No.

IN THE

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_______________
MICHELLE MONASKY,
Petitioner,
v.
DOMENICO TAGLIERI,
_______________

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
_______________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_______________
ANDREW A. ZASHIN
CHRISTOPHER R. REYNOLDS
AMY M. KEATING
ZASHIN & RICH CO., L.P.A.
950 Main Avenue, 4th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
(216) 696-4441
JOAN S. MEIER
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT AND APPEALS
PROJECT AND THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
2000 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20052
(202) 994-2278

AMIR C. TAYRANI
Counsel of Record
MELANIE L. KATSUR
KELLAM M. CONOVER
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500
atayrani@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Petitioner

 QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction requires that any child
wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence” be returned to that country. A.M.T. was eight
weeks old when she traveled with her mother,
Michelle Monasky, from a domestic-violence safe
house in Italy to her grandparents’ home in Ohio.
Monasky’s husband, from whom she had fled, filed a
petition under the Hague Convention seeking
A.M.T.’s return to Italy. The district court found that
A.M.T. had not acclimated to living in Italy and made
no finding that her parents had ever agreed that she
would be raised in Italy. The court nevertheless ruled
that the existence of a “matrimonial home” presumptively established Italy as A.M.T.’s habitual residence.
In a fractured 10-8 opinion, the en banc Sixth Circuit
affirmed after reviewing the district court’s determination of habitual residence only for clear error and
holding that a “subjective agreement” between the
parents to raise A.M.T. in Italy was not necessary to
establish that A.M.T. was habitually resident in Italy.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention should
be reviewed de novo, as seven circuits have held, under a deferential version of de novo review, as the
First Circuit has held, or under clear-error review, as
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held.
2. Where an infant is too young to acclimate to her
surroundings, whether a subjective agreement between the infant’s parents is necessary to establish
her habitual residence under the Hague Convention.

 ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

All parties to the proceeding are named in the cap-
tion.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...........................................i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii
TABLE OF APPENDICES ........................................ iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... vi
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1 
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1 
TREATY AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED.................................................................. 1 
STATEMENT .............................................................. 1 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 11 
I.  CERTIORARI IS WARRANTED TO CLARIFY
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE
TO HABITUAL-RESIDENCE
DETERMINATIONS .......................................... 13 
A.  The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Deepens A Three-Way Circuit Split ............... 13 
B.  The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With This Court’s Precedent ......... 17 
II.  CERTIORARI IS WARRANTED TO RESOLVE
WHETHER AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARENTS IS NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH AN INFANT’S HABITUAL
RESIDENCE .................................................... 20 
A.  The Sixth Circuit’s Decision
Creates A Circuit Split On The Necessity Of A Subjective Agreement ............. 21 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With The Language And
Purpose Of The Hague Convention ....... 23 

 iv
III.  THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT
VEHICLE TO ADDRESS THESE TWO
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ............................... 26
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 27 

 v
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A: Opinion and Judgment of the
En Banc United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit (Oct. 17, 2018) ................... 1a
APPENDIX B: Panel Opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
(Nov. 30, 2017) .................................................. 42a
APPENDIX C: Opinion and Order of the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio (Sept. 14, 2016)....... 73a
APPENDIX D: Order of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Granting
Rehearing En Banc (Mar. 2, 2018) ................. 108a
APPENDIX E: Treaty and Statutory Provisions
Involved ........................................................... 110a
Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 .......... 110a
22 U.S.C. § 9001 ....................................... 129a
22 U.S.C. § 9003 ....................................... 131a

 vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U.S. 1 (2010) .............................................. 3, 11
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006) .............................................. 24
In re Bates,
[1989] 2 WLUK 293 (Fam.) ................................. 21
Berezowsky v. Ojeda,
765 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2014) ................................ 22
Chafin v. Chafin,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) .............................................. 11
Delvoye v. Lee,
329 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2003) ................................. 22
Feder v. Evans-Feder,
63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) ................. 13, 14, 21, 24
Gitter v. Gitter,
396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................. 21
Guzzo v. Cristofano,
719 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2013) ............................. 2, 13
Koch v. Koch,
450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006) .......................... 14, 19
Larbie v. Larbie,
690 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................ 14
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,
572 U.S. 1 (2014) .................................................. 11

 vii
Maxwell v. Maxwell,
588 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2009) ................................ 15
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337 (1991) .............................................. 18
Monasky v. Taglieri,
No. 16A557 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2016) ............................. 8
Mozes v. Mozes,
239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) ............ 12, 14, 19, 27
Murphy v. Sloan,
764 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................. 22
Nicolson v. Pappalardo,
605 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2010) ...................... 2, 15, 16
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690 (1996) .............................................. 18
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273 (1982) .................................... 2, 17, 19
Robert v. Tesson,
507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................ 7, 25
Ruiz v. Tenorio,
392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................ 14
Siding & Insulation Co. v. Alco Vending, Inc.,
822 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2016) .................................. 9
Silverman v. Silverman,
338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) .................... 14, 19, 24
United States v. Perry,
908 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990) .................................. 15
Treaty and Statutes
22 U.S.C. § 9001 .......................... 1, 3, 4, 12, 19, 20, 27

 viii
22 U.S.C. § 9003 .......................................................... 1
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 .............. 1, 3, 4, 23
The International Child Abduction Remedies
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300,
102 Stat. 437 (1988) ............................................... 4
Other Authorities
1980 Conference de La Haye de droit
international prive, Enlévement d’enfants,
Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in
3 Actes et Documents de la Quatorzième
Session 426 (1982)................................................ 24
Nigel Lowe & Victoria Stephens,
A Statistical Analysis of Applications
Made in 2015 Under the Hague
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the
Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (July 2018) .......................................... 26
U.S. Dep’t of State,
Hague International Child Abduction
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986) ................ 3, 25

