,v TOP SECRET.- . - CIA Intemaz Use my a A fkwaw:?bn?v?aiby I . 3? CIA Historg Staff Ts#795052 CoPy PIGS OPERATION VOLUME EVOLUTION OF '(pages 1?203) TOP DCI-8 December-1979 Copy l?of 2 PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY M1 ??00000. .1 . TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF BAY OF.PIGS-OPERATION DCI-8 Volume EVOLUTION OF FOLICIESL 1961 a 1 December 1979 I Jack B. Pfeiffer . TOP SECRET. 713-00000 TOPSECRET Fore?ord This is the third volume of the Official of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United .Statestovernment as Fidel Castro and his cohorts. came to power in Cuba.* The colicy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the'displace- ment of Fidel Castro; and it was by no means a uni? lateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency 4? although it is deeonstrable that the Agency was far more gerceptive than the policy making bodies 'in recognizing the_threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro?s Communist affiliation. Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and/or the Organization'of American Staten the of 9p1ausible deniability" Was the caveat that deter~ mined-the CIA-would be the principal implementing arm for' ?the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination, The preceding volumes were: I - Air Operations Participation'in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET "deniahility" would be the albatross around the necks? of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs. This volume describes the Agency' organizatiOn designed to task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other cgovernment components (State and the military in particular), between the Agency and the.White House, and among various CIA components as the program I evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than harmoniouso Particular attention is-focused on the ;roles played by both President Eisenhower who author~ ized the anti~Castro program and Vice President Nixon 'who has been charged time and again unjustifiably as the record reveals with being the maStermind behind the operatibn. :1 Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change . in the concept of the operation between the spring ?d and fall of 1960.'.From April's plans for the infil- tration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained Specialists in communications, sabotage, and para- ?military operations to provide training and guidance iv?- 13-00000 to anti~Castro dissidents, November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a? provisional government CIA) could issne its clarion calls for US, UN,'or OAS inter? vention. Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level meetings which considered such items as funding the operation,possible use of Us personnel in combat roles, the use of Us bases for training or for operations, types of direct action programs propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the best of other -problems related to Castro?s overthrow; It also makes clear that various US. cerporate interests played an active (sometimes overactive) role in Support of the anti?Castro efforts of the Government. This volume- also examines official records in light of the allegations of the Senate Select Commit~ tee' inveStigations that the assassination plans being developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel Castro. There is no basis in fact for this 713-00000 TOPSECRET Finally, the reader of this volume Should gain' "some insights to the character of various of the principal actors Agency and non?Agency i- who were Vinvolved meet closely sith the Government's anti?CastrO' policy during the periOd from its inception through the close of the EisenhoWer administration. Not all of these impressions are_flattering; but the anther; 'who was in no way aSsociated nith the operation or . the Directorate of Plans (now operations), hopes that the presentation of.the evidence has been as free from . bias as possible. I Again the authbr wishes to acknowledge the Valu-. able centributions of the other two nembers of the CIA- History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hamnond and Mrs. Sharon Bond}?to the completion Of this volume. Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the?substantive research or the grimly mechanical tasks require& in 'preparing a volume-such as this, the task could have been interminable. For any errors of_fact or questionable interprets" tions, the author alone is responsible. vi - TOP SECRET. '1 3-00000 Vblume Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . A. Watching from the Sidelines B. Castro Takes-Over . . . . Part II castro Must Organizing for Covert Action B. Forging the Tool . . . . . . C. Cooperation and Challenge . D. Personnel and Training . . . Changing Concepts . . . . . . . Part IV Presidential Resurgence . . . . 'Part Direct Action Programs . . . . . A.. Propaganda . . . . . . . . . 35' Sabotage and other Exercises Part VI Mr. Nixon?s Role . . . . . . . Part VII The Question-of Assassinations . Part ?Conclusions . . . . . . .I. . . Appendixes A. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 vii - ITOPSECRET 32 32 ,80 10a 126 11:3 165 20a 20? 233 2n 277 290 296 713-00000 B. A Program of'CoVert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 Mar-CNO Correspondence with Department of State? and - 1) Letter for Allen Dulles from Arleigh'Burke, 17 Mar 60 T5 0?1436Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh BurkeMemoranaum for the Special ?Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, ,sub:. US Policy toward Cuba . . pDi Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) Action 2 May 60, sub:7 Liaison with US - Agencies.on JMARC Activities . . . E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at. Santiago de cuba; March 1961 . . . . F. Richard Memorandum on Meeting With Fidel Castro, 19 April_1959 . . . . G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba . . . . . . . SOUrce References Part I 'Backgro?Part II ".Castro Must.Part Changing Concepts . . . . . . Part IV ?Presidential Resurgence . . . TOP SECRET Page #300 311 313 318 3.32; A 3:35 337 3% 3H7 352 366 369 13-00000 TOPSECRET Egg Part Direct Action . . . .. . . . IPart Mr. Nigbn'siROIe . . . . . . 382 Bart. VII A?sassination . . . . . 386: Part Conclusions388 TOPSECRET 13-00000 . . . - OF PIGS volume Evolution ofCIA's' Anti-Castro Policies, 1950 January 1961! Part'I Background A. Watching?from the Sidelines Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one or the young, i'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself inrolved in many things that do not'concern him." l] Beginning in 19u8, 'the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the iSland of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be-carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency? and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17- 19 April l961. ?Beginning in 19?8 and continuing eVen after the United States had formulated its official poliCy of TOPSECRET '1 35-00000 TOPSECRET removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban Government, the principal questions faced by western HemiSphere Division, by the Department of State, and by other concerned_principals in the united States were: What is Fidel Castro? 'By whom is he cohttolled? What does he represent?_ Is he, or is he not, a Communist? The_nature of the AgencY's interest in answets to theSe questions is reflected in various of the_tecords-fot the period beginning in the mid- 1950ts when it appeared that the Agehcy depended in considerable oart on the reporting from the American Embassy offices in Havana. ?Commenting on a report entitled "Antidemocratic 'Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared by President Batista's Military intelligence Service (SIM) apparehtly in reSponse to a request from the Euro de Represi?n a 1as Activadades Communistas i- to the Counselbr of the American Embassy (Amembassy) in Havana, Lihcoln Vihtoh Chapih, told the CIA repre~ sentative among other things, that: Bureau for the Repressioh of Communist'Activities. 13-00000" TOP SECRET vThe SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegations and accusations made against Fidel Castro during the period-19Q8?l950. This summary has apparently been slanted in an'effort to .make Castro a "Rojo,? but the result is a rather poor one. g/ 'The Department of State reporter refuted, on a paragraph byparagraph basis, all of the allegations which indicated_that Castro had been tied in with Commnnists,'or'Communist sympathizers, ever since his university days; and in forwarding the report_to Chief, western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana indicated that he was furnishing the information be? cause 0f renewed interest-by the State Department in Fidel Castro- 3/ ?The tenor of State reporting continued in a. similar vein well int01957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State did note that in-his student days, he'Was involved in gangster-type activities." Havana Embassy reporting also reflectedanother of the problems of continuing concern to the-US Intelligence Community w? ?would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista, and were his baSic feelings toward the US friendly. 713-00000 in the midwl950's, Havana Station ran seven approved most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista 9opular), Agency fonds alsoWere used to support tne efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities. Lyman KirkpatriCk', CIA's InspeCtor General,- .apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting With President Fulgencic Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles, in praise of the meeting.* 2/ In fact, Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratiCally elected- -succe550r and amnesty for Castro and his followers, as well as other anti?Batistaldis~ sidents, was proposed ina memorandum from the Inspector General in November 1957. David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's In- spection Staff;-attached a note to the copy, of Dulles' letter Of (McLean) included in the file.of miscellaneous docu? ments on'the Bay of Pigs,-which were inherited by the present author.' McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not Confirmed this story. . 13-00000 In View of subSequent developments, one inter- esting suggestion made by the Inspector General in No'vember l957 was the following: . On the island cf Cuba, probably only a US citiZen, -in some way known to be connected with the US Government and "assumed" to be backed by would have the ability to act as intern mediary between the various opposition groups in the Batista Government and . work out a-possible "cease fire." This would have to be done covertly, and any. results achieved either not ever publicly announced or certainly not advertised_ until after the election. Any public attempt to bring peace would be fore- 'doomed to failure by each side probably" indicating exorbitant demands and then being unable to.withdraw from its announced position.* g/ Although it may_have had no relation to the Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957,1ess than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum, William Wieland of the Department of State notified Adolf Berle, one Of the country's leading eXperts 0n Latin American Affairs and a former member of the It is interesting to speCulate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Paney,- former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an_ American businessman who operated significant enter? prises in Cuba, to negotiate with Batista- Within a year' time, Pawley, who also stood high in thei ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was desig?? ?nated to undertake such a missibn to Cuba. TOP SECRET 13-00000 State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac- 'cording to Berle, ?to see whether anything can be done to bring the cuban revolt to any kind of an orderly concluSion." lg/ . Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted: It is rough going, anti-intervention is. all right up to a point. But we are re? sponsible for keeping order in the hemis? phere quite aside from the proprieties, and .a rather bolder pelicy in that regard_ seems indicated. 11/ By ea-rly 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently concerned abOut the pro?communist orientation of Castro's government, and particularly the pro?Castro proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel?s brother, that penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a priority concern of the field. At least two agents were successfully placed in ranks, and in March 1958,.one Agency officer managed to join the Castro farces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958, ?Robert D, Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself ?captured? by Raul CaStrO's forces in order to be able to assiSt 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US TOP SECRET 713-00000 businessmen Who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro. In both instanoes, the Agency representatives returned- unharmah and both reperted on the "radioal" and anti?. American natureof'the Castro movement. According - to one sonroe, Wiecha found "de?inite communist overs tones" among the Ranl Castro forces.* Additional documentation of the proecommunist nature of the Castro organization was reported with ?great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's contingent was communist oriented or not, others suoh -as Adolf Berle and hisf?riends (both in-and out of. State.Department), continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba. lg/ Berle'was most hopefnl that the Cestro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American-liberals working in conjunotion with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos and Pepin Bosch) with additional support from the OAS The historian for WH Division provided the figures _on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates 19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured; TOP SECRET '1 35-00000 TOP SECRET and Only minot participation from the US Departeent of State. l3]. a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing, a rather different- proposal was put foreard by the thef of the Para? military Division, Political and Staff, of the Clandestine Service}_ Rather than trying to 'whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency wOuld be to join Castro; It was'apparent, accofdihg to Get, that since Batista was on the way out, we should-now'tty to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of (our efforts to prop up BatiSta. To accomplish this, Cox suggested that: A-practical way to protect United States interests_in this matter would be to make seoret Contact with Castro, ~assure him of the'United States sympa~ thy with some of his objectives, and to offer him support. ?The individual chosen to make the contact should be . ,l of such?background that.it is clear that he Speaks with the authority of the United States GoVernment. ObviOusly; the support must be given covertly so as not to endanger United States relations with Batista. The most effective means of help to-Castro would be arms and'ammunition. Air dropping of SECRET 13-00000 .this equipment might be dangerous from the security asPect. Allowing a shipe load of equipment manned by,a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be.a better method. The most .rsecure means of help would be giving the money to Castro, who could then .purchaSe his own arms. A combination of arms and money would-probably be best.* lg/ By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent. that the Eatista regime in Cuba was about to go under, the Agenc? in Conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country ?taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta pending subsequent free, democratic-elections. When Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was biased against Castro. One report in the fall of 1958 indicated that CaStro definitely was not a Communist, Citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five peroent of his fOlloWers are good Catholics. Three_Catholic -priests have-joined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains, while the entire .Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain._ '(SOurc_e comment: The United States should not be taken in by.President Fulgencio Batista?s attempt vto label the revolutionary movement as Communist in? spired, dominated, or influenced. 16/ The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as one might surmise, a Catholic priest.. . 13-00000 TOPSECRET tra?eling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant .Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William D. Pawley on 18el9 Nosember 1958 to discuss a plan which would,ha?e Pawley travel to Cuba to-meet with ?Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out Pawley was a long?time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the dafs-when-Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline. I In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta 4+ nominally to be re3ponsible for his ouster f-'the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be proVided safety for himself, his friends, and his close eronies, particularly those mhose liVes would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow Of the government. Batista also was to be provided-eroteotion for his personal assets in Cuba. Various individuals were identified as possible candi- dates for the junta, and,'aceording to King, the objective was that variOus of these members would have 713-00000 TOP SECRET sufficient political strength to weaken Castro?s sup?1 port. Following the ?eeting~in Miami, Pawley ?id undertake the miSSion to see Batista in Cuba.v Arriv? ing on'8 Deoember in HaVana he had'a series of pre? liminary-meetings with the Cuban Foreign MiniSter, who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately, nhowever, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was _unlikely that-Batista wou1d accept the proposals. The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re- I?port from HaVana station:- Pawley met with Batista for two hours this evening. Laid his plan before Batista without pulling any punches. . BIatista] took it calmly. He agreed with ?much of Pawley' 3 analysis Of situation, but said he could not take the junta way out._ 17/ Batista made no promises, and went-through?the- taa?ons why he pessibly give up the office -- .for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that there would be a'blood bath; and that he had both; moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana TOP- SECRET 713-00000? TOP SECRET noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as Batista will not accept plan, and will make every effort turn government over to Rivera.Aguero [the Batista candidate who had_been named Presidential successor in -a rigged election}. However, unfavorable developments may produce change of attitude on part of Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ~ ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A representative of the Archbishop of Havana; Father Bez Chehebe, approached the American-Consul in Santiago to float some proposals for resolving the differences be~ tween the two countries. The priest emphasized that although a Castro take over was ineVitable:l Both Fidel Castro and US interests? had important stake in sugar crop and both undoubtedly wish resolve problems caused by present situation; Also said that there were matters now mostly minor on both.sides which have been sources mutual irritation and_misunderstanding _and that these should be eliminated- soonest, so that they would not grow to affect future relations, which Father considers inevitable. lg/ In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the?Amconsul that: He thoughIt] US Government could profitably send person Of confidence, -12.. TOP SECRET 13-00000 - Tl)? not necessarily an official, to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possi- ble with Fidel; Implied that such would be well received. '20/ Despite the fact that the communist proclivities ?of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba; on-lB December 1958, COS .Havana cabled-Headquarters strongly Supporting.the position that_the Archbishop of_Havana's representative -had proposed to the American Consulate, saying: Havana Station feels propoSal merits serious State/CIA consideration. Opera? tion this nature could pay big future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and disPatched quickly. Regardless how we may feel about Castro? and his movement, both will be important ?political'forces for a long time to come. Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic. welfare Organization. 21/ At ahOut the same time this proposal was being put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary Division (PMD) to establish a Small contingency task force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two representatives of PMD, and were sent to Havana locate and,_ 'sarvey pOSsible drob zones get himself into position to see if he could locate dissidents who '1 3-90000 TIMYSECRET were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista; What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that_they could organize these anti-Batista and anti~Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking deer the government if Batista should? I suddenly resign or decide to flee the country; gg/ 0n 31.December i958,?Paramilitary Dirision reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in} place in Key West with a backup Helioin Washington; a sterile c-su had been requested from Europe; and the Office-of Logistics would have an arms load rigged-for a drop by 2 January 1959. 32/ 'It was not until the last week of December 19587 that President Eisenhower became aCtively_involved-in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. IHis interest was precipitated hy-a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had heen prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 Decem- her. 7The President apparentiy indicated that he had not.been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA em.? TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET 'regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of 'the Special Group under NSC 5&12/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject 'for discussion. oGordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the I President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign_Intelligence Advisory Board) he made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant dif?erence between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Cdvert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities fer general problees related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made the specific~point that if the Board of Consultantswas going to get involved in the detailsf 0f planned covert operations, they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discus? sion also seems to_have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee cOvert operations a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, ?noting that such action by Congress would be an in~ fringement of'hisgnerogative'as 15 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET "At on the afternoon of 31 December 1958; there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of State; Irwin, Department of Defense: Admiral Burke, the General Cabell, and Gerdon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again diSoussed. Even? as the meeting was in progreSS, Batista was preparing to flee Cuba; and possible US action; including direct intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that were discussed. There also Was some suggestion that >the US take the responsibility for naming members to a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take orer the Cuban With_some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower ref called this period in the following manner: . During the rush of these last.events in the final days of 1958, the Central ?Intelligence Agency suggested for the' first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States; (Earlier.reports which I had re- ceived of Castrofs possible Communism were- suSpect because they originated with people who favored Batista.) A "Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have'penetrated the Castro movee ment," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro TOPSECRET takes over, they will probably participate in the government." When I heard this estimate, I Was provoked that such a con- ?clusion had not been given earlier. At another hoint,.the Though our intelligence exPerts hacked and filled for a number of months, events were gradually driving them to the conclu- sion that with the coming of Castro, Comm munism had penetrated Castro Takes over Daring the first few weeks of 1959 following? Castro?s tahe over, there was a of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the. - changes in government. IThe Station seemed assured that it was-cognieant of all of Castro?s movements,, especially on the developing militarnyapabilities. ,In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station provide su?port for the Arny?s covert collection of -military intelligence under-cOmmercial cover in Havana, COS took strong.exception to the proposals, emphasizing the Stationfs'o?n capabilities\in this area. COS was overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell aesured the Assistant Chief of Staff fer Intelligenoe 1. {of the Army that while he was aware?that? Havana had .. 13-00000 TOP SECRET objected to the Army?s proposals, the C08 nonetheleSs had been "instructed? to cooperate.*32/ In these early weeks of 1959, US_representatives in.Havana_were predicting that Castro would have a difficult time holding his government together, and among other things, one report emphasized the proba~ bility that Castro would soon find that he would have to get along with the United States? 32/ The most - likely threat_to relations with the United States was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa? tives'san any threat to this installation, and this belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special 'National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro "sooner or later [is] likely to ask for major increases. .An interesting side note.to the discussions at this time was_that the Army Attaohe apparently had_planned to use a negro Lt._Colg who was in Havana to do a study of the new Castro Army. In a memorandum to the Chief: Western Hemisphere Division, and to the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief, Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term "black? 7?.that General Erskine (Army Special Forces) believed that a "color bar? did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col; Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could be made. 2g] +01) SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET in the ndminal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base, reVisiOn of employment practices which appeared to' discriminate againSt Cuban workers, and perhaps other changes.'f 30/ In the early spring ofI1959, as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United States, COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the im- portance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters information?Ithat: -Washington viSit can make or break Castro. Unless he gets a streng helping 'hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his regime will collapse Within a matter of months. 