ESTATE OF WILLIAM JAMES, IN THE
By its Personal Representative,

Menyonde Lewis, CIRCUIT COURT
Plaintiff. FOR BALTIMORE CITY
V.
CASE NO.: 
1 MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL 
OF BALTIMORE, 
Defendant. 

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

Defendant, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (?Movant?), by its undersigned

counsel, hereby moves for summary judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501, as there

. . . . . .
- ex15ts no genuine Spute of material fact and movant 15 entitled to Judgme as a matter Of law.

In support hereof, ovant ?les herewith the attached ?Stipulated Stateme tof Undisputed

Material Facts? (with accompanying Exhibits A through I), Memorandum in Support of mtion
. (-3 a:

. 33 :5
for Summary Jud ent, and Request for Hearing53,313
WHEREFORE, the City requests that upon the hearing and conmderatro?iem?f, 
8,3" .0 gen-5.."

judgment be entered in its favor against Plaintiff. A proposed Order is attache? 233?
.. 

85? 

 

?fndre M. Davis
CITY SOLICITOR

Justin S. Conroy
Kara K. 
CHIEF SOLICITORS

Alexa E. Curley
Natalie R. Amato
ASSISTANT CITY SOLICITORS

Baltimore City Law Department

100 N. I-[olliday Street, Room 101
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Telephone: (1410) 396?2496

Facsimile: (410) 396-2126
alexa.curley@baltimorecity. gov
kara.1ynch@baltimorepolice.org
Attorneys for Mayor City Council of
Baltimore

REQUEST FOR A HEARING
Movant, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, respectfully requests a prompt hearing
on its Motion for Summary Judgment.
CERTIFLCATE OF MAILI 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of July, 201 copies of the foregoing Motion
for Summary Judgment, Pmposed Order, and Request for Hearing, were mailed, postage paid,
to:

Howard A. Miliman, Esq. 
Mandy L. Miliman, Esq.

D?Alesandro Miliman, RA.

1 1 E. Lexington Street, 5th Floor

Baltimore, MD 21202

764th

Kara K. 
CHIEF SOLICITOR

Page 2 of 2

ESTATE OF WILLIAM JAMES, IN THE
By its Personal Representative,

Menyondc Lewis, CIRCUIT COURT
Plaintiff, FOR BALTIMORE CITY
v.
CASE NO.: 24-C-l9-002784
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF BALTIMORE, 
Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION


This is a so-called ?enforcement action" in which Plaintiff, the Estate of Williangl 21113338 If:
3U
. 
(?Plaintiff? or ?the Estate"), seeks to ompel Defendant, the Mayor and City Council gar



Baltimore (the ?City") to pay al$32,0( 0 judgment Plaintiffs decedent James?He_coUre

C)



  

in an earlier lawsuit against three former Baltimore City police of?cers. See Johnson v. gancis??
239 Md. App. 530, 555 (2018),Icert. em?ed, 463 Md. 155 (2019)(holding that plai+tiffv~rl 
obtains a judgment against a local government?s employee [pursuant to the procedures applicable
under Maryland?s Local Government Tort Claims Act] can establish the local government?s
liability [to pay the judgment] by ?ling an enforcement action against the local government."
(brackets added)).

To expedite Maryland courts? resolution of important and novel questions of state law
raised in this action, the parties have agreed to ?le cross-motions for summary judgment. In
connection therewith, they have entered into a comprehensive ?Stipulated Statement of

UndiSputed Material Facts? (?the Stipulation," which is ?led together with this Memorandum)

consisting of a 220 paragraph recitation of the history of the federal prosecution of the ?rst eight

known members of the Baltimore City Police Department’s Gun Trace Task Force (“GTTF”),
three of whom are the judgment debtors in respect to the $32,000 judgment underlying this
action. As the Stipulation expressly attests, its contents comprise the entire universe of
undisputed, material facts dispositive of the question presented.
The GTTF was a notorious specialized unit of plainclothes officers whose ostensible
functions and purposes were to identify, arrest, and build legitimate, prosecutable cases against
violent offenders in Baltimore City, particularly those who used firearms. However, as spelled
out in meticulous detail in the Stipulation (which is accompanied by nine indexed exhibits, the
genuineness, authenticity, and admissibility of which are expressly stipulated by the parties) the
real story of the GTTF best comes from the co-conspirators’ own mouths. The GTTF members
readily explain how they deviated completely from the mission of the BPD, and instead used the
GTTF as a cover to run a vast criminal enterprise for which several members are currently
incarcerated. As the City elaborates in this Memorandum, the GTTF was in fact a sometimes
violent, always armed, “racketeering enterprise” within the meaning of federal law, whose
members, over many years, willfully, purposefully, and intentionally conspired with each other
to devise and execute a far-reaching and outrageous plot to terrorize residents of and visitors to
Baltimore City for their own financial gain through the most vile criminal acts: extortion, threats,
theft of United States currency, the unconstitutional seizure of illegal narcotics, and the
subsequent distribution of those narcotics to known drug dealer GTTF associates for subsequent
street sale.
The upshot of the sordid history of the GTTF, as shown by even a casual reading of the
Stipulation, informed by enduring principles of law well-established in Maryland, is that, as a
matter of law, in this particular enforcement action, the City is not liable to pay the judgment

2

 obtained by Plaintiff’s decedent. This is so because the former GTTF officers against whom that
judgment was obtained (Jemell Rayam, Marcus Taylor, and Wayne Jenkins, referred to herein as
“the Officers”), were acting outside the scope of their employment as Baltimore City Police
Department (“BPD”) officers when they pretextually detained Mr. James, planted a gun on him,
arrested him, and then lied in the arrest paperwork, maliciously causing Mr. James’s prosecution
for crimes he did not commit, as the Officers very well knew.
Specifically, the record here shows, as a matter of law, that the Officers’ willful
prosecution of Mr. James on false charges and fabricated evidence was conduct on their part that
occurred during, and in furtherance of, the criminal conspiracy for which the Officers pled guilty
(or, in the case of Taylor, was found guilty at trial) and for which they are currently incarcerated
in facilities maintained by the federal Bureau of Prisons. Because the Officers acted outside the
scope of their employment, neither the LGTCA nor a mirror provision of the relevant collective
bargaining agreement (“Memorandum of Understanding” or “MOU”) between the City, the BPD
and the Fraternal Order of Police, requires the City to pay the judgment entered against them.
Collectively, the Officers have been convicted of, or pled guilty to, racketeering and
racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
and Hobbs Act Robbery. From at least 2014 until their arrests in early 2017, the Officers were
co-conspirators in a far-reaching and outrageous plot to terrorize citizens of Baltimore City for
their own financial gain. They routinely and as a matter of course detained and robbed citizens,
planted guns and drugs, and lied in documents to justify arrests, and perjured themselves on a
daily basis. They coached each other on how to mislead BPD and City officials about their
crimes. In short, they were lousy police officers but accomplished mobsters.

3

 The City should not be ordered to expend taxpayer dollars to pay judgments entered
against convicted criminals who happened to be employed by the BPD when they committed
intentional and malicious crimes using their police status, gear and equipment as mere disguises.
Such actions are categorically outside the scope of a police officer’s employment. Both
Maryland case law and common sense dictate that partners in crime acting in furtherance of their
personally motivated criminal conspiracy cannot ever be said to be acting within the scope of
their employment when they commit serious felonies against and terrorize members of a
community.
Whether the City, on a case-by-case basis after examining the facts and circumstances
presented by any particular claimant, should provide compensation to a victim of the GTTF
criminal enterprise, is not the question posed in this enforcement action. That is a question to be
determined in the exercise of the City’s discretion to do justice by its residents and visitors. But
for the reasons explained within, there is no basis in law to compel the City to pay the judgment
sought to be enforced in this case. Manifestly, the City is entitled to judgment in its favor.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 23, 2017, and November 30, 2017, the Officers were among eight BPD
policemen indicted on, among other federal offenses, RICO and RICO conspiracy charges. See
Case no. 1:17-cr-00106-CCB, ECF No. 1 (D. Md.) (Rayam, Jenkins, Taylor); 1:17-cr-00638CCB, ECF No. 1 (D. Md.) (Jenkins). A superseding indictment was filed against Jenkins, Hersl,
and Taylor on June 22, 2017. See 1:17-cr-00106-CCB, ECF No. 137 (D. Md.). On June 28,
2017, Rayam pled guilty to RICO conspiracy. See 1:17-cr-00106-CCB, ECF No. 196. On
January 5, 2018, Jenkins pled guilty to RICO conspiracy, racketeering, and Hobbs Act Robbery.
See 1:17-cr-00638-CCB, ECF No. 5. On February 12, 2018, a jury found Hersl and Taylor guilty

4

 of RICO conspiracy, racketeering, and Hobbs Act Robbery. See 1:17-cr-00106-CCB, ECF No.
342 (D. Md.). The Officers are currently incarcerated in federal prisons. Stipulation, ¶¶ 3, 16-19.
On March 23, 2018, Mr. James filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against the Officers,1 BPD, and the City alleging tortious conduct during a traffic stop by the
Officers of Mr. James on August 18, 2016. See William James v. Balt. Police Dep’t, Case No.
24-C-18-001701. On July 13, 2018, Mr. James, the BPD, and the City stipulated to the dismissal
of the BPD and the City.
On April 1, 2019, Mr. James and the Officers (i.e., Rayam, Taylor, and Jenkins) filed a
Motion for Consent Judgment and proposed Consent Order, providing for entry of a judgment,
jointly and severally against the Officers, in the amount of $32,000 in favor of James for full and
final settlement of all of his claims in the underlying case. The Honorable Philip Jackson
approved and signed the Consent Order on April 8, 2019, and the judgment was docketed on
April 9, 2019. Following the indexing of the judgment on April 16, 2019, the Officers assigned
their rights to indemnification to Mr. James with respect to collection of the judgment amount.
The City has stipulated to the propriety of the consent judgment and to the validity of the
Officers’ assignment of their ostensible right to indemnification to Mr. James. Moreover, the
City has stipulated that, under Francis, supra, if indeed Plaintiff Personal Representative, now
seasonably substituted for Mr. James (who died of causes unrelated to the matters at issue here)
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Officers Rayam, Jenkins, and Taylor were
acting within the scope of their employment as BPD police officers when they detained Mr.
James, planted a firearm at the scene and then falsely and fraudulently prepared charging

1

Mr. James also named ex-officer Daniel Hersl, a member of the GTTF, as a defendant
but he voluntarily dismissed his claims against Hersl on April 1, 2019.
5

 documents prompting the criminal prosecution of Mr. James, then to that extent the City is
obliged under the LGTCA (and the related MOU provision) to pay the judgment sued on. See
Francis, 239 Md. App. 530 at 598-99, stating,
In summary, where a money judgment is entered against an employee of a local
government arising from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee:
• The local government is liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the judgment, up
to the limits provided in [the LGTCA], if and only if the employee was acting within
the scope of his or her employment with the local government; and
• A plaintiff who obtains a judgment against a local government’s employee can
establish the local government’s liability by filing an enforcement action against
the local government. In such a proceeding, the local government can raise as a
defense that the employee was not acting within the scope of his or her employment.
III.