 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Michelle Monasky respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The court of appeals’ en banc opinion is reported
at 907 F.3d 404. Pet. App. 1a–41a. The vacated panel
opinion is reported at 876 F.3d 868. Pet. App. 42a–
72a. The district court’s opinion is available at 2016
WL 10951269. Pet. App. 73a–107a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on October 17, 2018. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
TREATY AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”
or “the Convention”), Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89,
and relevant portions of its enabling statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 9001 & 9003, are reproduced in Appendix E to the
petition. Pet. App. 110a–133a.
STATEMENT
Determining a child’s “habitual residence” is the
fundamental issue in any case under the Hague Convention. The answer controls whether the Convention
applies, which nation’s laws determine custodial or
access rights, and—crucially—whether a child must
be sent back across international borders to another
country for adjudication of those rights. As a result of

 2
the Sixth Circuit’s sharply splintered 10-8 en banc decision in this case, this critical inquiry is now the subject of two distinct circuit splits: first, on the applicable standard for reviewing a district court’s determination of habitual residence and, second, on the substantive legal standard for establishing the habitual
residence of an infant.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision deepened an existing
circuit split on the standard of review to be applied to
a district court’s habitual-residence determination.
The majority of circuits treat a child’s habitual residence as a mixed question of law and fact because “the
issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289
n.19 (1982); see also, e.g., Guzzo v. Cristofano, 719
F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). These seven circuits review historical facts for clear error but the ultimate
determination of habitual residence de novo. In contrast, the First Circuit reviews historical facts for
clear error but accords “some deference” to the district
court’s “application of the standard” for determining
habitual residence. Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d
100, 105 (1st Cir. 2010). Here, the Sixth Circuit departed from both of those approaches—“put[ting] [itself] at odds with the standard of review used by [its]
sister circuits,” Pet. App. 30a–31a (Moore, J., dissenting)—by reviewing both the underlying historical
facts and the ultimate determination of habitual residence for clear error, an approach previously applied
by only the Fourth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit then created a second circuit
split by holding that, when an infant is too young to
acclimate to her surroundings, a “subjective agreement” between the parents about the country where
the infant will be raised is not required to establish

 3
the infant’s habitual residence. Pet. App. 12a. That
conclusion directly conflicts with the holdings of four
other circuits that, where the acclimatization standard cannot be used, the parents must actually have
agreed at some point on where to raise the infant to
establish her habitual residence in that country.
The Court should grant review to provide a definitive answer to both of these questions and to restore
the uniformity essential to the proper functioning of
the Hague Convention. Indeed, when Congress
adopted legislation implementing the Convention, it
expressly underscored “the need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention.” 22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(b)(3)(B). That uniformity will be impossible to
attain as long as the circuits remain divided about
fundamental aspects of whether and when the Hague
Convention applies.
1. In 1980, the member states of the Hague Conference on Private International Law—including the
United States—unanimously adopted the Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, Letter
of Submittal from George P. Schultz to Pres. Ronald
Reagan (Oct. 4, 1985), 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,496
(Mar. 26, 1986). The limited purpose of the Convention was “to secure the prompt return of children who
have been abducted from their country of habitual residence or wrongfully retained outside that country.”
Letter of Transmittal from Pres. Ronald Reagan (Oct.
30, 1985), id. at 10,495; see also Convention pmbl.
As this Court has explained, the Convention’s
“central operating feature” is the remedy of sending a
child back across international borders to her country
of habitual residence. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 9

 4
(2010). This remedy is available only where the
child’s removal was “wrongful,” i.e., if the child was
taken across international borders in breach of custody rights defined by the laws of the country in which
she was habitually resident. See Convention arts. 3,
12. Where the child was not habitually resident in the
country from which she was removed, the Convention
does not apply—although other remedies under other
treaties or domestic law may be available. The question of habitual residence is therefore the fundamental inquiry in every Hague Convention case.
In 1988, Congress passed the Hague Convention’s
enabling statute, the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act. See Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437
(1988) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011). In its
findings, Congress echoed the Convention’s purpose
“to help resolve the problem of international abduction and retention of children” and to “deter such
wrongful removals and retentions.”
22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(a)(4). Consistent with the Convention’s limited purposes, Congress empowered “courts in the
United States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child
custody claim.” Id. § 9001(b)(4).
2. Petitioner Michelle Monasky, an American citizen, married respondent Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, in Illinois in September 2011. Pet. App.
73a–74a. In February 2013, Taglieri moved back to
Italy after being unable to find continued employment
in the United States; the parties lived apart for nearly
six months until Monasky joined him in July 2013.
Pet. App. 74a.
Soon thereafter, Taglieri began a pattern of repeated physical and sexual assault against Monasky.
Pet. App. 75a, 104a–105a. During one assault, he

