T83 30883

Office of the Press Secretary

 

For Mediate Release June 3; 1359
PRESS WWNCE
BY THE PRESIDENT
The B: iet inc; Room
9:40 3.3. m.
{go 

TEE mam: airing the past few days, elements of the
Chinese Amy have been brutally messing popular and peaceful
amtratione in China. There has been widespread and continuing
violence, may casualties and my odeathe . And we (1091039 the
decision to use force, and I now call on the Chinese leadership

publicly, as I have in private climate, to avoid violence and to

I

return to their previous policy of restraint.

me in ?emmen Square were advocating

basic tame rights, includiog the freedoe of expression, freedom of
. the press, freedoa o: assoczation. These are goals ye support aroma
the world. These are meow that are enshrined in both the 8.8.

Constitution and the Chinese Constitution. Wheat the world ve
stand with those who seek greater fraction and democracy. i?ois'ie 

?trawl? teit viev of a?niniettation, at our Congress and, 
6? ?home, of meadow people. -

usi restraint,

in recent weeks, we?ve urged net
3 been a violent and

nonVi?1ence and dialogue. Instead, there he
b10062 attack on the demonstrators. The United States cannot consone
-: Violent attacks and cannot ignore the conseqoencss for our

stionship with China, which has been buiit on foundation of
?ad ?91301?: by the Mexican people.
espouse, but for a
to our long-tern
lex internal situation in China.
of the political leadership

This is not the ties for an emotional 

reasoned, careful action that takes into account bo

interests and recognition of comp

There clearly is turmoil within the ranks
as veil as the People's Liberation Army. And now is the tine to look

beyond the moment to important and enduring aspects of this vital
relationship for the United States. Indeed. the budding of
democracy, which we have seen in recent weeks, owes nnoh to 
relationship we have deveioped since 1972, and it's inportant at this
time to act in a way that will encourage the further developnent-and
deepening'ofvthe?positive elements of that relationship and the
og,denocratisetion. ~It would be s.tregedy for all if China
were to pull back to its pre-1972 era of ans repression.
Xindfui of these complexities, and yet of the necessity
ssnetion of the events of 

by strongly and clearly express our coed
recent days, I an ordering the following actions: scepsnsion of all
es and consercial exposes of weapons,

governsent?to~governnent sai
S. and Chinese military leaders,

suspension of visits between B.
ethetic review of requests by Chinese students in.?he93nited

seam to extend their stay, and the offer at hwitarian and
radical assistance through the Red Cross to that. injured during the
assault, and xeview or other aspects of our bilateral relationship as
events in China continue to unfold.

she process or desecratization of conunnist societies
9111 not he a snooth one, and we ans: taunt to ao?bseke in a say
which.st1nu1etes rather than stities progress toward,cpen.and
representative systems. -

- ?xoee






And I'd be glad to take a few guestions before our

Cabinet oeeting, which starts in a few minutes.
Yes,ixr. President, you have said the genie of
democracy cannot be put back in the bottle in China. You said that.
?Wm: before the actions of the past weekend. 2) you still
believe that, and are there further steps that the United states
further democracy in China?

could take such as economic sanctions to
I believe the

szom: You, I still believe; that.
forces at democracy are so powerful, and when you see then as
recently as this earning .. a single station: standing in ?ront of a
tank --: and than, I might add; Boeing tho tank driver exercise
going to

restraint, I on convinced that the forces of democracy are

these unfortunate events in Monomer: Square. 
On the commercial side, I don't want to hurt the Chinese
oomercial contacts have led in

to be}. iove that the
essence to this quest for more from.
commercial incentive, whether it": in China or in other
systems, the move to democracy becomes more inexorable.

So what we have done is suspended ?certain things on the

side, and my concern is with those in the military who are
see some exercisioo restraint and see
I think no need

I think as people have

people. I happen
totalitarian

military
213mg force. .?And yet, when I
the b1 divisions that exist inside the pm, I an:

9
.to oove along the lines I've oo?cnood here.

I think that it's important to keep sayintho those

elements in tho chimes. nili?cary .- restraint -- oonth'mo to show t2
restraint that of you have shown. Ana I understand there are

if? divisions in: do the bray.
So this is -- we?re putting the mitosis on that side:

XEROX W332 295 G3 9



President, could you give us your current .best
assessment of the political situation there which leaders are up,
which are dam, who apparently has prevailed here and who apparently

has me: 

- . It?s too obscure; it's too beclouded to
g? . 88?. and I - li?xi' I Mt! ionind You of the hicwry. In the
??lmed. Revolution days, Deng Xiaoping at Mao Tao-Mg?o right hand
.4: pat out. He me back. In 1976 he. was put out again in the hat
days of Hao 930-th and the days of the Gang oi! Pour. Then he cai'?
hack in and to his credit he moved China towards openness; towards

(Mooney, towards reform. And suddenly we see a reversal.

?me don?t think there's anybody in this Emery that
can answer your question with authority this point. It doesn't
work that way in dueling with China. ..

1 But, President, there have been reports that
other reports that
he?s ailing and in a hospital. What do you know about that, air?

panorama: Bon't know for sure on eithex. And I?ve
talked to our Ambassa?ox on that, as I say, last night, am we just

can't confirm mosey or amigo; on the other.
9 15:. President, room at tho nee: for the ms. to

maintain relations with China, but given the brutality at the attack:
overthelatoouphofdays, anthems. maroon-atom?

usual with the current regime?





 I don?t want to see a total break in this

. ".elationship end I will not encourage a tote} break in the
?Rehabs-P. -2?his relationship is - vhen you see these ki?s
struggling for deeocraoy an? freedon, this would be a bad time for
the United states to withdraw and pull back and leave thee to the
devices of a. leadership that night decide to crack dovn further.

I do -- em have suggested I take the Ambassador out.
In my View, that would be 180 degrees wrong. .013 Ambassador provides
one of the best listening posts we have in China. He is thoroughly
experienced. And so let others make proposals that, in ?my View,
don't make much sense. I went to see us stay involved we continue
to work for restraint and for human rights and for democracy. And
then down the road, we have enormous commonality of. interests with
China, but. it 9111 not be the some made: a brutal one repressive

regime.

So 1 stop short' oi suggesting that that we ought to do is
as farce): relations with amino, and I would like to encourage those to

:?ontinue their change.

242?. Bush, you're sending a message to the oilitery
and to the governeent. A couple or weeks ago, you told the students
to continue to stand by their beliefs. that message 51o you want the

students to hear free what you're saying right now?

me 9328mm: what we support their quest for
doeocrecy, to: reform and for freedom, and there should be no ?oubt

about that. And then, in sending this engage to the military, I
would enema-age the: to go back to the posture of a tow days ego that

did show restraint and that did recognize the rights oi the people
and that did epitoaize that that Chinese leader told no, that the
my loves the people. There are still vivid canopies of that.
Should the students go hm? Should the students
stop trying on am one Any? f,
m'mm: mu: dictate to the meant. oi.? they

{would do tron helm: around the world. not we support the We
Ito: Moran? and return. and I'd jut have that.

231:. 

T83 PRESIDEHT: think they-ere in the sense of
:ontradiotion themselves right now. China has historically been less
:hen totally interested in what other countries think of their

oerfomence. You have to just look back to the Kiddie Kingdom
and you 1603: back in history when outsiders, including the
inited States, were viewed as "barbarians.? 80 historically, China,

with its imenee pride and its cultural background and its enormous
history at con?ict, internal and external, has been fairly

independent in setting its course.

I have had the feeling that China wants to be a more

acceptable 3-- acceptebie in the family of nation, and I think any
observer?would agree that, indeed, until very recent events, they've

mud in that direction. So what I would like to do is encourage
than to move further in that direction by recognizing the rights of
young people and by rebnking any use of. force.



0- Hr. President, more than most Americans,- you
understand the Chinese. How do you account for the excessive
violence of this resyonse? Once the Army decided to act, that they
would drive armored personnel carriers em walls of people - how

can you explain that?

eagerness: I really can't. it is very hard to,

amino, because there was that restraint that was properly being
showed to: a while on the part of the military, chance to come in
and restore what: sure they'd been told order to' 2213124101: 
which I expect they had been told we: enmhietic. And so I can't
explain it. I can?t ?plain it unless they were under: orders .. and
than you get into the argument about, well, whet orders do you
?01109? And so I condense it: I don't try to explain it.

andfhaxiz'ugo
pemtuny. Sorry. about you gay: bars: there. -

. will you, Mr. mutant, be able to accumulate the
'19 none 

.5-

die from Congress for tougher sanctions? Many lawmakers felt you

are slow to contiemn or criticize the violence in China before now
1d many are pushing for much tougher action on the part cot-this
buntry. 

THE PRESIDENT: I've told you what I?m going to do. I?m,
he President. - I set the foreign policy objectiv 3's and actions taker

:y the Executive Branch. I think they know -- most of then on
Iongree?e -- that I have not only a keen peraonei' interest in China,
mt that I understand it reasonably well. I will just reiterate to
:he leaders this afternoon my conviction that this is not a time for

anything other than a prudent, reasoned response; And it is a time
to assert over and over again our commitment to denooreoy, emphasize
the strength that we give to oemooraoy in situations of this nature.
And I come back to the frontline question here -- I do think this
,chanqe is inexorable. It may go a couple of step: forward and than
take a step back, but it is on the nova. The genie will not be put
back in the bottle. And so I an tryingto take steps that will
encourage a peaceful change, and yet recognize the tact that coma
does have greet pride in its own history. Ami 3y recommendations are
based on my knowledge of Chinese history.

- So I would argue with thou who want to do some are
?amboyant because I happen to rod that this relationship is 

to the United sumo: Auction. Ami so is our names to
democracy and our mungeaent for those who are willing to hold
high the banner of dmcracy. 30 V8 found, I think. a prudent goth
here. .. - . . 


.hnling effect on amtio meow; Mowing in other minis};
commode: particularly in the Sov at out! Europe, when:
my look'at the kind of uprising that sparked in came

.. 

wrv?


