainly and its level of success as well so the thing that 10 differentiated -- among the things that differentiated this 11 particular effort by Russia as compared to historical efforts 12 they had engaged in was of course the advent of social media 13 and the ability of Russian actors to use that platform to 14 proliferate messages that would be, that would further their 15 objectives of sowing dissension and discord. 16 And then there were other, you know, the hacking and 17 release of emails was something that we had not previously 18 seen before. 19 evidence of very high level approvals within the Russian 20 Government of this ongoing campaign. 21 other unique features, but the level I would say overall the 22 level of intensity of the Russian effort to interfere with 23 our election was at least to my understanding without 24 precedent. 25 Q And I guess the other thing that we saw was Thank you. There may have been I'm going to turn now to just a few COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 169 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 brief questions about the FBI, INSD internal file review if 2 you are familiar with that. 3 4 5 A I have never seen the document before. Q Let me -BY MS. KIM: 6 7 I am actually not. Q So we understand that in the Inspector General's 8 report Jim Baker is quoted as saying that he asked the review 9 team to examine the internal files of the Midyear exam 10 investigation. Were you involved at all in initiating that 11 file review? 12 A No. 13 Q The Midyear exams did undergo a file review. I was on maternity leave at the time. The 14 file review team's conclusion is quoted on page 142 of the IG 15 report. 16 substantial or significant areas of investigative oversight 17 based on the stated goals of the investigations. 18 that the investigative team conducted a thorough 19 investigation within the constraints imposed by the Justice 20 Department. 21 22 It concludes that the file review did not find any It found Are those conclusions consistent with your experience of the Midyear case? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Are you familiar with the Inspector General's 25 report? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 170 1 A Yes. 2 Q The Inspector General's report also concludes that 3 there were no improper considerations influencing the 4 specific investigative steps taken in the Midyear 5 investigation, is that correct? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Are the Inspector General's conclusions consistent 8 with your experience on the case? A 9 Yes. BY MR. MORGAN: 10 Q 11 And I would like to turn just generally to some 12 questions about the attacks on the Department of Justice's 13 and morale at the FBI while you were still there. 14 I'm sure you're aware that there has been a litany of 15 attacks from the highest levels of government accusing the 16 FBI and the Department of Justice of conducting 17 investigations driven by political bias instead of just the 18 facts and the rule of law. 19 Ms. Anderson? Are you aware of these attacks, 20 A Yes. 21 Q During your tenure at the FBI and DOJ, have you 22 been aware of any FBI investigation motivated by political 23 bias? 24 A No. 25 Q During your time at the FBI and DOJ, are you aware COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 of any Justice Department investigations motivated by 2 political bias? 3 A No. 4 Q On May 22, 2018, Republican Members of Congress 171 5 introduced House Resolution 907 requesting that the Attorney 6 General appoint a second special counsel to investigate 7 misconduct at DOJ and the FBI which I believe that we 8 discussed previously. 9 That resolution alleged quote "whereas there is an 10 urgent need for the employment of a second special counsel in 11 light of evidence that raises critical concerns about 12 decisions, activities, and inherent bias displayed at the 13 highest levels of the Department of Justice and the Federal 14 Bureau of Investigation regarding FISA abuse, how and why the 15 Hillary Clinton email probe ended, and how and why the Donald 16 Trump Russia probe began." 17 18 19 20 At the FBI, what was your role in the FISA application approval process? A I supervised attorneys who were involved in that application -- in the development of that application. 21 Q So you have some knowledge then of the process? 22 A Of the general process, yes. 23 Q Yes. Are you aware of any inherent bias at the 24 highest levels of DOJ and the FBI regarding FISA abuse as is 25 alleged? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 172 1 A No. 2 Q Is there any evidence of inherent bias displayed at 3 the highest levels of DOJ and the FBI regarding how and why 4 the Hillary Clinton email probe ended? 5 A No. 6 Q To your knowledge, is there any evidence of 7 inherent bias displayed at the highest levels of the DOJ and 8 the FBI against Donald Trump as part of the Trump Russia 9 probe? 10 A No. 11 Q Are you aware of any actions ever taken to damage 12 the Trump campaign at the highest levels of the Department of 13 Justice or the FBI? 14 A No. 15 Q Are you aware of any actions ever taken to 16 personally target Donald Trump at the highest levels at the 17 Department of Justice or the FBI? 18 A No. 19 Q Is there any evidence that any FBI or Department of 20 Justice, or are you aware of any evidence that any FBI or 21 Department of Justice official took any actions biased in 22 favor of Clinton or biased against Trump. 23 A No. 24 Q Are you aware of James Comey ever taking such 25 action? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 173 1 A No. 2 Q Andrew McCabe? 3 A No. 4 Q Are you aware of Lisa Page ever taking such action? 5 A No. 6 Q Are you aware of Loretta Lynch? 7 A No. 8 Q What about Sally Yates? 9 A No. 10 Q Are you aware of any action taken by Deputy 11 Attorney General Rob Rosenstein? 12 A No. 13 Q Are you aware of any action taken by Special 14 Counsel Robert Muller? 15 A No. 16 Q Are you aware of any evidence or is there any 17 evidence that President Obama ordered any investigative 18 activity that was biased in favor of Hillary Clinton or 19 biased against Donald Trump? 20 A No. 21 Q Are you aware of any evidence that President Obama 22 ordered a wiretap of Donald Trump or the Trump campaign? 23 A No. 24 Q Are you aware of any conspiracy against Donald 25 Trump or the Trump campaign involving anyone from the FBI or COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 174 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Department of Justice or President Obama? 2 A No. 3 Q Many of us have been troubled by the escalating 4 attacks against the Department of Justice and the FBI, 5 attacks against the independence of other institutions, the 6 integrity of their employees, and the legitimacy of the DOJ's 7 and FBI's investigations so I want to talk to you about some 8 statements in that vein and get your reaction. 9 On December 3rd, 2017, the President tweeted quote after 10 years of Comey with the phony and dishonest Clinton 11 investigation and more, running -- ruining -- running the 12 FBI, its reputation is in tatters, worse in history. 13 fear not we will bring it back to greatness end quote. 14 15 But Do you agree with the President's statement that the FBI's reputation is in tatters and is the worst in history? 16 A No. 17 Q Do you agree with the President's characterization 18 the Clinton investigation was phony and dishonest? 19 A No. 20 Q In your opinion, what kind of impact do statements 21 like this have on the morale of rank and file FBI agents? 22 A They can't -- 23 Q No I'm sorry please. 24 A Finish your question please. 25 Q FBI agents and other FBI personnel? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 175 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A Certainly statements like that can have a demoralizing effect on the workforce. Q Why would they have a demoralizing effect on the workforce, in your opinion? A Because it undercuts the credibility and validity of the work that they are doing. Q Is that central to the work that you do? The work the FBI does I should say? A Certainly one of the things that is central to the 10 FBI and its ability to investigate and contribute to 11 successful prosecutions is maintaining the credibility and 12 the trust of the American people in FBI personnel when they 13 testify in court, when they take investigative action. 14 so that is important to our successful perceived mission. 15 Q And Touching on your response there, what do you think 16 the impact of statements like these is on the public's 17 confidence in the FBI, and how do you think that impacts our 18 national security? 19 A That's a hard question. I'm not sure I am 20 competent to assess the full impact, but it is something that 21 I am concern about as a citizen, that it has weakened our 22 institutions, that it has weakened the bonds of trust that 23 the American people have in their institutions and the 24 Department of Justice and the FBI and that all of that trust 25 is important to the pursuit of our, of successful COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 176 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 prosecutions and national security and other types of cases. 2 It's moreover concerning the impact that these types of 3 statements has had on the ability of the FBI to recruit and 4 maintain human sources which obviously are a key building 5 block of FBI investigations, including national security 6 investigations. 