31/ Pointing to the.serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that QCastro? popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was "the idol of the masses." gg/ COS Havana did an excellenthob of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United States, Suggesting that Ca-Stro would probably make his pIitehI not to the heads of the State Department and to the press, but ?that-he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the 13-00000 TOP SECRET students, and the masses in America to support his revolution. .COS emphasised that Headquarters should Imake no mistake that the Castro Government, while not openly avowed heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to COmmunist?positions; and, moreover, there was little question about who woulu eventually control the Cuban - Gouernment. COS did suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing ques- tions with reporters to stick to Castro while he was in the US. Both the Departmentof State and C05 Havana were in_general agreement about the results of the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his. dispatches as follows: It would be unwise to assume from the minor indications to date that Fidel has undergone a serious change_of heart as a result of his visit to the United States. gg/ In a memorandum to ?or?on Cray, President Eisen-i bewer's SpeCial Assistantfor National Security Affairs, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted? that: 4 I Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the United StateS?public, there is_litt1e 20 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET probability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolu- tion.. From his experience here, he has gained a Valuable knowledge of American -public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man. =With all his appearance cf naivet?, 'Unsophistication, -and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a bern leader of great personal courage and conviction. D??le we certainly know him better than before, Castro remains an enigma; and we should await his decisions on specific matters before aSsuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the poSsibility of developing a constuctive relationship- with him and his government. gg/ With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in this periOd shortly following Castro's visit to the United States the C08 Havana pay have misjudged a- significant development which surfaced almost immee diately after Castro' 3 return to Cuba. Remarking on ?an apparent rash of anti?Communist statements appear" ing in the Cuban preSs, one dispatch speculated that: These demonstrations obviously welcome, but possibly most significant aspect is demenstration_once again, enormous power Castro, who with few words made anti" Communism popular position. By same ,token?he could reverse trend at.any time, and skeptics speculating that current stand is sop intended to make it more difficult for interests to protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform-law. -21- TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET A folIOqup dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth cf the struggle which was,in fact, being waged within Cuba between the pro? and the anti? Communist factions. _Reporting oh cemments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido SoCialista Popular_(PSP) with reference to.the confusion among barty members re?arding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante laid it on theline that there was a struggle between the left and he emphasized that the -conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States. According to the source teporting on Esoalante's talk, ViceuPresident Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the COmmUnists, the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements.? The source, however; noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement.in the Directorio Revolucionario (the DR), were in control of the revolution; and_that the -22- TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET duty of the PSP-was to work toward uhity and overcome the counterrevolutioharies. 31/ I In a Special NIE of 30 Jun-e 1959 on The Situation ie the Caribbean through 1953, the intelligence-come I munity again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not heen decided. ?The SNIE oommented: The Commenists probably do not now? control Castro, but they are in a posi? tiOn to exert influence in his regime, and to carry on further Organizational werk. 38/ . Through the summer ahd into-the early fall of 1959, the degree of Castro'scommitment to Communism cohtinued to be anajor subject of discussion within the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting that Was begun by COS Havana in early June; this topic loontinually occurred. In August 1959 when the Deputy . ?9 ?Chi ef of Western Hemisphere_ Division, Rudolph Gomez,r .aSSisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an "Urgent ,Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist aesociation was prominently featured.? At this time, . and refleoting the views of both WeSterh Hemisphere vDivision and the Department of State with whom Gomez . had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not 2.31.. 713-00000 - TOP SECRET 'considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro, however, was clearly identifie? as a hard?core Com? munist.* I i The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid~summer came to a head in mid- October 1959 when Hubert Mates, a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement. Mates resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 andi was arreste? on 20 Octoher. During the months prior to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a In VieW'of the trend of recent years, it is inter- esting to- note'that the Churn report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee. (sen. EaStland' 8 Committee) for getting in? volved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro? 3 Air Force who 'had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial inter: rogation. 2g 1 13-00000 TOP SECRET snu?ber of others who had been prominent anti~Batistianos also broke with-Castro. >Among these were Faustino VPerez, Minister for-Recovery of Illegally Acquired ?,Property} Rufo-Ldpez-Fresquet, Minister of Finance: Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che-Guevara,whose expertise was in revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has said, this was the second civil war for castro. 52/ Coincidental to the internal'squabble that led to Matos%;resignation, the DeputyChief of WE Division, Rudy Gomez, was in October 1959) promot~v ing.an increaSe in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP. In the course of this tour,:the qualifications of the Beet of the agents who might conductthis pene? tration were reviewed Qith COS ?aVana and Station personnei. Gomez aiso pointed out that the anti4Com- muniStxe?forts in Havana should not be limite? to thoSe who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in the StatiOn was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popularft In re~? porting on his visit with C08 Havana, Gomez noted that 25 - TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET the Ambassador and other members of the Americap Embassy in Havana also were very much intereSted is the program beingadvanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez a if CIA could ?seed a qualified Communist expert to_ Havana to indoctrinate appropriateEmbassy officers on Communist doctrines; particularly on their modus? 'operandi and how Communists working under coveerOuld be.recognized." 'Upon his return Gomez receivedJ; C. King's approval to comply with this request.* i Even as Gomez was promising Statefs representa- tives in Havana assistance in understahding'Communist activities} J. C. King, Chief of ?estern Hemisphere DiviSion;fwas going foreara to the Director of Central Intelligence with a me?Orandum complaining about the Department of State?s failure to provide CIA with a policy action paper o? Cuba a paper which; accords ing to King,?had beenxpromised as early as May 1959; yet had not been received by the'end of October. _Nor was there any indication when such paper might be? It would appear from this request that both the BOP and State were-remiss in the training of their oVerseas? That the StatiOn had to request Headquarters for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine. .. 26'? TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET expected, despite numerous meetings with Department representatiVes, King also was particularly critical of the fact-that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance had he called consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been-indications from the Department that such consultations were to be-heldl 33/ The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to the CommuniSt Party was illustrated by the.Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 intestifying at the hearings of?the Judiciary SubComn mittee which was ihvestigating.the "Communist Threat. to the US through the Caribbean." In responSe to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C. P. Cabell stated: Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro?Communist. 0n the other hand, they are delighted with the' nature Of his government, which was allowed the Communists opportunity r" free opportun- ity to organise, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoise TOur conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist, however, he certainly is not In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on 27%? TQE SECRET 13-00000 Top SECRET 6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until further notice-" The RMD stated in part as follows: For the moment CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically non? Communist, with legitimate reform goals that deserve US reapect and support. Cov- ert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a -rapprochement with the pres"- ent government and to eliminate the con? ditions described aboVe without resorting to forceful means. ?If it should_be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Com? munist-dominated, or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting meaSures which intentionally Or unintentionally accOmplish Communist objectives, the question of direct attacks against Castro will be_re?examined. In.planning for such a centingenth each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility frOm a paramilitary point of view, nor will the deVelopment or re- cruitment of assets be precluded merely because they Alaok? a paramilitary capa- bility. Under no circumstances would any asset be apprised of this contingency planning. In fact any disposition to undertake violent action should be and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the poliCymmaking level. an/ Even as the EMU was being dispatched to the field,wanother and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters. 0n ll December 1959, J. C. King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum fer the ?,28 13.00000 TOPSECRET Director of Central Intelligence, through_the Deputy Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its- specific objective "The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a-junta friendly to the United States-which will call for elections 6 months after asSumption of office." To achieve this objeotive, Chief, put forward a program, to in? clude among other items the following: I i l. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba, from liberal Caribbean countries. 2. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to.be mounted from within Cuba. 3. Formation of pro?US opposition groups to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba. Colonel King then went on to suggest that: Thorough consideration be given-to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his Companion Che Guevarra [sic], have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses.? Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac- celerate the fall of the present govern?. ment. The reader 3 attention is- drawn to Appendix A (see page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December 1959 J. C. _King memorandum to the DCI. In light of Subsequent inveStigations, hearings, and publicity regarding the Agency' 5 Complicity in assassination? . (footnote continued on following page) TOPSECRET '1 3700000 TOPSECRET As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National Intelligence Situation in the Caribbean through indicated that Castro'eas in to stay, despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no seriousf threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out? 'that if there was direct US intervention;"Most Cubans including the military, would react violently." As 1960 began, General Cahell, the Deputy Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint hriefing plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3 of Appendix A show two significant in Allen Dulles' own handwriting to the text submitted by Col. King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase "thorough consider? ation. be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro" carries Dulles' pencilled correction making the text read "removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination." At a later point in the same paragraph the original text said "many informed_people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would- greatly accelerate the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has substituted the word "removal" for the word "disappear? ance.? These significant changes in the text on the toriginal copy of King's memorandum which the author has recovered 4? support the contention that the author\ has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the I.ponent officially charged with the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro prOgram Was.neither charged with nor responsible for programs designed to asses" sinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Opera? tion. Colonel King? 3 memorandum of 11 December 1959, with the pencilled corrections noted above, was conw curred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by Allen W. Dulles on 12 December 1959. TOPSECRETI 713-00000 TOPSECRET (8 JanuarY-1960) on Cuba for-the Department of State and the Joi?t_Chiefs_of Staff.i He reviewea the inn creasing h91d_that the Communist iaealogy and those affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting the Caetro government; At this time, the DDCI also discussed the need for increased coVert and semi- cOVert programs aimed at_Castro ear- fare,'politicaL action, economic action, and para~ military action; all of which had been conducted in- 'some degree during'the past year. 31/ This 8 January 1960 briefing can be-used to denote the beginning of the serio?s anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli? ggence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Figs. 31? 13-00000 TOP SECRET 'Part II Castro?Must?Go A. Organising for COvert 1960) The first mention of a formal Agency Structure to deal with the matter of Fidel castro was noted by Colonel L. K. White, then De?uty Director for Support, in reporting on the 001's morning meeting of 8 January 1960. White's diary noted: There was Considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba, and-the_DirectOr requested Dick Bissell to'organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation frOm all possible angles. l/ The instruction was taken to heart, fOr-on 18 Jan- uary 1960 the WH Division organized Branch as an expandable task force to run'the?proposed Cuban Op? erations. ?The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, With 18 at Hea?qnarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago-Base. 2/ Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS, and formerly one of the principais TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted in the overthrow of the Communist?aominated government a of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 195%. Esterline wa5-' 1 the choice.of J. C. King; Chief, WH Division; and to the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end of his two year tour in he had been queried. by King about remaining in or coming back to Headquartets to work on the Cuban problem. It was shortly after his return to the States in January of 1960 that Esterline became g/ I In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan episode_and his extensive guerrilla warfate experience in World war II with the has, Esterline thinks that i he got the job because J. C, King "had pretty much confidence in my judgment."* 3/ The relationship -between Esterline and J. C. King} Chief, WH Division and_the relationship between King and Richard Bissell; . Deputnyirector for-Plans (DDP) during the course of The author had heard that Esterline had been directly selected by the Richard Bissell, to be the head of Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con- trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline. -33.. TOPSECRET 13-00000 the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subjeCt of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion; It seems appropriate that some atten~ devoted to this subjeCt before going bifurther into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to ouSt?Castrc. One source close to the DDP at the time Of the antiwCastro activity stated flatlyz' A task force was formed under Bissell, excluding J. King, Chief, from having in faCt any control whatsoever over the activity. 5/ .The history states: There was an informal but understood short out in the chain of command; basic decisions were made'at the DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key personnel were_detailed from Division; the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building; and no one pre? tended that J. C. King was running the ?show. Jacob D. Esterline Was the Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the build?up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP. - Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has vindicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the-anti~Castro activity;' but according to Elder, Col. King alwaYs knew what was going __3q TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET Pigs activity from its inception until its conclu? sion.* Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation} but indicated 'that he was not sure what King was up to at all I times; It is clear, hawever, that Esterline was in- very close contact with.Col. King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.** Additional insights concerning J. King's role in Bay of Pigs Operationfmse been provided by Richard. D. Drain, Who was Chief 0f Operations for- and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drainihas stated: J. c, King never was told, I think for .understandable reasons, to what extent he Elder suggested to the anther that "they" wanted ?King out of the operation becahse of his strong Re- publican affiliations; "They" were never identified, but King Was well acquainted with highly placed figures and centributors to the. Republican Party. This will hecome most apparent in the subsequent discuSsion of the relationships between and William D. Pawley. During the author' 5 initial conver~ sation with Eateriine about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline did state, in a manner similar to Elder, that J. .C. King was out of the mainstream of the anti~Castro effort, because he had known RepubliCan Party affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboratiOn indicating the impact of _such affiliations on King' 3 role, and there is nothing in the record- to support this allega~ tion. . .- 35 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET wa_s in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he would protrude ..: sometimes, saying that he was sOrry to protrude; and then he would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out that' as a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray Herbert, would call and say just don? 2 understand cable 18963 IN from Guatemala . today. Would you Come over and explain to me what that's all about;" and I would Step out of the maelstrOm of they were just working flat out and go over. There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way. - Maybe two cables a week from the stations, and quite _le1surely I think What had happened to J. King was that he had stayed ove1long in the same jobGawd; With the excep~ tion of f-irst Guatemala and_ then Cuba, 'there was very little that ever happened in Latin America which get to be,_given our other Worldwide responsibilities in the EDP, a very front priority matter; and consequently, at Staff meetings, for eXample, they Would go around and talk? about the Soviet Union and China and Europe and even Africa. Teen if there was any time left, J. C. King would have his time at bat and report some relatively minor th_ing.. Exoept in the case of Guatemala there was, as everybody knows now, a Very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M. Bissell in his capacity as Special As? sistant to the Director for Planning-and Ycoordination. I think that one of the many reasons and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Guatemala as an aid yto the Study of the Cuban operation 'While the latter was in process was 1 36 1 TOP SECRET 713-00000 that this had never set very well with J. C. King. He was divested of the Guatemalan experience, and particularly when it turned out to be a success -.L PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb luck more than anything else.? J. C. 'cou1dn' take any of the bows for it. ?All right, that rankled, I am sure. sNow this one comes along, and rather than ex- pend or whatever the hell it was, and leave this JMATE Project within that .Branch, and'build up that BranCh oh, no. Once again the same man, Dick BisSell now, however, DDP instead of SAPC -- becOmes the case officer for the thing; and his assistant,_ Tracy Barnes, is all over him. >One of J. C. King's few very good men, Jacob D. Eaterline, is pulled aside and made Chief of the project The old man had a great deal of_amour ?propre, J. C. King did. He Was very vain. He had all of the area expertise that one would like to see in'a Division Chief, but he had been at it an awful long time. It was a very incestuous.Division. In terms cf'the rotation, it was solely within WH. There were very few people in.WH who-had served outside of the *Western Hemisphere, except-in Washington. They were_a tight-knit little group, and here now, for the Second time running, one ?of.their-big chances to shine he there was a lot cf moneY'and all that kind 0f 'stuff -- again had been taken away and it was it was tough. 2/ Where Drain implied that J. C. King was out com? pletely out of activities and operations, Mr.v Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat different.' In the course of an oral interview, the -37.. 713-00000 former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C. King in the following manner: Question: I would like to clarify at this point J. C. King's relationship to the- Bay of Pigs project. I have heard it on both sides -- that he was involved and that he- was deliberately_ end~ ~run Mr. Bissell: There.is no doubt in my mind that that was the case. I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them. There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -- I doubt if it was as early as March [1960._ In fact,] I am pretty sure that it wasn?t, [but] I am reasonably? sure that the decision I speak of was made by some such date as June [1960] -- [that] Esterline would take charge of this. Project and Esterline would have direct acceSs to me. He Would not be under the usual requirement of all the case.s going through J. C. King._ Now, as the scope of the scale of this' operation increased, and with the passage ?-of_time, Esterline?s direct channel to me came to be more exercised; and there was frequent interchange-between Ester- ?line and myself that didn't go through J. C. King in the sense of a command channel. On the other hand, J. C. was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation. His advice was sought and given, and I ?usually found it very good and followed it.? I remember no specific case where ?either J. C. King' 3 specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with, or in cenflict with my own. - 13?00000 - - TOPSECRET Question: _Why did you make this decision with regard'to_ Jake, coming direCtly to you and not going through King? Was it just a matter of great efficiency, or what precipitated that? Mr. Biasell:7 I think it was in part on the model of the Guatemalan operation, and in part, I think, a feeling, probably on my own part -- in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles that J. C._was not effective enough to handle? this kind of very fast moving; quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation. .Question: Do you recall any instances where there was a serious conflict be? tween what Jake wanted to do and what J. C. King thought should be done? Mr. Bissellr. I don't remember many, if . a rany, and I believe that the relation- ships between Jake and J. C. were pretty good throughout. 10/ Certainly the written record bears out Bissell' .contention that King was fully informed and that the_ -relationship between King and_Esterline was,_if not .love, at least mutually respect?u1.* The only point of contention between King and Ester- line that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At one point, Jake Suggested to the DDP that all contact ?with Pawley be cut off, but in sending Esterline?s memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contaCt with In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact even though in disagreement with both Jake and King until_ the close out Of the operation. 9 39 TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET Another of the questions which must be addressed in setting the_stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is '..the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of COperations (COPS) for the to become more than -marginally inVolved in the Cuban project. Oral inter? vie?s again provided the best explanations, and, con? sequently. are entered into this record in rather fullu detail; Dick Drain, who became made the following comments: - Helms was COPS {Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, whieh I sus- pect or on order 9* which I doubt mm Dick 'Helms completely-divorced himself from this thing; -I.mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from.Helms during this entire ,project=was I am Sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, on'a Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend workinq with?the quv who is now the.head?ofl who was then thel [resident in washing? ton -- trying to get an airplane_and some Cubans.out of MOntego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long weekend I am sitting there cone gratuiating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are hasn't hit the fan, and I get.a telephone call from Dick Helms's long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would like to speak to you." Well, fine well, the whole thing on his part was so- to me .., incredibly apologetic .1. =three times he said to me in different parts of the_conversation "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since -40- 713-00000 TOPSECRET the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had been a member Of an inter-Agency comm . mittee that met with periodic regularity to disouss air matters of any sensitivity. I guess he' had enough to do with this aproject so that somebody [who] had [been] reading the cable traffic told him "Well, those nuts down in Quarters seem to have lost an airplane this week- end." He was going to the regular com- mittee meeting that afternoonthe details very apologetic? ally. The third time that he said, "You know I have nothing to do with this project, I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't want to be fatuous about this, but I wish to Christ that you did have because we .could use your expertise;" He said, "Hahaha well thank you very much," and that was the end of that. He aVoided' the thing like the plaguei One of the reasons may have been that, of course, life went on; and if Bissell was getting 'increasingly immersed in this one thing, somebody had to watch the whole worldwide store which of course Helms was damned' good at._ A less attractive suggestion is ?that Helms figured that there Was a high likelihood that this thing would sorew up, and he didn' want to have the tar baby around him. I don't know. ll/ Bissell, in res pending to the qnestion about, Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com? mented as follows: I think that he [Helms] saw most all of the Cable traffic and I think he was pretty well informed as to What was going on, very well informed; but he was really out of the line of command on this opera? tiOn. There was something of a tacit agreement between us, that he wOuld be devoting himself to a lot of the other on 1:1 TOPSECRET '1 35-00000 .going business of the BOP office, cause this was taking a great deal of my time. . Question: This was a tacit agreement, .?this wasn't a session in which you and Bissell: iet me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observation here, and I don't want you to infer_anything really beyond what it says; it was not particularly easy I did not find it particular- ly.easy we to discuss.things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick [Helms] about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy._ I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry, but he_wou1d go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters, and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters. 'We saw one another, of course,-a11 the time. Quite often I would cons?lt him .about something that I was handling. I think rather'less often he would con- sult me; don?t mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me I never had that feeling at all but it really was our habit during the. whole time that we were in those posi- tions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit. Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH-Division to handle the anti- Castro activity were begun by-both the Special Group Sulz and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the many queStions raised early in the game was whether? _u2_ TOPSECRET 713-00000 the US program should be overt or covert, with the overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be under? taken by the Special Group, without-necessarily in? ?volving either the President or the National_Security Council. The hepartment of State was conterned that if Fidel Castro were deposed, perheos?hi5'successonL Che Guevara-and'Raul Castro, would he even worse than Fidel. As_reported in subsequent congressional reve~ lations concerning CIA?s-r01e ie_assassination plots, it was during the Special Group Meeting?ofil3 January 1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "empha~ _sized that we do not ha?e in mind a quick elimination designed_to enable re~ Sponsible oppositio? leaders to get a foothold.? lg/ At this same special Group Meeting, Preeident Eisenhower?s National security Adviser, Gordon Grey, predicted with uncenny'accuracY would ultimately develop as one of the key weakhesses in the whole concept of the Bay of Pies Operation. According to the report on the Special Group Meeting: _q3_ TOPSECRET 13-00000 Mr- Gray commented that a problem would he posed for administration offi~ cials if a decision should be taken to' change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. .He acknowledged that any Such decision -must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimOny by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury' before CongreSS, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impreSSion that. the US was not doing anythi ng about Cuba. This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if I don't? position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United 'States found itself with reference to both the United Nations'and theOrganization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs-operation as the of fplausible deniability" overruled common sense; Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some Solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDPfor Action), J. C. King, Jake Esterline} and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of_i$sues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identi~ fication of the princioal Cuban leaders Ramon Barqui?, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET ?head up the principal anti~Castro organization sup- ported by the Agenoy) were mentioned; radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas ?was raised; the training program for both communicae tors'and for PM trainers at Fort Ran?olph in the Canal Zone was disoussed; and the possible acquiSition of aircraft for support operations and the question of business as-a cover for the operationslof the exile groups in the United States were all discussed; The possible-involvement of US businesses to put overt- pressure on the-US government for the posSible imposi- tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza?' tions.also surfaoed; This initial meeting also recog? nized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments _that of Betanoourt in Venezuela). l?f Al Cox, one of the senior officers in-paramilitary [operations was in attendance, an? he would subsequently =note: Stringent_security precautions were placed on including the.exclusion of the PP_Staff and other Agency comp0m nents from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondende between. TOP SECRET ?the project and the Office of the-DD? rIn point of fact, Such restrictive meaSUreS'were somewhat meaningless inso- far as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from The granted permission to to read the daily project traffic, (with Esterline?s knowledge and permissiOn}. Esterline personally knew the majority of the senior officers, and in no time he had drafted six or seven of these,_including the Deputy Chief, for assignment to JMARC This, of course, was Valuable ?as a built?in penetration of JMARC in Athe best FI and CI tradition.* l?f ?Early in-February of 1960, Allen Dulles was briefed in general terms on the planning that was being initiated by WH.Division, and at thesame time C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept was used [in establishing rather than the term Task Force for greater seCurity and to simplify chan? nels The Director subsequently explained to the Special Group.(3 February 1960) some of the 'activities that were being undertaken, noting that within the next week or two, the Group would receive The for the anti?Castro operation was initially JMARC. Following compromise of this crth, the project became-JMATE (sometime in the period be- tween 6?13 December 1960i Throughout this volume the project will be identified as JMATE, except in direct quotations. g5 713-00000 (a paper outlining the Agency's thOughts on the programs, ?which'had been initiated against the Castro Govern" ment.* The proposals of Which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a DDP review session_on 11 February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes,-Jake Esterline, Al Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propa- ,ganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division had available for immediate use, it was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars an estimate that would, in effect, be some HQ million short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however, that funds would easily he obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages- At this planning ses? - sion, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort - Randolph in Panama was given minor attention: and In addition to the Special_Group, which included a DOD repreSentative, Worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the poSSible coordination of activities vis~awvis Cuba; . ?The big sugar sadk?? TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes for an attitudinal survey of "Cuban society" which _could have (and.should have) caused CIA planners to. remthihk the whole anti~Castro effort.* i2/; A very similar briefing, with somewhat more emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given to a highlevel group from DOD on 12 February 1960;. ?and the agenda for the 17 February leOHmeeting?of the Speoial Group, again emphasized that the Castro Governmeht wasde?endent on sugar revenues for.both continuatioh of popular domestic and hemisbheric subversion programs.** 29/' It was further suggested to the Special Group that dissidents within Cuba - might also be stimulated.to sabotage; with the ulti- mate result leading to castro's ouster. Ei/ The recommendation that the DCI made to the Special Group was as follows: This refers to the Lloyd.Free Report, which is discussed-subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222?226. The DOD representatives who were briefed were the Deputy Secretary, Mr; Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis~ tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale. #8 TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, inCluding covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for.eventual sabotage of both 'Cuban and Americanwowned Sugar-mills, Should this course of action prove.feas? ible and desirable, the ogaemion would be designed'to deny castro as much as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/ Interestingly enough, although the briefing for -DQD had.placed considerable emphasis on paramilitarY' planning, apparently no mention of the Subject was made to the Special Group. On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presentedr rthe sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he em- phaSized that he was not asking for permiSSion to engage in action, only that he was looking fer a Special Group approval. .Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secref tary of Defense for International Security Affairs) noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of-Defense, Mr; Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the Presi? I.dent?sireacti0n- President Eisenhower-was less than enthuSiastic about the Sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting that the loss of sugar resenues would impact on - 09." TOP SECRET '1 35-00000 TOP SECRET CastrO's_ability to continue to finance subversive -activities in other Latin America areas; President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic ?sabotage; and he wOuld not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations Iagainst the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing ?to support a program to identify assets for the sugar" industry'" and Other_things as well including even possibly things that might be drastic." In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program he prepared by Mr. Dulles. This; it was suggested; should go to the Special Group; and if they approved the plans, then the President wanted to discuss them. In any event, action on_the PM pro? gram would be delayed until Eisenhower-returned from - ?his upComing Latin American visit and gave his specific approval.* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 Feb- ruary 1960 also noted that Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made xaC'tly the same point. This appears to have been_ one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political Solutions to the Cuban problem.? '1 3-000001 vDespite,the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity, C. King Charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group'Meeting of 17 February l960- On- 18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the diaruptive. effects which might_result from interference?with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Am? bassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork?) Corcoran,_ and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assist? ance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, ~Col. King met with Thomas Mann; the Assistant_Secre- tary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant A Secretary for American Republichffairs) who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills; According to King, Secretary Mann also would support both out backs in US oil companies del_iveries to Cuba. and actions whiCh might cut back on Us touriSt trade with the island. 23/ Col. King also-consulted with former Ambassador ?HWilliam.Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of Diario de la Marina in Miami, -51- 13-00000 TOP SECRET and also "to raise at least a portion or the money, whioh would be needed for this operation." In addi? tion to Pawley, King also oohtacted Hesry Holland in - New York City, suggesting that Hollandraise meney, through Cuban_exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New YOrk radio station WRUL. King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors that the "money was going to be used on behalf of hon-Batista groups Who were going to make a serious reffort to remove Fidel Castro." g?f In addition to Ji King's high level con- tacts, Jake Esterline and Mr, Dulles had a meeting .with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director Of the US In- formation Agency Who had requested a briefing on the current state of activities_in Cuba -- washburn was oohcerned lest there be a conflict of interests be~ tween USIA and the CIA's ongoin? effort in the area. Washburn Presented the Agency with a copy of some _proposals which the State Department had approved I .for.imp1emehtatioh by-USlR.in Cuba; USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba ahd the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of COmmunists and Communist ideology -152; TOP SECRET '1 3-00000 .into Cuba at the same time not denying that the US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba. The _Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would be advisable fer Mr. Was hburn, who- was planning to visit Cuba, to mead I COS Havana, and oute- line the USIA program for benefit.* As the propaganda activities were being pushed forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM action, and oth er measures against Castro were being contemplated, a cautionary memorandUm apparently was drafted by one of the individuals most closely con- . cerned with the potential antincastro operations. The aemerandum; undated and unsigned, reviewed the anti-Arbenz operatiOn in Guatemala in light of what was being planned\for Project It noted some of the similarities or differences with respect to 'Eheire?oval of'Jaoobo Arbehz in contrast to the pos? sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the One result of the meeting with Washburn was a dew .cision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro car?. toon effort to CIA. - 53?- 713-00000- TOP SECRET key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat- ing even though it is not known who read the piece. Among other things, for example, the author of the memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favor" able factorS" with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE. It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was "unusually inept"; that V?ommunist su?port for Arhenz came from the local Communist Party, which was immature, badly led, and generally weak"; and, that-?we had.un? believable luck." 31/. The memorandum also noted that there were a number of CirCumstances which.would not recur during the cohrse?of the anti-Castro activity. Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader; thatLCastillo Armas was a Guatemalan.leader of high character and standing, but no one of similar Stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he could not depend on his army.) Castro, on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled -54- TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP. SECRET the key military positions with his own followers and "introduced a system of intense ideological in? doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed out that while.Moscowfs interest in Guatemala was compartatively mild the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the Arbenz GoVernmenti?- in Cuba, the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and_Peiping were a matter of record. gg/ The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical +--not strategic -- errors were being made. It stated that the blunt? propaganda attacks on Castro were forging a11.anti?US elements in Cuba into a nnited front and US efforts should be attempting to drire a wed?e between Castro, as a victim of international Communism, and the Com? munists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations, even if the time were legitimately being purchaSed by Cuban exile groups, would be a "kiss of death" for anyone-who tried to 'deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re- lated to the propaganda aetivities, the planned use 55 TOP SECRET 713-00000 . TOPSECRET of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of_the_Cuban opposition, particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study} [If the author was correct in-assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny, it would mean that-the anti-American contingents would. have additional ammunition to use against the US. The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda actiVities were moved to Third countries and if fund raising activi? ties were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. gg/> Based on thteanguage,gthe-familiarity with the Guatemala actiuity and the nature of the-critique, it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question; 'The memorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the OCR and {the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out of the United States. The Agency fully supported Gen- eral Quesada effort to put an end to such flights. 30/ QueSada was Director of the Federal AviatiOn Agency.? 55'- TOPSECRET 713-00000? TOP SECRET From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba ?and the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960, When President Eisenhower formally approVed the ert anti~Castro plan, CIA personnel.most closely involved in the anti?Castro effort were fully immersed in the efforts to define and refine policY-_ which would be acce?table to President EiSenhower. In the Course of this two week period, they were en- Ugaged in efforts to satisfy the-5412 Group, the National Security Council, and'?mmselves that they had developed Ia viable program which would lead to the downfall and 'ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of CommuniSm from the island of Cnba and,-in effect, from the Western Hemisphere; . During this period of evolution of national policy, held its first official meeting as a branch on 9 March 1960. C..King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general, nature of the programs that Were going to be put into, operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo :training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation 57 - TOPSECRET 713-00000 SECRET and supportfrom all of the offices that were repre? sented at the meeting, including, among others, the Office of Training, the otfice of Communications, the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff, Personnel (particularly the MilitaryPersonnel Divim sion), and the Office of Security.- At this initial meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that hob Reynolds, Deputy Chief, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer, Phil Toomey, Political and Stategist, Ithe Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would I be in contact with other Agency elements which would" be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the Us Government, particularly With the Office of Special onerations_of the Department _of Defense. gl/ It was during the period between 8?17~March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro~ gram which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February 1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were TOP SECRET '13-00000-_ TOPSECRET 'C--Traoy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom_Parrott, among others. Those who figdred meet prominently among the Special 'Group representatives at this time were Livingston Merchant, Department of State: John Irwin, Assistant Secretary-for International Security Affairs, Depart" .?ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera- tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Adviser. Other-than the more than a dozen' and drafts and other papers related to the development of the policy_paper, perhaps a note from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960 .best?illustrates the seriousness with which-the Agency approached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-, tor; .Mr.yHelms?s note to Mr. Barnes read as follows: Tom Parrott gave me for security late this.afternoon the attached paper for the 5&12 Group outlining the proposed covert action program against Fidel Castro. After reading it, I asked Tom to defer consideration of Cuba-until next week since I feel that-this document needs re- drafting whether it-is used by the Direc? -tor for'an oral briefing or handed to the designated representatives for their en? lightenment. I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various i 59 TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET places. I do not disagree with the listed rebommendations in paragraph 6? but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the reference to a ?short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no way, in my opinion, to describe what we have in mind. Also'the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raiSes more questions than it answers, There are.other points, but there is no _sense in belaboring them in this note to you. May I ask that you take this matter in hand-and advise WH how to put it in suit- able'shape for use_by the Director with ?the S?lz Group next week. gg/ In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows: To replace the present Government of' Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with-one that will be aCceptable to the United States; and to_cause this change to-occur in sudh a manner that antieUS repercussions are not induced in Latin America. - Throughout the discuSsion of the Agency?s role in the anti?Castro activity, there was a tremendous concern that there be no "anti" 8 repercussions," not only in Latin America per se, but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Or- ganization of American States and in the United Nations. The conStant quest for plausible deniability would 60 i 713-00000. TOP SECRET become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and une successfully, to be sought throughout the course of, the operation by Agency planners. The proposed paper for the Special Group (the 'paper which Mr. Helms-found somewhat lacking) empha- sised those areas highlighted_in preyious Special Group sessions antiwCastro propaganda, disrup?? 'tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale Sabotage operations, and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba. Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early' stage of US planning mention was made of the offer 'from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM-cadres, or "action groups" as they were icalled. A_financial annex included in the propOsals for the special Group indicated the need-for $900,000 for?the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for- FY 1961.* gg/ Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement for fiscal. 1961 which is Shown as 6 million, was either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition the sum of the parts shoWn for FY '61.is $1.7 million. It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60, the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these "non? program requirements. TOPSECRE 13-00000 - I As the paper was being preeared for speCial Group consideration, J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Divisioh had forearded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him a with additional ihformation for use during the Special Group discussions; and the-transmittal to the DCI recOrded that this paper had been deed to brief Mr; - Nixon on 2 March 1966} King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the payer which went to the Special Group, but contained considerably more de- 'tail about the.activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legitin .mate,go?ernments and replacing them with Cohmunist oriented governments. Col. King's paperalso re? vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua the only ,two govern?ents in Latin America whioh were to_throw? Itheirlfuiitsupport behind the Agency?s anti-Castro activity had made offers at this time for both . radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for- training facilities for anti?Castro groups which the Agenoy might wish_to sponsor: gg/ -Despite President Eisenhower?s previous objec- tions to the over~emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's TOP SECRET 713-00000 TO ECR ET sugar induStry, King's paper did reflect.considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector. Another item which Colngi saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following: ,_We have available, a drug, which, if placed in Castro's food, would make him -behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damag~ ing results to him.* Even as the Special Group was planning its ses? sions on the antiwCastro program, so, too, was the ?National Security Council being geared up for discuse sions of the same situation. Again, there was great ,concern over the qnestion of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international_> organizations. There also was interest in protecting US business and in the protection of US lives, and 'the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was- of considerable concern to the President's National?? ?Security adviser,.Gordon Gray. The pelicy that Gray d5Jwas advised to recommend to the National Security 5 Council regarding US bases stated: ?Take action as_necessary, including military action, to insure the continued For comments on this subject see Part VII of this I volume. 63?? TOP SECRET 13400000 TOP SECRET availability to the United States of bases and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to the securt ity of the United States. An additional aspect of the basic national.secur- ity yolicy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged'to promote with the National Security Council on_10 Maren 1960 recommended that} In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, etake.all feasible measurefs} to thwart it, including military action if finally re~ squired and appropriate to cope with the situation. 38/ Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 Mardh 1960, President Eisenhower approVed the following rather innocuous actions: 1. Every effort should be made to in~ 'fluence the other members of the Organ iza~ tion -of American St_ates to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation- and support action with reapect to them. Mr. Gray also was adviSed to play both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged to promote was the following: The United States should be prepared, if required to protest US interests, to take similar actions againSt Subversion or armed .rebelliondby?non-Communist elements hogtile ?to US'interests. 64 13-00-000 TOPSECRET 2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal with likely contingencies Which might develop with respect to Cuba, eSPecially those involving the safety of US citizens in the Guantanamo Base; -3. The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should.be reviewed . by the'Counoil?each meeting, for the immediate future. gg/ Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, 'Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2?hour session on-lu March "to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." 22/ rPrior to the in March meeting, Messrs.- _BiSseli and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering "some suggestions as to possible added 'starters? for our Cuban paper; use? your own judgment as to adding Among these starters was Dulles?s suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to reque to load '"dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:* In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in- duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading. 55 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET Stress point that while the dynamism Vis running Out of the Marxist~Leninist revolution in Russia, it still remains in China. This explains ChiCom special -interest in supporting the Cuban revolu? tion and expanding it; with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over-population problem. (This may be premature, but there may be something to it. As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group Meeting of?l? MarCh 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan _for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar? to the participants, but the memorandum of the meet~ ing reflects a number of items worth reyiew. Even though Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged for coVert and overt propaganda activities, not only through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation, ibut also through the efforts of programs for Latin America programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity Was again_raised and discussed, the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida ~66" TOPSECRET 713-00000 - TOP SECRET Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere. Somewhat more attention was focused on the para~ military_plansduring this discussion than had occurred before, and Mr; Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency eatimate that: ?it appears no large scale para- military effort (other than wholly overt) will be feasible in less.than 8 nonths"; and.he wondered if - a crash program was feasible to speed up the training. program. 03/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS and individual Latin American Country involvement, the- 'choice 0f.the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in.exile, and the question of a budget ~4 the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1,641.? million for 1961 were also the Subjects of discussion. One additional subject of disucssion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King was: What would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che GuevarraEsic] should disappear simultan- ecusly. In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET Castro's government from political power. The para- graph which had raised the question then continued: _Admiral Burke said that the only orga? nized group within Cuba today wereIsic] the Communists, and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable 0f taking over so far identified. One pos-? sibility was Nunez Jiminez,'the head of the Agricultural Referm Program. No other names were widely enough known to be men- tioned. . Other dissussion, notwithstanding, the focus of Mr. Dul les' 3 recommendations on IE March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were Specifically re" lated to the development of the guerrilla capacity of 'the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cubam? The Agency should be responsib1e_for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify, 'This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March C. King that "unless Fidel and_Raul Castro andehe Guevara could_be eliminated in one package which is highly unlikely this operation can be a' long drawnmout affair and the present government will only be?overthrown by the use of'force" were discussed (pp. in SSC report on Alleged-Assassination Plots Involving Foreign'Leaders, and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assaSsination was not the issue in these two instances. - 132-00000 them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting these groups_to develop friendships among various of the Latin American Governments which were skeptical of Castro and that the Agency should be for identifying and training we in facilities in the United States or elsewhere those who would be the leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the conclusion-of the in March meeting, it was agreed that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis -of the discussions and plan to present it to President Eisenhower later_in the week. gg/ As part of the effort to improve the paper on the proposed antiFCastro operations, the Agency pre- pared additional backup material which could be cranked into the version which would eventually go to the Bresident. On in and 15 March, the records reveal copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which was labeled as "revised version, done by (C. Tracy] Barnes, evening in Mar,? which Went into more detail on both the political opposition to Castro and on the prepaganda activities that were being mounted against Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary 59 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET- activity Would "take_the longest to become a usable asseti" The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp, upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 from $1.6-l.7 million to $3.5 million -- with'the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary Operation. The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Dulles's lu-March preSentation to a total of $l,3 million for that same year? From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan (in March) until President Eisenhower ap- proved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of biwplay between the National Security Council and the Special.Group 5312.