Case 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ Document 1 Filed 06/28/19 Page 1 of 74

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Gainesville Division
JEFF GRUVER, EMORY MARQUIS
“MARQ” MITCHELL, BETTY RIDDLE,
KRISTOPHER WRENCH, KEITH IVEY,
KAREN LEICHT, RAQUEL WRIGHT,
STEVEN PHALEN, CLIFFORD TYSON,
JERMAINE MILLER, FLORIDA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, ORANGE
COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NAACP, AND
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
FLORIDA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KIM A. BARTON, in her official capacity as
Supervisor of Elections for Alachua County,
PETER ANTONACCI, in his official capacity as
Supervisor of Elections for Broward County,
MIKE HOGAN, in his official capacity as
Supervisor of Elections for Duval County,
CRAIG LATIMER, in his official capacity as
Supervisor of Elections for Hillsborough County,
LESLIE ROSSWAY SWAN in her official
capacity as Supervisor of Elections for Indian
River County, MARK EARLEY in his official
capacity as Supervisor of Elections for Leon
County, MICHAEL BENNETT, in his official
capacity as Supervisor of Elections for Manatee
County, CHRISTINA WHITE, in her official
capacity as Supervisor of Elections for MiamiDade County, BILL COWLES, in his official
capacity as Supervisor of Elections for Orange
County, RON TURNER, in his official capacity
as Supervisor of Elections for Sarasota County,
and LAUREL M. LEE, in her official capacity as
Secretary of State of the State of Florida,
Defendants.

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Complaint

No: ______________

 Case 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ Document 1 Filed 06/28/19 Page 2 of 74

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
This

lawsuit

challenges

Florida’s

new

law,

SB7066,

which

unconstitutionally denies the right to vote to returning citizens with a past felony
conviction based solely on their inability to pay outstanding fines, fees, or
restitution.1 Plaintiffs allege as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

On November 6, 2018, a supermajority of nearly 65 percent of

Florida voters—more than 5 million people—approved one of the largest
expansions of voting rights in the United States since the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. In enacting the Voting Restoration Amendment, known as
Amendment 4, voters revised the Florida Constitution to abolish permanent
disenfranchisement of nearly all citizens convicted of a felony offense.
Amendment 4 automatically restored voting rights to over a million previously
disenfranchised Floridians who had completed the terms of their sentences
including parole or probation—ending a broken system that disenfranchised more
than 10 percent of all of the state’s voting-age population and more than 20 percent
of its African American voting-age population, Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d
1289, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2018). Its passage was a historic achievement for American

1

This document refers to persons with felony convictions as “returning citizens”
throughout.
2

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democracy and made clear that Florida voters intended to end lifetime
disenfranchisement and give their fellow citizens a voice in the political process.
2.

Florida’s prior disenfranchisement provision originated in the 1860s,

as part of Florida’s prolonged history of denying voting rights to Black citizens and
using the criminal justice system to achieve that goal. From the shadow of that
history, voters overwhelmingly chose to expand the franchise to persons previously
excluded. Floridians recognized, as the United States Supreme Court has, that
“[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
3.

This action challenges the attempt by certain Florida lawmakers to

vitiate Amendment 4’s enfranchising impact by making restoration of voting rights
contingent on a person’s wealth. Amendment 4’s language is clear and simple—
individuals with a conviction for any felony other than murder or a sexual offense
will have their voting rights “restored upon completion of all terms of sentence
including parole or probation.” Yet, on June 28, 2019, Governor Ron DeSantis
signed legislation—which the Senate and House ultimately passed along party line
votes—that attempts to drastically claw back the voting rights conferred by
Amendment 4 and retract Plaintiffs’ right to vote. SB7066 provides that returning

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citizens are not eligible to register or vote until they settle any form of legal
financial obligation (“LFO”) that arises from their conviction—even if those
returning citizens will never be able to pay outstanding balances, and even where
their outstanding debt has been converted to a civil lien.
4.

SB7066 conditions Plaintiffs’ right to vote on their wealth and

penalizes returning citizens who are unable to pay, in violation of the First,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. If not enjoined, the law will have a massive
disenfranchising effect, and result in sustained, and likely permanent,
disenfranchisement for individuals without means.2 It creates two classes of
returning citizens: those who are wealthy enough to vote and those who cannot
afford to. This disenfranchisement will be borne disproportionately by low-income
individuals and racial minorities, due to longstanding and well-documented racial
gaps in poverty and employment.

2

The Florida Clerk of the Courts Association anticipates that 83 percent of all legal
financial obligations will remain unpaid, due to the payor’s financial status. See
Daniel Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being Able
to Vote in Florida, WLRN Public Radio and Television (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/felons-might-have-pay-hundreds-millions-being-ablevote-florida. Similarly, the Florida Circuit Criminal Courts failed to collect nearly
80 percent of all fines and fees in 2018. Fines & Fees Justice Center, Annual
Assessments and Collections Report [Florida, 2013-2018] (Sep. 30, 2018)
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/annual-assessments-and-collectionsreport-florida-2013-2018/.
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5.

SB7066 is further unlawful because it was motivated, at least in part,

by a racially discriminatory purpose. It is well-established that people with felony
convictions in Florida are disproportionately Black—a product of higher rates of
police stops, arrest, prosecution, and conviction of Black citizens in the criminal
justice system. It is also well-established that a large majority of returning citizens
have LFOs they cannot pay now or in the foreseeable future. In addition, Black
Floridians with a felony conviction face intersecting barriers to paying off their
LFOs due to hurdles to employment and long-standing racial disparities in wealth
and employment across the state. Yet, notwithstanding this disproportionate impact
on Black returning citizens, before SB7066 was enacted, lawmakers expressly
refused to consider evidence about the racial and socioeconomic impacts of the law
and the foreseeable harm to Black communities, and rejected ameliorative
amendments that they were advised could have lessened the law’s impact on Black
returning citizens. There is a strong inference that the law was motivated by
discriminatory purposes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution in light of: the history of racial discrimination underlying
Florida’s felony disenfranchisement regime; the sequence of events and procedural
irregularities leading to SB7066’s enactment; the reasonably foreseeable and
known discriminatory impact; and the tenuousness of the stated justifications for
SB7066.

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6.

SB7066 will also prevent or at least chill voter registration and voting

among returning citizens because Florida has no unified system to accurately
record data on LFOs, and no system to access data on federal or out-of-state
financial obligations, leaving returning citizens without any reasonable or
accessible method of determining if they would violate the law by registering to
vote, or means to defend against challenges to their eligibility to vote based on
LFOs. Such a scheme violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
7.

SB7066 will also significantly impede organizational Plaintiffs’

ability to engage in voter registration activities and thus directly burdens
fundamental First Amendment speech and associational rights, which are
inseparable and intertwined aspects of those activities. Organizational Plaintiffs’
members and volunteers must hesitate in conducting their core voter registration
activities due to the risk of creating legal liability for returning citizens who have
no means to determine whether their LFOs would make them ineligible to register.
As a result, members have been deterred from registering voters. The need to
inquire into the status of potential applicants’ LFOs has undermined the feasibility
of organizational Plaintiffs’ voter registration drives.
8.

Floridians spoke loud and clear last November by amending their

constitution by citizen initiative, “the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the
people,” Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 485–86 (Fla. 2008).

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It was regularly reported that Amendment 4 would restore voting rights to roughly
1.4 million people in Florida, reflecting the public’s understanding that restoration
of voting rights would not be contingent on one’s wealth.
9.

SB7066 reinstates a system of lifetime disenfranchisement for a large

number of returning citizens—imposing precisely the unjust system that Floridians
overwhelmingly rejected through Amendment 4. The Florida Legislature’s attempt
to retract voting rights and revert to a system of permanent disenfranchisement for
the large class of citizens who cannot afford to pay LFOs—and who are
disproportionately people of color—is an affront to the U.S. Constitution. It cannot
stand.
PARTIES
10.

Plaintiff JEFF GRUVER is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident. Mr.

Gruver, a 33-year-old white man, works at Grace Marketplace, a facility for the
homeless in Gainesville, where he is the director of shelter services assisting
shelter residents to access treatment, employment, and permanent housing. He just
completed his first semester of a Master of Social Work degree at Florida State
University. Nearly ten years ago, Mr. Gruver was struggling with addiction. He
was convicted of possession of cocaine in 2008 and was assessed $801 in LFOs—
including a court attorney and indigent application fee, court costs, and a fine. Mr.
Gruver is unable to pay his outstanding LFOs. Mr. Gruver’s voting rights were

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restored on January 8, 2019, by operation of Amendment 4. He registered to vote
on February 19, 2019, and voted in the Gainesville regular election in March 2019.
Mr. Gruver is worried that he will lose his right to vote, and that he might be
removed from the voter registration rolls because of his inability to pay his
outstanding LFOs.
11.

Plaintiff EMORY MARQUIS “MARQ” MITCHELL is a U.S.

citizen and Florida resident. Mr. Mitchell, a 29-year-old Black man, is the
president and founder of Chainless Change Inc., a non-profit organization that is
committed to reducing recidivism by providing resources and support to
individuals and families who are impacted by the criminal justice system.
Additionally, Mr. Mitchell serves as: a trained Peer Support Specialist at the South
Florida Wellness Network, which assists young people and families with cooccurring disorders; a mentor with an employment-readiness nonprofit; and a
member of two subcommittees on the Broward County Reentry Coalition. Mr.
Mitchell devotes significant time and resources to his public interest endeavors, for
which he does not receive a salary. He recently qualified for food assistance
benefits. Mr. Mitchell grew up in the foster care system and was in and out of
Department of Juvenile Justice custody after the age of twelve. He was convicted
of felony escape from a Department of Juvenile Justice facility for an offense he
committed at the age of sixteen. He was sentenced to 8 months and 1 day in jail.

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Weeks after aging out of the foster-care system, he went on to attend Florida
Memorial University. At twenty-one, he was convicted of battery, a third-degree
felony, arising out of an incident in which he was abused by campus security
officers while he was a student. Mr. Mitchell had his voting rights restored on
January 8, 2019, by operation of Amendment 4. He registered to vote in Broward
County on March 9, 2019. Mr. Mitchell has outstanding LFOs stemming from his
two felony convictions—a combination of court costs and fines—in the amount of
$2,143. He was unaware of his court costs and fines until he received a notice from
the Miami-Dade Clerk of Court earlier this year, soon after registering to vote. Mr.
Mitchell fears he might be removed from the registration rolls and denied the right
to vote because he is unable to pay his outstanding LFOs.
12.

