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Do juvenile curfew laws work? A time-series analysis of the
New Orleans law
Article  in  Justice Quarterly · March 2000
DOI: 10.1080/07418820000094531

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 DO J U V E N I L E CURFEW I,AWS WORK?
A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF
THE NEW ORLEANS I JAW*

K. MICHAEL REYNOLDS**
University of Central Florida

R U T H SEYDLITZ***
University of New Orleans

PAMELA JENKINS****
University of N e w Orleans

Juvenile curfew laws are one of the most recent weapons for combating delinquency, but little is known about their effectiveness. This study examines the impact of the juvenile curfew law in New Orleans, Louisiana on
victimizations, juvenile victimizations, and juvenile arrests. Interrupted
* An earlier version of this research was presented at the 1996 annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology, held in Chicago. We thank Ronal
Serpas, Chief of Operations; Mr. A1 Blackledge, data analyst; and Lieutenant
Michael Lentz of the New Orleans Police Department for the data used in this study.
We also thank Robert Bohm, Mark Lanier, and Joseph Sanborn of the Department of
Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida for their
comments; Terry A. Watkins, Professor of Mathematics, University of New Orleans,
for his assistance with the statistical analyses; and the anonymous reviewers for
their comments. This project was supported by Grant 95-IJ-CX-0024 from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Please direct all correspondence to K.
Michael Reynolds, University of Central Florida, Criminal Justice/Legal Studies, PO
Box 161600, Orlando, FL 32816, USA (e-mail: kreynold@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu).
** K. Michael Reynolds is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Legal
Studies at the University of Central Florida. He specializes in criminaljustice policy
analysis and in technological applications for policing. His most recent publications
have appeared in Crime and Delinquency, The American Journal of Criminal Justice, the American Journal of Police, and the Children's Legal Rights Journal.
*** Ruth Seydlitz is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of New
Orleans. She is primarily interested in juvenile delinquency, but has also examined
the impact of offshore extraction on Louisiana communities as well as the effect of
media presentations of hazards and disasters on the public's responses. Her recent
publications include articles in Youth & Society, Impact Assessment and Project Ap.
praisal, Rural Sociology, the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, and Society & Natural Resources, and chapters in Thomas P. Gullotta, Gerald
R. Adams, and Raymond Montemayor (Editors), Delinquent Violent Youth: Theory
and Interventions and Joy D. Osofsky (Editor), Children in a Violent Society.
**** Pamela Jenkins is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of New
Orleans. The focus of her research is behaviors and attitudes related to violence and
crime. She is coeditor of Preventing Violence in America and also of Witnessing for
Sociology: Sociologists in the Courts. She has published articles in Social Work, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, and the
Journal of Family Issues and chapters in Thomas P. Gullotta, Gerald R. Adams, and
Raymond Montemayor (Editors), Delinquent Violent Youth: Theory and Interventions and Joy D. Osofsky (Editor), Children in a Violent Society.
JUSTICE QUARTERLY, Vol. 17 No. 1, March 2000
© 2000 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

 206

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS WORK?
time-series analyses are used to compare victimizations and arrests before
and after the curfew was implemented. The results show the ineffectiveness of the curfew. Victimizations, juvenile victimizations, and juvenile arrests during curfew hours did not decrease significantly after the law went
into effect; some victimizations during non-curfew hours increased significantly after the law was implemented.

Juvenile curfew laws are one of the most recent weapons in the
war on delinquency. Curfews are extremely popular: 80 percent of
the 200 largest cities in the United States (with populations of
100,000 or more) have juvenile curfew laws. Moreover, since 1990,
30 percent of these cities have enacted a new curfew, have modified
a dormant curfew, or have increased enforcement of their curfews
(Ruefle and Reynolds 1996). Curfew laws are not restricted to the
largest cities: Reynolds (1996) found that such laws are in effect in
75 percent of 60 moderate-sized cities (with populations between
10,000 and 100,000).
Despite the popularity of curfew laws, little is known about
their effectiveness. Two studies report small decreases in offending
during curfew hours, but also small increases during non-curfew
hours. Hunt and Weiner (1977) found that index offenses (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft,
auto theft, and arson) decreased 3 to 6 percent during curfew hours
in the first month after Detroit's curfew law went into effect. Yet,
they also reported a similarly sized increase in these offenses between 2 and 4 p.m. More recently, Wright et al. (1994) discovered
that juvenile arrests decreased slightly during curfew hours after
Cincinnati's curfew went into effect, but they increased during noncurfew hours and did not decrease overall. A third study found that
no crime decreased significantly as a result of juvenile curfews enacted in California (Macallair and Males 1998).
The present study was designed to examine the effectiveness of
the juvenile curfew law in New Orleans, Lotfisiana. The current
law, which went into effect on June 1, !994, is the most restrictive
juvenile curfew law in the United States. During curfew hours,
youths under 17 are prohibited from being in public places, including the premises of business establishments, unless accompanied
by a legal guardian or authorized adult. During the school year, the
curfew begins at 8:00 p.m. on weeknights and at 11:00 p.m. on
weekends. During the summer, it begins at 9:00 p.m. on weeknights and at 11:00 p.m. on weekends. In some cases, adolescents
may be in public during curfew hours, such as when traveling to
and from work; when attending school or religious, civic, or city-