7 perspective about the impact that this pattern of statements 8 about the FBI could have on the ability of the institutions 9 to successfully perform their missions. 10 Q And so I am concerned from a long-term At a White House press briefing the day after 11 Director Comey was fired, Sarah Huckabee Sanders said the 12 termination happened because and I quote, "most importantly 13 the rank and file of the FBI had lost confidence in their 14 director" end quote. 15 Looking back on the lead up to Director Comey's 16 dismissal, do you agree with Ms. Sanders that the rank and 17 file of FBI had lost confidence in Director Comey? 18 A I personally did not perceive that to be the case. 19 Q What was your reaction when you learned that 20 Director Comey had been fired? 21 A I was shocked. 22 Q And was that reaction shared by FBI agents that you 23 spoke to regarding the firing of Director Comey? 24 A 25 leave. I didn't speak to any agents. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I was on maternity 177 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 2 Would you say that that reaction was shared by other 3 4 5 Is it -- let me rephrase then. members of the FBI? A It was shared by the FBI personnel with whom I was in contact with at the time. BY MS. KIM: 6 7 Q Why were you shocked? 8 A It was abrupt, it was handled in a manner that was 9 surprising and abrupt. It was without precedent. Obviously 10 former director Sessions had been fired but for reasons of 11 ethical violations that he had committed. 12 shocking. 13 And I also personally, I had assumed that because some time 14 had elapsed between the announcement of the public disclosure 15 of the Russia investigation that any concerns that we had 16 about him being fired had dissipated. 17 not the case. 18 surprising and shocking to me personally. It wasn't something that was expected at the time. But that clearly was So the timing I guess was somewhat what BY MR. MORGAN: 19 20 It was just Q On that same day that Director Comey was fired, 21 President Trump tweeted, James Comey will be replaced by 22 someone who will do a far better job bringing back the spirit 23 and prestige of the FBI. 24 25 Do you agree with the President's assertion that there was some problem with the spirit and prestige of the FBI COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 178 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 under Director Comey? 2 A I didn't believe so. 3 Q Why is that, or why do you disagree then? 4 A I believe the FBI is a great institution. It was 5 great under Director Comey. 6 the FBI serve their country honorably, and they do their jobs 7 with a great deal of distinction. 8 Q The men and women who work at Following the Inspector General's report, President 9 Trump has stated and I will quote again, "I think Comey was 10 the ringleader of this whole you know den of thieves, they 11 were plotting against my election" end quote. 12 13 Do you have any reason to believe the FBI is a den of thieves? 14 A No. 15 Q Do you personally -- did you personally witness 16 anyone at the FBI attempting to plot against Donald Trump's 17 election? 18 A BY MS. KIM: 19 20 No. Q Ms. Anderson, there has been a great deal of 21 interest in the media in our joint investigation around the 22 FISA process. 23 purchase on how that process actually works. 24 25 I think it would be helpful to get your Do you agree that the government is required to meet a high burden of proof when seeking a FISA warrant from the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 179 1 FISA court? 2 A Yes. 3 Q Is it fair to say that the Justice Department's own 4 internal review process for applications is also extremely 5 rigorous? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Do FISA warrants require considerable review prior 8 to approval? 9 A Yes. 10 Q And is the level of scrutiny both internally at the 11 Justice Department and before the FISA court even higher when 12 the government is seeking a warrant to surveil a U.S. person? 13 A Maybe as a practical matter that might be correct, 14 although formally there is no difference in the treatment of 15 non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons, they are both treated with 16 a great degree of rigor. 17 Q With a very high level of rigor. 18 A Correct. 19 Q I understand that the FBI conducts its own 20 investigation about whether there is enough evidence to be 21 outlined in an affidavit in an application for a FISA warrant 22 and that package goes through the approval process of the 23 FBI's chain of command, is that correct? 24 A Yes. 25 Q Who in the FBI's chain of command would review that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 180 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 packet? A 2 I don't know sitting here the particulars of 3 exactly who approves that package before it goes over to the 4 FBI. 5 responsibility. It was not something that was within my area of 6 Mr. Herrington. 7 Ms. Anderson. Before it goes over to the DOJ. I am sorry before it goes over to DOJ. 8 It was not within my area of responsibility. 9 of the approvers in the chain of command. BY MS. KIM: 10 11 I was not one Q Are you aware of any circumstance where FBI 12 investigators could rush an application process through 13 without giving it sufficient level of scrutiny in an attempt 14 to bypass the FBI's own high internal standards? 15 A No. There are FISA applications that are 16 expedited, but there are particular procedures that apply to 17 those applications, and they are simply designed to literally 18 as they are described expedite the process. 19 Q Is part of the internal review process at the FBI 20 to ensure that the FISA application is supported by credible 21 evidence, and why is it important that a FISA application is 22 supported by credible evidence? 23 A It is important because we are talking about 24 national security-related surveillance in the context in 25 which the government is applying ex parte for the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 181 1 surveillance warrant. 2 FISA that are, that differ from the criminal standpoint, and 3 there's some possibility that or a likelihood that the 4 warrant will never have the opportunity to be challenged 5 because many of the national security warrants are never used 6 in a criminal prosecution and will never see the light of 7 day. 8 9 Q There are certain allowances within There has been active speculation that the FBI failed to follow its applicable standards in applying for 10 Carter Page's FISA warrant. 11 general questions. 12 I would like to ask you some In a FISA application, does the FBI typically include 13 all of the information it has about an individual or a 14 source? 15 facts relevant to the court's determination on the merits of 16 that application? Or does it cull that information to include only 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 182 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 [2:59 p.m.] Ms. Anderson. It culls the information to that which is 3 relevant to the merits of the application. 4 pretty close to almost all the information that we have, is 5 what it seems, with respect to our FISA applications. BY MS. KIM: 6 7 But it comes Q Is it possible to give the FISA court a highly 8 accurate set of facts about a source without including every 9 individual fact that the FBI knows about a source? 10 A Yes. 11 Q There has been a great deal of fixation on specific 12 minutiae that political actors have found relevant to make 13 important about Carter Page's FISA application. 14 Do you have a personal response to the attack that the 15 FBI somehow abused the FISA process or committed illegalities 16 by not disclosing all of the very specific minutiae to the 17 FISA court about Bruce Ohr, about Christopher Steele? 18 A About Bruce Ohr? What about Bruce Ohr? 19 Q I think the allegations are that Bruce Ohr's 20 biography was somehow relevant to the Carter Page FISA 21 application. 22 A I don't believe it was relevant in any way. 23 don't think -- yeah, I don't think it was relevant. 24 aware of any sense in which it was relevant. 25 Q I also I'm not Have you ever been a part of any FISA application COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 183 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 process where the FBI sought to hide, bury, or omit material 2 facts from the FISA court? 3 A 4 Mr. Herrington. 5 Ms. Kim. 6 [Recess.] 7 Ms. Kim. 10 11 12 13 14 Could I take a 5-minute break? Yes. We're back on the record. It's 3:04 p.m. BY MS. KIM: 8 9 No. Q Were you part of the FISA application review process for the FISA applications regarding Carter Page? A I was involved at a supervisory level within the legal chain of command. Q Did you observe any improper considerations, including political bias, affecting that process? 15 A No. 16 Q Did you observe any improprieties in that process 17 that would have required subsequent disclosures to the FISA 18 court about content that the FBI had omitted? I need to confer -- 19 Ms. Anderson. 20 Mr. 21 Ms. Kim. 22 Mr. 23 Ms. Anderson. 24 [Discussion off the record.] 