DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Testimony before
The Senate Committee on Finance
Hearing titled
Foreign Threats to Taxpayer Funded Research: Oversight Opportunities and Policy Solutions

Lawrence A. Tabak, D.D.S. Ph.D.
Principal Deputy Director
National Institutes of Health

June 5, 2019

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 Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wyden, and distinguished members of the
Committee. Thank you for your long-standing support of the biomedical research enterprise and of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) specifically. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss how
NIH works to protect the integrity of the U.S. biomedical enterprise and neutralize foreign threats to the
integrity of taxpayer-funded research.
The United States is the world leader in biomedical research. As the largest public funder of that
research, NIH sets the standard for innovation and scientific discovery that aims to advance the health
of all Americans. We exemplify and promote the highest levels of scientific integrity, public
accountability, and social responsibility in the conduct of science. We promote open collaboration by
leveraging formal and informal collaborations with scientists at research institutions around the world,
which is imperative to solving the most pressing and perplexing health challenges that are facing the
American public. This exchange of knowledge is an essential part of innovation, and it is critical to our
global competitiveness. Foreign-born scientists contribute to improving health, fostering innovation,
and advancing science.
Many recent scientific advances, such as sequencing the human genome, or the development of
the gene-editing tool kit known as CRISPR-Cas were predicated upon international collaborations. Since
2000, 39 percent of U.S. Nobel prizes in physics, chemistry, and medicine have been awarded to foreignborn scientists1. Foreign-born scientists, trainees, and employees at American universities are hard at
work assisting in the advancement of knowledge. U.S. scientists routinely collaborate productively with
investigators in foreign countries, resulting in many scientific successes.

1

https://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/DAY-OF-RELEASE.Nobel-Prize.October-20171.pdf

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 Partnerships with numerous foreign entities are also essential for predicting, and rapidly identifying
and responding to threats from emerging infectious diseases and pathogens. For example, a joint
working group made up of NIH and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) representatives
developed a strategic research program that identifies, reviews, and jointly funds bilateral projects that
address high priority infectious disease concerns, including antimicrobial resistant bacteria and evolving
strains of influenza that could cause global epidemics2. Furthermore, because diseases can and do occur
in many parts of the world, we must rely on productive research collaborations and partnership
programs with foreign entities to share information on seasonal and pre-pandemic influenza viruses,
and to access strains of emerging infectious diseases such as SARS and MERS, Zika, Ebola, and many
others.
Unfortunately, we are aware that a few foreign governments have initiated systematic programs to
capitalize on the collaborative nature of biomedical research and unduly influence U.S.-based
researchers. It is essential for us to continue vigilance and take additional actions to protect the
integrity of the U.S. biomedical research enterprise, while also protecting important relationships with
foreign scientists worldwide.
NIH’s three areas of concern are:
1) failure by some researchers at NIH-funded institutions to disclose substantial contributions of
resources from other organizations, including foreign governments, which threatens to distort
decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds;
2) diversion of proprietary information included in grant applications or produced by NIHsupported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries; and
3) failure by some peer reviewers to keep information in grant applications confidential;
including, in some instances, disclosure to foreign entities or other attempts to influence
funding decisions.

2

https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/us-china-collaborative-biomedical-research-program

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 NIH has taken, and continues to take, a proactive approach to identifying, resolving, and preventing
issues of concern.
NIH identifies and monitors concerns through several channels. We regularly partner with
colleagues at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and other federal agencies, such the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to exchange information on emerging threats. A new dashboard is
being developed to assist NIH in responding to data requests needed for its reviews in this context. In
addition, NIH maintains an open channel of communication with our funded research institutions and
their investigators, several of which have proactively contacted us with concerns.
We have also actively taken steps to increase awareness about peer review integrity with our
employees who lead scientific programs and review meetings. For example, NIH staff were specifically
trained to identify and report suspicious activity on the part of key scientists designated in grant
applications and peer reviewers to the Research Integrity Officer in their NIH Institute or Center, or
directly to our central research integrity official within the Office of the Director.
When concerns are identified, we work with leadership within the awardee institution to quickly
address the issue as appropriate. As of May 2019, we have contacted more than 55 awardee
institutions related to this issue, and this process is ongoing. Our efforts have directly or indirectly led to
actions by awardee institutions (who have the authority to take certain actions as employers). Such
actions include:
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Terminations or suspensions of scientists who have engaged in egregious violations of NIH grant
terms and conditions and institutional policies.
Interventions to address previously un-reported affiliations with foreign institutions.
Relinquishment or refund of NIH funds.
Prohibition of certain individuals from serving as investigators on NIH grants.
Outreach to FBI for assistance.
Discovery (through acquisition of certain foreign grants and contracts) of overlapping or
duplicative work, or conflicts in stating committed effort to research projects. This discovery
has led to NIH suspensions of active grants as appropriate.
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Efforts to raise awareness among institutional faculty about government and institutional
policies dealing with foreign affiliations and relationships (see, for example, the Penn State web
site).3