- One of the principal Concerns of the National Security Council was the prdper Us re? sponse shonld the Cubans try to intervene or inter? fere with operations of the Naval base_at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover Of the Base. On 16 March 1960, after Gordon Cray had been fully apprised of the propOSed plan for covert action submitted by I Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing 370?? 13-00000 TOPSECRET note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk,. for the planned National Security Council meeting of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though Mr. Beik{ even'though'he was a member of the NSC Staff Was oompletely in the dark as to.the planning that had already been undertaken with regard to Castrb's ouster. At a time when the President had already indicated that proposals for economic action or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were? less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever reason, suggested again that with the new sugar? legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened outax In addition; Belk suggested a plan which was "uhconvehtional and radical" we haviag President Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro_te11ing him that he was concerned_over the deterioration_of? relations betWeeh the two oountries and suggesting that Castro have?rivate conversations with an emissary WhOm the PreSident would personally designate. Staffer Beik believed that this_was a "can't _lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to meet with Eisenhower's represe?tative, then he would _71_ TOP SECRET be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the other band would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts.? If Castro did agree to meet with the President's repreSentative, then relations between the US and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/ Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond Mr. Gray. At 1u30 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles pre- sented his covert action plan toia combined meeting of the National Seourity Council and the principals of the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi? dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr. .Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander? son, Seeretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell, Colonel King,.Gordon Gray, Major John Eis?nhOwer, and General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's report on the meeting: The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situa- tion. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. EverYone must be pre?" pared to swear that he has not heard of it. He said we should limit American . contests with the groups involved to.two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done He under- ?stood that the effort will be to underm mine Castro's position and prestige TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET The President told Mr. Dulles he thought he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other ,agencies involved should take account of all likely Cub reactions and prepare the actiohs that we would take in reSponse to these The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that ?if the Cubans were to start to attaCk our people in Cuba we'would be obliged to take action - The President said that at the next meeting, he would want to know what is the sequence-of events by which we see the situation developing ?n specifically what actions are We to take. He Said Our hand should not show in anything' that is done. In the'meantime State should be working on what the OAS Essentiallysupport us. {31/ A During the coarse of this meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of_the US fir?s which had investments in Cuba; ?and he was pushing for US intervention to protect these private property rights. The President, how? ever, out him rather Short on this. Vi?e ?resident ,Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in" Vestment by Us firms_in Cuba, terminating private 713-00000 TOPSECRET businesses already there, and reducing American tour? ism.* 52/ President Eisenhower's apprOval of the 17 March ,1950 covert action program_against the.Castro regime thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti- -Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti?castro elements, provision for a powerful propa? ganda offensive against the island, perfection of a coVert intelligencewin?action network organization within Cuba; and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, with_the neceSSary logiStical support for covert military operations on the island.** lCol. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting, but, Strangely enough, failed to include a list of the participants.? The fact that the President Vice Presi- dent, and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone. 29/ Not in attend- shoe at.this meeting was Jake Esterline, This was one Of numerous instanCes where higher level_ personnel in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and Bissell were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline Would seem to have been an equally legitimate_ participant. a Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti- Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not "demonstrably under the domination or control cf the international Communist moVement." (SNIE 85" 60, 2-2 March 1960, p. 3. S. I 171;- TOPSECRET 713-00000 It is particularly important in light cf changes which were subsequently made.in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference, to the paramilitary operation: Initially, a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful soreening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase, a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance forces recruited there, both before and after the establish? ment of one or mere active centers of resis? tance. At no point in this Presidentiallyaapproved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion. 'The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader? ship and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians.* Finally, with reference to the approved .Coloneliack Hawkins-(USMC) who was Chief, ?correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that: The only approved, written policy governing paramilitary action against ?Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of . the Policy Paper approved by the Presi? dent On 17 March 1960;" (Emphasis added by author.) TOPSECRET '1 3-00000 . TOP SECRET plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60, and FY '61_of million was approved with the caveat that should there be cost overruns; these could ?be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingene cies,* A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action Against the Castro_Regime is given as Appendix (Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also urged to ekamine Appendix C, a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations,_Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Livingston?Merchant, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. (Appendix page 311.) Admiral_Burke apparently had become ex- tremely agitated about the rise.of Castro to power in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded a paper.on US action in Cuba, to both Seeretary Merchant and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine the various options available to the United States to reassert itself in the western Hemisphere visuawvis ?the growth of COmmnnist power represented by Castro. Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were available to the United States, such as multilateral action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by the Us, or covert unilateral action by the Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and Article 5 of the InterwAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of-19u7) Burke made a series of recommendations covering the same ground ?-_propaganda, organization Of the anti?Castro exiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter? vention ?e,which had already been considered at high levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries Merchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, MerChant replied to Burke's memorandum noting Fa marked degree of simi- larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of-our people here-concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve (footnote continued on following page) 76 i 13-00000 TOPSECRET 'With reference to his action of 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower subsequently wrote: this result." Merchant then went on to review the 7 bidding that had already been dOne, particularly in the Special Group, on the question of how to handle Castro, emphasizing, .of course, that State was very 'much concerned that precipitate action against Castro' 5 government would work, if not immediately, certainly in the long run, to the detriment of the United States, particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America. Whether the response did not satisfy Admiral Burke Or Whether he sincerely believed that the Navy, more than any other US Agency, should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known.a In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray,.the Special.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles. Burke' 3 comments on the transmittal sheets to these 'two individuals are interesting. To National Security AdviSer Gray he wrote: Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum On U.S. Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours, Arleigh Burker To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote: Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some sugges? tions which mi.ght be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with -quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will for" give the impatient young lad for his de- sire to make sure no opportunity is left unCovered. Warm regards. Sincerely, Arleigh Burke. Why one of the recipients was cautioned about "the im? I patient young lad" and the other was not is something (foetnote continued on following page) .177 TOP SECRET 713-00000 SECRET On March 17, 1960, less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland.1 More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans.living.in exile had made no move to seleCt from among their numbers, a. of a mysteryi Certainly the proposals by one J. E. Pond, Jr;, reflect at least, Pond's youth and immature. ity.- For among other things in his memorandum, Mr. "Pond suggested that the Navy: ?Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities' vis- a?vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster." Or, with reference to action that the State Department should take, he suggested: "Brief all individuals and groups of U. S. nationals 'going to .Latin America on the Kommunist [sic] threat in Cuba for further diesemination to host country personnel. Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond, were that the IADB (Inter?American Defense Board) become involVed in the anti?Castro effort an exceed?, ingly naive suggestion considering that the members 'of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution. And the second unique Contri- Ebution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Ekecutive Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a These last propoSals that Adu miral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. ?The memorandum having been sent doWn from Mr. BisSell's office, with the following notation to C01. King: Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March, hand the latter handed [it] to me. do not believe it requires a reply, but pass it to you for any value it may have. 1 *73" I TOPSECRET leader whom we could recognize as the head of a government in exile.* gg/_ In preparing this comment, the former President ap-? parently had to call on his own memory, on the memory of Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray. Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that neither his own nor.Goodpaster?s records contained' anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly, Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower: 7 . You may recall that not so very long after I became your Special Assistant, in a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and .me you gave instructions that activities of the-soecalled "SpeCial GroupP'should not be recorded_in.any place except the files of the Director of the Central In~ telligence Agency. You did not wish that there.be other copies. It was for this 'reason that I did not seek a copy of the 'March 17th paper for -my files, nor did I make notes at that meeting. Subsequent to March 17th, I began to make memora_nda of every meeting on that particular subject because I had a hunch that someday theSe might be important, and I intended to put them in your hands at the appropriate time,- understanding, of course, 'that ydu might wish to have them destroyed. Incidentally, there were no carbons or other copies made of these memoranda. By not making copies, and by planning to put the documents in your own hands for. what" ?ever disposition you wished to make of them, .I sort of rationalized my viOlation of your inStructions about not making such memoranda. I hope I need not assure You ?that it was not my practice to Violate your instructions and this is the Only instanCe of euch that I can recalL 53/ 13-00000 .1 TOP SECRET A . 4Forging the Tool Following President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions, meetings, and briefin?s-pre? Viously mentioned; the Agency?s leadership then faced the problem of acting-directly to implement the anti- Castro program. Problems which had been discussed -philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality; Among_the problems of principal importanCe dUring the period from March to September 1960 were the following: I The establishment of the leadership of and the acquisition of personnel for ?Extensive coordination between Agency representa- tives and representatives of other US Government Agencies and{ at the same time, a high leVel of intra? Agency coordination. I i ?TheinitiatiOn of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who ?ould be directly invol?ed in help- ing to dispose of theCaStro Government: Attempting to establiSh project parameters and torgive,proper consideration to possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed; -80? TOPSECRET 713-00000 And, finally, to retain the credibility and viability of the operation despite numerous wild haired proposals that were being put forWard at vari- the months under_study an proposals which never should have been offered let alone given any serious consideration." . As previously noted, was established by Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not I until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bisseli apparentlv of- ficially got around to approving the new Branch, for ?in a membrandum for the Deputy Director for.8upport it was noted: ?The SSA-DDS has advised of the'DDP?s approval_of the creation-of a new opera? tional Branch,,the abolishment of an existing Section, and the creation of a -new Section within the WH Division Head? quarters Staffing'complement. The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be more than offset by the decrease in the.DDP complement. The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved the various grades that had been proposed and then the .memorandUm went on to-state: The limits the usage_Of the requested positions to the duration of the 31 TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET Cuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be re? viewed for reclassification purposes. . (i The question of financing and budget for.project - JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon after the President's approval of the_project, the question of badget and finance surfaced.~ By 2? March 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:? "Jack Barman advised me that the Director had approved of.the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from the reserve for Project Indeed.the Director had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as "an unprogrammed reguirement for which other funds are not availablei" - In his.?emo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director was also careful to?point out that it would be the. responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that .the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification; that the only Headqnarters file on the budget for the project would he maintained by WH/Division; and that the 32 '1 3.00000 TOP SECRET lfile sould_be complete as to the purpose cf the expend~ iture. the date, those who were involved as payees, and any other details; and finally that access to this financial file would be "limited to persons vspecifically authorized hy_the Deputy Director Elf In the first meeting following the Presidential approval of the anti?Castro.program, Jake Esterline calledthe members of together to announce that the.program had been given the and he further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning 0f training at Fort Randolph in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assumpm tion of a satisfactory report from the inspection Team? ?Which was to travel to Fort Randolph.on 27 March.) Medical and security Officers were to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to A ?be established with Headquarters. In this-early Unlike Some Suggestions that had been forwarded by the Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's MemOrandum placed budgetary responsibility with the DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, was not even included on the routing fer the Director? 3 memorandum. The Financial Officer, on the other hand,. had suggested that certain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief Or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/ -33.. TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET meeting,'ESterline'emphasized that training at the Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Pana?a.wasi going to be extremely limited; and since there would be no training areas in the United States; third country training activities would need to be estab- lished; He emphasized again that secrecy was of paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, and stressed that the establishment of a GOvernmente in?exile.was a key point to making the planned operaf tion credible. Esterline further indicated that such a government hopefully could be announced by the early part of April and that the Headquarters for such a government could he?located either in Puerto Rico or .Costa Rica. . Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two, the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be known as .One interesting point made at this i first.meeting was that: Mr, [Scudderl Georgia reported that the DDS O?fices concerned had nominated nearly all of the personnel required by 1 and 15 April respectively. Action was being taken to make all these available at [andl it was agreed that DDS representatives would meet once a week ~8Ll~ TOP SECRET 713-00000 . TOP SECRET i?to reView aetivities} determine the status of commitments, and prepare.a brief re? port for Chief} Branch In another Branch meeting soon after the one just mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation, ,the'need for security practices designed to-protect 'the?fact'of'Agency involvement in this covert opera- tiOn. He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services. Dave Bhillips provided a specific. _example of this, emphasizing that-without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficnlt to transport the two radio transmittersl 'which.were going to be installed on Swan Island._~ Moreover, Phillips reported that a Crew of Seabees would be responsible for the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for per? 'sonnel who would conduct the propaganda effert from I Swan Island.- Because the activities than established on Swan ISland were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C, Tracy Barnes.(the was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. El?ood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were _85_ TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET ihvolVed in establishing this Agency actiVity on the Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that -there be no interference with maritime activities; and?the Immigration and Naturaliaation Service was alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban As attempts were being made to establish the parameters for the operations against Castro, a most preScient memorandum was directed to Chief, . from Paul_0berst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division. ?Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS, the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in and recalling some of the "pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of that-particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows: I have the impression that our basic JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm timetable. In my judgment, we should have great flexibility in deciding the appropriate time for kicking off any paramilitary operations. Before such operations.are initiated, we should have firm evidence that our propaganda and have irrev- ocably undermined Castro's prestige, both in Cuba and,abr0ad. We should not .initiate paramilitary actions until we are convinced that they_will not enable 86 TOP SECRET 713-00000? Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally lOCal and foreign sympathy and sup- port.- Generally speaking, current area- attitudes toward_the Castro regime are satisfactory from our point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature para? military actions. When the time comes 'for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion tactions. To avoid or minimize Castro's counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an internal uprising by?dissident elements within Cuba. ?This, of ocurse, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel and-arms before the hestitlities begin. In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be in- clined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is_a massive diVersionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime If it became known, er strongly suspected, that we were supporting opera? tions to -bring about a transition to demo" cratic-government in the Dominican Republic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* Eg/ Debatable though Oberst's philosophy.regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations Which would ultimately con? _Clude at the Bahia de Cochinos.? As with other of they cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put forth prior to launching the inVasion, little heed (footnote continued on following page) .. 87 TOP SECRET 713-00000 .TOPSECRET In midepril of made the first presen- ?tation for the DCI since the basic program had been approved by PreSident EisenhOwer in mid?March. ?In attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell,? Mr. Helms Herman Horton (CI Staff), and c; Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. ,This high level group was informed that broadcaSting activity from Swan island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and that very special operations were being carried out in order to provide stories for propaganda use.. Ac- cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals. About the'same time that Oberst's memorandum was going forward, the DDP was calling for to' prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat- ing the need for crash-type responses or actions. In discussing the contents of such reports, it was indicated that: The Progress Report should generally not exceed one page in length, and that we should not hesitate to-include it in items which were not favorable to our progress, in other words, setbacks 0r handicaps which we might have endountered. Also, by way of keeping informed about developm? ments related-to the operation, Chief instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele- ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera? tiOnal coordination similar to that achieved by the? meeting of_support elements every Tuesday morning." 713-00000 TOP SECRET on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained. The reports on the evolution of the government in exile and the buildup of the stay? ~behind network and . on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to-be done_to get these activities? Off the ground? Further, it was pointed out to the and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating, principally because: Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment [were] being charged against the project which ,Iin fact, was the major cause of the project's over?obligation, It was the. opinion of all concerned that such property shOuld be held on a MemOrandum Receipt . basis without cost to the project, and that Charges, if any, should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to com- munications stock supply after the project is terminated. The DCI was advised that [this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution. Most important in'connection with this brh??ng, was the DCI's comment that: _With respect to personnel needs, he assured all, no matter whether-personnel were overseas or in the US, he would arrange to obtain personnel required in isupport of JMARC. 66/ The meaning of Chief/WH/Q? 5 comments to the DCI, was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment ?No. 1 to the project Was submitted to the Director 39 1 TOP SECRET '1 35-00000 for approval. The amendment concerned the need for more money.and pointed out that: Not only has the initial $900,000_ already been -expended, bUt it is cur? rently estimated that an additional 0 million is immediately required to carry the activity through 30 June 1960 Note is also made of possible A contingenC-ies amounting to an additional million for which no funds are re- quested at this- time. 67/ In addition to an-early updating for the-DCI, also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisen- hower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April 1960, General'Caheli headed a CIA delegation including Mr. Bissell, Col: King, and Jake Esterline which Ibriefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introduc? tory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was con- ducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from Included among the Defense participants Were Thomas ?.Gates, SeCretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman,? Gen. Shoup, COmmandant U. S. Marines; Admiral Burke; .General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U. S. Army;_Gen. White, and Gen. JWOolnough, repre~ senting gg/ -901 13-00000 TOPSECRET Cf King._ Apparently Jeke Esterline, the man who had the monkey on his back as project ohief sat? quietly by. The suggestion Which.had been made by.Baul Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it 'appeer that the Us was backing the antifTrujillo ?forces in the hominicen Republic was not intrOduced 'dUrino the course Of briefing of the JCS, e?en though the Dominioan Republic was included as a part of_the overall briefing. What did emerge with refervll ende to the Dbminioan Republic was a cohcehsus that . if Trujillo were ousted; there_was a strong possibility that Castro might move.into the Dominicen Reoublic where he probably woulo he receiVed as a conquering ?hero. piIn the Course of the discussion which followed the'briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal '"hawk," indioating his willingness to move fleet omits into the Port au Prince,?Heiti area because the sug?? gestion had been made that-if Castro went into the ,Dominicen Republie it would only be a few days time before he also wo?ld be welcomed into Haiti; In ad~ dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the 491? 713-00000 TOPSECRET Cuban g0vernment-launCh an attack on Guantanamo, the Navy was.prepared to-defend that base; In Burke's opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do 'that.* ?2fp Whether a direct reenlt of this briefing of the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement - in-WH/uVs relations with the military services be- fore the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example, 7$150, 000 was to be funnele_d from the CIA's Director of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly as a working fund for the This money, of course, was to be used for necessary construction, renovation, produrement of material, and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM insturctor cadre. Zlf= Before the end of-April 1960, the-Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's This briefing for the senior personnel in the Departm ment cf. Defense, would have taken- place in any eVent; but it may have been prompted by the reluctance 0f the designated DOD liaison officer with Capt. Burns Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to 5 re- quests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until. he received a green light from the? SecDef. 