25 Ms. Anderson. May we confer? Yes. Thank you. -- with FBI counsel about classification. I've been advised by the FBI lawyers that COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 184 I can't answer that question in an unclassified setting. BY MS. KIM: 2 3 Q Thank you. 4 In the Carter Page FISA warrant process, are you aware 5 of any attempts by the DOJ or the FBI to intentionally 6 mislead the FISA court? 7 A No. 8 Q Are you aware of any efforts to omit evidence or 9 manufacture evidence deliberately? 10 A No. 11 Q Are you aware of any instances regarding the Carter 12 Page FISA application of the FBI failing to follow all of its 13 proper procedures in obtaining a FISA warrant? 14 A No. 15 Q Are you aware of any effort by the FBI to seek a 16 FISA warrant for Carter Page that was not based on credible 17 and sufficient evidence? 18 A 19 Mr. 20 21 No. Counsel, you may be done with this line of questioning. I would just ask the witness, while you're discussing 22 questions that pertain to FISA applications or the FISA 23 process, just to give us a moment to think about the question 24 just in case we do need to ask to confer. 25 Ms. Anderson. Sure. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 185 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Mr. 2 Ms. Kim. 3 4 Thank you. Thank you. Actually, I believe that concludes our round of questioning. Mr. Well, then I'm too late, but thank you for 5 your consideration. 6 Ms. Kim. 7 [Recess.] 8 Mr. Baker. 9 I'll start with a random question. 10 Thank you, sir. Back on the record at 3:11. I have an email here that I will introduce as majority exhibit 3, I think. 11 [Anderson Exhibit No. 3 12 was marked for identification.] BY MR. BAKER: 13 14 Q It's an email chain. It's ultimately from you. It 15 looks like there's some folks that have done some research at 16 someone's request on the standards for appointing a special 17 prosecutor. 18 And then it looks like it's sent to you. You thank the person and then say, "Could you please 19 follow up with" -- redacted -- "to get more detail about what 20 she found on the conflict of interest component? 21 about whether there is usually an actual conflict, or have 22 special prosecutors been appointed due to an appearance of 23 conflict (or out of an abundance of caution)?" 24 What is that about, if you recall? 25 A I don't recall. Anything I didn't remember this email chain COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 186 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 until I saw it in the production, the portion of the 2 production that was given to me by the FBI for review. 3 Q Okay. 4 relates to? 5 A But you have no recollection of what it No, although I do understand that in the IG report 6 there's information that FBI Attorney 1 did testify to the IG 7 that there had been an intern within NSLB who was asked to 8 look into this issue in connection with the Midyear case. 9 Q Okay. 10 A But this would've been from around the time of the 11 opening of the case, and I don't recall any of the 12 circumstances or reasons why this research would've been 13 done. 14 Q Okay. You don't recall anything about a conflict 15 of interest that came up in discussions about the case? 16 mean, this does seem pretty early in the process. 17 18 A It does. I I don't recall the circumstances that generated this request for research. 19 Q Okay. 20 It was widely reported, various conflicts that former 21 Deputy Director McCabe had. 22 employees in your National Security Law Branch that required 23 consultation with the Office of Integrity Compliance or 24 anything like that? 25 A Was there any conflict of any No. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 187 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q Okay. 2 You've talked a little bit about -- or discussion has 3 been had a little bit about the FISA process. I want to be 4 clear on what your branch and your specific role in FISA 5 would be. 6 familiar with FISAs that originate from a field office. It's my understanding -- and I'm somewhat more 7 A Uh-huh. 8 Q Where did this, the original FISA in the Russia 9 case, where did that originate from? Was that something that 10 was done at the headquarter level, or was it done from 11 Washington field? 12 cross-pollination of resources, agents pulled from the field 13 office, and I'm just curious where the FISA physically 14 originated from. I'm a little confused. I know there's a 15 A So I don't know the answer to that question. 16 Q Okay. What would be your role in any FISA as far 17 as approval or looking at -- any FISA. 18 specific facts. 19 A No specific case, no So I typically would not be involved in the minutia 20 of the development of a FISA. 21 informed about or be brought in to be consulted about FISAs 22 that involve controversial legal issues or fact patterns that 23 present difficult calls about probable cause. 24 25 Rather, I would expect to be So that's one aspect in which I would -- I was involved and how I viewed my responsibilities with respect to the FISA COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 188 process. Another area was with respect to all FISAs going 2 3 through, before they went to the Director, there was an 4 expectation that there would be an SES-level approver of the 5 FISA. 6 of my two section chiefs. 7 in the office, that would mean I would be responsible for 8 reviewing the FISA package before it went to the Director. 9 Sometimes that could be me, but oftentimes it was one But if I was the only SES person And then, third, within my branch, we had responsibility 10 for the logistical processing of the FISAs for the entire 11 Bureau. 12 logistics of the process: 13 executives, walking them over to DOJ, handling the orders 14 once they came back from the FISA court, uploading them into 15 the system, that sort of work. 16 Q And so I had a support unit who handled the getting the signatures by So a FISA package, is it presented to you and also 17 simultaneously presented to others that are also approving or 18 looking at aspects of it, or does it follow a linear path? 19 A It follows a linear path. There is a system called 20 FISAMS within the Bureau that tracks in a linear fashion all 21 the approvals on a FISA. 22 chain, but I or another SESer in my branch is the final 23 approver on hard copy before a FISA goes to the Director or 24 Deputy Director for signature. 25 Q I'm not part of that approval And that is the next stop after it would leave COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 189 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 National Security Law Branch; it would go to the Director or 2 Deputy -- 3 A Correct. 4 Q -- Director? 5 A The Director unless he was unavailable, in which 6 7 The Director. case it would go to the Deputy Director. Q So this FISA management system you reference, 8 someone that gets it would not do whatever they do unless the 9 person below them has done what they do. It follows this 10 linear path. 11 A Correct. 12 Q Okay. 13 You mentioned earlier -- someone had a question about 14 the FISA court, and I think you said something to the effect 15 that it wouldn't be unusual for supplemental information to 16 be provided to the court when a FISA warrant had been 17 presented to the court if there was something learned by the 18 FBI that needed clarification or a supplement. 19 said there would be a mechanism -- I thought you 20 A Correct. 21 Q -- to provide additional information. 22 A Correct. 23 Q Do you know if any additional information, either 24 supplemental or for clarification, was provided to the court 25 for any of the FISAs in the Russia case? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 190 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A This question raises the same classification issue 2 that was raised by the question a few moments ago by the 3 minority staff. 4 FBI lawyers, I'm not able to answer that question in this 5 unclassified setting. 6 Q Okay. And so, based on my consultation with the Going back to not to a particular case or 7 particular facts, it would be part of the general practice or 8 possibility in dealing with a FISA that you would go back to 9 the FISA court with new information in the interest of being 10 11 12 candid with the court? A Yes, if it met a certain threshold. That's correct. 13 Q Okay. 14 What is a Woods file? 15 A A Woods file is a file of documents that's 16 maintained to support the accuracy of every individual fact 17 that's contained in a FISA application. 18 Q So this is a file. Any fact that is presented in 19 the application, this file documents the source of that 20 individual fact? 21 A That's correct. 22 Q And it would probably be more robust than the 23 actual application. My understanding would be the 24 application is asserting the fact but it might not have every 25 detail about the fact or where the fact came from, where the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 191 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Woods file would have all of that as a repository. 2 A That could be the case, yes. 3 Q And a Woods file is mandatory? 4 A Correct. 5 Q And a Woods file gets its name from -- why is it 6 7 8 9 10 called a Woods file? A in NSD. I'm sorry. Non-SES. There's -Mr. Herrington. Ms. Anderson. A former colleague. A former colleague at the Department of 11 Justice drafted the form, and so the form derives from the 12 individual's name. BY MR. BAKER: 13 14 15 16 Q And did the form and the practice of a file result from an issue with FISAs? A Yes, that's my understanding. It precedes my time 17 at the FBI, but I understood there was a pattern of some 18 incidents of omissions that were of concern to the FISA court 19 that resulted in former Director Mueller actually appearing 20 before the FISA court. 