 5
climbed on top of Monasky while she was laying on
the bed and told her: “‘spread your legs, or I will
spread them for you.’” Pet. App. 104a n.3. Despite
Monasky’s express unwillingness to have a child with
him, Taglieri “‘forced [her] to have sex that he knew
[she] didn’t want to have,’” Pet. App. 103a & n.3 (quoting Tr. 636), and his sexual assaults resulted in her
becoming pregnant in the spring of 2014, Pet. App.
75a.
Monasky’s pregnancy was a difficult one. Due to
medical complications—which nearly resulted in a
miscarriage—Monasky’s doctors ordered her not to
travel “for the entire pregnancy.” Tr. 507–09; see also
Pet. App. 45a, 76a. The difficulties facing Monasky
were compounded by Taglieri’s decision to move more
than 165 miles away, returning only on certain weekends and leaving the pregnant Monasky—who spoke
no Italian—alone. Pet. App. 75a.
When he was present, Taglieri’s abuse intensified;
he began “slapping [Monasky] more frequently” and
“harder.” Pet. App. 75a. Around August 2014,
Monasky began to apply for jobs in the United States
and to contact American and Italian divorce lawyers
and international moving companies. Pet. App. 76a–
77a. The parties had previously discussed divorce,
and during this time, Monasky repeatedly informed
Taglieri that she intended to return to the United
States with the baby after she was born. See Tr. 356,
381, 388–89, 392.
In early February 2015, Taglieri again forcefully
struck Monasky, who was, by then, nine months pregnant. Def. Ex. X. Monasky told Taglieri once again
that she wanted a divorce and that she would take the
baby back to the United States once she was born.
Pet. App. 4a, 77a. This time, Taglieri agreed, saying

 6
“f[—] you go back to the States with your mom on
[February] 27th.” Def. Ex. X; see also Tr. 381, 388–89,
392; Def. Ex. P-3.
A few days later, A.M.T was born via emergency
cesarean section, after Taglieri refused to drive his
wife to the hospital while she was in labor and forced
her to take a taxi. Pet. App. 78a. After arriving at the
hospital, Taglieri screamed at his newborn baby and
threatened to “shove [formula] up her ass.” Tr. 339,
553; see also Jt. Ex. 19 at 5.
After the birth, Monasky’s physical limitations
were so severe that she needed help performing basic
tasks from bathing herself to changing A.M.T.’s diapers. Tr. 555–56. Monasky’s mother remained in Italy for two weeks to assist her daughter. Pet. App.
78a. Taglieri, meanwhile, returned to his home more
than 165 miles away. Pet. App. 78a. After Monasky’s
mother returned to the United States, Monasky
agreed to join Taglieri temporarily so that he could
help with the newborn and sign the papers necessary
to obtain A.M.T.’s U.S. passport. Pet. App. 79a–80a.
Throughout this time, Monasky repeated to Taglieri
that she was divorcing him and returning to the
United States with A.M.T. Pet. App. 78a–79a. The
parties jointly applied for A.M.T.’s passport in early
March, Pet. App. 80a, several days after an e-mail exchange in which Taglieri told Monasky that “you can
gothe us whenever yoouwant . . . [sic],” Def. Ex. J.
Three weeks later, Monasky and Taglieri got into
an argument after Taglieri refused to allow Monasky
to change A.M.T.’s urine-soiled clothing because of the
price of laundry. Pet. App. 81a. While screaming, Taglieri raised his hand as if to strike Monasky before
going into the kitchen, where Monasky heard what
sounded like Taglieri “picking up [a] knife and putting

 7
it . . . back.” Tr. 593; see also Pet. App. 81a. After he
left for work, Monasky took A.M.T. to the police, who
placed them in a social-services safe house for domestic-violence victims. Pet. App. 81a. They remained in
protective care for two weeks until A.M.T.’s U.S. passport arrived—at which point they immediately left for
the United States. Pet. App. 50a, 81a. On the date of
their departure, A.M.T. was eight weeks old. See Pet.
App. 82a.
3. Taglieri filed a Hague Convention petition in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio seeking an order returning A.M.T. to Italy. See
Pet. App. 82a. After a bench trial, the district court
granted Taglieri’s petition.
At the time of the trial, the Sixth Circuit had rejected consideration of parental intent in determining
a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention—focusing instead on the child’s “acclimatization”
to a particular country—but had left open the question whether that same standard would apply to infants, who are generally too young to acclimate to
their surroundings. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981,
992–93, 992 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007). Expressly noting the
absence of binding precedent, the district court created its own legal standard and presumed that an “infant will normally be a habitual resident of the country where the [parents’] matrimonial home exists.”
Pet. App. 90a. No other court has ever adopted this
presumption.
The court then shifted the burden to Monasky, examining whether she had proven that the marriage
had “irrevocably broke[n] down” before A.M.T.’s birth.
Pet. App. 92a. Although the court repeatedly stated
that Monasky had a “fixed subjective intent” to leave
Italy with A.M.T. “as soon as possible” and made no