 

 

 



 Pesszom: Re. I think the moves that we're seeing
12: Eastern Europe today and, indeed, in the Soviet Union are going to
go forward. And I think people are watching more with horror and
eaymg 310?: given this movement towards deeocracy, can the Chinese
leadership react in the way they have? And no I think this my be a
sign to others around the world that people are heroic when itnconos
to their commitment to democratic change. Ami I would just urge the

Chinese leaders to recognize that.

Mr. President, there are reports that the Chinese


ui;itary is badly divided and that. with this crackdown: the
authorities brought in some trooye free the Tibet conflict. If"

that's the case, how does suspending our these military
relationships .encourege any kind of change? I mean, could You

explain my the point of doing that is --
- 9335mm: .1 already em, David. ion missed it. I

explained it because I want to keep it.on the military side. I've
'preoeed bore rhetorical}: tho indignation we fool. I've recognized

{is history or China moving into its own maze Kingdom as
it?s done in various times in its poet, and I went to encourage 1'55

things that have helped the And I. think?n'oe the
suspension is going to send a strong signal. not saying it?s
going to care the short-range problee in China. I'm not sure any
outside country can cure the short-Tango, the today in Thrower:
Square problem. But I think it is very important the Chinese leadexs
know it's not going to be business as usual, fund I think it?s 
important. that the Amy know that we want to see restraint. And this
is the best way to signal that.

0 would you ?0.33: bonfiict? You talked. about tho
Do you or you: advisers too: that

division: within the Chinese Aray.
there could actually be a civil conzlict?betwoon Army'oonnendera?
TEE PRESIDEHT: ?ail, I don't want to speculato on that,

but: than are ditterencea, clearly, within the Amy in tom of 
of force. Otherwise, they won?t be doing me David Rotten

properly pointed out to hem-sepia: - unlts casing 53;: tm auction.


f7 

And it is not, incidentally; just in Tianannson Square that. the
Chinese -- that this problem exists. It is in Shanghai; it?s in
Chengdu today: it's in Guangzhou, I?m told, in a much mailer scale.
But they brought; the troops in fros outside because the Beijing
troops apparently demonstrated a great sensitivity to the cause of

- -. . I tn. opted
the young people and were disciplined though they so go?

a; our! eople
tor the side 0: domecracy and @9399 in ?3 3' 9. '01, something

otbexo as i . But I certain}. don't want to spoculate
a -- put 3.1: that

?hat I don?t have. -- I can't reach that conclusion

lay.

?rhere were eons news reports that some}? the
soldiers? units had burned their own trucks in -- have you received
the same type of intelligence reports?

THE PRESIDERT: I think I?just saw Speculation., I
havendon't believe thav intelligence said that.

But there are reports that it in vary di?ticult to: some 01' tho
military, Who are much more oynpathatic to tho toga-mass, to the
again. go back to the original quostion here

dwamtratora. And I,
that aslfed. I think, with the change that's taken place so for
we're beyond kind of a Cultural Rwolution reopen?.

I think the depth of the feeling towar?s democracy is 1:
great that you can't put the genie back in the bottle and return t:

total to ?ssion.? A154 I thin]: .what va'ro seeing is 'a mitumtio:
of that the divisions within the pm. But I ?mainly mt. to
stop short: of predicting a civil war botwom out}: o: the 3

Motion Amy.

?ank you all very ouch. I have a cabinet meeting at
10:68 ads.

-

.. ?Mh~ .0. IL- 

 

   

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O. God
L. .. 

-lv'mo

to the test iota. be
Helen.

President. o2: militexy sales to onan
does not seen to heve eede en on the rulers there end
they've become tore whet else ere you going to do to
express an}. nation's outrage? And do you have any other pleas?

9 282 Belem. I think the position ve took,
eiainq not et the Chinese people, but et the allitery errengenente,
we: well-received exouno the world and we; tolloved by zany
touatziee. Right efte: we did thet, eon: o: the Europeea countries
{alloyed suit. the event: in thine ere each thet we, obvionezy;
deptore the violenoe and toe lees o: zlze, urge restozetioa o: order
vath racoqnition o: the righte o: the people. Ana still hopetul
that Chine will cote together. respecting the urge to: deaooteoy on
the pert of the people. .

And what we will do in the tutute I will ennounoe et
appropriate tines. But right now, we ere engaged in diploaet?c'
efforts one other couytrtes ere doing the thing, end zet'e hope

that it does en euclioreting etteot on this situation.
?15
Does your support o: \taen ziohts to: acnocreqy
extend to other piece: in the world. like South Atrice. the ?eet
.3enx, they've been fighting lot longer than in thine eonEosh
regrettion?

Tu! Pazszotxr: fee. it does. It certainly does.
Concern is universel. And thet'e whet I vent the Chinese leeders to
i undetstenq. .

You see, we've taken this notion -- I en one the in

China: I underxteod the ioportence o: the relationship with the
Chinese people end with the govezaoent. It is in the interest at the
Unite: Stetes to heve good.re1ettons. But o: whet you the
question that you properly raised, we have to speek out in fever 6:
human rights. And we aren't going to reoeke the
stend {or something. And there's no question in the aiade or 
students that the united Stetes 13 standing in theit cornert.

1?11 tell you a littze anecdote - when on: core vent out
to the university to pick up?eoae o: the students and bring the: out.

they were met by universal eppleuoe. And then the ctndente in gag.
country heve been qu?te supportive o: the Itepo that 2 have tekgn.
we had tev into the Ovel otzice the other day. end 1 unit eey. :y
heert goes out to then. they oennot 3:1: to their teotlieo end.tt?e
dlttiwlt. 

lot. yep. the?Onited States soot etend.uhe:evex. ta. 3
3 vlietwer universeny to: human rightsyou teationed South Attioe. Abooluteiy. hopellino eyertheid?enet?

?bl!

- m?

 



world, but we should 1





. .ell ov?w?eebeI ma 0

Kr. Preaicent. can the United States we: have
noun}. relations with can? ea long a: the herd-Aim? believed
anponeible to: the manure. mg as Dan; Xiaoping and Frasier Li

main in payer? In other worth. what will it take to get
3? :eletim baa: to actual?

 

- vacuum: It vii: take a recogaiticn o: the rig'ate
o: individueie an: teapot: to: the :19th at those who diaevr?- 13? 
you have cited two leaders.? one 0: when night all you in 
motioned. bong xiaopeag -- not eure the Marion: people not this 
I -- be we: thrown out by Cultural levoiution trovd back in the '9 
:ate cane back in: 1-76 vac put out again because be was new - 
1 as too towarddonhinq. .13 en saying 2:03 that expel-1m is

let't not 3239 at concinxi me as to how individual loosen in China .
{eel when we aren?t sure a: that. 

w?


But the broad question that you at - ve can": but 
totally none: relations 1 ale-e there?s a recognition that the - 91? 
the validity o: the etude: aoyirationa. And this): that met .
win baypen. Re bad a v14: right hl?, upstairs in, the ?nite Booze I 
vita at. Ran Li. Row. 2 don't lows whether he's in ?out, him: 3- 
said something to ne toe: I think the hex-1m poop}; would be 
interestod in. Be km lot? the people. And then .

seen ?adieu tron the 27th My ooainq in tree ?use. 3e 
and clearly shooting peosze. . 

C)

  
   
   
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
   

tut I dm't thin): -- lining said that. I don?t think we
ought to udqe the whole People's uhu'atioa may 0; China by that
Martino clans. ~Aud eo Rat'o - m; 1? vent to $3 is procaine
this relationship ae beat 1 can. and I he? the conditions that lie
ahead Vin permit in to gnome this relation-hip. I don?t want to
pee: 3udqxent on individual leadm, but. 1 Vent to take very else: to
those leaders and to the net at the maid that the we?: States

. denounces the kind. o: brutality that all 0: as have sum on out:
?i 1: television. 
"s 

{Wits 9 maiden: I want to at you about the now
'5 inzeme nanorauduu the Republican national mitten ?uctuated
concerning Speaker roiay. first, do you think it's credible that
. this sauna-dun which you called dimming. we: not know most
anybody above the Xaval o: the outta: who wrote it? 131 second, 6o
you ?lm? it": ?rough. air. to: thia acute: to resign ax?: to:
everyone then to simply say that the utter in closed?

 

 

- mzm: van, in the {ix-st place. I have great;

respect to: to: roley, and he?s the one that lay; the letter emu

he closed. and 123': right. And let are ?ne: repeat -- ie 

dissenting. Md 2 hcpe -- it'a against ?anything that. 1 my. 

to etaad to: in 99mm: 312.. 1 ?mad an: utter with Lea 
amcor. a. locked me right in the and said he am not new

about it. Be nove? prone.? to move the person thet did how about
it. use so I accept that. But I think thet an", mg

honorable am, who obviously we done a tan-it a in mice to by
0 this. to correct when he let?s get it me an. 

8226 I'd like to asset the am: nova
leqialatlon an the tine being 9 into 

sure we .
aqua?: on either aide. ?it kind c:

I: this a ionowup queatim?

ch 0 "gang: rose)! he hue-ice?? that awe :ike
CWVO I 
5?0 you. no to:

. . .u.m
were in town about! (So scathing to to-
}oin in that enact. "bag 6? you ?:29 

9 . I



avoid min; at airway. an: numbing that 60612:? thy
acceptmco o! brutal?:

or lock, 02 rupcct. 2mm: rights v11} in.
. thing: much am." ?itticnlt.

nor-?3 no caution. about me.
I have one tenant-up. new. 20,000 this?.
in nu Oahu Strut.
mstom: Ya.

Kany 0! thus have cpo?ken out An you prepzod to
this: political ?Wm: in this count. should thus. ..
3

I'hcy'ro not ?an; asylum 1'11 :11:
you Vb? '5 "?902 Ch. question tint 93y not sacking asylm.
u. had :our 0: the: the athct day. And cm an: that on
at that -- an -- said. 1w. 3y countryhis mum. But what NV. dam is ?and tho vat-.3 so
can. p.092. an no: unpaid to go but): to our may. 33': no:
staining uyhn. at: am is not going to turn his on 2:13 on .
country. no mt. to chime thingsgaindon't blame 2:1: that. So 


1.931 status, and that's not: mu: thorn looking tax.

