7 a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 .4 . - ?Lei?*4 Desclasi?ed and Approved Fr 13/09/23 vr we. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/0923 31F Amwm Dec??ied and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ?agm; - 35%? is? a In Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and A roved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA RDP13X0000100010030007 To Colonel Buxton FROM . Secretariat Pd Plan - ETD, 194% when you have had a chance to 35$ transmitted with Colonel Erldlay?s letter ef we believe yam may wish to refer I Eh?m to the EXanning uPOUpo . Tho Secratariat is documents-have been received. a I . ease 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 .0. m. .g-mm- Declassified and For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 {3531 Farm 33333333. 30 b3 ii}; 336:?! 3363 333537. 1 3 .4 QWd-g? ?Gammaat enter 33*?3 3-3 ?loeuamnl 133:; (E Cops? mm 3N0. of? 333%: ?Mt 303mm?: meawl? Berg: Ari-wrum; {?15 1'1? 1?34 333 . if" 3 Hm named bale? is roupotmihin ?63" 3. 3:12.33 ?5131?" marge?d this m- ?ranch. On {1333-3313333 313556313333?; mu?. yrtapnrn Hui-a form on which 333 33533333333 win Roam Hm document or 10 urban: its: cam?kat? 3313133125533 333; 33:33! 9:32:13?. duke and. tium rece?? mi, and *nitiwl Wick the 633310; 3:113 1532:? 335 I opponite an mum. Thz?u dac-ustgg? as: 0311? 313 3:33me ca To? $3693? daunments, ?33 mun n35 regsiue3 Eu 3333 ?33 33333333333 cantaiun. Each peraoa ?03ually churga3 W333 the uatahaugiwg a3 3333 3M 3CD in his Eli-mach or Office in 2335203333163 533 333 ?:33 ?33333:: 3?33in 3? TSCO before further routing. The attachbd docuuant wan rnce?vna from ?35 133335 (ht-armh- at 333333 RECEQVED 333$ 3rw? I33333335 TSCO As soon as the officials canon-nut hum ?rcmi Jim: 11, detach tiling Mme: 13.30: 1:33 document him 311033 Be 35:533. ?xer; deliver 3116b 36,31: listed on the 331250;: Routing Shaet 3.1333333 The attaeha? ?dcamant ru;anae D, - {Hi-:57) lassified and Aggroved For Release 2013/09/23_: CIA- -7 For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 Declassified and ;Eh5.5555555. ,5 - h? 55$ @5551Mummy 5: 25.; 5, W5 MW WW: "the?fl" $555755. ?Y?iji WW: 5? 55'; ?if? 455115?:- e! 51;: 5 5? Egg!" 55!} Wi?i?- my and Wuy (unrauu .wW? . M: {1:15de halw #335 is 5i5 e'rQ ..Q5 :~iJ in) ?3?qu 1?5551?55 9mg: 55,19 f? 3:973 Hm f?i: 1.8% 119351anth a? 9 3535*? 519? mun? ?Hiia Li I. SECRET WNW 333 TE 999* ?a?w (?my 0 fi?i . my hh?mt? Tbim Waae 5 V5 5 1, MM tl?t?k ?50 51 human"! m: 6396998; VV 3,;Lan 033V ga?h fp? a infaiami b??w?uw ?f?i WW WWV?y?we 5 5 luqn vr WE3 maat ho hWWu?gu Wm Hum will be; ?rudi- Jl 5, 5 31' Evin)?: 3535!? Hi" data anti Hun. ?tmzzivr. {in-arts? 3755.39; 5117.31??! vi; .. ma?a?Wm mp.? r5 r" .5 515.175?? 55, VV?Thgm?igg? Wa?tiwxa?my mm? 5$35v 5:_Declassified an_d Appr_oved For Release 2013/09/23. R000100370007-7 w" .. "mm mm" was: 333 3333.33 13;? MEMORAJW FOR THE DIRECTOR OF Subject: Bailing Plan for Rotornnco: JCS memornn?um ta 03$, dt& 23 Kar'??g subjaat as abcvn 9 Enclosure: COS 545/5. 33 any 441 uubjaqa-sn?ahavw, copy *65 Supplementing above raforonca. analOaurn is furnishea herewith for your interaction and ?11Ii? 5. 323mm: clonal, 6.5.63 Assiatant Socritary . 1 3 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 comnzm?n CHIEFS GP OUTLINE PLAN FOR PGLITICAL Note by the.360race33?g Chiafa 0f egagf 1 By informal actign, the Combine? I "11? mml?ae? *he recommendation contained in 0.0.3. The/p 1 i tr wee the Suprere Commander, AllLed Exga?hcxa?ary 30? u, message 0 n, dispatched as FACS 28. 2 1.3 A c.c.s. ans/3. A. J. Combined ?ecreeariat? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 53.1.2154 :13. 1 1 ?122.. 5.2.3.4:lx} of?! 35.3} .. roved AFgr_R_elease 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 Mil-Inna Declassified and A . 21% NH. 1.. $73.1 I. - . Declassified and Auroved For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 Ila; I .I, 4 mama 103 mm or Subject: Dueling Plan ?whining! max-ran '3 Reformat: JCS 03!, int 1339211535 aubjict as: than? 1 urea: C05 545 1 30 Apr: ?y ?want, u. ?ame? game}?! he on 008 546%: 131. 15.: ?lm? cos 54513, 11 May 44, rubdmat egg; cos may.r 20 44, uubjmc?? a: drama, await? Supplamonting above rerun-mam. the um furnished: herewith for your Md. ?lm? Cir/??2? (?31311: 11' Fore-2.1., Mme sin-haw SumterApproved F'or Release 2013/09/23 dispatch? .. 'l to the Supreme Commander, Ailie A u. - Expeditieneey??emeenl ea mee?age-?Politic a1 We ana?ye eemmeme s' A 516/3, 0011091 rni mg a section on Austria for the Fie?-? the vi 7a? of the British .1 hiefe of Staff ea 1 Staten iefs of Staff ?rE?i? a: ?7 Th Unite Wig? hi.? Memor i andum by the Unite? Stetee Ghi?? .?eeme?e ?g Refere 11065 ()5?11531 OUTLZ 1 NE FOR GFV Sm? 7 Declassified and ApprovedFor Release 2013/09/23 CIA From: on Austri Chane The Supra Political Warfare OVERLORD. ombined Chiefs 9f 3taff. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA me Cemmander, Allied Eerditie?afy?Y?f??e a are acceptable as part 0f the Gutii?e:??a?wm?mag I: 03.5; Declassif' ed and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- RDP13X00001R000100370 . 007- 7 cams 012:, mm OUTLINE PLAN FOR POLITICAL WARPAME Memoran? h1 the of tho ?rtbish Ghiofa of Star: 1. With regard to tho United Shatoa Chiofe or S?ptf that a sootLon on Austria should be added! tho Brit?ehz??iofe of 'g have proposed that tho fol ion with Supreme 36 5 Staff lowing footnotog drawn up in consultat ndquortar. a, ?ii?o? E??oe should be added at tho office of War informezaom (3.53.5; ?nt?iz (S ditionary Force, and oi? pogo 8 gm annex rfaro EXCcutivo - 1 of the Political We 1 Warfare - ?Outline Plan for Politico 123% Austria. In propaganda to Austrians, our ob}ect?ve@ arm not . essentially different from those given abovoh @ho Motn @iffor~ of emphasis aro:~ once-a Under objective (0), it is par of can oo?ootige no thoroby aho?img ?oanriene Moscow Declaration, that the consequences of Germany?s unoon?itionel euvroa?oox: 4 I ,r ration of Austria and aro for proforahio to 7w exploit the include the libe ontinuanoe of Ri?ler?s war; the Austrians than the outributa to their-own 7? particularly if the Austrians liberation. Under objective (6), eXploit the difference in tradition it is part of our ppjgexiwga ?Auatria and Nazi Germany* ?mer swam ?24612 11 May lean . come: 1mm deters Cir semi OUTLINE PLAN roe mummy; WAemee;_? #?exzeemm?f Note by the Secreperiee The message contained in the enclosure to Grae?e weev approved by the Combined Chiefe of Staff, by informal ee?iemp and dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Alxiee expeeitie?ery Force (FAQS 2k), in the form shown in the eneloeure to t?ie paper. Reference to 5&5 was deleted from.the cf i 7?1: as the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Foree, hes not been furnished copy of that paper. The new page referenoee refer to the original document forwarded to the Cemhine? Secre~ teriet by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditienarw Force. R. J. Mormamm, Re Do COIJERIDGE, Combined Secretariet. I?d? ?1 ?a -. a 1R000100370007 . DeCIassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 The Combined Chiefo of Staff. #3 0 Supreme Commander, Allied The Gombinod Cniofo of Staff have oongiaoroo too Gutl??&* Plan for Political Warfare - GVERLOHD moo in gonorol ogroo with the provisions of the plan. However, certain changes which can roadily to 1 i?g 1n.the plan are desirable. Specifically, thoao aro: g. The reference on page 7 to recognition of the Frono? National Committee of Liberation should be olim?nato?w Gm the same and following page rareronceo to tho mooitorronoam Commission should be changed to Advisory Uounoil for b. As regar?s the reforenoeo to Germany, we bol1evo that with rospect to the propaganda object ivos sot forth in Annex 1, it would be wise to eliminate paragrayhs and 09 (page 8). I .1 g. It is noted that the document makea no mentionzof Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, a section on} 3 Austria should be added. d. That section of the document on page 1.9 whioh suggo3ta the encouragement of people in the occupiad countr1es to collect evidence for and against local offioialo is quos;? tionable. There will probably be all too much of th1? our of thing Without our encouragement. Since civil a?k Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- RDP13X00001 R000100370007- 7 092mm mom 62:? .. sow; We are of the opinion that the Combined Chiaxa of should ac cept the Outline Plan for Political Warforo QEEREQRD (0.0.8. 5k5), with certain minor changes Whloh era in the attached draft of a proposed message Jim Commander, Allied Empeditionary Force. . It will be noted that the principal amendment Suggestow. is the addition of a section on Austria. Although thie to not an essential feature, it should be helpful in View of the Moscow Declaration on Austria. If the British Chiefs of Staff approve, it ie that the enclosed message be dispatched to the Supreme Com? mander, Allied Expeditionary Force. a l?u Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA- RDP13X00001 R000100370007- 7 From: {ma combined mm of Many To: Supreme Gommnnaor, Enga??1? agree with the provisions of tho plan; ti However, certain changeo which 1&3 ?ood? 1? E1 in the plan are dosj.robla. Spoolficollyg thoao $1111 jg. The reference on pogo 10 to veoogoiulon of 511? 7 National Committee of Liberation Should to the some and following page roferenc?o to anolmao??ar?gn?nnal 1. Commission should be chann ed to Advinovy CounM ll lt?i?aa? Q. As regards the referancos to Germany, we bol?mvg 1&111 with respect to the propognnon objectivoa set forth in ?1 Annex 1, it would be wlso to paragraphs 13 1n? 09 (page 11). 3. IL is noted that the document mnkos no montion ofl Austria. In view of the Moscow Declaration, section.o?l? Austria should be added. ?1 g. That section of the document on page 29 whioh suggonos the encouragement of people in the oocnpia? countr?oa to collect evidence for and against local officials is quoom tionable. There will probably be oll too much of this sort of thing without our encouragement.? Since oivil admimiou a} tration is to be a function of tho national governmonEo concerned, who doubtless have their own means oi knowinsh what local pcrsonages have been working With tho believe this problem shoul? be left Eo thjm.~ Declassified and A0 oroved For Release 2013/09/23 THE Jam mars: w: my mm?much. :dezu. 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CIA- R000100370007- 7 353133333323 may ?amin?mtim 32: 3?33, in. 33.313314: . ?31mm? in aiming mi: aw; 3331mm 3 33432;: W: 3.33:2; 33m Milt 3m, as th?L 333 in 333 wmr?wun Eti??hiizmmi7 . 0 famrala ?gmzvatima)?, film 313? In i311 ?fu?E-w 5?13?" 1 . ?1 Declassified and A0 oroved For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 wmamm 'sz "w a wan?, :ng Him: am Frau: Grfiua a? atrm?a?ie ?a?t?ipmg wlanniwg swamp Bubj?at: Ontiina Finn fur r?X1R$?ix 7 ?O?br1ari* l. Eh: read ?1 yastarday, tmrwugh m3 :i?aff, or am 5&3; 13- apr? 1941.5?, @115th Eii??gmwr yolibiual erfara $55; 2. It in nataa ?hat uh: glam ?sa ??m-m?prwr?x??t? tho Cuma?ndur, ?llibd.?xrqd??ia?ar? thag thy aggroval a? nu. now requastada It ha? baauwmuggpn?i? #?:133 th?? eta? manta from th? Planning Gravy it. S. The plan ?a drawn to an it aituation as it axiith in tun tu?mu? retain not ?hs nitumticn ua 1% non ?xili?m 1h! t? oavaring or overall aauminn mn? draft: a? ?v were ?uted 5 Gatubdr 19433 15G g'J? warn dated 25 Novombar but thai? tap"_? atatod to b; ?opandant upen ataaptanca by ?it G?:g flapfi 1a Raniatmnaa in tho or Ina upuu augid?ga apaciflc amppart by in Exilt iniihi Belgium, ?allund and Mbruty. ?hmt t??p??lm if :33? baan obtainad thu ?nnt??le?na thiso anus not appear. sinae the plan artmn ihmri hand beau changes in the Enrapacn Ehuatgr?atLQpatg?;anngk? Headquarters of th? Allied.?xgnd?ti 1= the place of'coesac, ukiehAlngt Kl {nary atata of argnnisttian lag?oal uarfaru aativitin: goat? @aan made wholly gr Ra? Dirt? Warfare larggiy from an. tram I Declassified and Appgle?d For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 . Declassified and A0 oroved For Release 2013/09/23 45:. 5? 5.1M If ?autumn of nudquM ?113%, to II gift-1i rmyartyd II Ihaw i? ith??I; 1;;i {?wq?rah mad Imiyth} 3mm: It? Innb Imam ?ung and ?t I ?train: I and mymm?m? mm mm Iii: Invitations} Mum at Hi I wadsm?nd II II I: 1W WWII ml" In pun, Ihsaugh new Item Indicato?. 8. Int Pianning Gran; II II II roviaad gIvIn?. II notud II In ahave, beliavad to In Image 1 WI involving prapI Inat, II Ilva pragrmm Io:v aparatianw. I. 81312300: to ?u mama?, ?aws? Group favars plan. 3mm Wilt mung mum In Ir. gun Gan. ?mith Col. ?igel?m Ia Branch pp. Declassified and Aggrov For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007 7 Declassified andA oved For Release 2013/09/23 TO: FROM: mum: muslin. 111.13: for Jemima; m?gt?g 1 35?? Attached harato is a yrgp?aad We my to Eng chiefs of Staff cancarming rinanh?ch ii-? directly to the Elanning Grcup raga. for camments to tha Joint Chiars suuxx. "?h??Piinqge Group has agreed on this: maplye In its deliberations, the Jit?n? advantage of discuasion with Lt. . ml?? (3.5.) McFadden who have agrea? with thu'ktfhek Since thia is be ha disauasaa Staff Planners this aftarznaon, 19 Apr11 LQJJ, of the Planning Gran; shemld be uaikvara? ta ta& Jn?m Chiefs of Stafi before 1203 today; I Shapmr? Jargtn Acting Chairmln: 9 . h' Declassified and Aggroved For Release 2013/09/23- CIA- R000100370007 7 Declassified and A oved For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 . . 