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ,AND JENKINS

207

sponsored events if suitable adult supervision is present; in emergency situations; for reasonable errands; and when exercising First
Amendment rights.
Although the law restricts adolescents' access to public places
during specific hours, it provides no legal punishments for the minor. Curfew violators are either warned and sent home or transported to the curfew center. The sanctions focus on the legal
guardians: They can be fined, ordered to obtain counseling or attend parenting classes, or perform up to 60 hours of community service. This focus on parents and their responsibility to control their
children is deliberate, as demonstrated in this statement by Mayor
Marc Moriah "The objective is to open new lines of communication,
begin a dialogue between parent and child, and we hope, set new
ground rules within the home" (1995:A21). Business operators also
face legal punishments because they can be fined up to $500 and/or
imprisoned as long as six months for allowing minors to remain on
the premises during curfew hours.
THE THEORETICAL BASES OF JUVENILE
C U R F E W LAWS

Although the connection is not stated explicitly, juvenile curfew
laws are loosely related to several theories of juvenile delinquency,
particularly opportunity, social control, deterrence, and routine activities theories. Thus an examination of these theories and their
implications for curfew laws is useful for discussing why curfew
taws are, or are not, successful in reducing delinquency. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to test theoretical links. Curfews
draw only on particular aspects of the theories; thus our findings
cannot be used to test the theories empirically.
According to the first-mentioned theory, opportunity theory, access to legitimate and illegitimate means to achieve culturally acceptable goals is stratified by class. As Cloward (1959) states,
neither conventional nor illegitimate methods are infinitely available; access to these techniques depends on the person's position in
the social structure. When Cloward uses the term m e a n s , he is referring both to access to environments in which to learn the values
and skills associated with a particular role and to opportunities to
play the role that has been learned. Thus m e a n s refers both to
learning structures and to opportunity structures (Cloward 1959).
Curfew laws attempt to alter juveniles' access to illegitimate
means by reducing their opportunities not only to learn but also to
commit illegal behaviors. Curfew laws strive directly to curtail
some opportunities to commit delinquency by forcing juveniles to
remain at home in the evening and through the night. They also

 208

DO JUVENILE CURFEWLAWSWORK?

attempt indirectly to reduce juveniles' opportunities to learn delinquency by decreasing the amount of time spent without adult supervision. If curfew laws reduce opportunities to learn and to
commit delinquent behavior, then juvenile delinquency should diminish when these laws are implemented and enforced.
The second theory, social control, focuses on factors that inhibit
juvenile delinquency. Both Hirschi (1969) and Nye (1958) stress
the relevance of parental supervision for this purpose. Hirschi suggested that "virtual supervision'--the psychological presence of the
parents during opportunities to commit delinquency (Cernkovich
and Giordano 1987:299; Hirschi 1969:88)--will reduce delinquent
behavior. Thus youths who believe that the parents know where
they are, and with whom, will be less delinquent (Hirschi 1969:8889). Nye also hypothesized that parental supervisionwparents'
control of the adolescent's time away from home and the choice of
companions and activities (Nye 1958:7)--will decrease delinquent
acts. Increasing parents' supervision of their children is one aim of
curfew laws. Mayor Marc Morial alludes to this purpose when he
claims that one goal of the curfew law is to "set new ground rules
within the home" (1995:A21). Research demonstrates that parental
supervision in fact reduces delinquent activities (e.g., Barnes, Farrell, and Banerjee 1994; Cernkovich and Giordano 1987; Denton
and Kampfe 1994; Kafka and London 1991; McCord 1991; Messner
and Krohn 1990; Peterson et al. 1994; Sampson and Laub 1994).
The third theory related to curfew laws is deterrence theory.
As Siegel and Senna (1997:95) point out, juvenile justice authorities
historically have been reluctant to rely on deterrence-based punishments as opposed to treatment to alter juveniles' behavior. This
reluctance is evident in the seemingly curious fact that juvenile curfew laws, such as the law in effect in New Orleans, punish the parents for their children's behavior.
Finally, routine activities theorists claim that the rate and the
distribution of direct-contact predatory crime (crimes against persons and crimes against property) are affected by the daily routines
of life (Cohen and Felson 1979). Cohen and Felson suggested that
such crime is more likely to occur when a suitable target (person or
property) is available, when a capable guardian is absent, and when
a motivated offender is present. As Siegel and Senna (1997:93)
state, "[T]he greater the opportunity there is for criminals and victims to interact, the greater the probability of crime; reduce the interaction, and the opportunity for crime will decline."
Curfew laws obviously strive to change the routines of potential
victims and potential criminals by forcing juveniles to be at home or
to be supervised by responsible adults during curfew hours. If

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ,AND JENKINS

209

these laws keep unsupervised adolescents out of public places during the curfew hours, then juveniles will be less available as suitable targets, and victimizations of juveniles will decrease. In
addition, when juveniles are at home rather than on the streets,
crime should be reduced if juveniles are a large category of motivated offenders who commit direct contact predatory crimes.
On the basis of this brief theoretical review, apparently there is
reason to believe that juvenile curfews can reduce delinquency. If
the juvenile curfew is effective, victimizations of people of all ages
and victimizations of juveniles during curfew hours should decline
significantly after the law takes effect. This should be the case because fewer adolescents will be unsupervised in public during curfew hours; thus their chances of being offenders and/or victims will
be reduced. In addition, if the law accomplishes its goal, arrests of
juveniles during curfew hours for offenses other than curfew violations should decrease significantly after the law is implemented because fewer unsupervised adolescents will be in public and thus
able to commit offenses. Victimizations overall, victimizations of
juveniles, and arrests of juveniles during non-curfew hours should
remain unaffected.
DATA AND METHODS