 8
finding that A.M.T.’s parents had ever agreed to raise
her in Italy, it concluded that Monasky “lacked definitive plans as to how and when” to leave Italy and
therefore had not “disestablish[ed]” A.M.T.’s presumptive habitual residence in the country. Pet. App.
93a, 96a–97a. Based on that reasoning, the court issued an order directing A.M.T.’s return to Italy. Pet.
App. 99a, 108a.
Monasky appealed and sought a stay of the return
order, which was denied first by the Sixth Circuit, Pet.
App. 5a, and then by Justice Kagan, see Monasky v.
Taglieri, No. 16A557 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2016). A.M.T. was
therefore returned to Italy, where an Italian court in
an ex parte proceeding had terminated Monasky’s parental rights, Pet. App. 81a–82a, and made Taglieri
“sole custodian with full parental rights” over A.M.T.,
Pl. Ex. 61 at 7.
4. On appeal, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit
affirmed after adopting an entirely different legal
standard for determining habitual residence. Rejecting the district court’s “matrimonial home” approach,
the panel majority adopted its own novel standard,
ruling that “where the child has resided exclusively in
a single country, that country is the child’s habitual
residence.” Pet. App. 53a. Because A.M.T. “spent her
entire life in Italy” before her removal to the United
States, the majority held that “it is appropriate to hold
that her habitual residence was Italy.” Pet. App. 60a.
Judge Moore dissented, emphasizing that the majority’s new single-country rule conflicted with the approach of ten other circuits that determine habitual
residence by looking at either (i) a child’s acclimatization or (ii) the existence of a shared parental intent.
Pet. App. 64a (Moore, J., dissenting).

 9
5. The Sixth Circuit granted Monasky’s petition
for rehearing en banc and then affirmed again in a
fractured 10-8 decision.
Applying yet another legal standard in this case,
the en banc majority held that “the parents’ shared
intent” determines whether an infant who is too
young to acclimate to her surroundings has attained
a habitual residence in the country from which she
was removed. Pet. App. 9a. The majority went on to
hold, however, that “‘shared parental intent’” does not
require the parents to have a “‘meeting of the minds’
about their child’s future home.” Pet. App. 12a. According to the majority, “[a]n absence of a subjective
agreement between the parents does not by itself end
the inquiry” because a subjective agreement, while
“sufficient,” is “not a necessary . . . basis for locating
an infant’s habitual residence.” Pet. App. 12a.
Even though the Sixth Circuit had not previously
adopted a “shared parental intent” standard to determine the habitual residence of infants—and even
though a remand is normally “required” when the
Sixth Circuit adopts a different legal standard than
that applied by the district court, Pet. App. 34a
(Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting Siding & Insulation
Co. v. Alco Vending, Inc., 822 F.3d 886, 901 (6th Cir.
2016))—the en banc majority declined to remand the
case for the district court to apply its new standard to
the facts of this case, Pet. App. 12a.
The en banc majority also refused to undertake its
own determination of A.M.T.’s habitual residence under that new standard. Pet. App. 11a. Rejecting
Monasky’s argument that determinations of habitual
residence are subject to de novo review, the majority
stated that Sixth Circuit precedent “treat[s] the habitual residence of a child as a question of fact.” Pet. App.

 10
9a. It therefore applied clear-error review, concluding
that “[n]othing in [the district court’s] habitual-residence finding leaves a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake was made.” Pet. App. 9a (internal quotation marks omitted). Because “no part of [the district court’s] habitual-residence finding sinks to clear
error,” the majority upheld the return order. Pet. App.
3a.
Five of the ten judges who joined the majority
opinion also joined a separate concurrence defending
the panel majority’s single-country approach to habitual residence. Pet. App. 15a (Boggs, J., concurring).
The concurring judges made clear that they “concur[red] in [the en banc majority’s] conclusion that the
habitual residency inquiry is a question of fact and
that the district court made no clear error in its factual findings in this case.” Pet. App. 14a–15a.
All eight dissenting judges joined a principal dissent concluding that, while the “shared parental intent” standard is the correct standard where an infant
is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, shared
parental intent cannot properly be determined without analysis of “external indicia of the last shared
agreement of the parties.” Pet. App. 27a (Moore, J.,
dissenting). Parting ways with the majority, the principal dissent explained that, where an infant’s habitual residence is “unclear” from external indicia, the
petitioner “has not satisfied [his] burden.” Pet. App.
29a.
The dissenting judges further disagreed with the
en banc majority’s decision to affirm the return order
under its newly adopted legal standard without remanding for the district court to apply that standard
in the first instance. Pet. App. 34a (Moore, J., dissent-

 11
ing); see also Pet. App. 34a–35a (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Pet. App. 39a (Stranch, J., dissenting). And they
expressly disagreed with the en banc majority’s application of clear-error review, rather than de novo review, to the district court’s habitual-residence determination. As the principal dissent explained, “[t]he
district court’s ultimate determination of habitual residence—in other words, its application of the legal
standard to its findings of fact—is reviewed de novo.”
Pet. App. 30a (Moore, J., dissenting). The majority’s
contrary conclusion, the dissent emphasized, “puts
[the Sixth Circuit] at odds with the standard of review
used by [its] sister circuits in these cases.” Pet. App.
30a–31a (citing cases).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In the past decade, this Court has granted review
three times to clarify application of the Hague Convention. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1
(2014) (equitable tolling); Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S.
165 (2013) (mootness); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1
(2010) (custody rights). But the Court has never addressed the meaning of “habitual residence” and the
substantive standard for its determination, or the
standard of review to be applied in reviewing such a
determination. This case provides the Court with a
valuable opportunity to address both of those important questions.
Even before the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in
this case, the courts of appeals were deeply divided on
the standard for reviewing habitual-residence determinations. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion exacerbated
that split: there are now seven circuits that apply de
novo review, one circuit that applies a deferential
form of de novo review, and two circuits (including the
Sixth Circuit) that apply clear-error review. See Pet.