Plaintiff BETTY RIDDLE is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident. Ms.

Riddle is a 61-year-old Black woman. She is mother to four adult children,
grandmother to twenty-four grandchildren, and great-grandmother to eight. She
works as a communications assistant for the Public Defender of Sarasota. She
dropped out of high school at the age of sixteen, and was convicted of a felony in
at the age of seventeen. She spent 22 years caught in a cycle of addiction that led
her to a series of convictions, mostly for possession of controlled substances and
offenses related to supporting her conviction. At the age of fifty-two, in recovery
from her addiction, Ms. Riddle went back to school, earning a degree from the

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State College of Florida. On January 8, 2019, she became eligible to register to
vote for the first time in her life. She was one of the first people to submit her
registration form to the Sarasota Supervisor of Elections on January 8, and is now
registered to vote. Having her citizenship recognized was one of the proudest
moments of her life, and she celebrated the occasion with her daughter. Ms. Riddle
still has over $1,000 in outstanding court costs and fees. Because she cannot afford
to pay her LFOs, Ms. Riddle fears that she might be removed from the voter
registration rolls and deprived of her first opportunity to cast a ballot in Florida,
where she has lived her entire life.
13.

Plaintiff KAREN LEICHT is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident. Ms.

Leicht, a 62-year-old white woman, lives in Miami-Dade County, where she works
full-time as a senior paralegal at a civil rights law firm that specializes in disability
rights work. She is also the main caregiver for her mother, who suffers from
Parkinson’s disease. On April 7, 2010, she pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
insurance and wire fraud and provided substantial assistance to prosecutors in the
case. The court sentenced her to a term of incarceration and ordered her to pay
$59,136,990.19 in restitution, which includes the full judgment of restitution
ordered against her ten co-defendants—who are jointly and severally liable—even
though she played only a minor role in the crime. She fulfilled all terms of
probation and was released from supervision on January 1, 2013. Within one week

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of being transferred from federal prison to a Miami-based residential reentry
facility, Ms. Leicht had secured full-time employment at her law firm, where she
has worked full-time ever since. Ms. Leicht dutifully makes monthly restitution
payments towards the shared $59 million obligation, but has no ability to satisfy
the outstanding amount in her lifetime. Ms. Leicht’s voting rights were restored
pursuant to Amendment 4 on January 8, 2019. On April 29, 2019, she registered to
vote.
14.

Plaintiff KEITH IVEY is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident. Mr.

Ivey, a 46-year-old Black man, lives in Jacksonville, Florida, where he manages a
car dealership, supervising some 10–20 people he contracts with at his business.
He qualified for early release after serving eight-and-a-half years of a ten-year
sentence for violating Florida’s RICO statute. Even while still incarcerated, Mr.
Ivey was a part of a Duval County entrepreneurship and mentorship program, and
while at the Transition House in Kissimmee, Florida, he was elected Community
Coordinator at the facility. One week after he was released from prison, Mr. Ivey
had already enrolled in community college, before beginning his current role
managing the car dealership in Jacksonville. Mr. Ivey has conducted speaking
engagements to motivate and connect with at-risk youth in Florida and wants to
help fellow returning citizens become productive members of society as he has
done for himself. He had no probation or parole associated with his sentence, but

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has $400 in outstanding costs from more than 15 years ago. Mr. Ivey was not even
aware of these costs until a reporter notified him of them in 2019. Mr. Ivey’s
voting rights were restored pursuant to Amendment 4 on January 8, 2019. He
registered to vote on that day and, as a registered voter, subsequently voted on two
occasions: once in the March 2019 Duval County election and then in the May
2019 runoff election.
15.

Plaintiff KRISTOPHER WRENCH is a U.S. citizen and Florida

resident. Mr. Wrench, a 42-year-old white man, has struggled with addiction and
has been convicted of felony offenses for acts related to his addiction, such as
possession of controlled substances and driving with a suspended license. He has
been in recovery, and sober, since January 4, 2012. He is now a productive
member of his community and takes twelve-step programs into prisons to support
those who are still struggling with addiction. Mr. Wrench attended Santa Fe
College, where he studied for a degree in bio-medical engineering technology. He
works as a painter while his wife is studying for her master’s degree. They are
expecting their first child later this year. His voting rights were restored on January
8, 2019, by operation of Amendment 4. He submitted an online voter registration
application and was registered to vote in Alachua County on May 4, 2019. Mr.
Wrench owes approximately $3,000 in court costs and fines, as a result of his past
convictions. Mr. Wrench fears he might be removed from the Alachua County

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voter registration rolls or denied the right to vote because he is unable to pay his
outstanding costs and fines.
16.

Plaintiff RAQUEL L. WRIGHT is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident.

She is a 44-year-old Black woman and mother to a 13-year-old daughter. Ms.
Wright works part-time as a legal assistant to the Special Counsel to the Florida
State Conference of the NAACP and part-time as the Assistant Secretary of the
Indian River County Branch of the NAACP. She has a college degree, student loan
and other debt, and aspires to go to law school. She was convicted of drug
trafficking in 2011. Before this conviction, Ms. Wright had been a teacher for more
than 14 years. Following her conviction, the State of Florida permanently revoked
her teaching certificate and prohibited Ms. Wright from teaching in a Florida
public school. After completing the first seven months of her sentence in prison,
Ms. Wright served the remaining twenty-two months on a work-release program.
During such time, she tutored more than 80 women who passed their GED exams.
On January 8, 2019, Ms. Wright’s voting rights were automatically restored
through operation of Amendment 4. Soon thereafter, Ms. Wright registered to vote
at the Indian River County Supervisor of Elections Office. Having her voting rights
restored has been one of her proudest accomplishments. Ms. Wright has
outstanding LFOs stemming from her sole felony conviction—a combination of
court costs and a fine that has been converted to a civil lien—in the amount of at

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least $50,000. Because of Ms. Wright’s inability to fully pay these monetary
obligations, she fears she might be removed from the voter registration rolls and
barred from participating in the democratic process. Ms. Wright wishes to vote in
future elections to have a voice in who represents her, to illustrate to her daughter
the importance of political participation, and to exercise a fundamental right of
American citizenship.
17.

Plaintiff STEVEN PHALEN, a 36-year-old white man, is a U.S.

citizen and Florida resident. In 2005, Mr. Phalen resided in Wisconsin and was
convicted of arson and public endangerment by a Wisconsin state court. The court
sentenced him to a term of probation and payment of approximately $150,000 in
restitution and court costs and fees, of which he still owes approximately $110,000.
Since that time, Mr. Phalen has earned a Ph.D. in organizational and relational
communication and established his career doing HVAC logistics for a
multinational manufacturer and distributor. In 2015, he moved with his wife to
Florida. On November 18, 2017, a Wisconsin court discharged Mr. Phalen from
supervision and converted his outstanding LFOs to civil liens. Wisconsin restores
voting rights to its residents with a past conviction upon completion of their
supervision, irrespective of their outstanding financial obligations. As a Florida
resident, Mr. Phalen had his rights restored on January 8, 2019, when
Amendment 4 became effective. He registered to vote on February 26, 2019. Mr.

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Phalen makes monthly payments towards his outstanding LFOs, but cannot afford
to complete payment at present. He fears he might be removed from the
registration rolls as a result of SB7066.
18.

Plaintiff CLIFFORD TYSON is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident.

He is a 62-year-old Black man and a Pastor. He has been convicted of three
felonies related to theft or robbery— in 1978, he was sentenced to a 15-year term
of probation and ordered to pay $2.00 in court costs and $10.00 per month towards
the cost of his supervision; in 1997, he was ordered to pay $1,337.94 in restitution
and $259.00 in court costs and fees; and in 1998, he was sentenced to a period of
community control and probation and ordered to pay $530 in restitution, along
with court costs and fees that appear to total to $661.00 (records of the costs and
fees assessed for Pastor Tyson’s 1998 conviction are difficult to parse, particularly
because two Hillsborough County records reflect differing amounts). He fulfilled
all terms of community control and probation and was released from supervision
on October 6, 2003. Pastor Tyson is a productive member of his community and
provides pastoral care in prisons across the state. His voting rights were restored on
January 8, 2019, by operation of Amendment 4. He registered to vote that day in
Hillsborough County and, as a registered voter, subsequently voted on two
occasions: March 3, 2019 and April 23, 2019. Pastor Tyson has paid off his
restitution obligations, but is unable to pay the costs imposed as part of his felony

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sentences. He was unaware those costs remained unpaid until he was notified by
counsel, and it is unclear from records or officials how much he actually has
outstanding. Because of Pastor Tyson’s inability to fully pay these monetary
obligations, he fears he might be removed from the voter registration rolls or
denied the right to vote.
19.

Plaintiff JERMAINE MILLER is a U.S. citizen and Florida resident.

He is a 28-year-old Black man, community advocate, and graduate of Tallahassee
Community College. Mr. Miller was convicted of a robbery and trespass in 2015,
sentenced to prison, followed by a term of probation, and ordered to pay $223.80
in restitution and $1,221.25 in court costs and fines. Mr. Miller’s probation was
terminated on October 31, 2016. His voting rights were restored on January 8,
2019, by operation of Amendment 4. Mr. Miller registered to vote in Leon County
on January 21, 2019. Although Mr. Miller has paid $242 in restitution—$18.20
more than the amount ordered—the Florida Department of Corrections contends
that he owes a balance of $1.11 because of the 4% surcharge charged on the
restitution payments he has made. Mr. Miller still owes $1,221.25 in court costs
and fines, and he is unable to pay these outstanding LFOs. Because of Mr. Miller’s
inability to pay off these monetary obligations, he fears that he might be removed
from the voter registration rolls or denied the right to vote.

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20.

Plaintiff FLORIDA STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES AND

YOUTH UNITS OF THE NAACP (“Florida NAACP”) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan
civil rights membership organization in Florida. Florida NAACP is a state
conference of branches of the national NAACP (“NAACP”). The NAACP was
formed in 1909, to remove all barriers of racial discrimination through democratic
processes and through the enactment and enforcement of federal, state, and local
laws securing civil rights, including laws relating to voting rights. The Florida
NAACP’s members are predominantly African American and other minority
residents, who reside throughout Florida. The Florida NAACP also has local
branch units throughout Florida, including the Orange County Branch NAACP
(“Orange County NAACP”), discussed in more detail below, which themselves are
membership organizations. Members of a branch are also members of the Florida
NAACP. For example, Plaintiff Wright is a member of the Florida NAACP and the
Indian River County Branch of the NAACP.
21.