STIPULATED STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the City respectfully refers the Court to
the full Stipulation (and accompanying exhibits) attached to this Memorandum. Nevertheless, to
assist the Court in its review of the compelling evidence militating in favor of the grant of the
motion for summary judgment, the City sets forth below some of the more salient aspects of the
Stipulation, retaining the numbered paragraph designations but otherwise not indicating where
deletions have been made to the filed Stipulation:
3)
Momodu Bondeva Kenton Gondo, Evodio Calles Hendrix, Daniel Thomas
Hersl, Wayne Earl Jenkins, Jemell Lamar Rayam, Marcus Roosevelt Taylor,
Maurice Kilpartrick Ward, and Thomas Allers (at times hereinafter referred to
jointly and severally as “co-conspirators”) are former officers of the BPD,
members of the so-called Gun Trace Task Force (“GTTF”) all of whom were
indicted by the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland
for their knowing and willful participation in a wide-ranging, years-long
racketeering conspiracy, as described in detail below.
4)
As of the filing of the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment in this case,
each of the co-conspirators has pled guilty or was found guilty of his crimes
following trial and has been sentenced to incarceration in a federal prison for a
term ranging from a low of seven years to a high of twenty-five years.

6

 5)
The Baltimore City Lodge #3 of Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (“FOP”) is
a nonstock corporation and a labor organization that is the sole authorized
collective bargaining representative for rank and file BPD police officers
(including sergeants and lieutenants).
6)
The Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) was negotiated by the FOP
on behalf of BPD officers; the co-conspirators remain beneficiaries of such MOU
and any predecessor and successor MOU in matters relevant to this case.
7)
The indemnification provision of the Local Government Tort Claims Act
(“LGTCA”), codified at Md. Code, Courts & Jud. Proc. Art., sec. 5-303(b)
provides: “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a local
government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for
damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the
employee within the scope of employment with the local government.”
8)
Both the City and the BPD are deemed “local governments” under the
LGTCA but the City alone maintains a “suits and judgments account” for the
payment of settlements and judgments arising out of police-involved litigation
and, exclusive of the BPD, makes disbursements therefrom on behalf of the BPD.
9)
Personnel of the BPD are afforded indemnification under sec. 5-303(b),
whereby the City, via its use of the City’s General Fund, customarily satisfies
judgments up to the statutory cap entered against BPD personnel when same are
found to arise out of actions committed within the scope of their employment as
provided by the LGTCA.
10)
The current labor agreement between the FOP, the City, and the BPD is
memorialized via the MOU between the City, the BPD and the Baltimore City
Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. Unit I, Fiscal Years 2018-2020.
Article 15 (“Protection Against Liability”) of the MOU provides in part:
[L]egal counsel will be provided in any civil case when the plaintiff
alleges that an employee should be held liable for acts alleged to be
within the scope of his employment and/or his official capacity. The
City will provide indemnification to any member of the unit who is
made a defendant in litigation arising out of acts with the scope of
his/her employment that results in a monetary judgment being
rendered against the employee.
11)
The allegations in the federal indictments against the co-conspirators and
the additional criminal wrongs not included in the indictments, but as to which the
co-conspirators have pled guilty or were found guilty following trial, demonstrate
actions that are at odds and contrary to the customary and normal duties of
legitimate law enforcement, including officers of the BPD.

7

 12)
No duty of indemnification is imposed under the relevant sections of the
LGTCA or the MOU for liability incurred based on acts and conduct that are
without the scope of employment of BPD officers.
13)
On or about August 24, 2017, the Office of the Unites States Attorney for
the District of Maryland filed a seven-count indictment against co-conspirator
Thomas Allers. See Copy of Indictment, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and
incorporated herein by reference.
14)
The indictment charged Allers with knowing and intentional participation
in racketeering activity, consisting of multiple acts involving robbery, attempted
robbery, conspiracy, extortion, attempted extortion, and authoring false incident
reports. See Exhibit A, at Paragraphs 8-9.
15)
The indictment further stated that the “purposes of the defendant included
violating the legitimate purposes of the BPD in order to enrich himself through
illegal conduct, including robbery and extortion.” Id., at Paragraph 7.
16)
On or about February 27, 2017, the Office of the United States Attorney for
the District of Maryland had filed a two-count indictment against the seven other
co-conspirators. See Copy of Indictment, attached hereto as Exhibit B, and
incorporated herein by reference.
17)
That indictment charged seven co-conspirators with knowing and
intentional participation in a vast criminal conspiracy, encompassing willful and
intentional criminal activity that included as overt acts during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, robbery and
extortion of citizens and visitors to Baltimore City, deprivations of civil and
constitutional rights, time and attendance fraud against the BPD in order to obtain
salary and overtime pay for time not actually worked, and other offenses too
numerous to name. See Exhibit B, at Paragraph 16 (a)-(h). The indictment further
stated that the “purposes of the [co-conspirators] included violating the legitimate
purposes of the BPD in order to enrich themselves through illegal conduct,
including extortion, robbery and time and attendance fraud.” Id., at Paragraph 14.
18)
Six of the eight co-conspirators (Allers, Jenkins, Rayam, Gondo, Ward,
and Hendrix) pled guilty to the various crimes alleged in the indictments and/or
additional crimes not alleged in the indictment, but identified in their written plea
agreements with the Office of the United States Attorney.
19)
The plea agreements are attached hereto and incorporated into this
Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts by reference as Exhibits C, D,
E, F, G and H.

8

 20)
In his plea agreement, Allers agreed that “[t]he purposes of the Defendant
and his co-defendants included violating the legitimate purposes of the BPD in
order to enrich themselves through illegal conduct, including extortion, robbery and
time and attendance fraud.” See Plea Agreement of Defendant Allers, attached
hereto as Exhibit C.
21)
In their respective plea agreements, Gondo, Hendrix, Jenkins, Rayam, and
Ward likewise agreed that “[t]he purposes of [the individual Defendant] and his codefendants included violating the legitimate purposes of the BPD in order to enrich
themselves through illegal conduct, including extortion, robbery and time and
attendance fraud.” See Exhibits D, E, F, G and H.
22)
The offenses to which the co-conspirators pled guilty demonstrate actions
and omissions and various forms of conduct that grossly depart from any authorized
or legitimate police conduct.
23)
Two of the eight co-conspirators (Hersl and Taylor) proceeded to trial on
the indictment and were found guilty of various crimes, including racketeering, and
Hobbs Act robbery and extortion.
24)
The verdict sheet from that joint trial is attached hereto and incorporated
into this Stipulation of Undisputed Material Facts by reference as Exhibit I.
25)
The crimes of which the co-conspirators were found guilty demonstrate
actions and omissions and various forms of conduct that grossly depart from any
authorized or legitimate police conduct.
26)
The underlying actions comprising the criminal acts described in the
indictments and plea agreements failed to serve any legitimate purpose of the City’s
or BPD’s business as a municipal government entity or the principal public safety
agency of that government or did so only coincidentally.
27)
The underlying actions comprising that criminal activity are not ones
recognized, supported, or otherwise authorized by any of BPD’s training provided
to law enforcement officers.
28)
The underlying actions comprising that criminal activity are not ones
recognized, supported, or otherwise authorized by any of BPD’s policies, standard
operating procedures, general orders, or guidelines.
29)
The actions of the co-conspirators were performed during and in furtherance
of their outrageous criminal conspiracy and in pursuit of their own pecuniary selfinterests.
30)
The co-conspirators purposefully and willfully and regularly deviated from
the legitimate law enforcement aims of the BPD’s mission in order to enrich
themselves through their illegitimate and illegal conduct.

9

 31)
The co-conspirators accomplished this by concealing their illegitimate and
illegal conduct from City officials and from their superiors.
32)
The co-conspirators would sometimes intentionally avoid attending and
would not appear for scheduled court proceedings related to individuals they had
falsely arrested so as not to be questioned regarding their illegal activity of extorting
and robbing citizens and fabricating evidence against such falsely arrested persons.
33)
The co-conspirators conspired with each other and coached each other in
order to better lie to internal investigators to cover up and conceal their wrongdoing.
SPECIFIC AGREED FACTS AS TO THE CO-CONSPIRATORS’
ACTIONS IN RESPECT TO WILLIAM JAMES ON AUGUST 18, 2016,
DURING AND IN FURTHERANCE OF THE RACKETEERING
CONSPIRACY
34)
Plaintiff’s Decedent, William James (“Plaintiff”) was a citizen of the United
States residing in Baltimore, Maryland.
35)
Co-conspirators Marcus Taylor, Jemell Rayam, and Wayne Jenkins
were on duty on August 18, 2016. On that date, Plaintiff and his girlfriend were
traveling in a vehicle on Hillen Street in Baltimore when two Baltimore police
vehicles cut in front of him, causing him to pull over. The three above coconspirators were inside those two vehicles.
36)
At the time that Plaintiff was pulled over, neither Plaintiff nor his girlfriend
was committing any traffic infraction or engaged in illegal activity. After cutting
off Plaintiff, Taylor exited one of the police vehicles, approached Plaintiff’s
vehicle, and, without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause, pulled Plaintiff
out of his car. Co-conspirator Taylor advised Plaintiff that he would release
Plaintiff if Plaintiff provided the name of a person who possessed guns or drugs.
Plaintiff could not, and did not, provide any such names. Co-conspirator Rayam
then advised Plaintiff’s girlfriend that Plaintiff would be going to jail for possession
of a gun. Plaintiff was not in possession of a gun, a weapon, or any illegal
substances.
37)
The co-conspirators then huddled in a circle around their vehicles to
converse. When they finished, Jenkins emerged with a gun and stated to Plaintiff,
“This is your gun right here.” None of the co-conspirators had searched Plaintiff’s
person, Plaintiff’s girlfriend’s person, or Plaintiff’s car before Jenkins produced
this gun. Indeed, this gun did not belong to Plaintiff.
38)
The co-conspirators then arrested Plaintiff and transported him to Baltimore
City Central Booking & Intake Center, where he was ordered to be held on no bail.
The co-conspirators charged Plaintiff with six felony counts related to illegal
possession of a handgun.