0

 

-
-. -- in light 0: student mad-ups.
a they tact 

I m, i:
mm?r: '2 think it's smiling, and to 1 would -
simply ny ma m: va'w: ?tuna! dam would say to than poop?, .
'you don?t luv. to qg back. but no: going to than to ma 
dam: tho any 1w. and turn ?3011' he}: Claim. fun at. . - if
patriotic young pooph who tux beans. a: mint; their own arm 
m: sisters quanta down. but turn not aching any 1%
v.51. to 11-. than: um: to M19 dung. than. 
. u- ..
nutdwt, 9: can Mucus mg: math: 3' 
country to: a vhnc. Your asthma tum. mu: Union at? ?9 
.tuvc 335.2th a bit since you boa:- mum, :m (up mum? 
f'to stoning ?capture. at their intentions. no you an! accept 11:. . .. . .
Gorbachov'c ?acuity in tb his pledge 91 1 "swat . .
car. you an we 0 1193.1: bf'c.? than; 91:? yawn My? -- 
21:: 2mm:
- ?Shit. meant.

?no.
3 don't think it's um? as men a:
1 don?t think it's shifts! as men.

 

F. 
mt. 1 ?a 
to saymam diam

mcsuquum um diam. And than to go (mg
and vc'vc dam vastly that.

proposal in ad. mm
un?t? the; Alumna. and :m a! ?u hadm 

told that it's not.
with: iv: baa 4.x: history. ROW. :36. . good 


 

a. mu. :11: - 

new.
?weaned by the: "spam so 

mung use! that. 1.3 mung with the mu: M033. I 
going to continua. to keep any can: V16: 0953. I 0111 anpug-mun ?cam. ?at to 11: w, 
2 sold Gotham! that: mum-om In: an

a: I: tux. 
So 2 don?t thins: hunts-that. m: his?.
vu- rclutimbtp, or that

it um 3;
:mntutum hangs.?
an: he 1.3.: than won um am in this

 


tan. a. 41? a, to}; .
Wmtdu. .3 
I ?we think 2 hop. mt NY In that. 1 don't look t: it": 
?h?t V.YQ .3232
mu. 1.: an jun: (anew up. no you a, 
is sine." man: or tum ?attach? a ??ats; 
8: I are tank,? a: k. .. 
?cum g? . ..
. 11!: mm: gar-say damn-sud m: up 3.5
1.. sums 1: dam to
cod cone othcr VA to a road: this. ?at when you got: 2:161!
2t. I do not war. {a try to ?nation.
It qtta into a ccnxorahip node that I in?: MM tn vary
matarhhlo with. -
tn
Kr. President. Proddmt 81:63:15 public mm
About his mating: with China. luau: can to imply me ?34:13::
Chinese balm? that new ?tt?a than to: the 6.6. to act it with.
both:- tolttiom with the ?u that. anything thin thinking
toner Proaidcnt told. you in print. that ?smug? an do?
that relations with the Guiana v11: uprovc. and min? V3 6

pmrm: ma Chino? hum a ?log-.21: :10 who 
can knot mould and: it. the chino? still in). my; 1R9 tied ?u
knot. and than _ahould antic it. I don't that way.

Pruid?nt Mama's Visit to China. wax Var-Y helpful bacauu
he was an unot?cial vixitor, H. is respected in chin: a. law :5ch
You old (thud. in a- can who opancd a relationshif with China
things aura extraordtnadl dittioult. Rot just a. no): of-
cmunicntion. but. go back to :2 new and team a. 1002 at 3'03
80:0 in last. thtiqoo 01' the Cultural R?vuution was!? many,
may, my poopl. -- humus? o: thoustntu roportodzy 1.08%: that:

XLVQI. 

so ha want there at a d-Ltticult tint. 80 CW ?u
tundumtgl haportam or this autumn, I do. 119,0de 
quite: {ruddy to can can.? lenders, and. ?ag. in turn, spake 
runny to his. mt; 2mm: in and; the pain that we didn't cu 
m. Rev, thin]: a my. Mmummpm.m1m-
in chin have to: Pram: than. that. unit var
?attractive. a. ?ma no We. treat no. 8013: not on a.
unbound mission or: may at um: am: I that I hum
a hotter tmtugotuhmmu Mmatandae. 
1: ?hath-ram cm
managed?. tiara

many
"new. muo'n ?0 when it gm. .

sat-m: 
a: ?no: mlmp?y?t . I but mat (?and the
com-:4 m. ?m
m.z.uumupu.tom?uum 3124 ?ictd 

Muwo'chottotzym. luxvouu hop.
understanding from this group. who has 1 ?a

your Oh to but
nine, Ivocot:
to m. nut-.101: but hat. WW
cm 81m visit: contributed to that; won. fury Inch 

in If M.
?t last I. ?3 ?Mo Imm
with hi: rm 1: mama: 3??new: m3 
cum a 81m'. ?tabulation an alpha?? m? 

tummy are 9: his an 

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81.6 A ?8 

at. 'u 

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mm 


. M9.t 
P501139: Wish Chairman Deng Xia 
p*e 5 Republic of China op?ng 01




?26 Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the

Pres 
idea: for Mezzonal Security Affairs

Lawrence 3, Ba.
02! State gleburger. DePUty Secretary


.lorence E. Gantt, Notetaker

gins; Xiaoping. Chairman PERDEC ?5.1650

Peng, E'temier 13 

Cia?ugg?gzl V?m! Premier 

orei 172

O?ther Chine?e 5136133

DATE, TIME July 2 1939
- .
AND PLACE Great Hall a! ch; People,lg?2?igg
chairman_nan9 - 
How is my friend, President Bush? How is he

getting along?

-
He is fine and he sends you his warm persona}. 

regards.

chaixman_ngna - Thank you?
- He remembers with grut aftection his meeting

with you in February.

- me reason I have chosen Resident. Bush a: my

friend is because since the inception of my contact with his: I
He doesn't say much

found that his words are rather trustworthy.
So that's.

in terms of eupty wordgor words which. an insincere.



coo-c 

 

YCJQE7 tore
JP why even be your general election I expressed the hope that

he would be elected as President of the United States. However,

he was not all that lucky because shortiy after he assumed the

office of the Presidency turmoil broke out in China. This was an
event and it is very unfortunate that the United

States is too deeply involved in it. In my address to the

Chinese at the army level andabove, the cadre of national troops, 
I mentioned the macro international climate. I was actually
referring to the United States involvement in the events in

China. We have been feeling since the outset or these events

more than two months ago that the various aspects of 8. 3.

foreign policy has actually cornered China. That's the feeling

of us in China. because the aim of the counter-revolutionary
rebellion was to overthrow the People's Republic of China and ou21~?.
If they should succeed in obtaining that aim
To be frank, this could even

socialist sy3tem.

the world would be a different one.
I know that you, of course, have an interest in the

I understand that you actually

lead to war.
development of Sinceus relations.
were personaiiy involved in the activities in the U. 3. opening

to China in 1972, presided over by 2resident Nixon and Dr. aenry

?e have many American friends like you. ?owever. 

who have positioned themselves

what they have

Kissinger.

indeed, there are some Americans

and are antagonistic towards China an the tine.

been doing could be termed as operating a rumor mongering

Corporation. The largest rune: nongeti?g is the

Voice of.3nerica. .And the ruler earned gut.hy this
corPOntion is the ao-caiied blood bath of timeout! ti);



  

neg they played up the whole thing that in the blood bath more than

2,000 Chinese were gunned down or even more than 10,600 Chinese
were gunned down. In Short, if a country should formulate its
policy and handle international relations on the pasis of rum?cs
this government itself would suffer a great deal. a: least one
can say that the U. S. Congress has taken actions of one kind or
another against China on the basis of such rumors. Indeed, Sino~
US relations are in a very delicate state and you can even say
that it is in a very dangerous state. Such actions are leading
to the break up of the relationship. On our part we so far have
not seen any relaxing of such actions on the part of the U. 
In fact, the 0.8. stepped up actions just three days ago when the
House of Representatives passed an amendment on further sanctions
against China. So, such actions are still going on. ?ortunateiy
there are still people -- some people among the leadership or our

two nations who have adopted a rather cool-headed attitude.

For example, President Bush on your side. me, myself, and other

Chinese leaders have adopted a cool-headed attitu?e toward the.

handling of Sincevs relations. I mean tresident Bush -- the fact

that he has sent you, Mr. Scowcrott, as his emissary shows that
he has taken a wise and cool~headed action -- an action well
It seems that there is still hope to maintain

received by us.
I believe that is the hope of

our originally need relations.
President Bush. it is also the 11090 shared by no.
question of this nature cannot be solvad'bytvo 
President Bush haste speak on i

Beaver, a

P018P80tivo 0: being friends.
behalf 0! American interests.' I, 338?1?Q?Pr6mier'bi Peng and

so no: . obn-

cdoou?od-an

 

people. And that is the position we take and make decisions on
that basis. It is my hope that both sides all; adopt an
objective and an honest attitude towards the counter-
revolutionary rebellion. Only in this way can both sides find a
feasible way and method to settle problems arising from the two

countries attitudes towards the rebellion.

The cause of the issues between China and the voiced States on
this question is not because China has offended or impugned U. S.
interests even in the least way. The question is that on a
considerably large scale the united States has impugned Chinese
interests. has hurt Chinese dignity. That is the crux of the
matter. With regard to how to resolve this issue there is a
Chinese proverb -- the person to tie
the knot to untie the knot. Our hope is that in its future
course of action the United States will seek to antic the knot.