We used two sets of data in this study; both were archival
records from the New Orleans Police Department. One data set
contained official victim reports; the other consisted of official juvenile arrests. Both covered two years, one year before and one year
after the curfew law was enacted; hence they span the pemod from
June 1, 1993 through May 31, 1995.
The victimization data set was a collection of official victim reports, which included codes for both the offense and the victim's
age. The type of offense was either a property offense (aggravated,
simple, residence, and safe burglary; theft; theft of a bicycle; theft
from the interior or exterior of an automobile; automobile theft;
pickpocketing; and shoplifting) or a violent offense (homicide; aggravated and simple battery; aggravated assault; aggravated and
simple rape; armed robbery; simple robbery; and purse snatching).
We used the victim's age to separate violent and property victimizations of juveniles from victimizations of people of all ages.
We created four series from the victim reports: property victimizations of people of all ages, violent victimizations of people of all
ages, property victimizations of juveniles (under age 17 in Louisiana), and violent victimizations of juveniles. The victimization data
contained duplicate and incomplete records, which we removed; the

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DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWSWORK?

remaining data contained 122,617 complete and unique victim report records. In addition, we deleted the first four weeks of the victim reports because the information was incomplete. Therefore, we
used 100 weeks of victim report records: 48 weeks before the curfew
law was enacted, and 52 weeks after the law went into effect.
The juvenile arrest data set consisted of official police records of
arrests of people under age 17. This data set also contained duplicate and incomplete records, which we removed. We also omitted
arrests of juveniles only for violating the curfew law itself. The final data set contained 19,869 usable juvenile arrest records.
In summary, we examined five dependent variables in this
study: property victimizations of people of all ages, violent victimizations of people of all ages, property victimizations of juveniles,
violent victimizations of juveniles, and juvenile arrests. We
counted victimizations and juvenile arrests separately, depending
on w h e t h e r the incident occurred during curfew hours or non-curfew hours. Victimizations and arrests t h a t took place between 8
p.m. and 6 a.m. during the school year (September through May)
and those which took place between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. during the
summer (June through August) were categorized as occurring during curfew hours; those which took place between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m.
during the school year and between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. during the
s u m m e r were classified as occurring during non-curfew hours. It
was not possible to alter the curfew hours on the weekends (Friday
and Saturday) because of the complexity involved; therefore, we introduced systematic error that inflated curfew-hour victimizations
and juvenile arrests by about 1 percent. This error, however, was
the same both in the weeks before the curfew was implemented and
in the weeks after the curfew was in effect; hence it should not affect the comparison of these two periods.
We used three independent variables. The first was the week
within the time series, which varied from 5 (the first week in J u l y
1993) to 104 (the last week in M a y 1995). The second independent
variable was curfew implementation, a d u m m y variable coded 0
before enactment of the curfew law (before J u n e 1, 1994) and 1 after
the law w e n t into effect. The third independent variable was enforcement hours, which reflected the amount of police officers' time
dedicated to enforcing the curfew.
We used time series to analyze the data. Although ARIMA is
usually used to analyze time-series data, we employed regression in
this study for two reasons. 1 First, the data did not violate any of
1 In fact, we intended and prepared to use ARIMA. In the summer of 1997,
the first author took the ARIMAcourse at SPSS in Chicago and learned that ARIMA
was not needed to analyze our data. Steve Schacht (the instructor) and the first

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

211

t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o f regression. T h e series w e r e s t a t i o n a r y ; we s a w
no evidence o f a n y s e a s o n a l i t y p a t t e r n s . Second, A R I M A a s s u m e s
t h a t t h e d a t a a r e a u t o c o r r e l a t e d . W h e n no a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n is present, A R I M A is n o t r e q u i r e d a n d h a s no a d v a n t a g e s over regression.
F o r t h e v i c t i m i z a t i o n d a t a , we calculated a s e p a r a t e e q u a t i o n
for e a c h c o m b i n a t i o n of d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e ( p r o p e r t y victimization,
violent victimization, j u v e n i l e p r o p e r t y victimization, a n d j u v e n i l e
v i o l e n t victimization) a n d t i m e of d a y (non-curfew h o u r s or c u r f e w
hours). T h u s e i g h t r e g r e s s i o n m o d e l s w e r e n e c e s s a r y for t h e victimi z a t i o n d a t a . Two a d d i t i o n a l m o d e l s w e r e n e e d e d to e x a m i n e j u v e nile a r r e s t s d u r i n g curfew a n d n o n - c u r f e w h o u r s . We e m p l o y e d a
l i n e a r spline m o d e l w i t h o u t c o n t i n u i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s . This techn i q u e e n a b l e s e s t i m a t i o n of t h e t r e n d for t h e e n t i r e t i m e series, allowing the slope a n d t h e i n t e r c e p t after t h e curfew law w a s
i m p l e m e n t e d to differ f r o m the slope a n d t h e i n t e r c e p t before t h e
curfew w e n t into effect (Cook a n d C a m p b e l l 1979; M o n t g o m e r y a n d
P e c k 1992). 2
B e c a u s e t h e q u a d r a t i c t e r m s w e r e n o t significant, we elimin a t e d t h e m f r o m t h e model. The final model e x a m i n e d for each dep e n d e n t series w a s 3
y = ~ + ~lt + a2I + ~2(t-to)I + yX.
T r a n s l a t e d , the final model ( w i t h o u t q u a d r a t i c t e r m s ) w a s 4
p r e d i c t e d v a l u e = i n t e r c e p t + slope (week) + c u r f e w i m p l e m e n t a t i o n + c h a n g e in slope (week) + e n f o r c e m e n t h o u r s .
I n this e q u a t i o n , t h e l a t t e r t h r e e coefficients w e r e t h e i m p o r t a n t
ones b e c a u s e t h e y signaled r e s p e c t i v e l y a significant c h a n g e in t h e
author inspected the data, testing it for autocorrelation, and found no evidence of
any autocorrelation. Moreover, we consulted Dr. Terry Watkins, a mathmetics professor at the University of New Orleans, who analyzed the data with ARIMA and
concluded that it added nothing and was not appropriate for this study. E-mail communications with David Nichols at SPSS in February 1999 confirmed the choice of
regression rather than ARIMA. Mr. Nichols, principal support statistician and manager of statistical support, at SPSS Inc., stated, "ARIMAmodels fit the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation pattern[s] in data. If there are no such patterns,
then these models are not needed . . . . if there is no autocorrelation in the residuals,
then that part of the OLS assumptions [is] met and ARIMA would have no
advantage."
2 This is equivalent to splicing together two time series, one before and one
after the curfew went into effect, and calculating the differences in the slope and the
intercept before and after the curfew was implemented.
The final term in the equation was enforcement hours. This variable was
included only in the equations calculated for victimizations and arrests during curfew hours.
4 We included enforcement hours only in the equations calculated for victimizations and arrests during curfew hours. The change-in-slope term is not an interaction term, although it is the difference between the slope before the curfew was
implemented and the slope after the curfew took effect. We coded this 0 for the 48
weeks before the curfew was implemented and 1 through 52 for the 52 weeks after
the curfew took effect.