70/ -92 713-00000 _request'f0r overflight photo coverage of the islands 'offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was taken up, not only with the Air Force, bat also with J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Alm though the'authoriZation and plan for these overflights, presnmably by the antedated the shootdown of ?Francis Gary Power's in the Soviet Union, it was recorded that: . Ambassador Berry had called to say that the,Department,.,. had approved the mission, but insisted that extremely tight security'be erercised throughout and that Col, Benson (USAF/OperationS) inform Ambassador Berry before eaCh sortie so. that the Department would be properly prepared to respond to any emergency. 72/ The first flight, incidentally, was tentatively sched- .nled for the weekend of 30 April 1 May of 1960.** In April of 1960, in addition to working with ?the Army, the Agency representatives also_began to_ work with the COvert Limited Warfare Committee of Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (AEEP) to CeYlon who was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research A A Powers was shot down over the 1 may 1960. x. . 9 3 713-00000 TOPSECRET the Office of Special Operations, Department of De? 'fense. One of the_particular problems of concern in this_relationship was that of covert sea transporta? tion which might be necessary to lift anti?Castro forces back to the.island of Cuba. Even though.a11 Ethe planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only.cadres for guerrilla Warfare training and the infiltration of communications ex" herts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of bDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and a Col. Anderson were members of the CovertLimited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and; discussed among other intereSting-subjects: The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing ShipeTanks (LST) and four Air- Sea Rescue the training of the Cuban creWs for these vessels, and ?0 the means of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 22/ In addition to the requested overhead reconnis- sauce of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the' It is rather strange that at this early date in ?April 1960 discussions.were being held concerning the acquisition of There had been no discus? 'sions concerning the mOVement of a large body of Cuban .tr00ps back into their homeland; and, consequently, the discussion re LST's seems highly?out of place. 9g - TOPSECRET 713-00000 Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems_withthe Marine Corps and'reprem sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It was ascertained that much work needed to be.done in order to upgrade informatiOn suitable for planning the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops -and vehicles. 23/ In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the antiwCastro policy, the Department of State seemed to be operating-in a world of.its own ?w making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow internal developments? On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for American RepublicAffairs, was the originator of an'elaborate memorandnn which provided a check list\of current.operations and ten. oategories of activity related to developments ing Cuba. _From the tenor of the paper itself, it Seems as though RubomanWas ignorant of the CUban issues before the Soecial=Group{ of the discussions among CIA, State, and Department_of Defense, and of the President's approved plan for covert action. Nor was there any evident awareness of the various overt TOPSECRET '1 300000 - TOP SECRET ptograms with reference to the Cuban problee. About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to _the Special Group his displeasure that the Departw ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to .announCing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US- 'AmbaSSador to Cuba. lg/ The Rubottom plan appaiently had some impact, 'for by the end of April 1960; Gordon Gray was calling ?on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to find someone in the Department ~?-Dillon himself -- ?to be "constantly seized of the Cuban problem and ?who would take steps to aesure that all of the activ? ities of variOus groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed."? 22/ Mr. Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting: [Livingston Merchant] has-set up two grOups, one'under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory.' In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livia is a mem- her, and in his.absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity This, of.course, apparently?ignores or disregards the creation of and the reaponsibilities desig? nated.to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen? hower. TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson, with which you may or may not she familiar. .Allen Dulles has a particu? lar liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department, of course, has .many interests. 'The suggestion that Undersecretary Deuglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the -programs with reference talcuba-did not sit well with? the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at a meeting?of the Special Group on 28 April; Chief, ?u prepared a memorandum stating in part'with? reference to -Dillon: The agency would not look with favor on this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the rDirector, therefore, plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon [2 May,1960] .and head off this new development. Mr. Barnes believes that a short paper setting 'forth what we are already doing in the fields. of coordination and liaison shonld be adeq?ate to suppert their point of View. 79/ . Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon bedome Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself dista?teful to the Agency or whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not resealed in the records;. Presumably both elements 97 TOP SECRET- 13-00000 TOP SECRET entered into the picture. In any eVent, Gordon Gray seemed caValier in disregarding the creation of and the liaison arrangements which had already been Imade. (See Appendin But whatever the explana- tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for the nation?s Cuban prOgram. Although it wann included on the list of. -Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con* tacts at this tine; mention should be made of the contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the? FBI was pfohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas, out in mideJune 1960, Chief, revealed that the FBI reportedly?had.plans for installing a stay~behind-network n? using Mexicans and Cubans e? to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief, that the CI Staff get in touch with tne FBI Liaison Officer. Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the Bureaufs?plan. gg/ About the same time that Chief was evincing concern about FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in Appen?ix D, page 332. 713-00000 TOP SECRET a memorandum for the Aoting Director of Central In? telligence'that:? . A thorough investigation has been made of the relations between the Havana Station and.the Havana Office of the Federal Bureaur 'of Investigation. ?It has been concluded that the-operations of the FBI haVe neither interferred with nor conflicted.with the Station?s operations. gl/ ColL-King's memo also stated the Bureau's long? time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that jfrequently the Station was called on to participate in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various individuals who had come into the.FBI officeS?to volunf teer information. On occasion, the Bureau had even .7.turned Over syecific operations to the Station. Chief, WH DivisiOn went even further when, during the course of one of the weekly interdepart~ mental meetings in State, it Was suggested by Mr. Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its -jurisdiotion, and hat perhaps this should be brought before the NSC for consideration. Col..King reported that he remained non?committal at this time, but did point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue should he "50ftmpedaled.?v He did say, however, that 99 713-00000 TOPSECRET the memorandum he had prepared on this Subject was being held_in the files should questions about this particular Bureau abtivity ever be raised. King also recomnended that the Agency not take the initia~ tive in raising the question. Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in the anti4CaStro'operationeyer registered a formal' protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area. By midesummer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded activities at the Forward Oberations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. _In one report concerning the number of the-Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of e- or Were ww working for .Castro, or who were trying desperately to get'sup~ pOrt from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent made a rather_interesting forecast to the CIA repre~ sentative with-whom he was exchanging information. According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible, if not completely impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime uSing Cuban exiles; He thought the only solu? tion to the problem, and the one that stood the best Chance of success, Was to 1.00 - TOP SECRET 713-00000 go in with therS Marines. ?He admitted -_that this was only his personal opinion, but he felt that in View of his experience and contact with the Cuban exile33'he had a good point; I could not help agree with him. - Agent George Davis apparently was extremely interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick- 7 ly accepting the Agency representative' 3 proposal that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each week to compare notes; and the CIA field representan tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the FBI any information which the Agency might acquire pertaining to FBI interests.* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May 1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second FOB that had been established since the formation of .WH Division the initial base having been set up during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953- In general the Miami FOB paralleled the organ- ization of Headquarters with F1, CI, CA, Support, and PM units. FOB reported d-irectly to the Chief .WH Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, Ini- tially the satellite communications center for relaying commo between Headquarters and the field "m including facilities in the F1orida Keys concerning the maritime operations was established; ?and ultimately the commo link'would connect Headquarters with the operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base,? was Clarence A. DePew 8 Sons, a notional cover- for an organization engaged in Classified reSearch. A series of some 32.reports has been prepared on' the FOB, and the reports are available through the Records Management Officer of WH Division. These (footnote continued on- following page) - 101 TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET In addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban problem, in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to pfdvide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and VicewPresidential candidates of the major politi~ cal parties. EWhile the intelligence briefings were - scheduled to consider the world situation, consider?- able emphaauswas being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr; Dulles' briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F, Kennedy, on 23 July 1960, wn/u prepared a detailed Cuban brief? ing paper touching on the principal aspects of the exile organisation, the propaganda plan; penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (includ~ ing the Soviet Union; Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Ger?any), and the play?that Castro was making in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympa? thizers. in addition, emphaSis also was given to the reports deal basically with the period between 1962 and 1968; and While there is sOme feeling that the story o?'the Bay of-Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of the FOB, this author has choSen not to do so, focusing instead on only those broad aspects of the problem relating to the Miami Base. g?f -.102 1TM38ECRET '1 3-00000 TOP SECRET planned program for paramilitary training and opera? tions under the aegiS'of CIA. VInsofar as can be determined, however, there iS'no indication that in his premeleCtion briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr; Dulles went into any specifics on the Agencyis antimCastro plans. g?f As mentioned previously, one of the continuing, prOblems requiring coordination within the ExeCutive Branch was'the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made avail~ able for the program by midmAugust of 1960, Mr. Bissell. appeared at a speCial Group meeting, requesting that an additional $10.75 million_be releaSed from reserve funds to-meet the eyer?increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell?s appeal was that: This matter should he laid before the .appropria.te higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was be- lieved to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to variOus substantial expenditures which e103- TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOESECRET should not be undertaken without a reason- able assurance that the Operation Was to go forward. 86/ On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr. Stans and Mr. MaCy, the Agency was notified that the requested $10_million for FY 61 would be made availe . able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* C. fCooperatioh and Challenge As already mentioned, immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the antimCastro program, there was a considerable degree of coopera- tion between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies the Department of Defense? the Department of State,. the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. As continued to expand and develop the-various programs propa? ganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and para- military operations -- there.were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other _One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserVe funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue, rather than upon consumption an aspect of the operation that was explained to the authdr by William E. Eisemann, formerly Chief, Support 7 -- 1014-? TOPSECRET '1 3-00000 . TOP SECRET "Q0vernment'agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from.the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge. Cobperation because the needs of the Agency represented NationaeroliCy. Challenge to most if not all of proposals ~--proposals which oondermaithe nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make~up . a of the ehile military force which was being organized, the location of training sites, the types of technical materiel (including-aircraft) being requested, and, mest important by the end Of this period, the Specific nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro. By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training.of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees.~? even. though the actual trainL ing of the initial instructor Cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in "the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo ??training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated -that the increased number o? PM trainees would be recruited_out of the Miami area, from other Latin 7 American countries where Cubans had taken up residence, 105 13-00000 TOP SECRET and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba. The emphm?s on the PM training at this time was to be on weapOns, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was Ito be_with the Mel carbine, the Garand and Spring? field rifles, the Thompson Sub-machine gun, and the . .HS Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs, gg/ It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees-was related to the con- tinued impertation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of_the Communist Party in.Cuba.~ An NIE written in mideune 1960 on "The Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro' regime was Fl'deeply and increasingly influaxmd by Com- munists .. no longer any prospect of democratic govern- ment under his [Fidel Castro's} regime.?v As was past estimateS, this particular NIE was unable to answer gthe question of whether Castro himself was a Communist. The NIE also mentioned_that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the opposition at that time "pose a serious threat to - 106 TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET, the regiae." One weakness touched on by the National Estimate concerned the Castro militia which Was char? acteriZed as "only partially armed, and for the most part poorly trained .5. [and] appears to haVe little, if any, effectiveness as an organized combat foroe. in conventional operations." For either of the fore? going reasons,-perhaps, an increase in-the number-of PM.personnel might assist in bringing a strong dissident leader to the fore, or (5) develop the capability to overcome the Castro militia. gg/ The qUestion of an inoreased.number of PM trainees-surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi4 dent Eisenhower, Seeretaries Gates, Dillon! and Ander-? son; and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster by the DCI and Mr, Bissell. After President Eisenhower?s National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized developments since the March ashouncement of the anti- Castro program, Mr. Dulles ?resided some specifics concerning the orgahization of-the FRD and its prin- -cipals; noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi? tation of President Ydigoras of-Guatemala to permit the FRD to operate'from his country} ?Mr. Dulles - 107 TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET noted that at this time, it was particularly important that the US preSence in Guatemala not be resealed; When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De? partment of Defense representative; Mr. Gates, made it quiteclear that he was concerned abont the pos- sibility of US military personnel being involved _directly in the military operations inside Cuba. Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in third coontries would-be used only as instructors not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or'a guerrilla warfare effort. Bissell did stress, however, that there was? need for a standby force, preferably of noneAmericans, with special training in guerrilla warfare to pro- vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when "push? came recommendation that prevoked some di?ferences of opinion-during the course of this briefing for\the President when it was suggested that US officers might be required to direct these forces. 'Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis~ ?cussion until the_Agencyand the JCS could talk the matter overt Mr; Gray seemed to be determined that the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved - 108 - TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET I at this particular timetI According to his own report . of his poSition at this meeting, I Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation ?without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all He there? fore thOught that if this backup force *was easential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning., Mr. Dulles again urged thIat a decisiOn on this be deferred 91/ In support of Mr, Gray and in Some contradiction to Mr.'Bissell's View that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carryzoff.the effort without any out- Iside help, the President was reported to have indicated that,? I He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we. have a good chance of being successful. He Wouldn?t care much about this kind of cost [the $10 million increase noted I earlier}; indeed, he said he would de- fend this kind of action against all comers and that if we could be Sure of - Ifreeing the Cubans from this incubus,. $25 million might be a small price to pay. In light-of today's-relations between the United States and other of :the'major World poWers with. the third countries, Gordon Gray displayed in the 1summer of 1960 a dengee_ of feresight with which he has never been properlY credited. For he noted at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass~ -ments of the major powers. 92/ ?109 1 TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET The President Concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting some? .thing before we were ready for it.* 23/ One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti~Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State,- principally from Thomas Mann,-who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub? lic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 AuguSt 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss- ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. DulleseandnBissell, a third CIA officer might possibly-be in attendance; and he also Anoted that-the Vice?President had been invited to at~ tend the briefing. According to Gray?s record, how- ever, neither'the VicemPresident nor the third 01A /repreSentative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative from was further illustration of Jake Esterline' criticism that at too many high level briefings, repre? sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwithw standing, Were the furthest from the operation yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policy? makers about the details of the anti~CaStro program. 93/ It is also interesting to note that this off-the? record meeting which was arranged by GOrdon.Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary Powers. 95/ - 110 - TOPSECRET 13-00000 . TOP SECRET Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief, learned from a member of the Department of State that Mr. Mann was going to aSk for-a restudy of the basic concept of JMATEthat re?evaluation, he would ask for immediate review and resoheduling of the timetable for the JMATE oper? ation. At this time and in View of the laok of progu - rress both in developing any great cohesion within ithe FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba, _the questions seemed in order. The reaction 0f Chief, was_that an attempt should?be made to .blunt Mr. Mann?s efforts, noting for example: The degree to which we are-already com? mitted would pose a monumental- security problem alone if we were suddenly instructed to cease and desist from further activitya; As of this moment, they.have well in excess of'ZOO?people ,engaged in air, ground, and communication3\training in Guatemala. Additionally, Our across? theeboard propaganda activities are being? stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling ,of either activity, therefore, could bring about serious repercussions. 96/ The_precise nature of these "serious repercus- sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however, _it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency- sponsored-training activities would loose a flood of TOP SECRET 713-00000 Cubans baCk into the eXile community; and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake the task of ousting FidelJCastro. ?This, in turn, would mean that therS would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubans were willing to support an insurrection against Castro. A enggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that: To strengthen our position, therefore, we are-bending every effort to.get at_ least one supply airdrop into the target -country, prior to the Assistant Secretary?s return to the United States Success~ ful action in this area Should weigh heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann?s alleged new attitude. 22/ Just how one or eVen more successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiVeness of the Cuban population to a pos? sible insurrection effort was not explained; =That there were dissidents on the island was-unquestioned, the problem was the degree of strength and effective- ness that they might be able to demonstrate.* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE, A the hurry?up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred. did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis? "solution of the project. This air drOp was a complete (footnote continued on following page) ~-112 TOP SECRET 13-00000 Mr, Mann would contihue to raise questions coh? Cerning the feasibility_of discontinuing the training? in Guatemala, andJin on-going meetihgs With Agency repreSentatives including the DCI, the EDP, Chief, WH, as well as Chief, others, Mann Continued to' raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE I should all the_American trainers and cuban trainees be pulled'out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also questioned the esact timing for Project JMATE. As he raised such Questions, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they would much prefer that the training of the Cuban exiles take place in US bases, both for purpoSes of security and for effioiency. But they alSo pointed 'out that it had been the decision for the Special Group an? the "highest levels" that such training shoeld take place ih third countries, rather thah in the US. LMann persisted, however, soggesting that the_questiOn of-maintainihg the training base in. -and total bust, the supplies being dropped to the ?guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's ferces; and the aircraft_itself made a forced landing in Mexico and was not reCovered. See Volume Iiof this history, Air Operations. - 113 ?a TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency's repre- sentatives agreed to this suggestion fwith the strict- est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in_ the Zone of the Interior have been prepared.? gg/ Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the? base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and Jo C. King. Barnes_recommended con- sideration be given, among_other items, to: The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made tee hurriedly and the importance.of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training Opera- .tional use. I realize that this latter'. point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but, after all, there is an intervening election; and political-views can shift so that every? thing possible shOuld be done to avoid our getting ourSelves into the box where we move to the US fof one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* lgg/ One additional point which was made by Jake Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with. Source referenCe Not 99 not used. 111:, ?f TOP SECRET 713-00000 A TOPSECRET Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro- communist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indi? cated that should the troop training he moved from Guatemala to the United States, 300 Gnatemalan troops. Would be trained_as a special security force for the Guatemalan government. lgi/ Daring these discussions in the late fall of 1960, Mann also raised the issue of soonomic sanctions thich had been touched on in the early spring. At this time however, the Agency's representatives be? lieved that Mann was talking in terms otia one to three year quarantine period, in an attempt to dise rupt the Cuban economy w" a quarantine,however, which would not interferewith the flow of goods from the Communist countries; This was a point of some contention between State and CIA, with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union_would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/ In the context of a possible m0ve of the train- ?ing facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared -4115 TOPSECRET 13-00000 TOPSECRET a memorandum for theDDP indicatingthat the need for training bases to be lotated in the sonthern part of the United States should include an infantry training base.capable of handling-3,000 men with range-facilities: tactical training areas, an air~ field for training air and ground crews in the utili? zation of 3?26? and c-su aircraft, aerial gunnery and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and Staging facilities. It ?es Suggested that the air-? field logistical base should be located in southern Florida, and permission to use Ra?ey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to stage black over?flights to Cnba should he.obtained. The maritime facilities would 'be located on Vieques Island, '?uerto Rico and also 'in southern Florida. - I ?0 In a meeting with the Special Gronp, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence put forth the pro~ [posals concerning the morenent of training bases to the United States; and although he was supported by the Department of Defense representatives e-Mr. Douglas and-Gen, Lansdale mm Livingston Merchant of the Department of State, normally one of the hard liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent 116 TOP SECRET '1 35-00000 TOPSECRET feelings at this time about the training program. Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann' 5 arguments suggesting that.the time for military action was so rfar down the line that US efforts shou1d be concen? ?trated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/ Adolf A. Berle, who wou1d become one of the Kennedy ?administration' 3 principal advisers on Latin America,- also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann' 3 argument in favor of economic sanctions{ Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to inclUde the shipment of arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America. iou/ Although it has been indicated that the Depart? ment of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its request for the eStablishment of training facilities in the continental United States, DOD did A balk-at the nee of military personnel in third country? areas in support of Preject JMATE. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to ques~ tion?mm?ier his department had actua1ly been committed Ito Support CIA's anti?Castro efforty it seems clear that poliCy approval.for the use of Department of ?Defense perSOnnel in Project JMATE had been established ?117-~ TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET- with the approval of the PreSident?s comprehensive program of covert action against Fidel Castro in7 March 1960. igg/ . ThediffiCulties endountered with the Department of Defense concerning the assignment of Special Force, trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training bases has already been spelled out in considerable detail in another volume, but eVen as the Department of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the possible use of DOD personnel in either training or combat activities, the Agency was proposing the rem ?cruitment of either American or foreign volunteers to serve as combat troops for_Project JMATE. The Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department of State, however, put the Quietus on the-plan fer obtaining foreign volunteers; bet J. Foster Collins, the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need to re?examine the Department of State policy.* ,The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis? cussed in Volume II of this history, Participation .in the Conduct'of Foreign Policy. TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET Collins was particularly enthuSiastic about the pros- .spects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, anleurks to serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's View 'prevailed, and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers;'106/ During the period of'buildup and organization of for the JMATE'effort'against Castro, the? Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense per se, the Air_Force, or the United_States Army. The exist" ence of the United States_NavalBase'at Guantanamo Bay in puba presented an unusual situation in View of the planning that was taking place; Apparently,_ however, there was no disagreement between the Agency and the Navy that prohibited Ghantanamo from being - used-to mount anti-Castro activities or from being used as a safe haven area for?those who might have -been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or other anti?Castro activities. The purpose of such restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans from claiming violations of the legal and binding international agreement between the United States 119 - TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET Aand the Government of Cnba over the lease of Guantanamo Bay. '80 serious was this issue in fact, that the Agency agreed. i i that all Cubans participating in Over- flights of Cuba would be told that Sean? . tanamOlhwal Base Was not to he used as a Safe haven, and that if they-landed there, they would be turned over to the Cuban.authorities. ?91/ The GuantanamoBase also presented a major dif-i ficulty for theDepartment of State. Evidenoe of this surfaced in early_0ctober of 1960 when it was reported that during a meeting of the State werking Group on Cuba a Suggestion was put forward that the US try to, iinfluence Latin emerioan nations to approve US reten- tion of the base. One proposal had been made that this be done thrOugh the Inter?American Defense Board UADB), where a resolution apparently was about to be introduced asking for a definition of the relations between Cuba and the USSR, With the expectation that this might force Cuba?s resignation from membership -on the IADB. LAcoording to Col. John F. Mallard, the Agency's.liaison officer with the State Working Group: In addition, State desires that the IADB, make some statement on the impor- 'tanoe.of- Guantanamo Bay to Latin American hemisphere defense. This statement would, in effect,.give Latin American approVal to 0,8. retention of this base. 120 TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET This frame'of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of wn/u, Ed Stanulis, to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief, Western Hemisphere Divisionraising some questions, which are as pertinent to CIA teday as-they were when they were.raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as follows} I realize that this Agency is an implementing-arm of-the Executive BranCh and has no right Or privilege in the area of formulation of national policy. believe that within this framework we who are part of this Agency are permitted to comment on certain State Department' or other Executive Department proPOsitions Ithat appear, on the basis of our.own personal observations and experience; to be Counter-productive to the best interest of the United States. rIjam convinced that the course of action,described in paragraph-1 [that the U.S. use the IADB to win Latin American support for the U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact within'this-categOry. It is high time that the U.S. take an understandable'public pesition in matters of international agreement; compact, con- . 'tract, and-treaty, .The rights of_the U.S. to the.Guantanamo Bay area have been-clear~ ly_and.legally described in several docuu ments which bear the signatures of the then reigning and cognizant governments of the United States and Cuba, respectively. .Certainly the assistance of any single or plural Latin American national entity (ies) pseems to me to be indicative of an admitted weakness on the part of the United States ~121~ TOP SECRET 713-00000 and its. conviction of its legal inter~ national rights. I suggest that this AgenCy make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter, as described above (if ad- dressees agree) . I realize that consider?- able discussion could be waged'in terms of legally and/or logically preSenting our case. This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements. . One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, has on at least_two occasions in'U.Sg mass .media of sizable-circulatiOn stated that the United States would,n0t tolerate any invasion of Guantanamo or_hostile abroga? tion of-our treaty arrangements to the base. I - I believe it is significant to note that no re3ponsible member of the Executive Branch (including the President of the United States) has contradicted his state? ments. -on the basis of this evidence, it would appear to me that the official overt poSition of-the United States is clear and we need not at this time places ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantan- amo isSue. 109/ By early November 1960'Secretary of State;- ChriStianHerter, had decided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level; and,consequently, he introdnced the subject on the pagenda for the National Security Council meeting of_ 7 November-l960. The Secretary emphasiZed the need for cOordination of military and political planning ?122~ TOPSECRET. 13-00000 TOP SECRET (in case of an.attack on the naval base. Herter. Iindicateddtwo extreme one, that in case of an attaek, the United States respond with only sufficient military farce to grotect the base Iitself; and another, that the ?nited States decide that_an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and anply such military peWer as necesSary. Herter Halso suggested, of course, that there would be pessi~ ble responses between the?t?o extremes, with activitiesv ?in the GAS er the UN possibiy having some bearing on the US response -- the sort of.contention that undoubt- ediy must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis again; The Secretary of State did specify, however, that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would: be the result at a decision made by the President of _the United States. As wiil be pointed out subsequently, the_Cnbans would make charges about Guantanamo being the center\ for.anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few instances where anti~CaStro Cubans were able te find refuge eithin the confines of the base. Overall, however, there was a surprising degree of neptrality sewith?respect-to the naval installation during the course of the Bay 9f Pigs operation. I -?1.23 - TOPSECRET 13-00000 It is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief, CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison.? Before the end of October 1960? the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed it,impossible.for? his to conduot the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area prOperly until he received further- information h? specific information -4 about the Agency's planned operations againSt Castro. When this report On Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. Holoomh, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be answeredri By this time, Dennison- nindicated that he haa already been in touch_with General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the 'expectationwas thatsuch briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on.' Holcomb,.quite truthfully, indicated that neither he nor the Agency?s liaison officer to CINCLANT, Commander Ray E, Millard; were privy to the planned operations of Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide 121s 4- . . TOP SECRET .him with the necessary information, Holcomb then noted: It was.the impression of the officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA, and that if his needs can be met, he will undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful CourSe. 0n 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Ester? line, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representa~' tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con- tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return, they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. 'Mr. Bissell gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis? cussed the political and propaganda aspects, and 2 Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the plan for a force to seize a lodge-? ment on the island of Caba. -Hawkins emphasized that this last objective could not be met until March or? ?April of 1961.* 112/- In a telecon with the author.of this history on 15 May l978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it_was extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper?' ation before-he received any briefing from CIA on the anti?Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact, . as though he was not brieted until shortly before the (footnote continued on following page) a 125 4 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET Personnel and Training, ?From the time of the official apnroval of the anti?Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant conoern; Even though the Director of Central Intelligenoe "emphasized the significance of_the Project; by saying that he would recall Agency gersonnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE ohjecti?es," some of those who were Closest to the personnel problem be? lieved'that DCIDulles failed completely to keep that promise; llg/ Jake-Esterline, Chief, markedas follows: It It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divi~ sham personnel, the .senior personnel;'to staff out the organ? ization-; or if they did h_ave them, they ?weren 't about to release them from the. LSD (Landing Ship Dock)-whieh was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready ?to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion. As the text above confirms, however; the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and' should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961. 126 TOPSECRET 713-00000 '-sions.-115/ TOP SECRET things they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which_was probably correctgw It was on that basis, I think, that when people like Dick Drain came 'back home from in Dick's case, I think he came in from where he had a pretty good recor ut he was not re4 ?turning to.Headquarters to go into an' passignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us; Gerry Droller had been arOund Headquarters fOr a long time,r had been quite a bit of a replacement problem.? He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard 'Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of '5selected, not by us, but they were told ?they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation; llg/ Esterline also noted that the shortage of compe- ,tent_personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand. He claimed that when serions problems came up none of the case officers were available to make deci- Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/u, was more specific in his critiCism of the personnel management for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insUre that the support elements got the best ?people for Project JMATE, ?he [White], directed all .Support office heads that if there was a need for any 127 - TOP SECRET 13-00000 senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitatiOn whatsoeVer." 116/?. But, in contraSt, Eisemann pointed out: I canft say that was true on the opera- tional side of the shop. A Contingency- Task Force, a program developed by the Clandestine Services, was designed to .make available Agency personnel who could be pulled out of any position that they 'were'assigned to and moved into any urgent,. . high priority type of project JMATE tP-roj-ect, was a high priority project; and the Centingency Task Force concept, _in my opinion, failed at that point because the Clandestine Services did not provide the top quality-people we needed for the posi? tion?to be filled. After JMATE Project the Contingency Task ForCe was completely Labelished. .Many people in the Agency were designated from the Support and the Opera- tional side to fill variOus positions as they would come up, but it didn' work frOm the Clandestine Services side. We had real ?problems, trying to get qualified top qualified people to do those jobs. In my Opinion, the Contingency Task Force was a failure, It was set up and designed so that_qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with _passports at any given time. But you couldn' get the people you wanted -1 I talking- about qualified- key professionals in: the Clandestine Services because the Division heads in the Clandestine Services would net release those people. lil/ Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for Project JMATE was among the Severest of the critics with reference to the personnel assigned to Project Pointing to his own case; Drain stated: - 128 - '1 3-00000 TOPSECRET . I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but really, I didn't have any qualifications fer this except that I was there and unemployed had no Spanish language whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in l9?0. That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos, and any of that had never been on_an amphibious operation, and if that was characteristic of my quali- fications, it really characterized the whole damned operation about which, it seemed to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning what he said, would say repeatedly, "now, I Want_the very best people assigned to this-project there is nothing more_ important that we are doing than this; and I want directed assignments I want peeple pulled out of tours overseas if necessary, this thing must be manned." Everybody would solemnly nod and, then, much like the case of Vietnam humans being humans we would tend to get the? people that the area Division Chiefs found ."excess" "w which normally meant'"fbund 'inSUfficient.? With many notable exceptions, we did-not get the very best people availe able. llg/ Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of Ithe Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division: More of this staffing would have come from WH if-there had been more competent people within WH. WH suffered, in my Opinion, from a surfeit of officers who had been picked up at the time that whether this "Must Go" is in terms of the assassination, or in terms {of} nobody, none of these people must be allowed to have a role in the new govern- ment. I guess "Must Go" came to pass eventually in the case of number one on ?this list, Che GueVara. Raul -.. I myself, contemplating the future government, thought it might be interesting to try to keep Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture What magic there was in the name of Castro, .but'do it With that little homosexual, instead of with Fidel, the real man. I .. .288 -- '1 3-00000 TOP SECRET don't oven know the rest of these guys Hart; Escalante; etc. By way of summatizingiit Would appear that officialanti-Castro program as raftected in Project JMATE did not inolude assassination as an iotegral .part of-its operational planning, but would not have Ibeen averse to=eliminatin? Castro or other of the. .?uban leadera if tho opportunity had been afforded. Based on reoords, however, principals were in no way privy to, or partioipa?ts in, the'Mafia assas? ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs. - 289 '1 3-00000 TOP SECRET Part Conclusions ,This volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti~Castro program from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower adminiStration in??anuary of 1961. it emphasized that in the initial perioa when Castro's revolution was taking place, the Agency, refleCting the polici3s of the Us Government, was caught betwixt and between to move with Castro or to move against Castro. Shortly following his take~ over} it became clear that Castro had little or no in?' tention 4~ nor apparently concern ?n for establishing cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North.". Instead, he tnrned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military,_technical, and economic assistance. It -became clear that a new being intro-- duced into the Caribbean basin and'that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations, whether democratically governed or governe? by dictatorships of the right. - 290 - TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET As CastrolS'threate became more serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate eco? nomic interests?of the United States in cuba, pressures within the ?nited States Government led to a decision that Castro muSt go.: With great concern about the- impact any overtiianti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United- Nations and on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be "m - adopted; This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on l7 March of 1960.? It broadly_outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA wa5}to be the principal actibn agent for the bulk of the program. once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policyT A separate Task?Force within the Western HemisPhere DiviSion was established under th? leadership of Jacob Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial conCeptS of the Central Intelligencengency called for a propaganda program to be run out of_a radio 291 TOP. SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City. Strong support was to be provided for anti-CaStro . publications launched in the'area of Miami. Para- military programs initially?iCalled fer the training of cadres of cemmunicators and paramilitary instructors who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and- training for the numerous dissident elements that reportedly were ready to move against Castro. s; 'as the summer_of 1960 Unfortunately, hOwever, drew to a ciose,it became apparent that'Castro?s military strength and training erograms were inproving.and that the initial plan to infiltrate small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was feasible.? Consequently, the Concept changed_to one' of,a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensible .base in Cuba from which a Provisional'Government might cali for assiStance'from the United States Government if the invaders themSelves?conld not arouse sufficient support to force the overthrow of Castro. This volume emphasized that following-his decision in March 1960 that there should be an anti?castro pro? gram,-President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the 292 '1 3-00000 TOP SECRET question of developments of the anti-Castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr; Nixon; At that time Mr. Eisen? hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where sons of planners hoped that in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway f4 paramilitary operations might be 'initiated._' Apparently this was feared by Castro, too, for'in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs . he said: When our country was in danger of direct aggressiOn and mobilized itself, it waited for the {Kennedy} presidential inauguration thinking that this man [Kennedy] would do.something different, 7 because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone.else's mistakes.* l/ This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only limited support for sabotage activities prior to_the Foreign MiniSter charged that lain the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and Generava. P. Cabell;-ADCI, were two of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell proposing air and naval protection for the invasion and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the beaChhead. 3/ - 293 TOP SECRET '?300000 i . . TOP SECRET. end of Eisenhower?s administration. There was con? siderable concern oVer the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be in- solved in investigations by either the UN or the_OAS for its antirCastro program, Because it has been so widely publicized that Richard Nixon was one of the prin? cipals in planning the Bay of'Pigs Operation, this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper contexti It was the role of Ian intereSted senior offioer in the Executive Branch, and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's 'role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its antimCastro effort. Similarly, because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select_Comnittee's report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, including Fidel(ketKJamitheinplications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for_the Bay' of Pigs Operation; thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was sup? -portable. It was not; The Mafia operation was run TOP SECRET- 13-00000 aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti4Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials ?u Allen Dulles; Riccard'Bissell; Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and pos- sibly, Tracy Barnes probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu. I In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits rof informarion which indicate the possibility of as- sassination attempts against the Cuban'leadershi? also fail to demonstrate any.respon?ibilitj for-their inim tiation on the part of _If anything,'the evidence would indicate.that was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinkinthhat disSident Cebans wOuld'themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. The possibility, of course, cha?ngencyusuppli weapons might be involved in.sach ac atte?pt-cannot be ruled oat. I ObViously it would be foolish to contend that those princioally responsible for developing ClA?s anti~Castro program would have objected to the'assas~ sinarion of Fidel Castro; On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of: the official program of the Central Intelligence Agendy; . -'29;5 TOPSECRET A 713-00000 Appendix A Memorandum for the Director 0? Centfal Intelligence from J. C. 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Dela" in 0&5 ac?aion could result in a Coutunist led front Lovern?ant 130131;; a "fait. in Cuba. 64341141 result. in 4:513 entire probiem Endizg 1E1 the Secar?y Page 2 '14" 713-00000 (20:213. 01' the 33113".ch the novict union has'a veto. - a 491. I4 -- - v.3.21:. guaranty to 3012:: Cuba by mrecu milgary action, and aft-3r a commhcau?n ad, z: .3 . . non-c .. - It would ?Ii?ich is 51.11.]. 2:15.18 new" I. - J. . I. 4'5 not tolerate he capaL-men. a, camar?t or 1. a. 1- 1:1 tar: ?as; 2?9. It .14- tab!- when its It; 11011113 the U. S. is 'zmsillia. ?15.13 1:23:19. to act It would also praba?oly :5 powers throughout the Uisac?imni-a?jc It would violate our 03.3 by peaceful mans. It would leaci to charges oi? aggression against the 13.5., the res ulti :15; pmsl??ility both its treaties if (6.) It caulc? It would 1:301:16. solve the 0 be 32:1 cousomme policy not ice to the world communist ?front" ream 4~ 1 1.9 t..c tau . .. 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I..- 1 9.2 42.8.. 543 @3553 ma 4.22.4.4?. 4mm m5. mam worrg?o. -5844 $5525 .4. 35cm 24.54.. 4.4.. 4.4 4.454455 . . . . . @4554. 20 4.4% 90 Flu ?Kw 713-00000 Appendix Richard M, Nixon's Memorandum . 6n Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 13-00000 RICHARD NIXON LA CASA PACIFICA SAN CLEMENTE. CALIFORNIA July 27, 19i9 1 am enclosing summary of.my conversation With Eidel_Castro 'in 1959, as you requested in your letter of Ju1y 19th. 'With best wishes, Sincerely, Dr. Ja?k B. Pfeiffer CIA Historian 20S05 ?ehclosure, 4 pageS' 337 713-00000 COPY . cosy CONFIDENTIAL April 19, 1959 Summary of conversation betWeen The Vice President and Fidel Castro: .When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and tense.- He apparently felt that he had not done.as well on "Meet the Press? as he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irri- tated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured at the beginning of the conversa-' . tion that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult pro- grams a public official could- go on and that he had done ex?_ tremely well 11 particularly having in mind the fact that he "had the cOurage to go. .on in Engl1sh rather than to speak through a translator. The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which.he had.made public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of in? terest, particularly in View?of the Comments I made with re? gard to the positions he took I suggested at the outSet that while I understood some reasonable time- elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it Would neVertheless be much better from his viewpoint if he were not to- state so categorically that it would be aslong as four years before sleetions would be held. I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having -elections at the earliest possible date and that four years . wo?ld be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were Scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not hold? ing elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections- because the elections in the pas-t had prom duced bad government." He used the same argument that he was reflects ing the will of the people in justifying the executions of war criminals andhis -overruling the acquittal of Batista' avian tors. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his responsibility.to carry out the will of the peeple costs - COPY- 1 2:9 13-00000 COPY COPY -2- whatever it might appear to he at a particular time.- It was also apparent that as- far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a goVernment- loan but to win support for his policies from American public *opinion.? It was this almost slavish subservience to prevail- ing majority opinion 1- the voiCe of the mob rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even. the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be.