DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 39TH BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION
1523 HIGHWAY 63 NORTH
HAZEN, AR 72064

NGAR-39BSB-CSM

2 September 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Mark H Berry, The Adjutant General, Arkansas
National Guard, Camp Joseph T Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas 72199-9600
SUBJECT: Rebuttal to Proposed Relief for Cause
1. First of all, it was the saddest day of my military career that I have to endure losing a
Soldier during training, only to then be found negligent for his untimely death. I am truly
sorry this happened, but using statements attained from this Soldier’s buddies the day
after the incident who were looking for someone to blame before they even had time to
grieve and then to find the leadership is to blame just extends the tragedy. I have
replayed the decisions I made a million times, and with the information I received from
my medics at the time while continually reassessing the situation, I do not see how any
other Command Sergeant Major would have acted any differently than I did. In fact,
other sergeants major in the 39 th have stated that they believed adequate measures
were in place to ensure the safety of the Soldiers in training.
2. On 14 June 2016, I left the Motor Pool with the Range Staff around 0530 enroute to
Range 100, where I was at the AA when the training unit arrived around 0700. I
followed the unit to Range 100 after I helped serve them chow and Gatorade that I
personally made. I stayed until after the training unit departed to eat dinner chow. There
are several inconsistencies and untruths I want to point out.
3. On 9 June 2016 at 1444, I sent a text with a picture from Charlie Med’s Wet Bulb to
all 1SGs with a picture of the correct work/rest schedule and Heat Categories after
receiving numerous calls about being in Heat Cat V and still working for them to
disseminate to their companies. I was continually referring to this chart. I had it on my
phone and a copy printed out in my notebook to ensure we were not pushing the
Soldiers too far or too fast. I was using the new schedule from 2016 in Exhibit 82, page
18 as my reference that says marksmanship training is Easy Work, not the old schedule
from 2005 in Exhibit 83, page 2 that says marksmanship training is Moderate Work.
4. The first casualty I was aware of was SPC Bautista. I watched as two of our medics,
with the MSG OC/T observing them, evaluate SPC Bautista. SPC Bautista immediately
sat up from the stretcher and the medics decided to remove his ACU top and move him
to a vehicle with air conditioning and give him water to cool him down. My vehicle was
very close, so I cranked it up and personally retrieved his water source, then had my
driver watch him as I went back to troop the line. There was nothing emergent that
needed immediate evacuation according to all medics attending to him at that time. We
had six medics on the lane with two ambulances, plus the two extra OC/T medics on

 NGAR-39BSB-CSM
SUBJECT: Rebuttal for Proposed Relief for Cause

site. We believed we had plenty of medical support to combat any issues that might
arise that day.
5. I was not aware of the actual first heat casualty (SPC Davis) that happened,
according to the statements, at Range 100 AA, over a mile away from my dismounted
location on the ground. After two of the crew served weapons on Firing Point 2 and
Firing Point 3 malfunctioned, I was busy using my prior heavy weapons experience
trying to get them operational for blank fire. Range personnel had briefed earlier in the
day that blank fire was critical to the safe execution of the live fire later in the day.
6. SGT Cline’s own PSG, SSG Heard, said in Exhibit 63 page 4 that he put SGT Cline
in the shade for 45 minutes because of his physical condition, but did not inform anyone
of his condition. SSG Heard stated that his Soldier, SGT Cline had already drunk two
Camelbacks of fluid. Then SSG Heard let him back into training where he ultimately
went down for a heat related injury. The range safety, SGT Barlow in Exhibit 24 page 1,
stated that SGT Cline was not showing any symptoms of EHI until he jumped up and
walked off to cool down while Cline himself said he was fine.
7. In Exhibit 27, MSG Farquharson said he traveled the route with the medics on the
route recon, checked both FLA’s for equipment, and we had double the required FLA’s
on site. MSG stated that it was a great opportunity to experience Ambulance Exchange
Point operations because nothing emergent was present at that time. I had to rely on
the medical expertise on the ground as I continually reassessed the situation. See
Exhibit 31 page 2 and Exhibit 33 page 2 to reiterate that we as leadership understood
from our medics that the casualties were in stable and responsive condition and were in
no danger of losing life, limb, or eyesight.
8. I did not choose where the gun positions were placed. They were placed with strict
guidance set by Range Control. The Alpha Company and platoon leadership recon had
inspected the range the day prior to occupying and were fully aware of the conditions
they would be operating in the next day with their assigned Soldiers. Due to finding
UXO’s, see Exhibit 24 page 1, the crews did not place stakes in the ground to anchor
their camouflage nets. We provided shade, but unfortunately the Soldiers were not
allowed to use stakes to put up the camo nets.
9. The Range Safety Officer took about 10-20 minutes on each crew served weapon
system to lock the left and right limits down with hose clamps and a compass after the
CSW was initially mounted. This is a break that the crews took down the line as the
RSO moved from FP 1 to FP 3. We considered this rest time as required by the work
rest cycle. The Soldiers were in the shade resting while their weapons were serviced.
10. Because I had extensive crew served weapons experience, having been in a
leadership position in a heavy weapons company since 1995 with an additional 21
months of OC/T experience, I helped SPC Malrich from the 1-138 work on the M2 50