 212

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS WORK?

level of victimizations or juvenile arrests after the curfew was implemented, a significant change in the trend of victimizations or juvenile arrests after the curfew went into effect, and a significant
effect of enforcing the curfew. Specifically, when the coefficient for
curfew implementation was significant, the number of events (victimizations or juvenile arrests) after implementation of the curfew
was significantly different from the number of events before the
curfew went into effect. When the coefficient for the change in slope
was significant, the trend of the events after the curfew went into
effect was significantly different from the trend before implementation. Moreover, this coefficient was the actual difference between
the two trends. When the coefficent for enforcement hours was significant, the events after implementation were altered by the
amount of police time dedicated to enforcing the law. We examined
plots of the residuals from the regression equations, but found no
indication of heteroscedasticity. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistics showed no sign of autocorrelation; the influence statistics (individual t-values and Cook's D) showed that no problematic outliers
were present.
RESULTS
We expected that, if the juvenile curfew law was effective, victimizations and juvenile arrests during curfew hours would be significantly lower after the curfew took effect, while victimizations
and juvenile arrests during non-curfew hours would not be influenced significantly. Our results do not support these expectations.
The implementation of the curfew law did not significantly reduce victimizations, juvenile victimizations, nor juvenile arrests
during curfew hours. First, violent victimizations of people of all
ages during curfew hours were significantly affected only by the
amount of police time spent enforcing the curfew law (see Tables 1
and 2). These victimizations decreased significantly when enforcement was greater, but they returned to their pre-curfew level and
trend as enforcement diminished (see Figure 1).
Second, property victimizations of people of all ages during curfew hours increased significantly after the curfew law took effect
(see Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2). Moreover, during the weeks after the curfew law was implemented, these victimizations decreased significantly more slowly than before the curfew took effect,
and the number of these occurrences at the end of the series was
higher than before the curfew.
Third, juvenile property victimizations during curfew hours
were related significantly to enforcement hours: They were higher
when enforcement of the curfew was greater, but returned to a level

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

213

Table 1. Regressions of Victimizations and Juvenile
Arrests during Curfew and Non-Curfew Hours
Curfew Hours
Intercept
Week

Violent

Property

Juvenile Property

151.58"**

510.17"**
-1.038"**
-2.113"**
.429"
50.516"
.485*
1.666"

107.51"**
-.224*
-.130"

Curfew
Change in slope
Enforcement hours

-.230*

R2

-.006*
.053*

Non-Curfew Hours
Intercept
Week

112.32"**

.375***

.134"*
398.03***

Curfew
Change in slope
R2

.411"**
.467***
.169"**

.219"
.476*
.048*

.007***
-.145"**
-22.89***
.625**
.155"*
-.474*
-6.808*
-.103"

Notes: Only significant relationships are displayed. There were no signfficant
models for juvenile property victimizations during non-curfew hours, juvenile violent
victimizations during curfew hours, and juvenile arrests. Standardized coefficients
are shown in bold type. "Change in slope" is the change in the slope after the curfew
went into effect (Weeks 53-104) in relation to the slope before the curfew was
implemented (Weeks 5-52).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

close to their pre-curfew amount and to the same slowly decreasing
trend when enforcement was reduced (see Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 3).
Fourth, juvenile arrests were not affected significantly by the
implementation of the curfew law, nor by its enforcement.5
Fifth, as further evidence of the lack of influence of the curfew
law on victimizations, juvenile victimizations, and juvenile arrests,
the proportions of variance explained, were very small, even when
significant.
Sixth, we found only small changes in the number of events-about 20 or fewer--from just before the curfew went into effect to
the first year after the curfew was implemented. Thus victimizations, juvenile victimizations, and juvenile arrests during curfew
hours did not decrease significantly after the curfew law went into
effect; the curfew had very little effect on these occurrences.

5 Graphs of the series that were not affected by curfew implementation and
enforcement are available on request from the first author.

 214

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS WORK?

Table 2.

Summary of Results
Effect of
Effect of
Curfew Implementation Curfew Enforcement

Curfew Hours
All violent victimizations
All property victimizations
Juvenile violent victimizations
Juvenile property victimizations
Juvenile arrests
Non-Curfew Hours
All violent victimizations
All property victimizations
Juvenile violent victimizations
Juvenile property victimizations
Juvenile arrests

+

+
+
-

A

G
G
A

-

A

T

+

A

T

P

P
P
T

stands for a significant positive association; - stands for a significant
negative association; A means that the change was abrupt; G indicates that the
change was gradual; T indicates that the change was temporary; P means that the
change lasted throughout the year after the curfew was implemented. No significant
effects were found for juvenile violent victimizations during curfew hours, juvenile
property victimizations during non-curfew hours, or juvenile arrests.