21 reforms that were made jointly between the FBI and DOJ in 22 order to ensure that we were meeting the standard of accuracy 23 with greater precision. 24 25 Q And the practices were the result of So it goes towards making more sure that the presentations to the court are accurate? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 192 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Absolutely. It's designed to discipline agents 2 when they are drafting and reviewing affidavits to ensure 3 that each of the facts contained in that affidavit are, in 4 fact, accurate, because they must maintain that file of 5 documents supporting that accuracy. 6 Q Are you aware of any, for lack of a better term, 7 compliance audits that the FBI does on Woods files to make 8 sure that agents that are submitting these applications are, 9 in fact, maintaining an accurate Woods file? 10 A Yes. There is a sampling of FISA applications that 11 are reviewed in the course of the field office oversight 12 reviews that are conducted by Department of Justice and FBI 13 OGC personnel. 14 Q And would it be fair to say the reason those audits 15 occur were similar to the reasons that the Woods files began, 16 to ensure accuracy to the court? 17 A That's among the reasons those oversight reviews 18 are conducted. 19 appropriateness in the administration of FISA and other 20 national security tools overall. 21 files and FISA applications for accuracy is just one piece of 22 what's looked at. 23 24 25 Q They are designed to assess and ensure The review of the Woods Those teams that go out and do these audits, does anyone from the National Security Law Branch participate? A Yes, I believe everybody participates. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE In fact, it 193 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 may be mandatory within our branch, or it was mandatory at 2 one time. 3 to work with agents and analysts in talking to DOJ and in 4 reviewing the actions that they've taken. 5 6 7 Q Lawyers go to those field office reviews in order And what would be an outcome of a Woods file audit? What are the possible outcomes? It's my understanding in a regular inspection at the 8 FBI, when a field office is inspected, at least under an old 9 way, you could get a rating of effective, effective but 10 inefficient, and maybe another variation. 11 What possible outcomes of rating or assessment to 12 determine your compliance with a Woods file would there be? 13 A I don't believe that would be the outcome. Rather, 14 if there were any compliance issues that were identified, 15 they would be handled either through, if it was appropriate, 16 a notice to the court or inclusion in one of our regular 17 reports that go to the court. 18 19 20 Q Are you familiar with any Woods file audits where there were significant issues of noncompliance? A I was not aware of any significant accuracy issues 21 during my time at the FBI and certainly no intentional 22 omissions or misstatements. 23 Q Had you ever heard of any issues prior to your time 24 at the FBI where there were -- my term -- a bad Woods file 25 audit that was reported up through the chain because it was COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 194 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 deemed to be so out of compliance? A 2 Just the pattern of incidents that I referred to 3 earlier in my testimony that resulted in former Director 4 Mueller, as I understand, having to testify before the FISA 5 court or talk to the FISA court in some fashion. Q 6 And, if you heard, what was Mr. Mueller's response 7 when he was made aware of noncompliance issues and he's the 8 one that has to go before the court to talk about them? A 9 My understanding is that he committed to the court 10 to address the problem and then that the series of reforms 11 that we implemented, including the use of the Woods form, 12 were the direct result of his engagement before the FISA 13 court. 14 Q So would it be fair to say he, as the then-leader 15 of the FBI, took compliance with the Woods file and 16 compliance with accuracy in presentations to the FISA court 17 seriously? A 18 Yes, he did; Director Comey did. All the people 19 that I witnessed participate in the FISA process all did as 20 well. 21 Q Okay. 22 Changing gears slightly, you mentioned earlier some of 23 the people you did or didn't deal with at the Department 24 based on your role. 25 A Did you know Bruce Ohr? I did. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 195 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q And in what capacity did you know him? 2 A I knew him from my time in the DAG's office. I was 3 aware that he was a longtime career individual in the 4 Criminal Division with responsibility for organized crime. 5 And I may have had a couple of meetings with him when I was 6 in the DAG's office, but I did not have any interaction with 7 him when I was at the FBI. 8 9 Q Okay. So your knowledge of Mr. Ohr was in a previous work capacity when you were at the Department. 10 A That's correct. 11 Q And you had no dealings with him in an official 12 capacity while you were at the Bureau? 13 A Correct. 14 Q Did you ever socialize with him in a social 15 capacity? 16 A No. 17 Q Did your branch get any information that ultimately 18 came from Mr. Ohr that you're aware of that you were asked to 19 review or assess or do anything with? 20 A Not contemporaneous with the investigation. 21 Q What would it be related to? Did you get it 22 earlier or after the -- you said "contemporaneous." 23 relate to the investigation? 24 25 A At some point, I -- let me pause here. I'd like to consult with my FBI colleagues about classification. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Did it COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q 2 [Discussion off the record.] 3 Ms. Anderson. Sure. 4 consult. 5 can be accurate? Thank you for that opportunity to I'm sorry, could you repeat your question just so I BY MR. BAKER: 6 Q 7 In your capacity, did you receive any information 8 that generated, again, with Mr. Ohr that you reviewed or 9 looked at or analyzed, whatever? A 10 Yeah, so at some point I received the 302s, the 11 written summaries of the interviews that FBI personnel 12 conducted with Mr. Ohr about his interactions with 13 Christopher Steele. 14 drafting of those 302s; it was much later. Q 15 16 196 But it was not contemporaneous with the How much later? It's my understanding those 302s, some were in the vicinity of end of 2016 -- 17 A That's correct. 18 Q -- early months of 2017. 19 A So I received them in the course of the oversight 20 process. So I believe the first time I reviewed them was 21 probably after the House Permanent Select Committee on 22 Intelligence produced its memo on the Carter Page FISAs. 23 believe there was a reference in that memo to statements that 24 Mr. Steele made to Bruce Ohr that were documented in our 25 302s. I And that was the first time I received those 302s and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 197 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 reviewed them. Q What were you asked to review them about? What 3 were you looking for? 4 that occurred in HPSCI, the House Intelligence Committee? 5 A Correct. You say it generated from something I had not previously been aware of the 6 statements that were documented in those 302s about Mr. Ohr's 7 perceptions of Chris Steele's motivations, and so I read 8 those 302s for the first time in connection with that, the 9 release of that memo. 10 11 Q And that was the extent of materials relating to Ohr that you reviewed? 12 A Yes, that's correct. 13 Q Did you ever review information about Christopher 14 15 16 17 Steele from any source? A I don't remember reviewing any other documents relating to Christopher Steele. Q Were you in any discussions or were your attorneys 18 in any discussions relating to information that Mr. Steele 19 provided or about Mr. Steele? 20 A Yes. 21 Q And what were they? 22 A There were meetings with Mr. McCabe about the 23 Russia investigation that involved discussions of the various 24 reports that were generated by Chris Steele that we had 25 received, both with respect to the content of the reports as COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 well as what we had learned about Christopher -- we, I'm 2 sorry, the FBI investigative team had learned about facts 3 that might bear on his credibility as a source. 4 Q And what were those facts? 5 contents. 6 about? 7 8 9 198 You had mentioned the More specifically, what were these discussions But start with the credibility issues. Mr. I'm sorry. May we consult with the witness, please? [Discussion off the record.] 10 Mr. Thank you for that opportunity. 11 Because these questions pertain to matters that are 12 being looked at by the special counsel and its investigation, 13 we will instruct the witness not to answer. 14 Mr. Baker. 15 Rewind just a second before that question was asked. Okay. 16 Was your role in the FISA process for the Russia 17 investigation different than what your normal role is in a 18 FISA matter? 19 Ms. Anderson. 20 Mr. Baker. 