The incidents in the united States, be it the O. 8. Congress or
the mass media, should no longer edituel to the tire. China has

not finished the handling of the putting down of the counter~

revolutionary loaders. Chins persist in punishing those

instigators of the rebellion and its behind the scene boss in

accordance uggh ca?ngsa-1eus. China will by no.neess~uatver L:
the
its resolution ot'this heady: Otherwise hon can the sac cos: 

t, to
to exist; for?the governess

 

. exi:t- Tn::eiis even the likelihood that this government would
no 0399: existence it China .
dignity, its right, and enjoy in n0: exerC1s? its

gnity. The: how can China be
an independent country. There is really no independence to speak
of, and china would not exist as the People's Republic. If
people would like to add fuel to the fire that is a simple
pretext to use. With regard to the train incident in Shanghai we
executed three persons -- criminals who burned an entire train in
Shanghai and this incident was a loss to the'state. nowever.
even this kind of punishment could lead to trouble -- could lead
to accusations from some people. How can one talk about justice,
let alone the dignity of Chinese law and its sovereignty? I
would like to tell you, Mr. Scovcroft, we will never allow any
people to interfere in China?s internal affairs. No matter what

are the consequences in China. we insist on managing the

internal affairs of China by ourselves.
disaster should fall upon us, the Chinese people will be able to
China can say proudly that the Chinese

No matter what kind of

hold themselves up.
leaders have never said anything or done anything irrationally in

terms of handling our bilateral relations with another country

and there will never be such rashness in the future. However,

when China?s sovereignty, dignity and independence are in

question then China will not since its words.

Maybe I have gone on too long on this issue between China and the

United States. It was not my original plan to come and discuss

it with people from the malted States, . but since you 

Scowcroft, have come here as an em

issary of the President I
wanted to see you otherwise it would be discourteous. Just now I
have told you my personal feelings on this matter and I hope you
will convey my feelings to my friend, President Bush. Please
convey the following to President Bush that no matter what sdould
be the outcome of the discussions between our two governments on

this issue if he wouid continue to treat me as his friend I would

also like to do that.

As regards our further discussion on this issue, the person who
is in charge of discussions on the part of China is Premier 3:
Peng. It is a matter up to him to decide whether in the future
he would like to hold such discussions with emissaries of the

American side himself or if he would like to have a designee

on China's side.

 

- Than
you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have

expressed very well the reason that we are here

is a true friend, a true friend of you and 0? China He is

chairman_?sna He cycled around Beijing.

It is for that reason that he wrote you

recently a very personal letter which he wrote with his own hand.
it is for that reason that he asked us to come here. We are
deeply appreciative of your willingness to receive us this way.

i understand what a rare privilege it is and for that reason, to
conserve your time, I have written out the aessage I bring from
The words are mine but the thoughts are wholly

the President.

those of the President. You and China could have no better

friend then George Bush.
important a productive and friendly relationship built up over

my years of patient effort in both Beijing and Nashington is
As you have just stated,

He knows free personal experience how

and has been for the world as a whole.
today he sees the possibility that our two countries, because of

internal development: in both nations could.nove toward a time of
disturbance beyond sum we hove encountered since Resident

- ?grate thee. and.hs
Nixon first. ,5 39332; i. 1mm"



 

  

f?ig?gfhas sent us here in the hope that these two acts would begin a
process Of finding a way to reverse the current negative trends
ubich 80 disturb him. He has sent us both, in particular.
because we are very Close to him personally. I work just down
the hall from him. I see him 5-6 times a day and I see his pre-
occupation With the Problem between our two countries. We both
served in the Nixon Administration. as have both been for zany
years close associates of Henry Kissinger. I am the oldest
friend of China still in the United States Government. I believe
you all know the depth of my feeling for China, and for the
relationship. And our presence here after a trip of many
thousands of kilometers, in confidence so as not to imply
anything but an attempt to communicate, is s3mbolic of the
importance President Bush places on this relationship and the

efforts he is prepared to take to preserve it.

Our two countries have made much progress since the Shanghai
Communique first set us on a new course. we represent two
different cultures and backgrounds, perceptions. Through
diligent work on both sides we have managed LO reconcile or
accommodate differences arising from the very wide disparity in
traditions, cultures and econasic and political outlooks.


1.4 
.
. a
The haw. been the= a i 
re upe 9; ch. whole it has been a steadi?

  
  

deepening one 
. . .ot only because
3 nded to 
it re p0 the asic interests of both sides, but because we

respect the diversity between our two societies. We have
benefitted bath sides -- strategically with respect to the

soviet Union, with respect to a number of regional events and

with respect t0 the stability that our relationship has brought

to the world as a whole. We have benefitted economically as

"911' The public Perceptions of the strength and durability of

our relationship have given economic interests the world over not
just in the United States confidence to invest in the PRC.

thereby contributing greatly to the economic development goals of
the Chinese Government. Our bilateral trade has grown from

almost nothing to over $10 billion a year. American industry has
invested heavily in China and has plans for further investment in
the future. 0n the human level, we have also benefitted.
Thousands of Chinese students have studied in the United States
and brought back with them to China knowledge of ?esters
technology, methods of industrial organization and production
techniques that have served, and will serve-10v? years 50 00m? ?10
improve the economic well-being of the Chinese people. Mei-?13?
tourists have travelled in ever~increasing numbers to China,
bringing with them millions o! tourist dollars and taking home a

greater appreciation of the warmth and friendship of the Chinese

People and the incredible richness of Chinese culture.

The latest mm develop-ant of this relationship
assorted only a months ago with the visit of Presidmt test


. 
?41-.o1 

?ux? ?44 ovum? 

g: to ?ne {avg-um: :3 Republic. It

was a visit marked warm

. a th and

was th

frankness culmination over these long 
years 

mutual effort. Finally, it should be noted that the American


ongly supported the improvement in our ties. As
hav
3 dBVElOped so has our admiratitn for the Chinese

people and the efforts of the Chinese Government to encourage

'people have st

chose tie

economic reform grow'increasingly strong. Americans have ever

more strongly identified themselves with the progress they saw

taking place in China.

It 15 onto this bilateral climate of deepening cooperation and
growing sympathy that the events of Tlananmen Square have imposed
themselves. What the American peOple perceived in the
demonstrations they saw or wrongly -- was an
expression of values which represent their most deeply cherished

beliefs, stemming from the American retolution.

We, like you, were born in revolution. We, like you, hold deeply
to the tenets of our own struggle for independence. Our whole
national experience, beginning with our revolution, has been a

struggle to expand.the boundaries of freedos as we define that

term. we fought our revolution to establish freedon of speech,

freedom to assenble, tron arbitrary authority. These

beliefs represent American tradition-and culture. 

the5?
naturally and respond antimony when they se

?31393 Promoted 

 

. 1-. . 
Jr. Anne M- A A 



 

However, how the United Sta

tes Government end the American peocle

view that activity is, equally. an internal affair of the

Both will be governed by the traditions,
cultures and values peculiar to each.

American people .

It is an obvious fact that

Chinese actions in Pursuit of solutions to the :ecent problems of

wholly internal concern in the People's Republic have produced a.
popular reaction that is based on and reflects our own beliefs
and traditions. It has therefore produced its own internal
reaction which is real and with which the President must cope.

That is the crux o: the problem President Bush now faces.

The President shares the feelings of the America: people with
regard to the recent events in China, but he also believes very
@3915! in preserving the relationship between our two countries.
?e wants to manage events in a way which will assure a healthy
relationship over time. That has not been easy. It has not thus
ta;- been without cost. and it could, depending on events, hem
impossime for m, The actions taken by the Chinese Government

um demands 1) the

to deal with the Wsustm have prod 
mud-Stat? Congress to take steps of
We database actions.

Amt-1cm m1; and the

our own to Wrote 6131-?

?m step. be 2311va new??!

Pm?m Bush Cam 0?

?noA-.AA4AA
..- .- .

 enough You,

People's Re ub 
he. The President opposed that action. Despite

his 0 
pp Sition the vote was an almost unprecedented ?318-0. Toe
Presi I
dent will continue to Oppose such legislation but the

magnitude of the vote illustrates the political realities with

which he must cope. Even his veto authority is powerless against:

such unanimity .

The President is very sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding the
actions he must take to preserve control over the course at
events in the United States, but he is not omnipotent in his
ability to control such events. The President's ability to
'corztrol events in the United States would, beyond a doubt, be
strengthened were the Chinese likewise to try to be sensitiv 
as you proceed over the coming days and weeks to the reality
that what you will-have a major impact

on opinion in the United States and throughout the Western world.

a have not come here with any detailed set of prescriptions to


guide us through the current difficulties. As I said at the



I

reserve and strengthen our bilateral

to rest-ore; 
and his effort, confident that with the mutual

relationship. The President is

 that ha 0-
9 3 brought us through difficulties befo
.. . re we
?y.surm??nt the present altuation and he


whib?

he finds hrmself. That's the message from a true friend of the
Chinese Government and the people of China

W-
I don't have much time to elabora.e on the

points. I just hope that United States statesmen and people'will

understand one point. I think that one must understand history:

?We have won the victory represented by the founding of the
People?s Republic of China by fighting a 22-year war with the
cost of more than 20 million lives, a war fought by the Chinese
people under the leadership of the Communist rarty; and it one
Should add the three-year war to assist Korea aga.nst U. s.
aggression then it would be a 25-year effort. The second thing
is that people must come to understand that China is an
independent country which means no interference by foreigners.
And China is not a country to be directed.by the backing of
another country no matter what kind of difficulties should crop
up in our way. China will be able to overcome them. There is no
force whatsoever which can substitute for the Perple?s Republic
or China represented by the Communist Party of China. this is
not an empty word. It is something which has been proven and
tested over a period of several decades of experience. We always
hope that the five principles ot?peaceful coexistence will be

observed in dealings with China, equal non?

 

intortorence in each other's internal affairs. So long as these


eng. Let: me restate my greetings to 

 

Mr.
Chairman, I thank you sincerely for being

willing to receive us and listen to'the Presidmt's thought:

- 3. 8e
asked me to convey to you his sincere and newest personal
regards and he hopes that we can overcome the difficulties and

proceed with deepening reiations between our two countries

- That is also a hope of ours.



 



July 21, 1989

Dear Chairman Deng, Dear Friend:

I use this unique form of salutation because
General Scovcroft told me that if I would
continue to treat you as a friend, you would
welcome that no matter the outcome of the
difficulties now between us.

or course, I, too, want it to be that way.

First, let me thank you and Li Peng for
receiving General Scovcroft and Larry
Eagleburger. The minute General Scovcroft
returned to the USA, he came to Heine to brief
me on your talks.

I have waited to send you this letter. I wanted
first to go to Eastern Europe and the Economic
Summit Conference at Paris, because I wanted to
listen carefully to their views on their
relations with China.