- That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responu sibility Of a leader not always, to follow public opinion . but to help to direct it in the proper channels not to give the people what they think they want at a time of omen tional stress but-to make them.want what they ought to have. I pointedcut that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely- disillusioned as far as elections ?and representative government Were concerned but that this placed an eVen greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby 'to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictator- ship against which he and his fol_lowers had fought so gale lantly. I used the same argument with regard .to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial -court, judge- and jury, and on other issues which came up .during the course of the conversation.v In every instance he - .justified his departure from democratic principles-on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we bee lieve in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority ?should never have the power to destroy_. I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him butIe did listen and appeared to be somewhat recepe tive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how this place in history would be affected by the courage ,and statesmanship he diaplayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to?b was to follow the mob, but that the right COPY . COPY 3729 713-00000 COPY . - COPY .3.. thing in the long?run would be better for the people and, -of course, better for him as well. As I have already in? dicatedte was incredibly naive with regard to the CommuniSt to have no fear whatever that the Commu~ nists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that ?:during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place. He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Com- 'mnnism, and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953.1n our discussions Of Communism I again tried to cas-t the arguments in terms of rhis own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turneQ against him and the Cuban 7 pe0ple unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the COmmunists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made Very little imr pression, if any. Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong - men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to 'them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did thiste would have a workload which would be So great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great iss?ues. I put as much emu phasis as possible on the need fothim to delegate-responsi- bilityr but again whether I got across was doubtful. It Was apparent that while he paid lip service to. such_institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion his primarchoncern was with;deVeloping programs for economic .progress. He said Over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for hhree months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a jOb something to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom alongmith it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his peeple, he should try to den velop support for policies wh_ich could assure economic prom grass with freedom rather than without it. COPY COPY COPY ?Um 713-00000 oopr' copy -4- He indicated that it was very foolish for the "Uniteditates to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Carib" 'bean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world.war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used ~to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It. would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with! we had a rather extended_discussion of.h0w Cuba could_ get the investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed- and what he wanted was not private capital But government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the united States was concerned.was not in getting more government capital but in attracting private - capital. I explained that government capital was limited be? 'cause of thenany demands upon it and the budget problems?we? -presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it I pOinted out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a oeuntry where there was any considerable? fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to eXplain why he had said and done some of the things which ha?d appeared to be anti?private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression. He explained his agrarian reform program in consider- able detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produded within the country and that it would make no sense to pro" duce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands ,of Consumers was increased. ICOPY COPY 13-00000 ICOPY . COPY -5- He rather bitterly assailed the United States press .for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after-he came to power. I,-of course, tried to explain that speakingjrom some personal experience, it was neces- sary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and - unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with riticismgr?regard to might eventually- lead him to take some -rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future. He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was axery- disturbing attitude the part of the AmeriCan press and the American peeple generally. His? argument went along this l1ne: "yours is a great country -v the richest, the ?greatest, the most powerful in the world. Year people, there? fore, Should be proud and confident and happy. But every? .place I go you seem to be afraid n? afraid of Communism, ?afraid thatjf Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced 5? afraid ?that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much.abroad as they have previdusly. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa 11 you should be talking more abOut your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship. - In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welw . comed the industrialization and deveIOpment of Latin America, "that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that .as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that coun- try but goodjbr us as well. I also tried to put our attiw tude toward Communism in Context by pointing out that Commu~ nism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set uptictatorships- I also emphasized, however, tthat we realizedihat being against Communism was not enough that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we con? .vince people every place that we want to help them achieve economic progreSs in a climate of freedom. COPY COPY Ill?) 13-00000 COPY - I COPY COPY -6- I Severa1_Other subjects were discussed but none that I think are at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar I quota nor did he engage in any Specific discussions with - regard to?conIOm1c assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a . Commun1st and that his- policies- had the support of the great majority ofthe Cuban people. My Own appraisal of h1m as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of 15 that he has those 1ndeuI finable qualities which Imake him a leader of men. Whatever we may think offmm he -is going to he a great factor 1n the 'development of Cuba andI-very- -possibly- in Latin American affa1_rs generally.I He s-eems. to be sincere. He 15 either 1ncred1bly naive about Communism or under Communist discip~ line my gueSS 13 the former, and as I have already 1mm p11ed his ideas as to how*to run a g0vernment or an economy are less deve10pe dI than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty Oountries. But because he has-the power to lead to which I have referred, wethe nethoice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction. COPY . COPY '101 13-00000 Appendix G4 MemOrandum for {for Briefing Vic? President Nixon], 29? Feb 60. 1 13-00000 a ,3 i 29 Febmiery 1960 WOW FOR: Director of Central Inte1.11genee VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) I I SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba. 1. this memorandm 18 for-information only, and is for the mieetor'a . I meeting with the Viee President on 2 IHarch 1960. 2. Intelligence 2 1 Some highlights of recent intelligence- which Justify the actions being taken or planned against Cube. are: Rapid builduup of events which indicate slide toward Commist orbit I and intensified efforts inglement intem :prog'ams towards estatlislmeat Conmnmiet dictatorship. Patna feeling among middle and upper class Culverts and studeats has leached new high on Com?et?issue and wrote I . station Conteete II ranging from left to tight have declared. that eituetion eennot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Commists control I Cuba.' I I we Chief or 01113311 intemgenee activities in. Mexico is on a trip . through Centra1. America to initiate activities for the estabiish?xent of a pro-Castro tevolutionary movement in each country aimed at the. over- - throw of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover. I g. Considerable intelligence ?has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operatioaal reietienseip with guerrilla grougs in Coletnbia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government. 61. reports "Che? Guevara is talking of including Martinique and. Guadeloupe 511a Caribbean Federation headed by him. 31m 713-00000 29 February 1960 25mm mmotor of m; Deputy Director {Plat-2e) W: . Meat what doing in We; 1. mm :3 tea: Wm onlymeeting-with tm Wampum: an 2 mm 1960; taken. or 321m amuse cum em: I .mpm build-up of mm which indicate slide mach-mania orhit and intenst?ed efforts. "Wet intemel progrm towards establishmt -- amulet dictatorship. Public: teammate-mg 1215:1213 am mar-clam 133112me seesaw dammt 31mm - cmmotbe wanted, Cuba- Central Mm to initiem activities for the hemmt 0f anv?u?MmtmeechWMattheMr- throw of mating Mmetv Cuban Embassies term. has mm c. Considerable intelligence has ?been received. of cum emu to establish an Operational relationship with W113 in mm. with ulti'eatte 3min. exact-tm'ouing {In Colml?an gem-amt. '53. W"Che??mietendngofinmg 243.3.th and (Endgame in a. Caribbean Federation beade? hy-hin. 345 713-00000 8 March 1950 FOR. Director ?of? central Intelligence ?9 . Deyu y?L mtor (Plans) VSUBJECT: What we are doing in Cu?a.v 1. Tuis namorandum is for information onxy, and is for tha Director's use at the 5h12 Representatives ?eeting which will cansiuer tha Cuba covert action program- paper. (This paper was used fori?r. Nixon' a briefing.) Intelligence $953 highlights of rece??_intelligence?which justify the a??ions being taken or planned against-Cuba ?re: Rapid buildnup of avents.which indicate sli?e toward Communist orbit ?c and int?nsified intern?i ?rograms towards estabiish?ent .Cow?mnisL dictator?hip. Pgblic feeling a?ong middle and upper cLasa C?bans and stude?tsvh?s raached.?ew high on Communist issu? and numarous station contacts ranging frgm.lefb to fight have a?clared that situation ?annst be tblerated, and.thai they convinced Communists central Cuba., . g. The Chi?gf 6f mm inh?mgence acni'?tiea? inter-Mac ishma trip thicugh Central marks. t6 ini?iate, aegivities for the eatabliament or a revolutiongry movement in e?ch country aime?_at the over~ throw of existing government. Cuban E?bassias serve as covag. Considerable intallL enca has bean renaived of Cuban attempts to Ivestp blish an operational relations.1ip with guerrilla gro' Aps in Colombia with ulaimgte goal at the Colombian government. I Ersports "Che" Guevara is b.1king 01 including -.-. Hartinieua and Gua?clouge ?in a Caribbean Federation headed by him. hr? 3/57!) 74/ 346 713-00000- TOP SECRET Source References* Volume Part I - Background iA. Watching from the Sidelines 1. State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing. Collins, 17 Noy_48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. C. 2. Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. 3. Ibid..' 7 'Ih .. a. State, Memo for.Mr. Braddock from 1a Oct 57, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 185.) S. 7 5. State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub: Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro .Ruz. (Memo-No. 869). C. 6. David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, 1946565, 2 Dec 73). S. I I 7. Letter to General His Excellency'Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar from Allen W. DullesMemo (no addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick, 19 Nov 57, sub: How to Bring Peace in Cuba. S. 9. Ibid. 10. Beatrice B. Berle'and Travis E. Jacobs (eds), Navigating the Rapids,1918u1971, (N.Y., 1973), p. 681. U. A Unless otherwise specified. all sources are SECRET. Copies or notes of all sources Cited are filed under 2632. 3&7 TOP 713-00000 12. MR [no author}, 27 Jan 61, sub: WHD Reporting on the-Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel Castro tO'Power. p. 6. -S. 'McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, op. cit., I, 213 216. 8. Hugh Thomas, Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom (N. Y. 1971). PP- 1000-1001. U. 13. Berle and Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 685?686. Following CS reports (S): 3,3?5,2813;3u7.126, .u Mar 58 Apr 58 3,35?,755,Berle?and,?acobs, op. cit., pp. 685?586. 15. Memo for Chief, p9 Staff from Alfred T. cox, ?25 Aug 58, sub:_ US Course of Action-in Cuba. 8. 16. TDCS 3/376, 032; 30 0.. 53, sub: Fidel Castro 2 Ruz and Forces Strongly Catholic, Non~Communist. S. 17. from J. c. king, 20 Nov 58, sub: 0Cuba Dis- cussibn of Pawley Preposal. S. ?Cables;to Diractor from Havana: 9 0661 (IN 35522); ll'Dec 58, HAVA 006 bl .. y_ 18. Cable to Director from Havana, 11 De 0668 (IN 36486). S. - 19. State, Incoming Telegram from Amconsul Santiago de Cuba, N0. 3H1Ibid. - 3&8 TOP SECRET 713-00000 21. 22.' 23. VZQ. 25. \26. TOP SECRET Cable to Director from COS Havana, 18 Dec 58, s. Alfred'T. Cox, Paramilitary Activities at.the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 31 Dec 61, II, 37?-375 (CSHP 183, Mar 70). 5. Memo for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred T. Cox and Col. C. H. Heinlen, 31 Dec 58, sub:. Support Arrange? ments. S. - memo for the President from Acting Secretary [of State], 23 Dec 58,?sub; Cuba. TS [no number]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, 1952?61, "Cuba" folder, Box [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from' Thomas A. Parrott?], 7-Jah 59. S. {Minutes Of] sgecial Group Meeting_on Cuba [from Thomas.A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S. Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting On Cuba [by Gordbn Gray?}, 31 Dec 59. (Dwight D. 'Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, "Cuba" folder, BOX 27') .U.V 7.Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (N. Y., 1965), ,pp. 521, 52?. U.- Castro Takes ?ver cable to Havana from Director, 9 Jan 59, DIR (OUT 60805). S. - Cable to Director from.Havana, 15 Jan 59, HAVA 0900 (IN 47617) Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Army) from C.- P. Cabell, 6 Feb 59, sub: Proposed US Army .Operation Against the New Cuban Armed Forces. (ER 11 H09a S. 349 TOP SECRET 13-00000 TOP SECRET ,3 28. Memo for Chief who from Alfred T. Cox, 30 Jan 59, sub: Research Project on Castro Movement. 3. 29. Cable to DirectOr frOm Havana, 3 Feb 59, 0989 (CKNR 797). S. Memo for Mr. Braddook from [Army] Attache, 16 Feb 59, sub: Situation Report, Memo'No. 912. S. 30. Boar? of National Estimates, Threats to the Stability of the U. S. Military Facilities Posi? tion in the Caribbean Area and Brazil, SNIE 1-00? 3~5931. Cable to Director from Havana, 9 Apr 59, 1191 (CKNR 009). . 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 13 Apr 59, 2000 (CKNR 017); 15 Apr 59, - 2016 (CKNR 039). S. 39.- Dispatch to Director from Havana, 15 May . 2161. .S. . 35. 'Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy, 1 May 59, sub: vForwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro Visit. C. >35.?7Dispatch to Director from COS Havana, 26 May 59, HAVA 2197.- . 37. Jun 59, sub: Comments of Cuban Come- munist Leader on Castro's Trip to US. C. C'Theodore Draper, Castrois Revolution (N.Y. 1962), pp. H8- 57. U. 38. Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the 'Caribbean through 1959, SNIE 80-59, 30 Jun 59. S. 39. Memo for DCI from Rudolph Gomez, Aug 59, sub: Mr. Leo Cherne. S. 350 4 9? TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Dispatches: To Direc_tor from Havana, 5 Jun 59, HAVA 2233, 5 Jun 59; To COS Havana from DIR, 9 Jun 59, DIR 300u1. S. Q0. Draper, op. cit.,.pp. 61?62, 65-69. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 123u-1271. Memo for Col- King from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Oct 59, sub: Visit of Mr. R. E. Gomez to Havana, Cuba, 15?18 Get 59. 8. Q2. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:' - Discussions between the Department and Chief, WHD on Cuba. 8. .QB. US Senate, 86th Congress, Session, Judiciary Sub-Committee Hearings Threat to the US through the Caribbean," Part Testimony vof Gen. C. P. Cab?ll, pp. 162-163. U., Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba frOm Chief, WED, 18 Dec 59, sub: RMD -- Cuba, 3214.. T8 (N0 number). - . 45. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59, sub: Cuban Problems. S. ?a9871.) Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the Caribbean through 1960, SNIE 80/1?59, 29 Dec 59, pp" ?1'7113o 47. Office Memo to Doris from Pau1ine, 11 Jan 60, *sub? General Cabell Briefing of JCS State, 8 Jan 60. S. 351 TOP SECRET 713-00000 IO. 11. Source ReferenceS' Part II Castro Must Go A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan?Mar 60? L. K. White, Diary fates, 8 Jan 60. S. CIA InspectOr Generai's Survey of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS l730?0. (Hereinafter cited as I. G. Survey.) Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by ?Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, p. Ibid., pp. 3-H. Memo for James E. Flannery, 12 Dec 73, sub: Review of Howard} Hunt's Book [Give Us This Day]. 8. David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-' 1965 HP 32a, Dec 73. S. Conversation between Walter Elder and Jack Pfeiffer, 1H Jun 7H. U. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 3 Oct 73, sub: Brief Conversation with Jake Esterline. C. Oral History Ihterview: Richard Drain by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1,-pp. 6~8. .Oral HistOry Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 2~3. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. Tape 1, pp. 15-16. - by This ahd all other Oral HiStory Interviews conducted Jack B. Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED. -- 352 TOP SECRET I 13-00000 . . . TOP SECRET 12. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17. Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 5-6. Proposed Agenda [for the] Special Group Meeting, ,12 Jan 60. S. 13.- MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 13 Jan 60. S. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activi- ties, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 20 Nov 75, (Bath Congress, 1st .Session, Report No. U. (Hereinafter SSC.) MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, op. cit. 15. Memo for DDP from C. Traqy Barnes, 21 Jan 60, sub: - Cuba. S. 16. Alfred T. Cox, Paramilitary Ground Activities at the Staff Level, 15 36p 55 - 31 Dec 61, II, 38?? . ., 335 (DDO HP 183, Mar 60). S. 17. MR froij. D. Esterline, 2 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with.the"DC1.? S. from Thomas A. Parrott] B'Feb 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting Cuba. S. - 18. MR from J. C. King, 26 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with DODsrepresentative on Cuba.- S. MR from-E. Scott, 3 Feb 60, sub: Meeting, 3 Feb hours - 1015 hours. S. . Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever, 0 Feb 60, sub: Request for Special Allowance for CIA Rep~ resentatiVe to CINCLANT. S. 19. from Jim Flannery?], 11 Feb 60, sub: Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations. S. MR from J. D. Esterline, 12 Feb 60, sub: Briefing- of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba. 8. 353 TOP SECRET 713-00000 g'20. 21. 22. 23. 2Q. 25. 27. 28. 29.? .30. 31. Memo to Designated Representatives Under 5&12/2 {from Thomas A. Parrott?] [15? ?16 Feb sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel ._Castro. S.- Memo to DeSignated Representativesrhder.NSC 5u12/2 [15-16 Feb op. cit. Ibid. from Thomas A. Parrott?] Minutes of Special Group Meeting Cuba, 17 Feb 60. S. 'Memo of Meeting with the President {on 17 Feb 60] from Gordon Gray, 19 Feb 60. T8 189337- 1. MR from J. D. Esterline, 18_Feb 60, sub: Conversa? Vtion with C. King, llo?_hours, 18 Feb 60. S. MR from J. C. King, 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Thomas Mann on Cuba. 8. MR from-J. D. Esterline,?18 Feb 60,_sub: Conversae tion with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60.? 3. MR from J. D. Esterline, 19 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with the DCI on Cuba. S. Memorandum [no author, no date, presumed written between 24- 25 Feb 60], sub: Covert Action Against Cuba. S. - "ibid. Ibid. Minutes of OCB Meetings(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Files Of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray Box 67.) [from E. A. Mar 60, sub: First Meeting of BranCh a Task Force- S. - 35H ITOPSECRET 713-00000 32. 33.- 35. 36. '37. 38. 39. 41. az. TOP SECRET Note toer. Barnes frem Richard Helms, 8 Mar 60, sub: [Revision of 8 Mar 60 paper for?SQlZ Group]. S. 0 [Memo] to DeSignated Representatives Under NSC 5&12/2 [from T4;A..Parrott, 8 Mar 60], sub: Covert Acti Operations Against Fidel Castro. S. - Ibid. Memo fer DCI from J. C. King, 8 Mar 60, sub: What we Are Doing in Cuba. 5. Ibid. Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60;:sub:, Cuba. (TS (Dwight D._Eisenh0Wer Library. -Clean-Up Files, Box 6 >Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60, from S. E. Belk, 9 Mar Cuba. S. (Dwight D..EisenhoWer.Library. CleanmUp Files, Box 6 [Cuba].) . Memo for Mr. Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, op. cit. Meme for the NSC from James S, Lay, Jr., 15 Mar 60, sub: .U. 8. Policy Toward Cuba.- TS (no number). .(Dwight_D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray Records, 1952-61, ?Cuba". Box .Memo bf Meeting With-the President on 12 Mar 60 from Gordon Gray. (no number). (Dwight D. Eiaamower Cleaanp Files, Box 7,'1960, Meetings with the President. Vol.-I.) .Memo for Mr. Bissell and Col. J. C. King,_fr0m 'Allen W. Dulles, l? mar 60, sub: -["Starters" for Our Cuban Paper].' S. Ibia. 355 Top. SECRET 713-00000 Q4. Q6. as. ,50. 51. 52.' 53. TOP SECRET MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: Special Group Meeting, 14 Mar 60. S. . Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2 Mar 60}, sub: ~Covert Action Operations Against Fidel Castro. 8. MR from J.-C. King, lS-Mar GO, sub: Special Group Meeting, in Mar 60. 5. Ibid. Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service' s. anti-Castro efforts, 1a and 15 Mar 60. (15 Mar, 6 pp. plus Financial Annex; 1n Mar 60, 5 pp., no Financial Annex.) Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from S.E.Belk,16 Mar 60, sub: Cuba (Briefing Note for NSC 17 Mar 60). S. Memo of Conference with the President, 2:30 17 Mar 60 from Goodpaster, 18 Mar 66. T8 (no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Clean?Up Files, Gordon Gray, et a1, 1953- 61, Box 3. Ibid. {Memo from} C. King, 21 Mar 60, sub: Policy Meet-ing on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba, 17 Mar 60 S. MR from ?01. Jack_Hawkins, 5 May 61, sub: Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Govern- ment of Cuba (CSHP 105). S. Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace (New York, 1965), p. 533. Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray, 3 Dec 7Q, sub: 'Letter to Dr. Don WilsonTOP SECRET 713-00000 -5h. 55. 56. 57: I 53. 59. so. 61. _62. 63. 6Q. 65. 66; B. FOrging the Tool Memo for DDS frOm John E. 0' Gara, 2n Mar 60, sub: ?Establishment of a New Branch and Section within :Headquarters WH Division._ 8. L. Notes; 2n Mar 60. S. Memo for Comptroller; CIA from Allen W. Dulles, 2n Mar 60, Project JMARC. 3. 'Ibid. Memo for J.-D. Esterline from M. J. King, 18 Mar 60, sub: [Branch u.Financia1_Support. S. Memo for Ed Stanulis from?mike King, 22 Mar 60, sub: Per Diem for Domestic BaSe. S. MR - No. 2 [no author}; 25 Mar 60, sub{no author], 31 Mar 60. S. Ibid. Sevilion H. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion: Maritime Aspects, (CSHP-SG, Nov 66.) 8. Memo for Chief. from P. E. Oberst, 31 Mar 60, sub: JMARC 9 Timing and Tactics. S. Memo for Chief, from R[obert] Reynolds, a Apr 60, sub: Daily Progress Reports. 5. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 15 Apr 60; sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report for frOm Eleanor, 27 Apr 60, sub: DCI Briefing 1? Apr 60. S. 1555. I 357 TOP SECRET 713-00000 67. 68.' '69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 7Q. 75. .76. 77. 78- TOP SECRET Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 26 Apr 60, sub: No. l. S. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Briefing Of the JCS on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. S- Memo for- DCI from J. C. King, 6 Apr 60 sub: Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba. S. MR from Jacob Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. S. MR from E. A. Stanulis, 10 Mar 60, sub: Meeting with Capt. Burns Spore, USN. S. Memo for Director'of Legigtics from William E. Eisemann, 19 Apr Funding of ?Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 27 Apr? 69 sub: Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the Offu Shore Islands. S. . Chapman, The Cuban Invasion, op. cit., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 8?9. Memo for the.Secretary [of-State] from R. R. Rubottom, Jr., 25 Mar 60, sub: Coordination of :Activities Relating to Cuba.. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Gordon Gray, Records 1952 61, Box 29 Folder: -Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar 60 from T. A Parrott 2% Mar 60. S. fMemo for HonOrable Douglas Dillon from Gordon "Gray, 29 Apr 60, sub: Personal and COnfidential. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. ?Gordon Gray Records, 1952-61; Box 27, Folder: "Cuba?.) Ibid. 358 TOR. SECRET 713-00000 79. 80. 81. 82.1 83.. 8Q. 85.. T015 SECRET Minutes of Special Group meeting of 28 Apr 60 from T. A. _Parrott {29 Apr 60? 1. S. Memo fer E. Stanulis from J. D. Esterline, 30 Apr - 60, sub: -Review of Coordination with other Agencies. 8. Memo for Chief, fibm Jacob D. Esterline, 1a Jun 60,lsub:? Bureau Stay?Behind Activity. Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 23 Jun 60, sub: .0perational Activities othhe FBI in Cuba. . MR from J. C. King, 30 Jun 60, sub: FBI Intelli? gence Operations in Cuba and Mexico. S. Dispatch to Chief WHD fromzCOB JMASH 30 Aug 60, sub: Forwarding of Memorandum (UFGA 113). S. Official Routing Slip 6 Mar 69 sub: [Review of papers on s. - _Memo fer the-President through the Secretary of gtate from Allen W. Dulles, 9 Jul 60, sub: [Brief? ing of Presidential Candidates] S. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Clean?Up Files .(Gordon Gray, et a1), Box 6H, Actions by the ?President Miscellaneous Action Notes, 18 Jul 60, ."Telegrams to Sen. John F. Kennedy and Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson." U. Memo fOr Mr. C. T. Barnes from John H. Dyer, 20 Jul-60, sub: 'Briefing Material. C. Memo for Mr. C. T.-Barnes from E- A. Stanulis. 21 Jul 60, sub: Cuban Briefing Paper. S. Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles,_ 3 Aug-60, sub: [Briefing of JFK, 23 Jul 60, and LBJ, 28 Jul 60]. S. 4 359 1 13-00000 [Minutes of] Special Grbup Meeting [from T- A. Parrott], 11 Aug 60. 'Memo for Dc: from J. c. King, 12 Jul 60, sub:' Project JMARC, Amendment No. 2. S. Memo for Geerge H. Reingruber from J. C. King, lS-Jul 60, sub: Instructions for the- Obligation.an? Expenditure of JMARC Funds. S. Memo for the DCI from J. c. King, 19 Aug 50, sub: .JMARC, Amendment No. 3. -S. 87. [Meme for} Mr. Bissell from-T..A. Ptarrott], 23 Aug 60, sub: [Release of $10 million ?rom the Agency Reserve for Project S. 88.- Oral Histery Interview: L?illiam E. Eisemann by Jack_B._Pfeiffer, 1? Nov 75, Tape 3, pp..33?3Q. C. Coeperation a?d Challenge 89. Cables to: MASH and RAND from Director, 6 Jun 60, DIR 33225 (OUT 82950); MASH from-Director, 22 Jul 60, (OUT 9927?); OARSMAN, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, Aug 60, DIR H3756 (OUT 5?882). s. 90. The Situation in Cuba,?iu Jun 60, 'pp. 1, 546.' 91. Memo of Meeting with the Preeident on 18 Aug 60 Gordon Gray, 22 Aug 60. TS 208101. (Dwight Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Projecti Clean-Up Records of Gor?on Gray, et a1, 1953-1961, Box Speeial Group Papers, 15 Apr 60 31 Dec 62, Vol. I, 30 Jun 60. 93. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60, op. cit. "360? TOPSECRET '1 35-00000 95. 96. 197. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. TOPSECRET Memo of Meeting with_the President, 17 Apr 60 2 from Gordon Gray.? (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White Hduse Office, ProjeCt ?Clean-Up ReCords of Gordon Gray et a1, 7, 1960 Meetings with the PreSident, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60. TS (no number). The President?s Appointments. 1960 (Dwight D. Eisen- hower Library, A U. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 7 ISep 60 sub: Attitude of Asst' Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann, 0n JMARC. 8. ,Ibid.' MR from Jacob D. 'Esterline, 2? Oct 60 sub: Rem view of Cuban Situation far Asst. Sec. State for L. A., Thomas Mann. S. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub: Observation On Briefing of Asst. Sec. State, Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operations from Jacob -Esterline, 2Q Oct 60 sub: Meet? ing with DCI and Asst. SecState for L. A., Thomas Mann, on Cuba. S. Not used. Memo for frOm C. Tra?y Barnes, 31 Oct 60. _sub: Attached Paper for Special Group. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 2? Oct 60, sub: Meeting with DCI and SecState for Thomas Mann, on cuba.t S- MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 2? Oct 60, sub: Review of Cuban Situation for Asst. SecState for L. A., Thomas Mann. 3. - Memo f0r DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub: Observations on Briefing of Asst. SecState, Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operation on 20 Oct 60. S. 361 TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET 103. Memo for from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: S. Base.Requirements.f S. MR froijacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting*with DDCI. S. 1 10a. MR frova. C. King; 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with Adolf A, Berle, Jr. 0:105. MR from J. D. ESterline, 10 Sep 60, sub: _Meeting . with James A. Douglas, 9 sep 60. S. Memo for Chief, from E. A. Stanniis, 12 Sep 60, sub: Policy Approval for the Use Of DOD Personnel in Project S. 106. Memo for DDP from J. Foster Collins, 15 Sep 60, sub: Foreign Volunteersgior JMARC. S.H Memo for Chief, WH'DiviSion from Alfred T. Cox, 12 Oct 60, sub: Recruitment of American Volun? teers. S: - 107. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Sep 60, sub: JMARC PrOgress Report-for 12?16 Sep 60.. S. 108. Memo for Chief, WHD .from E. A. Stanulis, 5 Oct 60, sub: Guantanamo Bay. .. I . 109. -Ibid. 110.? Briefing.Note for NSC Mtg, 7 Nov 60 frOm CAH [Christian A. Herter], Nov 60, sub: Ur S. Policy_Toward China. S. 111: Memo for DCI from Ff P. Holcomb, 28 Oct 60, sub: Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT. 112., MR from J. Hawkins,-2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this date.at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme Commander, Atlantic on Project JMARC. - 362 .TOPSECRET 713-00000 '113, ll?. "115; 116, 117.' 118. 119. '120. 1203. g121. 122. 123. 1p. 5; TOP- SECRET D. Personnel and Training Memo for DDP from Jacob Esterline, 1a Apr 60, sub: JMARC Daily-Progress Report. 8.- ESterline?Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 99- 3-4- - MR?from Sacka, Pfeiffer, 26 Oct 73, Sub: Brief cogversation with_Jake Esterline. 2C. EisemannePfeiffer 0H Interview, op. cit., Tape 1, p. 2. Ibid., Tapelq pp. 2?3. Drain?Pfeiffer 0H Interview, op, cit., Tape 1, Ibid., Tape 1, pp, 6~7, Ibid;,,Tape 1, pp. 9?10. Memo for Executive Officer, DCI from Righard Helms, 19 Jan 50, sub: Diesemination of Intelligence to (ER 11w552); s. David Coffin, Development of Ecnomic Intelligence in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950+1967, II, uuwus. 2, Oct 74.) s, Military biOggaphic sheets on Hawkins and Egan. U. JMARC ?aily Progress ReportsDrain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. . pp. lOwll. 'Esterline?Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 5. 363 713-00000 12a. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 17 Mar 60, sub: Personnel Assignments to BranCh H, WH Division. S. 125. WH Field Memo. No.712?60 to Chief: All WH Field . Stations and Bases, from Oliver G. Galbond (P) 19 Feb 60, sub: wAgent Candidates for PosSible Use in Cuba. 8. I Bobk Dispatch No..1881 to All wH Field Stations and Bases from Chief, WHO, 22 Apr 60, sub: Re". cruitment of Cuban Nationals. 8. and to from 12 Sep 60 forwardm? ing FI activity reports for*m0nths of Mar through. 'Aug 60. S. 126. DDS Chrono Files: Minutes of DDS Staff Meetings, .20 Apr, 18 May, and 29 Jane 60. S. 127. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Jun 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for Memo for DDP from J. C. King, l? Jun 60, sub: Staffing?Guide.for JMARC. S. Memo for DEF-from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60,.sub: Personnel Requirements for JMARC. S. Memo for from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., '25 Aug 60, for (EDP?Oe?uoz.) S. I128. from John F: Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub:. Meeting with mr.?Tracy.Baxnes. S. 129. Memo for Chief, ftom Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 5 NOV 60; sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/um JMARC. (DDP-O-SBSB.) S. 130. JMARC Daily'Progress Reports Support, 19 Aug 60. e'36u:~ 713-00000 131. 7132. 133., 13a. 7 TOP SECRET _Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct'60, sub: Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime Operations. 8. Cable to JMASH from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738 (OUT 90611) S. - Cable to Director from MADE 1 Nov 60, MADE 8&52- (IN 36%07) S. Eisemahn-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1, p; 7. 365 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET Source References Part Changing Concepts 1.. Savilion H. Chapman;.The Cuban Inpasion Maritime Aspects, 1961, pp. 11-12. (CSHP 86, Nov 66Memo for Chief; from Richard Bissell, Jr.; 2 Nov 60 sub: [Memorandum on ProjeCt S. Memo for from Francis W. Barkley, 2 60, sub: Paper for SubmiSsion to Special Group from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting with DDCI. ?Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60. -S. 5. Cable to Guat from Director_, 4 Nov 60, DIR 09972 (OUT 8897a). Cable to Director from MADD, 5 Nov 60, MADE (IN 38552). - Memo for Chief, TRAV from Jack Hawkins, 7 Nov 60, sub:' Organization and Training of Strike Force. 8. Memo for from 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft Cuban Operational'Briefing [for] PresidentrElect. S. MR from JaCk Hawkins, 2 Nov 60 sub: Briefing this date at Hq. CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Com- ~mander, Atlantic.l S. MR from.RiChard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP.- 5-. 366 - TOP SECRET 713-00000 7; MR frOm Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC ,Meeting with DDP. s. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Nulles, l'Jun 61, sub; [Briefing of President? Elect, John F. Kennedy, 18 Nov 60}. S. Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, sub: Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meet~ ing, Saturday, 19 Nov 60. . S. Minutes Of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott], 16 Nov, 19 Nov, and 23 Nov" 60. 5. 10a. Memo fOr DDP from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC Budget. 5866). S. '105. Memo for Chief WHD from Richard M. Bissell Jr., 7 NOV 60, sub: JMARC Budge-t 0? ?5866). S. 11. Memo for Chief, Support from Herbert B. Juul, ?22 Nov 60, sub: Staffing Requiremen?ts for 600 Man Strike Force Training. 'Cable to Director from Guatemala, 22 Nov 60, GUAT sea-(IN u6u27). 5.1, Memo for ?rom Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Nov 60, 1 sub: 'Major Problems Confronting_Operation'JMARC. S. . . 13. Ibid. 1n. Memo for DDP from?C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, op. cit. 15. Cables to Director from JMTRAV: 23 Nov 01%1 (IN 25 Nov 60, TRAV 01H8 (IN #7383). is. 16- Cable.to Director from Guatemala, 28 Nov 60, GUAT 605 (IN ?8628). S. 367 a TOP SECRET 713-00000 - 18. 19. 20. 21.? ?22. 23. TOP SECRET Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 29 Nov 60, sub: Para? military Policy re Cuba. S. Ibid. Ibid. Taler Committee Reporte, MR's of PM Study Group Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 1961, p. 3. S. Memo for Chief, PM from Jacob D. Esterline;- 2 May 61, sub: ,Straightening Out Dates of Strike Force Concept for the Taylor Committee; 5. Oral Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10?11 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 39. Oral History Interview fo: the John F. Kennedy Libraryz? Richard Bissell by Joseph E. O'Connor,' -25 Apr 67, pp. U. Oral History Interview:L Richard M. Bissell, Jr. by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75. 368 TOP SECRET 713-00000 Source References 'Part IV Presidential Resurgencee 1, Oral History Interview:b Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. lBul?. MR. from Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: Meeting with DDP. S. 3. Memo of Conversation with William D. Pawley from "'Livingston T. Merchant, 28 Nov 60. S. Q., Minutes of Special Group Meeting Efrem Thomas A. Parrott], 30 Nov 60. S. Ibid. ?5ea?b-TS . 6. rMemo for [Allen W. Dulles} from Livingston Merchant, 10 Dec 60, sub: Proposal to the President and President's Reply. TS (no number). - l7._ Ibid. Ibid. WW: *2 51.11.64? they: imigi 1&5??ch . Memo for frOm Jacob D. Esterline, 6 .Dec 60? sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of Special Group. 8. Memo for Gen. Lansdale-frOm-C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub: _[Problems for Special Group'Meeting of 8 Dec 60]. Memo for DCI from C.-Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub: pSpecial Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60._ S. 369 TOP SECRET 713-00000 ll. 12. 13., 1th. 15. 1'6 . l7. 18. .19. 20'. 21. 22. TOPSECRET from Thomas'A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60.. 8. Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W. Scott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Suggested Program for Cuba]. TS (no number). Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New Yo?c, 1965), pp. 603, 712.1U. SNIE 85w3~60, 8 Dec 60, Prospects for the Castro Regime. - . MR froml 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting with Amba_ssador Wilhauer [sic]. S. Ibid. Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A. Parrott], 22 Dec 60. S. MR from. I 22 Dec 60, sub: _Meetingr arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60. Minutes of special Group Meeting {from Thomas A. Parrott];w22 Dec 60. S.- MR from 22 Dec 60, sub: 'Meeting arranged by Henry Holland? 21 Dec 60. fMemo] for Attention Of Col;-J. C. King from Mike' Raider, rec'd 10-Jani?l, sub: [Anti?Castro Leftists]. Memo for Mr. Richard Bissell from BG Lansdale, 28 Dec 60, sub: Cuba. 3. Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 29 Dec 60. S. Ibid. Ibid. 370 - TOP SECRET. 713-00000 23. 2a. 25. 26. 27. 23. 29. 30. ?31. 32. 33. TOP-SECRET Memo of Conference with the President, 29 Dec 60, from A. Goodpaster, 6 Jan 61. S. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, DDE Clean?Up Files, Box 51 Cuba.) Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 Dec 60, ,op. cit.? Memo for Chief H/u from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60, sub: [Cuba]. 8. Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 2 Jan 61, sub: . Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 Jan 61. S. Memo for Mr} Frank-Devine from J. D. Esterline,? 3 Jan 61, subzi Personnel for US Embassy in Havana. S. - 7 Cable to Havana from BELL, 3 Jan 61, BELL 0173 (OUT 5669). S. MR from-C. Tracy Barnes, 3 Jan 61, Sub: Outline of 3 Jan 1961 [White House] Meeting. 5. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 3 Jan 61. 3. Cable to BELL from Havana, 7 Jan 61, HAVA 7805 (IN 118W). S. ,Cable to Havana from Director, 7 Jan 61, DIR 19746 (OUT 60701). S. .Memo for Chief, from J. Hawkins, Jan 61, sub: Policy DeciSions Required for Conduct of Strike OperatiOns Against Government of Cuba. S. MR from R. D. Dra1n, a Jan 1960 {sic}, sub: Meeting with S. Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 5 Jan 61, sub: Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting; 8. Memo for from J. D. Esterline, 9 Jan 61, sub: Material for the 12 Jan Special Group Meeting. S. 371 TOP SECRET 1 3,-00000 Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A. .Parrott,12 Jan 61]. - S. 3H. MR from John 8. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appear- .ance before CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations Committee, 6 Jan 61. (TS 17u817). 35. Daily Progressteoorts, WH/?/Support: June 1960 March 1961: ?28 Dec 60,'36. 'EisenhOWer, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 61#. U. 37- MR from J. C. King, 11 Jan 61, sub:? Meeting to Discuss PropOsed Release to the Press re NIT Story of 10 Jan 61 on Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala. S. 38. memo for Under Secretary-wMerchant from Ambassador Willauer, 18 Jan 61, sub:? The Suggested Program . for CUba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated 6 Dec 60. S. Minutes Of Speoial Group Meeting [from Thomas A. Parrott], 19 Jan 61. S. ?39. Memo for Under Seoretary Merohant from Ambassador Willauer, 18 Jan 61, op. cit. 1 Playa Giron:i Derrota-del Imperialismo (Habana: Edicioues R, 1961), I, U. ui. Ibid., u36. Peace, op. cit., pp. Q3. Newsday.uu. pp. 50-51. - I Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D. Hopper, 19 Jul 67, Columbia University Oral History Project, Part 7, pp. 27H 277. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library copy.) . 1 372 713-00000 #6.I-The following Oral Hietory Interview filed in the Dwight Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 Jul 6a. Thomas C. Mann, 23 Feb 68. Livingston Merchant Part I, a May 67; Part 2, 13 May 68. 011?183 Thomas Gates, 3 Aug 67. Gen. DaVid Shoup, 29 Aug 72. James H. Douglas, 23 Oct.?2. - 373- - 0.TOPSECRET 713-00000 TOP SECRET SourcerReferences . Part Direct Action Programs Propaganda Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub: Propaganda Operations in the Caribbean. Minutes of Special Gr0up Meeting, 28 Oct 59 [from T. A. Parrott]. Memo for from Shegman Hoar, 29 Oct 59, sub: DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal. Memo for DCI from 3 Nov 59, sub: Opera?- tion Against the Regime_of Fidel Castro. . Memo for'Aoting Chief, WED from Richard.M. Bissell, Jr., 16 Nov 59, sub: Anti~CastrOVBroa?cast Opera" tions, . -Memo for DCI from R. E. Gomez, 17'Nov 59, sub: Anti?CaStro Broadcast Operations. Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott]: 18 Nov 59; 9 Dec- 59. Memo for_Chief; WHD from C. Tracy Barnes, 20 Jan 60, sub: Cuba Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Feb 60, sub: ?Report- On WHD Plans and Activities ConCerning Cuba, etc. Propaganda Program'lMarch 1960]. from J. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: 'ngs with Messrs. and . Ibid. - 37H TOP SECRET 713-00000 7a. 7b. Yo. MR fromiJ. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: TOP SECRET Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio rProgram. Memo fer Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution to Cuban Broadcasting Program. 1 to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal -Revenue,V10 Aug 60 from John S. warmer. Memo fer Col.-King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60, subs, Teiecon with Henry Holland, 19 Aug 60. Memo for Chief, WHD l. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60, sub: WRUL Radio Effert. Cable to Director frothASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 17%? (IN #5083). Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132 (OUT 95725). 1' 'Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60. Memo for JMARC/Rinance from 23 Nov 60, 'sub: WRUL Payments. Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022 (OUT 507a). ,Memo for Chief, WHD from David A.Ph1111ps, 25 Jan 61, Sub:- Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE Funds for WRUL Radio Program. Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, frOm- .29 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report (DPD 3505-60). Memo for A. Phillips, 25.May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft -375?? 13-00000 TOP SECRET Memo for from D. A. Phillips, 27.Jun 60, sub: Estimates for Aircraft?Broadcasts to Cuba. 8. JMARC Propaganda program, op. cit. 9. MR from David?R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview with David A. Phillips. 10.? Ibid. 10a. Cable for Director from JMASH, 22 Nov 60, MASH 1805- (IN ll. Memo for C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 61, sub: Cuban Briefing Papers. 12. [Memo for] Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director, Operations DiVision and John P. Hebrew, Director, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Dept. of Commerce from R..W. Lindsay, Intelligence Division, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Fereignf Commerce, Dept. of Cemmerce, 20_May 60, sub; Swan Islands 2-37). Ltr. for Harold W. Reeves, Collector of Customs, Tampa, Fla. from Geraldine S. DePuy, 25 May 60, Memo for Chief, from Chief, Support, 27 May 60, sub: Shipment of Supplies and Equip~ ment to Swan Island. MR from? I, 27 May 60, sub: JMHOPE. 13. MR from David A.-Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Briefing of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against Cuba. ,Minutes Of-Special;GrOup Meeting [from T. A. Parrott], 12 May 60. 1a. Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. EiSemann, 27 Jun 60, sub: ,Administrative'Plan for the Phase of Project JMARC. 'u 376 -- TOP SECRET 713-00000 15.? 16. 17. ?18- TOP SECRET Phillips, David?A? The Night Watch (New?York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 90-91. U. MR from?L 22 Apr 60, sub: PropoSed Implementation P?an for Cover Plan for . ?Memo for from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Apr 60, ?sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report 22and Sheet for Stanu1is from David A. Phillips, .5 May 60, sub: Annex A,U0peratioua1 Plan for Memo of ConversatiOn from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60, 1?sub: Cover for JMARC. {Burwe11, James, Logistics'Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960 October 1961, 0L M7 Apr 71. . [Memo from] WH/Security for Cuban History [May 61], sub: [Security Of Swan Is1and]. Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline, 29 Mar 60, sub: Ranaom Notes of 29 Mar [60] which Require Attention. - Cable .to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, 3930 (CKNR 208) Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, . 18Q35 (CKNR 098)- MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Inter? View with David A. Phillips. Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., sub: S. Policy Toward Cuba; 20 Ju1 and 5 Aug 60. OUO. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: RecOrds, 1952-61, Box 27, ?FOlder "Cuba.") [Dept. of State, ProgreSS Re port on Cuba, 22 Jul 60. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952- 61, Box 27, Folder ?Cuba. u) - 37? TOP SECRET - 1' 4 7 TOPSECRET 19. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72. op. cit. 20. ws/u Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60. 21. Memo fer DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub: Radio'Swan. 7. 22. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub: Ra?io Swan.r - Memo fer DDP from Jacob D. Esterline. 30 Aug 60 sub: JMARC Progress Report for 25?29 August 1960. Prop Notes fer 23 Sep 60. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 27 Sep 60 sub:' JMARC Pregress Report fer 23?26 Sep 60. Memo for MobilizatMXIend Military Personnel Divi~ ,sion from J. C. King, 19 Nov 60, sub: Request for Personnel from Department of Defense. 22a. Cables to BELL from RAND: 7 Jan 61, RAND 0172 (IN 1153); 10 Jan 61, RAND 0179 (1360). -22b. Dispatch to Chief, WHD from cos, JMWAVE, 20 Mar 61, ,sub: Request for Promotion/Fitness Report. 23. [Memo from] C. T. Barnes, 15 Mar 61, sub: Propaganda. Effort. 23a. MR from Davile..McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 May 60, sub: Progress Report, 28 Apr-5 May 60. WH/?/Prop Notes for fromeacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub: Conversation with Free, Lloyd A., Summary Report on Attitudes of the Cuban People.toward the Castro Regime" '[August 1969}. (ER 60?5982). 378? TOP SECRET 713-00000 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 301 31a. 32. TOP SECRET from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60; op. cit. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 12 Aug 60, sub: Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60. Interview of David A. Phillips by Jack Pfeiffer, ll Mar 75. Memo for_DDP.fro? Jacob D. Esterline, 2? May 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12?19 May 60. Klein and Sake, ?Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Government Platform, etc," 17 Jun 60. U. Memo for DCI from C. King, 5 Jul 60, sub: Operational EXploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba (ER 60- 525A) '3 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960, 6 Jul 60o Memo- for DDP from Jacob D. Esterlinel,7 23 Aug 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report for 19 22 Aug 60. ?Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Sep 60, sub:' JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60. Information on Khrushchev destinations from John Zabotto, Div/PoluMil Br. 23 Aug 78. U. Memo for DDP.from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Aug 60, Jeub:z JMARC?Progress Report for 8 Aug 60. Prop Notes forNdv? 69; and 1 Dec 60.. Memo for DCI from C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba. . Cable to JMASH from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 1&634 (OUT 98992). Senate Select Committee,-AZZeged Assassination Plots Involing Foreign Leaders (Buth Cong, Sees, No. 9u-u65), 20 Nov 75, p. 72. 0.x, - 379 713-00000 33. 3a. 35. 35a; _35b. 36. 37. 38. 39. TOP SECRET Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60, 22 Aug 60. Cable to HavanaJ i JMASH from Director, 19 Aug 60, DIR #6287 (OUT 60198). Memo for from R. E. Gomez, 24 Aug 60, sub: Outgoing Cable to Havana,? i and MASH, OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60, B. Sabotage and Other Exercises [Information- Requeste? fOr Green Study], Job 63 289, Box 1, Folder 9. MR [from T.A, Parrott], 16 Mar 61, sub: ?Speoial Group Meeting - Cuba. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 9 Mar 60, sub: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 9 Mar 60 of Special Group Meeting, 1Q Jul 60. MR from J. D. Esterline, 15 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary Meeting with DDP. Transmittal Slip to Chief, from [Chief] 21 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary 0p Plan 1. Routing and Record Sheet to from 12 Sep 60, sub: Reports of F1 Activity, March-August 1960 (See Aug 60). MR from 30 Nov 60, sub: Operation to Subtle sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage [in Cuba]. Cable to BELL from WAVE, 31?Ja? 61, WAVE 3322 (IN 3361) - Cable Director, 23 Jun 60, DIR 36353 (OUT 8921?) 380 TOP SECRET 713-00000 TOPSECRET -Q0. MR [from J. C. King?}, 29 Nov 60, sub: Sabotage - [of] Cuban Television Services. TS (no number). Cable from 2a Feb 61, BELL 192d (OUT 9992). Cabie from Director, 2a Feb 61, BELL 1929 (OUT 5001). Memo f0r DDP from J. C. King, 1 Nov 60, sub: Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against 'Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targets_in Cuba. Memo fOr DDP frOm J. Ci King, 18 Nov 60, sub: Development of Action Squads by WHD. .Memo for Chief, WED from Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 10 Nov 60; sub: Goon Squads. Memo for'bDP from J. C. King, 18 Nov nu. Memo for Chief. JMARC from ,?12 Sep?60, sub: Approval of Special Operations. Memo for Chief. from J. Hawkins, 1a Sep 60, sub: -Special Operations. 381 TOP SECRET 13-00000 vSource References . Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation 1. Richard M. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy,", Reader?s Digest, Nov 64, pp. 283-286. U. [Richard M. Nikon, RE: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon Y., 1978), pp. 202 203. U. ITheodore Draper, Castro' 3 Revolutien (N. Y., 1962),? pp. 62-63. U. 2 2. Nixon, ?Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit. - 4-, Nixon, RN, op; cit., p. 202. Rufo Lopez~Fresquet, My Fourteen Months with Castro (Cleveland, 1966), p. 107. U. 2a. MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 18 Jul 79, sub: Telecon with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon. U. Letter to Richard M. Nixon from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 19 Jul 79. U. . Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack Pfeiffer, 5 Mar 79, sub: Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59 (ER 79 7295). U. -3. s?from J. C. ?King: 27 Jan 60, sub: Meeting in- Vice President' 5 Office on Cuba; 27 Jan 60, Meeting with Mr. Henry Holland on Cuba; 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with General Cushman, Aide to the Vice President. a. ibid., 25 Feb 60. 5. Ibid,, 27 Jan 60. 382 4 TOP SECRET 113-00009 - TOP SECRET 6. ,Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba. '1 7. Minutes of the u36th'Meet1ngI of the NSC [from Gordon Gray], 10 Mar 60. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray, Box Minutes and Agenda 1960.) TS (no number) Memo of Conference with the President [on] 17 Mar 60 from J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. T8 (no number). 8. ?MR-from J. D. Esterline, 60, sub: Contact - with Mr. William Paney in Miami, 21 Mar 69. 9. MR from J. D.IESterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: ReView.of the Cuban Operation and Examination of Possibilities for Hemispheric Sup.port for Liberal Governments (DDP 01 ?1956). 10. Mame for DDP from 1C Tracy Barnes, 17 May 60, sub: - Preject JMARC. 1 10a. [Minutes of] Special Group Meetings 1 Cuba [from Thomas A. ;Parrott], 19 May 60. 11. MR from Jacob-D. Esterline, 20 May 70, sub: Review of Swan Island Operation and [William D. PawleY' s] 'Apparent Unilateral Decision to Work With Cuban Exiles Lnkpendent of CIA. 12. 'Memo for DDP frOm Jasob D.Ester11ne, 7 Jun_60, sub: Rubio? ~Paw1ey Group. 13. Cables to Director:' from Havana, 9 Jun 60, HAVA ?8003); from MASH, 9 Jun 60, MASH OOQI (IN Q9533). lu.? Official Routing Slip to from Gerard Droller [9 Jun 60]. 15. Memo to DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60: sub: . Rubio?Pawley Group. '16. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Jul 60, sub: Lunch [on 20 Jun 60] with General CuShman, VicewPresidential Aide. - 383 -. TOP SECRET 713-00000 18. 18a. 19._ 20. 21. :22. TOP SECRET [Minutes of] Special Meeting [from?James S. Lay, (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:' Gordon Gray: Records, 1952?61, "Cuba?. folder.) st (no humber). ?Routing?and Record Sheet for Chief, WHD from Chief, 21 Jun 60, sub: Copy of NSC Briefing Paper sent General Cabell on 20 June. Ibid, Memo for AssiStant to the Presi?ent for.National Security-Affairs from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Jun 60, sub: Notes on Policy Discussion which FolloWed the CIA Briefing-of the NSC on Cuba, 22 Jun 60. Memo for Jacob D. Esterline from James S. Lay, Jr., 29 Jun 60, sub: Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60. [Notes on Policy Discussron at Special NSC- Meeting vof 22 Jun 60] -MR from Jacob D. Esterliue, 1 Jul 60, sub: Tele- phone'Conversation with General Cushman. Memo from C. Tracy_Barnes, 7 Jul 60, sub: Swan Island BroadCasts. Memo for DCI from Rudolph E. Gomez,_26 Sep?60, sub: Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. (ER Memo for DCI from_J. Jul 60, sub: Contacts with mario Garcia Kohly. MR from J. Q. ESterline, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing? of General CuShman.? 2 wH/u Prep Notes Jun 60 - Jul 61: 18, 19,.20, 21, 26, 29 Jul; 1 Aug; and 11, 17 Oct 60.? MR's?from .Robert Andrews, 23 and 26 _Sep and 4 Oct 60,~sub: William JackSon Powell. Memo for Gen._Maxwell D. Taylor- from Allen W. Dulles, 17 Jun 61 ,;sub: Marshall Diggs Proposals on Behalf of Garcia Kohly. 38a 1. TOP SECRET '1 35-00000 2a. 25. 26. 27- 28- 29. 30; 31. 32. 33. 288. TOP SECRET Star, 2 Aug 76. U. VMemo for the President from Allen'W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60, [sub:7 Intelligence Briefing for DemoCratic Candidates, July 1960L (ER 50- -6067). U. Memo for the Record from Allen W. Dulles, 21 Sep 60, '[sub: Briefing of Sen. John Kennedy on 19 Sep 60]. New York Ti?es, 21 Oct 60. U. Nixon, WCuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 286-288. Nixon, cit., pp; 220m221. U. Nixon, "Cuba, castro, and John F. Kennedy, op. cit., Nixon, RN, Op. cit., p. 221. MR free Jack B. Pfeiffer, 1 Mar 78, sub: Meeting_. with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie. U. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days (New . York, 1965), Pa 225.? New York Times, 23 Oct 60. U. from Thomas A. Parrott, 27 Oct 60, sub: State? ments by Presidential candidates. 'Schlesinge1,gop. l6?. U. Memo for from 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft Cuban Operational Briefing: President Elect. ?Memo for the Honorable John A. McCone from Allen W. Dulles, 20 Mar 62, sub: [Intelligence Briefing of President?elect Kennedy] - U.. Letter to Admiral Stansfieldeurner from FaWn M. Brodie, A Jan 78; U. .MR [from 15. Nov 60, sub: [TransCript of Tape of] Telephone Conversation between and William D. Pawley on in Nov 60. - 385 TOP SECRET . Source References Part VII Assassination 1. Oral History InterView:. Richard M. Jr. by JaCk B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 2, p. 18. 2.. Ibid., p. 17. 3. IL. White, Diary Notes, 22 Mar 61, u. ,Ofa1 History Interview: Jacob Esterline_ by - Jack.B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75. (Untaped conver- _\sation.) 5. Ibid. 6. Oral History Interview?- Richard Drain by Jack BL Pfeiffer[from Thomas A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60, sub: Minutes of Sgeoial Group Meeting, 3 8. ?Hunt, Howard, Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, N.Y., Arlington House, 1973), pp. 38?39. U. 9" Daily Log PM Section, 18 Jul 60; 18 Oct 60. [No author], Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary Assets, [no date, but after 6 Aug 60}. 10. Cable to Director from SACU (Santiago, Cuba], 18 Jul 60, 609 170). 11. Esterline- Pfeiffer OH Interview, of 16- 17. . 11a. Cable for Director from Havana, 9 Dec 60, HAVA 7133 (IN 14488)." 386 TOPSECRET 713-00000 12.? 13. la. 15. 16. 17. 18. TOP. SECRET Richar? D. Drain,'Per30naZ Notes. V, 'Drain- Pfeiffer 0H Interview, op. cit., Tape 'AMHINT-Operations,. I 19 132- ~16/1- -3. Cable to BELL from JMWAVE, 2n Feb 61, WAVE 3931 0915). Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61, 28 Feb 61. Richar? D. Drain, Personal Notes, 28 Feb 61.? Letter to Jack B. PfeIiffer from D. Dirain], Jan 76. Letter to_ Richard D. DraiIn from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 22 Jan 76. EsterlinemPfeifferI OH Interview, op. cit., Tape 1, - pp. 15- 16. "Must Go ListI" Drain?Pfeiffer 0H Interview, 0p.yc?t., Tape 1, p. 21. TOP SECRET. TOP SECRET iSource References Part Conclusions 1? 'PlayaIGiron: Derrota d?l Inperialismo (Habana: Ediciones 1961), I, ?36. U. - Maurice aalperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel p. 89. U. 2. Playa Giron: Derrota, op. cit., 387. U. 3; oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by 536k Pfeiffer,-8 Jan 76, Tape 1, p. 21. 388 - 113?