23 24 25 Okay. BY MR. BREBBIA: 21 22 No. Q Can I follow up a little bit on those Ohr questions? Prior to reviewing the -- I know you say contemporaneously, but prior to reviewing the 302s, were you COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 aware that Bruce Ohr was coming and meeting with people in 2 the FBI? 3 A 199 I was not aware that he had met with FBI personnel 4 on multiple occasions. 5 was I did have a general understanding that he had met with 6 Mr. McCabe on one brief occasion. 7 meetings that were documented in the 302s that I believe are 8 in the Reading Room. 9 Q The only meeting of which I was aware But I was not aware of the And I'm curious, after reviewing the 302s, is it 10 regular practice for FBI to fill out 302s after speaking with 11 a Department of Justice attorney? 12 A No, but my understanding of why the 302s was 13 generated here was that they were speaking with a Justice 14 Department attorney about his interactions with an individual 15 who had been a source for the FBI. 16 Q So would you agree they were speaking with Bruce 17 Ohr in his capacity as a fact witness, not as a Department of 18 Justice attorney? 19 A I believe that's the way they would've looked at 20 it, yes. 21 evidence-collecting purposes and not to memorialize general 22 conversations that occur between DOJ attorneys and FBI 23 personnel. 24 were generated. 25 Q In other words, 302s are used for And so it's in that vein that I presume the 302s Did you ever meet with Bruce Ohr yourself? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 200 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Not in my capacity at the FBI. 2 Q The committee has learned that, after Christopher 3 Steele was terminated as a confidential source, Mr. Steele 4 continued to meet with DOJ Attorney Bruce Ohr. 5 would then meet with the FBI and relay those findings. 6 Given your position with the FBI, do you have any Bruce Ohr 7 thoughts on continuing to meet with a terminated confidential 8 human source? 9 10 11 A I'm sorry. So you're asserting that the FBI continued to meet with Christopher Steele? Q Continued to meet with Bruce Ohr to receive 12 information from Christopher Steele after Christopher Steele 13 had been terminated as a confidential human source. 14 have any views on that practice? 15 A Do you Well, I'd be hesitant to provide views on I think 16 what you're asserting was happening, because my understanding 17 based on my reading of the 302s -- and, obviously, I don't 18 have those in front of me. 19 was that they reported on conversations or impressions that 20 Bruce Ohr had of Christopher Steele, not -- in other words, 21 they didn't reflect ongoing tasking, if you will, or anything 22 like that by Bruce Ohr of Christopher Steele. 23 information related more generally -- the information that 24 was reported in those 302s related more generally to Bruce 25 Ohr's impression of Chris Steele's credibility and his But my recollection of the 302s COMMITTEE SENSITIVE But the 200 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 A Not in my capacity at the FBI. 2 Q The committee has learned that, after Christopher 3 Steele was terminated as a confidential source, Mr. Steele 4 continued to meet with DOJ Attorney Bruce Ohr. 5 would then meet with the FBI and relay those findings. 6 Given your position with the FBI, do you have any Bruce Ohr 7 thoughts on continuing to meet with a terminated confidential 8 human source? 9 10 11 A I'm sorry. So you're asserting that the FBI continued to meet with Christopher Steele? Q Continued to meet with Bruce Ohr to receive 12 information from Christopher Steele after Christopher Steele 13 had been terminated as a confidential human source. 14 have any views on that practice? 15 A Do you Well, I'd be hesitant to provide views on I think 16 what you're asserting was happening, because my understanding 17 based on my reading of the 302s -- and, obviously, I don't 18 have those in front of me. 19 was that they reported on conversations or impressions that 20 Bruce Ohr had of Christopher Steele, not -- in other words, 21 they didn't reflect ongoing tasking, if you will, or anything 22 like that by Bruce Ohr of Christopher Steele. 23 information related more generally -- the information that 24 was reported in those 302s related more generally to Bruce 25 Ohr's impression of Chris Steele's credibility and his But my recollection of the 302s COMMITTEE SENSITIVE But the 201 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 motivations. 2 Q 3 Mr. Baker. 4 5 Did you ever have occasion to meet or otherwise work with an individual named Ms. Anderson. ? No. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 6 7 Thank you. Q You had mentioned earlier that all FISAs have to be 8 signed off, have an approver at an SES level. 9 that anywhere inside the FBI? In OGC? Or is 10 A In NSLB, in my particular branch. 11 Q In NSLB? 12 A Yeah. Uh-huh. 13 Q Okay. Who was that SES approver for the Carter 14 Page FISA? 15 A My best recollection is that I was for the 16 initiation. 17 Q Can you explain some of the process that you 18 engaged in in reviewing the FISA prior to you approving it to 19 go on to, I presume, the Director? 20 A Correct. My approval at that point was more 21 administrative in nature -- in other words, filling the 22 signature line. 23 through and including the leadership of the FBI and the 24 leadership of the Department, by the time I put that 25 signature on the cover page had already been obtained. But all necessary approvals, including up COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 202 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 And what do you believe you are approving at that 2 moment? 3 does that mean? A 4 You mentioned it's an administrative approval. What Versus a substantive approval? Well, in this particular case, because there were 5 very high-level discussions that occurred about the FISA, 6 what I'm saying is the FISA essentially had already been 7 well-vetted all the way up through at least the Deputy 8 Director level on our side and through the DAG on the DOJ 9 side. And so my approval at that point was really purely 10 administrative in nature. 11 issues -- the FISA had already substantively been approved by 12 people much higher than me in the chain of command. 13 In other words, the substantive But, typically, the review by an SESer within FBI OGC, 14 it happens on a very short timeframe. 15 SESers often will get a stack of FISAs that are -- it could 16 be 10, could be 15, could be 5 -- you know, perhaps, the 17 morning they're obligated to go to the Director or the night 18 before. 19 review. 20 In other words, those There's not a lot of opportunity for substantive But it is sort of a backstop, if you will, a check to 21 ensure that we agree that there's probable cause, that all of 22 the essential elements of the application are met, that the 23 Woods form is completed, that the source checks, the asset 24 checks have been done, that the affidavit -- the verification 25 page has been signed by the agent with authority to sign it, COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 203 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 those types of issues. There were circumstances where I might look more 3 substantively at something based on what I saw in a cover 4 note summary of the FISA, but that was fairly rare. 5 point in the process, the FISA had already been very 6 well-vetted both on the FBI and the DOJ side. 7 function of that SES signature was really to ensure sort of a 8 last check in the process to ensure that all necessary 9 elements of the FISA package were present and that it met the 10 At that And so the basic requirements of probable cause. 11 Q Does that mean you read the FISA -- 12 A No. 13 Q -- application? 14 A No. Unless there were an issue that was identified 15 by the cover note. 16 that would summarize the FISA. 17 by DOJ. 18 sort of very-last-stop-in-the-process nature of the review, 19 the SES review, that's done, I wouldn't read a FISA unless 20 there were some sort of issue that was identified based on 21 the cover note. 22 23 24 25 Q So there typically would be a cover note That cover note is generated And because of the time pressures involved and the You are, though, reviewing for the sufficiency of probable cause -A After many people have reviewed that assessment. And so, as I mentioned, this was essentially a backstop to COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 204 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 all of the other processes and the rigor that had been 2 applied by DOJ attorneys and by FBI investigative and legal 3 personnel. 4 Q Okay. So you did not read the FISA, but you 5 would've been familiar then with at least part of the FISA 6 with regard to the legal predication for probable cause in 7 the FISA in order to be able to sign it? 8 A I would be familiar based on the cover note, yes. 9 Q On the cover note. 10 A In the case of the Carter Page FISA, I was 11 Okay. So -- generally familiar with the facts of the application -- 12 Q Okay. 13 A -- before I signed that cover note. 14 Q Okay. So were you ever concerned that, in signing 15 an application, any FISA application, approving it, that your 16 administrative approval could be considered a substantive 17 approval for the application itself, including the 18 substantive facts, the probable cause determination, the 19 predication, the -- whatever sources may have been used? 20 I'm having a little trouble with understanding an 21 administrative approval versus a substantive approval. 