DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS. 39?" BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION
1523 HWY 53N
HAZEN. ARKANSAS 72064

 

BSB-CDR 22 August 2016

MEMORANDUM THRU Colonel Jason Carter, Judge Advocate General, Arkansas
National Guard, Camp Robinson, North Little Rockr Arkansas 72199-9600

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Mark H. Berry, The Adjutant General. Arkansas
National Guard, Camp Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas 72199-9600

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident. Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee. Arkansas

1. As the Battalion Commander, I acknowledge that I am responsible for everything
good or bad that happens in my unit, even things out of my control. Due to my rank and
position, I accept responsibility for SGT Cline's death. and I will live with that forever.
However. i do not believe I was negligent in my duties as supported by the evidence in
this rebuttal. In making your decision as to how to hold me responsible. I ask that you
take into account my previous service record and the future contributions I can make for
the Guard (Respondent Exhibit I hope you will see that my actions in this tragic
event were appropriate and reasonable, and should not result in a career?ending
administrative action.

2. First, the Investigating Of?cer (IO) determined that I signed a de?cient Deliberate
Risk Management (DRM) form (l0 Exhibit 16). I agree with this. The DRM inaccurately
assessed the initial risk as Medium and it should have been "High." The DRM listed
several risk mitigation measures, but it did not include all of the measures we planned to
take to mitigate the risk of heat injury. The residual risk was assessed as ?Low?. and it
should have been ?Medium." I acknowledge these oversights. However, the fact that I
failed to have 2LT-correct this form, must not overshadow the actual proactive
and reactive risk mitigation measures that actually took place. I believe this to be a
matter of form over substance.

 

1 Most recent OER ending 1 June 2016 is pending completion and is with?

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training. Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas

3. Proactive Measures

b.

Planned for a Safety NCO be assigned to each ?ghting position and each QRF
team. (IO Exhibit 6)

Planned for coverage to augment our Safety NCOs with ten (10), 3rcl party,
expert, of?cers and NCOs that are trained to provide oversight of training events
such as this. Among these individuals was 68W veteran
medic that would directly supervise the medics? actions. (IO Exhibit 6, 44)
Planned for six medics and two Ambulances to be on the range when only one of
each was required. (IO Exhibit 26, 27, and 28)

Personally observed the Platoon Leaders? OPORD Briefs on 13 June 2016 to
ensure the plan was communicated properly and effectively. (IO Exhibit 31)
Directed that IOTVs would not be worn during the dry ?re portion of the range.
(Confusion pertaining to the uniform will be addressed later, but this uniform
decision was made the evening of 13 June 2016 (Exhibit 91) as a heat injury
prevention measure)

Provided a hot breakfast on the range with Gatorade as opposed to just providing
an MRE. (Exhibit 93)

Planned for water and Gatorade to be available on the range throughout the day,
to include a scheduled resupply (Page 14 of IO Report)

The Battalion's School-trained Safety Of?cer. MAJ- who has much
experience running live??re ranges, was assigned as the Assistant OIC of the
Range in order to mentor 2LT-and to provide his quali?ed Safety Of?cer
perspective to the range operations. (IO Exhibit 6)

Conducted a range recon and rehearsal on 13 June 2016 with all key leaders,
Range Safeties and support personnel to ensure everyone clearly understood
the plan and the environment. (l0 Exhibit 6)

Planned for senior leadership to be present and involved the entire day (Exhibit
44. 93)

4. Reactive Measures

a.

b.
c.

d.

Maintained an adequate Work/Rest cycle. ATP 5-19, Risk Management, lists
Marksmanship Training as ?Easy Work" and requires Work/Rest cycle of 50
minutes of work/10 minutes of rest. Statements demonstrate we exceeded this
requirement (IO Exhibit 86, 31, 30, 92).

Allowed Soldiers to remove their gear during breaks (Respondent Exhibits B. C,
and D)

Called to expedite the resupply of ice and Gatorade. Conducted an additional
resupply of ice and Gatorade. (IO Exhibit 43)

Made a command decision to not require IOTVs during the Blank Fire iteration
(IO Exhibit 91, 93. 30)

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas

e. Stopped training after three heat casualties to reassess whether we should
con?nue.

5. The evidence that both the proactive and reactive steps taken for Range 100 were
suf?cient are found in the statements of numerous, unbiased, well?trained observers.
(Respondent Exhibit B, C, and D) In his statement to the IQ (l0 Exhibit 92), the Brigade
Safety Of?cer, CW2-. stated that he observed ?no immediate risks? during his two
plus hour visit to the range. Mr.-observations included speaking to small
groups of Soldiers, NCOs and the command group and he never heard or observed
anything to suggest the command was not taking adequate steps regarding the heat. In
addition to Mr. -there were over a dozen and safety NCOs present, who
all witnessed the commands proactive and reactive measures.