 12
App. 31a (Moore, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit
then created a second circuit split by holding that,
where a child is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, the parents need not have reached a “subjective agreement” about where to raise the child in
order to establish that child’s habitual residence, Pet.
App. 12a—a conclusion that conflicts with the holdings of all four other circuits that have addressed the
issue.
The Court should not permit these intolerable
conflicts to persist. Because the Hague Convention’s
application turns on habitual residence, every petitioner seeking a return order under the Convention
must establish that the child was habitually resident
in the country from which she was removed. Accordingly, the question of habitual residence “is the central—often outcome-determinative—concept on which
the entire system is founded.” Mozes v. Mozes, 239
F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001). In the absence of clarity regarding this essential element of Hague Convention litigation, “parents are deprived of crucial information they need to make decisions” and courts are
set “adrift with” no meaningful guidance to inform
their decision-making, id.—in direct contravention of
Congress’s emphasis on “the need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention,” 22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(b)(3)(B). In addition, inconsistent application
of the Hague Convention can have dire consequences
for young children who are subject to a return order
that takes them away from their primary caregiver.
This Court should grant review to restore the
“uniform[ity]” that Congress deemed essential in the
Hague Convention setting and to reject the Sixth Circuit’s doubly flawed approach to the habitual-resi-

 13
dence inquiry, which contravenes this Court’s precedent and conflicts with the language and animating
objectives of the Convention.
I.

CERTIORARI IS WARRANTED TO CLARIFY THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO
HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATIONS.

As the principal dissent emphasized, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision to apply clear-error review to the
district court’s habitual-residence determination puts
it “at odds with the standard of review used by [its]
sister circuits,” Pet. App. 30a–31a (Moore, J., dissenting), the majority of which have correctly applied this
Court’s precedent by undertaking de novo appellate
review of habitual-residence determinations.
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Deepens A
Three-Way Circuit Split.
The ten circuits that have addressed the issue apply three different standards of review to a district
court’s habitual-residence determination.
1. Seven circuits apply de novo review to a district
court’s ultimate determination of habitual residence,
while reviewing the district court’s underlying findings of historical fact for clear error. The Second Circuit, for example, has explained that “[t]he habitual
residence inquiry is heavily fact dependent, but
whether the relevant facts satisfy the legal standard
is a question of law we review de novo.” Guzzo v. Cristofano, 719 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). The Third
Circuit has likewise held that the “determination of
habitual residence is not purely factual, but requires
the application of a legal standard, which defines the
concept of habitual residence, to historical and narrative facts.” Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9

 14
(3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the Third Circuit “employ[s] a mixed standard of review, accepting the district court’s historical or narrative facts unless they
are clearly erroneous, but exercising plenary review of
the court’s choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the
facts.” Id. The Fifth Circuit agrees, explaining that
“[a] district court’s ‘habitual residence’ determination
. . . presents a mixed question of law and fact subject
to de novo review.” Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 306
(5th Cir. 2012).
The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also apply the same approach: reviewing the underlying historical facts for clear error, but the ultimate determination of habitual residence de novo. See
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The
ultimate determination of habitual residence is a
mixed question of law and fact to which we will apply
de novo review.”); Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d
886, 896 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[A] district court’s
determination of habitual residence . . . is necessarily
a determination subject to de novo appellate review.”);
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1073 (Because habitual residence
“requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix of
fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles, . . . the question
should be classified as one of law and reviewed de
novo.”); Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2004) (“[W]e accept the district court’s finding of
historical facts unless clearly erroneous, but with regard to the ultimate issue of habitual residency, the
appellate court will review de novo.”).
2. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held in this
case—over the dissent of eight judges—that it would
“treat the habitual residence of a child as a question

 15
of fact.” Pet. App. 9a. Emphasizing “the comparative
advantages” of trial and appellate courts and that
“clear-error review is highly deferential,” the en banc
majority stated that it would affirm the district court’s
habitual-residence determination “unless the fact
findings ‘strike us as wrong with the force of a fiveweek-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’” Pet. App. 9a
(quoting United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 58 (6th
Cir. 1990)). The majority then deferred not only to the
district court’s findings of historical fact but also to its
determination that those facts were legally sufficient
to establish A.M.T.’s habitual residence in Italy. See
Pet. App. 11a. Recounting the record evidence, the
majority concluded that the district court was “[f]aced
with [a] two-sided record”—which was sufficient, in
the majority’s view, to uphold the district court’s return order. Pet. App. 11a.
While the Sixth Circuit is decidedly in the minority in its application of clear-error review, it is not
alone in applying that deferential standard. The
Fourth Circuit has likewise stated that “the crux of
the issue” on habitual residence is “whether the district court’s determination . . . is clearly erroneous.”
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009).
3. The First Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach. Although it applies clear-error review to historical facts underlying the habitual-residence determination and de novo review to the district court’s resolution of that question, the First Circuit affords a
measure of deference to the district court’s ultimate
determination. According to the First Circuit, “[i]t is
not easy” in Hague Convention litigation “to attach an
abstract label to a complex of discrete facts, some of
which push each way.” Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605
F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2010). The court therefore will