70: imam. Acting Chairman, gs Pian?xn? agga? summn, Outline Plan for Poli?ia?l iggyi7 Attached heratm is a prmp?se? ?e Chiefs of Staff concerning the Plaanh?dh wae~wu?w? -1 directly to the Planning Graup yaatardmy, witm for comments to the Joknt Chiefs af?stlf?g was Group has agreed on this reply. Qg In its aaliberationa, tho Flan?ing gave? ??dy??an advantage of discussion wi?h Lt. Gal; Biegxau (3.3.) McFadden who have agraad wi?h the atta?he? f??iwa- Since this subject lg ?o b3 ?i$ausg$d ?y the Staff Plannera this afternoon, 19 ?pril xga?, a gg?m?a of the Planning Group Shaul? b8 dalivere? Ba tam Chiefs of Staff before 1205 ?uday. . .g?wi?mmgaly . .1 . I R000100370007-7 a . . I DeCIaSSified and A0 oroved For Release 2013/09/23 2 R000100370007-7 1 WASH I L3 $521213}; 11w; THE 3Hujmct3 ?ua11na ?1&n ?0r Wamfarw a ?303 545, 1.3 ?JXpril Mm for Fali?iaal Warfarw camy The unclonure ls furnimh?4 harawlhh lnf?nrmat?zrm and Films. ?759 (aria? . Miran 2301' ??rngr 001 G.5.G. Sacraa&m7 I Declassified and?gp?ved For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 . . . NEWFEL .3 .1 I 1 I in: 4.1, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Kat.? :1an rs? ?47 16 autumn 1 3 mm; .1233: .GHIE, *1 OUTLINE mm FOR 210me. muA? Note by the ?t??pt?fie? 1. In the encloaurc be this paper he fauna t?u guuhiaw plan for political warfare (equals U.S. yaya?alemlaml for Operation OVERLORD. It; has buun submtt?e? Supp-nu. Allied where ping-m3?? by the of 1.11:. Offlom I. fermatmn um 12172-1112 warfare Ex?..cui.tv.. Th? 1: .. of ?lm. Supreme Commander, Alum: Eixp?..dit.t.0nwry Cw. of the. Combined Chiefs: of St'if?f J3 now 2. The French 3?-ct10n of glen may :uqulre the light of the final duals-Lon yet; no be taken maerciiab the?. degree of recognition to bu accorded to the French aoxmiztww 9f . National lemtion. H. 123331222132, .11. Cambium?i Searchermzm ?1 . . . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7. Outline ??ee gee~?ex Warfawe v.5. Propaganda Objertivee and Themes frem New D?]3ay (Annex egg?; Joint and Poli?leeid Warfare Flam 1: Support 0f ?deliee To Injure the Enemy (Appendix I t0 Annex To Secure Maximum Aid for Allied Miliherv Operations (Appendix II to ?nnex 1 To Secure the Morale 0f Civilian Pepuletiene Between Now and 3-Day: To Guide Wheir Publ?e Opinion and Direct TheLr Activit?es (Ampend?x EEIA to Annex Political Warfare Plan (in of outline Introduction France.. Belgium. Holland. Norway.. $1pQ3u-m RANKIN C??Outline Plan for Political/Psyehdlegieal ?l Propaganda Objectives and Themes (Annex i: 1? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 . Re fer?encse 17' [we 118?. I. meme; Political Memes 1,43 The above Plan has now been eppveve? Ey ee?13?y being submitted to the Combined Chiefe 9f ee following additions and emen?ment9:* 1. On page sentence heeteen ed?ed ?e ?ne ?ee% eu?? 1, as followezs political advice must be mm tame epee?eL direetewee paragraph to ?Careful matter and reflected in the weekly end 0' which implement the Plum?. 2. Rage hag been a copy 3f tee eedre?t ee attached. R. Du {MejarwGenerelI Deputy r?tfi?tg? 8. E.45. *rege 4 3f this paper. 1H'?i?eginning, with note 2 at bottem ef page 6 and ending bottom of page T, paper contains redra?t ef. (Ge 1943. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 . 0 1/0 mum-ans? PALE OUTLINE. gm; FOR WARFARE (5 n.3? I. TERMS OF REFERENQE In accordonoa with tho P.W.E. and 0.W.I., 1r nppropriate consultation with om? submit the following OUTLINE WOW PDLITECAL (5 U.S. WARFARE) to progmrw the way For and RANKIN and to assist whirhovow operation ovootumtos. For Political Forfnre purpoaon the preparatory is wommoo to OVERLORD and RANKIN, the only diFfornnro being timing. II. APPRECIQIIQE l. Morale in Germany will be "tougher nut to groom" then was the case in Italy where conditions wvro novomtmgoout for Political Warfare operations. Nevertheless, morale in Germany has attained a brittle state whirh presents promising opportunitios for Political Warfare. (8.5. The cxisto to 09 six miliiom foreign workers who have been pressed into Forced labour in Gtrm?ny on? who form an indispensable but explosLVo port of the Gorman war machine.) 2. While the Balkan Satellites lie outside the direct soopo of the proposed operations, events in the Balkans can matari?ily assist There is an opportunity for Political worfmmo to exploit several factors which might combine to bring about conditions in the Balkans which would seriously affect Sermon morale as well as military dispositions.f Those footoxt iaoi?go": i? the course of military events oapecialiyyon tho growing.activitios of patriot forces in, ugyol?xiaEana oraetagl, ?god the fact that the Satellites, are Declassirfied and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 military intemenisim m; semis been greatly heightezied is? screams: we" premature outbursts; and third that ef when desired, and if necessary an Eurepeemse??M@i? 4? In all calculationa, Political consideration the extent tc which condiaidn? fifth winter of the war favour morale apere?ieme inveevmemy the Satellites, or militate against them in the ?eeupiee Territories. OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIQNS 1s The impact of Fesriem and four yeere of @ermen.deminebien have created a powerful ferment of political forcee througheet Europe. These do not nereS$ar11y Follow the preuwer political pattern, but the common trend is against the polimicel end economic conditions which led to the ?eetruutiea a? the rights of the individueL Whereas the State use Diplomacy aireotly ta influence Governments, political personalities and dominenb grouye? uses Politicei warfare to exert di?ecn and indirect infi??mggis upon the mass of the people; Political Warfare muet thexe?e: utiliae the popular trends and emergent forces in??urepeei'NVs Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 ef?feo?civeljr we: Hig?eet?; go these movemento and sens-tide eueh ebimuletxooa X?tw The effertiveneea of Politicel Warfare $e eov ed and RANKIN Will also be qualifxed=3y ??elfoi?e??egf factorez? . (1) Politiq??. The extent to which maintained and to which the politicel eime or the Nations are clearly defined one are accepted by the ?eoo?ee of Europe. (11) Bombing. The extent to which morale are taken into account in the implementation of Decegtion. The extent to which morale Footore ere taken into consideration in the formulation of deoeotmen plane. (A deception plan based upon purely millt?ry eomezdoeew tions might prove to be boomerang from morale ooint of View, sinte it might create premature ecthon befoee D?doy or discredit authentic instruvtions at Dedey.) IV. In rooperotion with the United motiono Armed Forces and all rompetent departments; 1. So to affect the will of the German People and of the German Armed Forces as to make them refuse to continue the War; 2. To cause the Satellites to abandon Germany in oiroumetenooe which will assist 3. To complete the process of enlisting, prepari n5 one. mobilising the Peoples of Occupied Countries for ao?ioo?vithin the framework of United Nations plans in such a way ae?to,ren?om? maximum assistance to OVERLORD and RANKIN. H. To create maximum goodwi 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 1 2- I 34? the objectives the themee euppe?tt?? tt?ee in Annex I. and cognate objectives i in Annex LI. . i I The weekly dirertivee of P.W.E. end the meet for rurrent implementation. The nbove nimr are basically those pureuee hy the and Ameriran euthoritiet in the Eumopeon theatre up to the present time. They will be brought to a cihmex by thegoen? tingencies contemplated. The extent to which they er?inohiev$? will be conditioned by the degree of political and militeey euccese attained by United Nrtione between new and Duet}. V. A. Preliminpry and Preparatory Phases. From Pelitichl Warfare point of view these are identihel extent we regnr?e temge. During those t.oees, P.W.F. and O.W.I. will: 1. Harness their regular media, reeie broadcasts, leaflets, publications, rumours, ct<. to the tank of achieving the nine and objectives laid down in Annex I. by exploiting to the full the supporting themes listed therein. 2. Make the maximum use of ?ovort wr_? covert loaflete the same effect. 3. Support the subversive and tabotage activities which.will carried out by the duly authorised agencies in enemy amt enemy occupied territories. u. Assist, in consultation with the outhoritiee coneebmady an? . to the extent required, in implementation of hombingbtol?ey and deception plans. ?e?r-f v. a' R000100370007-7 liberated. 1f7. Assist the competent suthoritiee in the test proclamations, instructisns, etc. Fer ?aeeyr B. D-dsl (Assault Plan) On D-dey, whether as srheewle? fer about by RANKIN, P.W.E. and 9.W.I. Willis 1. Broadcast and disseminate by leaflet such preelemstie or instructions as may he issued by the Supreme Aliiedi?emme??e?ji and the highest United Netions Pelitieel authorities. 2. Issue whatever instructions the Supreme Allies Cemmeh?er requires to:? i (3) areas of the same country not involve? in the imme?ia?z? operation; other Occupied Countries not immediateiy invelve?w 3. Organise and stimulate, in conjunction with the sutheeitieshv concerned (see Annex II) strikes, guerille action and erme?? uprisings behind the enemy lines in the arse involved in militevm operations. 4. Put into effect in (onjuncti0h with the eutheritiee eemw earned (see Annex II) the tactical plans for the cenfusien.e? the enemy, the destruction of his will t0 resist; the ?ieren?ie of his communications, the I NOTE 1. The above applies to or but (3) and (A) are either iheem-l~ . modification in cenneetienu?ith3RARKE? NOTE 2. -e.?Liberete& so?elm "Ins" 1. - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 or After capturn of Inittni cnf?qugng Elna 90. Plans for this phase ?annat be rmninta? n??ii intentions of the political and military ties? 15.13113? is? ., E. 3. These, in turn, will be degenaent up?n the ?agrae 65 int Ett? r~ military success achIQVed. - m? <1 VI. CHANGES 1. Whenever it becomes necessary ta affect tn approved themes already embo?iad in the pkg?? following procedures will become operative; will, on their own initinmw ?n consultation with S.A.C., affect ehnnges tn their Central or in Special Directives. S.A.C., on his own Lnitintive, will suggent fenst??e changes to be incorporntod in Cantrni wmi Special DirectiVes For emergency or con ingency deciaiene! Wi?? 1 issue Special Directives. VII. INFORMATION 1. The releasing ot information dealing wi the of major phases of the operation must be the In drafting the form in which the will be essential that the requirements of as. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 I. Pali?iaal Wgr?ar?rt With refeien?a to my Most Sacra? mimm?a COSSAC nan requaated that the fallewing mada to the above Plan:~ 1. Add in the parenthenis undgr item 1 a? .2 porting Objective (page 0f Annax aha ?EurOyean Adv130py Council?. 2. Add a parenthesis t0 itam 8 a? Thames Objective (page of Annex I) the Qantanae ?c?va be exercised by Vermit no Latitude eithan Cavaw? hmr??w mar a kindly fee ing in developing bhi? t??mw?t .1 P. a. far (Major??en&rai} Deputy Dmraccav?aanawal; 20th December, *rage 10 of this payer. **Page 11 of this paper. I . Declassified angApproved For Release 2013/09/23 AIM 033. so TO AFFECT 333: 31333- 333 333*fo 3333333 033mm A3333 303333 33 30 31333 3333 3333373213 31303, 333: 333. OBJECTIVES: To make the German Pompla aha 333 Armed 333333 miss that their defeat 13 3 p333333 3331353. To make the German People 393333133 that umsam?iu tional surrender is our irreducihla ?emand 333 8333 $3333 13 no possibility 01' splitting the Emit 3d N?bion3 1:13333 or any other issue. To make the German temple 3331333 that 311 3333 33m accomplish by prolonging the war is 33 mak3 it 33333 $03 themselves, not only during bug artar th3 333, an? 3333 333 consequences of unconditional surramd33 will b3 more baaru able than the consequences of continuing the war To dispel the fear of the Ge3mam ?33333 m33hin?m To produce pressure for endixxg tha war by 33333ina mass resentment among the Germans against their palitiaal and military leaders, and by appropriate 33133133333 5E 3H5 foreign workers (through themes to Occupied Gaum?ri3333 THEMES. Supporting Objective [Tc make the German People and thezArma? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 5; Gc?kany: (30115153 Human ?11mm wmamahg 6. Germany 111 1631 111 ea??ami 11 and Manpower); 7. Garman loa?er? fea11$o Supporting Objective [To make the German People racogn1$? 6111 a: surrender is our irrm?uctblo doman? and 3116 11111 11.11 possibility of splitting tha Unihnd Nabiona o1 1111 91 other issue?7 1. United NatLons solidarity Ln tho polit 1c? 11 f1o1a recognltion of the Meditarranaan Comm1?11?mj Three Power Conference). 1 a 2. United tions co~0peratlou in tho ?1116 (8.8. Lease-Lend). 3. United Nationu unity in the field of military a?raw tegy. h. United Nations community of intepascs in postawar planning Atlantic Charter, U.N.R.R.11, etc.) Supporting Objective make the German People realise that a11 c1 oy o?m accomplish by p1"olonging the war is to msake m: for themselves, no? only during, but after aha war; and hh1t ithaj consequences of unconditional surrender will ho moxa ha&r&h1& than the consequences of continuing the wang7 war impossible for Germany. 