10

 39)
On March 24, 2017, after the federal racketeering conspiracy indictment of
the co-conspirators became public, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to all
counts.
40)
As a result of the co-conspirators’ false charges, Plaintiff was imprisoned
and held without bail for more than seven months, resulting in the loss of his
employment, the loss of time with his six-year-old son, his home going into
foreclosure, and substantial other losses.
42)
Plaintiff’s false arrest, assault, and fraudulent conviction (i.e., the events of
August 18, 2016 and all subsequent matters related thereto) were not part of the
indictments and criminal prosecution of the co-conspirators as described supra in
Paragraphs 2, 3, and 9 – 33; the factual bases for the guilty pleas and/or guilty
verdicts of the co-conspirators involved victims other than Plaintiff.
43)
Plaintiff was not interviewed by federal investigators or prosecutors, nor
was he called as a witness in the joint trial of co-conspirators Hersl and Taylor;
none of the events of August 18, 2016, the day of Plaintiff’s arrest or any
subsequent incidents involving Plaintiff, were included in any stipulation of fact,
plea agreement, pre-sentence report or other document relating to the coconspirators’ federal prosecution.

SPECIFIC ACTIONS OF THE CO-CONSPIRATORS EXPRESSLY
ADMITTED UNDER OATH IN THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
44)
The following twenty-eight (28) specific incidents admitted to under oath
by the co-conspirators, among many others the precise nature, date of occurrence,
and character of which are unknown, demonstrate the co-conspirators’ illegal,
illegitimate and egregious criminal conduct and craft a vivid picture of the nature
and character and duration of the conspiratorial agreement into which all the coconspirators knowingly and willfully entered and remained through the date of their
indictment.

October 5, 2016
45)
On October 5, 2016, Rayam and Gondo were involved in an incident with
citizens bearing the initials A.A. and T.C.
46)
During the incident, Rayam (equipped with a BPD issued firearm) and a
third party named Kyle Wells, entered A.A.’s residence, while citizen T.C. was
present in the home. Gondo acted as a lookout while Rayam and the third party
were inside. Rayam took personal property, U.S. currency in an amount between
$12,000 to $14,000, and 800 grams of heroin. Rayam took some of the drugs and
sold same for profit, and provided Gondo with a share of the profits from same.
The co-conspirators never submitted any paper work or otherwise advised BPD of
the seizure of the personal property, funds or drugs seized from the location.

11

 47)
Rayam and Gondo pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this
incident. See Plea Agreement of Defendant Rayam, attached hereto as Exhibit D;
Plea Agreement of Defendant Gondo, attached hereto as Exhibit G.
48)
The October 5, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

October 3, 2016
49)
On or about October 3, 2016, Jenkins, Rayam, Gondo, Taylor, Hendrix
and Ward, were involved in an incident with a citizen bearing initials G.H.
50)
The co-conspirators pursued citizen G.H. in a high-speed pursuit. G.H.
threw over nine (9) ounces of cocaine out of the window of his vehicle during the
pursuit, wherein G.H. eventually crashed his car near Mondawmin Mall, located in
Baltimore.
51)

Jenkins recovered the cocaine and provided it to Rayam.

52)
None of the co-conspirators authored any police reports noting the seizure
of the drugs, nor submitted any drugs into evidence with BPD.
53)
Rayam pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with this incident. See
Exhibit D.
54)
The October 3, 2016 incident and acts and omissions in respect to same
depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy,
standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

September 7, 2016
55)
On or about September 7, 2016, Gondo, Hersl, Rayam, Taylor, and Ward
stopped S.S. as he attempted to leave the parking lot of a storage facility in
Baltimore City. Taylor told S.S. that they had a warrant to search his storage unit
when, in fact, they did not. Hersl, Jenkins and Rayam then went into S.S.’s storage
unit and took a sock containing $4,800 from the unit and took $2,000 from it.
Rayam then gave the sock back to S.S. and told him to leave.
56)
S.S.

Rayam told Gondo that he had to give Jenkins $100 of the cash stolen from

57)
To conceal the robbery and extortion, Jenkins, Gondo, Hersl, Rayam,
Taylor and Ward did not prepare an Incident Report and did not submit to BPD the
money stolen from S.S.

12

 58)
The September 7, 2016 incident and acts and omissions in respect to same
depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy,
standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.*

August 24, 2016
59)
On or about August 24, 2016, Jenkins, Rayam, Gondo, Hersl, and Hendrix
were involved in an incident with a citizen bearing the initials A.F.
60)
The co-conspirators initiated a traffic stop of citizen A.F. Hendrix stole
$1700 from citizen A.F during the traffic stop while citizen A.F. was detained.
61)

Hendrix later gave a portion of the $1,700 to Ward.

62)
None of the co-conspirators submitted any paperwork acknowledging the
stop of citizen A.F., nor the taking of any of the funds from citizen A.F.
63)
Ward and Hendrix pled guilty to the criminal activity related to this incident.
See Plea Agreement of Defendant Ward, attached hereto as Exhibit E; Plea
Agreement of Defendant Hendrix, attached hereto as Exhibit F.
64)
The August 24, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

August 24, 2016
65)
On or about August 24, 2016, Rayam, Gondo, and Hersl were involved in
an incident with a citizen bearing initials J.B.
66)

Rayam, Gondo, and Hersl eventually entered citizen J.B.’s home.

67)
While inside the home, Rayam stole $1,500 from citizen J.B. directly in the
presence of Gondo and Hersl.
68)
Rayam authored a false police report in relation to the incident and in same
failed to disclose the taking of the money.
69)
Rayam pled guilty to the criminal activity related to this incident. See
Exhibit D.
70)
The August 24, 2016 incident involving citizen J.B. and actions in respect
to same depict action not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy,
standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
The Estate’s claim in this enforcement action under Francis is based on events
occurring on August 18, 2016, during the conspiracy.
*

13

 August 8, 2016
71)
On or about August 8, 2016, Jenkins, Hersl, Gondo, Rayam, and another
BPD officer bearing initials J.C. were involved in an incident with a citizen bearing
initials D.A.
72)
Jenkins, Hersl, and J.C., observed D.A. leaving a storage facility, and then
pursued and arrested D.A. as he was leaving the storage facility.
73)
D.A. was taken from the scene, and Jenkins, Hersl, Gondo and Rayam
went to D.A.'s storage facility.
74)
Gondo and J.C. left the scene to prepare a search warrant for the storage
facility.
75)
While Jenkins, Hersl and Rayam were waiting for officer J.C. to return
with a search warrant, Jenkins called a third party, and told the third party to
break into D.A.’s storage unit and steal the contents located in same.
76)
The third party then responded and broke into the storage unit and
recovered three quarters of a kilogram of cocaine from same.
77)
The third party later sold the drugs and provided some of the proceeds to
Jenkins.
78)

In turn, Jenkins provided some of the proceeds to Hersl.

79)
None of the co-conspirators prepared any police reports acknowledging the
seizure of any funds or drugs from the location or incident.
80)
Jenkins and Rayam pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with this
incident. See Exhibit D; Plea Agreement of Jenkins, attached hereto as Exhibit H.
81)
The August 8, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict action
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

July 8, 2016
82)
On or about July 8, 2016, Rayam, Jenkins, Gondo, and Hersl, were
involved in an incident with citizens bearing initials R.H. and N.H. which
eventually lead the co-conspirators to the home of citizens R.H. and N.H.
83)
The co-conspirators asked citizen R.H. where he kept his money in his
home, and in response citizen R.H. advised them he kept his money in an upstairs
bedroom.
84)

The co-conspirators stole $20,000 from citizen R.H.’s home.

14

 85)
During the incident, Jenkins told citizen R.H. that if R.H. could provide the
name of a drug dealer for the co-conspirators to rob, they would “take care” of
citizen R.H. and could perhaps provide narcotics for R.H. to sell.
86)
Rayam later authored a false police report detailing the incident related to
R.H. and N.H., and in same failed to disclose any of the sums seized from citizens
R.H. and N.H.
87)
Rayam, Gondo and Jenkins pled guilty to the criminal activity related to
this incident. See Exhibits D, G, and H.
88)
Hersl was found guilty by a jury of participating in the criminal act of the
July 8, 2016 incident. See Verdict Sheet of from the trial of Daniel Hersl and
Macrus Taylor, attached hereto as Exhibit I.
89)
The July 8, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict action not in
furtherance of any recognized mission, training, or policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
June 24, 2016
90)
On or about June 24, 2016, Jenkins, Ward, and Hendrix were involved in
executing a search and seizure warrant in the home of a citizen bearing the initials
M.M.
91)
During this encounter, the co-conspirators were advised by M.M. where he
kept sums of money in his home.
92)
After the co-conspirators were advised where citizen M.M. kept his money,
they sent him away, and stole a total of $17,000 from citizen M.M.
93)
The co-conspirators did not report the seizure of any funds from citizen
M.M. to BPD.
94)
Ward and Hendrix pled guilty to their criminal actions relating to this
incident. See Exhibits E and F.
95)
The June 24, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions not
in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

June 2016
96)
In or about June 2016, Jenkins, Gondo and Rayam conducted a car stop of
an unknown citizen.
97)
Following the car stop of the citizen, the co-conspirators went to the
citizen’s home and seized a 9mm handgun and a pound of marijuana from the home.
15

 98)
Jenkins directed Rayam to sell the handgun and the marijuana in order to
pay a debt Rayam owed to Jenkins.
99)

Gondo arranged for a third party to buy the handgun and the marijuana.