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SUBJECT: Rebuttal for Proposed Relief for Cause

from FP 2. Then I walked down to FP 1 to help them remove the barrel and Blank Firing
Attachment (BFA). When I came back to FP2, which was right in front of the ambulance
and the OIC/NCOIC vehicles, I did talk to the medic (I think SPC Winters) sitting in the
front seat of his ambulance with the vehicle running. I told him to make sure to remove
the chock block if he drove off, and he informed me that another medic in the back was
initially assessing a patient. I did not interrupt the procedure, but let the medic continue
his assessment. Then I continued to assist SPC Malrich and SGT Scaife put the barrel
and BFA on the M2 at FP2 to ensure it was safe to fire.
11. When I finally realized there were three heat casualties, they were driving off the
range. The BC and I decided to end the range but did not convey our assessment to the
training unit until the crews were eating chow; see Exhibit 28 page 2.
12. See Exhibit 33 page 1, where the medics assessed the first casualty and stated
there was no need for evacuation and patient was stable. We, as leaders, must rely on
our trained medical advisors to advise us on medical treatment.
13. There were numerous statements saying the IOTV was worn all day by training
Soldiers. It was put out initially to their Commander by the OIC during the safety brief
that the uniform was ACH, FLC, Gloves, and eye and ear protection. See Exhibit 30
page 1. There was also a second reiteration in Exhibit 30 page 2 where the OIC told the
training unit that IOTV would not be worn during blank fire. See Exhibit 44 page 1 where
it states the Alpha Company NCOs had some wearing IOTVs, and LT Baum had them
ground the vests. I did notice that the two PSGs were wearing theirs sometime during
the day, but they stated that they were setting the standard for leadership in Alpha
Company. They wanted to train like they fight. I personally did not notice anyone else
wearing their IOTV at any time.
14. SPC Davis, in Exhibit 39 page 1 said that his leadership checked his PPE the day
prior and were told to be in bed by 2200 and have a water source and at least 3 MREs,
therefore the range was properly planned. In Exhibit 37 page 1, SPC Bautista states
that he was up until 2330 because some guys were making noise. SPC Bautista’s and
SPC Davis’s leadership under CPT Cox did not ensure proper rest before traveling to
the range. LTC Richardson stated in Exhibit 44, page 1 that the two PSGs briefed the
timeline with a 2100 bedtime. SPC Davis says he was drinking water from the motor
pool all the way to the range, but did not state that the water buffalo was on site for
refills at the AA. SPC Davis did state that on page 2 the NCOs did move everyone off
the line to take a break from the sun to stay cool.
15. SGT Neal, Exhibit 41 page 1, SGT Cline’s partner on his CSW stated that he was
not working for an hour or so while the UXO was cleared. SGT Neal stated that SGT
Cline and he did not run out of water. I personally talked to SGT Cline during the day
and he definitely was not wearing an IOTV. In fact, he was sitting in the shade in front
of CPT Cox’s vehicle.