The Florida NAACP and its local units have been heavily involved in

voter registration and voter education activities for decades and have been credited
with registering thousands of voters in the state. The organization conducts
statewide voter protection on election days (including the operation, in 2018, of six
“satellite centers”). Many members of the state and local branches, including the
Orange County NAACP, had their rights restored on January 8, 2019, by operation

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of Amendment 4. Some members of the state and local NAACPs, including the
Orange County NAACP, as well as members of the communities that they serve,
include low-income people with felony convictions, who will be permanently
disenfranchised by operation of SB7066. Many of these impacted people are
unable to determine the full amount of the LFOs that they may owe, cannot afford
to fully pay all of their LFOs, and are at risk of being purged from the registration
rolls when SB7066 becomes effective. SB7066—which amends Florida’s voter
registration form to require that individuals identify as having been convicted of a
felony, and the means by which their voting rights were restored—will stigmatize
members of the state and local NAACPs, including the Orange County NAACP,
and individuals that they serve.
22.

Moreover, as a result of SB7066, Florida NAACP and its local units,

including the Orange County NAACP, will have to expend much-needed resources
identifying people with felony convictions to determine whether they are eligible
to register, and the extent of any LFOs that they may owe. Were it not for SB7066,
the Florida NAACP, and local units including the Orange County NAACP, would
otherwise be spending these resources on its regular activities, such as registering
voters, getting out the vote, and conducting statewide voter protection on election
days.

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23.

Plaintiff ORANGE COUNTY BRANCH OF THE NAACP (“Orange

County Branch NAACP” or “Branch”), which was established in 1942, is a
nonprofit, nonpartisan civil rights membership organization in Florida and local
branch of the Florida NAACP, with the same mission, objectives, and votingrelated activities, as the Florida NAACP. The Orange County NAACP has been
heavily involved in voter registration and voter education activities for years,
including being credited with registering thousands of voters in Orange County.
Members of the Florida NAACP residing in Orange County, who also are
members of the Orange County NAACP, will be affected by SB7066 as described
above.
24.

Plaintiff LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA (the

“LWVF” or “League”) is the Florida affiliate of the national League of Women
Voters (the “National League”). LWVF is a nonpartisan, not-for-profit corporation
organized under the laws of Florida, and a tax-exempt charity pursuant to section
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.
25.

The mission of LWVF is to promote political responsibility by

encouraging informed and active citizen participation in government, including by
registering citizens to vote and influencing public policy through education and
advocacy. LWVF has thousands of members in Florida and an even greater
number of supporters and volunteers, who receive regular communications from

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the League. The National League has conducted voter registration nationwide since
1920, and LWVF has conducted voter registration in Florida since before 1939. In
the past, LWVF has conducted voter registration drives through the auspices of its
29 local Leagues located in cities and counties throughout Florida.
26.

Registering new voters is the core mission of LWVF, and an

important part of accomplishing the League’s goal of increasing political
participation by underrepresented and disenfranchised communities, particularly
residents of low-income, African American, and Hispanic/Latinx communities.
LWVF assists voters in filling out voter registration applications, and then collects
and submits them to the Supervisors of Elections. LWVF finds that this collection
and submission are necessary to the success of its voter registration drives. Absent
this assistance, LWVF has found that applicants are confused about how to
properly fill out their applications and are unsure where and how to submit them,
which results in incomplete, and therefore ineffective, registrations that later cause
confusion at the polls when would-be voters find out they are not on the rolls.
LWVF’s success in registering new voters depends on its ability to not only
persuade others of the importance of registering to vote, but also on its ability to
assist others to fill in forms properly, to collect the forms, and to deliver completed
forms to the appropriate State offices.

20

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27.

LWVF volunteers: (i) generally discuss the importance of voting and

of civic engagement; (ii) inform other citizens about important issues that will be
decided in upcoming elections, such as ballot initiatives and referenda; and
(iii) urge other citizens to associate with LWVF and with one another by
registering to vote and engaging in meaningful collective action, described above,
to advance shared political or social objectives.
28.

SB7066 significantly impedes LWVF’s ability to engage in voter

registration activities and thus directly burdens LWVF’s fundamental speech and
associational rights, which are inseparable and intertwined aspects of those
activities. LWVF is careful to avoid inadvertently helping someone register to vote
who is ineligible. Some volunteers will not engage in registration activities at all
because of their concerns about SB7066. Because SB7066 renders LWVF
volunteers unable to determine the eligibility of some returning citizens, it prevents
LWVF from registering returning citizens who are in fact eligible to vote and
whom LWVF would otherwise help register.
29.

As a result, LWVF has been forced to divert substantial time and

resources away from registration activities to, inter alia: explain the complicated
provisions of SB7066 to potential registrants; field inquiries from members and
volunteers who cannot determine who is eligible to register under Amendment 4;

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and develop new training materials for its volunteers and new educational
materials for returning citizens.
30.

Defendant Secretary of State LAUREL M. LEE is sued in her official

capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Florida. The Department of State
(“DOS”) “shall have general supervision and administration of the election laws.”
Fla. Stat. § 15.13. As Florida’s “chief election officer,” the Secretary must
“[o]btain and maintain uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of the
election laws.” Id. § 97.012(1). She is responsible for “enforc[ing] the performance
of any duties of a county supervisor of elections.” Id. § 97.012(14). She is also
responsible for providing “written direction and opinions to the supervisors of
elections on the performance of their official duties with respect to the Florida
Election Code or rules adopted by the Department of State.” Id. §§ 97.012(4)–(5),
(16). She is responsible for ensuring state compliance with all election laws. See
Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Because the Secretary is the state’s chief election officer with the authority to
relieve the burden on Plaintiffs’ right to vote, she was appropriately sued for
prospective injunctive relief.”) (citing Fla. Stat. § 97.012); see also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permitting injunctive relief against individual state
officers in their official capacities).

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31.

Defendant KIM A. BARTON is the Supervisor of Elections for

Alachua County, Defendant PETER ANTONACCI is the Supervisor of Elections
for Broward County, Defendant MIKE HOGAN is the Supervisor of Elections for
Duval County, Defendant CRAIG LATIMER is the Supervisor of Elections for
Hillsborough County, Defendant LESLIE ROSSWAY SWAN is the Supervisor of
Elections for Indian River County, Defendant MARK EARLEY is the Supervisor
of Elections for Leon County, Defendant MICHAEL BENNETT is the Supervisor
of Elections for Manatee County, Defendant CHRISTINA WHITE is the
Supervisor for Elections for Miami-Dade County, and Defendant BILL COWLES
is the Supervisor of Elections for Orange County, Defendant RON TURNER is the
Supervisor of Elections for Sarasota County. These Defendants are responsible for
conducting elections and voter registration in their respective counties. SB7066
gives local Supervisors of Elections (“SOEs”) more front-end responsibility for
registration, requiring them to “verify and make a final determination . . . regarding
whether the person who registers to vote is eligible pursuant to [Amendment 4] and
this section.” Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(3)(b). While the SOE “may request additional
assistance from the [Department of State] in making the final determination,” id.
§ 98.0751(3)(c), the bill does not give SOEs any additional resources for this new
responsibility.

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JURISDICTION
32.

Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to

redress the deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by the United
States Constitution.
33.

This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because the matters in controversy
arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and because Plaintiffs
bring this action to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States and
federal law.
34.

Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

35.

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all

Defendants reside in Florida, and Defendant Barton has her principal place of
business in this District.
36.

Under Northern District of Florida Local Rule 3.1(A)–(B), this case

is properly filed in the Gainesville Division of this District because Defendant
Barton has her principal place of business in a county included in the Gainesville
Division.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Background on the Passage of Amendment 4

37.

On November 6, 2018, Florida voters resoundingly and decisively

approved Amendment 4 to the Florida Constitution with 64.55 percent in support.
5,148,926 Floridians of every race and political party voted in favor of
Amendment 4, reflecting the clear will of the people that individuals with felony
convictions should re-join the electorate once they complete their sentence. Fla.
Div.

of

Elections,

Voting

Restoration

Amendment

14-01,

https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=64388
&seqnum=1 (last visited May 24, 2019).
38.

The

full

text

of

the

Amended

Article

VI,

Section

(Disqualifications), reads:
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or
any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to
vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of
disability. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any disqualification from voting arising from a felony
conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored
upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or
probation.
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense
shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights.
Fla. Const., Art. VI, § 4 (italics added).

25

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39.

Amendment 4’s language is clear and simple—the constitutional

amendment ensures that individuals with a felony conviction, for a felony crime
other than murder or a sexual offense, will have their voting rights “restored upon
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.” Id. The Florida
Supreme Court, in approving the title and summary of the amendment in 2017,
declared that Amendment 4 conveyed to voters “that the chief purpose of the
amendment is to automatically restore voting rights to felony offenders, except
those convicted of murder or felony sexual offences, upon completion of all terms
of their sentence.” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. Re: Voting Restoration
Amendment, 215 So. 3d 1202, 1208 (Fla. 2017) (emphasis added). 3
40.

“[T]he power of the people to amend their state constitution by

initiative is an integral part of Florida’s lawmaking power.” Brown v. Sec’y of State
of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2012). The Elections Clause of the U.S.

3

There is a presumption that provisions of the Florida Constitution are selfexecuting, see, e.g., Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053,
1064 (Fla. 2010), because “in the absence of such presumption the legislature
would have the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their
constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the people,” Fla. Hosp.
Waterman v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 485–86 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Gray v. Bryant,
125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960)). The Supreme Court’s determination that
Amendment 4 confers automatic rights restoration clarifies that the constitutional
amendment does not require legislation and is self-executing. See Gray, 125 So. 2d
at 851 (determining that a constitutional provision is self-executing if the right
conferred “may be determined, enjoyed, or protected without the aid of legislative
enactment.”).
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Constitution permits citizens, through the initiative process, to regulate elections as
a lawmaking apparatus of a state. Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015). Floridians’ initiative power permits them
to constrain the state legislature’s own authority, by amending the state
constitution. Brown, 668 F.3d at 1278. They did so in Amendment 4.
41.

Self-executing constitutional provisions constrain the Legislature’s

authority. While the Legislature may “supplement, protect, or further the
availability of the constitutionally conferred right . . . the Legislature may not
modify the right in such a fashion that it alters or frustrates the intent of the framers
and the people.” Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053,
1064 (Fla. 2010). As such, the Legislature cannot pass any legislation that would
reduce (a) the rights guaranteed under Amendment 4, or (b) the number of people
to whom they are guaranteed. See id.
42.

Amendment 4 was passed on November 6, 2018, and became

effective on January 8, 2019.
43.