22 the Director making a substantive approval following your 23 administrative approval? 24 25 A Is So, yes, I would characterize the approval of the Director as being substantive in nature. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I'm using COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 205 1 "administrative" in this context to indicate here, as I 2 described, that there were individuals, all the way up to the 3 Deputy Director and the Deputy Attorney General on the DOJ 4 side, who had essentially given their approval to the FISA 5 before it got to that step in the process. 6 That part of it was unusual, and so I didn't consider my 7 review at that point in the process to be substantive in 8 nature. 9 people on both sides of the street who had reviewed and In other words, there were smart lawyers, high-level 10 signed off on the application, the details of the 11 application. 12 package is ready to go forward. 13 Q And so I was simply signaling, yes, this So, in signaling that, in terms of a probable cause 14 determination, can you just explain, in terms of going up on 15 a FISA on Carter Page, what are the elements that would be 16 necessary in order to do so? 17 A I don't have the FISA statute in front of me here, 18 but, essentially, Carter Page -- there would need to be 19 probable cause that he was an agent of a foreign power and 20 that he was about to use or using the facilities that were 21 identified in the package. 22 required by the statute. 23 Those are the essential elements And I don't recall offhand the particular prong of that 24 agent-of-a-foreign-power requirement under which we pled 25 Carter Page, but I believe that is reflected in the Carter COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 206 1 Page applications that were released through the FOIA process 2 and to which you all have access through the Reading Room. 3 Q And because he is a U.S. person, is there any 4 additional aspect that is required if you're going up on a 5 FISA on a U.S. person? 6 7 8 9 A Not that I recall, but it does affect the frequency of the renewals that are required. Q Okay. So, because you are signing off and approving the FISA, is it incumbent upon an approver to 10 understand the legal parameters, or is it necessary only to 11 have a management decision that particular processes have 12 been followed? 13 looking to see whether particular processes have been 14 followed or whether there is legal sufficiency for obtaining 15 the FISA? 16 A In other words, you, as an approver, are you I would say, in the regular case, I would say my 17 review includes both. 18 judgment about legal sufficiency, it would be with a great 19 degree of deference to the many lawyers who have reviewed 20 that application before me -- in other words, to the various 21 layers of review both on the FBI and on the DOJ side that 22 preceded me. 23 However, with respect to the first In this particular case, I'm drawing a distinction 24 because my boss and my boss' boss had already reviewed and 25 approved this application. And, in fact, the Deputy Attorney COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 207 1 General, who had the authority to sign the application, to be 2 the substantive approver on the FISA application itself, had 3 approved the application. 4 been the case before I did that. 5 sign the cover note on the FISA application. 6 And that typically would not have Before, I would usually So this one was handled a little bit differently in that 7 sense, in that it received very high-level review and 8 approvals -- informal, oral approvals -- before it ever came 9 to me for signature. And so, in this particular case, I 10 wouldn't view it as my role to second-guess that substantive 11 approval that had already been given by the Deputy Director 12 and by the Deputy Attorney General in this particular 13 instance. 14 Q Would it make sense if you were to hear that, when 15 dealing with a U.S. person, in addition to showing probable 16 cause that that person is an agent of a foreign power or a 17 foreign power, that that U.S. person also would need to be 18 engaged or have engaged in criminal activity? 19 A I don't remember the -- there are five prongs of 20 FISA under which individuals can be pled as agents of a 21 foreign power, and, sitting here today, I can't tell you 22 precisely what I remember about the statute. 23 I mean, I believe that the way we pled Carter Page did 24 involve -- was under the aiding-and-abetting prong that does 25 involve a reference to probable cause that he aided and COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 208 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 abetted -- and I can't remember the precise statutory 2 formulation, but activity that does involve criminal 3 activity. 4 Q Okay. 5 Changing subjects here, were you ever aware whether 6 Hillary Clinton's campaign or Mrs. Clinton herself was ever 7 directly targeted by a foreign power? 8 A 9 setting. 10 Mr. 11 12 I don't think I can answer that question in this May we consult before the witness responds? Ms. Anderson. Well, I'll tell you, based on my 13 knowledge at the FBI, I don't believe I can answer that 14 question in this setting. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 15 16 17 18 19 20 Q Were you ever aware whether any of Secretary Clinton's emails were accessed by a foreign party? A I was not aware of any evidence that her emails were accessed by a foreign power. Q If you had been made aware that any of her emails 21 had been accessed by a foreign power or foreign party, would 22 that have in any way colored your own interpretation of the 23 facts and the law as you eventually acceded to with regard to 24 the FBI's overall decision? 25 A So I don't know the answer to that question. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE It 209 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 might have affected the extent to which we conducted a damage 2 assessment of the information that had been compromised, for 3 example, by a foreign power. 4 process and the steps that we took. 5 would've affected our substantive assessment of the evidence 6 in the case as it applied to the criminal statutes in 7 question. 8 Q So it might've affected the But I'm not sure that it Have you seen any recent stories indicating -- 9 there was a recent story, I should say, indicating that the 10 Chinese had potentially received ongoing access to Secretary 11 Clinton's emails. 12 particular accusation or allegation? Did you have any knowledge as to that 13 A No. 14 Q It has also been publicly speculated that 15 Mr. McCabe had memos that he memorialized. 16 whether that is the case? Are you aware 17 A Yes. 18 Q Have you read those memos? 19 A Yes. 20 Q What is the general subject -- or is there a 21 22 23 general subject for those particular memos? Mr. May we consult with the witness before she responds? 24 Mr. Breitenbach. 25 [Discussion off the record.] Yes. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 210 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Mr. Because that question would require 2 addressing matters that are within the purview of the special 3 counsel investigation, we will instruct the witness not to 4 answer. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 5 6 Q Well, without getting into the substance of the 7 memos, were you aware contemporaneously that Mr. McCabe was 8 keeping particular memos? 9 A No, I was not. 10 Q At what point did you become aware of the memos? 11 A I believe I first learned about them at some point 12 when I was Acting General Counsel, which would have been in 13 January of 2018. 14 15 16 Q And are you aware of other individuals who also were aware of the memos? A And who were they? I understand Lisa Page was aware of the memos. 17 Obviously, Andy McCabe. 18 Office has access to those memos now. 19 Mr. Priestap may also have been aware of them. 20 Q 21 Mr. 22 I understand the Special Counsel's And I believe And are you aware of the number of memos? We're going to give the same instruction to the witness for that question. 23 I'm sorry. Did you ask if she's aware? 24 You may answer -- 25 Mr. Breitenbach. Is she aware of the number of memos. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 211 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Ms. Anderson. 2 Mr. Breitenbach. 3 Ms. Anderson. 4 Mr. Baker. 5 I don't recall. You don't recall. No. You became aware of them based on your capacity as the Acting General Counsel? Ms. Anderson. 6 I believe that's correct. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 7 8 Q Do you know why you were made aware of the memos? 9 A I recall having a discussion with Andy McCabe about 10 them sometime during that month, but I don't recall the 11 reason for that discussion. 12 Q Did he seek your guidance? 13 A I don't recall the nature of the discussion that we Q Do you recall the situation in which you and 14 15 16 had. Mr. McCabe had a discussion regarding the memos? 17 A No. It was in his office. 18 Q Okay. 19 One more change of subject. You previously indicated in 20 the prior round that you were shocked by the firing of 21 Director Comey. 22 regard to the firing of Mr. Strzok? 23 A More recently, what were your thoughts with I thought it was very sad, everything that's 24 happened with respect to Pete. He was an excellent agent. 