2. The longer the war, the greator the and material destruction. The greater h) German industry by hombing)? thelgr? oulty of reconstruction. . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 1 u. The longer s36 ?ermems oppression of the-Goeuple? ?i 3g postpone relief For themselves; owe starved and enslave? by the Neal regimes 5. The example of Sicily and Italy and she 2 I of the Mediterranean Commission upon whion.?ossl& is ?e??eef sented. 6. United Nations? leaders assurances toes t?sy will meg be party to mess reprisols but will insis? upon s?esm punishment of the guilty. 7. Evidence of good?breetment From prisoners of was. 8. The traditional just treatment of beete? enemy my Anglo-Saxon peoples. 9. In is in the interests of'nha Unite? Nations thee Germany, stripped of Nazism and Lradltlo?sl militarism. be reconstituted as a member of the family of nations en? share peacefully in the prosperity of the posc~wer wefld. 10. surrender means that never in the life~ time of any living German will a German boy go off to war again. Supporting Objective [To dispel the fear of the German tervor meohine?? l. The terror machine is being weakened by casualtias?w dispersal, and doubts as to its own powers and 2. The terror machine can function only so long eS?xt $3 accepted by the German people. 3 A 5. The increasing brutality of the terror maehxne,$s evidence of its anxiety and weakness.5 Examples of successful resistance?to' ine by the peoples of Occupied Countries?? Supporting Objective [To produce pressure for-anoingyf? - Qt among the Gefm Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 German civilization. The German lee?erehip hes feathered tte one ?eet nt?j the expense of the peeple end of the natienel tnteres?e 5. The German leadership is prolonging the to save its OWE skin. AIM TWO. T0 CAUSE THE SATELLITES T0 ABANDON To convince the Satellites that Genmeny'e defeat present reality. to convince the Satellites that the of sharing in Germany's defeat ere worse then the consequencee of a prompt surrender to the ?atbed ?attens, end that there is no third course open to them, To make the Satellitee conecioue that they are within the reach of United Nations military power. To convince the Satellites that Germany will net and cannot defend them, but will try to make them battlegroenee for the defence of Germany. (N.B. This ?ees not eppiy to Finland). To show Germany?s decreesin power to her wilt a . upon the Satellites. A To cause the peoples of the Satellite goynt?ieefte sabotage the German war effort, bring-pnesi?re?' I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 R000100370007-7 ?5 row;iepe ?ance . Faeptiem?dt.cf??ac?ern??urcpe. SuPporting ObjectiVe (aJ [To convince the gatclliaes that ?1 present roalltyi7 Same cc themes supporting Objective of ?ip 3&1 Supporting ObjecbiVe [To convince the Sntellite? that the eoneeqpenoee d? sharing in Germany?s defect are immeasurably worse consequences of a prompt surrender to the pad that there is no third course open to them?7 l. The longer they stick with GermanyP t?e greaseW'Ehm?e human suffering and material desuruction. 2. The longer they stick with Germamy, the longer will they be exploited and impOVorishoo for Germany's benefit. 3. The longer they atlck with Germany, the longe? will they postpone their own relief and rehabilitation: u. The sooner they surrender, the copper will their countries he reconstituted as accepted memwmerof amp famiky of nations. Supporting Objective [To make the Satellites conscious that they are alreaQ? within the reach of United Nations military powengf? l. Ploesti and similar examples ca available. 2. The growing strength of patrion forces of the Uniteo 5 Nations close to the frontiers. Supporting Objective . [f0 convince the Satellites that aer?any ?cannot defend them, but will try to make th%m?? mu. the defence of Germany. (3.3.1Th18 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 nit Ge-menyfe dwell? upon the Satelliteeg7 1. Same as themes supporbl?g G?ie??i' 2. The decrease of Germanyle?erme?le?e??g??w both less able to back her demen?e fe?ee dent upon the Satellites. 4 3. Examples of Germany's failure ?e e?l?'ome ?ee gum demands upon satellite or oven upon Docuplow Gda?t?i?Qe Supporting Objective 1 [To cause the peoples of the Satellite ?e e?mw tage the German war effort, bring pressure upom their Gover?w ments overthrow bholr Gevornmenae they resist such pressure. timing 5? gene will veey i for each country.l7 l. Campaigns to encourage sebobage of hremepoet, wl?na holding of manpower, hoarding of crepe; eth 9. Promotion of oissension and explicit or implicit stimulation of all democratic groups. 3. The Satellite Govarnmente are continuing lo Germem$?ev; war at the expense of their peoples either to serwe their own interests or because they lack skill and courage ue=rew verse their course. 4. The Satellites must "work their home?l ?he? will be judged by their actions and by ?ne ?egroe he they help to shorten the war. 3 5, Mutetis Mutendis, same as themee eugporting:?b?eehiwe of Aim One. Supporting Objectives (3) lie dispel both the Box, Anglo/U. leper: . a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 DeclaSSI led a Apploved 0 Release 20 3 09 nettl?m?n? US Luf??il $.3me as anam?a 5 of Aim One. TO COME-LETS THE GT MOBILITITG THE PEOPLTT TF THE CLUDITG FORETGT IT WITHIN THE TRTMEWDRK 0F NATIONS FEAT OBJECTIVES. To sustain morale. To maintain discipline and, whila sombatiag to avoid premature overt actioni To ensure disciplined canopwratlan of The whala in all degrees from passive to para-military in canrc?m??y TTETTW the requirements of the United Tatgnna. (I To stimulate the peoples of the Occupis? Toun?stT to prepare themselves for fuLure voluntary cauap?ration TT ?ependent members of the family of natiams. THEMES: Supporting Objective [To sustain moralo?7 l. The United Nations are winning the warm politically and economically). 2. The peoplea of the Occupied ountriws TPT in Haw forefront of the armies of liberat1on of which aha faruigmgv ;Lw workers are the ?ne advance guard. Ir. 3. The Dccupiad Nations thruugh th?iv armed farch amT? esour08$ outside Ocaupied Territory are alrea?y mg??mg aw y'h major contribution Lowards winning the wazm 3 Each Occupied Nation deal uiTh collaborationists. x?n i? 5 This is tha last winter nef?re DeclaSSIerd and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 time (Avis, etc.) Supporting Objec*1ve ensure elect; Linmd co ef the w?ele geegke in all degrees from pass eive t0 pereemixitmey La eenfermk?? wm?? '1 Ah the requirements of the United Netienegf a 3 1. Stimulation of undeueeteble eebe?ege ?g?iee? port and communications. 2. Stimulation of the withhol?ing ef I Germans. 3. Stimulation of administrative a??etegek 4. stimulation of evasion of slow-down of forced labourm 5. Support of para-m1litery aetivatg by ge?eiee areeges where consistent with Un1ted Natiens'p?enew 6. Demoralisecion of German/treepaw Supporting Objective Declassified and Approved or Release 2013/09/23 oroatod wit?in the 3. We s?oro and support tho tiona of the pooplo of tho Oooupio? that t?e sufforing? ond the Occupied Peoplaa have g1vwn them no? o?ly vig?a but the competenoo to mgko on meorto?? oom?vihu-?o?-?o reorientation of the poot?wor worho? 5. Full explanation, with particular appxioabm?$ay ?o each coun?ry, of United Nations piano for rmliof habilitation. 6. The United Nations will insist mgon the raa?or??io? of all property looted or anolon from the occupie? Goum??i?? by whabover means. To CREATE YHE MAXIMUM GUODWILL AND TION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS mom momm- OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. (N.B. This in Brihhah is a Ministry of Information function.) OBJECTIVES: To ensuro resistance Lo eventual anom? agurassion; 10 ensure continued nouarolity whore it is in tho Low terests of the United Nabiona military polioy. To create an ravauroble to such maturol countries entering the war on our sido oa the Unito? Notioua High Command wish to have do so. EHEMES: Supporting all three Objectives: 1. The continued existence of tho nou??ala oagfreo gn?? independent nations depends upon a Uni?o? Nation? wio?oo?g So ?oss their continued enjoymenh of tho Sour fgoa?mxgn . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Supporting Objective [To ensure continue? nauterjhy?w?mrm interests oi the Unttad Nat-10m mummy policy? 1. German defeat in a present raaiiby? (?ll aavam; themes supporting Obj?cniva un?ar Aim Ema.) 5th October 19u3. Declassified and Approved For Release2013/09/23 FEW Era ?ow son? men ANNEX, Ii JOINT AND stems/leis. ts IN suppose OF mes/own. oestrus FEM The activities considered in Cal to Qt? will be undertaken jointly by one 3? as an extension of, and in conjunction with, the main ?uW?Esf 0.W.I. Political Warfare campaign. The operations skew in fact, a continuation of current bleak ens watts propaganda themes, to be supplemented by use of agents ?n&.gents? to the requirements of OVERLORD and the contingency 0f R$N?i?e For convenience, each paragraph is divided into two parallel sections: Occupied Territories, and Garmeng. A. PRELIMINARY PHASE Occupied Territories. This is the period of organization and education of the civilian oopuletions in occupied territories. Political wsnfere will be planned and executed with the purpose of bringing shout conditions considered essential for the success of minimum enemy morale, optimum patriot morale. Should the node tingency of RANKIN intervene, current activities woeli be accelerated and brought to a climax; but the preliminary wo?k? is identical for both operations. The objects of this first phase fell under threats .3 headings: (1) To Injure the Enegx. To supplement the spee1f?h_ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 .1 am A. . . nonfusion one ?e d) Guerille activitxoe; Promotion of strikes. (For details of oporotlone, Append?x it? (ii) To Secure Maximum ?id for Allied The populations in general will??e e?imuke?e? ?e the Allied military authorities, e? Bhe Followi?g brood lines: Utilization of inhobitnnto' local knowledge of enemy'o dispositions, nous, dumee, ate. Utilization of local labour, Skilled and tmeicilliea?. to smoolomont military personnoi. Prescrvation and reconstitution of 100%. recorde useful to the Allies. Preservation of food?stusfe, livestock, fuel? vrih'iczlirs, eta. (gov drtails of Oporntion-, so; Appendix II) To secure the Morel: of Civilian Popuietionsl and to Guide their Opinion etworn new and D. (1513? The success of the objects in subuparegrephs (L) and (ii) is douondent on tho maintanenc: of civilian morele at the highest possible level during tho period of suspenee between now and D. day. In addition to a general,educehionel campaign instructing the populations how to before and on D. day, we must conteroct the depressing eifeote cf another winter without invasion by a constant, overwridiegff \during and after D. day. ?_?For de?eile or operations; sgeVA?pendi Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified an Approved For Release 2013/09/23 pmnm? to concont'a?m 0m Calumna inui?e Germany: nonmariptma Fows?gn ham alvnaa 3 been generated bv 6 #31} ?g fur??e? and organiZUd by spewial agente?bgf??e dep?r?uvw own countricsa Defeabist talk, rumoure, M?d ge?e??i me against the German civilians will be the whief now manned chLafly by ??remgms? workers, will also be penetrated so &a ?n un?armin? eke-m?yaig? of German troops, tho 3.D., the 3.5., and Todt B. PREPARATOHY Occupied Territorius. As D. day approaches, the bempc 0f all activitiga under? (ii) and (111) will bu accelwrateda A aanse of urganay will be in all white and black activitiae and madtei Agents and mlSBiOnS in tha field will bu to 01056 b?m at gaps vn their organiz ntional and upgrabionel plan:s. in particular, undermining of troop morale, and confusion of enemy, enter the final stages and will b8 made a& Wideapree? as posaLblg. 9.9mm- Foreign workers in factories, and Todt workere, WEE: be urged to voice subversive and ?efaatist views more freely, ta slack, and ideally, to paranada their ao-warkers (in the fotmer group) and their guards (in the latter group) he ?mint the?M?m; "ca' canny? tactics and breaches of dissiplinat i C. ASSAULT PHASE Occupied Territories that "The invasion has begun,, Resistance grQups and agents t" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 a 1113111111 111t1 111 11111 ?hrmugh radio 11d 11111111 1:111 1111 different 1011191 or ?mgarua?1va a1 1111111.1 ing to proximity to the b11111 1011. mare manu disorder, w111 hm 111 0111111 1111111 11 1' table DQIltiGal imwlicationa, and Bha p0311111161?a?'1111; measures by the enemy againsto chLLians. Gurm?ny. During ftrat hours of tha invmai?n 11 1111 11111111 not be to instruct conacr11phmd 1111115 111 1111 1511111 to stage Strikm? or break tnto opun revol?1 1111111} 199111111 on the degree of impaat rngistorud by 111111 111111111 11.111 German home front, somv forma or ngitatLQn will 10 1115111111 . . togethernath rumours, dofuntist talk and gcn1111 31111~1&1. D. PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT AFTER 019111101 1111111,111111111 - "75-72:: At this stage, activitLaa will raquira to 11?11111111d11 into thr?e main arena: ml 1 mm$eans? (1) Back Arqgg. nonsolidation of the liberated popul11mam 31 1a 11 afford Maximum Aid for Allied Milit1r3 6111111011 1111 11 pursudd. In particular, tha day-by-??y 10111111u11 af?t?a population will require to be watched, 13813311, 1n1.1antr01?11y to encourage good elements and goodthinking, and 11 111111 nnti?Allied attitudes. 