6. To say "39"1 BSB leadership and staff did not adequately identify the hazards
associated with training in the hot weather environment" simply because I approved a
deficient DRM prepared by a Second Lieutenant is simply not true. My staff and were
well aware of the heat and the risk of heat injuries. We had been working in those
conditions for over a week to include a four-day FTX and planned for the proactive
measures listed above. Considering the exhaustive amount of safety measures that
actually took place, I do not believe the de?cient risk management form had any causal
effect on our heat casualties on 14 June 2016.

7. Secondly, the ID claims battalion and company leadership failed to comply with
some speci?c requirements listed in ALARACT 042/2016, which was published on 18
May 2016. There is no evidence that this ALARACT was ever disseminated to the 39?1
BSB through any State or Brigade OPORD, a State or Brigade Policy Letter or any
other means. Having since been made aware of the ALARACT, I would like to point out
that we were following many of the directed heat injury prevention methods listed in the
message through our own risk management processes. However, the speci?c
requirements to ?develop a written heat stress prevention policy" and to ?immediately re-
evaluate all unit personnel and mitigation actions when any heat illness occurs" were
never disseminated nor discussed in any State or Brigade planning meeting the 39?1
BSB attended. Even without knowledge of the requirement, I believe the evidence
shows that we were constantly re?evaluating all unit personnel and mitigation actions
throughout the day, both before and after our heat casualties. (Respondent Exhibits B,
C, D)

8. The IO highlights confusion pertaining the uniform of the day. The uniform of the day
was Helmet, FLC, Camelback, gloves, and protection until we moved into the Blank
Fire iteration at which point we would add I made this decision known the
evening of 13 June 2016 (10 Exhibit 91) and it was announced again at the initial brief
on the morning of 14 June 2016 (IO Exhibit 30). Once I arrived on the range around
1230, I learned that there had been confusion about the uniform and Soldiers began the

3

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard. Training Accident. Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee. Arkansas

day wearing IOTVs. Unit personnel corrected this issue before I arrived, and the vast
majority of Soldiers had removed them. The statements support this. While I
was on the range. I only observed two NCOs wearing their IOTVsasked MAJ -why they were wearing them and he explained that some of
the NCO leadership wanted to "train like we ?ght?. 2LT-had heard this too, and
believes that is where the confusion in the uniform came from earlier. Later in the day,
due to the heat, 2LT-asked if we could postpone the wearing of the IOTVs until
the Live Fire iteration. granted this request.

9. I made a deliberate decision to allow SSG-and SSG-zontinue wearing
their IOTVS.

    
   

When
I heard that A Company NCO leadership was actually trying to ?raise the bar" and do
something "above and beyond" the requirement. was actually proud of them.
Conversely, was glad to hear the unit leadership had recti?ed the situation and
Soldiers had downgraded from wearing their IOTVs. but I was proud to hear of their
good intentions. Considering that SSG-are both in excellent
physical condition. and are both combat veterans that have worn IOTVs in the desert
heat, I allowed them to continue to ?lead by example? rather than squashing their
initiative. One would have to understand the issues in that unit to fully appreciate my
judgement on this decision. In any case, it was a leadership decision made
deliberately, not negligently.

 

10. The IO also highlights there was not adequate water provided for the Soldiers
throughout the day. The need to reposition of the water trailer was identified and
resolved before I arrived on the range by junior leaders. Until I arrived on the range, I
was never made aware of any issues regarding water or hydration. I knew we had
resourced the range with a water trailer, a hot meal and fluids to start the day and had
planned for resupply. As conditions changed, the unit made appropriate, albeit slower
than desired, adjustments. I don't think I should be found negligent for this issue.

11. The ID describes that in spite of 2L'_and SGT.Voicing concerns for the
safety of the Soldiers due to the heat, and that in spite of multiple heat related injuries, I
wanted to continue training. He says we didn't cease training until Range Control
decerti?ed the Range OIC and R80 for failure to report the heat casualties. This is
incorrect and paints the wrong picture of multiple key events that took place in a very
short amount of time. This is perhaps the most important thing to clarify in this rebuttal.
I knew I had two heat casualties before the Blank Fire iteration began, Davis and
Bautista. SGT.old me they were going to be ?ne, they were drinking water and

4

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee. Arkansas

sitting in an air?conditioned vehicle, cooling off. This is the only time I made the
decision to continue training in spite of experiencing heat casualties. I do not believe it
was negligent or unreasonable to continue at this point, and neither do three other
current or previously successful battalion commanders (Respondent Exhibit B, F, G).
When the Blank Fire began, we had some weapons malfunctions and had to cease ?re
to resolve them. Once we resolved the weapons issues, we resumed the Blank Fire
iteration (IO Exhibit 30). It was during this time that SGT Cline succumbed to the heat
and walked to the FLA. (IO Exhibit 24, 41) The medics, under direct supervision from
MSG Farquharson, an E-8, active duty medic treated him. SGT Cline did not
appear to be a medical emergency at this point (IO Exhibit 27, 30, 33, 90). In fact, after
he was treated, I observed MSG ? eading and coaching them through a
thought process of, "You've got 3 patients now, maybe you should consider evacuating
them so you could free up capacity. This would be a good time to utilize an (IO
Exhibit 44) MAJ-and 2LT- made some phone calls and coordinated the
AXP.