.Also, in waiting, I was hoping against hope that
some new development would take place that would
enable us both to move towards improved
relations. Unfortunately, no such development

has occurred.

The 6-7 Communique in Paris made reference to
events in China. 2 can tell you in total
confidence that the U. S. and the Japanese
removed.sooe rather inflammatory language from
the Communique. It was still a Communique which
I'n.sure you'd rather not have had at all, but
in the final form it did not urge new action

affecting ChinaLkiv? . . .. u? 

?erein lies our major dilemma. You feel we
tied the knot? by our actions, especially
regarding military sales.

We feel that those actions taken against
Peacefully demonstrating (non-violent) students
and the nationwide crackdown against those
simply speaking for reform "tied the knot."

Please understand, my friend, that when I use
the word ?we" in the preceding sentence, I am
not simply referring to the United States.
Rather, I am referring to many, many countries
from North and South, East and West.

Let me emphasize, if there is anyone on the
world Stage who understands how China views
interference in its internal affairs, it is I.
Likewise, I could indeed identify with the
problems China?s government faced when, as Li
Peng told General Scovcroft, it felt that
Zhongnanhai itself might be invaded or overrun.
Li Peng pointedly asked General Scowcroft how we
would feel if the white House were threatened by

a mob out of control.

But here's the big problem. Given the 311*
penetrating (but not comprehensive) nature of
television, peOple all around the world first
saw massive but peaceful demonstrations,
?peacefully contained. ?With ayproval and
respect, they saw Chinese leaders meeting with
the students. They heard authoritative voices
saying, ?The Army loves the People:' and they
saw soldiers showing amazing restraint. And
people around the world.ssluted.China and its

leaders. .



It is what happened seat that we believe "tied
the knot.? You and Li Peng frankly described

that you thought happened to the Character of

the demonstrations a
nd wh
do. But peep at you felt you had to

19 all around the world with their
own eyes saw 0t . I
which hag her happenings, too. and China,

been rais
criticized, ed for restraint, was widely

I have great respect for China's long-standing

position about non-intervention in its internal
affairs.

Because of that, I also understand that I risk
straining our friendship when I make suggestions
as to what might be done now. But the 
China relationship, which we have both worked so

hard to strengthen, demands the candor with
which only a friend can speak.

If some way can be found to close the chapter on
the students whose actions were those of
peaceful demonstrators, that would help
enormously.

General Scowcroft reported to me that many or
those arrested were common criminals, repeat
offenders. I am not talking about these people.

If forgiveness could be granted to the students
and, yes, to their teachers, this would go a
long way to restoring worldwide coniidence.

Such a move could well lead to improved
relations with many countries. For example, it
would give me the opportunity to make a
statement supporting your decision. .Also, it it
would be helpful to China, I could then publicly
dispatch a high-level emissary to Beijing thus
signalling to the world that our country was
prepared to work our way back towards more

nornsl relations.

ri tl or wrongly, it was the students
zggtureg?tn: imagination of so aany'people
srdund.ths ?orid. They are young and, like
students everyshere. they are idealistic.

In our 

was, nOtogg?ry' as Li Peng pointed out, there

was some forgeago' much student unrest. There

Criticism used to quell the unrest and much
came our "aY- Many countries

crit

unreigigigaus. Perhaps China did. But the

were lenienggeared in time and the students here

laws were Gel? treated, even though some of our
berately broken. We never doubted

that the studs
our COuntry, ?t8; even in dissent, truly loved

Perhaps the difference
3 in our systems are so
great that you will find the above analogy
rre evant. I hope not. But of this I feel
certain: the Chinese students who have spoken
out truly love China.

I am.drafting this letter to you from 37,000
feet in the air on my way back to the USA from
Poland, Hungary, France and the Retherlands.
Talk of economic reform is everywhere in Poland
and Hungary. Others are finding, as China has,
that incentive works, that joint ventures are
good, and that standards of living can be
improved through economic reform.

I hope you still feel that economic contacts

'with the west are good. In spite of a U. 5.
Congress that continues to try to compel me to
cut off economic ties with China, I will
continue to do my best to keep the boat from

rocking too much.

Please understand that this letter has been
personally written, and is coming to you from
one who wants to see us go forward together.

Please do not be angry with no if I have crossed
the invisible threshold lying between
constructive suggestion and ?internal

interference.?

?hen we last net, you told as you had tutned
more day~to~day matters over to others; but 1

closeness and ?t Of respect

Yes, friendship

:12: it all been up and down.

This futurzo?ilstg 100: 31th me into the future.
he 0 

and China ramtlc change. The 5

each has much this
eXCiting fature, contribute to

We can both do more for world
Peace and for the welfare of our own people if
we can get our relationship back on track. I
have given you my unsolicited advice. New I
earnestly solicit your advice. If there is to
be a period of darknesslight some candles.

. a feeling of

Respect fully,



His Excellency

in
Military Committee

People's Republic of China
Beijing

with gay previous letter to you, the
:53 c3}! of this letter will be in my
safe, for I truly want to speak by myself from
the heartthe same.

 
WW 6140


.0 

unseematotwuus 


500 
3:5 'rE
August 4. 1989 ?32MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCONCROFT

THROUGH: mm. mm?

rnou; mucus PAW

SUBJECT: China -- Outlook Sven Bieaker Than It Seems

You have seen intelligence reports and analysis that say the
domestic political situation in China is 'unstable,? "fragile,?
and hard to predict. The purpose of this memorandum is to point

out that the situation is more volatile and dangerous than even
these characterizations suggest.

Having suppressed the uprising in Beijing. Deng got a grip on his
temper and moved to stes the political damage to himself, trying
to restore a balance of reformers and conservatives in the
Politburo. In doing so, Deng toiled the expectations of Li Peng
and others to be rewarded with higher positions. Their
resentment, including that of rang Shangkun, who has not moved up
either, is the source of the danger.

For these men, and for those close to them who are viewed within
China?s elites as having the blood of Tiananmen on their hands.
Perpetustion of the status quo mounts to continued risk o1 their
political demise. lhat they have done in the last 8-10 weeks has
made then perpetually vulnerable to charges of 'biood crimes.?
They must achieve dominance in the leadership in order to protect
themselves.

that is why these leaders are pressing now to round up all of
Zhao's supporters and to charge his with crimes that will put
thao out of action permanently. By extension. they are also
underadniog Deng. So far, however, Deng and a substantial
portion of the Central Committee have stood in their say. The
fourth please, in June, fell short of their denaoaa in denouncing

Zhao. Deng, moreover ordered a two~year suspension oi teeth.
recriainetions within'the leadership. 

 

This past wee
allies to cir??am?imer? we have ?in ?forthe reti 
hadous to teen re cadets who
ve Hu
A fierce attack on Yaobang in 1987 and to oust

one of Zhao's followers in
this week is a good exauple of this approach.

Zhao this year,
9

80
1?39 33 Deng remains active and retains the loyalty of the

mili
1039 as there is no sudden development that
postpone th orces all at once, Deng and his allies may
work d1 In the tine remaining to him, Deng may
0 vide and conquer this group. He is strong when he
wants to be, and with luck and cunning he night dispose of Li
Peng in time. But we need.to remind ourselves that, for the
people at the center in Beijing today, the stakes are extremely
high. Release of these pent-up pressures will not come through
POlitical coupromise and accommodation, and may be triggered in a
scramble for military support after Deng's passing.



The broad course of Chinese foreign policy is set by objective
circumstances. We have seen evidence of this since the beginning
of Sine-OS relations. Nevertheless, things could get very much
worse tor our relationship within that broad course. Already the

Soviets appear to enjoy a better dayeto-day relationship than we
do, and this is not healthy.

 

Li Peng and many conservative leaders have a.so set themselves
apart from Deng in the harshness of their rhetoric against the
United States and in their willingness to lean toward the Soviet

Union. Yang Shangkun has not joined them in this, and in the
long run reliance on the USSR is not a viable option. But in 
short term, increased xenophobia and self~reliance, coupled with
teints toward unseen, are a real possibility should this group
gain the upper hand. It is instructive to think back to Senator
Hugh Scott's unpleasant encounter with the Gang of Four after
Deng tell in 1976. to imagine what it night he like.

There is little we can do to she the out
succession struggle in China. pe cone of the continuing

the President's prudent course

 

 

{anu- ng?u'rg'lil 321M335.

should be followed, lest we 9e
politics. ?there is reason for
near-tern. however, a great man

go wrong for the opposite to occur. As are factor China into
regional and strategic calculations, it is important to recall
that we may not have seen the worst, yet in China.

 

 o'Kl'f?S 




November 6 1 989

Dear Mr. Chairman:
Greetings to my friend.

Last night at the white House, former President
Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates
on his visit to China. He appreciated the
manner in which he was received there. My
personal view is that his visit to China was
helpful.

I scheduled this meeting immediately upon his
return from China, hoping that this will signal
to you, to the people here at home, and to the
rest of the world that I want to find a way to
work out the major difficulties that have
darkened our relationship. I will be carefully
considering everything Mt. Nixon told me.

New, for a different subject. Soon I will be
meeting President Gorbachev at a non-Summit
meeting, in other words at a meeting without a
set agenda. Though our relations with the
Soviet union are more free of tensions than at
times past, enormous problems still remain. At
a time of rapidly moving events in many areas of
the world, this nesting is designed, not to
reach major decisions. but to reduce the chances
of misunderstandings on issues of significance.
I want to assure you that nothing will take
place at this meeting that will be detrimental

to China's interests.

view the geo~politicai reasons that
;:G:;ted Nixon to case to China in the
re still valid. I see many areas

lace a
gifingrtance today where?China.and the 0.3.

hay; senile; interests.

.bachev. If that is

principle we can decide later who
the emissary should be and who might receive

him. If, prior to the US-Soviet meeting you

have any conc
erns or thoughts to conve to me I
?would welcome hearing from you. I

On the broader subject that is a constant

concern to me, how to normalize relations
between us, I will continue to try to find some
answers. With respect, I hepe China will try to
do the same. In this regard, I think the
discussions that you had with President Nixon

and with the physicist, Dr. Tsung-Dao Lee, were
extremely helpful.