1? (11) Eng Back Areas Activities To Injure the En1_?_will Gauginua~ta 11 promoted vigorously in remaining enemg3haekhargaah 111,111 1117i" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 nannt on tha 333333 33 333333 333333; 333333333, this munt be 33133333 633 3333P33am3333333 333333 33?3333<\ and S. to durb tha TrmJ?n 33333. 33333333 33333 33333;x* therefore, h3V3 *3 b3 farmul3333 33 {33 33333L33 33333333 E. PERIGD 3112333523333 33 331? 31,33 1,29 1: Spocific p?ans Fer Allied 333 33333 3333333933 33 33L3 33 Germany, will depun? mainiy on 333 333333 3? t: 3ucc 33 13:3 333333 by Allied arms. Emanuan Hf: 3f and 33313r3n3n 53 3333333333 groups in unnmy~hmld turritnry will 33 3 primar? 33j333133; 333-3= by ~v~vy 333313313 m33n3, mf trumps, 3333333, 333 civilian insidm Gurmnn" will ?ntor?tnv finai 33333. October 53h. Ln . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 T0 INJURE THE ENEMY A. 1. Inunmnilimtion of Enemy Tmnwert amt?timg??tmtm To supplement the 1arge?scale, S?ecifie tmb?tege?etteete against transport end communicationa prepere? by $.dc?g few'?r day, it is proposed to prepare For wholesale $5 enemy rm 1, road, telephone and teiegraph facilitiee by t?auee??e of simultaneous smell acts of interruption, easily exenwte? by untra med patriots. Tactically, thin will turn be acmcunt the enormous numerical advantage possosned by the pctuimtiom ever the ctupying enemy, who cannot prevent, and anly with difficult? repair, an unfinite number of stoppagen; technitally, the simpler forms of musn sabotage are well wtthin the pavees at ordiner; nJleiuns; practically, the plan requiree only the realizatgon by the populntion of what #5 neededObjective be achieved by combined whtte en? bleak hepinn?up nuw and Continuing untii D. day. The total 000:7L\cn - Egyulatiwn versus tranqport and cemmunicmtions effers which Seem tn justify it tigh, i? not priority in the joint Polltteel Warfare. ?dcrm ning Enemy Marnie, espvaially Two Waraie. the Russian Frent, the bombing a? now it are known to be having prefour? effeete on the minds of tte individual German soldiers. The time wee never riper to attempt the systematic undermin*mg 0? their morale. Rut this is a plan worth carryimg out only if dame a considerable scale; epecially trained organising egente are? required in the chief Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 Him..Ln linwn 5? 5555551 5551555 ].nnri traog?, .51555555 555 5555 -5 be Worry and @xm?pmr?ba L55 555555 55555:; 11LL15 by Litnie to branmh?a nf 5155155555, morale" an hunb5n5n, f?bh?r?. 555 hum5n 555555,;;1 The musL hm 5055551 555 55555555; ,5555 prasupuouus compLaLu 10551 155555156555; W555 555 '55 55 555 and covering 155565 5f 555 55555?5 m111?5?y 555 5? lifu. ShLuchga Inca: L5 555555 5055555 with hr0055, lel bu used 55 and unchnaqLaus??omha? Mdbh?d3 wili anludu: gil?55L55 5? 5551;55555 of uniiv?duwl Laura, in?lrrutglon 55 55L5555c, vummuna, anonymous gawk {ij155555, lameetsr 155 555555? on thymus such as: i ?1 . bomb chi-1:11:55 ?5.5 2501551": hm; I coming batrayul bJ s? 11;;1 a . ?Angurs of pinpuu. bust mutmod5 of mal ?jxu? On D. day, 5h;s 3-: frauvss WILL Dr by MOPL Cyan muthods, *1 -. 1555513, through 511 m??iay 55 dcserL and surrendvr. on and ?f o?u??gmx Con?uslon of 555 unim"$ aucurLty, goLLca 555 rathur Lh?? convus5on on 5 stratugic proposed here. Thu :P:u1ut. on of basic rumauPs a, by 555553 555 black r5530 among chmwu unxus whoa. moral? 5511 5155553 ha greatly waakenud, can bu an imgortann some I Lbution towards 555 wholesale breakdown or dlSCipll?L and organxsation Rumour can be sup?l mentaa 53 mare 55551515 atferts: thar simultaneous removal or of Sign 50355 555 by the population; the issue of ?3135 555 ?05355 movemem? for tPOOps and material; ?5135 signs 3555 53 ?5555 55555; White and black media can aducate the 5551;;Tm"~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 4 . and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R00100370007 7 LerL From W?p??lfj? and ha?m?h%n0@ urn-- O?cuv 0n any far HpnannLnun ?y u?r?ggag? provided they mra rdunnbod Ln UMLL Le ?e Q?fy?w the enemy b4 anrrerc? in. Lme E?m? Lg method. Lhrnuwh Ln? mL?Lm Lat D. day. nppunr? huLh prquLcLL and would also Ln aganL Lad LduGL?m th aa aa to Lou?r. LLanb? be as "Puservun" for . eruLL LL LL ma; LuffLL rcnruesivL nn my H5: 5 mad he Lamd hit?ew?? nmu organised pquLots. and: II- Om 11H: (1. Ln Garmm& :Lirm m- . a T?zzr 33. L. any, 1L 3a . av? will accur in man} Lr.1 . 1 13:5 "1 kat 0% ital of Li?s enn$LtLon gum uttumrt Lu Lion . .L. 1? rk.vs. LunL?Ld other Lhan Lanngoti un . miners, cgvil ervaan, uLc. . ?1 La bk I "d?i*Lor L0 0 contacts, 30mg Hg an ?21 .I g?onQL oquan JCR unu White rw;;v=orL adun to and E1LL on?; ?3 ILIC 1enemy?s unminiaL?qnivL control of occupiad are&$ L3 largely dupeuiunt on records of manyowcrt re?oureca and eguigm ment. HIS system is complex and ?mechanisad?. Duaaruccian QL certain types of records will burden his samurai of civilian . 4*a1 mpm?mtw elements throw his sytum into confusimn at a cine; k? . . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 61666.6666656666 6111 51 gP?dm mivil 66vV6666 666 The population $6666611y 6111. 666 66 66666? 3616 6rnon (burm T6wn?H6161 66 616 #6 ijoatiVU 6. (Pvaagrthion 6f R6 66666 6666' A. 7. 666 En6my nf $666 463 ELMEE8 and. th?? 1461? 01"Fl1. $Je?iflc 0666661066 66666 6h16 6666166 6666 66 of major 3.0.E. inspired S?b?tagm 66 g66661116 6661666 it is envisaged that considerablu 6666666 666 66 61666266 populations in 666 way of pi??mring, dmmagiu6, con66m1nating, 6LC., onumy and aqui?m?n?e 866666n now and D. 663, 66166 mmdia Will 366683 616666SIE61 by patriots 1n othur 066666166. 61666 66611 #111 6666666 white by givxng explicit instructions ?66 66 63 666 Kinds 66 A 8. rivig; Enumly oi and $665 o- Thu d6struction of mor616 666 Long 6666.6 primarv w. E. O. E. and much 3660653361 yerformed. The aim 0f t616 6666166166 666666106 is 666m6616;\ to nullify th6 hard corc of traitor$ who may 6666: by 666 66666 on D. day, and to bring such prossure on th?m 666066 D. 663 6666 some at least will betray thbir masta?s eclaSSIerd and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA R000100370007 7 I?Declassmed and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 399 33303311; I TO SECURE MAXIMUM AID FOR ALLIED MILITARX B. l. Utilization of Populatl-on?o Local Knowlnaam Dispositions, Dofoncos, _Dumps, Except in zones closed to oivill?n?? on?mn? cannot conceal his dispositions from the local popul??lnny kanr there is a vast store of vital local ln?olliganow available, provided it is Offernd Ln form nn? is demonstrably reliable. To tho ?asks of llied InhoL? ligenco off cors, educational propaganda in proposed mainly through white rndlo and loofloto. To suggnat soon actIVLtios to the population has furfh?r advantage bayond direct utillty: Lt will increase tho anomy?g fooling of surrounded by hostile elements, may impose extra and anonvcnient (and always inadequntn) aoouriky monsunna, and W313 the popular one sofa and construotkvo work in the! period of suspense before D. any. B. 2. Utilization of Population?s knowlodgo This operation ls basically an untension of objectivo? B. 1., but an added purpose: to amnuro of?eomr patent, rolmoblo :ivllian gui?os whom militany op ntiOns bog;nx Direct appeals by white radio and leaflets to spaoiflcz lik?ly categormos, such as postman, Boy Scouto, ex~soldiers? gon?onmn?x etc., are envisagod. B. 3. Utlleation of Lon a1 Labour Resources, Skilled and to Supplement Milita r3 Paraunnol. leo objectives B. 1. and B. tn} 3 operation woulq? serve to educate workers in gonaral as- to ?no of them durj.ng, and immediotoly after garago*hands, builders, decki a una 0th Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 .4 - - z; L..- -- 1 $?ang? anniut?ncu to Fianna? c?m?unt?? in-n?i?na r"a enemy demolitiuna, prav1?nd ??naa gruupe k??w'i?z?v they Will be needed; Educatmm?n? in is again envisaged. B. 4. Utilization of Local A.R.P. and Public Sorvicea. Apart from the negatLVG line We wish 9f pu??EmK: services to follow and which they probably wall, 1? e.g. to serve the enemy as badly as pmssiblo and ?0 themselves and their plant, it sanms dustrnoln an gramnza gy?u? activity of Lhleldu?lS, (First Aid, mack) t0 Stand? and maintain mass morale through tha dangeroun and uncomfar?nbiu period of day and immodLat?ly after. An OVu?t sauna {?nal campaign by white leaflets radio is Lndicwbud. Rnsul?s cannot be 100% but neither a thy; bu nil. In ?dstiOn, the organisatzon of such ens; groups is an activity to wh ch thu enemy cannot very Wuil object, cVun theugh he may suspect that such groups might pnrform Selecteve on D. day by failing to put out strategic flPuS, ate. B. 5. of Loyal Legal Administrativ; use ?nliuu 2.922.033.1322; Because is charged with the pronnrution emu ?iatriw bution of "Black Lists" for D. day operations, it upganre dam sirable to extend to populations generally the alrua?y wi*av spread being undertaken by 8.0.3., S.I.S., an? Resistance Group agents of collecting uvidenqa fer an? ageing? 14? .1 local All propaganda me?ia will be used tn exuunith? A- fully the possibilities of ?unorganisad caunter-espiewuge.? 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 uselul Ea thu Aill?E EE EE E. made by dlffuroniiEbLng bu?wEE? natal? Eug?b raooraa, o.gs links a? EEJEE . German H.Qs. an oppoaed ta Ef Town Hall. Apart t'rom airman ?lf' diathctionS can be wlqboratnd hhrmu?h supported Ln more general way by thEE B. 7. Proservation of Food Stuffgj bl?q?tQ?ky??u6?k For aomo time thLE them? has noun 3 Ef appeals an Whitc and black mudta, ta Em occupied with rufarancE BE of the harvest. Supmr?tu and using all posgiblm prapnganda forma EupplEmEEt SEE-mmrw direct ;rort$ of agunta to organism nhu hiding . u? I sary, the buying) of non~pcriahmble commedmLLEs. . Declassified and Approved For Relase 2013/09/23 - ?eclaesified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA- 7 T0 BFCUBEW MGRALEW 0E THEIR Eo AN d. 1. Prqugation of u_Ren113313 Undarnhan?;r? for_?po Civilian Population, in an Elvt This is not one, in fact, several ?g?f?tl? Ea related that they are groupod under a singxg In preparation for D-day it will be Vital ho kap? um of and educate the occupied p0pu1nt1.onn as to To survive the invnsion with as little logsron? suffering as possible. (14) To cause maximum trouble, obstruction and domoralisaa tion to the enemy (Objectives A. Actively to help Allied military forces (ijactivES B. The problem is complex, but a: ernl pointo Ebnn? out. us must first make it plain that we oxooct and Ara aura, botwwon of the practical of the population, whom we regard as Allioa. We must u: presenting as ala?r?y comprehensxvo a picture forocmst Ea must fit every specific request into, or at least mako in con# sistent with, the general picture we orvsent. Mccwec n; now and Daday, 1: will be nacassar; to a constant and consistent larg ?scale oduonttomal and mEEala~ building extort on the above lines. To progont such a masa of informati.on, instruction and advice as a oohorazt whole, radio (with its limitations of transmission time amd ?hfficulhy of recention) and leaflets (equally limited} OEnnEt be relied upon to keep and maintain the various tho?os i?r?l?a? p?rsgae~? tlve. It is, therefore, to use thase Rmdi& as shrang: support for one comprehensive basic quklmt which will the widest pos?ible?gistributicn, aven.atl tha leaflets, betweenlnowgg ?nd Dnc?mn. . . and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 Declassified and A oroved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 SECRET elaborate on subjeccs which it ?nale we enemy reprianls against cLVilians ace o?leo?e?s} 8o see?e Openly :In a white publication. - In addition ta the basic booklet): whee ?eece: anti ?Aztecs? leaflets will summarise information on: eelfeswsserva?ion theme; enemy morale theme; eabotage; aid for the Allieey etc, C. 2. Securing Information necessary for Direc?ion cf_?rcnaqen?e to, and Relations with, Civil Popu1ations. SLEHECAODS excerienced by P.W.E. in the past heVe shown up the difficulties of collecting and collating inielligenoe from its own and rther sources and keeoine the material so up?to-dote that accurate analysis or inference can be assureem In the planning of Political Warfare and propaganda to aboututow be liberated napulstions, it will be especially noose? sary to provide machinery to give accurate (almost mathematical} quali? tative of opinion on such subjects as: who are locally accepted leo?ers; how much has potertial resistance been lowered by ?tion; is local Communism ideological or the resale of grounings Within the resistance movements? To secure -ucn men chinerg will require the organisation by agents of investigators and informants on the lines of ?public oninion polls Results made c'rilc ble to all interested intelli gence or'anisatione will have comelnercble value during current onerntione; tney have an ever?:Incrensine imr ortance to D.C.A. and civil organisetiens in established occupation areas. 