Notes: +

S e v e n t h , c o n t r a r y to t h e expectation, v i c t i m i z a t i o n s d u r i n g
n o n - c u r f e w h o u r s w e r e affected b y t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e curfew law. I n fact, violent a n d p r o p e r t y v i c t i m i z a t i o n s o f people of all
ages b e g a n to i n c r e a s e significantly a f t e r t h e c u r f e w w e n t into effect
a n d c o n t i n u e d to i n c r e a s e t h r o u g h o u t the r e m a i n d e r of t h e series
(see T a b l e s 1 a n d 2 a n d F i g u r e s 4 a n d 5). T h e levels of t h e s e victimizations h a d r e m a i n e d s t e a d y d u r i n g t h e 48 w e e k s before t h e curfew began; a f t e r the law was i m p l e m e n t e d , however, t h e s e
victimizations b e g a n to i n c r e a s e significantly, especially violent
victimizations.
E i g h t h , j u v e n i l e violent victimizations d u r i n g n o n - c u r f e w
h o u r s s h o w e d a significant, t e m p o r a r y d e c r e a s e w h e n t h e curfew
law w e n t into effect (see Tables 1 a n d 2 a n d F i g u r e 6). A f t e r this
initial decrease, h o w e v e r , t h e s e v i c t i m i z a t i o n s i n c r e a s e d a t t h e
s a m e r a t e as t h e i r r a t e of i n c r e a s e before t h e c u r f e w law was implem e n t e d . T h e s e differences, however, w e r e also small: a b o u t 20 or
less. T h u s victimizations a n d j u v e n i l e victimizations d u r i n g nonc u r f e w h o u r s w e r e affected b y t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e curfew
law.
In s u m m a r y , o u r findings did not s u p p o r t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t
victimizations, j u v e n i l e victimizations, a n d j u v e n i l e a r r e s t s d u r i n g
c u r f e w h o u r s w o u l d be r e d u c e d significantly w h e n t h e j u v e n i l e curfew law was i m p l e m e n t e d . H e n c e t h e j u v e n i l e curfew law was not
effective in r e d u c i n g crime in New O r l e a n s d u r i n g its first y e a r of
implementation.

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS
Figure

1.

All Violent Victimizations
Curfew Hours

215

during

240.
230!
220i

2~o~
200i
190i
180~

17o!

"~
~.

160
150
140
130
120
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 216

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS WORK?

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 218

DO JUVENILECURFEWLAWSWORK?

Although the curfew law was not effective in reducing victimizations and juvenile arrests, the findings demonstrated some patterns. In fact, they varied along four dimensions: the type of
victimization, the victim's age, the time of day (curfew or non-curfew hours), and the aspect of the curfew law (implementation or
enforcement).
Property and violent victimizations were influenced differentially by the curfew law: Property victimizations tended to increase
after the curfew went into effect, while violent victimizations were
more likely to decrease. During curfew hours, property victimizations of people of all ages increased abruptly and we observed more
of these victimizations one year after the curfew was implemented
than before the curfew. Juvenile property victimizations also increased abruptly, but returned to the level and trend prevalent
before the curfew. During non-curfew hours, property victimizations of people of all ages began to increase after the curfew went
into effect. In contrast, violent victimizations of people of all ages
during curfew hours and violent victimizations of juveniles during
non-curfew hours decreased abruptly, although temporarily. Contrary to the pattern, however, violent victimizations of people of all
ages during non-curfew hours began to increase after the curfew
law went into effect. Yet one year after the law was implemented,
we found an increase in both property and violent victimizations
because the more permanent changes were increases, while the decreases were temporary.
The outcome also differed by the victim's age. The curfew law
had a stronger effect on victimizations of people of all ages (four
significant effects) than of juveniles (two significant effects). Moreover, all of the effects that remained one year after implementation
of the curfew occurred for victimizations of people of all ages: property victimizations during curfew hours, and violent and property
victimizations during non-curfew hours. The significant changes for
juvenile victimizations were temporary: property victimizations
during curfew hours, and violent victimizations during non-curfew
hours. Thus the increase in victimizations one year after implementation reflected victimizations of people of all ages, not victimizations of juveniles.
The results also varied by the time of day. During curfew
hours, changes in victimizations were abrupt and tended to be temporary; during non-curfew hours, these changes tended to be gradual and permanent. All three changes during curfew hours were
abrupt, and two of the three were temporary (violent victimizations
of people of all ages and juvenile property victimizations). Two of

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ,AND JENKINS

219

the three changes during non-curfew hours were gradual and permanent (violent and property victimizations of people of all ages);
only one was abrupt and temporary (juvenile violent
victimizations).
The findings differed by the aspect of the curfew law: implementation or enforcement. Implementation was associated with
two significant changes in the numbers of victimizations--the increase in property victimizations during curfew hours and the decrease in juvenile violent victimizations during non-curfew hours-and with three significant increases in the trends of victimizat i o n s - p r o p e r t y victimizations during curfew hours (these occurrences decreased more slowly after the curfew law took effect) and
violent and property victimizations during non-curfew hours (these
occurrences began to increase after the curfew took effect).
Enforcement of the curfew significantly influenced only violent
victimizations of people of all ages and juvenile property victimizations; these effects were temporary. Violent victimizations had a
significant negative relation to enforcement hours (more enforcement, fewer violent victimizations); juvenile property victimizations
showed a significant positive association with enforcement hours
(more enforcement, more juvenile property victimizations). In beth
cases, when enforcement was reduced, these victimizations returned to the level and trend that had existed before the curfew was
implemented.
DISCUSSION