100) The third party paid Rayam for the handgun and the marijuana, and Rayam
provided Gondo with a portion of the proceeds.
101) Rayam and Gondo pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with this
incident. See Exhibits D and G.
102) The June 2016 incident and actions not in furtherance of any recognized
mission, training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

Mav 28, 2016
103) On or about May 28, 2016, Allers, Gondo, Rayam, and Det. D.H. were
involved in an incident with a citizen bearing the initials A.C.
104) Allers, Gondo, and Rayam, while executing a search and seizure warrant
stole $700 of $1,000 from A.C.’s bedroom and gave D.H. the rest to give to the
homeowner, who was A.C.’s grandmother.
105) Allers, Gondo, and Rayam pled guilty to the criminal activity associated
with this incident. See Exhibits C, D, and G.
106) The May 28, 2016 incident and actions not in furtherance of any recognized
mission, training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

Mav 11, 2016
107) On or about May 11, 2016, Gondo, Hersl, and Rayam initiated a traffic stop
of citizens bearing the initials N.D. and M.A.
108) During the traffic stop, Rayam stole approximately $700 from a citizen
described as N.D.
109) Gondo, Hersl, and Rayam did not submit the money to BPD for keeping in
evidence, and authored false police reports excluding any mention of the stolen
money.
110) The co-conspirators, in initiating the traffic stop, stealing the money, and
authoring false paperwork, were acting out of their own self-interests in order to
further their criminal conspiracy to rob and extort citizens.
111)

Rayam pled guilty to this incident. See Exhibit D.

16

 112) Gondo and Hersl did not stop Rayam or report his illegal activity to the
BPD.
113) In failing to stop Rayam from stealing the funds, or reporting his illegal
conduct of same to BPD, Gondo and Hersl were acting solely out of their own selfinterests to further and continue their criminal conspiracy to rob and extort citizens.
114) The May 11, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depicts actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
April 28, 2016
115)

On or about April 28, 2016, Allers, Hersl, Gondo, and Rayam arrested D.R.

116) After D.R. was in custody, Allers, Hersl, Gondo, and Rayam went inside
the home where D.R. was living and gained consent from L.W. who lived with D.R.
and their two children, to search the house.
117) L.W. and D.R. had more than $10,000 cash in their home at the time of the
search.
118)

Allers stole over $10,000 cash during the search.

119) To conceal his illegal conduct, on or about April 28, 2016, Allers approved
an incident report, authored by Rayam, which he knew contained false information.
120) Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident. See
Exhibit C.
121) The April 28, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
March 22, 2016
122) On or about March 22, 2016, Jenkins, Hendrix, Taylor, and Ward were
involved in an incident with a citizen bearing initials O.S.
123) The co-conspirators initiated a traffic stop of O.S. and seized a total of
$21,500 and narcotics from O.S.
124) The co-conspirators submitted only $15,000, and stole the remaining
$6,500. Hendrix, submitted a false police report to BPD, approved by Jenkins as
the supervisor of Hendrix, which falsely stated that only $15,000 had been
recovered from O.S.

17

 125) During the incident, the co-conspirators also took O.S.’s house keys and
determined O.S.’s home address by looking at his driver’s license.
126) They later entered O.S.’s residence and stole approximately $200,000, and
other property.
127)

Jenkins stole at least two (2) kilograms of cocaine from the residence.

128) Jenkins later gave the narcotics to a third-party to sell in order to obtain the
profits of the sale of same for himself.
129) The co-conspirators did not author any police reports recognizing the
$200,000 they seized from the premises, nor the narcotics Jenkins seized from the
premises.
130) Jenkins, Ward and Hendrix pled guilty to the criminal activity related to
this incident. See Exhibits, E, F and H.
131) Taylor was proven to have committed the criminal activity associated with
this incident at trial. See Exhibit I.
132) The March 22, 2016 incident involving citizen O.S. and actions in respect
to same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training,
policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

March 9, 2016
133) On or about March 9, 2016, Jenkins, Hendrix, Taylor, and Ward were
involved in an incident involving a citizen bearing initials M.MC.
134) During the incident, the co-conspirators stole at least $1,000 from citizen
M.MC.
135) Ward authored a false police report and submitted same to BPD, which
omitted any mention of the seizure of funds from citizen M.MC.
136)

Jenkins signed off on the police report as the supervisor of Ward.

137) The March 9, 2016 incident involving citizen M.MC and the actions in
respect to same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission,
training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

March 2, 2016
138) On or about March 2, 2016, Allers, J.C., Hersl, Gondo, and Rayam
executed a search warrant at B.H. and T.A.’s home in Baltimore City and Allers
stole more than $7,000 of the cash that T.A. and B.H. had in their home.

18

 139) To conceal his illegal conduct, on or about March 2, 2016, Allers approved
an incident report which he knew contained false information.
140)

Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident. See

Exhibit C.
141) The March 2, 2016 incident and the actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

February 23, 2016
142) On February 23, 2016, Rayam, Gondo, and Allers were involved in an
incident in Baltimore County with a citizen bearing the initials B.C.
143)
Gondo, Rayam, and Allers entered a residence where B.C. had a bedroom
and stole $7,000 from B.C.
144) Gondo authored false paper work and submitted same to BPD, that
otherwise omitted that $7,000 had been seized and taken from the B.C.’s
bedroom.
145) To conceal his illegal conduct, Allers approved Gondo’s report knowing
that it contained false information.
146) Allers, Rayam, and Gondo pled guilty to the criminal activity associated
with this incident. See Exhibits C, D, and G.
147) The February 23, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

February 17, 2016
148) On or about February 17, 2016 Jenkins, Ward, and Taylor were involved
in an incident with a citizen bearing the initials R.B.
149)

After chasing citizen R.B. on the street the co-conspirators arrested R.B.

150)

Ward and Taylor stole approximately $500 from R.B.

151) Ward submitted a false police report to BPD, omitting that any funds had
been recovered from R.B.
152)

Jenkins signed off on the police report as a supervisor.

153) Ward pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with the incident. See
Exhibit E.
19

 154) The February 17, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

February 10, 2016
155) On February 10, 2016, Rayam, Gondo, and Allers were involved in an
incident with a citizen bearing the initials P.E.
156) Gondo, Rayam, and Allers entered the residence where P.E. was located
and stole money that citizen P.E. was counting at the time.
157) Rayam and Gondo pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this
incident. See Exhibits D and G.
158) To conceal his illegal conduct, on or about February 10, 2016, Allers
approved an incident report authored by Rayam that he knew to be false.
159) The February 10, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
February 4, 2016
160) On or about February 4, 2016 Jenkins, Ward, and Hendrix were involved
in an incident involving a citizen bearing the initials M.S.
161) The co-conspirators initiated a traffic stop of citizen bearing the initials
M.S., and during same seized approximately $1500 to $2,000 from citizen M.S.’s
vehicle.
162)

The co-conspirators did not report to BPD the seizure of the money.

163) Jenkins pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident.
See Exhibit H.
164) The February 4, 2016 incident and actions in respect to same depict not in
furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

November 28, 2015
165) On or about November 28, 2015, Hersl was involved in an incident
involving a citizen bearing the initials A.S.
166)

During the incident, Hersl stole $282 from citizen A.S.

20

 167) Hersl submitted a false police report to BPD in association with the incident,
reflecting that only $218 had been seized from citizen A.S. when in fact, a total of
$500 had been recovered from A.S.
168) Hersl was proven to have committed the criminal activity associated with
this incident. See Exhibit I.
169) The November 28, 2015 incident involving citizen A.S. and actions in
respect to same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission,
training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

November 27, 2015
170) On or about November 27, 201 5, Hersl was involved in an incident with a
citizen bearing the initials H.T.
171)

During the incident, Hersl stole $312 from citizen H.T.

172) Hersl submitted a false police report to Plaintiff in association with the
incident, reflecting that only $218 had been seized from citizen H.T., when in fact,
a total of $530 had been recovered from H. T.
173) Hersl was proven to have committed the criminal activity associated with
this incident. See Exhibit I.
174) The November 27, 2015 incident involving citizen H.T. and actions in
respect to same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission,
training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
July 31, 2015
175) On July 31, 2015 Rayam, Gondo, and Allers, were involved in an incident
in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, with a citizen bearing the initials Z.N.
176) During the incident Gondo and Rayam seized U.S. currency from Z.N.’s
home.
177) Gondo and Rayam found $10,000 and stole $8,900 if it; the remaining cash
was recovered by the Anne Arundel County Police Department.
178) The co-conspirators did not author any police reports, or otherwise advise
BPD that they seized the funds.
179) After Allers, Gondo, and Rayam left the residence they went to a
bar/restaurant in Baltimore City and Rayam gave Allers his share of the stolen
cash; Rayam and Gondo split the remainder.

21

 180) Rayam, Gondo, and Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated
with this incident. See Exhibits C, D, and G.
181) The July 31, 2015 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions not
in the furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
April 3, 2015
182) On or about April 3, 2015, Allers, Gondo, Rayam and J.C. entered the
residence of D.M. and D.R. in Baltimore City to execute a search warrant.
183) At the time of the search, D.M. and his wife had approximately $6,000 in
their home.
184) During the execution of the search warrant, Gondo located money in a
portfolio and gave the money to Rayam.
185) Allers then instructed Gondo and Rayam to “just do this here,” or words to
that effect, which Gondo and Rayam understood to mean that they should take the
money and split it with Allers.
186)

Allers, Gondo, and Rayam stole approximately $5700 from D.M. and D.R.

187) To conceal his illegal conduct, on or about April 3, 2015, Allers approved
an incident report, which he knew to be false, authored by J.C. that was filed with
the BPD.
188)

Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident.