0.3. Distribution of News and Instructions to Until D-day, the supolying of?news to occupiedu ??iteniee largely devolves on the B.B.C. and other Allied be? oa?caating k? systems and on leafletm distributed by the Anglo-American Air Forces. Instructions to Resistance with 5.0.E. or the ExiZLed Governments. I . . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . . ssified and A ro .Lumn? 1 ll formulate independent actions. To counteract t??ee it will be of the utmost importance to con?ne oemnontcettnee with the Continent (possibly based on Morse etgnnie?g one at t" .eame time to exercise no much control as noesiblo on the neetew, tance grouns, by equinping them as emergency news as well as instructions. C. H. end Maintenance of Contact. Contact, as considered here, is with grants of ctV?? pogw ulations for the purpose of supolying leadership elemente to not yet organised communities. Whilst this concave to be aria marily a 8.0.3. function, agents specially trained for enbotege are not necessarily suitable for contact and organisational worml Beccuwe of considerable dependence on local recruiting, and training, there is a special need for ooychologionl conditioning of trainees through printed and spoken block medics the distribWe tion of which could be locally controlled. .4 . . I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 (m etmpervt 5" 144/3314 it, WWMW 1244?}? 4- . Jul; 1. The relieving vatannl ?ummeriee Fm? WRANTE. HOLLAND, NOHWAY and DENMARK have been prep?red by and eg?ee? between the vqunua anuntry Sevtidne Wf ThnSe ?ummnriwe Will be mew? ee notaa LU planning and marry mg nut ?n the above?Mnn??J?e? Occupied TerrLtorlen the apnruttene 143:"ihmd Ln Awee?w.nwe II and of Annexe of The ?1en fer Poltt cal Warfare (- 0.8. Psyohmlochni Herrera). ?Attentmon is drawn to the M33 Ln $$0h23umm?f?, shows that the and melemwn?etLon a? the oyermu are largely on two feature: Securing full of ihe relevert Government~1n?Exile (or National 3m4wa*t? Securing an adequate names? a? nationeie 05 the countries, to be trained and ea mgenmew 3o These requirements, which are now urgent; wilt sitete the Lntervention of C.0.S.S.A.C. either expect, or, theough the Foreign Office; they are recapxtuleted belewm country by country: . Potential agents can only be Consell de la Remistance. It may be neceseang 1'??ntervene on behalf of Ef?e f0? tn secure this noo-epez?eexemm meetings, to be held shortLy with the Geneeil, conclusive. Declassified and Approved For Release 201309/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R00010070007-7 Declassified and AEproved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 (by It 33 333333333?33 ?33 tn he anL333 33 3333 333 333 333333 33 3333333 t0 impmr?nmCQ 33 33333 3L3 313 33333? 33'33 33:? aurwte Lha 333333333 333333?33 3333333 3:333 3:33 33333 3333333 much L3333V33LL33 33 thug 3333 3133333333 33 ?333333333333333 own Lo 333 3323333 33 m3an333n333 3333333 armo? faraca. mm Dimer. 3333333 333' 3331333333L33L 3L3: L333 nra new 3333 by 333 ?r and Lt" tI?L-e 3:33 333333333: Lt lel Um for Fnralgm 033333 La 33.L33L333 to 31,11;anqu thwse r'nqlma?ba. NQRW3Y: an by CLO 3.3.3-1, wah the Norwegtan LS pruuraqulaite 33 333 33333L133m333 of sathxactory co? Durwaan the 13:33:? and wawe?aih ".nri .3 S:nc-- there Ls no Oovwrr mwnc~Ln~ExL?33 33 action by C.0.S.5.A.C, L3 ad. 3. UntLl actLon has been taken along the abova 11338, 33 real can be made Ln satin .ng up required o~ganis3t?qn' in the field In opznion av and (8.0.), unless these facilLtLas becoma available dum?ng 333? month of December, there Will be Lnsuffloiant txma preparky :3 organise and execute these aperations. 26th November, 1933. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Jamey maham ?Regwiossl ?umm?m? ?1:255..th (General Note: paper, jointly drafts? ?t and will be used as guidance by thoso Wham A translating, from tho boners. into tho the terms of the Floss for Political Warfare, Annex ?1 with I, 11, and paper as read and as a on tho operational 1. The operations dosoribud 1n Appendices I, XI gnu of the Joint Plan are provided that tho following two essential conditions are fulfilloo: That full co?oporatlon of the Consoll as ls assistancn is requested, and That a clear distinction be betwuon specific "professional" tasks and tspgotsi and the mors numeral acthitios to bo orbmnisad and lnsgirca by among Lhu ?nan-profusslonal" Fronch As regards only with tho co~opcvatlon of the will it be possiblc to socuru tho longs of agents rcoulrod to the Plan; Yurthor, nVum if agents were available through P.W.E. and 5.0.E. souPCss, thosw man could only establish authority the massws in France witl tho backing and co-operatlon of the local Resistsnoa groups? the selection, training, and placing of agents will be grostlg accelerated if the Conseil instructs Resistance group las?ans} to recruit and train agents in the fiald} to was relatively very small number that can be trainnd.ih Grog a! 4' (D?e'claesified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: 7 it is prapcnaa; ?hevafa55, 53 ?rmwawg am ?g ml 5h tho mun fax items 5113635 (5951511532530 :535 51715 discussion with the Consul} an t?e Eagle 5355 ??ai ?v?5?a act.lv1t 103 arc tho normal wlnter 6f F?W.?rf?g?a?p 1n the wn.ri'e.rw field, ?at 600 g??w 3133111137 or the: migrations being, unmet to the: 3:555:55 ?555 eventual Allied invasion should be en?ie?ga?, As regards it has Dunn agreed tha? 3:0.E5f3.0: will divulge to dctalla at ?ne ?prefsaeienel? sabotage and guerrilla plans, so that the organisatlmn of, 5am propaganda to, the "non?professional" masses will 155d 33, as far as possible, entiruly sugarabe but complementary aeniom la the field on D.-day and Lh reuitc:r. 2. QQMMEQES ON II anp?lgg A. l. Transport 5 Thu gepulat Lon will be encouraged Lo tukl all tossiblt action on against moving and pa Pk ?banSC smell; ear perks and small petrol depots. '?om rrafassionul" action Agela$o thy followxng w_ll b\ all linms and installatlons;lmporLanL rvtrol iegaLs, all Lalcphamh am? tulaw graph and uaLLl A. a. - lelaud wark, ?lth same vaults, has by F.N.E. end S.O.E. Plans for intu??irlu?tmon are in head, but 3:5 largelf dependent on churlng properly train50 e5enns from the Gamswill undertakb ta dulivlp propag?nda material 30: initiate distribution from uhu followin5 pieces: Earlig g?ons, Rica: Tauggu$a# Ra (Note 1: These centrus can, and will he, naua as distribution p@in53 for ohn?rl?eliti a warfare material callu? for in.tha Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and A pproved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 4 100370007- 7 AA A. AA praiui AA salootwd Aubaagents. AA AHA population will Am in brand, will bo made to prevent "confusion" AA Able to turn Against our forcos. already been given their Aptolflo AA Kept entirely separate from thtsa AA certALn instances, A linkLnA-up ls to be A. A. ACEAKAELEE - In vlow of gusAAillA aotivitios for D.-day and dlructud by 3.0.AAXA.0AA propaganda and organisational work will stress the follOW1ng points: individuals who, on D.~dny, wAsh to perform guerrilla and AAVL the arms, should form thtir own independent bands if thuy do not bAlonA to Alrumdy organised groups; they should not to Attach to other bands which thoj may ask in tholr nulghbourhooi; they should not attempt attacks ag?lnst Aroundod Llrorxft, guarded transport or tank important patrol well-protected Gtrman millt?ry H.Q.'s, but should, '5 much possible, attack only unltAA small LHSCILLWCAOHS, and military H.Q.'s. To avoma Gorman ny3-? efforts will bo mAdo to Asv ALVltios to districts not so far rtmovcd from thy battle AroA as to make thoir activitlts so dangorous ms to be 5. - plans and for D.~day can only be olsboratud Aftor ounsultatlon with Aha Consoll, which will be rtquirsd to divulge the sxtent Af own plans and those of tho C.G.T. Howovwr, it should As nened that many French workers do not belong A0 establishad trsdas unions; agontA outside tho C.G.T. but hAving C?nn?ati?n?.Wi?hg? ?it, will be required to influence Aha nan-union and A i I I pproved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R0001 00370007 7 Declass ed and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 A A outright dostruotlon. Proson? w??ow?d Vi?? elaborated after consultation wlah tho ?ldg?yf?g?w Av 7~ B?iBElviil? 32:22:91.2. .qs?nrmasgm Das'lm?umm hiding of foodstuffu is partly covorsd by soslss?los envisaged for guerrillas when attacking.mill?svy Ew?e's d?d dumps. Previous instructions to formor? ?o dopr?wo End Germans of crops and produco, will be conhl?uod, out the population will be discouraged from largo, wall? gusrdod dumps. A. 8. Dcpriving Enomx of Colloborggogg This operation don be performed only with the full co?oporstion of tho local Resistonco groups, and thoroforo, through tho Conso?l. Tho importance of discouraging and avoiding prosonsl vendubbss is recognised. Ideally, the Resistance groups should their own comploto lists of collaborators which could bo publishod or postod up on D.?day. Tho papulation would no instructod only to Ska out thoso Quislinbs whoso namos apgoar on thuSC ?official" lists. B. 2. 3. u. ULilggation of Population's Knowledgp of Enemy Dispositions - Local Topogyaphy - Locsl Labour Local Porsonnol for Public Services Rosistsnos Gran? aaduso are to 30m? extant familiar with tho moccasity of those facts; tho briofing of agonts in tho fluid will, thoraw fora, be and agonts will be provided with a h&3im? directive for tho furthor oducsnion of tho population, union can bu amplified through ordinory whito add black radio and loaflots. . - \9 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 a S?lfled and A roved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA 7 1 EL Loeru? in LEL Lim? oerLtiLnL. #mL 0.1 P?ggarlg? thu Popula?ion Low LL - The ba?je ins tructimnam Ln? ?booklct, clearly dtfining tum diffLronoL ?pv?f and "non-profnssional" holp and hindranou, will v~u LEL widest possiblo distribution now and TELL distribtuion will bL affected through 3 0 (as in A. 2.) and will be thromgn ResistanCc Groups. C. 2. ?vcur1ng Information for ?irgction of - Political considurations ron?er ELL co-Opcration of thu Consoil meossiblu. Whilu ruoognismng the importa of this operat ion, its sucocsa musL LL securing agents wholly under? control. C. 5. of ?ows and Instructiogg - LLsuminL nccossity on and after D.?day, of poasesaing communication for of and instructions of local powm;r and curanLL Li?l be modc of tho notwork of somL hundreds o? roccivcrs which will bL in the field at Lima. Arraygf? ments will bu completed, bmtwoen Ln? and the Consoil, for thosw Lo bulletins thru necessary to thu locLl Ln alternatively, to produce their own amiss Law public distribution. Decl and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 momma ogor? from, puroly guorrills soosvi?io?w ??wni?m; for in conju?otlmn Wl?h ?g political worfuro ono propognnoo guldonoo. mTpool; ?n Britain, of trolnod mannto will no ?oqul?o? ?ow thoso cmorgonoy duties. (Noto 2: Poles in Franco Education and instruction of tho Fronch population will includo motorlal to tho orgw? nisod groups of Polos in.Northorn Franco. HOVovor, bocauso tho5o Polos nro, so for, not compromiSod in subvorslvo activities, all instructions will bo issued in tho Fronoh languago. Tho oporobions in which tho Polos can give grootost assistanco oro: A. l, - Immobilisatigg of A. 2. gingng Troop ggpolo, conconbrotlng on Gormon troops of Polish originStirgln??gp ?Erf?ggL (llst: Torrltorlis Tho stipulation contained ln that D.-d3y approachos, tho tompo of all octivltios will and a sonso of urEoncy will bu prosont in all black and whit; activitios and media? should bo taken to moon that tho final stato of which this accolornnlon is designod to crooco will no achiovod without Surving prior nouico on s&onto, tho population, or tho anomy that military operations arc impending. 