12. Once the AXP was coordinated, MAJ approached me with 2LT

concerns about the Soldiers' safety if we continue training in these conditions. (IO
Exhibit 30, 31, 91) Knowing that there were only 5-10 minutes left in the Blank Fire that
was already underway, I decided to ?nish this iteration, and then we would cease
training, send the Soldiers to dinner, and reevaluate after dinner whether or not we
should continue with the Live Fire iteration (IO Exhibit 31, 91). It is important to note
that 2LT.was not attempting to call a ?cease ?re" as if he had witnessed an
unsafe act that required immediate action. He was making it known that in his opinion
the training value we were receiving at this point was not worth the risk we were putting
on the Soldiers, and he felt like we should stop. (IO Exhibit 30) heeded his advice, and
we stopped training within minutes. I don?t believe the additional 5-10 minutes was
negligent and neither did LT'Respondent Exhibit B).

13. The Soldiers ?nished the Blank Fire and gathered at CPT-vehicle for the hot
wash before being transported to the bleachers for a hot meal and rest. Therefore,
training had stopped within minutes after assessing the third heat casualty, and before
Range Control put us in a check ?re. During the hot wash, SSG.succumbed to the
heat (IO Exhibit 30). The decision was made to evacuate him immediately. Around this
same time, SGT Cox got a call on his cell that said SGT Cline's condition was
deteriorating, and they decided to take him Med instead of
conducting an AXP. Also around this time 2LT-was talking to Range Control
about our three heat casualties. They put us in check ?re and informed us that he and
SSG.must return to Range Control for retraining before we could continue.
(Exhibit 30) I am advised of this at the same SGT .gets another call explaining that
SGT Cline is ?coding". He advises me of that and explains exactly want "coding?
means. Now I had four heat casualties, one that was critical (Cline), and my Range

5

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee. Arkansas

OIC and R80 required retraining. There was no need to reevaluate whether we would
continue training after dinner. I made the decision to cease training for the day.

14. I called LTC-and informed him I had ceased training for the day and told
him about SGT Cline's condition. Since the Soldiers had already moved to the
bleachers for dinner. the decision that we were done for the day was not broadcast to
them at that time. SGT-got another call that explained SGT Cline had died. and he
informed me. I again called LTC-and informed him of SGT Cline. He
encouraged me to be careful with the information because we needed to make sure the
famil was noti?ed before the Soldiers. relayed this information to CSM Franks and
I told them to have the Soldiers ?nish dinner, clear the range, and return to
cantonment, and not to discuss SGT Cline with them. I left the range to go to the
hospital. After I left, the armorer succumbed to the heat, bringing our total to ?ve heat
casualties. (l0 Exhibit 30) The takeaway is that I did not continue training after ?ve heat
casualties. I continued after two. It was during the last iteration when SGT Cline and
down and I made the call to stop. (IO Exhibit 30, Respondent Exhibit 
and C)

15. I think it is important to note that many of the unfavorable statements regarding my
conduct were voluntarily submitted to the IO by members of Alpha Co within 24 hours of
SGT Cline?s passing. Many of those statements contained accusations were proven by
the IQ to be patently untrue. An example are the various statements by A Co that there
were no rest cycles. (IO Exhibits 43, 55, 63, 8. 68) We know this is untrue because
every neutral observer (CW2- and Safety NCOs) at the range observed
the rest cycles taking place throughout the day.

16. It is not my intent to attack the credibility of any Soldier. However, I must point out
that the IO gave statements from A Co great weight, despite their obvious
misstatements and the emotional fatigue of losing a battle buddy. Yet he appears to
have dismissed the observations of neutral observers such as LTC- CSM -
CW2 -and MSG?because they were not on-site all day, even though

MSG ?was present all day.