 16
reverse a “district court’s raw fact findings . . . only for
clear error” and gives “some deference” to the district
court’s “application of the standard” in making a determination of habitual residence. Id.
4. The circuits’ deep disagreement about the
standard of review to apply to habitual-residence determinations has profound practical consequences for
Hague Convention litigants and their children. If this
case had been decided using the de novo standard of
review applied by seven other circuits, it would have
come out differently because the evidence demonstrates that Monasky and Taglieri never shared an intent to raise A.M.T. in Italy.
The district court made no express finding that
Monasky ever intended to raise A.M.T. in Italy. To
the contrary, the district court found that she had an
“intent to return to the United States with A.M.T. as
soon as possible.” Pet. App. 94a (emphasis added); see
also Pet. App. 97a (noting “[t]hat Monasky had a ‘fixed
subjective intent’ to take A.M.T. to the United
States”). Before A.M.T.’s birth, for example, Monasky
took numerous concrete steps that evinced that intent, including “applying for jobs in the United States,
inquiring about American health care and child care
options, and looking for American divorce lawyers.”
Pet. App. 76a. And “shortly after A.M.T.’s birth,
Monasky reiterated her desire to . . . return to the
United States with [A.M.T.],” and “communicated
[that] desire . . . to members of her immediate family.”
Pet. App. 79a, 92a–94a. In fact, although the district
court assumed that the “shared intent of the [parents]
is relevant,” its ultimate habitual-residence determination downplayed Monasky’s intent to raise A.M.T.
in the United States through application of a legally

 17
erroneous burden-shifting presumption—not recognized by any other court—that a “marital home” established before a child’s birth is the child’s habitual
residence after birth. Pet. App. 97a.
A court of appeals applying de novo review to this
record thus could not have concluded that Monasky
and Taglieri shared an intent to raise A.M.T. in Italy.
Because this appeal was decided in the Sixth Circuit,
however, the court of appeals refused to undertake
that de novo examination of the record. Instead, it upheld the district court’s return order because
“[n]othing in [the district court’s] habitual residence
finding . . . strikes one as wrong with ‘the force of a
five-week-old, unrefrigerated’ aquatic animal.” Pet.
App. 9a.
It is fundamentally unfair and incompatible with
the Convention’s uniformity-enhancing objectives for
a return order separating a parent from her child to
be upheld on appeal based on the happenstance of the
circuit in which the other parent filed suit.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts
With This Court’s Precedent.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision to apply clear-error
review to the habitual-residence determination also
conflicts with this Court’s precedent.
The Court has defined mixed questions of law and
fact as those “in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and
the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule
of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
289 n.19 (1982). The Court has subsequently made
clear that mixed questions of law and fact are subject

 18
to de novo appellate review where they require application of historical facts to a statutory or constitutional standard.
In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996),
for example, the Court held that “independent appellate review of . . . ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause” is required because
“the decision whether . . . historical facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or probable
cause” is a “mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at
696–97. “A policy of sweeping deference” to district
courts, the Court reasoned, “would permit, in the absence of any significant difference in the facts, the
Fourth Amendment’s incidence to turn on whether
different trial judges draw general conclusions that
the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute
probable cause.” Id. at 697 (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). “Such varied results,” the
Court concluded, “would be inconsistent with the idea
of a unitary system of law.” Id.; see also McDermott
Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355–56 (1991)
(holding that although “seaman status under the
Jones Act is a question of fact for the jury,” interpretation of the statutory term “is a question of law,” and
emphasizing that “the court must not abdicate its
duty to determine if there is a reasonable basis to support the jury’s conclusion”).
Habitual residence under the Hague Convention
is a paradigmatic example of a mixed question of law
and fact: it turns on whether “the historical facts” regarding the child’s residence history and acclimatization to her surroundings—as well as, in cases where
the child is too young to have acclimated, the parents’

 19
intent regarding where the child will be raised—“satisfy the statutory standard” for “habitual residence”
under the Hague Convention and its enabling statute.
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19; see also, e.g.,
Silverman, 338 F.3d at 896 (“a district court’s determination of habitual residence is not devoid of legal
principles” or “a question of pure fact, to be decided
without reference to statutory language and established legal precedent”).
The considerations that led this Court to conclude
that de novo appellate review is essential in the probable-cause setting apply with equal force in the habitual-residence context. As those courts that have applied de novo review have recognized—and Congress
confirmed by its emphasis on “uniformity” in the
Hague Convention’s implementing legislation, 22
U. S. C. § 9001(b)(3)(B)—there is a compelling need
for “consistency and predictability” when assessing a
child’s habitual residence that strongly militates in favor of de novo review. Koch, 450 F.3d at 712–13; see
also Silverman, 338 F.3d at 896 (habitual residence
“must contain an objective standard” and thus “is necessarily a determination subject to de novo appellate
review” because “it is imperative that parents be able
to assess the status of the law on habitual residence”).
“Without intelligibility and consistency in [courts’] application” of the habitual-residence standard, “parents are deprived of crucial information they need to
make decisions, and children are more likely to suffer
the harms the Convention seeks to prevent.” Mozes,
239 F.3d at 1072. That “intelligibility and consistency” can be attained only through the application
of de novo appellate review. Id.

 20
The Sixth Circuit’s application of deferential
clear-error review to the district court’s habitual-residence determination contravenes this Court’s precedent and undermines the Hague Convention’s purpose of establishing a uniform, consistent, and predictable legal framework for determining a child’s habitual residence. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit stated that
a district court would have been free to rule either way
on the habitual-residence issue based on the factual
record in this case. Pet. App. 11a. Permitting two
courts to reach opposite outcomes based on the same
facts is flatly at odds with Congress’s intention to foster “uniform[ity]” when enacting the Hague Convention’s implementing legislation.
22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(b)(3)(B).
This Court should grant review to clarify that
courts of appeals must exercise de novo review over
district courts’ habitual-residence determinations,
and must reach their own independent conclusions as
to whether the facts of the case meet the correct legal
standard. The en banc court’s decision here erroneously subsumes a primarily legal determination under the mantle of a purely factual assessment.
II. CERTIORARI IS WARRANTED TO RESOLVE
WHETHER AN ACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARENTS IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
AN INFANT’S HABITUAL RESIDENCE.
In addition to deepening the circuits’ disagreement regarding the standard of review applicable to
habitual-residence determinations, the Sixth Circuit
also created another circuit split when it held that a
subjective agreement between the parents is not necessary to establish the habitual residence of an infant
who is too young to acclimate to her surroundings.
The Sixth Circuit’s outlier approach is incompatible