3w (1) egg Until the dogroo of collaboration obtainablo from tho Consoll has boon ascortalnod, and on ostimnho of sultoblo Resistance group agonts soourod, no lint eon no drawn up. It should bo noted that tho following ogorotions *1 are more particularly dopondqn? on a agents: A y' 5% a Declassified and Approved For Releae 201 3/09/23 Emm?EiLEqE?iwn Enauwmimn?g Con?unimn E: EHE aijrinn Ev uthEGE 1. g, E, w. EC E: GEE, Maintunanaa or Th0 pwssible cEVErEga by proportionntc atrang ;Eh of the gv?uga i? EECE locality anE thu Suitabzll?. Ev 0E subjects roquiro clash study in conjuncnion wiEE $14 It is nsaumcd that ono agunt in one laoality undortaks tho organisation of Epermtiena uffucting economy of manpOWLr and communicaticns. (ii) a.nd iac; litiaa requirod noE_ n?d D-d?y Detailud Estimatos cwnnot bu formulated am?il af?ar discussions with tho Howuvor, tho follnwiEg gemwr?m can b? UntiClp?tbd. To obtain tncsu, authority and backing of C.O.S.S.A.C. will probably bu r3 Groztly facilities for droyping contiincrs of rurol" materiml; Gruatly droyping of whltu by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. t9? . wag; IncrcusL of 3.0.E. communicabim f0? nstrucbions to, and rheuiving Paper ts fr? mm, EguaEE-ingtn?y field. E. As stated in the AFPRECIATION, tho imylementatian Qf operations in the Plan is larguly, not whelly; Esymn?anula?; securing agents through thu Conscil do 13 Rusia a; at. nccessary for to intarvanc on behm1f and to secure howaver, this contingancy will not oedu Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/9/23 aesified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 1? . a 1-. Decl {u . w. who: Mir/mm. . Regional, mammary. i?i?o?flf??t?; (Qggorol Moog: Thia pnpowr joho?oy drafted by ?nd will be mood ho ,ui?nnoo by tho?o month when translating from the go?owoi into tho particulnr, the rooms of ?ho Outiiho Plan for ?oliz?ool W?rforo, Annex II with Apoonoicos i, it; ?nd Tho power ohould, thoroform? ho rond and oonsidorod as commentary on tho opornhionnl 1. fiihjuligi COlln?or?tLon on political warfare mattera, Ln Lon?oo and in tho fivl?, hotwvon P.W.E., 3.0.8. and the Boggion nu?horibxoo (tho Govornmont and tho Suroto) hno boon wall ?ovolopod drying the post yosr. Ton joint missiono hovo boon despatchod to Belgium for oollticnl warfare activibLos With the full Pooroval of the Surotv which has loyolly in the selection of the agents (the Suroto is tho only sowrco of recruits), as well as in the wraparntion and financing of the A3 a result of this collaboration, mn? and the Belgian Govornm nt are in comoloto agreement as to which clandestine organisations in Belgium ghould receive encouragement and support. The main oolitical organisation is the "Front do l'Indopendonce", a union of all prowwar po?itioal parties; most of tho formations which, within thia organisation, engage in active sabotage are Communisb~oontrollod. None of the joint missions is now in contact with purely para-military formations such as the former "Legion Bolgo%, which hos now been reorganised under the homo of "L?Apmoo Q?;gongl? An emissary from 8.0.E. and the Belgian ?Kama Soction3x?u?;oh deals with para-military activities) recan?lsiretuymaor?rom eclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIAEelg?um w1th a ?111. rep ewt an th?e 15 vieit, the Be1gien authoritkee crew tE nna to give moral and financial Support. ?Wi?r/EEWw?w pro in egreement wince, ?1thoegh "Lf??m?E 1E not active in political warfares lte . and well-disciplined nn? can probably he mega few tion of leaflets and instructions, between new en? it is desirable that all pornumilitcry organieetteme Eheul? 3E acquainted with political warfare directivee to ?c11ti?n13 warfare organisations proper, so misunderaten?imgm field con be minimised, if not avoided entirely. Cont neta-3 ma" n1sc be devolooed for the purooaew'mEH?lfne?? above with a third organisation, 'Le Mouvement National Be?gew, whic:h work 8 in harmonv with the "Front do Should this motorialise, contact will be initiated and mainteine? in agreement with the Belgian authorities. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, II AND Because of the well-developed political warfwto ect1v1t1es during the poet twelve months, many of the themes 1n Appendices 11 one . ?d treatment. Their develop? nocorc?lence with the terms of the Plan, requires ex? and acceleration of present activities. In Aooendix I, all themes with the exception of A.3 (Confusion and Diversion of the Rue m3) and (Guerrilla Activities) have already rcu ceived some development in black or white radio, or in both. Degree of omohasis and frequency of mention will require further 1 plann11ng. 3 1 In hopendix 11, themes 8.1 (Population1s knEFIedge ef?Ememy Dispositions), 3.2 (Pepulation's knowledge of TopEkre?hg1yan? 3.7 {Proscrkation of Foodstuffs, etc. have alrea?y?hEeE?c1 developed in black and white radio. The rcmeie1n? themem be etcrted at an ear1y date. However, it is expecte?ithat.? 5 (Utilisation of Loya1l Loca1 Personne1) may meet with eclassmed and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 Declassif'ed I . 54]? I 1 end [Release 2013/09/23 . 1.. the main ehyuiael requiremenbe fer din 03 ?ame and Inntruceiens to the ?fe ?5$?5e?e?i?ee? paregreoh 3(11) below; the remaini?g reauire fur?ho? ?ieemeeion and elen?i?gm 3. 2.1m] ?1-315 011* neemmemm agents roqeire? Home difficulties nro ?3.3eeufieg ?ne required number of new Dol?t4091 warfare programme in Belgium. unless the Office intervenes the letter to release the number of men to ?he Surote (n00 New ?gontz A.1 - Immobiljentten of Treesooet: A.S Stirring no Strikeer of Belgian werkere in Germ?ny: Dissemination of suggestione and instructions to the unorgenmeed Reserves for replacing eventual losses: Totals: (Note: These agents agents fer the exteneto? e? ?he Qvgemisere WXW: Orgneisere Greenisere Resistante 0? Organieers (2 Flemieh 2 Welieen) Organisers WYW: with the Belqi?n Government to ere runu$r0d for the following Qrgeniaera :5 are required to eupplemeem the six organisations still in the fiel?x which are specially trained for and one of which contains an aehetege mission. These groups areDeclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . - CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 33 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 1111 31MQY111 QEEZEER An 1g1111111111 1111151*11111 1 111111 1111111 1111 1 11111111111 111111111111. 111 151111 111 11 11111-11111 111111111111: 11111 1111111 111 11 111 1?11 11111: 1111:3111 111' 111 111111 11 111 1111111111 11 r1111n1111 111111. 01111111111 1: 11111111 ?u 1111111" 11111111 111 1111 been 111111111111 11111111111 morale 111F11t11 Pigeon P011. ?ggdrill N11111a1111 111111111111 ?11 undermining enemy mmr111. Evuipment and Fncilitie1 required 11111111111? 1 fn? D-dax i Detailed cstimntes will be formulata? 11111'111 111111 comin: informal discussions between P.W.El/O4wnz. and $1?1?1f 3,0. with the Belgian nuthoritios. However; 111 fcil1w?ng general requirements can be anticipated. To obtain 111111 the authority and backing of will ymobably?b?ig necessary. ?avoral hundred Emerson battery 11111 1111111111 1&1 ciant,1n any case, for country?1111 org1111ed 11.331 n1ng??yosts. Greatly increased aircraft 1111111111 fer 11111111 containers of purely P. W. 1.1 matariala Greatly increased dropping 1?111111 11111111 11? A. and U. S. 1.1. F. on specific 1115111.\ 1 A small numbar?of 191111 111n11n31111111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 . - . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 this: at?d?timn 0f Brig/:14 their mz?zing mvaila?lw the num?q; ?f maapraw'waxw the field. The Belgian Sura?e wculd-?ela?ma eu?? Ln? erve?fk?ay? as they oneountur diffimulty in mmr?un?Lng'?ha to Order, or nvon permit, the relense 0f mag fr?m;?he which are nlmomt their only source 0? rearui?s, from tho Continent or from North Af?ice are ea f?Ww Declassified and Approved ForRelease 2013/09/23 TSLS by "th It ?11113 5:1 BIS/eda?rg used as by transla?Lng erS the MS cuLSr, the terms Sf the F1E . Plan for ?01111Sn1 Aa- Appendicca 1, 1111 T1111a pupa tharaiore, be re Sad ?f1d SS On Operational 11APPRECIAT10H At the pres sent time, only any F. E1 field, and there is an ubmanca of r911nhlm available upon the various WS1SS 1S exist in Holland. This state of SffS1rs is Sue to a Sf which may be cited the following: The department in Lha Natharlnn?s responds to 1.6. The Matherlan?s no contacta of 113 w1tb and its SEES Dutch Action Service which, 1n c011jun011en utLtS $1.0 contacts, is of the loosost. (11) Until recently, any contacts whiah between the clandesthe press in Holland and the Government in London ware handled by the Dutch 1S 1 conjunction with 1. this further handed to mach tacts divorced from those iaparbmenta whicS coul? mash and advantageously exploi them in an active rather than passive manner. Recent discuss?ons betwe31S1Sthn department: earned have, however, removed this obshaale ta San?eru 0.11 I and 0.3 11111111311. 3; . 11-1 .1 (111) Since personnei which awe racruitad b31? Dutch Farch ch and A . . I pproved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R00 - 0100370007 7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 . Kewauld b9 suitahfa.rar joi?b %minnimn is, in,a?y 0359! niaaunniomn will nhartly he maid Icint Plan, to ascertain what ?e??ae ar mLInbora?im?uw' forthcoming. anoul? thmse t:rlka ?r?vg qabkafan?ewy, da?piiwd plans, including the degren of Dutch WEI: formulnta?. 2. COMMENTS ON I, El" Eli Owing to the lack of previoum a?ncacn w?hh the ?m?cn; Action Service, as well we to 1% 0k of dstribution channeia a?d contact with the Dutch press, dataila? the extent to which the propoeed operations wmul? he feast?le km Holland cannot be made at jumuture. The objecta are, in una main, clearly desirable but their will be aapan?emt to a very large extent upon their degree of by the Butch Action Service. 3. ESTIMATE OF RF LQUIREMENTS 352.32,. Assuming that the Dutch Action Service will accept the greater part of the Plan, the following minimumKnumbar af?agan?a is repulred:- A.1.~Immobi sntion of Transport (b)A Enemy Morale A35.?Stimr1ng up Strikes -Dissemination 0f suggaa?iomsr and instruCti?zna to the: un?rganised populatiun "i the clandestine prefa' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 - Declassified and Approved For Rele 13/09/23 CIA-RDP1 {9612.31 mag/3b mini/was? far m?r? hing a5 rurtne? abld.j {11) Equipment and now Dateilg? estimates will be formulated between and wi?n h?E ?d?h?W??fQ$w Howovev, the rollowLng genarml wm?uiram??ts 06% be To obtain these, the nuthcrity backing 0f Ce?igvgn?r?; probably b0 nucaasnry. Sevewal hundred Emarswn battery raaeivars; muffi?i?m?f in any case, for country~deo organised li?t??i?g'p6333i Greatly increaswd facilities far'?roppn?g contnincrs of purely material; Greatly incremscd dropping of white laafla?s by and U.S..AA..F on specific. A small number of mobile printing units, with stacka of papcr, ink, etc., and the necessary printing staffs? fer use during Phase II of oparntions, to produca: 1. Anti?German morale material 2. Local posters and announcamants A. At a later stage, it may be necessary to requast the Fara?gu Office to support the direct requests for conperation which Viki ha made by and to the Hetherlands Gavarnm?mty -0- 26th November, 1943. 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP1X00001R000100370007-7 .4. ed and A pproved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- Lb. . :7 Eggi??ml 6666661V6 (General 6916: T616 666665 3616616 66 by Poga?to;0 I: and} 31104 used as guidsnae by 66666 6666666666 translating, from 666 6666661 1666 ou166,bhe terms 0f bha 6661 Pi6n for PoliticaL 6666666 66666 11 6166 6666661006 1 II, and 111? 166 66666 666616! therefore, be 66-66 and 6666166666 66 6 666? monhary on the 66666610661 166666 :66. 1. APPRECIATION The Norwegian Govornmont 6666666 611 im?mrmunio?? 666666666 Ga, and political worfaro activities in 6066666 66166 its concern, as roprcsontativo of ?66 Norwegian 666616 666 666 servant of the Home Front; the latter has 616666 66666 666 6666 tinucs to be, extremely jealous of what 16 661611666 ?166666 feronce from outside" in 606663166 6066616 6611663. 1616 tudo is given substance by virtue of an 63:666 amonb 1960 between the Foreign Offica and the 666663166 66* which the Norwegian authorities 66166616 611666166 nil B.B.C. broadens 6ts in the Norwegian 166.g6656 ?6thar than? 1 plain news bulletins) Efforts by to 36166 dfscussions on radio policy h6Va been aboirt166; tha ND?%Qgimn authorities have remained adamant in their 666166 16 66?6~ful control. As no black 660 610, one black station di? 6661616 66 considerable period, but was f?mvaod 16 61666 6066?66666661 I P.W.E. disposes of the nacasaary 160661661 Norwegian authorities refused t0 66166661166 Norweg1; necessaryl to continue those 66t16161633 secured infreturn for ful1 control Declassified 3 I I and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X0001R00010037000 7 7 operations over Norway are infrequont. In adJLtio?w can ana?i quantiticc of leaflets arc aont into Norway throug?xtha?nola controlled by the Norwegian authoritioc; additionam amami quantitioa arc distributed in Norway without two ?nowio?ga'?? t?a Norwegian authorities, through 8.0.E. chanaala; but this Iattor distribution is limited by tho fact that 8.02Et ara tound by agreement not to undertake activitioa in Narway without approvaI of the Norwegians. has been able to effect a small amount of propaganda by the indirect method of indoctrinatimg, during the training period, 5.0.E. agents sent to the field; but, the Norwogzan authorities have refused to pormit tho doapatch and Operation of agents for the specific purpose of political warfare. collaboration in tho past has been as close as the difficult conditions allowed; any closer colla~ boration on the part of 3.0.E. would have exposed that organasa- tion to the risk of joopardising its relations w?th tho Nervogian authorities, with whom it is already far advancad in planning jaunt paraomilitary operations. and are in full agraomant an to the allocation of activities arising oat of?t?o?ogenationst envisaged in the PM. E. /cJoint Plan? These joint operations can only be conducted sac i the following conditions: 2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/and tho ?31? ?5 1already botwoon rltloo. That tho Norwegian authorltloo to to up to for training and?bapatch as warloro'ogom?o: A few potential agonts are ovoiloblo in kho holding pool, but, o3 thoy are all momhoro of too ?atwogio? armed forcos, they can only bo by porm2331on of the Norwegian High Gommona. It will, ?horou fore, b0 nocosoary to recruit further poraonnol, oomo of whom may he found among NOPWoglon lo Swo?ong That the Norwegian authorities make available to tho necessary personnol for tho revival of Kor~ woguan block radio station, to asalst oporotiona ln too fLold before and after D.