The findings show that the juvenile curfew law in New Orleans, although restrictive, was ineffective for reducing victimizations, victimizations of juveniles, and juvenile arrests. All changes
found in victimizations were small, half were temporary, and four
of the six significant changes were increases. Hence the outcome of
the present study is similar to those of other research (Hunt and
Weiner 1977; Macallair and Males 1998; Wright e t a l . 1994) that
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of juvenile curfew laws for combating crime.
The current investigation also hints at possible changes in victimization patterns, consisting of initial decreases in violent victimizations and initial increases in property victimizations when the
curfew law was implemented. Also, the results imply that the curfew had a greater effect on victimizations of people of all ages than
on juvenile victimizations. In addition, our findings suggest that
changes in victimization during curfew hours are abrupt and
mainly temporary, while effects during non-curfew hours are more
gradual and more likely to be permanent. Moreover, the findings

 220

DO JUVENILE CURFEWLAWSWORK?

show that the number of enforcement hours has only a temporary
impact on victimizations.
Why is such a seemingly reasonable law so ineffective in controlling crime? We suggest several possible reasons.
Juveniles and Crime

First, juvenile curfew laws will result in large, significant reductions in crime and victimization only if (1) juveniles are a large
percentage of criminals; (2) juveniles are a large percentage of victiros; (3) the curfews are in effect during the periods when juveniles
are most likely to commit crimes; and (4) juveniles comply with curfew laws. In fact, although juveniles account for a greater proportion of persons arrested than of the total population, they are
responsible for only a relatively small proportion of crimes overall
in the United States. According to the Uniform Crime Reports
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 1961-1996), juveniles (under age
18) have not accounted for more than 25 percent of the annual total
arrests since 1975, and they have constituted less than 20 percent
of persons arrested each year since 1980.
Moreover, juveniles (under age 18) are not the largest category
of victims of serious violent offenses. Again, juveniles are a greater
proportion of the people victimized than of the total population, but
they are not the majority of crime victims. In 1994, juveniles were
about 24 percent of the victims of violent crimes, ranging from 10
percent of the victims of attempted robbery with injury and 15 percent of the victims of rape and attempted rape to 28 percent of the
victims of simple assaults with or without injury (Sickmund, Snyder, and Poe-Yamagata 1997).
In addition, the curfew laws are not in effect during the period
when juveniles are most likely to commit crimes. A large proportion of juvenile crimes are committed after school, before the curfew
starts. About 20 percent of violent juvenile crimes are committed
between 2 and 6 p.m. on school days (Sickmund et al. 1997; Snyder,
Sickmund, and Poe-Yamagata 1996). On school days, violent offenses and gang crimes committed by juveniles peak at about 3 p.m.
(Sickmund et al. 1997).
Further, juveniles may not comply with the curfew laws. During the first year of the New Orleans curfew law, 3,572 youths were
taken into custody solely for curfew violations. Therefore, because
juveniles under age 17 are not a large percentage of criminals or
victims, because they are more likely to commit offenses during
times not included in curfews, and because they do not comply with
curfew laws, the juvenile arrests and victimization series examined

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

221

here were not altered much by implementation and enforcement of
the curfew law, even when the effect was significant.

Police Action
Second, police crackdowns--sudden increases in police activity
to raise the likelihood of offense detection--tend not to deter crime
in the long run (Sherman 1990). The result is usually only an initial, temporary deterrent effect (Ross 1973; Ross, McCleary, and
Epperlein 1982; Sherman 1990). Our findings in the present study
are similar to those of other investigations of the influence of police
crackdowns: The changes in victimizations during curfew hours
were abrupt, primarily temporary, and very small. Previous researchers also reported that police crackdowns are extremely costly
to maintain (Ross 1973; Ross et al. 1982; Sherman 1990). Curfew
enforcement in New Orleans was no exception: The New Orleans
Police Department spent more than $600,000 in overtime funds for
curfew enforcement during the first year of the curfew law although
the department was understaffed by more than 300 officers.

Possible Theoretical Explanations
The third possible reason for the ineffectiveness of the juvenile
curfew law is that such laws are related only tangentially to theories of delinquency. They do not draw on the full power of the theories, nor fully utilize the research stimulated by the theories. We
revisit the four theories presented earlier and examine them for insights into the ineffectiveness of the New Orleans juvenile curfew
law.

Opportunity Theory. As noted previously, opportunity theory points
out the importance of examining access to illegitimate means. Juvenile curfew laws do not reduce adolescents' access to illegitimate
means; youths still have many opportunities to commit delinquent
acts. They can engage in crimes during non-curfew hours rather
than hours covered by the curfew laws. The findings of Hunt and
Weiner (1977) and Wright et ah (1994) suggest the possibility of
temporal displacement. Similarly, the present study shows a perm a n e n t increase in victimizations of people of all ages during
non-curfew hours, although the increase was small (approximately
20 additional property crimes and 20 additional violent
victimizations).
Social control theories. Social control theories, as presented previously, emphasize the importance of parental supervision. Although
the possible sanctions entailed in curfew laws, including the New

 222

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWSWORK?

Orleans curfew law, include counseling and parent training classes,
these laws apparently are based on the assumption that parents
know how to relate to and supervise their children so as to reduce,
rather t h a n increase, deviant activities. Mayor Morial (1995:A21)
suggested that the juvenile curfew law can improve communication
between parents and children and, it is hoped, establish new rules.
Unfortunately, there is much evidence that m a n y parents do not
know how to relate to or supervise their children. In fact, poor relationships between parents and children, poor communication, poor
supervision and discipline, family deviance, and family conflict and
violence increase delinquency. (For a more fully detailed discussion
of the family's influence on delinquency, see Seydlitz and Jenkins
1998.)