189) The April 3, 2015 incident and actions in respect to same depicts actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

Spring 2015 Robbery at Belvedere Towers
190) In or about the spring of 2015, Jenkins, Taylor, and Ward, interrupted the
sale of a large amount of marijuana at the Belvedere Towers apartment building in
Baltimore.
191) Jenkins seized a bag containing approximately 30 pounds of marijuana
from the would-be seller of the marijuana and a bag of containing approximately
$15,000 in U.S. currency.
192) Jenkins lied to the parties to the drug sale that he was a Drug Enforcement
Administration agent, and that he was exercising his discretion to not charge or
arrest the parties to the drug sale.

22

 193) Jenkins took Taylor and Ward to a secluded area and gave each of them
$5,000; Jenkins never reported the seizure of the U.S. currency or the drugs to the
BPD.
194) Jenkins later provided the drugs to a third party to sell, so he could obtain
all of the profits from same.
195) Jenkins pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with this incident.
See Exhibit H.
196) The spring 2015 incident at the Belvedere Towers apartments and actions
in respect to same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission,
training, policy, standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

November 5, 2014
197) On or about November 4, 2014, Hersl was involved in an incident with
citizen, Jimmie Griffin.
198)
I.

It was proven at trial that Hersl committed a robbery of Griffin. See Exhibit

199) The November 5, 2014 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
October 8, 2014
200) On or about October 8, 2014, Allers, Gondo, Rayam, and J.C. entered a
store owned by D.K. in Baltimore City to execute a search warrant.
201)

D.K. had approximately $9,000 in cash in his apartment above the store.

202) Allers stole $3,000 of the $9,000; the remaining $6,000 was recovered by
the U.S. Marshals Service.
203) To conceal his illegal conduct, on or about October 8, 2014, Allers approved
an incident report authored by J.C., which he knew to be false.
204) Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident. See
Exhibit C.
205) The October 8, 2014 incident and actions in respect to same depicts not in
furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

July 11, 2014

23

 206) On or about July 11, 2014, Jenkins, Hendrix, and an unknown police officer
attempted a traffic stop of a citizen bearing the initials J.C.
207)

J.C. fled from the co-conspirators.

208) The co-conspirators went into J.C.’s vehicle and seized between $12,000
and $14,000 from J.C.’s vehicle.
209)

Jenkins did not report the seizure of funds to the BPD.

210) Jenkins pled guilty to the criminal conduct associated with this incident.
See Exhibit H.
211) The July 11, 2014 incident involving citizen J.C. and actions in respect to
same depict actions not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy,
standard operating procedure, or guideline of the BPD.
March 11, 2014
212) On or about March 11, 2014, Allers, Gondo, and Rayam executed a search
warrant at the residence of G. W. and Y.W. located in Baltimore County, Maryland,
after having arrested G.W.
213)

G. W. had approximately $416,000 in the residence at the time of the search.

214) Y.W. had approximately $1500 to $2000 in the house at the time of the
search.
215) Prior to calling Baltimore County law enforcement, Allers, Gondo, and
Rayam, Searched the house and located a drawer full of money in an upstairs
bedroom.
216) Allers told Gondo and Rayam that the homeowner “wouldn’t miss a stack,”
or words to that effect and Allers took a stack of cash which contained
approximately $8,000 to $10,000.
217) Allers also had his adult son with him, who was not a police officer, for the
execution of the search.
218)

Allers’s son also took some of the cash.

219) Allers pled guilty to the criminal activity associated with this incident. See
Exhibit C.
220) The March 11, 2014 incident and actions in respect to same depict actions
not in furtherance of any recognized mission, training, policy, standard operating
procedure, or guideline of the BPD.

24

 IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and,
on the undisputed facts, a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501.
Although ordinarily a jury question, scope of employment may be decided as a matter of law.
Houghton v. Forest, 412 Md. 578, 592 (2010); Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 262 (1991).
“Where there is no conflict in the evidence relating to the question and but one inference can be
drawn therefrom, the question is one of law for the court.” Rusnack v. Giant Food Inc., 26 Md.
App. 250, 265 (1975). There is no dispute of material fact when “the facts adduced to show that
the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment are not legally sufficient to support
such a reasonable finding by the trier of fact. Clark v. Prince George’s Cnty., 211 Md. App. 548,
571 (2013). Here, the parties have entered into a stipulation of undisputed material facts for the
purposes of their cross-motions for summary judgment. Based on the undisputed material facts,
the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The City acknowledges, of course, that in reviewing its motion for summary judgment,
“[t]he court is to consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
consider any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts against the
moving party.” Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc., 435 Md. 584, 598, 80 A.3d 269, 276
(2013). But the outcome of summary judgment in this case does not remotely hinge on
inferences. Rather, this is a case of abundant direct evidence, of the Officers’ intentions and
purposes, as revealed in their own sworn admissions and (as to Taylor) jury findings beyond a
reasonable doubt as to those intentions and purposes. Although the Officers have not been
specifically convicted of criminal activity in respect to their treatment of Mr. James, it is
impossible for a reasonable factfinder to conclude, given those admissions and the timing and

25

 character of the Officers’ stipulated crimes perpetrated against Mr. James, that they were acting
within the scope of their employment. And this is true notwithstanding that they were on duty,
driving agency vehicles, armed with agency-provided service firearms, and present within their
assigned territory at the moment they terrorized Mr. James. These factors are the sum total of
Plaintiff’s evidence; as a matter of law, they do not come close to sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Officers were acting within the
scope of their employment.
Indeed, in recognition of the reality of the record presented here, Plaintiff will be filing
her own cross-motion for summary judgment, insisting that, as a matter of law, the Officers were
acting within the scope of their employment based on the factors set forth in the preceding
paragraph. Thus, the binary choice presented to this Court is stark, and rightly so. The case is
undeniably teed-up for resolution as a matter of law.
IV.

ARGUMENT

There can be no clearer example of unauthorized activity occurring outside the scope
employment than the egregious and pervasive criminality exhibited by the Officers in the
underlying case, the same activity exemplified in the dozens of cases to which they and their coconspirators have pled guilty in federal court. It is impossible to overstate the moral depravity of
the GTTF officers, including the three at issue in this action. These individuals are, by their own
admission, criminals of the worst sort. The extent and scope of their criminal enterprise is mindboggling. As more fully explained below, these criminals violated RICO, the Hobbs Act, and
engaged in a massive criminal conspiracy in violation of federal and Maryland law. Such
outrageous conduct is, without question, outside the scope of their employment. Indeed, criminal
conduct akin to that displayed here would clearly be outside of scope of any lawful employment.

26

 As Plaintiff will concede, under Francis, she must carry the burden at trial to demonstrate
that a reasonable juror could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Officers’ actions in detaining and causing the fraudulent and unconstitutional prosecution of Mr.
James constituted conduct consistent with and within the scope of employment of the three
Officers. Clearly, however, no reasonable fact finder could make such a finding on this record.
As the City shows within, the nature and character of the offenses and the underlying facts and
circumstances that are the foundation of the offenses in which the Officers were convicted, when
viewed through the prism of binding and persuasive caselaw precedents on the issue of scope of
employment, leaves no room for doubt: the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A.

SUMMARY OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
(“RICO”) AND THE HOBBS ACT

The Officers were convicted of offenses among the most serious and harmful to victims
that appear in the federal criminal code. Congress enacted RICO, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961,
et. seq., “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States.” United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)); accord
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983). The Supreme Court has noted the importance
of Congress’ direction that RICO be “liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. Id.
at 27 (citing § 904(a) of Pub.L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 947). Accordingly, since its inception, RICO
has been invoked to prosecute a variety of offenses, including police misconduct. See generally
Jake DuCharme et. al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1323, 1370-71 (2019) (“RICO has been used in a variety of cases beyond its initial congressional
imagining, including those involving protests, the tobacco industry, health care fraud, and police
misconduct.”).

27

 Broadly speaking, in order to prosecute persons under the RICO statute, the
prosecution must show that members of a criminal enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity that had an effect on interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Racketeering
activity is defined by statute as follows:
any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled dangerous substance
or listed chemical [] which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year[.]
Id. at § 1961. In turn, § 1962 prohibits: (a) using income derived from a racketeering activity;
(b) acquiring an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (c)
participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (d)
conspiring to do any of the above.
In addition to prosecutions for actually committing a substantive RICO offense, the
government is authorized to prosecute an individual under the RICO statute for conspiring to
commit a substantive RICO offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). In a § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy
prosecution, the prosecution must prove: (1) that two or more people agreed to commit a
substantive RICO offense and (2) that the defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective
of the RICO offense. United States v. Gardner, 417 F. Supp.2d 703, 711 (D. Md. 2006).
Importantly, in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), the Supreme Court held that a
RICO conspiracy charge does not require proof of an overt act “to effect the object of the
conspiracy.” Id. at 63. Rather, an agreement to purse a criminal objective, even without an
agreement as to every element of the offense, is enough. Id. at 65. As the Court explained, a
defendant need only know of and agree to the overall object of the RICO conspiracy. See id. at
64 (“A conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all the
elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or

28

 facilitating the criminal endeavor.”). In particular, the Fourth Circuit has held that a defendant
may be convicted of a RICO conspiracy even if the defendant did not commit or agree to commit
any predicate racketeering act himself. United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207, 218 (4th Cir.
2012). And, “even where a defendant does not commit any racketeering act himself, a defendant
who has joined a conspiracy continues to violate the law through every moment of the
conspiracy’s existence, and he becomes responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators in pursuit
of their common plot. Withdrawal terminates the defendant’s liability for post-withdrawal acts of
his co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy.” Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106,
111 (2013) (cleaned up).
The Hobbs Act addresses criminal violations similar to those covered under RICO. The
Hobbs Act criminalizes acts affecting commerce by robbery or extortion, as follows:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §1951(a) (emphasis added). The statute defines robbery as:
The unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the
presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or
violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or
property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or
member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). A Hobbs Act conspiracy under § 1951(a) requires a showing that the
defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit acts that would satisfy the following
three elements:
(1) that the defendant coerced the victim to part with property; (2) that the coercion
occurred through the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear or
29

 under color of official right; and (3) that the coercion occurred in such a way as to
affect adversely interstate commerce.
United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Buffey, 899
F.2d 1402, 1403 (4th Cir. 1990)). A Hobbs Act conspiracy may be committed “even without the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
United States v. Edmundson, 153 F. Supp.3d 857, 859 (D. Md. 2015). In other words, the
“statutory definition of Hobbs Act conspiracy does not require as an element the commission of
an overt act. Id. To prove a Hobbs Act conspiracy “[i]t is sufficient to prove that the conspirators
agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy.” Ocasio v.
United States, 136 S. Ct, 1423, 1432 (2016).
*

*

*

*

*

As the above summary of both RICO and the Hobbs Act shows, violations of both
statutes occur when conspiratorial conduct of the most outrageous sort is committed. The
agreement to commit underlying crimes lies at the heart of both RICO and the Hobbs Act. Of
course, such conspiracy requires meticulous planning, deception, and an agreement to band
together to violate the law, and to do so willfully and purposefully. The Officers were found
guilty of, or pled guilty to, this very conduct. More specifically, the Officers pled guilty to, or
were found guilty of, RICO conspiracy. Jenkins also pled guilty to racketeering and Hobbs Act
Robbery, and Taylor was convicted of same. It strains credulity to say that such criminal
behavior, which necessarily involved a sprawling and intricate conspiracy in order to avoid
detection, could ever be found to be within the scope of employment. Although the Officers’
crimes against Mr. James were not made a specific element or feature of their plea deals or the
verdict against them, by operation of the above legal principles, and frankly by virtue of plain

30

 commonsense, it is undeniable that the crimes the Officers committed against Mr. James were
part of that conspiracy.
B.