-day. In order to norm any possible Norwegimn suspiciono that and are: attempting; to carry on "foreign propaganda in Norway, and to omsuro ootivo collow boratzon from tho Norweglan sldo, it is tha? tho Joint Outline Plan be presented or; an integral part of, and a necessary precursor to, the Allied mlli?omy plan for tho llooration of Norway. 2. COMMENTS ON APPENDICES I, If ARE The following comments are made on tho assumption that the Norwegian authorities will ocoept the prlnoiplo?ok on? Qu?~ line Plan for Political Warfare, aha will pro?ld?_th nod Soar 1 ca Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 .11., ?r propagan?o an? organiaa?io? By aabotago tasks (91g. railwavgj to ?o by ?profosaional" agonta, scope of "non?professional" agentoa Tdi?o?iy? ?3 ?mi? differentxation, will indic??o ?d the type of target aoloctad for tnoxr Enudoy A.2. Undormining Troop Morale Onoo the roguiro?-?ombo?? of agents are in the field, oontaot will ho moin?ainoa through communiootionm. wiil an ostim?yo of communioationo reqnxraw manta, as well as estimates of distr;buti0n facilinias needed to food agents with propaganda matur?al. A.3. Confusion of the Enemy - As for ?g the massos of tho populataon are concerned, propagan?a.ond organxsatmon by agents will supplement tho more spooiflo deception tasks allotted to by C.O.S.S.A.0. support will bo all the more offeotive if the mgin terms of those tasks are aivulgad, so that ?nal? instructlons to the field can be made om ?ofinito as goaaihkox A.4. guerrilla Activities - The extensive guerrilla act1v1tLCS for D.~day inspired and dirootod by 8.0. and the Norwegian Home Front will ho supplemonto& by pro?Day education of the ?non?professional" massoa by P.W.E./O.W.I.propaganda. In addition, some agaoiol ?uuk?kgi"a of any spontaneously organised bands will oonraxq 3.0. requirements. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 f?mruwzian 111 111113 011119, hava 1119111 knov?. 1111111, anr dwavour to enlarge, 11111 1111111113? ?g ?f1 tha Norwegian 11111111115. 1.6. Destruction of Runwr?s 1 A11 319:3 111111 d??p?tchOd 1o tho flol.d will 1111r1v1 1111111 1111111g 11 this subject, to bo 18511 on 11101m1111n 1161111 1111 111 Nervognan authorities. In m?dition, endeavour to despatch Gnu 13011 1111 V1111 enemy and rocords, wha will in 1111 1161111 and traLn a number of spwcial agents. 31111 111 11111 propaganda to thu masses of the papul1tion will 1111 up 111 act_VItrus of agents. 1.7. Deprivzng Enemy cf Ford Stoo?g a 3.0.11/3161 91111 and targets will be dxscusaod with the 111111 Will glvo support with blag? and 11111 propagmn?a to those 111) actlvitios which appear to re quirn str1111ng. 1.8. Depriving Enemy of Collaboratora and the Norwegian Home Front have 1011111111 plans 111' this oporat1on; will, therefore, give 1111111 w1th black and white propaganda. B. l, 2 Utilisation of Population?s knowle?me - 11 Enemy DLspositionS - or Topograpgy;- ?3.11. agonts are automatically instructed in the importance 1f those subjects; but, wider task of 1nforming the 133113 of the population will be acoomplishpd by E. . . I I and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 Peclassified and Approved For Release 2:013/09/23 3:3 3.3, E, 5 a 3111 Nation .of 10 13 3 ?gcal Porsonn 1 0 Po ~Mafia as the various occupational groups al?oady'aoVQro?? 1o extent, by 101mm. 05 of and the; Front. 3.6, Prosorvatxon of Preservatiom of Foodstuffs Those are the posLtivo oountorw parts of 1,6. and 1.7., and are i?oludad in those opor1?iom?1 0.1. - Preparing tho population for an Alliod vacm mm, and what this Entailg The distribution roquirod, through and Norwegian Home Fron? cilanno1s of educational booklet will be oatim?to? 1n terms of and areas; P. W.E w. I may toquL1ro spootai agents to facilitio?. 0.2. Securing Information for Distribut1on of Propaganda to Civilian Fopulatiom - ?ne pro? an? post-D.-day importance of this operation roqolros the so; vices of special ag onts; in addition, adequate communioaw tions agents in the flold will be needed, althor through the network or through tho Norwog ?1an Homo Front courier service from Stockholm. 0.3. - of Nova and Instructions 0n:1ho assumption that there may be a complete or martial "blaox 1 out" of radio listening due to tho cutting off of power Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declass ed and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 - . all/activities; pf'ovltlo marinate (5.5 .656: 'with tho masses of tho popmlatlom; but bo sparo?, Ono or two should ho Hildad?o& for 3. ESTIEATE OF REQUIREMENTS Approximately twenty agents will be rooulred ?o drawn, tho conSOnt of tho Norwegian aothovi?iee, F?om: tho NorWCgian holding pool. These men will be required prinoipally fov'tho ?olioww lug opcrat:10ns which azo more particularly depondont on a suff?caonty of trained agonts: A.l. - Immobilisatlon of Enemy Tronaport Undermining of Troop Manolo A.3. Confusion of thu Enemy A.H. Guerrilla Aotlvitios A.5. Stirring up Strikes Utl satLon of Local Labow Resources, once Securing Information for Propagand? to Civiliane Maintenance of Contact. proposed to employ one agon? in one locality on several operations. Declassified and Approved Fo Release 2013/09/23 "1 i . Declassified and ?eproved For Release 2013/09/23 (a Greatly incraaqed containers of purely ?f Greatly inc raased ?rmppihg by 1mm. and mam/:31, mmtfid (0) Increase ef instructiona to, and reaeivi?g ?gpor?s fr?mya Een?e in? the field. As stated in the last paragraph af Ehe intervention by 3.0. S. .A C. with the Norwegia Go varnmen? ts a pre?reouisite to the establishment of satisfactory work??g relations between the latter and Until wunh a relationship exists in fact, the urgent task mf training an? despazching agents cannot be undertaken; v-thmut agents, nhe majority of the operations would either be impracticable er ineffective. 26th November, 19h3. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 ease 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007Rogionnl ?ummo?f (gpnorai ?gte: This paper, joi?ml? by Faonl?O-wolo ??giOJ?El/S?aq" Wiring uoo? as guidanco by wnon tronointing from the porbiw culnr, tho tormm of tho ?o?iino Finn for Political Warfare, A??ox Ii 215% Appendicoo I, II and Tho ?houi?, therefore, be road and conai?orod on a oomw on tho opornbionol Appomdioos.i l. In considering politionl worfaro in one important foot must be remembered: it in the only oohnary ?owing no Government in Exile. This oomdition nllows grootor of notion For politicnl warfare would oxiat if a Govornmon? nan to be conaultod, or van required to collaborate on oporntious. However, owing to its geographical position and con?nement difficulties of communication and the introduction of ogonts into tho country, hitherto purely operational considerations have boon dominant; it has not been procticnl to give political warforo train? ing to those 8.0.E. agents now oporating inoi?o Ronmork. But, in future, all agonta dispatched to the fioid will rocaivo political warfare trnining. It is agreed between and that th% recruiting and training of political warfare agonns for tho in?ghwawk once of the Joint Plan should be put in hand at once. While two agents might be found in Great Britain, it iolbaliovod phat tho oonaidornblo numbor of Dnnish Aryan refugees who oscopod to Sweden offer possibilities which Should he exglorod ?brough i ?1 contacts from Stockholm. Training on? 9 would probably take ploco in Sweden, owing to n?mog?rimp?parohl?' difficulties in transporting man from Syodanf?l?r?gm f1 ?1 3 i. rt. 21; book to Sweden or direct to Donmark. i .i 591% Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 practicable. anon/611m or; 11611131616 17 1:11:13 111' organised from inside Denmark, are in tho 95611536 66 development? 0n the other ham}y tho and 6*366665? tion of the Danish Resistance grougs, as axem?111166 6*?166 6666156 of actions and attitudes inspired an? directed by 3363661 potentially, the following oporntlons could be foctivo basis? - All.~Immobilisotion of Enemy Transport 1ft: 6 6 6 [6 6w will be supplemented by and the mnssas of tho population; however, the 663663 will 66 instructed tm kuop nwny from certain a? naniv1ty, 56.63 661 avoid conflict, with mom/3.0. opmr'nt?lons. . Troop Morqlo-ActleCy can best be 611m616666 through agents; 11 is possibla that 3 0 can 666166 by indoctrinating sevurnl need-agents who will in turn 66616 and recruit sub?ngenta; the latter will rem main antlraxy Gut6166 field organisation. may 1166 66 6666 to provide courier facilities. 3 A. 3. Confusion 01 Due lel b6 made black 666 specific 8.0.E deception operations undertakozn an inatrucm tions from C.O.S.S.A.C. and mass action tQ-b? animals-ted by 1 51 methodsw Detailed plans, cireu666?g of 9.14.13. rumours! 1111 be worked 621 1616666161123. 6166 available as to the main dooepblen plan Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: 7 A sAusAi PAH in ha?di inciting MAN Ao-ordinatAA ow all Danish civtl desirable than doStruction, and Agaiar t?;??dar?w A.7.~Dapv1v1ng Enemy of Food Atoq?gwadnarai haokgr?un& propaganda will be mufflciant to nobiAV? ?hiA ?bja??a A.8.-Depr1ving EmAmy of A comprehen?ivo list of collaborators; it mAy p?ova through black radio or obhor manna, ta ?Anoun?e S?m? 0f individuala before or on D,?dayt of? Populations local knowledgp at a Bowm?j Military Dispositiona of Topography A ?30 AA much as poesible, an excesa of unco~ord1nabad Lnformahi?n, instructions and appeais will be mada as AA ?inibe as possible, and in line with known military requiremantAA 3, H, 5, 6, 7- Utilisation of Local - Labour Resourcms Personnel for First A3 - Admimzistr ativa Parmonnai Preservation of dstuffs Preservation qf Remor?A A As the Danish civil administration 13 a functionina amti?g; and is expected to be loyal to the Allias, genaral propagan?m 1% expected to be sufficient to attain these dbjacua. C. l. ?Prenaring Pogulationa for an Allied Invasion? an? whaIt this Entails 3. 0 E.7S. O. are A ready providingj;?h Ouw.1. with suitable intelligence from the field: so thAt't? latter's continuing morale-building task can pe'mqga mOn?fa? fectiva. Propaganda on this wide theme will Aom?inqq made more intensive. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declas?sified?and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 Ia?a acmewhab easier. C.3.~DistrI ution of ?aws and In??r??.I5?si? a. radio "blackao at" on my causdd Ev cutting off current, it may be nacessary to provida an hxt?tsio? 3.0. field communicatiunn and, In addiFIUnr .rI? into the country prior to D.?day several hg?drId bn Enary?racaiww era which can be organised into a natianml nItIorI If'IIata?I?Qf posts, for news and Instructional C.4.-Ma1ntcnance of mparntion, Is agaimra?dargI easier through the expected loyalty cf the admini??raEIQ?I agents, and Resistance grcup ngant?, will pra?a??y be called upon to co-opernto. 2* at 3. ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMEHTS (1) Agent Six ngenns, and if poasiblc, four as rewarves, are quired as a minimum number to Implomant the ogara mtIorla envissgadm In all probability, these men will have to be recruita? Ina trained in Sweden, from among the Danish Aryan refugaea. It may be possible to bring one or two to Great Britain.for trains ing; but it is unlikely that time or travelling difficultiea will. permit all the agents to bo trained here. (11) Equipment and Frcilitioa required be stanlnew and ~dna; Detailed estimates cannot be formulatsd?at this ?I$gsig However, the following genaral requirements can b3 To obtain these, the authority and backing will probably be necessary classified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 :r - Declaslsified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIAThe possibilities of recruiting auitgbia ?g??tn be examined shortly by 0 through their Pa??e??a?n??35$H?a StoCkholm. Methods and place nf he an ?ne outncma of this enquiry. It is clear, howeVav! that unip?? agents can be to Denmark, the greater pert Jnt?? Plan be implemented; the necessity of implementing the g?nn 13 al] the grenLur since comparatively Little polx?ical activity has been from the field. 26th November, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . 49 I ed and Approved For Release RDP13X00001 R000100370007- 7 I I "?PubILcj 15:; and Peycholegwm Warm twee iwAwrvauxgutiwo OUTLINE PLAN FOR IPSI 1, TERMS OF emeritus): RANKIN C. is defined as: ?The one of organieea enemy resistance in North~west Europe: UnconditiOnel Qurreeder a: Germanya" II. APPRECIATIQII 1. This outline plan for RANKIN C. proceeds from Plan and is a particularisetion of Home of its eepeets. 2. This plan's First three aims are predicated on the existe enze of unorganized resjatanco. The last three eime concentrate on the transition from combat to occupational conditione. 3. The aims and objectives of this plan will in a large measure depend on the proclamations of S.H.A.E.F., which will in this context be P.w. instruments. k. In implementing this plan particular attention will be paid to avoid inviting Occupied People to premature or-preoipiteme action, whirh may lead to civil war or to German repri sale. AIMS 1. To enlist all possible aid in ensuring the rapid seizu?e of our military objectives. 2. To affect the will of remaining combatants so that thexf wiIl cease reeistance. 3. they wiIl both actively and passiver make can in? impeseible. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and A ved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA RDP13X00001R000100370007 my United NetiOno Loroo? of pookof? 5.?To induce in the anomy orderly oompii?po?~w??% imposed after unconditional aurron?o?. 6. To pwomoto in all Europe an atmosphere in wnio?.??e pacification of GERMANY and the roconst?u0?10? or C?p?in?n? may proceed with minimum expenditure of Uniboa Nationl fowoesl 7. To minimize the effect of the Displaced Per??ns ?vobiomeoa the military operations envisaged in RANKIN C. The objectives and Themes supporting these aims are oteto? in Annexe I. Iv. ?The preliminary and preparatory phases oro covered in the OVERLORD Plan. The warfare operations un?or RANKIN C. will be carried out with the some policy machimory, the same personnel and the some media as in the past 0-day phase Of Whenever it beromes necessary to effect changes in the approved themes already embodied in the COSSAQ Plan, one-of the following procedure will become operative: will, on their own initiative in.oonr sultation with S.H.A.E.F., effect the necessary change& in their Central, or in Special, Directi"os. S.H.A.E.F., on their own initiative, will suggest dnanges to be incorporated in Genpral and Special Dirootives. For emergency or contingency docisi issue Special Directives. . . and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7 07- 7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 511' x?z; Plan for 5 VII. INFORMATION oi nmjor phases of the operatien muEE be 1 .A .E .F. opposed to those of public minions: and causeway? 33o d3 taken into full consideration. DirecEIy~ EQEQ known their wishes, and O. I will EM 9 furl puE to the proper audiences by all media and, whenever feasible, leaflets. COVERT OPERATIONS Mgtatis mutandis, this plan applies also to coverE operations. IX. RECOMMENDATION Owing to the delicate question of precise reiationE wiEE our allies, the Russians, extreme will be uwed in tEe: employment of themes and aims as stated hereunder: Annexe I, Aim II, Objective C, Theme Annexe I, Aim Objective A, Theme 3 .Annexe I, Aim V, Objective A, with themes develr?gd: thereunder. 1 -. . or? I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 For Release 2013/09/23 A 0. OUTLINE PLAN FOR Kayne I PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES To all aid in ensuring the rapid ?elewre of our objectives. 219.19.23ny the Allies to enter GERMANY quickly will ensure that War criminals are punished. 3. from local transportation facilities will eld 2. Allies to enter GERMANY quickly will ensure that War Criminals are punished. J. in implementing the "stand-feet? Greer? B. .Assisting the Allies to obtain military objectlees will speed rehabilitatlon and relief. Theme. Assistance from local labor and trensportetlen?greaps?; will ensure speedy rehabilitation and relief. wee To effect the will of remaining they Will cease resistancew Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: 7 we make cembatante odmploto dofoat. l. Jontral paliticnl and military have surrundcrod to tho United Natimna and nationals t0 coaau all resistance. 2. American, British and other United Na?m?mg?arma? forces are landing in Europe in arggo numbers, 3. GERMAN armed forces have laid down their armar Organized rosistanco has coagud Remumning resistance is not part 0? a so nu@.va m111+ary plan. 5. Ev dance that the great mass of the ?90pla thcomc overthrow of thy Nazi bosses and Gestapc spies and opprosuors. 7. Amr war against targets other than pockcta of r0313: ancc has automatically C?35ad, but the threat atill exris 53. Objective B. To me]:e comb: r031L3(.it is thqu duty to cease resistance. 1. is suicldo. Resistance now 13 illegalw? is in deflanco of both GERMAN and INTERNATIORAL LKH, end those who resist are not soldiers, but cerinala. 2. Off: cars or Loaders with a proper sense of resp?naime resistance. Declassfied and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 Declassified and Appro . . .. . i 14x Ewi?o?cu of honou?abi?"?nd ?prmsanorm. A.) Any Ordorn purporting to domo?? $1 forgorioa. 5. Thu GERMAN armod forces have loi? down choir otmo (Thoma 3, Objective A.) 6. Rumistanco is not part of 3 oohosivo mili?ary'pia?? (Theme 5, ijmctiVD As) 7. nUudS all he? surviving mmnDOWor'fo? reconstruction. L. mu slings in tho Occupied Tarritorioa who tomcat continued arc traitorS in the oyos of their country. Thoy using GERMAN soldiers to postpono Choi? inevitablh punishment. To make combatants realiso that it is within their and in their interest to cease rosistanco. l. The repressive forces of tho Nazi State which woul? prCViously have taken roprisals against those rofuging to fight or against their families, havo boon disbandea :Ii disintegrated. to make men fight. 3. Those who continue resistanco. destruction. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 45? I: A. far 1. GERMAN fanutles are seeking ta G?rik? blow to CHUHU sufforimg and aaehruw?ie? befawm 0v prams; ?ma? . 2. last ouhrngu of pe?ae ewe to Europe; it is deferring re?ief and N.B. While rulhmf and in Em?epe of aha chief nima of the $6 #111 not be possible for UnLtu? (th?eugh ?s?.?a?gmqf to prov 00 large of Food and relay? Ehm malxinry occupation has been completed. Th 3 outrage LE dulhying the m?ment When way pr'sonurs ?1d labour conucrapts may return name from egnmewm; non-combatants Pu?llap that they can pie? in TC?lBtuan. :lj?humcGERMRN .nchincry removes the risk whieh formerly attached to action agninmt the GERMANS. 2. Small, isolated pockets of resistance are partieu VUalF?blO to both active and pasaive interfareaqe 3., sabotage and refusal to centribute in way to last resistance). .1 Declass?iand Appvroed For Release 2013/09/23 Declassif?ied and Approved For Release 2013/09/2 CIA-RDP13X00001R007001003700-7 1? ceasing work in munibion fectoriee, and coureging poseible reeruite f0? reeie?e?e? eke; Objectiveil. To make them realise that it is du?y to ehsmeexvee en? to their countries to help put an en? be reate?eane. Themeu for GERMANS only 1. Since the central politirel an? military iee?ere e? the 'Roirh have already surrendered to STEM further destruction, it is both illegal and immorek t0 engage in or support resistance. 2. The physical and moral rehabilitation of depends upon GERMANS taking an active pert. The first step is obstructing and discouraging resistance. 3. Lives needed for reconstruction of GERMANY mueb net be squandered in hopeless and pointless reelstance. u. Resistance necessarily involves the destruction,of more families, homes and workshope and makes more ?ifficuit task of building a stable society. Themes for 1 Patriotiem demands that Noanermane participate im.t?eff liberation of their own countries. ?an-Germans in ?nregn fight on nonaserman soil and emdang er;non?ge" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 'Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 TOP LUHPT: h. Ending RMAN res1stance is an 93? rounding up war criminals. 1 5. GERMAN vesiu?ance must not be per?i??ed ?6 restoration of NON-GERMAN prisoners 0f war a?a lab?r tuna scripts to their homes and families; GEHMAN resie?a??m mue? be permitted to delay national rehabilita?ion. 6. The moral standing of European natione Will be Tn??uu enced by the degree of activity they have shown agaim?? . 7. Participation of quislings in GERMEN rasisba?ce?ie a criminal action and will be dealt with as 51M FOUR (See Annex II, Appendix of OVERLORD To enlist all possible aid in facilit&ting the slimin?tien United Nations fore of pockets of resistance Objective A. To demonstrate to the people that their aid 13?st111 essential to the United Nations. Eggmes. l. The peoples of Europe are on the scene and in a?gqsitioa 1 to inflict blows against the enemy at innumerable imp?rtant places. 2. The peoples of Europe can expedite "mopping up" ?1 . 3. The peoples of Europe can ac vely asa1at tn Declassified and Approved For Realese 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA ?isplaced persona. Objective B. To Show the people of Europe how they can fit actions into the United Nations military programme? Shqug. l. Unitad Nations military and political inatruc?ions should be listened to systematically an& fallmwad oarofuliy; 2. Undiaviplined and gratuitous violence has no tart in United Nations plans. The crimes will be judgad by Coumts of Law. Themes relating to Resistance Groups. 3. Resistance groups will give the lead to the civilian population in peaceful collaboration with the United Nations? In particular, they should be instructed:- I To prevent destruction of road, rail and oth?m transportation. {11) To report with their arms and explosives.at.EM?ng Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA- 7 rations forcen put an and Lo V??igtgh??u Thames. 1 The United Nations forces are ?rm mgi?g ofdorm (Remainder some as for AIM TWO, ijeon1Va Am While making; full use or the man that ?ne Raw walecmm and the Atlantic Charter are mount for tma GERMAH people 33 for all others, it is desirable at thie stage to avoi? 33y promises that apecific benefits implicit in them will to GERMANY immediately or in the near furnre. 3 $1516 mntor:1al promises, foodstuffo) should also be ovoi?e?r To induro in the enemy orderly compliance wi?h the terms impored after unconditional surrender. gpjeotive A. To convince the GERMANS that the terms of surrender are not unduly severe. Themes. (The actual terms of surrender will suggest many explanatory themes) Objective 3. To inhibit, isolate and discredit elements interfering with the implementin of the surrender ta?ms. 3 Tnemes. 1. There must be no private punishment vengeance or destruction. Crimes will be punished by the Courts. ?1 2. Troublemakers are ignoring the interests of f: their?owe selfish purpose?. I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 2 . . .553 - 1g 34. "if -, 1? 3: v4. pee-?le ?mo are making to" implamenting of tho surrendor tofm? ??95??ooe GERMANY into war. ijective C. surrender terms. Eyemas. .-, l. The surrender by the GERMAN central militor??anm; authorities was in the ?ame of the geop?a them morally and legally. 2. Violation of the tarmo of surrender will inflict additional hardships on GERMANY. Also'Themes of Airm Objectivo C. (GERMENS): Objective 2. To cause the GERMANS to preserve and maintain tho machiae?w daily living. Declassified and Arppoved For Release 2013/09/23 I r" w' I his; momma gimmd?mvo, sabotage commi?taa a. Public hygiene and ouidemioa are to be avoided. Objeo?gyo E. To win GERMAN co-oporation in implementing tho surt?ndogr terms. 1. United Nations forces are coming tho country and to preserve law and order. Thoy aro not coming to wrwak ludisoriminato vengeance on tho 2. Unconditional surrender signals the opportunity of tho; ERMAN people to assume the responsibility for thoir own future. Also Themes of Objectivos A.promote in all Europe on atmOSphere in which-thoopaoif cation of GERMANY and the reconstruction of tho oopbioonmxmay? proceed without expenditure of United Nations fordemwxi A u. a" ngective A. To encourage restraint and moderation, ah?iaiSC in violence in all thing?, Thom?s. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 I Declassified and Approved For Rel tho ooutimm 3. Polimiool,vo??lomonbo ho So, without now of fowoo. u. Tho Unito? Nations are liohmont of justioo, ordor and tranquil?y in.??ro??r Objgotivgwg. To inapiro the peoples of tho to voluntarily as indopondon? mombors of tho ?om??y?of nations. 1. Roaffirmmtion of Unitod Notiona determination t?o? o??h people shall frooly choose its own ultimoto form of?govornmom?w 2. We salute heroic loaders of tho rooistomoo movomom? on? call on the populace to follow hhoir local lomdora inumainmomnw- ing law and order until the normal machinery of domoorotmo governmunt is ru-ostablishod. 3. We whore and support the common hopos and of the people of tho Occupiud Countrios. Rocognition that the sufferings and prarionooa of tho Occupiod Peoples have given thom not only tho right but tho computhCu to make an important contribution to the yearlonw ation of tho post-war world. 5. Full explanation, with particular applicability to each country, of United Nations plans for roliof ondhrohobiliw tation. 6. The determination of the Gnited Nation: to ?o their' utmost to secure redress for the acts of spolxation?oommottod by the enemy in countries under their ocoupnt?on ?linking with tho United Nations Declaration of Loot or'?thmJan?o?y, 1 AIM sm?i mo minimize the affects of hho Di '65 tho ?xlitany3" #74? d1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 fed and Appr?o?ved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP 3111 "u V-w' - 4 v: 5 .?Il mo ca??e tha_diap1aea? nmm?an? ?e 1. @hc prampt implementawia? @f yiaug I: rehabilitation require all peepiee t5 re??i?d until the maahinary can be put in ma?i??r . 4 2. Undirected mavemanhs involve ?ne of lack of food, lack mf shelter ?ne gaeeibie ?y the GERMANS. 3. Military requirements must come Egret; A. uonditions "at heme" are apt ta be worse ?hmHIW?ere people are. 5. Armistice conditions require the GERMKN Central $QVer?me to maintain food distributicn. ?Mb 3 ($953.2- To maintain order. Themes. 1. Hardships, pestilence, disease alwaya follow movements. To canalize any movement along selected rouCes. 1. Keep out of the way of treep movements. 1 1 Declassi fled and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 7