Returning citizens, like individual Plaintiffs and members of

organizational Plaintiffs Florida NAACP and Orange County NAACP, began
registering to vote on January 8, 2019, and subsequently voted in local elections

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across Florida.4 Just months after it was enacted, Amendment 4 had already made
Florida’s electorate more representative of its voting-age population by reinstating
the voting rights of many people of color and less affluent individuals. More than
2,000 formerly incarcerated Floridians registered to vote between January and
March 2019, about 44 percent of whom were Black people. Kevin Morris,
Analysis: Thwarting Amendment 4, Brennan Ctr. for Just. 2–3 (May 9, 2019)
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05
_FloridaAmendment_FINAL-3.pdf. Similarly, the average income of formerly
incarcerated Floridians who registered to vote during that time period was $14,000
below the average Florida voter. Id.

4

Mainstream and widespread media coverage of the Amendment 4 campaign
estimated that it would restore rights to between 1.2 and 1.6 million people in
Florida. See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Connie Humburg & McKenna Oxenden, What’s
Riding on Amendment 4 and Voting Rights for Convicted Felons, Tampa Bay
Times (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/11
/02/amendment-4-democrats-and-blacks-more-likely-to-have-lost-voting-rightsthan-republicans-and-whites/ (citing an estimated 1.2 million people affected by
Amendment 4); Samantha J. Gross & Elizabeth Koh, What is Amendment 4 on
Florida ballot? It Affects Restoration of Felons’ Voting Rights, Miami Herald (Oct.
5,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election
/article219547680.html (estimated 1.6 million); Steven Lemongello, Floridians
Will Vote This Fall on Restoring Voting Rights to 1.5 Million Felons, Fla. Sun
Sentinel (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/os-floridafelon-voting-rights-on-ballot-20180123-story.html (estimated 1.5 million). These
estimates included returning citizens with outstanding LFOs, reflecting the
common understanding—including by the Floridians who voted for it—that
Amendment 4 was not intended to condition voting rights on ability to pay LFOs.
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44.

Florida has been an ignominious outlier among states because of the

breadth of, and racial disparities present in, its disenfranchisement. Prior to
Amendment 4’s passage, Florida was one of just four states that permanently
disenfranchised its citizens for committing a single felony offense. Br. for The
Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae (“Brief for Sentencing Project”), Hand v.
Scott, No. 18-11388, 2018 WL 3328534, at *5 (11th Cir. June 28, 2018). Florida
disenfranchised a higher percentage of its citizens than any other state in the
United States and was responsible for more than 25 percent of all U.S. citizens
disenfranchised nationwide. Id. at *14–*15. As of November 2016, more than 1.6
million Floridians—about 92 percent of whom had already completed their terms
of sentence, id., were disenfranchised on account of a felony conviction,
comprising “[m]ore than one-tenth of Florida’s voting population,” Hand, 285 F.
Supp. 3d at 1310 (emphasis in original).
45.

The racial disparities within the disenfranchised community are

pervasive and deeply entrenched. 5 Prior to Amendment 4’s passage, “[m]ore than

5

There was widespread and mainstream media coverage of these racial disparities
during the Amendment 4 campaign. See, e.g., Gabby Deutch, Florida Felons Want
Their Voting Rights Restored, The Atlantic (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/florida-felons-want-theirvoting-rights-restored/570103/; see also Steve Bousquet et al., 1.2 Million
Floridians Have a Lot Riding on Passage of Amendment 4, Miami Herald (Nov. 2,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/
article221021940.html.
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one in five of Florida’s African American voting-age population” could not vote.
Id. One reason for this staggering percentage is that Black Floridians are more
likely to be arrested, charged, convicted, and face harsher sentences than white
Floridians. See Racial Bias in Florida’s Electoral System, Brennan Ctr. for Just. &
Fla. Rights Restoration Coal. (Jan. 2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites
/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_9477.pdf; see also Nick Petersen et. al,
Unequal Treatment: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Miami-Dade Criminal
Justice at 5, ACLU of Fla. – Greater Miami Chapter (July 2018),
https://www.aclufl.org/sites/default/files/aclufl_unequaltreatmentreport2018.pdf.
While Black people comprised 16 percent of Florida’s population in 2016, they
made up nearly 33 percent of all those disenfranchised by a felony conviction.
Erika L. Wood, Florida: An Outlier in Denying Voting Rights (“Wood”) 1, 3
Brennan Ctr. for Just. (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files
/publications/Florida_Voting_Rights_Outlier.pdf.
46.

Florida has a long, troubling history with voter suppression tactics,

many explicitly motivated by racial discrimination—including the very felony
disenfranchisement provision revised by Amendment 4. In its 1865 constitution,
Florida “explicitly limited the right to vote to ‘free white males.’” Id. at 4. A year
later, Florida became one of ten former Confederate states to reject the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and thus, the constitutional mandate that no

30

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state can deny any person the equal protection of the laws. Id. In 1868, after
Congress mandated that Florida adopt a constitution without an explicitly racially
discriminatory suffrage rule, Florida ratified a constitution that permanently
banned individuals with felony convictions from voting, a provision that Florida
paired with the Black Codes, which increased the number of felonies and
“increased prosecution . . . for certain crimes the legislature believed were more
likely to be committed by freed blacks.” Id. at 4–5.6 The intent of these measures,
which came in the immediate aftermath of the abolition of slavery, “was quite
clear: to eliminate as many black voters as possible.” Tim Elfrink, The Long,
Racist History of Florida’s Now-Repealed Ban on Felons Voting, Wash. Post
(Nov. 7. 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/07/long-racisthistory-floridas-now-repealed-ban-felons-voting/?utm_term=.aa37bdf36300
(quoting Darryl Paulson, emeritus professor of government at the University of
South Florida). In 1889, Florida became the first state to adopt a poll tax, followed
shortly after by other Jim Crow voter suppression tactics such as literacy tests and
residency requirements. See id. Florida’s voter suppression tactics effectuated their
purpose; in 1940, only 3 percent of Florida’s Black population was registered to
6

See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689–90 (2019) (“Among these laws’
provisions were draconian fines for violating broad proscriptions on ‘vagrancy’
and other dubious offenses. When newly freed [enslaved people] were unable to
pay imposed fines, States often demanded involuntary labor instead.”) (citations
omitted).
31

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vote. Id. The history of discrimination and vestiges of Jim Crow underlying
Florida’s

felon

disenfranchisement

statute

were

known

and

expressly

acknowledged by Florida lawmakers during the legislative debate over SB7066.
See, e.g., Video: April 24, 2019 House Sess. (“April 24 House Hearing”) at
5:25:05, https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=2443575804
_2019041282 (testimony from Rep. Jacquet) (“In 1868, we decided in order to
limit the voice of certain communities, to set aside a certain population, this was
the strategy.”).
47.

The ramifications of this history continue into the present. Wealth

disparities persist for Black and Latinx families in Florida as compared to white
families. Alan J. Aja et al., The Color of Wealth, The Kirwan Institute, Samuel
DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity, and Insight Center for Community
Economic Development 1, 7—10 (2019), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2019/02/The-Color-of-Wealth-in-Miami-Metro.pdf; How Families of
Color are Faring in Florida, Corp. for Enterprise Dev. (Jan. 2016),
https://catalystmiami.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/racial-disparity-FL.pdf. The
Black unemployment rate is twice as high in Florida when compared to the white
unemployment rate. Aja at 39–40.
48.

There are a multitude of collateral consequences triggered by a

felony conviction, including ineligibility for federally subsidized housing, driver’s

32

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license suspension, and employment barriers. These collateral consequences make
the financial circumstances of returning citizens far less tenable, hampering reentry
and leaving them with limited resources to pay outstanding LFOs.
II.

Florida’s Voter Registration Process

49.

Once Amendment 4 became effective, Floridians who had their

rights restored by operation of the amendment could register to vote using the same
process as all other voters.
50.

Before SB7066, to register to vote, an individual must first obtain a

voter registration form in hard copy or online. See Fla. Stat. §§ 97.052; 97.0525.
This form is statewide and is currently Form DS-DE #39, R1s-2.040, F.A.C.,
available at https://dos.myflorida.com/media/693757/dsde39.pdf (last visited May
24, 2019).
51.

The form gave the applicant the option to check a box with the

following statement: “I affirm that I am not a convicted felon, or if I am, my right
to vote has been restored.” Id. (emphasis added).
52.

Voter registration forms were “designed so that convicted felons

whose civil rights have been restored . . . are not required to reveal their prior
conviction or adjudication.” Fla. Stat. § 97.052(2)(u).
53.

SB7066 amends Florida’s voter registration form to give returning

citizens three options—one stating that an individual has “never been convicted of

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a felony,” a second stating that an individual’s “voting rights have been restored by
the Board of Executive Clemency,” and a third stating that an individual’s “voting
rights have been restored pursuant to [Amendment 4].” Id. § 97.052(2)(t). There is
no box for individuals who lose their voting rights due to a felony conviction in
another state and have their rights restored by that state before moving to Florida.
See Dep’t of State Advisory Opinion 04-05, 2–3 (May 27, 2004), available at
http://opinions.dos.state.fl.us/searchable/pdf/2004/de0405.pdf

(“Those

persons

convicted of felonies outside of Florida whose voting rights were restored by the
state wherein the felony was committed, may register to vote in Florida. No
evidence of the civil rights restoration is required at the time of registration.”).
54.

Applicants with a prior felony conviction who have completed “all

terms of sentence” need not provide affirmative evidence that their voting rights
have been restored beyond these affirmations. As the Florida Department of State,
Division of Elections explained in a formal Advisory Opinion:
Felons who have had their rights restored, whether they were
convicted in Florida or in another state, do not need to present
evidence of restoration of rights at the time of application for
voter registration. Checking the appropriate box on the voter
registration application representing that although they are
convicted felons, their civil rights have been restored, and
signing the oath included in the application affirming that the
information provided is correct, is sufficient. Such
representations are all that is required under the Florida election
laws.
Id. at 2.
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55.

Florida SOEs are required to accept voter registration applications

from all applicants in their county offices. Fla. Stat. § 97.053(1). An application is
complete, and should be approved, (a) when “all information necessary to establish
the applicant’s eligibility pursuant to § 97.041 is received by a voter registration
official,” and (b) when that information is “verified pursuant to” Id. § 97.053(6).
Id. § 97.053(2).
56.