There have also been situations in which honest mistakes were made by research investigators who
were unaware of the requirement to disclose other funding sources (both domestic and international)
or affiliations with foreign entities. In these cases, we worked with the institutions, which took steps to
help their employees understand disclosure policies; both why they are important, and how to comply
with relevant rules.
We will continue to address issues of concern. To mitigate security breaches, we have improved
the electronic systems that are used by researchers to submit applications to NIH, and that are also used
by peer reviewers to access applications for evaluations. Our security updates include: two-factor
authentication for electronic research system logins; using an all-electronic conflict-of-interest
certification; and, development of a dashboard.
A major focus of our preventive efforts is proactive communication to engage the research
community as partners. For example, on August 23, 2018, the NIH Director issued a statement on
protecting the integrity of U.S. Biomedical Research4, and sent a letter to officials at approximately
10,000 organizations applying for NIH funding. The letter reinforced that NIH and the U.S. biomedical
research community at large have a vested interest in mitigating these unacceptable breaches of trust
and confidentiality that undermine the integrity of U.S. biomedical research.

3

https://www.research.psu.edu/international_affiliations.

4

https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-protecting-integrity-usbiomedical-research

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 We are developing resources to help awardee institutions understand our expectations regarding
research investigators who - in addition to NIH funding - receive additional research funding from
domestic or foreign sources.
As I mentioned, the U.S. biomedical research community at-large has a vested interest in mitigating
these unacceptable breaches of trust and confidentiality. Community engagement is such an important
part of our activities. Last year, we convened a working group of the Advisory Committee to the NIH
Director (ACD) to develop recommendations related to foreign Influences on research integrity5. We
charged them to identify robust methods to: 1) improve accurate reporting of all sources of research
support, financial interests, and affiliations; 2) mitigate the risk to security of proprietary information
while continuing NIH’s long tradition of collaborations, including foreign scientists and institutions; and,
3) explore additional steps to protect the integrity of peer review. Many of their recommendations,
which were considered and adopted by the ACD, and conveyed to NIH through the ACD, have already
been acted upon by NIH, as described above. As recommended by the ACD, following input from the
working group, we are working with key stakeholders to figure out how best to collate and disseminate
best practices, with the Association of American Universities and the Association of Public and LandGrant Universities taking a lead role in these efforts. An update on these activities will be presented and
discussed publicly at the June 2019 meeting of the Advisory Committee to the NIH Director. We also
recognize that we will not be successful in our domestic efforts to protect the integrity of the R&D
enterprise if we do not work together internationally with allies and like-minded partners to take
coordinated action. As such, we are working with the Department of State to engage key allies and
partners to identify effective approaches to promote U.S. scientific and technological advances through

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https://acd.od.nih.gov/working-groups/foreign-influences.html

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 international S&T cooperation, while simultaneously identifying and minimizing improper influence on
the integrity of the American R&D enterprise.
While we have taken bold and concrete steps to bolster research integrity and neutralize foreign
threats against U.S. biomedical research, we remain conscious of how these actions could affect the
morale of honest and dedicated foreign researchers. In March 2019, we responded to a joint letter6
from three Chinese American biomedical professional societies, in which they expressed concerns that
policies designed to protect biomedical proprietary information may be singling out Chinese students
and scholars working in the United States. In our response, published in the journal Science7, we
acknowledge these concerns, and that the vast majority of Chinese scientists working in America are
committed to the cause of expanding knowledge for the betterment of humankind, and to do so in a fair
and honest way. Importantly, NIH reviews have identified concerns involving individuals who are not of
Chinese ethnicity
The individuals violating laws and policies represent a small proportion of scientists working in and
with U.S. institutions. We must ensure that our responses to this issue do not create a hostile
environment for colleagues who are deeply dedicated to advancing human health through scientific
inquiry. We cannot afford to reject brilliant minds working honestly and collaboratively to provide hope
and healing to millions around the world.
In closing, as Principal Deputy Director of NIH, I can assure the Committee that the senior
leadership at NIH will continue to diligently protect the integrity of U.S.-taxpayer funded research.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6433/1290
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6433/1292.full

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