THE OFFICERS PLANTED A GUN ON MR. JAMES AND FALSIFIED HIS ARREST
PAPERWORK DURING, AND IN FURTHERANCE OF, A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE LAW, IN PURSUIT OF THEIR PERSONAL
ENTERPRISE TO ENRICH THEMSELVES

As noted in the Stipulation, Mr. James and his girlfriend were traveling in their vehicle
when two Baltimore police vehicles cut them off. Neither Mr. James nor his girlfriend were
engaged in illegal activity or had committed any traffic infraction. Stipulation, ¶¶ 35-36. Coconspirator Taylor pulled Mr. James out of his car and advised that he would release him if he
provided the name of a person who possessed guns or drugs. Id. ¶ 36. Co-conspirator Rayam
then advised Mr. James’s girlfriend that he would be going to jail for possession of a gun. Id.
The co-conspirators then huddled in a circle, and Jenkins emerged with a gun and stated, “This is
your gun right here.” Id. ¶ 37. Mr. James was not in possession of a gun, and none of the coconspirator Officers had searched him. Id. ¶ 36. The co-conspirators then arrested Mr. James,
and charged him with six felony counts related to illegal possession of a handgun. Id. ¶ 38.
Although the Officers’ interaction with Mr. James was not part of the indictments and
criminal prosecution of the Officers (nor was the incident included in the plea agreements or any
other document relating to the criminal prosecution), the Officers’ conduct with respect to Mr.
James constituted acts performed during, and in furtherance of, the larger criminal conspiracy
described herein. By operation of law then, the incident that formed the basis of Mr. James’s
damages claim is part and parcel of the Officers’ criminal conspiracy. 2

2

Although the City is not required to show or explain the immediate trigger or motive of
the Officers to stop and detain Mr. James when and as they did, it is perfectly clear that the
Officers’ standard operating procedures, their modus operandi, was to stop random motorists about

31

 1.

The Officers Clearly Violated Maryland Law

Notably, there is no daylight between the features and character of the federal conspiracy
offenses on which the Officers were convicted and the Maryland state counterparts of those
offenses. In Maryland, a criminal conspiracy is defined as “the combination of two or more
people to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful
means.” White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 167 (2001). The “unlawful agreement” requires only “a
meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design.” Id. No overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy is required. Id. In other words, “the crime [is] complete when the agreement
formed.” Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 698 (2012).
Precisely as under federal law, co-conspirators have joint and several liability for the acts
of every member of the conspiracy. See Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 703 (“the law imposes
upon a conspirator full responsibility for the logical and natural consequences of acts committed
by his fellow conspirators if such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of
the conspiracy.”). Liability attaches even if the conspirator was not physically present when the
act was committed. Id. Under Maryland law, “one who encourages, aids, abets, or assists the
active perpetrator in the commission of the offense, is a guilty participant, and in the eye of the
law is equally culpable with the one who does the act.” Id. Thus, all of the GTTF members who
knowingly joined the ongoing conspiracy were “in for a pound” even if, subjectively, he was
only “in for a penny.”

whom there might be some hunch or guess regarding the presence of contraband (or, more
urgently, United States currency). That clearly is what happened here. When reasonable suspicion
and probable cause did not develop after Mr. James was arbitrarily detained, the Officers went
about their conspiratorial business and fabricated an entire criminal case against him. It was the
essence of what they did, day in and day out. See supra, pp. 10-24.
32

 2.

The Pinkerton Rule Ensures the Guilt of All GTTF Members

In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), two brothers were indicted for
violations of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 641. A single conspiracy was proved. Id. at 642.
There was no evidence to show that one of the brothers participated directly in the commission
of the substantive offenses, but there was evidence to show that the substantive offenses were
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 645. In what became known as the “Pinkerton
Rule,” the Court held that evidence of direct participation in the substantive offense was not
necessary in order to prove the existence of a conspiracy. Id. at 646. The Pinkerton Rule
provides that “a defendant is liable for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when
their commission is reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States
v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137,140 (4th Cir. 2014). The law considers conspirators each other’s
agents, and, “so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in
carrying it forward.” Id. (citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646.) A single conspiracy may have a
multiplicity of objects. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643.
As shown by the Stipulation, the GTTF conspiracy continued right up until the GTTF
members were arrested in early 2017; the crime of conspiracy is a “classic” continuing offense.
Savage v. State, 212 Md. App. 1, 25 (2013). A conspiracy continues unless and until there is
“affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the purposes of the
conspiracy.” Id. (citing United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984)). 3
In the instant case, from at least 2014 until the date of their arrests, the Officers were coconspirators in a plot to enrich themselves at the expense of the residents and visitors of

3

To be sure, withdrawal is not an affirmative defense to conspiracy. “Once the conspiracy
has formed the conspirator may withdraw from it, but he will still be subject to a conspiracy
charge.” Savage, 212 Md. App. at 25, n.19 (cleaned up).
33

 Baltimore and the integrity of the BPD and the City. They pled guilty to conduct that
“demonstrate[s] actions and omissions and various forms of conduct that grossly depart from any
authorized or legitimate police conduct.” Stipulation, ¶ 22. Moreover, “the actions of the coconspirators were performed during and in furtherance of their outrageous criminal conspiracy
and in pursuit of their own pecuniary self-interests.” Id. ¶ 29.
The law is clear that the Officers are thus responsible for each other’s actions done
during and in furtherance of the objectives and goals of the conspiracy. The parties have
stipulated that “[a]s a result of the co-conspirators’ false charges, [Mr. James] was imprisoned
and held without bail for more than seven months . . . .” Stipulation, ¶ 40. Tellingly, the
Officers’ interaction with Mr. James occurred in August 2016, and during that same month,
barely a week later, the following occurred:
59)
On or about August 24, 2016, Jenkins, Rayam, Gondo, Hersl, and
Hendrix were involved in an incident with a citizen bearing the initials A.F.
60)
The co-conspirators initiated a traffic stop of citizen A.F. Hendrix stole
$1700 from citizen A.F during the traffic stop while citizen A.F. was detained.
61)
Hendrix later gave a portion of the $1,700 to Ward.
62)
None of the co-conspirators submitted any paperwork acknowledging the
stop of citizen A.F., nor the taking of any of the funds from citizen A.F.
See supra p. 12 (quoting the Stipulation). On this record, it can only be concluded that, as a
matter of law, perhaps if Mr. James had sufficient United States currency when he was
unlawfully stopped, he too might have been “allowed” to “purchase” his freedom from a false
arrest and an unconstitutional prosecution based on fabricated and planted evidence. In any
event, the criminal scheme the Officers executed against him (i.e., lying in arrest paperwork,
planting evidence, intimidating witnesses, terrorizing citizens, and manufacturing probable
cause) were in furtherance of the conspiracy, and is exactly the same type of criminal behavior
for which the Officers were indicted and for which they were ultimately convicted.

34

 C.

APPLICATION OF MARYLAND LAW DEMONSTRATES THAT THE OFFICERS’
ACTIONS WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

The question in this case is not whether the Officers’ conduct was lawful. Mr. James has
won his case. He has a judgment against the Officers. The question is simply whether the
financial burden for that judgment should be shouldered by the taxpayers of Baltimore City or
the criminals who participated in the depraved conspiracy that resulted in the judgment.
The City is not strictly liable for torts committed by its employees. 4 The LGTCA
provides generally that a local government is liable for torts committed by an employee only
when the employee is acting within the scope of employment. Md. Code, Courts & Jud. Proc.
Art., § 5-303(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, the collective bargaining agreement between the
City, BPD, and Baltimore City Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. Unit I provides that
“[t]he City will provide indemnification to any member of the unit who is made a defendant in
litigation arising out of acts within the scope of his/her employment that results in a monetary
judgment being rendered against the employee.” (Emphasis added). The scope of employment
question is the “linchpin” of the City’s obligation to pay. Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 347
(2015).
The Officers pled guilty to, or were found guilty of, RICO conspiracy and other crimes.
In their plea agreements, the Officers admitted that “[i]n order to conceal their criminal conduct
[they] authored false incident and arrest reports . . . documenting their encounters with detainees
and arrestees” and “created false reports of property seized from arrestees . . .” See, e.g.,
Jenkins’s Plea Agreement, 1:17-cr-00638-CCB, ECF No. 5 at p. 17 ¶ d.; Stipulation, ¶¶ 68, 86,

4

It is clear that the General Assembly did not intend boundless liability. There are
important limitations on when a local government may indemnify for punitive damages. Md. Code,
Courts & Jud. Proc. Art., §5-303(c).
35

