?1 . paoassmc . DESPAFCH Jifi'-Ch1er, Task?Force w- -3 .. '-awvuhsuwmo - I . ., - . - .mer oiquml? . - - 19:00an "on15mm . Chief . 7'3 - ?mm? I23: era 03 I KHHIKT - I I Independent DRE Infiltration'Operatiqn - - Fir files . . . I I Ref 2? WAVE 3851 . - - . . . a. .Iwavg 73911 IIBackgmu-According to on 20 May 196 2200Ihdurs; the Directorio Revoluc;onarlo operation independent of JMWAVE support, infiltrating AHHINT-40 and . The two-man '0 team was aunched successfully and obServ?d as tIey moved up the beach and across a field to a lighted dwelling.which is'an operational AMHINT safehouse, However, after the team were safehouaed and duringv? recovery of the launch dinghy.hy jhe parent craft JUANIN a I2~man rmilitia'patrol discovered them and challenged. During the brief fire; fight that ensued, the JUANIN I grew fdported_that_twq to four militia; ?3 I I men were obgerved to drop under their fire. (According'tb reference confirmatibn of this operation there were-no -I and the local militia?post also reported they'had :16111ctcd two t6. "on-the escapees"1) JUANIN I suff?red no ca5ualtiep _-or-h1ts, retired from'the beach a?vspeeds up to 30 knots and retur?ed I - .to their base in Key Mnrathon-withoutIincid?nt. -. Di?t?ibntion: 3. 13049 M15 - - - . mum mummrcum. I 5. I 218 my 1952 3 I '953 I-I: I mtwmummwggpy mum 19-120-19/3 9 ?Mm a . . i. 5.-.. m. . communion or . UV. 2.- At 1515 hours on 21 May, thewDRE offices in Hiami received commercial cable in prearranged code indicating the team had arrived safely in Varndero; Later, at about'l??o hours, a telephone call indicated that the team were in safehouscs in _morning 21 any.' On 22 May, a legal traveler,? Larrivchin Minmi and reported to DR ces this operation; is the safehouse owner who (Subject of a following dispatch;)0 received the team, provided change 0 othing,.food, Shelterg'sent the cable confirming safe arrival and them to Ravana. Subject did not witness the beach encounter, but heard the.fire-fight and overheard reports of the encounter during a visit to the Militia? post the following morning. 3. The most significant operational factor of thiShmiSSion is that the militia post has reported the incident as an ?eScape" and has not suspected that an infiltration'operntion hns_taken~place; . Therefore, no search or roadblocks were set up and it can be_assumed uthnt AMHINT safehousing in.that area is still intact. It is also im- ?;portant to note this point, apparently .the GOC has not given this clash the propaganda treatment giten the patrol encounter of their CV-28 with the SUSAN.ANN because it;wn5' reported as an "escape? and therefore any casualties inflicted on escap wduld make sympathetic-prOpagnnda. Also,?there were reportedly no militia casualties to give this clash propaganda value; 4. .This operation Was mounted by orders of who was 'becoming understandably desperate about DRE internal conditions. Subject has been scheduled for infiltration three times over the past three months and cancelled for reasons ranging from mission reception . hazards te'renssessment and requirements for further training. This, coming after a long history of DRE internal support problems and obStaCles, some of which resulted in costly_operational losses and compromises, prompted to mount the infiltratibn at any teet. Subject's-primary mission is to identify and confirm appointments within clandestine apparat at national?and provincial levels. Opera? tidnal losses through arreSt snd_KIA or eXeCution during past four, months has resulted-in almost two complete turnovers in leadership at national levels. -His.secondary mission is_to organize the National Reception Committee for materiel supply and infiltration of paramilitar instructors, radio operators and'intelligence agents, For this purpose has operated ns-Nntional Reception committee organizer for almost too yesrs, formed the team with These preparatio within PBRUMEN should be ready by~the time their_radio operator, completes his training, . 5. Some of the pertinent operation details follow: a. The JUAN-IN I is a new, 30~foot, BERTRAM built "?oppy", recently by the DRE.for their infiltration and-supply operations._ They hare'trained their crew and equipped their vessel with the idea of offering'it to in return for communications? and armament support for their missions. Such a support agreement has been approved in principle by JMWAVE and details are being worked out by the Maritime Section, - b. On this operation, the vessel crew was as-follows; AMHINT-42, captain Navigator - AMBOUY-B, regionl intelligence and guide gcrnabe PESn,Ballate, gunner" gunner "sud '15 1?85 52m 2' 34700000 ?5 542:5;h:EvT i DISPAYCH I I c. Vessel armament was procured by DRE and reported as: ea SMG, he3, cal .45 (800 ammo) ea FAR, Belgian, (200 rds) I I ea'Cn1bine, MlAl Cal .30 (300 rds)I I on Rifle, Garnnd M- {300 rds) ea Pistol, Cn1.45 (100 rds) en Fistol, 9mm (100 rds) - 6. According to ANHINT-42 narrative of the_ mission, the JUANIN I departed Marathon base at 1130 hours local on 20 May with clear soothe and about one foot sons. P10ceeding on a course of 186 degrees a-t abou l7 hunts cruising, the JUANIN I arrived at point approximately 20 miles north of their launCh point, 233ON-8115W) at abouth2?30 hours. In order to reach their point.nt 22 hours, an reduce daylight exposu in the sensitive north coast area, they reduced speed and killed time. Herehant vessels were observed and avoided since it was feared that JUANIN position and course might be report_ed to GOC.I Upon arriving at theirI launch point beach conditions were as expected on this day of traditional festivity.? The small park known as' 'Parque lnfantil Ini was illuminated and much of the local populace were dancing in the pavillion. Selected a point about 500 I-yards north of the part and about 500 yards fromI their nearest snichous As he brought the JUANIN into about 200 yards of the beach;- theImoon' 'was at about a 25 degree elevation and a fringe of pine shaded most ?of the deserted beach area where the team would land. I The JUANIN is a dark blue camanOuge color and was apparently not readily visible from the bench. The team. boarded the 12- foot, dinghy -with 6 hp outboard and accompanied by 2 and Bernabe PENA tor protec- tive cover fire, pioceeded to the beach. The landing was smooth and without incident but after the- team had made their way up the beach, through the pines and across the field to thIe safehouse, a patrol of abouIt l2 militia came downI the beach. 8. The launch dinghy had Just started from the beach when 'two of I the militia ran forward and challenged them- to stop and return to the beach. AMBOUY- 2 and PENA opened fire at about 40 yards range, observ- ing. both militia men dropped to the sand. The patrol then opened up with one burst of automatic fire as the .dinghy got underway to the parent JUANIN. Meanwhile, the JUANIN came in to about 75 ynids to r??over the dinghy and retire from the beach at top speed. During reCovery, the patrol kept up fire from one automatic weapon which was tineffective and did not seeie OneI hit on personnel or craft. 9. Upon retuin to base, the JUANIN crew uere warned by- of security implications and responsibilities of the operation, 1. e. any leak in Miami Could result in the compromise of AMHINT Safe housing in that area as. sell as t-he death of the. infiltrees There was no contact nith ODYOKE agencies upon departure or re-entry - END or re Ls;