Deterence Theory. Deterrence theory claims that the threat of punishment makes people forgo crime. The curfew law, however, includes no punishment for the juvenile who violates it beyond the
negative aspects of being taken into custody and the possibilty of
parental punishments. Thus, according to deterrence theory, the
juvenile has no reason to refrain from appearing in public during
curfew hours. Therefore youths who are not deterred by the curfew
law find more opportunities to commit crime, and possibly even increase their opportunities to learn how to commit crime. In addition, if family relations are poor, the juvenile m a y not be deterred
by the thought that his or her parents will be arrested because he or
she violated the curfew law. In fact, in households marked by mutual rejection, this possibility could be an incentive to violation. As
mentioned previously, more than 3,500 juveniles in New Orleans
were not deterred by the curfew law, and were taken into custody
during the first year of the curfew.
Routine activities theory. Routine activities theorists argue that a
direct-contact predatory crime is more probable when a suitable
target is available, when a capable guardian is absent, and when a
motivated offender is present. On the basis of our current findings,
it appears that routines were not altered so as to reduce the presence of juveniles as suitable targets or motivated offenders. Specifically, juvenile arrests were not altered significantly by
implementation of the curfew. In addition, only two juvenile victimization series were influenced by the curfew, and these effects
were temporary and small. Osgood et al. (1996) found that opportunities for crime arise when peers are together without adult supervision. Such unsupervised togetherness can occur during noncurfew hours as well as hours included in the curfew. Further, offending and victimization are highly correlated (Clarke and Felson

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

223

1993), and curfew laws contain nothing that necessarily breaks this
connection. Moreover, the cost of attempting to alter routines to
lessen the availability of suitable, unguarded targets and/or motivated offenders is enormous.
A major problem with routine activities theory is that it does
not include domestic violence or child abuse as direct-contact predatory violations. In fact, Cohen and Felson (1979) claim that routine
activities near or in the home and among family members have a
lower risk of victimization. Similarly, Hindelang, Gottfredson, and
Garofalo (1978), in their lifestyle theory, state that people are safer
if they spend more time in the home and with family members. Unfortunately, however, the home and family members are not safe for
people who are victims of domestic violence and child abuse; therefore some juveniles may be safer on the streets, and many of these
adolescents run away from home (For an excellent discussion of this
issue, see Chesney-Lind and Shelden 1998.)

Major Correlates of Delinquency
The fourth possible explanation of the ineffectiveness of juvenile curfew laws is that they do not address any of the major correlates of delinquency. These major factors include peers, schools and
the family.

Peers. Curfew laws do not directly reduce adolescents' exposure to
delinquent peers and friends. Many adolescents are unsupervised
from the time when school ends to the beginning of curfew hours.
Hence they have several hours to spend with friends and to learn
about and engage in delinquent deeds. Many studies demonstrate
that youths who have delinquent friends are more likely to commit
deviant acts, often in the company of these friends (e.g., Agnew
1991; Erickson and Jensen 1977; Fagan and Wexler 1987; Giordano
1978; Giordano and Cernkovich 1979; Johnson 1979; Matsueda and
Heimer 1987; Messner and Krohn 1990; Patterson and Dishion
1985; Warr 1993a; Warr and Stafford 1991). Delinquent friends increase many types of deviance, especially substance abuse (e.g.,
Aseltine 1995; Dinges and Oetting 1993; Kaika and London 1991;
Kandel and Davies 1991). (For a longer review of the relationship
between delinquent friends and delinquency, see Seydlitz and Jenkins 1998.) More delinquency might be prevented if adults established places where adolescents could congregate and engage in
positive activities with appropriate adult supervision during this
time rather than paying police officers to find unsupervised adolescents and take them into custody. In the past, organized activities
after school and in the evenings fulfilled this need.

 224

DO JUVENILECURFEWLAWSWORK?

School. Similarly, curfew laws do not affect juveniles' relationships
with the school, nor how problems in this relationship can motivate
delinquency and increase exposure to delinquent friends. School
reduces delinquency for youths who are committed to school (believe in the goals of school), like school, and are achieving in school;
but it can increase delinquency for those who are not committed,
who dislike school, and are not doing well in school (e.g., Agnew
1985; Denton and Kampfe 1994; Fagan and Wexler 1987; Frease
1973; Hagan 1991; Jenkins 1995; Joseph 1995; Krohn and Massey
1980; Lauritsen 1994; Mann 1981; Pink 1982; Rankin 1980; Schafer
and Polk 1972a, 1972b; White, Pandina, and LaGrange 1987).
Seydlitz and Jenkins (1998:71) summarize the problem as follows:
"[S]tudents who do poorly in school are shunned by teachers and
other students, dislike school, view school as dull and boring, devalue themselves, develop a negative attitude toward schoolwork
and school rules, perceive school as irrelevant, spend more time
with friends, have more friends who are dropouts, and view peers
as more salient." Thus, negative school experiences can push
juveniles toward others who have similar problems, and can induce
acting out in delinquent ways. In fact, some standard practices in
schools, including tracking and negative disciplinary actions, have
been found to induce negative feelings about school and to result in
delinquency (e.g., Bowditch 1993; Frease 1973; Kelly 1974; Kelly
and Pink 1982; Messner and Krohn 1990; Polk 1969, 1983; Schafer
1972; Schafer and Polk 1972a, 1972b; Schafer, Olexa, and Polk
1972). (For a more exhaustive review of the influence of the school
on delinquency, see Seydlitz and Jenkins 1998.)
Family. The family influences juveniles' commission of deviant
deeds. Much research demonstrates that good family relationships,
communication, supervision, and discipline reduce delinquency,
while delinquency is increased by poor relationships, communication, supervision, and discipline, as well as family deviance and violence. Attachment to parents reduces substance abuse and
delinquency, but rejection by parents strongly increases deviant activities (e.g., Agnew 1991; Anderson and Henry 1994; Cernkovich
and Giordano 1987; Conger 1976; Hays and Revetto 1990; Liska
and Reed 1985; McCord 1991; Messner and Krohn 1990; Poole and
Regoli 1979; Simons, Robertson, and Downs 1989; Warr 1993b;
Wright and Wright 1994). In fact, delinquency is increased by the
combination of weak relationships with parents and strong parental control (Agnew 1991; Ellis 1986; McCord 1991; Seydlitz 1993).
Good family management practices--supervision, communicating clear expectations, and administering positive reinforcement--