On October 26, it was a pleasure to receive your
able new Ambassador a few days after he arrived
and hg?gzg_formal presentations of credentials.
By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to
know that I remain personally involved in
emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our
relationship and in trying to resolve our
differences.

tfull
Respec y, ?oat sincerely:

475%

can; 1:333:21? :81 ?rum

m.
emiat.a..4ixe?b11? ?5m? 

I . .?Nuow?vm?lo. . .4. . .

RKCHARO 

v- 
Novenbe. .. 4989 mm: Mm,

Una. 

2 
What a venerable evening lest Sunday was. It
was particularly thoughtful of you to give Mike
Oksenberg a tour of the iiving quarters. In his
tour years as the top China specialist in the .3
Carter Administration he had never been at a

dinner at the White acne. and bed never seen the
second floor.

I thought you might like to see neaorendun
I have sent to six members of the Senate and House I 
talked to before I left for Beijing. With Deng
retiring, I believe we are going to see 3 very
dicey battle. That is why it is
critically important for as to have contact at the
highest level so that we can use what 1n?1uence we
have on behalf of reforms over the reectioneries.

On reflection, I believe Brent ie the ideel
nan to undertake this niesian. He has the brains
and the eubtlety. Neat important, the Chinese
will know they are hearing from one who is close
to you end has your couplete confidence.

With were regerde.

. -V

 

mint?? Ff 

 

.
?0344-? a 'u 
an? Aw: - Rang? ., 

- . noaa' . .oo 



V..D\.November 10. 19:9 .

r?ic?iiwffz
mu: mm scowcaon 3? 15" 
ms mm nous3.. dupo! 
may BEIJING 3,23 50! 
. 953%?, ?6293
. 

.
"?husu

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR 

l. Jin, this is a three-part cable, all close bold, but 

parts two and three for you alone.

2. PART 083 83613 

President Nixon and Hike Oksenberq hed dinner with the President

on November 5 to discuss their recent trip to China. those

also included the Vice President, Governor Sununu,
General Scoucrott, Larry Eegleburqer, Rebate: the Bob Gates.
President Nixon began by giving his rundown of the leadership and
his judgment on each. He said that Deng XlaOplnq appeared vital

 

and healthy

DECLASSRED 1N PART
PER 8.0. 33528





 
 

?as the most impressive Chinese Ieader he met. A man

of outstanding qualities and one be regarded clearly as a comer.

 

He also had much praise 
regarded as another high quality individual.
the conversation subsequentxy focused on Sino~Soviet

 

relations. the views of these leaders on Gorbachev (less
sympathetic than his Western audiences), and on next steps in the

relationship. Nixon is worried that our current policies are

isolating the Chinese leadership tron people who should be
telling them what they need to hear and that the 05 would
probably need to take the first step in beginning the path back
on the relationship. Nixon was adamant, however, that such a
step should not be taken without having agreed upon a sequence so
that any step that the as night take by agreenent would result in
a reciprocal step by the Chinese. Among other things. he
suggested lifting the ban on travel by us senior officials and
seem to attach importance to reestablishinq the tulbright

Scholarships.

Nixon also focused on the triangular relationsnip. ?e said

that white there was no China card per se for the United States,
it was also important that there not be one for the Soviet Union.
He also indicated our concern that to the degree we are isolated

from China wopportnnities are presenter! for.?

go ought not provide an open door. - pm 0133.



 





- 



Jo



  
   

aumwoida





 

no - 886th! TEXT:

You My km, Prescott out has no: business
relationships China that ionoyreate tho Puttdont'r

Beacon of these busineu activities throw,

 

3'

election.
the State Depermnt ?and evidence to on made: severe}.

months ego at the President's requut to take care to avoid an?

appearance of favor-min: either to his brother or to my other
number of his fanny. Ito have just received word that the-

m1.: business negotiations with interests comctod
to Prescott Bush and it toning visitors that ho is dome what he

can to be helpful. we would aoprocuto it 1: you could quietly
that ?an. the canoe Stotu 60ch was

  

not oppose 9rescott Bush?s activities, it also docs not not then

given any special treatment, and (2) that what the Chinese

authorities do in this connection is a matter exclusively to: the

Chinose to docido on their own. 289 12x1 - PAR: two.

3361)! TM - PART rm.

?ou should also know that tho President has seat a personal

In it he connontod on Nixon's trip report and his 
so also said

(.

note to Deng.
interest in the relationship and its improveoent.

that nothing adverse to China?s interest: would occur at the
upcoming 05-3538 meeting and that no wouid provido reed-out (by

emissary if Deng wished) otter the meeting. 8ND tax: - v13:

78333.
5. warm regards, Brent.

TOAST BX TEE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIORAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

BEIJING, DECEMBER 9, 1989

MR FOREIGN MINISTER, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS FRIENDS, TO RESUME
OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL
INTEREST T0 BOTH OUR NATIONS. THIS IS A DIALOGUE WHICH WE

BELIEVE RAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SISTORIC, PEACE, STABILITY, AND
PROSRERITY OF ASIA AND THE VORLD.

LAST WEEKEND, IN ANOTSER CORNER OF THE WORLD, PRESIDENTS BUSH AND
GORBACHEV HELD TALKS ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. AFTERWARDS,
PRESIDENT BUSH INSTRUCTED ME TO COME TO CHINA AND INFORM OUR
CHINESE HOSTS ABOUT THE TALKS IN MALTA. THERE IS NOTHING BETWEEN
TRE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT NEEDS TO BE HIDDEN

FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. REACE AND STABILITY OF THE
WORLD ARE ENHANCED BY THIS DIALOGUE.

WE ALSO COME TODAY TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR INTO OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT 
ECONOHIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC. AND NE COME TO REDUCE THE
NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT EXHAUST OURSELVES IN
PLACING BLAME FOR PROBLEMS THAT EXIST. BY WORKING
TOGETHER RETRIN THE VALUES OF OUR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
US SHOULD SEEK T0 SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS.AND REMOVE IRRITANTS.

IT IS TRE STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE TALKS MAKE
AND THE GROUNDKORK FOR THE SOLUTIONS KB SEEK.

SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, I WOULD HOT 38 KOREST IF I OID NOT
THAT ?2 HAVE 9ROFOUND AREAS OF ON THE

EVENTS AT TIANANHEM, ON T88 SWEESUHG CEBRGES IN EASTERN EUROPE.
88 SEE YOUR COMPLAINTS ABOUT US IN THE PAGES OF 

ODDS, REEDLESS TENSION 388 SUSFERING UZSS T32 RESBLT.


mrmc'r on mamas OUR magmatic?, am new
mamas OW mass mum mm; 

 

IN THESE MEETINGS WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE 
IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF
DISAGREEMENT. THE SOONSR WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER.
TEE PATH AHEAD WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL NOT BE SHORT.

BUT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISRED MUCH WHEN NE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN Ti
PAST. I CAN CITE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, THE
DEPARTURE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIMITS ON
MISSILE PROLIFERATION, PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE
WITHDRAWAL OF COMBAT FORCES FROM CAMBODIA, MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, SCHOLARL)

EXCHANGES, AND MORE. WE BOTH SIDES MUST PERSEVERE. NOW
MORE THAN EVER.

HE ARE PRIME ENEMY OR THREAT, AS SOME WOULD CLAIM.
BUT, LIKE YOU, WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND
TRADITIONS. WE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY. WE EXTEND OUR HAND IN
FRIENDSHIP, AND HOPE YOU WILL DO THE SAME.

NOW MAX I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
-- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YANG
-- TO THE GREAT CHINESE PEOPLE
AND TO U.S.-CBINESE FRIENDSHIP.

. .
a 

{Translation}

Toast by Foreign Minister Qian Qiohen
at Dinner in Honour of
0.8. President's Personal Emissary

'9 December 1989

General Scoworoft,

Deputy Secretary of State Eaglaburger.
Ambassador James Lilley,

Ladies and Gentlemen.

It gives us great pleasure to have the opportunity
of hosting this dinner to entertain General Soowcroft.
0.5. President?s Personal Emissary and National Security
Adviser, Deputy Secretary of State Eagloburgar and our
other American friends. we wish to express our warm
welcome to you, General Soowcroft. and your party on
your visit to China.

General Soowcroft, you ara an old friasd very
familiar to us all. Over the years, you have contributed
a great deal to removing obstacle to Sino-U.s. relations
and promoting their development by having visited China
several times at the critical moments of the development
of those relations. The fact that President Bush has
sent you to China this time as his Personal Emissary to
brief Chinese leaders on the recent O.S.~Soviot summit
and to exchange views with on issues of Sino-U.s.
relations shows the importance he attaches to thoss
relations, for which ?a would like to express our

appreciation.

At present, the international situation -is
undergoing the soot profound chaos. in tho 'post~ugr
Years. The prospects for such chaos. and its influenc.
on world peace and progress of maagiad ara a sattar of
concern to the paopio of all countrios. I baliavo that.
under those circumstances, China and to. United 
should frequently exchanes Vious with cash othsr.
Unooubtadly, 900d Siso?o.s. rolatioas aro of 
3ignifioancs to world pan and 

  

Despite Periods of trial 
Sino~U.S. relat?
:?i?zizzg $21: ?a 
8 ?Yo Important :1
differences are, they cannot obliterate the majorscomggi
intereStS between us. So long as our two sides make a
concerted effort, we can certainly safeguard our common

there should be increased contact and better
communication between us. We in china believe that
the ?current visit to China by General Scowcroft, will
certainly be helpful to promoting mutual understanding,
cwercoming difficulties and removing difference: between
us so that Sine-0.3. relations may rezurn to normal and
further develop at an early date. 

Now, I propose a toast

to the health of General Scowcroft, Dgputy
Secretary of State Eagleburger. Ambassador James Liliey
and all the friends pregent here, and

ta the resumption of normal Sine-0.8. relaticns and
tha develcpment of these relations.