 109, 119, 135. Indeed, this is echoed in the Stipulation, which conclusively establishes that the
Officers agreed as a part of their guilty pleas that “[t]he purposes of [the individual Defendant]
and his co-defendants included violating the legitimate purposes of the BPD in order to enrich
themselves through illegal conduct, including extortion, robbery and time and attendance fraud.”
Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 21. The parties in this case have stipulated that “the offenses to which the
co-conspirators pled guilty demonstrate actions and omissions and various forms of conduct that
grossly depart from any authorized or legitimate police conduct” and that the “underlying actions
comprising the criminal acts described in the indictments and plea agreements failed to serve any
legitimate purpose of the City’s of BPD’s business . . .” Stipulation, ¶¶ 22, 26. The parties also
stipulated that “[t]he actions of the co-conspirators were performed during and in furtherance of
their outrageous criminal conspiracy and in pursuit of their own pecuniary self-interests” and that
they “purposefully and regularly deviated from the legitimate law enforcement aims of the
BPD’s mission in order to enrich themselves . . . .” Stipulation of Fact, ¶¶ 29-30.
Although Maryland law is somewhat unsettled as to whether and when a criminally
convicted employee can ever be said to have acted within the scope of employment while
committing criminal acts, a common sense reading of the existing Maryland cases provides the
correct answer. A police officer – or any employee, for that matter – cannot possibly be acting
within the scope of his employment when he commits malicious, heinous, intentional crimes
against the very people he was hired to protect and serve. Maryland courts have decided several
cases that are instructive on this point, all of which support the conclusion that the Officers acted
outside the scope of their employment when they “deviated from the legitimate law enforcement
aims of the BPD’s mission” by stopping James without probable case, planting a gun on him,

36

 and lying in arrest documents in order to “conceal their illegitimate and illegal conduct from City
officials and from their supervisors.” Stipulation, ¶ 30, 31.
1.

Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247 (1991)

Sawyer v. Humphries is Maryland’s seminal case on the scope of employment of a law
enforcement officer who commits grievous criminal acts while off-duty duty. There, an off-duty
police officer threw rocks at the plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at 251. Later that same day, the officer
saw plaintiff’s vehicle at a stop sign. Id. The officer approached the vehicle, identified himself as
a police officer, slapped plaintiff, and told him that he was under arrest. Id. Other officers arrived
and arrested plaintiff. Id. at 251-52.
In deciding the case, the Court undertook a scope of employment analysis, identifying
what has subsequently become known in Maryland as “Sawyer Factors.” See, e.g., Prince
George’s County v. Morales, 230 Md. App. 699, 727 (2016). The Court reiterated the “general
test set forth in numerous Maryland cases for determining if an employee’s tortious acts were
within the scope of employment.” Sawyer, 322 Md. at 255. An employee’s tortious conduct
does not come within the scope of employment unless: (1) the employee’s tortious acts were in
furtherance of the employer’s business, and (2) the tortious actions were authorized by the
employer. Id. at 255.
In applying the above test, the Sawyer Court cited with approval the factors from the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 (1933):
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. (2) In determining
whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or
incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment, the
following matters of fact are to be considered:—(a) whether or not the act is one
commonly done by such servants; (b) the time, place and purpose of the act; (c) the
previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the extent to which the
business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e) whether the

37

 act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not been
entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such
an act will be done; (g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished
by the master to the servant; (i) the extent of departure from the normal method of
accomplishing an authorized result, and (j) whether or not the act is seriously
criminal.
Sawyer, 322 Md. at 256 (emphasis added). The Court singled out as an “important factor”
whether the employee’s conduct was “expectable or foreseeable.” Id. at 256 (citing Cox v. Prince
George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 171 (1983)) (additional citations omitted). The Court announced
several other guiding principles: first,
[p]articularly in cases involving intentional torts committed by an employee, this
Court has emphasized that where an employee’s actions are personal, or where
they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the employer’s
business, or where the employee is acting to protect his own interests, even if
during normal duty hours and at an authorized locality, the employee’s actions
are outside the scope of his employment.
Sawyer, 256-57 (emphasis added); second,
[w]here the conduct of the servant is unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite
outrageous, courts tend to hold that this in itself is sufficient to indicate the motive
was a purely personal one.
Id. at 258 (cleaned up) (emphasis added); and third, even if an officer is on duty, that fact
does not lead to the conclusion that the officer is always acting in furtherance of
the State’s business of law enforcement and that all conduct is incidental to police
work.
Id. at 259-60. In support of this position, the Court cited Snell v. Murray, 117 N.J. Super. 268,
273-74 (1971), in which a “uniformed police officer on duty was not within the scope of his
employment where he extorted money from gamblers, shooting one of them in the process.” Id.
at 260. The Sawyer Court ultimately held that, although it was a jury question as to whether the
officer’s attempt to arrest the plaintiff was within the scope, throwing rocks at plaintiff’s car was

38

 outside the scope of employment as a matter of law, in part because it was clear that the officer
was acting for purely personal reasons. Id. at 257-60.
Sawyer stands for the proposition that a police officer’s personally motivated actions do
not fall within the scope of employment. The only conclusion that can be drawn from an analysis
of the Sawyer Factors is that the Officers in the instant case were clearly acting outside the scope
of employment when they stopped an innocent man without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause of criminal activity, planted a gun, and lied in documents in order to arrest and incarcerate
a man they knew to be innocent. The fact that the Officers were in an on-duty status at the time
of their deviant behavior is of no moment. Their actions were clearly personal (they were almost
certainly looking to grab some fast cash, as they indeed witnessed their colleagues do the same
thing less than a week later), did not further the BPD’s interests, and instead were part and parcel
of their vast and sprawling criminal enterprise. The compelling weight of the evidence arising
from the guilty pleas and the admissions of the Officers show that they were acting for their own
purposes. The Officers were enmeshed in a years-long a criminal conspiracy, which was purely
personally motivated, and at odds with the legitimate purposes of the BPD, as admitted in the
plea agreements. See, e.g., Rayam’s Plea Agreement at p. 10 ¶ 4; Stipulation, ¶¶ 26-30. No
reasonable juror could find that the BPD (or any legitimate employer, for that matter) benefits
from its members committing federal crimes in order to enrich themselves. 5

5

Even apart from whether the Officers committed their crimes against Mr. James in
furtherance of a conspiracy, their actions were nevertheless outside the scope of employment.
Planting a gun on anyone, let alone an innocent citizen like Mr. James, is outrageously egregious
conduct that serves no legitimate purpose. Although it could be argued that the BPD may benefit
from getting guns off the street, there was no gun to get off the street in this case. Mr. James did
not have a gun. Without question, the Officers’ actions were “seriously criminal” and of the kind
that the Sawyer Court concluded are outside the scope of employment. See Sawyer, 322 Md. at
256. The actions of the indicted GTTF members, including those of the three Officers involved in

39

 2.

Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 374 Md. 20 (2003)

In Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, the Court of Appeals similarly found that criminal acts
by a police officer were outside the scope of his employment. In Wolfe, an on-duty police officer
raped a driver whom he had pulled over for a traffic stop. Id. at 34. In an ensuing civil action, a
federal court entered judgment against the officer for this criminal act. Id. at 23. Thereafter,
Wolfe filed a complaint asserting that the county was required to pay the judgment. Id. at 24. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding that the officer’s acts were
not within the scope of his employment. Id. at 25-26.
The Court of Appeals summarized Wolfe’s argument as follows:
[T]he traffic stop was an act by [the officer] within the scope of his
employment, and the tort suit constituted ‘litigation arising out of’ that traffic stop
. . . . In arguing that the litigation, based upon rape and battery, arose out of the
traffic stop, Wolfe utilizes a ‘but for’ test. She states that, ‘but for’ Ziegler’s position
as a police officer making the traffic stop, the rape and battery would not have
occurred.
Id. at 31-32. The Court ultimately rejected this argument, stating “[t]he litigation arose out of the
‘act’ of raping Ms. Wolfe and not out of the ‘act’ of the traffic stop. Id. at 36. The Court also
noted that the rape “was neither authorized nor permitted . . . . [I]t was criminal.” Id. Again, as
in Sawyer, the case turned on the criminal conduct of the officer.
The instant case is indistinguishable from Wolfe. Here, as in Wolfe, the Officers’ actions
were plainly criminal. Their crimes against Mr. James were committed during and in furtherance
of the conspiracy for which they were later convicted or pled guilty. The judgment against the
Officers arises not out of any legitimate action or use of police powers, but out of the

this case, are the epitome of “unprovoked, highly unusual and quite outrageous” behavior for a
police officer that falls outside the scope of employment as matter of law.
40

 opportunistic planting of the gun, and falsifying paperwork, which were part and parcel of the
broader criminal conspiracy.
3.

Clark v. Prince George’s County, 211 Md. App. 548 (2013); Brown v.
Mayor of Balt., 167 Md. App. 306 (2006)

In Clark v. Prince George’s County, an off-duty officer used his service weapon to shoot
two furniture deliverymen after an altercation inside the officer’s home. Id. at 553. The officer
called 911 and reported the shooting as a “departmental shooting,” presented his police badge,
and filed a use of force report in accordance with police procedures. Id. at 576-77. He also
testified that when he shot the deliverymen he “was acting in accordance with his police training
in responding to a threat, and in particular in accordance with General Orders that provide the
police officers may have to use force in defense of themselves or others.” Id. at 577. In short, the
officer claimed that his actions were driven by a business purpose, and therefore within the scope
of employment. This stands in stark contrast to the instant matter, where the Officers have freely
admitted that their actions were personal and not done to further the mission or interests of the
BPD. The Clark Court held that because the officer was acting to protect himself, his home, and
his family, his actions were personal and not part of his duties. Id. Thus, the conduct was
outside the scope of employment and the County was free of any liability. Id. The Court further
noted that shooting delivery persons is not an act “commonly done” by police officers. Id. at 578.
In Brown v. Mayor of Baltimore, an off-duty police officer shot the victim 17 times
because he believed that the victim was having an affair with his wife. Id. at 323. The officer
pled guilty to first degree murder. Id. The Court found that the officer’s actions were highly
personal and outrageous and as such, not within the scope of employment. Id.
As in Clark and Brown, the Officers in the case sub judice acted for their own personal
gain even though they were on duty. They pled guilty to, or were convicted of, conspiracy