17. The are trained professionals and were present at Range 100 for a reason.
They, along with 9W2.had a responsibility to observe the training of units like
the 39th, offer guidance and intervene when appropriate. None of them had issues with
anything they observed. I respectfully disagree that their observations be found less
than persuasive simply because some. not all, were not present for the entire day. 
ask that you give their statements and opinions the weight they deserve. (l0 Exhibits
25, 26, 27, 28, 92, Respondent Exhibits B, C, D)

18. To this point. I have primarily focused on how we planned and reacted to the
hazards of the heat of the day. However, I think it is important to take into account the

6

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6, Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training, Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas

various factors that impacted the amount of time we spent on the range. First, is the
training level of the Soldiers prior to conducting this exercise. Besides completing the
necessary individual and crew-served weapons quali?cation and the mandatory Army
Warrior Task training that were "training gaits" to conduct this type of exercise, the
Soldiers of the 39?1 BSB had not conducted this type of tactical perimeter defense since
2003 (16 years), therefore the majority of the Soldiers had never done it. To my
knowledge. the battalion had never conducted such an event with live ammunition. The
battalion conducted an FTX in November 2015 as a "crawl phase? for the establishment
of the Brigade Support Area (BSA), and conducted a four-day FTX during the ?rst week
of Annual Training 2016. This was an attempt to move from the "crawl phase" to the
?walk phase". However, due to complex nature of simply establishing the BSA and
conducting logistical Operations in a tactical environment, the hot conditions, and limited
OPFOR interaction, this training event only gave the Soldiers a very basic
understanding of how to react to contact on the perimeter and how to deploy a Quick
Reactionary Force (QRF) to assist in repelling the enemy. You could say we were still
at a ?crawl phase" or maybe a "crawl-plus" phase in our training level.

19. Due to this training deficiency. (Respondent Exhibit J, IO Exhibit 30, 31, 91) the
Range leadership required the Soldiers to conduct multiple Dry Fire iterations to simply
gain an understanding of what was expected of them on the range. The Platoon and
Company leadership understood what was expected, and they briefed the plan
effectively to the Soldiers, but the Soldiers simply needed practice. The Range
Leadership?s concern during these iterations was whether or not the Soldiers would
ever get to point where they were con?dent enough to safely conduct the range with live
ammunition. The repetitive Dry Fires, coupled with the heat, also had an effect on the
Soldiers' morale. We tried to address this with pep talks following the hot washes
between each iteration (l0 Exhibit 30, 44). But if the Range Leadership was not
satis?ed with the Soldiers? level of pro?ciency during the Blank ?re. they would not allow
the unit to conduct the Live Fire (l0 Exhibit 30) or ?run phase" and achieve the purpose
of this long day. This is one of the primary reasons I was on the range in the ?rst place.
I wanted to see for myself if these Soldiers were going to get to the appropriate level of
proficiency, and if they didn't, I wanted to be available to support the Range Leadership
in making the dif?cult decision to cancel the Live Fire Exercise, an event directed by the
Brigade Commander. But the point of all this, is that Range Leadership was
deliberately trying to ensure the Soldiers could be deemed safe to conduct a Live Fire
Exercise. This required multiple Dry Fire iterations and took its toll on the Soldiers in
the heat.

20. Other signi?cant distractors that caused us to remain on the range longer than
expected were the delays put on us by Range Control when we identi?ed UXOs on the
range (I0 Exhibit 93), and then lastly the weapons malfunctions we experienced during
the Blank Fire. All of these events increased the Soldiers' exposure to the heat. We
continually reassessed and changed our control measures to mitigate the heat, but

7

 BSB-CDR

SUBJECT: Response to Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-
6. Arkansas National Guard, Training Accident, Fatality during Annual Training. Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas

these factors contributed to 2LT-s statement about how the training value we're
getting from this is not worth the risk we?re putting on the Soldiers. He was correct. and
I took his recommendation to cease training once we completed the Blank Fire iteration.

21. The IO has recommended that I be given a letter of reprimand. relieved from my
command and be given a relief for cause OER due to negligence and my failures in
leadership. As negligence is the departing from the conduct expected of a reasonably
prudent person acting under similar circumstances, I truly don't believe I acted in a
negligent manner. My actions and decisions were thought-out and deliberate. At no
time did I disregard safety concerns or the well-being of my Soldiers. I have attached
with this rebuttal the opinion of my peers regarding my actions to illustrate they were in
keeping with the expectations of a reasonable commander in a similar situation (IO
Exhibit 25, Respondent Exhibit F. G).

22. As I stated in the beginning, I accept responsibility but I do not believe that my
actions or the actions of my subordinate leaders meet the de?nition of negligence. I am
certainly willing to appear before you and answer any further questions you have of me,
and my witnesses are willing to answer further questions if you or your representative
wish to contact them (Respondent Exhibit I know that a Soldier has died on my watch
and there must be accountability. I trust there is a way to hold me accountable, but not
at the expense of my career. I still have much to offer the Arkansas National Guard.
Therefore. please consider alternative methods than those recommended by the ID.

may upon?. mm Calhoun; 1 "sum?

RICHARDSON.GIB.THOMAS.1 115840424 

Encls GIB T. RICHARDSON I I
LTC, LG, AR ARNG
Commanding