All voter registration applications received by a voter registration

official must be entered into the statewide registration system within 13 days of
receipt, at which point it “shall be immediately forwarded to the appropriate
supervisor of elections.” Id. § 97.053(7). Upon receipt of a voter registration
application, the SOE “must notify [the] applicant of the disposition of the . . .
application within 5 business days after voter registration information is entered
into the statewide voter registration system.” Id. § 97.073(1).
57.

The SOE’s notification “must inform the applicant that the

application has been approved, is incomplete, has been denied, or is a duplicate of
a current registration.” Id. The mailing of a voter information card “constitutes
notice of approval of registration.” Id. “If the application is incomplete, the
supervisor must request that the applicant supply the missing information using a
voter registration application signed by the applicant.” Id.

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58.

The voter registration process is a uniquely effective way for third-

party voter registration organizations to communicate nonpartisan political
messages and encourage fellow citizens to participate in the political process.
Voter registration activities provide the opportunity for organizational Plaintiffs’
members and volunteers, and other third-party voter registration organizations, to
exercise their First Amendment rights.
III.
59.

Challenged Provisions of SB7066
SB7066 creates two classes of citizens: those who can afford to have

their voting rights restored and those who are too poor to vote, a disproportionate
number of whom are racial minorities.
60.

In practice, SB7066 would maintain long-term—and in many cases

permanent—disenfranchisement for a large majority of returning citizens. Many
individuals with debt incurred as a result of a conviction are indigent and will not
have the means to pay their LFOs immediately (or ever). See Alicia Bannon et al.,
Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, Brennan Ctr. for Just. 1, 4 (2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines
%20FINAL.pdf (An estimated “80–90 percent of those charged with criminal
offenses qualify for indigent defense.”). And even for those returning citizens who
are not indigent, many have incurred massive fines, fees, or restitution obligations

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that they cannot pay in full immediately, which means that they would be
disenfranchised in election after election due to their inability to pay.
61.

Even though many returning citizens in Florida have been convicted

in federal or out-of-state courts, the LFOs imposed under Florida law provide
important context for understanding the burdens imposed by SB7066. Persons
convicted in Florida state courts can be assessed fines, fees, costs, and restitution.
Courts assess fines in addition to, or, where authorized by statute, in lieu of, other
penalties, including incarceration. See Fla. Stat. § 775.083(1). “If a defendant is
unable to pay a fine, the court may defer payment of the fine to a date certain.” Id.
Fines are deposited by the clerk of the court in the county’s fine and forfeiture
fund. Id.
62.

In Florida, court costs are often mandatory, and offset the costs of

maintaining the criminal justice system. 7 See Fla. Stat. Ch. 938. The sentencing
7

The Supreme Court has recently observed that state and local governments have
an incentive to generate revenue by imposing abusive LFOs on individuals in the
criminal justice system. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (“[F]ines may be employed
‘in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for
‘fines are a source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State
money.’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n.9 (1991)); id.
(“Perhaps because they are politically easier to impose than generally applicable
taxes, state and local governments nationwide increasingly depend heavily on fines
and fees as a source of general revenue.”) (quoting Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties
Union et al. as Am. Curiae, Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, 2018 WL 4462202,
at *7 (Sep. 10, 2018)). In Florida, between 1996 and 2010, the legislature added
more than 20 new categories of LFOs for criminal defendants while
simultaneously eliminating most exemptions for those unable to pay. Rebekah
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court has jurisdiction to ensure compliance with court cost obligations. Id.
§ 938.30(1). Certain costs are statutorily required, irrespective of a defendant’s
indigence and inability to pay. See, e.g., id. § 938.27(2)(a) (“The court shall
impose the costs of prosecution and investigation notwithstanding the defendant’s
present ability to pay.”); § 938.29(1)(b) (“Upon entering a judgment of conviction,
the defendant shall be liable to pay the attorney’s fees and costs in full . . . The
court shall impose the attorney’s fees and costs notwithstanding the defendant’s
present ability to pay.”). A court may defer certain costs after determining a
person’s inability to pay or order compliance with a payment schedule. See id.
§ 938.30(9)-(10). A court may also enforce LFOs in the manner allowed in civil
cases, including as a lien against property, which secures the judgment amount as
well as interest and costs. See id. § 938.30(6).
63.

Florida courts order restitution pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§ 960.29(3)(a)–

(b), typically based on the amount of loss sustained by the victim as a result of a
defendant’s actions. Id. § 775.089(6)(a). When determining whether to order
restitution and its amount, a trial court “shall consider the amount of the loss
sustained by any victim as a result of the offense.” Id. “[T]he defendant’s financial
resources or ability to pay does not have to be established when the trial court
Diller, The Hidden Cost of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 1, 1 Brennan Ctr. for
Just.
(2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice
/FloridaF&F.pdf?nocdn=1 (“Diller Report”).
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assesses and imposes restitution.” Noel v. State, 191 So.3d 370, 375 (Fla. 2016)
(quotation marks omitted).
64.

A criminal court may require that a defendant make restitution within

a specified period or in specified installments. Id. § 775.089(3)(b).
65.

A court may convert an outstanding restitution from a criminal to a

civil obligation if full payment is not made within a given period. See id.
§ 775.089(3)(d).8
66.

SB7066 states that, to complete “all terms of sentence,” there must be

“[f]ull payment of restitution ordered to a victim by the court as part of the
sentence.” Id. § 98.075(2)(a)(5)(a). SB7066 also requires “[f]ull payment of fines
or fees ordered by the court as a part of the sentence or that are ordered by the
court as a condition of any form of supervision. Id. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(b). The bill
specifies that these financial obligations “include only the amount specifically
ordered by the court as part of the sentence and do not include any fines, fees, or
costs that accrue after the date the obligation is ordered as a part of the sentence.”
Id. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(c). SB7066 then specifies that “[t]he requirement to pay any

8

Restitution is also reduced to a civil judgment if the court does not order
supervision. See Fla. Stat. § 775.089(3)(d). If restitution claims are transferred to a
civil lien, victims or the state may enforce that civil restitution lien in the same
manner as a judgment in a civil action. Id. § 960.294(2).

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financial obligation specified . . . is not deemed completed upon conversion to a
civil lien.” Id. at § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(e)(III).
67.

In other words, SB7066 requires that returning citizens pay all

financial obligations specified within a sentencing document before registering to
vote, even if the obligation has been converted to a civil judgment, and without
requiring any determination that they can pay those financial obligations. Indeed,
SB7066 requires full payment of LFOs even in cases where returning citizens have
no ability to pay outstanding financial obligations. This requirement is perversely
punitive if a court has converted LFOs from criminal to civil obligations. SB7066
also erroneously attempts to redefine LFOs that have been converted to civil liens
as a term of a criminal sentence for purposes of extending individuals’
disenfranchisement. 9
68.

Many returning citizens have outstanding financial obligations that

they cannot pay. The Florida Circuit Criminal Courts in 2018 reported that “the
collections rate for fines and fees was just 20.55%.” Fines & Fees Justice Center,

9

At a joint House committee hearing, Frederick Lauten, Chief Judge of Florida’s
Ninth Judicial Circuit, testified that “enforcement []post-sentence” is a “judicial
obligation,” and that “when the lawful authority to detain or supervise a person
comes to an end, the sentence is completed in the view of [FDOC], regardless of
how that authority came to an end.” Video: Feb. 14, 2019, Jnt. House Meeting of
the Criminal J. Subcomm. & the Judiciary Comm. at 1:03:00–1:04:32
https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/2-14-19-joint-house-meeting-of-the-criminaljustice-subcommittee-and-the-judiciary-committee/ (last visited May 26, 2019).
40

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Annual Assessments and Collections Report [Florida, 2013–2018] (Sept. 30,
2018),

https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/annual-assessments-and-

collections-report-florida-2013-2018/. This suggests that the vast majority of
Floridians cannot fully pay their outstanding LFOs and that SB7066 would have a
massive disenfranchising effect. Indeed, more than 83 percent of all court-related
fines and fees are labeled as “minimal collections expectations.” Id. This means the
Clerk of the Courts Association does not anticipate receiving a payment on the
debt because of the person’s financial status. Id. 10
69.

In a superficial response to sustained public criticism of SB7066’s

disenfranchising impact, the bill sponsors purported to add a failsafe that would
allow returning citizens to fulfill their LFOs without full payment if a court
modifies their sentence. See Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(5)(e)(III). But the putative failsafe
is fatally inadequate and ineffectual for multiple reasons.

10

Mainstream media has reported on this reality. One news report, for example,
found that between 2013 and 2018 alone, Florida had issued more than $1 billion
in felony fines, only 19 percent of which has been paid back per year. Daniel
Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being Able to Vote
in Florida, WLRN Public Radio and Television (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/felons-might-have-pay-hundreds-millions-being-ablevote-florida. In Miami-Dade County, there are more than $278 million in
outstanding court fines from felony convictions; in Palm Beach County, more than
$195.8 million in outstanding court fines from felony convictions (including
interest) remain outstanding. Id.
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70.

First, for residents with out-of-state11 or federal convictions, like

Plaintiffs Leicht and Phalen, Florida courts have no jurisdiction to modify or
terminate their sentences. In addition, Florida criminal courts may not have
authority to waive financial obligations once those obligations are converted to
civil liens. See Video: May 3, 2019 House Sess. Part 2 (“May 3 House Hearing”)
at 1:24:47, https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/5-3-19-house-session-part-2/ (in
which Representative Joe Geller states that “once [a financial obligation] can no
longer be enforced by contempt . . . it is no longer part of a criminal sentence”)
(last visited May 7, 2019); see also supra note 9.
71.

Second, even for in-state convictions, SB7066 permits modification

only in two scenarios that are plainly not viable in the vast majority of cases: (1) if
a third-party payee approves “through appearance in open court” or “production of
notarized consent” the termination of a returning citizen’s LFOs and a court
approves, or (2) if a court exercises its discretion to “convert[] the financial
obligation to community service,” and the individual completes that community
service obligation. Id. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(e).
72.

Under the first scenario, third party payees—including insurance

companies, for-profit debt collection agencies, and private individuals—appear to
11

House bill sponsor Representative James Grant conceded as much when
testifying before the state House, stating that the modification remedy “probably
doesn’t help” returning citizens with out-of-state convictions. May 3 House
Hearing at 13:48. “There’s nothing we can really do about that,” he added. Id.
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have absolute discretion to grant or deny a person’s request for approval to
terminate LFOs, for any reason, no reason, or based on personal whims. Id.
§ 98.0751(2)(e)(II). SB7066 provides no standard or guidance to courts or state
agencies on whether to approve termination of LFOs when acting as a payee,
thereby inviting arbitrary determinations. And, SB7066 provides no mechanism for
approval if a payee is unavailable or non-responsive.
73.