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SUBJECT: Rebuttal for Proposed Relief for Cause

16. SSG Tyner, Exhibit 42 page 1 stated that Soldiers were in IOTV during Heat Cat V
which is an utter and complete untruth. As NCOIC beside the OIC as he was giving the
range brief, he was in the perfect perch atop his truck to correct and mitigate any
deficiencies he saw in the uniform of the trainees.
17. CPT Cox, Exhibit 43 page 1 stated that they filled their Camelbacks at Range 100
AA after getting called back from Range 100 where they inadvertently went. It is a total
untruth that the Soldiers were training in IOTVs. It is a blatant untruth for CPT Cox to
state on Page 4 that the BC, S3 and I were sitting in the shade and watched as her
Soldiers suffered in the heat. I was continually trooping the line and reevaluating the
training. CPT Cox never left the immediate area around her air conditioned vehicle to
check on her Soldiers as she was part of the scenario on the radio from her platoon
leaders during the iterations. In the August 2015 IDT at CJTR in a supply room, Alpha
Company had a negligent discharge of a live M4 round. There were five Soldiers in the
room including three pregnant females. Knowing this information, the command,
including myself, realized that weapons safety must be the main focus for any Alpha
Company training.
18. It is curious that the list of statements taken from the Alpha Company Soldiers were
all very similar and there were no witness signatures on the sworn statements. The
Soldiers were upset, and their statements were made out of passion.
19. Soldiers did in fact downgrade around CPT Cox’s vehicle during breaks as has been
previously noted. I, nor any other responsible leader, would allow the downgrading of
necessary protective gear while performing missions with blank or live ammunition as
LT Craig said he requested on the firing line.
20. In Exhibit 54, SGT Scaife said that several times personnel on the lane were told
that the lane was unsafe. Never, in fact, did this get brought up to any safeties, medics,
or to my attention during numerous hot washes. It was definitely hot as June in Fort
Chaffee always is. I used the rest/work schedule as my guide. I did not have a stop
watch to time every stop and start, but I believe there was more than ample rest time
given. Even after the hot washes, LT Baum would say be ready in ten minutes for the
next iteration. Ten minutes is plenty of time given for rest according to the work/rest
matrix I was using.
21. In Exhibit 56, SGT Ireland talked about the 30 minutes she was off of her position
while her weapon was being readied because of her barrel. That is the time I was
pulling the barrel from FP3 and then bringing it up and installing it on FP2. She
described that Cline was known as a sweaty person.
22. In some of the statements, Soldiers said they wanted to downgrade their gear. This
meant they wanted to be in soft caps, however, I would not and would never allow