41

 charges, whose overt acts were cut from the same cloth as those taken against Mr. James, and at
a time (August 2016) when the conspiracy was in full execution. The incident with Mr. James
was during and in furtherance of that very conspiracy in connection with which two of the
Officers specifically admitted that their “purpose[] . . . included violating the legitimate purposes
of the BPD in order to enrich themselves through illegal conduct. . .” Rayam’s Plea, p. 10 ¶ 5. As
in Brown, the Officers have been found guilty of intentional, willful crimes. There is no reason
that this case should be treated any differently from Brown. The fact that the Officers have pled
guilty to or were convicted of intentional crimes forecloses any possibility that a reasonable fact
finder could reasonably conclude that they were acting within the scope of their employment
when they committed those crimes.
As in Clark, criminal conspiracy, planting guns, lying in official documents and sending
innocent people to jail are not things “commonly done” by police officers, any more than the
officer in Clark shooting the delivery persons with his service weapons was a thing “commonly
done” by police officers. In fact, it is actually more likely that an off-duty officer would shoot a
person in response to a perceived threat (i.e., the outside the scope conduct in Clark), than it is
that officers would enter into a criminal conspiracy, plant guns, manufacture probable cause, lie
in arrest documents, and conspire to send an innocent man to jail (i.e., the conduct in the
underlying case). Furthermore, the Court in Clark was not impressed that the officer claimed to
be following departmental policy and training when he shot the deliverymen. Even so, the instant
case is stronger than Clark because “[t]he underlying actions comprising that criminal activity
are not ones recognized, supported, or otherwise authorized by any of BPD’s training provided to
law enforcement officers.” Stipulation, ¶ 27. Furthermore, the Officers in our case actually
admitted that the purpose of the conspiracy was to “violat[e] the legitimate purposes of the BPD

42

 in order to enrich themselves through illegal conduct. . .” Rayam’s Plea, p. 10 ¶ 5, and the parties
have stipulated that“[t]he offenses to which the co-conspirators pled guilty,” or, “of which they
were found guilty” “demonstrate actions . . . . that grossly depart from any authorized or
legitimate police conduct” and “failed to serve any legitimate purpose of the City’s or BPD’s
business.” Stipulation, ¶¶ 22, 25, 26
4.

Tall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Balt. City, 120 Md. App. 236 (1998); LePore v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591 (1965)6

In Tall v. Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, parents sued a school board
for injuries a special education teacher inflicted upon their mentally handicapped son when she
beat his arms and legs with a ruler because he urinated in his pants. 120 Md. App. at 254. The
parents contended that the teacher had acted within the scope of her employment because some
physical interaction between the child and the teacher, including “disciplining [the child] if [he]
misbehaved or failed to listen,” “was foreseeable” due to the child’s disability. Id. at 248. The
Tall Court rejected this argument. Reviewing factually analogous cases from several other
jurisdictions, the court found two considerations persuasive in concluding that the teacher had
acted outside the scope of employment when beating the child. Id. at 258-60.
First, the school board had a written policy prohibiting corporal punishment in any form.
Second, although legitimate physical interactions between a teacher and mentally handicapped
student may “be appropriate in certain situations, [those legitimate interactions] in no way
constitute[ ] implied authority for a teacher to beat a mentally disabled child” in order to
discipline him. Id. at 259. Indeed, the Tall Court could identify no manner in which the act of

6

Although Tall and Gulf Oil do not involve police officers, the Court of Appeals has stated
that “the same basic principles of Maryland agency law, for determining whether actions of
employees generally are within the scope of particular employment relationships, are equally
applicable to police officers.” Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 721 (2001).
43

 beating a mentally disabled child could further the school board’s objective of educating
children, and it thereby refused to hold the school board vicariously liable for the teacher’s
actions. Id. at 260.
In LePore v. Gulf Oil Corp., a plaintiff brought suit against an employee of Gulf Oil for
assault and battery and sought to hold Gulf Oil liable under principles of vicarious liability. The
employee was a retail sales representative whose duties included promoting service station
outlets, securing operators and helping to train and counsel operators in merchandising Gulf’s
products. 237 Md. App. at 593. He also called on operators working under a bailment plan to
collect monies due to Gulf. Id. In furtherance of these duties, when the employee called on
plaintiff to recover monies owed to Gulf, a heated argument ensued between the two. Id. at 594.
During the argument, the employee used foul language and struck plaintiff. Id. at 595. Gulf Oil
sought and received a directed verdict on the basis that the assault by the employee was outside
the scope of his employment with Gulf and was not reasonably foreseeable by Gulf. Id. at 593.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the employer, holding that Gulf was not liable for
the assault on a third person by an employee “who lost his temper in a quarrel arising out of the
attempted collection, and struck the third person.” Id. at 595. The Court reasoned:
In the present case, the only authority … was to attempt to make a collection
and to call his employer if he failed to do so. We hold that this, without more,
is insufficient to make the subsequent assault an expectable act done in
furtherance of his employment and he was, therefore, acting without the scope
of his employment.
Id. at 600.
The present case has interesting parallels to both Tall and Gulf Oil. The Officers
obviously had the authority to make arrests, just as the employee in Gulf Oil had the authority to
collect monies. However, just as the employee in Gulf Oil did not have the authority to collect

44

 monies by way of violence, the Officers here did not have the authority to effect arrests by any
means, and utterly without the constitutionally required basis (probable cause) to do so. They
certainly did not have the authority manufacture probable cause out of whole cloth. Nor did they
have the authority to plant guns on citizens, to invent charges, to lie in arrest documents, and to
intentionally send innocent people to jail. Indeed, if this type of behavior is “expectable” of
police officers and is considered “in furtherance” of a police department and its objectives, then
society is in trouble.
As in Tall, where the Court held that physically disciplining a child could not further the
objective of educating children, there is no manner in which the act of planting a gun and
falsifying records in order to send an innocent man to jail (during and in furtherance of a
conspiracy for which the Officers have pled guilty to or been convicted of, no less) could further
the BPD’s objective, which is “to protect and preserve life, protect property, understand and
serve the needs of the Baltimore City’s neighborhoods, and to improve the quality of life in
Baltimore City.” Rayam’s Plea Agreement p. 10 ¶ 4; Stipulation, ¶ 2.
Planting the gun, falsifying charges, and intentionally sending an innocent man to jail is,
in and of itself, outside the scope of employment. The fact that the Officers committed these
crimes against Mr. James during and in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy solidifies that
conclusion. It is undisputed that the Officers were acting for their own personal motives, and
against any legitimate interests of the BPD or City. It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the
City is liable “either through an enforcement action or some other permissible mechanism.”
Francis, 239 Md. App at 548. Plaintiff cannot meet that burden. Given the damning facts
screaming from the Stipulation, no reasonable juror could find in favor of Plaintiff, and the scope

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 of employment issue must be decided as a matter of law: it is clear that the Officers’ actions in
this case were not within the scope of employment.
D.

CONSIDERATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY MILITATE STRONGLY AGAINST
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE

The Officers encountered Mr. James and detained him without probable cause, and then,
during and in furtherance of their conspiracy, they planted a gun on him and lied in the
accompanying paperwork as part of their scheme to further enrich themselves. There are
compelling policy reasons to find that the Officers were acting outside the scope of their
employment. First, it is hard to imagine a more outrageous abuse of authority. The Officers’
participation in the conspiracy has caused untold damage to the BPD and the citizens of
Baltimore. Consequently, the citizens of Baltimore should not have to pay for the Officers’
crimes (other than on a voluntary, case-by-case evaluation of the circumstances of each instance
of victimization).
Second, myriad undesirable consequences would result if a court were to hold that this
type of conduct is within the scope of employment. Local governments would have to flirt with
bankruptcy to avoid the costs of malignancy that sometimes overtake municipal law enforcement
agencies despite the best efforts of leaders to hold up such paramilitary agencies as having
integrity and being committed to constitutional policing. If this type of behavior is foreseeable
and furthers the BPD’s interests, then the BPD is nothing more than an organized crime
institution. In order for a court to rule that the Officers’ actions were within the scope of
employment, the court would necessarily have to conclude that the Officers’ actions were not
outrageous and personal.
In sum, the Court would have to find that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
actions of these convicted criminals were foreseeable and expectable, and that it is in furtherance

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 of police duties to lie, rob citizens, plant drugs and guns on people, and knowingly fabricate
evidence to send innocent people to jail in order to line their pockets. If this is the outcome, then
law enforcement agencies across the country are in grave danger: why even have a police force,
if operating a criminal enterprises on company time is within the scope of police employment?
Furthermore, with respect to the LGTCA, a ruling that the Officers acted within the scope of
employment in this case would eclipse the legitimate goal and social purposes of providing
indemnification to government employees. 7 It would also send a message to officers (and to
citizens) that officers will not be held accountable for their actions: even if they commit
intentional, malicious crimes, they will not be financially liable. The City does not seek to
condone this behavior by indemnifying these Officers, and neither should this Court.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City requests this Court grant its Motion for Summary
Judgment and enter judgment in its favor.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Andre M. Davis
____________________________
Andre M. Davis
CITY SOLICITOR

Justin S. Conroy
Kara K. Lynch
CHIEF SOLICITORS
Alexa E. Curley
Natalie R. Amato
ASSISTANT CITY SOLICITORS

7

There would be no indemnity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code, State Gov’t
Art., § 12-104, because the Officers acted with malice and did not act within the scope of their
public duties.
47

 Baltrmore Ctty Lavt Department
100 StreeL Room [01
Baltrmore Maryland 21202

Anorneyxfinr Mayor (.'try af
Balnmare

   

RE FOR A HEAR

Movant, the Mayor and Crty Counctl of Baltrmore, respectfully requests a prompt hearmg

on Matron for Summary Judgment
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 2nd day ofJuly 2019 Coptes oflhe foregomg Motron
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum Support, Proposed Order and Request for Hearmg,
were matled, postage patd, to
Howard A Esq
Mandy Esq
D'Alesandro A

II Lexmgton Street_ 5th Floor
Baltimore MD 21202

/s/Kam 

Kara 
CHIEF SULICITOR

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