Under the second scenario, conversion of LFOs to community

service is discretionary: courts are under no obligation to provide an opportunity
for a returning citizen to convert her LFOs into a community service obligation,
even if that court finds that the individual has no ability to pay. See id. § 938.30(2);
see also Video: May 3, 2019 House Sess. Part 2 (“May 3 House Hearing”) at
37:33, https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/5-3-19-house-session-part-2/ (House
sponsor Representative James Grant testifying that SB7066 did not require that any
courts or circuits have a community service conversion program, stating only that
circuits could follow whatever practices they currently undertake).
74.

Community service conversion is also rare in practice—the Florida

Clerks of Court found in 2008 that “only 16 of 67 counties reported converting any
mandatory LFOs imposed in felony cases to community service,” and “[o]f those
16 that did report using community service, 10 converted less than $3000 of
mandatory LFOs to community service in one year.” Diller Report at 23. House

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sponsor Representative James Grant conceded that the bill did not require that any
courts or circuits have a community service conversion program, stating only that
circuits could follow whatever practices they currently undertake. May 3 House
Hearing at 37:33. 12 Further, Florida law requires that individuals performing courtordered community service get paid at the federal minimum hourly wage, see Fla.
Stat. §§ 938.30(2), 318(18)(a)–(b), currently $7.25 per hour—meaning that it will
take any returning citizens with more than de minimis financial obligations
exceedingly lengthy periods of time to regain their right to vote via community
service. When Representative Anna Eskamani raised this latter point—that lowerincome returning citizens would not have a pathway to rights restoration because
the hourly rates for community service are so low—House sponsor Representative
Grant said only: “that’s not a concern.” May 3 House Hearing at 1:02.
75.

Ultimately, in both design and effect, SB7066 disqualifies individual

Plaintiffs and members of organizational Plaintiffs Florida NAACP and Orange
County NAACP, who have completed the terms of their sentence including

12

The bill sponsor, Senator Jeff Brandes, also acknowledged “there is no definitive
standard” but it is simply an option for returning citizens to return to court to
petition that their financial hardship be a basis for conversion. Video: May 2
Senate Hearing (“May 2 Senate Hearing”) at 6:30:41, https://www.flsenate.gov
/media/VideoPlayer?EventID=2443575804_2019051020&Redirect=true
(testimony from Sen. Brandes).
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probation or parole, from eligibility to vote because of outstanding financial
obligations that they are unable to pay.
IV.
76.

Legislative History of SB7066
After Amendment 4’s passage, the House and Senate held hearings

related to HB7089, SB7086, and SB7066, discussed in more detail below. Even
though these hearings were truncated because sponsors openly refused to consider
key information, the record revealed three overriding flaws with the Legislature’s
alteration of the rights guaranteed by Amendment 4. First, the hearings showed
that it will be practically impossible for Florida officials to determine who is, and
is not, automatically restored and eligible to register under SB7066. For example,
Lee Adams, Chief of FDOC’s Bureau of Admission and Release, testified that
FDOC in many cases “has no way of knowing” if an individual has not completed
her financial obligations after termination of supervision. Video: Feb. 14, 2019,
Jnt. House Meeting of the Criminal J. Subcomm. & the Judiciary Comm. at 1:18,
https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/2-14-19-joint-house-meeting-of-the-criminaljustice-subcommittee-and-the-judiciary-committee/ (last visited May 7, 2019).
Carolyn Timmann, Martin County Clerk of Court, stated that county clerks have
“some [] limitations” in their data on returning citizens, the biggest one being
restitution, and “in the majority [of cases], we do not [have restitution
information].” Id. at 29:56, 54:18. Timmann testified that courts often order

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individuals to pay restitution directly to victims, for which there are no receipts or
documentation. Id at 54:18.
77.

Representative Grant, who sponsored HB7089, conceded that there is

no existing database or repository that conclusively provides SOEs with
information about whether a returning citizen paid all LFOs. Video: Apr. 23, 2019,
House

Floor

Hearing

(“April

23

Hearing”)

at

7:04:00–7:04:07,

https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=2443575804
_2019041264 (“There is no stakeholder in the State of Florida that can serve as a
source of truth that somebody completed all terms of their sentence.”); see also
Video Feb. 14, 2019, House Comm. Joint Hearing at 1:03:30–1:04:05,
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=2443575804
_2019021160; May 3 House Hearing at 42:49 (stating that there were “data . . .
spread out all over government,” and that there was no “efficient or effective” way
for Florida officials to compile that data in one place).
78.

Additionally, SB7066 fails to provide any criteria or guidelines for

how an SOE is supposed to “verify and make a final determination . . . regarding
whether the person who registers to vote is eligible pursuant” to Amendment 4,
Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(3)(b) (2019), or to evaluate evidence presented at a hearing to
determine the eligibility of a returning citizen when the evidence is questioned or
challenged.

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79.

Second, legislators heard from returning citizens who were permitted

to testify at some committee hearings, all of whom testified that provisions enacted
in SB7066 would permanently disenfranchise them based on their inability to pay
outstanding LFOs. Legislators heard from Plaintiff Karen Leicht, who testified that
she had $58 million in outstanding restitution obligations despite dutifully making
monthly payments. Video: Mar. 25, 2019, Hearing of Senate Comm. on Criminal
J. (“March 25 Hearing”) at 1:31, https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/3-25-19senate-committee-on-criminal-justice (last visited May 7, 2019). Ms. Leicht
testified that at the time her probation officially ended, “it was my complete and
total understanding that at that point, when I signed that paper, I was free,” id. at
1:32, but that at first she was too “timorous” to register to vote because she did not
“want to be considered to have committed any crime,” id. at 1:36. After her
testimony, Senator Jason Pizzo, who represents Ms. Leicht’s state senate district,
told her to “go register to vote” and that she would not be prosecuted. Id. at 1:38.13
Legislators also heard from Erica Racz, a returning citizen who spent 13 years in
13

Nothing about Senator Pizzo’s recommendation prevents Florida from
attempting to purge Ms. Leicht or any of the other individual Plaintiffs from the
voter rolls based on outstanding LFOs. Nothing about Senator Pizzo’s
recommendation prevents the State from prosecuting returning citizens with
outstanding LFOs who believe that their rights were restored under Amendment 4
and register to vote after July 1, 2019. Senator Brandes stated as much: it would
“depend on individual facts” and be “up to the discretion of the prosecutor.” May 2
Senate Hearing at 7:16:28–7:16:51 (colloquy between Senator Rodriquez and
Senator Brandes).
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prison and four years on probation, who testified that she “cannot afford” her
$57,000 in outstanding financial obligations as a single mother: “You want me to
pay the government $57,000 to vote?” Video: Apr. 4, 2019, Hearing of House
Comm. on State Affairs (“April 4 Hearing”) at 3:42, https://thefloridachannel.org
/videos/4-4-19-house-state-affairs-committee/ (last visited May 7, 2019). And
legislators heard from Coral Nichols, a returning citizen who now runs a nonprofit
called Empowered to Change, who testified that she has $190,000 in outstanding
restitution. “At $100 a month, I will be 190 years old before I am eligible to vote,”
she testified. Video: Apr. 9, 2019, Hearing of House Comm. on Judiciary at 3:24,
https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/4-9-19-house-committee-on-judiciary/

(last

visited May 7, 2019).
80.

Public debate among legislators showed that they were plainly aware

that SB7066 would disenfranchise voters. At one hearing, for example,
Representative Adam Hattersley stated, “we’d create two classes of returning
citizens. . . . There would be a minority of well-off individuals who would be able
to repay their fines quickly and regain the right to vote; then, there’d be indigent
citizens.” April 4 Hearing at 3:49. Representative Michael Grieco warned that the
proposed legislation would not be faithful to “the will of the voters,” which was
“very clear” that “1.4 million Floridians or more” would have their voting rights
restored. Video: Mar. 19, 2019, Hearing of House Subcomm. on Criminal J. at

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1:41,

https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/3-19-19-house-criminal-justice-

subcommittee/ (last visited May 7, 2019).
81.

Third, the sponsors of the House and Senate legislation willfully

refused to empirically study or determine how many people would be
disenfranchised on account of their legislation. In the House, sponsor
Representative Grant said that he did not know or care how many people would be
disenfranchised if the legislation passed: “I was asked, have I done a study to know
how many people are impacted by this. I said no. They said, are you willing to take
a study. I said no. And here’s why. I’m happy to review when we’re done,
members. But members, I don’t want to know the impact of this. Because it’s
irrelevant.” April 4 Hearing at 3:57. A month later, he told the full House that he
“intentionally stayed blind to the data of the affected classes.” May 3 House
Hearing at 1:06.
82.

In the Senate, when asked how many Floridians have outstanding

financial obligations, bill co-sponsor Senator Keith Perry said that he did not
know. March 25 Hearing at 35:07. These statements suggest that legislators
deliberately chose not to consider specific data documenting the fact that the law
will disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of returning citizens because they are
experiencing poverty, with a stark disproportionate impact based on race. But the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that lawmakers may be presumed to be

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familiar with the demographics and socioeconomics of their state. Cf. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (“[T]he legislature always is aware of race when it
draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.”). This
presumption should be particularly salient in this context, given that HB7089 and
SB7086 arose in the House and Senate’s respective Criminal Justice
Subcommittees, where members are aware of the racial and socioeconomic
demographics of the Florida and federal criminal systems, including the rates of
felony disenfranchisement by race, discussed supra. These members are aware that
people with felony convictions commonly have LFOs following completion of
incarceration and supervision, that the vast majority of LFOs go uncollected by the
state because many people cannot pay them, and that persistent wealth disparities
exist between Black and non-Black individuals and families in Florida.
83.

Similarly, willful avoidance of inconvenient information does not

preclude knowledge of such facts, particularly when they are a matter of “common
sense.” See United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“[D]eliberate ignorance is the equivalent of knowledge.”). The Legislature
presumptively knew that SB7066 would disproportionately harm Black citizens.
84.

Based on the likely racial and socioeconomic impact of the proposed

laws and the difficulties that many returning citizens have in paying LFOs,

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advocates urged both chambers to study the racial and other impact of the bills.
See, e.g., Letter from Leah Aden et al., Deputy Dir. of Litig., LDF, to the Fla.
Senate (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/NAACPLDF-and-FLorida-NAACP-Opposition-to-SB-7086.pdf; Letter from Leah Aden et
al., Deputy Dir. of Litig., LDF, to the Fla. House of Representatives (Apr. 22,
2019),

https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/House-of-Representatives

_2019-04-22_NAACP-LDF-and-FL-NAACP-Opposition-to-HB-7089_final.pdf.
85.