 21
with the plain language and purposes of the Hague
Convention.
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Creates A
Circuit Split On The Necessity Of A
Subjective Agreement.
1. Prior to the decision below, four circuits—the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth—had squarely addressed the question of how to determine habitual residence for infants too young to acclimate to their surroundings. Each concluded that habitual residence is
established only if the parents shared a subjective intent—that is, if they reached a meeting of the minds—
to raise the child in that country.
The Second Circuit, for example, held in Gitter v.
Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005), that, absent evidence that a child had acclimated to her surroundings,
“a child’s habitual residence is consistent with the intentions of those entitled to fix the child’s residence at
the time those intentions were mutually shared.” Id.
at 133. Applying that standard, the court concluded
that because the parents “only mutually agreed to
move to Israel on a conditional basis,” their child could
only have attained habitual residence in Israel
through acclimatization. Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the Third Circuit has explained that
“‘the conduct and the overtly stated intentions and
agreement of the parents . . . are bound to be important factors’” in assessing a child’s habitual residence. Feder, 63 F.3d at 223 (quoting In re Bates,
[1989] 2 WLUK 293 (Fam.)). In accordance with that
standard, the court held in a subsequent case that
when the mother of an eight-week-old infant agreed

 22
to give birth in Belgium but to “live there only temporarily,” the infant “did not become a habitual resident”
of Belgium before her mother took her to the United
States. Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 333–34 (3d Cir.
2003).
The Fifth Circuit likewise held in Berezowsky v.
Ojeda, 765 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2014), that, to establish
a habitual residence, “[a] shared parental intent requires that the parents actually share or jointly develop the intention.” Id. at 468. “In other words,” the
court continued, “the parents must reach some sort of
meeting of the minds regarding their child’s habitual
residence, so that they are making the decision together.” Id. The court concluded that the petitioner
had not met her burden of establishing that the parents “reach[ed] an agreement or meeting of the minds
regarding [their child’s] future” and that the petitioner therefore was not entitled to an order returning
the child to Mexico. Id. at 469.
The Ninth Circuit follows the same approach. In
Murphy v. Sloan, 764 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), it declined to find a child habitually resident in Ireland because “there was never any discussion, let alone agreement, that the stay abroad would be indefinite.” Id. at
1152 (emphasis added).
2. The Sixth Circuit took an entirely different approach to ascertaining shared parental intent in this
case. According to the en banc majority, a “‘meeting
of the minds’” between the parents is “not a necessary
. . . basis for locating an infant’s habitual residence.”
Pet. App. 12a. “An absence of a subjective agreement
between the parents,” the court continued, “does not
by itself end the inquiry.” Pet. App. 12a. Under that
aberrant approach, the en banc majority upheld the
return order—even though the district court made no

 23
finding that Monasky and Taglieri had ever agreed to
raise A.M.T. in Italy. Pet. App. 11a. To the contrary,
the district court expressly found that Monasky had
formed a “fixed subjective intent” to leave Italy with
A.M.T. and to do so “as soon as possible” after her
birth. Pet. App. 94a, 97a.
Accordingly, if this case had been decided in any
of the four other circuits to address the issue, the absence of any actual agreement between A.M.T.’s parents—as well as the undisputed fact that the eightweek-old had not acclimated to her surroundings in
Italy—would have led the court to conclude that
A.M.T. was not habitually resident in Italy and that a
return order was not appropriate. But because the
case was decided in the Sixth Circuit through a fluke
of geography, 18-month-old A.M.T. was ordered to be
removed from her home with her mother and sent to
a country to which she had formed no connection.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts
With The Language And Purpose Of The
Hague Convention.
The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that an unacclimated infant may be habitually resident in a country
in the absence of her parents’ mutual agreement to
raise her there conflicts with the Hague Convention’s
language and purpose.
Although other treaties or laws may apply more
broadly, the Convention was adopted to resolve jurisdiction over international custody disputes in limited
circumstances. Under the terms of the Convention, a
return remedy is available only where a child is
wrongfully removed from the country in which she
was “habitually resident immediately before the removal.” Convention art. 3.

 24
Courts have repeatedly held that the ordinary
meaning of the words “habitual residence” requires
something more than a child’s mere physical presence
in a country. To have a habitual residence, a child
must be present in a country with “a degree of settled
purpose” or “a sufficient degree of continuity to be
properly described as settled.” Feder, 63 F.3d at 223
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Silverman, 338 F.3d at 898 (“Federal courts are agreed that
‘habitual residence’ must encompass some form of
‘settled purpose.’”). In the absence of acclimatization
or a mutual agreement between the parents, an infant’s mere physical presence in a country does not
have the “settled purpose” or “continuity” necessary to
make it a habitual residence. See, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d
at 223. Otherwise, an infant’s habitual residence
would simply be where she was born and initially resides, which would impermissibly render the term
“habitual” superfluous. Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006)
(“it is generally presumed that statutory language is
not superfluous”). Thus, under the plain language of
the Convention, the eight weeks that A.M.T. spent in
Italy could not have given rise to her “habitual residence” in a country where she had developed no ties
of her own and where her parents had never agreed to
raise her.
Moreover, by rejecting the requirement of actual
parental agreement in infant cases, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision gave controlling weight to Taglieri’s unilateral, eleventh-hour decision that A.M.T. should stay
in Italy—the exact opposite of the Convention’s goal
to prevent forum selection for custody disputes. See
1980 Conference de La Haye de droit international
prive, Enlévement d’enfants, Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report (“Explanatory Report”), in 3 Actes et