25 He was one of the smartest people I've worked with. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE He was a 212 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 great colleague. 2 FBI and to public service more generally. 3 And I know he had dedicated his life to the And so I think it's tragic what's happened with respect 4 to him and the publicity that he has attracted; the fact that 5 his family, obviously, is going through some difficulty with 6 respect to all of this; and now that, obviously, there's a 7 professional aspect of this for him as well. 8 human perspective, it's very sad. 9 10 11 Q So, from a Did his actions that resulted in his firing, in your opinion, harm the Bureau's reputation? A Yes. The revelation of the text messages obviously 12 was damaging to the reputation of the FBI. 13 aware, I was not aware, those that I worked with were not 14 aware of the text messages at the time they were being sent. 15 As I mentioned before in my testimony, we were not aware of 16 the affair. 17 colleagues that we had worked so closely with on this 18 investigation that was so important to the Bureau and so 19 sensitive, that they had engaged in these text messages. It was deeply disappointing to the team that two BY MR. BAKER: 20 21 None of us were Q It was widely reported that the reason for 22 Mr. McCabe's termination, I believe, was lack of candor. 23 you know what Mr. Strzok was actually terminated for, what 24 your understanding, what your belief was? 25 A I don't know. Do It's postdated my time at the FBI. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 213 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q Okay. 2 You had mentioned a little while ago, as part of the 3 FISA process, something you referred to as a source check and 4 an asset check was done, or would be done. 5 A One and the same. What are those? So it's an asset check. There 6 are a set of queries that are run of databases in order to 7 assess whether or not the FISA target is or has been a source 8 for the FBI. 9 source or former source, but it's something that we need to It's not disqualifying for the FBI to surveil a 10 know in putting together the FISA package. 11 asset checks or source checks are run. 12 13 Q And so those And I'm assuming there was no issue with it, because it kept moving along? 14 A You mean for the Carter Page FISA? 15 Q Yes. 16 A Correct. 17 Q Okay. 18 I'm curious, in the discussions you were having with my 19 colleague Mr. Breitenbach, who is the last person in this 20 FISA process that actually reads the whole package rather 21 than just an administrative part of it? 22 actually read the whole thing before he signs off on it? 23 A No, I would not presume so. Does the Director The Director might on 24 any particular day receive a stack of as many as 15, 17, 20 25 FISAs. That's sort of the outer range of how many the COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 214 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Director could receive. 2 unusual for the Director to receive a stack this tall. 3 indicating about a foot and a half between my hands here, for 4 the benefit of the reporter. 5 commensurate with the 20 minutes the Director has in his 6 schedule for review and approval of the FISAs. 7 And they're very thick. It's not I'm And so that, obviously, is not And so he does rely heavily on the process, on the rigor 8 of the process, both on the FBI side and on the DOJ side, as 9 well as on the cover note that is generated by a DOJ lawyer 10 who has read and been involved in the drafting of that FISA 11 application. 12 if he signs the FISA, you know, relies on others. 13 And so, yes, the Director or Deputy Director, I don't know precisely who is sort of the highest-level 14 person who does, you know, review and read every FISA 15 application. 16 Stuart Evans, who is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 17 who oversees the FISA process on the DOJ side. 18 many attorneys who report to him, but I'm not quite sure 19 within that chain of command who, to a certainty, would have 20 read every single FISA application that goes through. 21 Q I know many of them are reviewed and read by And there are At the FBI, do you know who that would be? 22 Obviously, someone below you. Like, if it's coming from the 23 field, would the Chief Division Counsel be someone that would 24 read it? 25 I'm just curious, where down in the chain does the final The supervisor of the agent that's submitting it? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 215 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 2 thing last get read? A Well, more importantly is on the DOJ side, 3 obviously. 4 submit the application to the FISA court and ultimately have 5 responsibility for the application. 6 line attorneys obviously read the FISA applications. 7 Occasionally, unit chiefs will read them as well. 8 9 They're the drafters, and there are counsel who I know, you know, our I will read FISA applications if they're flagged for me as raising novel or controversial issues. As I mentioned, if 10 there's something that I see in my review of the cover note 11 on that morning, the morning immediately before it goes to 12 the Director, I'll flip to the relevant portions of the 13 application or even read the whole thing in its entirety. 14 But, typically, that would not be the case. 15 Q And you said just a minute ago -- I thought you 16 said that the Director has 20 minutes set aside to review all 17 the FISAs? 18 A Approximately, yes. 19 Q That's a real number? 20 A It's not set in stone, and so we do have a process 21 in place by which the Deputy Director or Director often will 22 get a heads-up about the number -- there's an email that goes 23 out every evening that indicates the number of FISAs that are 24 ready for the Director's signature by the next morning. 25 And it is important, in most cases, that those FISAs, as COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 216 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 long as the Director is comfortable with them, do get signed 2 in a timely fashion, because on the other side of the street 3 we've got either the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney 4 General or the AAG for the National Security Division lined 5 up at a particular time to sign the FISA. 6 already has a read copy of the application and it's been 7 docketed for that week, and so we'd have to pull it off the 8 docket if it were not to go forward. 9 important that those FISAs that are presented to the Director 10 11 And the FISA court And so it is fairly get signed on that particular day. Q Would it also be true that if it sat at any one 12 particular place too long -- because it sounds like there's a 13 lot of stops that this package makes -- if it sits too long 14 at any one location, the information in it gets stale and has 15 to be -- 16 A That's correct. That's correct. 17 Q It'd be just like on the criminal side of the 18 house. 19 long at any one stage, you've got to go back and refresh the 20 probable cause? If you're doing a Title 3 application, if you sit too 21 A That's correct. 22 Q You had also indicated that this one was different 23 in that it came -- when it hit your desk, some of the 24 top-level executives, specifically the Deputy Attorney 25 General and maybe I think you said the Director, had already COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 217 signed off on it or had already reviewed it -- 2 A That's correct. 3 Q -- and that was not the normal course. 4 A That's correct. 5 Q Why was this one different? 6 A The sensitivity level of this particular FISA 7 resulted in lots of very high-level attention both within the 8 FBI and DOJ. 9 The General Counsel, for example, who is the former head 10 of what was known at the time as OIPR, the office within the 11 Department of Justice that has responsibility for all of the 12 FISA applications -- he's the former head of that office -- 13 he personally reviewed and made edits to the FISA, for 14 example. 15 The Deputy Director was involved in reviewing the FISA 16 line by line. 17 side of the street was similarly involved, as I understood, 18 reviewing the FISA application line by line. 19 Q The Deputy Attorney General over on the DOJ And when he was still on the rolls at the FBI, 20 Mr. Baker as the General Counsel was also in this process? 21 He would -- 22 A 23 moment ago. 24 Q Okay. 25 A Jim was the former head -- That's the individual to whom I was referring a COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 218 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q The former -- okay. 2 A OIPR. 3 Q Okay. 4 A And so he was extremely familiar with the FISA 5 process. 6 government's -- well, no longer with the government -- one of 7 the Nation's leading experts on FISA. 8 with that office led him to be one of the best people you 9 could possibly consult about what was contained within the 10 11 He's one of -- I would say, one of the And his experience FISA application. And so he read it. 12 understood. 13 Q The Deputy Director read it, as I The Deputy Attorney General read it. So I would assume when James Baker was at his desk 14 and a FISA's passing through him, based on his experience in 15 OIPR, people above him that are doing these administrative 16 sign-offs or whatever, if Jim Baker's looked at it, I'm 17 assuming there's a lot of confidence by the people above him 18 because he does have such an expertise in FISAs. 