Members of the Black caucus inquired about the racial impact of the

bills. See, e.g., April 23 Hearing at 7:05:31-7:05:40, (colloquy between Rep.
Driskell and Rep. Grant). As discussed above, Representative Grant went on to
state that: “I have intentionally not looked at the numbers.” Id. at 7:06:00–7:06:40.
V.
86.

Specific Sequence of Events Leading to SB7066’s Passage
During consideration of HB7089 and SB7086, House and Senate

members proposed amendments to each bill that would have mitigated the
restrictive and discriminatory impacts of the proposed legislation. Both chambers,
however, rejected significantly ameliorative amendments, such as one introduced
by Representative McGhee, who is Black, that would have removed the
requirement to pay all LFOs. Id. at 8:21:45.
87.

On April 29, 2019, Senator Brandes introduced a strike-all

amendment to the House bill, HB7089, that included the harshest LFO

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requirements and imposed burdens on SOEs to verify eligibility. 14 The strike-all
amendment also included new language that was not in previous versions of the
House and Senate bills, including changes to the uniform voter registration form,
as discussed above.
88.

Without further debate on SB7086, on May 2, 2019, Senator Brandes

introduced a new strike-all amendment to an entirely separate Senate elections
bill—SB7066.
89.

This strike-all amendment was a hybrid of the most restrictive

aspects of HB7089 and SB7086 and mandated new burdens, discussed supra.
These aspects include: requiring the payment of all LFOs, including those
converted to civil obligations; placing unfunded mandates and burdens on SOEs;
and forcing returning citizens to reveal their felony conviction on the voter
registration form.
90.

There was no need for such a restrictive LFO requirement. The

disconnect between the provisions of SB7066 and the issues it purports to address

14

Tellingly, in a colloquy between Senator Pizzo and Senator Brandes on May 2,
Senator Brandes conceded that alternative, less restrictive iterations of the Senate
Bill from weeks past effectuated the “will of the electorate,” particularly with
respect to those versions’ treatment of the terms of sentence provision. May 2
Senate Hearing at 6:35:50–6:38:38 (colloquy between Senator Pizzo and Senator
Brandes).
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support the inference that the proffered justifications are pretext for an
impermissible motive.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Violation of Fundamental Fairness
91.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
92.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars

states from depriving “any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law”
and from depriving “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”
93.

The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment prohibit states from imposing punishment for non-payment of LFOs
without a prior determination that the individual was able to pay and willfully
refused to do so. The Fourteenth Amendment’s doctrine of fundamental fairness
prevents states from punishing individuals if they fail to do the impossible—satisfy
legal financial obligations when they do not have the means to do so. See, e.g.,
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983);
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189

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(1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
94.

Plaintiffs have completed all of the terms of their sentences including

parole or probation.
95.

Plaintiffs have outstanding civil obligations for court costs, fees,

fines, and restitution resulting from a conviction.
96.

Mr. Gruver owes $801 in court costs and fees as a result of felony

convictions. Mr. Mitchell owes approximately $2,143 in court costs and fees as a
result of a felony conviction fourteen years ago when he was seventeen years old.
Ms. Riddle owes approximately $1,800 in court costs and fees as a result of felony
convictions. Mr. Wrench owes $3,000 in court costs and fees as a result of felony
convictions. Ms. Wright owes at least $50,000 in court costs and a fine as a result
of a felony conviction. Ms. Leicht owes approximately $58 million in outstanding
restitution jointly and severally with her former co-defendants as a result of a
conviction. Mr. Phalen owes about $110,000 in outstanding restitution and court
costs and fees. Mr. Miller owes $1,221.25 in outstanding court costs and fines.
Pastor Tyson owes court costs and fees, though Florida records are unclear about
how much he has outstanding. Plaintiffs are unable to pay these obligations.
97.

SB7066 violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment by disqualifying Plaintiffs from voting solely for failure to

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pay outstanding LFOs despite the fact that (1) they are unable to pay, and (2) there
has been no prior determination that they willfully refused to pay.
98.

SB7066 violates the Fourteenth Amendment by conditioning

Plaintiffs’ right to vote on payment of LFOs that Plaintiffs cannot pay.
COUNT TWO
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unconstitutional Discrimination in Violation of Equal Protection
99.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
100.

SB7066 invidiously discriminates between Florida citizens with a

prior felony who can pay their LFOs, and Florida citizens with a prior felony who
cannot pay.
101.

It is well established that “a citizen has a constitutionally protected

right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); see Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (“Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote
over that of another.”).
102.

A state “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an

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electoral standard.” Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966);
see also Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir.
2005) (“Access to the franchise cannot be made to depend on an individual’s
financial resources.”) (quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 668)).
103.

The Equal Protection Clause applies to felony disenfranchisement

and rights-restoration laws. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230 (“Plaintiffs have a
remedy if the state’s [felony disenfranchisement] provision violates the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
104.

SB7066 unconstitutionally conditions exercise of Plaintiffs’ voting

rights on their ability to pay outstanding LFOs, even after Plaintiffs have
completed the terms of their sentences and probation.
105.

Plaintiffs are not able to pay their outstanding LFOs.

106.

There is no rational, let alone compelling, basis for disenfranchising

Plaintiffs when they cannot pay LFOs or when they are paying LFOs but cannot
afford to complete payment immediately.
107.

Plaintiffs’ ability to pay these financial obligations is not germane to

their qualification to participate in elections.
108.

SB7066 would keep Plaintiffs in limbo and deprived of the right to

vote for election after election—often for life—based solely on their lack of
wealth, an arbitrary and unconstitutional distinction.

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109.

SB7066 serves no legitimate state purpose because it disenfranchises

Plaintiffs solely due to inability to pay their LFOs, a distinction not at all connected
to participation in elections.
110.

For those who cannot pay, disenfranchisement will not foster their

payment.
111.

Denying the right to vote does not and cannot incentivize payment of

LFOs that a person cannot pay.
COUNT THREE
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unconstitutional Burden on the Fundamental Right to Vote
112.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
113.

The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards the “precious” and

“fundamental” right to vote, Harper, 383 U.S. at 670, and prohibits any
encumbrance on the right to vote that is not adequately justified by valid and
specific state interests, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983).
114.

Courts reviewing a challenge to a law that burdens the right to vote

“must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the right[]’” to
vote “against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those

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interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
115.

Plaintiffs are registered voters and have the fundamental right to

116.

Defendants confirmed Plaintiffs’ eligibility to vote and added

vote.

Plaintiffs to the registration rolls.
117.

As an eligible registered voter, Mr. Gruver voted in the March 2019

Gainesville municipal election.
118.

As an eligible registered voter, Mr. Ivey voted in the March and May

2019 Duval County elections.
119.

As an eligible registered voter, Pastor Tyson voted in March and

April 2019 Tampa municipal elections.
120.

SB7066 imposes a severe burden on Plaintiffs’ right to vote.

Plaintiffs will be completely, and likely permanently, disenfranchised by Fla. Stat.
§§ 98.0751(1)–(2)(a).
121.

The severity of SB7066’s burden is heightened because the barrier to

the franchise disparately affects those citizens who are already among the most
vulnerable: people with a past conviction who lack the means to pay outstanding
LFOs.

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122.

Plaintiffs’ disenfranchisement under SB7066 does not serve any of

the rationales advanced by the Legislature to justify passage, or any other
legitimate state interest.
123.

Disenfranchising Plaintiffs does not serve to collect debt because

SB7066 cannot incentivize payment of a debt that Plaintiffs cannot afford to pay.
124.

It is unconstitutionally burdensome for the state to condition

Plaintiffs’ fundamental voting rights on their ability to pay the entirety of
their LFOs, which they are unable to pay.
125.

In addition, due to the lack of accurate, centralized information on

outstanding LFOs, it is difficult—if not impossible—for potential registrants to
determine whether their debt would disqualify them under SB7066.
126.

In order to determine their eligibility, Plaintiffs would have to contact

numerous agencies and conduct research of court records. Even with these efforts,
it may be impossible for many to determine their eligibility.
127.

SB7066 thereby places an unnecessary burden on the right to vote

without advancing a valid state interest.

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COUNT FOUR
Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unconstitutional Poll Tax
128.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
129.

SB7066 violates the prohibition against poll taxes enshrined in the

Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
130.

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment guarantees that the right to vote

“shall not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax.” U.S. Const. Am. XXIV.
131.

SB7066 requires LFO payment as a condition for exercising the right

to vote and without regard to whether Plaintiffs are able to pay.
132.

SB7066 excludes returning citizens with outstanding restitution

obligations from all means of restoration. Returning citizens cannot apply for
restoration through clemency unless they have completed their restitution
obligations. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Rule 9.A. The Florida Supreme Court
understood Amendment 4 to limit the Clemency Board’s case-by-case restoration
review to “only for those persons convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses,
rather than for all felony offenders[.]” Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General,
215 So. 3d at 1207.

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133.

Excluding Plaintiffs entirely from any chance at restoration imposes

an unconstitutional poll tax on Plaintiffs and other returning citizens.
COUNT FIVE
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Vagueness and Violation of Procedural Due Process
134.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
135.

A law is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process

Clause if it either (1) “fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits,” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 732 (2000), or (2) fails to “provide explicit standards for those who apply” the
law such that “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” is authorized or even
encouraged, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). See also
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1160–61
(N.D. Fla. 2012) (finding a “virtually unintelligible” voter registration regulation
that is accompanied by substantial penalties is void for vagueness).
136.

Florida lacks any accurate or centralized data on outstanding LFOs

that prospective voter registrants may access.

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137.

Officials from Florida agencies tasked with implementation of

Amendment 4 have testified that they do not have sufficient information to carry
out SB7066’s requirements.
138.

Without a centralized, up-to-date database, returning citizens are

often unaware of whether they have any outstanding LFOs or how much LFO debt
they owe.
139.

For example, Mr. Ivey has outstanding LFOs incurred more than 15

years ago but was unaware of the remaining debt until a reporter informed him of it
in 2019.
140.

Mr. Mitchell had outstanding LFOs incurred over a decade ago when

he was a juvenile, but was unaware of the debt until the Miami-Dade Clerk of
Court sent him a notice of the debt at his registration address soon after he
registered to vote.
141.

Mr. Tyson incurred his LFOs decades ago, but only became aware

that some were outstanding after being notified recently by counsel.
142.