 25
Documents de la Quatorzième Session 426, 429 (1982)
(“the problem with which the Convention deals . . . derives . . . from the possibility of individuals establishing legal and jurisdictional links which are more or
less artificial”).1
Especially in the context of domestic violence, a
legal standard that does not require actual agreement
between the parents opens the door to manipulation
and forum-shopping by abusive parents and spouses.
That is precisely what transpired in this case. Confronted with both an abusive spouse who forced her
pregnancy and serious medical complications during
that pregnancy, Monasky had no choice but to give
birth in Italy. But the Convention does not turn on
random circumstances of birthplace or the temporary
home of a parent: it turns on the habitual residence
of a child. The circumstances of A.M.T.’s eight weeks
in Italy—while her mother recovered from a difficult
birth and waited in a domestic-violence safe house for
A.M.T.’s U.S. passport so that the two could escape
Taglieri’s continued abuse—do not constitute the kind
of settled environment the Convention was intended
to recognize.
*

*

*

Absent this Court’s intervention, there will be one
standard for determining the habitual residence of
1

The Explanatory Report is the “official history” of the Convention and “a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of the Convention.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,503, 10,506 (Mar. 26, 1986). Nearly every
federal court of appeals has treated this report as “an authoritative source for interpreting the Convention’s provisions.” Robert
v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing cases).

 26
unacclimated infants in the Sixth Circuit and a different standard in four other circuits, while the standard
in the remaining circuits will be anyone’s guess. That
is not the uniformity required by the Convention and
Congress. Indeed, that disparity serves no one: not
parents seeking legal certainty, not children seeking
stability, and not district courts seeking clear appellate guidance. This Court should grant review to
make clear that, no matter the jurisdiction in which a
Hague Convention case is tried, an infant’s habitual
residence cannot be established in a particular country unless the parents actually reach an agreement
that she be raised there.
III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE
TO ADDRESS THESE TWO IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS.
The Court should seize this valuable opportunity
to resolve these two separate circuit splits regarding
the Hague Convention’s habitual-residence requirement and to establish the clarity and uniformity that
are essential to the effective operation of the Convention.
The United States receives hundreds of applications under the Hague Convention every year. See Nigel Lowe & Victoria Stephens, A Statistical Analysis
of Applications Made in 2015 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, pt. III, at 143 (July 2018)
(the United States received 254, 345, 329, and 379
Convention petitions in 1999, 2003, 2008, and 2015,
respectively). In fact, the United States has “received
more applications than any other [country]” every
year the Hague Conference has conducted a survey.
Id. at 142. In each case arising out of those applications, the habitual residence of the child is a critical—

 27
and “often outcome-determinative”—inquiry. Mozes,
239 F.3d at 1072.
Courts and litigants alike need certainty about
the procedural and substantive standards that will
govern the habitual-residence determination. As
things stand now, however, the standard of review
that will be applied to a district court’s habitual-residence determination—and the legal standard that
will be utilized in determining whether an unacclimated infant possesses a habitual residence—will
turn on the fortuity of venue. As a result, a child who
would have been permitted to remain in the United
States in some jurisdictions may be the subject of a
return order in other jurisdictions. Such arbitrary, inconsistent, and inequitable outcomes are anathema to
the “uniform[ity]” and predictability that Congress
sought to achieve when it enacted the Hague Convention’s enabling legislation. 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(3)(B).
This case—thoroughly litigated with a complete
record, multiple reasoned opinions by the lower
courts, and no vehicle problems—presents an excellent opportunity for the Court to decide both questions
presented and, in so doing, to provide essential guidance to the lower courts so that parents and children
involved in the trying ordeal of an international child
custody dispute receive fair, predictable, and evenhanded treatment from U.S. courts.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention serves as an important deterrent to, and remedy for, wrongful parental kidnapping. But in this case, it was applied beyond its intended scope to remove a toddler from the only parent
she had ever known, and to return her to an abusive

 28
father in a country to which she lacked any meaningful ties. That troubling outcome was the product of
the court of appeals’ inappropriate deference to the
district court’s habitual-residence determination and
both courts’ flawed legal standards for ascertaining
A.M.T.’s habitual residence. This Court should grant
review before any more parents and children are forcibly separated by judicial orders that the Hague Convention’s signatories never intended to authorize.
Respectfully submitted.
ANDREW A. ZASHIN
CHRISTOPHER R. REYNOLDS
AMY M. KEATING
ZASHIN & RICH CO., L.P.A.
950 Main Avenue, 4th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
(216) 696-4441
JOAN S. MEIER
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL
EMPOWERMENT AND APPEALS
PROJECT AND THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
2000 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20052
(202) 994-2278

AMIR C. TAYRANI
Counsel of Record
MELANIE L. KATSUR
KELLAM M. CONOVER
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500
atayrani@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Petitioner

January 15, 2019