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Soldiers to man live weapons in soft caps on a range. Downgrading from IOTVs was as
downgraded as was allowable on that type of range.
23. In Exhibit 58, SGT McNealy described the PCC/PCI’s LT Craig along with SSG Kell
and SSG Heard checked everyone for full Camelback. This reinforces that the NCOs
checked every Soldier before they came out on the range to train. Then, he describes
LT Baum giving them a brief on the events for the day. He also describes the PSG SSG
Kell and SGT Anderson switching out Soldiers to get in the shade and keep hydrated.
In my opinion, the NCOs along with the full complement of OC/T’s were observing the
training and, although it was hot, taking corrective actions to mitigate any unsafe
training.
24. In Exhibit 59, SSG Harris stated that he saw numerous Soldiers feeling light headed
and staggering while walking and that movement was delayed back to get ammunition.
That was never conveyed to anyone on the range staff, and a team leader would inform
his superiors if that did actually happen. As command, all we can do is rely on our
medics and our first line leadership. If we are not aware of the problems, we cannot
correct them.
25. In Exhibit 61, SSG Henderson stated that the Soldiers did take breaks after the dry
runs. She stated that the breaks were not long enough, but did not state how long the
breaks should be. On the work/rest schedule I was looking at, our breaks were more
than the 10 minutes required by the work/rest cycle. One point that SSG Henderson
makes is how it all happened so fast. It was within an hour that the three Soldiers were
treated for heat injury. After that, it was decided the range would close.
26. In Exhibit 62, SSG Maloney stated how the leadership did PCC/PCI’s on the
Soldiers after chow was eaten at the AA.
27. In Exhibit 63, SSG Heard the Platoon Sergeant, stated he was making sure every
Soldier was doing what they were supposed to be doing as well as putting Soldiers in
the most effective position to accomplish mission. He took SGT Cline and let him rest
for 45 minutes because of his obvious physical state. This was never pushed up to any
range leadership to use for future decisions. He then put SGT Cline “back in the game”
without ever relaying that information to anybody else on the range. SSG Heard said
that we had no plan for Heat Cat V, but he did not state his plan for Heat Cat V. I relied
on the information presented to me at the time to make my decisions on the range.
28. In Exhibit 64, SGT Fricks said she swapped with SGT Cline to give him a rest. This
information was never passed up to anybody in a leadership position on the range
operations detail. She states that SGT Cline continued to tell everyone he was fine
during the day. I was very happy with the way LT Baum performed his duties as OIC
and of the team the units picked to help him. LT Baum was picked for this position
because of his attention to detail.

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SUBJECT: Rebuttal for Proposed Relief for Cause

29. In Exhibit 68, SSG Kell stated that the water buffalo was on site 15 minutes after he
requested it. He stated that the training did not go as smooth as he had hoped. After a
break, he was given an additional ten minutes to have Soldiers ready to train. That
agrees with the work/rest schedule for the heat category we were in at the time.
Soldiers were not in IBA/IOTV all day until this point. See Exhibit 30 of LT Baum.
30. In Exhibit 88, SGT Sutton said at 1620 that is the first time he was aware of having
any medical interaction with SGT Cline.
31. In Exhibit 89, SPC Fields stated that he talked to SGT Cline because he was not
sweating and looked kind of dazed but did not report that up to anyone on the range as
a safety consideration. Only after the third Soldier went down did he notify someone. I
was only aware of three Soldiers going down as they were driving off the range in an
ambulance, but at the time it was just as a precautionary measure according to the
medics I talked to. Up to that point, I was only aware of SPC Baustista.
32. In Exhibit 90, SPC Winters said that SGT Cline was stable with normal parameters
and that he loosened his boots and told him to loosen his pants. After SGT Sutton
worked through the details of moving the patients, SPC Winters drove off the range.
33. In Exhibit 92, W2 Tatum the Brigade Safety Officer, stated that he visited range 100
from 1045-1300. He felt that there was more than adequate coverage on the range and
he observed no immediate risk. He also stated that he talked to CPT Cox in her vehicle
while she was manning her radio (see my #17). W2 Tatum also observed Soldiers
rotating from their positions to get water and talked with several about safety, hydration,
and work reset cycles.
34. I do believe I acted accordingly, and was definitely not negligent in my duties with
the information I had at the time. Looking back now with more information, I would
change many decisions I made that day, but I will never have that chance. I used my
many years’ experience to make the best informed decisions with the information I was
provided. I relied on my medics and they stated nothing emergent. There was three
times the required medical coverage at the range. I reassessed training with LT Baum
and the S3 Major Young all morning until the BC arrived, where together we reassessed
training continually.
35. According to the extra statements provided by two other OC/T (CSM Reyes and
SFC Odom) and the RSO SSG Rodney; there were plenty of safety considerations in
place. They are attached as enclosures to this.

ENCLS

/Original Signed/
CHARLES FRANKS

6

 
SUBJECT: Rebuttal for Proposed Relief for Cause

CSM, AR ARNG