Though SB7066 specifies that returning citizens need only repay

LFOs that were originally imposed by a court as part of sentence, returning citizens
may not be able to tell whether outstanding LFOs fall into this category. Charges,
including interest, collection fees, and other assessments charged after the fact, are
not disaggregated by the courts.

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143.

Furthermore, while SB7066 delineates LFOs in terms of the type of

fines, fees, and restitution incurred and owed for offenses adjudicated in Florida
courts, it provides no information or guidance on analogous financial obligations
or civil debt incurred in other states that would be disqualifying for purposes of
SB7066.
144.

SB7066 violates procedural due process by failing to provide

prospective registrants sufficient information or fair warning regarding whether
LFOs continue to disqualify them from voting. The absence of this information
impermissibly chills Plaintiffs’ exercise of their fundamental right to register and
vote.
145.

SB7066 violates procedural due process by failing to provide any

standards or factors under which an SOE can “verify and make a final
determination . . . regarding whether the person who registers to vote is eligible
pursuant to [Amendment 4] and this section,” therefore ensuring arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(3)(b) (2019).
146.

SB7066 violates procedural due process by failing to provide any

standards or factors under which a prospective voter registrant would be able to
seek, or a court would grant, termination of LFOs or conversion to community
service hours pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5)(e)(II–III), therefore ensuring
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

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147.

SB7066 violates procedural due process by failing to provide any

mechanism or standard by which a prospective registrant would be able to appeal
an adverse determination on a request for termination of financial obligations or
conversion to community service.
148.

SB7066 violates procedural due process by failing to provide any

process for individuals with convictions in other states to seek waiver, termination,
or conversion to community service.
COUNT SIX
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Burden on Core Political Speech and Associational Rights
149.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
150.

LWVF has a First Amendment right to speak, associate, and act

collectively with others in order to register voters.
151.

LWVF cannot determine whether many potential registrants have

satisfied their LFOs. LWVF volunteers do not have access to state data to help
potential registrants determine whether all terms of their sentences are complete.
Some volunteers will not engage in registration activities because of their
concerns.

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152.

SB7066 also limits the ability of individual Floridians, without

specialized training, to assist returning citizens with registering to vote, a civic
service that many of LWVF’s members and volunteers have routinely performed
of their own accord.
153.

SB7066 thus violates LWVF’s constitutional rights to speech and

association because the law deters LWVF from engaging in protected voter
registration activity. The law prevents LWVF from registering returning citizens
who are in fact eligible to vote because LWVF volunteers lack certainty that
registrants can affirm that they have completed all terms of their sentences.
154.

The success of LWVF’s voter registration drives is severely

undermined by uncertainty as to whether a potential registrant has satisfied all
LFOs imposed as part of a criminal sentence.
155.

As alleged above, SB7066 does not advance any legitimate, much

less compelling, state interest.
COUNT SEVEN
Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Retroactive Punishment in Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause
156.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

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157.

Article 1, Section 10, of the United States Constitution provides that

“[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law” that retroactively punishes or
extends sanctions imposed on any citizen.
158.

Plaintiffs were each convicted of crimes prior to the passage of

SB7066.
159.

Plaintiffs’ voting rights were automatically restored by Amendment 4

on January 8, 2019.
160.

Plaintiffs were registered to vote pursuant to Article VI, Section 4 of

the Florida Constitution prior to the enactment of SB7066.
161.

SB7066’s requirement of full payment of all LFOs despite inability

to pay is punitive in both intent and effect.
162.

State lawmakers referenced the punitive purpose of LFOs in debate

and discussion over SB7066. For instance, House sponsor Representative Grant
referred to “fines, fees, [and] court costs” as “punishment for a crime.” Apr. 4
Hearing at 2:58. In announcing his decision to sign the bill, Gov. DeSantis stated
that, “The only reason you’re paying restitution is because you were convicted of a
felony.” News Service of Florida, Amendment 4 Bill: DeSantis Says He’s Ready to
Sign, Tampa Bay Times (May 8, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2019/05/08/amendment-4-bill-desantis-says-hes-ready-to-sign/
?template=amp/.

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163.

Florida’s felony disenfranchisement law has been used for nearly two

centuries as a form of criminal punishment.
164.

The sanction of disenfranchisement involves an affirmative restraint

on Plaintiffs’ right to vote. There is no alternative, non-punitive purpose for
disenfranchising individuals who are unable to pay.
165.

SB7066 imposes and extends punitive sanctions on Plaintiffs in

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
COUNT EIGHT
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Intentional Race Discrimination
166.

Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each allegation

contained in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
167.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits

intentional discrimination on the basis of race. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The
Fifteenth Amendment forbids the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race or ethnicity. U.S. Const. amend. XV. Both constitutional
protections guard against any deprivation of the right to vote that is motivated by
race. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621–25 (1982).
168.

Because a discriminatory motive may hide behind legislation that

“appears neutral on its face,” the U.S. Supreme Court articulated several non-

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exhaustive factors to inform an analysis of discriminatory intent: (1) evidence that
defendants’ decision bears more heavily on one race than another; (2) the historical
background of the decision; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
decision; (4) departures from the normal procedural sequence; (5) substantive
departures; and (6) legislative history, including “contemporary statements by
members of the decision making body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.” Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–28 (1977).
169.

An official action taken for the purpose of discriminating on account

of race has no legitimacy under the U.S. Constitution. City of Richmond, Va. v.
U.S., 422 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1975).
170.

Demonstrating intentional discrimination “does not require a plaintiff

to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory
purposes.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Instead, the plaintiff’s burden is to
show that the discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, rather than the
primary or sole purpose. Id. at 265–66.
171.

Applying the Arlington Heights factors to the evidence reveals that

SB7066 was enacted, at least in part, with a racially discriminatory intent to
discriminate against Black returning citizens in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
172.

The history underlying Florida’s felony disenfranchisement regime,

the known and reasonably foreseeable discriminatory impact of SB7066, the

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sequence of events and substantive departures from the normal legislative process
which resulted in the enactment of SB7066, and the tenuousness of the stated
justifications for SB7066 raise a strong inference of a discriminatory purpose in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief:
a) Declare Fla. Stat. §§ 98.0751(1)–(2)(a), as amended by SB7066,
unconstitutional in derogation of the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Twenty-Fourth Amendments and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution;
b) Temporarily, preliminarily, and permanently restrain and enjoin the State of
Florida from enforcing the provision of Fla. Stat. §§ 98.0751(1)–(2)(a);
c) Award Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b);
d) Award Plaintiffs their costs of suit; and
e) Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in the
circumstances.

Dated: June 28, 2019

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Julie A. Ebenstein
Julie A. Ebenstein (Fla. Bar No. 91033)
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R. Orion Danjuma*
Jonathan S. Topaz*
Dale E. Ho*
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, Inc.
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Phone: (212) 284-7332
Fax: (212) 549-2654
jebenstein@aclu.org
odanjuma@aclu.org
jtopaz@aclu.org
dho@aclu.org
Daniel Tilley (Fla. Bar No. 102882)
Anton Marino*
American Civil Liberties Union of
Florida
4343 West Flagler St., Suite 400
Miami, FL 33134
(786) 363-2714
dtilley@aclufl.org
amarino@aclufl.org
Jimmy Midyette (Fla. Bar No. 0495859)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Florida
118 W. Adams Street, Suite 510
Jacksonville, FL 32202
904-353-8097
jmidyette@aclufl.org
Leah C. Aden*
John S. Cusick*
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10006
(212) 965-2200
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laden@naacpldf.org
jcusick@naacpldf.org
and
Wendy Weiser
Myrna Pérez
Sean Morales-Doyle*
Eliza Sweren-Becker*
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law
120 Broadway, Suite 1750
New York, NY 10271
(646) 292-8310
wendy.weiser@nyu.edu
myrna.perez@nyu.edu
sean.morales-doyle@nyu.edu
eliza.sweren-becker@nyu.edu
Counsel for Plaintiffs
* pro hac vice applications forthcoming

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 28, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court by using CM/ECF, which automatically serves all counsel
of record for the parties who have appeared.
Additionally, the parties are concurrently being served via email and
physical service of summons and complaint at the following addresses:
KIM A. BARTON, In her Official Capacity as
Alachua County Supervisor of Elections
Josiah T. Walls Building
515 North Main St., Suite 300
Gainesville, FL 32601
kbarton@alachuacounty.us
PETER ANTONACCI, in his Official Capacity as
Broward County Supervisor of Elections
115 S. Andrews Ave.
Room 102
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
elections@browardsoe.org
MIKE HOGAN, In his Official Capacity as
Duval County Supervisor of Elections
105 E. Monroe St.
Jacksonville, FL 32202
mhogan@coj.net
CRAIG LATIMER, In his Official Capacity as
Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections
Fred B. Karl County Center,
601 E. Kennedy Blvd., 16th Floor
Tampa, FL 33602
Voter@hcsoe.org

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LESLIE ROSSWAY SWAN, In her Official Capacity as
Indian River County Supervisor of Elections
4375 43rd Ave.
Vero Beach, FL 32967
Info@voterindianriver.com
MARK EARLEY, In his Official Capacity as
Leon County Supervisor of Elections
2990-1 Apalachee Parkway,
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Vote@LeonCountyFL.gov
MICHAEL BENNETT, In his Official Capacity as
Manatee County Supervisor of Elections
600 301 Boulevard, W., Suite 108
Bradenton, FL 34205
Info@votemanatee.com
CHRISTINA WHITE, In her Official Capacity as
Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections
2700 NW 87 Ave.
Miami, FL 33172
soedade@miamidade.gov
BILL COWLES, In his Official Capacity as
Orange County Supervisor of Elections
119 West Kaley St.
Orlando, FL 32856
voter@ocfelections.com
RON TURNER, in his Official Capacity as
Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections
Terrace Building
101 South Washington Blvd.
Sarasota, FL 34236
rturner@sarasotavotes.com
LAUREL M. LEE, In her Official Capacity as
Secretary of State of Florida
Florida Department of State
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R.A. Gray Building
500 South Bronough St.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
secretaryofState@DOS.MyFlorida.com
DOS.GeneralCounsel@DOS.MyFlorida.com
ASHLEY MOODY, In her Official Capacity as Attorney
General of Florida
Office of Attorney General
State of Florida
The Capitol PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
oag.civil.eserve@myfloridalegal.com

/s/ Julie A. Ebenstein
Julie A. Ebenstein (Fla. Bar No. 91033)
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation, Inc.
Voting Rights Project
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Phone: (212) 284-7332
Fax: (212) 549-2654
jebenstein@aclu.org

74