19 correct? 20 A Is that I would not say that this was a circumstance where 21 there was any deference given to Jim Baker. 22 when Andy McCabe looked at it, certainly when Sally Yates 23 looked at it, I don't believe they were simply relying on the 24 judgment of Jim Baker having reviewed the application. 25 understanding and my impression at the time was that they COMMITTEE SENSITIVE In other words, My 219 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 very much gave it their own de novo independent review and 2 that, you know, it was very carefully reviewed by those 3 individuals. 4 Q Would it be fair to say having James Baker as the 5 General Counsel brought with it an expertise in this 6 particular area of the law, based on his -A 7 It did, but I'm not even sure those officials were 8 aware that Jim Baker had personally reviewed the FISA 9 application. 10 Q 11 And you had indicated that -- when I asked why this was Okay. 12 different, you said because of the sensitivity. 13 opinion, was this sensitive? A 14 Why, in your We understood, because of who Carter Page was, that 15 people would second-guess the appropriateness of submitting 16 the FISA application, and so we were taking extra care with 17 the application itself. Q 18 Okay. That's all I have. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 19 Q 20 You indicated that you do personally read 21 controversial FISAs, and you've indicated that there's all 22 these sensitivities with this particular one, but you chose 23 not to read this FISA -A 24 25 I'm sorry, that's not correct. FISA. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE I did read this 220 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q You did read this FISA? 2 A Not on the morning when I signed the application, 3 no, I did not -- 4 Q Okay. 5 A -- but I read it at an earlier point in the 6 process. 7 Q 8 In terms of renewals, do renewals also require a similar 9 Okay. Thank you. sign-off by an SESer? 10 A Correct. 11 Q And with this particular FISA, were you also the 12 official that was signing off on the renewals? 13 A I don't recall. 14 Q You previously indicated in a prior round that 15 there, to your knowledge, was never a spy that was placed on 16 the Trump campaign or anywhere in the Trump orbit. 17 your definition of a spy? 18 19 Let me make it easier. What's Does a spy, in your mind, include a human confidential source? 20 A No. 21 Q Does a spy include an undercover FBI employee? 22 A I don't know. 23 Q So by saying that you -- I mean, you answered "no" 24 25 to the question was there ever a spy placed -A Right, so for two reasons. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 221 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 Q Sure. 2 A First, the word "spy" did not seem commensurate 3 4 with what I understood had been done in this particular case. And the other thing was the verb, the use of the verb 5 "place" a spy or "place" a source within a campaign. 6 knowledge, the FBI did not place anybody within a campaign 7 but, rather, relied upon its network of sources, some of whom 8 already had campaign contacts, including the source that has 9 been discussed in the media at some length beyond Christopher 10 Steele. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE To my 222 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 [4:04 p.m.] BY MR. BREITENBACH: 2 3 Q If I could circle back, we had talked before about 4 the 302s being filled out with Bruce Ohr. 5 made aware that one of the attorneys at the Department of 6 Justice was being interviewed by the FBI in this matter, in 7 the matter he was being interviewed about? 8 9 A I don't know. Mr. Herrington. 11 Ms. Anderson. 12 Mr. Herrington. 13 Ms. Anderson. But do you have any -No, I do not have any personal knowledge. -- on the job knowledge -No, I do not. I do not. BY MR. BREITENBACH: 14 16 I've seen reporting to the effect that she was not aware, but I don't know. 10 15 Was Sally Yates Q Did you participate in any discussions about whether or not she should be made aware? 17 A No. 18 Q Were there any discussions in the General Counsel's 19 Office about speaking to Bruce Ohr to receive information 20 from a confidential source? 21 A No. But remember, I also testified that earlier 22 that I had no awareness of the meetings that were taking 23 place between FBI personnel and Bruce Ohr except for that one 24 meeting that I understood occurred, that I understood was a 25 very high-level meeting between Bruce Ohr and Andy McCabe. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 223 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Q 1 Okay. So, to be clear, other than that one meeting 2 with McCabe, you were unaware of any additional meetings 3 between Bruce Ohr and anyone at the FBI. A 4 That's correct, until some of the information from 5 those meetings was referenced in the HPSCI majority memo that 6 was released in late winter 2018. 7 Q Okay. 8 A Yep. Thanks. BY MR. BREBBIA: 9 Q 10 One final question. Former General Counsel Andrew 11 Weisman of the FBI, now on the special counsel team, do you 12 know whether he had any involvement or any awareness of 13 either the Midyear Exam or the Russia investigation, 14 including the Carter Page FISA? A 15 16 I'm sorry. Say that again. I missed the last part of your question. Q 17 Are you aware whether he had any knowledge of 18 either the Midyear Exam or the Carter Page FISA and the 19 Russia investigation generally? A Before the special counsel office was stood up 22 Q Yes. 23 A No, I don't know. 24 Q You don't know. 25 Mr. Baker. 20 21 or -- Okay. Thank you. It's been a long day. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE We've asked you a lot 224 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 of questions, and I indicated earlier the process lends 2 itself to duplicity. 3 answering and reanswering things. You have been very gracious in 4 Is there anything you would like to tell us? 5 let me rephrase that -- anything you would like to say 6 about -- I mean, are you of the opinion that in both cases, 7 the Russia case and Midyear, that everything was done that 8 would normally be done in those cases? 9 things are handled in sensitive circumstances, which you've 10 alluded to, was everything done that could be done or should 11 be done? 12 Ms. Anderson. Yes. Well, no, Other than the way Both cases were handled, in my 13 opinion, in a professional, by-the-book, competent, and 14 thorough way. 15 16 Mr. Baker. Anything else you'd like to add for the record? 17 Ms. Anderson. 18 Mr. No. Before we -- I believe it appears you may 19 be about to adjourn. 20 just, I think, a very quick moment? 21 Mr. Baker. 22 Mr. 23 then, I think. 24 [Recess.] 25 Ms. Kim. May we consult with the witness for The minority is going to -. Okay. Well, we can do it during a break Thank you. We'll go back on the record. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE It is 4:08 p.m. 225 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE BY MS. KIM: 1 2 Q Ms. Anderson, in the last round, the majority asked 3 you if Mr. Bruce Ohr was a fact witness for the Russia 4 collusion case. I'd like to revisit that representation. 5 A Okay. 6 Q As far as we understand, Mr. Ohr's role was -- 7 sorry. 8 9 Strike that, please. As far as you understand, was Mr. Ohr ever specifically tasked by the FBI with contacting Christopher Steele? 10 A No. 11 And if I could clarify, I don't believe myself to have 12 accepted a premise that he was a fact witness. 13 my testimony related to was the purpose for which a 302 is 14 documented, and it's typically to record evidence or 15 potential evidence. 16 have been a fact witness simply because a conversation 17 they've had with the FBI has been documented in a 302. 18 Q I think what And so I wouldn't consider somebody to So you understood his role as providing information 19 to the FBI but not necessarily in the capacity of a fact 20 witness. 21 22 A Correct. I think that might be a little strong or inaccurate here. 23 Q 24 Are you aware of Mr. Ohr having any official 25 Excellent. responsibility in the Russia collusion probe? COMMITTEE SENSITIVE COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 226 1 A No. 2 Q Are you aware of Mr. Ohr making any investigative 3 decisions -- 4 A No. 5 Q -- in the Russia conclusion probe? 6 After the FBI terminated Mr. Steele as a source in 7 November of 2016, did the FBI task Mr. Ohr with the 8 responsibility of continuing to meet with Mr. Steele to 9 obtain information? 10 A Not to my knowledge. 11 Q So, to your knowledge, when Mr. Ohr continued to 12 convey information to the FBI, that was Mr. Ohr voluntarily 13 providing information to the FBI that he was receiving from 14 Mr. Steele. 15 A Correct. And, you know, some of what's in the 16 302s, at least to the best of my recollection sitting here 17 today, was that information that Bruce Ohr was providing to 18 the FBI reflected prior information he had obtained from 19 Mr. Steele. 20 meeting with Christopher Steele after the source relationship 21 was terminated. I don't know whether or not Mr. Ohr continued 22 Q 23 Ms. Kim. 24 25 the day. Excellent. I think that will conclude our questioning for The time is 4:10. [Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the interview was concluded.] COMMITTEE SENSITIVE