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

225

are important influences (e.g., Barnes et al. 1994; Cernkovich and
Giordano 1987; Denton and Kampfe 1994; Kafka and London 1991;
McCord 1991; Peterson et al. 1994). Proper supervision and appropriate, consistent punishment decrease delinquency; poor or excessive parental discipline increases such activities (e.g., Cernkovich
and Giordano 1987; Denton and Kampfe 1994; Fagan and Wexler
1987; Laub and Sampson 1988; Messner and Krohn 1990; Sampson
and Laub 1994; Wells and Rankin 1988). Also, attachment to the
parents can lessen exposure to delinquent peers, while rejection by
parents can enhance this exposure (e.g., Agnew 1991; Conger 1976;
Hirschi 1969; Jensen 1972; Kaplan, Martin, and Robbins 1982;
Poole and Regoli 1979; Warr 1993b).
In addition, parental deviance and instability increase delinquency by negatively influencing attachment, discipline, and supervision (Laub and Sampson 1988; Rosenbaum 1989; Sampson and
Laub 1994). Similarly, family drug use increases juveniles' drug
use; youths who use drugs tend to come from troubled families (Anderson and Henry 1994; Denton and Kampfe 1994; Johnson and
Pandina 1991; Peterson et al. 1994). Moreover, family conflict, parental hostility, neglect, cruelty, and abuse are conducive to delinquency (e.g., Brown 1984; Cernkovich and Giordano 1987; ChesneyLind 1989; Chesney-Lind and Shelden 1998; Conger et al. 1991;
Johnson and Pandina 1991; Rosenbaum 1989; Smith and
Thornberry 1995; Wright and Wright 1994). Even so, most of the
children who are abused do not become abusive parents, delinquents, or violent criminals (e.g., Smith and Thornberry 1995;
Wright and Wright 1994).
Delinquency will not be reduced by forcing children into negative family situations marked by rejection, negative communication
patterns, excessively lax or severe supervision and discipline, criminal family members, and abuse. Yet curfew laws force all youths to
be at home, presumably with their parents or legal guardians, without ascertaining whether the home is a safe and positive place for
these juveniles. Thus the curfew law could have the unintended
outcome of increasing child abuse, especially after the abusive parent or guardian is arrested because the juvenile violated the curfew.
The law may have much the same effect as has decades of returning
runaway juveniles, particularly females, to abusive homes. (For a
fuller discussion of this problem, see Chesney-Lind and Shelden
1998.) If children of inadequate, rejecting, or abusive parents are
picked up for curfew violation and if the parents are forced into effective parent training classes, there is an outside chance that some
homes might be improved. Counseling that is not sought voluntarily, however, is usually ineffective.

 226

DO JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS WORK?

Moreover, negative relationships in general are powerful motivators of delinquency. The importance of negative relationships
and the feelings they cause has been acknowledged only recently in
the field of delinquency. In the mid-1980s, researchers examining
the effect of the family on delinquency realized that parental rejection, a very negative relationship, is not the opposite of parental
attachment, and that it is one of the strongest predictors of delinquency, if not the strongest (Seydlitz and Jenkins 1998).
Agnew's (1992) general strain theory also addresses how negative situations can lead to adverse emotions such as anger, and can
result in delinquency. He cites the loss of a positive aspect of a person's life, such as the loss of a rewarding relationship, and the presence of a negative situation, such as victimization or abuse, as
possible strains that can lead to anger; this, in turn, can motivate
delinquency (Agnew 1992). Juvenile curfew laws, in their etiology
and practice, do not help juveniles to deal with strain and negative
emotions. It might be possible to strengthen the effect of juvenile
curfew laws on delinquency if young people caught violating the
laws were counseled or involved in other programs that might support them and help them cope with adversity in their lives.
SUMMARY
Juvenile curfew laws are ineffective for reducing crime because
they do not include many of the perpetrators of crime, namely older
adolescents and young adults; they do not include the hours when
juveniles are most likely to commit offenses; they are based on the
incorrect assumption that police crackdowns reduce crime; and they
do not fully utilize the theories and research concerning juvenile
delinquency. Final]y, they do not alter substantially the major correlates of delinquency: exposure to delinquent peers, school, and
the family. Delinquent behavior does not occur in isolation, but in a
social context consisting of an individual's peers, school, and family.
To clarify why juvenile curfew laws are ineffective and to determine whether they can be made effective, development of a theoretical basis for these laws is necessary. Surveys and interviews with
juveniles and their parents are needed to ascertain how they view
these laws and their enforcement. In addition, theory, research,
and policy might concentrate on the factors that influence the individual's social context. These factors are probably complex and cannot be addressed simply by passing a law requiring youths to be off
the streets during particular hours. In addition, future research
should examine the reasons why ineffective laws are popular, the
functions served by these laws, and the climate that enables such

 REYNOLDS, SEYDLITZ, AND JENKINS

227

laws to be enacted. The research questions should include the following: Why is the public willing to forgo longer-term, more encompassing prevention and intervention strategies in favor of
ineffective, quick-fix, piecemeal ideas such as juvenile curfew laws?

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