-SUBJEC71 Working Luncheon Between Foreign Minister

Gian Qichen and National Security Advisor
Scowcroft

DATE TIME: Sunday. December 10, 1989 - 12:15 pm
PLACE: Diaoyetai State Guesthouse - Villa So. 9
Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Lawrence s. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State

Ambassador James R. Lilley

Chase Untermeyer. Assistant to the President

Douglas,8??2aal, Director, Asian Affairs -
Nationef?Security Council

Vivien Chang, Interpreter

Florence Gantt, Notetaker

Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Vice Foreign Minister Lin Huaqiu 
Director, Department of American and Oceanlan
Affairs, Zhang Yijun

Director, Office 01 American Affairs

Ma wenzheng

Deputy Director, zha reixin

Ma Yunsung, Interpreter

Lien Shengbao, Notetaker

It the prose asks, how should I

O)

characterize the meetings?

I would say vig?t ggsitive in
the se that all sides understa ea 5 dcaeetic
that have to be worked out and we need.to work to take
reciprocal gestures in order to restore the relationship and that
our general vies or the world.1n a.broad sense and of recent
developments is parallel. the need to react to a changing world

is understood.

W391: I would Wt chit you might mt to say
that because of changing situati night not be the 
same but it 1a_a:111 very 

 



 


I guess I would say there were three elements
tng?gii- realiration of continuing need to evaluate?:;
:eet?ng EngefgfiSEShlp;i(2) telling you the results of the Malta
sense on of . i 1
relationship, now we can deal wi.h the late a

A There are differences but we

agreed to work toward improvement of the relationship.

We would be interested in your View of the

visit.

In spite of our differences both sides
agree that we have common interest. So this visit has served to
enhance and deepen the common desire to return our relations to
normal. Both sides agree that Sine-0.5. relations are of vital
importance to world stability. 50 I think we share similar View
of that issue.

- He do indeed. Now all we have to do is

overcome the differences.

9 Mr. Untermeyer, what did you

accomplish while we were working?
gu4_yn;ermegerzf Improved the Chinese economy by spending money. r?

7:364.
- I consider it is very inportant in the

world'that we resume discussion on sending loans to China. I do

recali that Secretary of State Baker said the American side would
take some measures. In a technical sense both the world Bank and

IMF have indicated their operations are free of political
consideration. I think it is difficult for their operation to be

completely immune to political considerations. It is almost the

same as saying the weather should not affect 
relations, but, in fact, the weather in the Port of Malta did

affect the relations because they had to cancel a meeting.
- It proves there is a power higher


than the President of the United States and.Chairnan Gorbachev.
while I might think that. I an not trying to impose it on you.

. Gorbachev said.then those warships served


no purpose and.they should be destroyed.

WW: Let?s not 9? too far.

;_Vae's reluctant to destroy his-warships, any

.s3



tine the Russians my t? Mm .,

gr: - -

-

?10

.ambaasador_Lillex: In terms of the World Bank they have 3ust
conducted a mission here. They have done research and I have
read their report on their visit here. Althougn political
situations do affect the situation like in terms of the weather
I think they are concerned that there may be, although you said
otherwise, some concrete evidence that you are going the other
way. It is important that it not become politicized. 0f great
concern is we are not jumping to any conclusions but we have to
work with preliminary indicators in.cases like this. And this

affects the decision on World Bank and we have been examining it
already.

China's reforms will continue. No doubt

about it, but it must be a gradual process under the prevailing
economic conditions. The biggest challenge is such a large
population. 80 right now we have to try to bring down the
inflation rate and stabilize. Although the rating of China has
been lowered somewhat on the Japanese market, China will have no
trouble in repaying. The total foreign debt of China is the same
as that of Poland. Yet we have (slouch larger export: than
Poland. So I think the 0.5. will face much less of a problem
when they come to invest in China than they do in Poland.

. The v.5. has more money invested in China

than any other country in the world. One of the reasons we
suggested a brief meeting after lunch is that, while we do not
have?answer to your package, it is important to have some 
preliminary discussion as to needs and how we sue it developing

so we lose no time in how we deal with things.

. That is to say)after the lunch we will
have a short visit.

Hr. Gian is one of the foremost ex 
Soviets. pert: on? 

General_?cesorn?t; Yes. You have listened to us for 24
that is your appraisal of what has been happening? hours.

Gorbachev would like to ma

balance in everything. There is balance between Sigtaigda?esc
and'balance between United States and Soviet 0n on. So he jun:
concentrates on this balance but he cannot continue balancin 
everything, for example in economic afrairs. 8e can't try 33?:

to strike a balance; for example, balance between econonic on;
political affairs. now can he achieve a balance it he cannot
ruminant? so {pally share your view that Gorbachev does
knqgieconony very*nnch; Ambassador Lilloy acntioned not 
that the Soviets ?ant to:nnke the ruble convertibl the fact 
abduction but 90 a. rua1izad 1+ u?11 9? gh" ?3 an

0 9mm. - a.

can say a lot of thin
So I think the Sovietgs that are really difficult to be achieved.

a a .
ethnic issue and the ecoigmigc?d with two major problems: the
result in prolonged tar lSSue, These problems will

In 
Gorbachev taking any meagiiein the Soviet Union. I have not seen

olitical reform or D?n't you believe that he began

.ly when he decided he needed it to make the
was not an original plan of his.



MaYbe so at the beginning. Because last
before last I had opportunities to meet with
and at that time he explained to me that because he

:zgoig?o in Perestroika he wanted to make political

That is the reason for glasnont.

But of late he seems to have gradually
developed more of a pattern for political reforms. Many use
political reforms as a means of removing those who hold opposing
viegs. Then the Eastern European countries are adopting the same
attitude on a much larger scale. In the Soviet Union they are
used to seeing a hundred members of the Committee resign. Now
you have in Eastern Burope the entire membership resigning.

Some problems are being resolved while
differences remain. Another problem to resolve is the reduction

of troops along the border.
- Troops along the border within a certain

scope. So in this regard we are starting first by talking about
general principles. We will have to make it clear that we will
have to avoid deployment along the border so as to avoid border
clashes. we have not decided as yet as to the scope of such
areas to be demilitarized, whether it should be on each

side or 200. The talks are next month.

ambassador Lill?2= we have mutual means of verifying that)don?t
we? 
. we agreed on principles. Gorbachev has

Wm.
called on the Chinese side to provide consumer necessities.

First of 311 we can provide consumer goods and they will pay back
in raw materials. They 8180 wants 10388. we were quite taken

aback when they first raised this. we have agreed to extend some
money to them.
. Also technology transfer. You are toasting




than how to grow soy mo

 
 
 



on

ter sowi Their rme
gig-air in the ?goun?stzig Egry unmotivated.

a 
because i. 21mm: 2*

he
2' cal}. potatoes Vegetables gig; {112w to grow vegetables.
ve no other vegetables.

W- Mysore on Soviet side re Vietnam?

be more inter Results are not vex: to
ested in Cambodia than in 

know why. Jug
America and Cugaazhthey are mare interested in Nicaragua, Central
an in Eastern Europe, So I presume that maybe

Uni

2nd Eastern Europe 18 next to them. I have the
Generally 8 aki aster-:1 EurOpe is a great burden on the Soviets.

Of Petrole go 1 rig/every year it has to provide 70 million tons r"
tot 11; 113 natural gas equivalent to 30 million tons,

a ng 10 million tons Of Petroleum. No other Eastern 

European country has so much natural resources. So this is a
great burden on the Soviets. I wonder whether western Europe is

now ready to take on this burden. I should sag that Western
Europe does not have natural. energy nor does it have abundant

natural resources.

W: The Minister has raised a very


important point in terms or where they can go in the future.

Much of their finances is in clearing arrangements, not hard
That is not easily accessible to them somewhere else.

currency.

The Soviets have a leverage that the West can forget. It is a
burden but a leverage with Eastern Europe. It is not something
we could fill in tomorrow morning it the Soviets should cut.

W133: ?ow is Secretary Baker?
I talked with him

?e is fine.

He leaves sometime today for Berlin and then he
1 24 meeting to talk about aid to Poland and



this morning.
has the Group 0

Hungary.
W: HomY?
W: No money; just promise.

?Huh-era- A. ?9

Memorandum of Conversation

Private Meeting 0

5 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft With
chinese Foreign ?inister Gian Qichen
Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9

Sunday December 16, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Stanard
?ime)

?articipants:

v.3. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for NArional
Security Affairs

Lawrence Eagieburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Liliey

Dcugias H. 9aai, NSC, Notetaker

Vivian Chang. Interpreter

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Soreign Minister Liu Huaqiu

Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang
Yijun

Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng

Deputy Director, Zha Peixin

Ma Yunsung, Interpreter

Lian Shengbao, notetaker

I would like Secretary Eagieburger to speak
now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.

Before we leave I want. to establish a few
points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip,
let me be undiplomatic. my impression is that you and we are are
engaged in a kabuki dance. rou say, and we aCCept, that there
has to be movement on our side before you can wove. we say to
you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side.
We are now circling each other, each waiting to: the other to
move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.

Prom aux side, we are faced with the realities 0: dates on which
decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be
on December 15, on the agreement to satellite inunchings.
Congress returns on.JznuarY 23. Certainly when they come back,
assuming no covenant, th? 961031 3111 and ?hetero: other
kegislation they decide-will  -.
-l?e we hale ?03 given you our rinal word on the cackage you

gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as
now structured.

All of us on the American side agree it will no
dork, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the

release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically
cannot manage 1t.

Let me emphasize that this is not the official government
response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get tee:

to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response,
we will have to say the same thing to you.

We will pull a small group together. We will get a
counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give
it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of
the package will include, I can indicate that they will include
such issues as martial law, the release of Fang lehi, World
Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit
all these pieces into that package.

I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One
proposal we will make will include that, because from our view
his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you
might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do.
We may also give you a second proposal which lees not deal with
this issue. If it is difficult to do the'other things, we are
prepared to set the issue of Pang aside, and after the 

in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to
that issue.

Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. ?ang
Lizhi is not necessarily the slas_sna_aen.to improving the
atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last
months.

with regard to who goes first. there is no need to.hgvg an
argument, but from the Washington Perspective, we have taken
steps already, not least that we are here already.

si veto you may ?the satis?ed with sheer-935mg;
Sgciggtoloaut it as: poltically costly {or his, and it will he
so when we go back. I was personally insolved.in treaties #.44 A??Mcoduvw.- ?14; J14



U)

~xceoti 
eKafort of inertial guidance equipment for the
moving forward 9 a?rcraft. And the Peace Pearl projeCt lS
Aga?n I Eaise. h?hese are some steps we have taken.
the; are 366 *8 no; $0 get into an argument or because I
Erasedent - I ralso them to demonstrate that the
epouid a:sls t?Ylng to take steps to improve the atmosphere. .I
2' r? 0 tell Y??t if we heard the Premier right this norning.
.t"?pg?t ?8 said that the Chinese government would make clear
?3 untappiness With the President's adminisrratlve measures
regarding the Chinese Students in the United,$tates after we go
name, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter
.rom Chinese), the impaCt in the 0.3. will undo whatever we have
done by 9?31?? here yesterday and today, undo that completely.
At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we
say we want.

feel

On the issue of the satellite launch. we face a decision date,
December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you
that we have informtion, which some members of Congres have
access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who
are talking or sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the
Middle East. we do not question the statement of your Foreign
Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in tse Congress will
doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, it we have a
reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication
that missiles will not be sold to regions of particular

instability. ?E'ao not expeCt an answer now, but will need it by
December 15.

Let me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the
atmosphere to make some small moves on each side. even before we
get the package response to you by the and or next week. we are
looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is

wise to begin the process or improving relations and to help us
I would like to leave a couple of ideas with

with the Congress.

you, For example, just for example, if your side could.possibly
stop jamming VOA or permit a VGA correspondent to come to China,
in an unconnected fashion; we could remove the travel advisorv.

Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but that we are
searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress
returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the
other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help
with military sales, the banks. and convince the American and
Chinese public: that it is wise to nave in this direction.Ia.l



we would like ggest far your consideration, for Ambassaaor
1 3 30d: designee to work out details on when and how the

Fangs may leav 
e. ?t appears all of us agree on the need to solve

this issue. 
to adree theufgtahy Of: the re??rdv and ad reierendsm: we need
a 0th of us want to see his release



to your package and the

Washington as t.at can be done here or to your ambassador :n

insist on it ?::U:Fefe?o ?We would prefer Washingtonaccomplish, 9 3 an effort we 30-ntly ?ant to

Mr. Minister, in the we have the trad' 

. . - . ition cf the 90?6 COP
and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good copy and
only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.

I would like to add one thing, if I may.
Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere
on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped
three get out already, and can do the talks.

That is if we are prepared to settle the
issueone side, that is another

matter.

One other matter that might be raised with

Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial
constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attaches
at our embassy are not permited to join attache trips. Resolving

this would.help to move our atmosphere along.

. I think, Mr.$ecretary Eagleburger, that I

understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will

week as a counterproposal. First. both sides agree
respond next and while this is in process, the general

solution
not get'the impression of any package deal. It
should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.
we should no: leave the impression of which side
gaiigoo:g?::s not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. 2 agree
Vice Minister Lin and Ambassador Lilley Should.meet to_dis?uss
izai. These.negotiations caaghegin without

the details on 

waiting a response 2 the package. naturally.I. Q43. sofa-zsk?i?g?sa?g??o . .. . of.? -, "31-44"ff? .. Irl-WounmnaMW/oyn .

 


MEMORANDUM or CONVERSATION

Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, General Scowcroft et ai
Sunday, December 10, 1989 8:45 a.m. - 9:40 a.m.
Beijing

Participants:

At a quarter to ten you will be meeting
the General Secretary so there is still an hour to go and
we can make good use of this one hour an exchange of 
Here I want to listen to your views because you are our gt
Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Mini:
Today we are going to talk on the basis of those meeting 3
last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to us
the evaluation of the united States with regard to the ge:
situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does Your

Excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As
China is concerned, it does not pose a threat to any coun'
any region. We are devoting ourselves to the goal of dou:
our GNP by the end.of this century so that our people can
more comfortable life- ?5 want a Peaceful international

alignment aha a st?k?f P01iti?31 Situation.

.. 30 here I 1:3
to listen to Ym Vim about the international ?smug.

 as-? by 

I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember

tame-in? five or ten years time you will see that events it" 11

prove our views, our measures are constructive in China and even

A to stability 2? the world.

nt?wf??
Bring a message back to the United States that the political
raw!!-

situation in China is stable. This iger we had a fuit?plenary

Junk)
committee meeting and then in November we had a 5th plenary

session of that conmittee. These were two very important
c?iunu a? 

.dw
meetings in which we reached agreement? Now to .e objective. the

specific steps and the line of China are very clear. 50 in

making an analysis of the situation in China you should not

listen to the views of the radicai?but rather to the broad masses

of peasants, workers, and members of the Communist Party of China

because our party has a total membership of #0 million.

7
i

believe it is to deal with such a stable leadership of

China and once more the present China leadership?og?zgainais


dopeedebie.

I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some
people who complain about the present government of China. There

are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two

man


.

    

they cm develop into the uiutrm. So similar events
not occur in cam. AI tor the economic citation in China I

think there are both good things and bad things. out the good
new; in more than bad news. Our inaction rate has now been
as!? is 4.

brought below the doobie digit figure. The slowdown in our
But only with this production rate

production growth rate.
r: we reboam ?smear:

slowdown with such a restructuring

can we Wanna progress. Now the general public in

China is very pleased with the fact that prices are quite stable
Mmh?i's
and we have an abundance of -- not like the Soviet Union

where their shelves are empty Our shelves are fun and this can
I am net saying that we have

be proved by Ambassador Lilley.
more supplies or better commodities than in the United Sta es but

I am saying as compared with the Soviet Union or as compared with

China during the same period last year when we had panic buying.

tarted with economic

You were right in saying Chinese reform .
?ddled
reforms and have been coordinated with coerced: reforms. So

of 
China 9 economy is We a vicious cycle and we are

I
constantly all kinds of difficulties. You mention

1?
market 554:5 . we also introduced uarket mechanism.
we tried to
A

At the 8m time we have preserved the economy.
So even in the process of

bring about a combination of the two.










 






>?wzz 
.. :31; .. Newlywed?: rotor!?
qr 4h?wv*?k CE 51 it worked out and ?all still be ?nplonontoo.
36
the that in China's economy so have stopped reforms.

that we
are now reverting to ton years ago -- this analyals is
and and observe our developmnt and

But estimate that the

  
 

wrong 80 you can wait

gradually come to a fair conclusion.
:1
oudown in China?s economic growth rate will contlnue for some

time and then 
A A

A: tar as

And finally I want to touch upon Sine-us relations.
China is concerned it is ready to improve ano~88 reratlons no
have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can

understand your repeated explanation or the predicament and
But on the other hand the

difficulties faced by President Bush
Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with
we are ready and

difficulties and are also under some restraint.
A

not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhl}!? because th~s
So if in the

question has also created a lot of trouble for us.

future we should release Fang Lizhl?then we have to do a lot ot
a
President Bush has on the one ha'

persuasion toward our people.
vetoed the Pelosi 8111 but on the other hand has taken some
administrative measures which are in essenoa the same as the
So the Chinese people really find it difficult 

The US may think this is drastic action but

legislation.
You see China is

understand this.
China it is like old wine in a new bottle.

44444444444444
?a 

 



13



Reei?u..~ ?iandtne one student to study abroad we
$10,006 each year on eech student. This amount of
no to bring out ten graduates.

cone back it is okay.
Because the government cannot

     

So I think It

decoy can enable
certain individuals don' If none of them
come back then this would not do.

justizy this hetere the la
. PO .

Stronqziequesg;to these administrative measures
So after you go back home we will have to make

are here we will not make such
V111 have to make soon

Therefore we have to make a
taken by

President Bush.
snon?
some reaction?but while you

reaction. I think you can understand we

strong reaction so I think it would be best it we can solve the

flu; shw?kn

problem of US-Chinese relationsf because we share common
on the other hand we should not rule out the

interests. That is,
steps. That is

possibility that both sides taken some practice;

For example. I don?t

to say we should do some solid things.

think 1: would create any difficulty for President Bush to send

students back to China. It would not prove difficult for
Iona: to

President Bush to ask the world Bank to extend
adhuqk
China because President Bush does not control the bank/aut?he can

Qua;
exert influence.

A
And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time
because I regard it as a new beginning in improvxng our

The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But

relations.
perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our

 

W.

[501m WAQWJM lace Lad.
W30 met/n.1, W5 com. 
W.

?2585:

or CONVERSAT 10}:

Meeting Between General Secretary Jianq Zemin et a1

Sunday, December 10, 1989 9:45 a.m. 10:47 a 
Beijing, China

Participants:

(Welcoming pleasantries.)

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

appreciate very much being here and having the Opportunity to

It is very nice to be here. I

meet you and to exchange views.
I bring you

appreciate very much the opportunity to meet you.

greetings and best wishes from President Bush. I must say on a


personal note the first word I heard when you became-premier~was

from Mr. Trammel Grove.
(5:5;g54) . .
My good friend. 3M fn?d?W'

bud 93" fret)!? a A

Generei.?sorero?n: He cal

0 say how good it is for 85

led to say what a uonferful person you

are and 1: -China relations.

W: Let: me say that President Bush has asked
0 come here in the spirit or the

Secretary Eaglebnrger and me 

Be is a strong supporter.


PERED. 1m


.. v- 
has developed between our two 



igk?nerIPectives on issues or maior V?rld Significan
of a

 
 
  
 
 

39o

    


2 your: that has resulted in the d?velo 8
etc

- 9? 5m

if?f?w . alu
strategic relationship which the U. S. feels is of qrea 
And it is in that

or and to the interest of world stability.
to

spirit that President Bush asked Secretary Eagleburqer and me
come :0 discuss ?ith you a significant event in US-Soviet

relations, that is the meeting in salta.

The President also wanted to take this step to underscore his
strong personal interest in putting our relationship back on a

positive track away from the negativisn of recent months. In
doing this and in his recent action of. vetoing the Pelosi Bill,
be has undertaken some considerable political risks to ninself.
The initial report: in the United States of the announcement of
our trip here has aroused strong negative press conments in some
I cite this simply to explain that the 9resident

circles.
definitely does want to move forward on our relationship but

there are significant impediments in the United States.

The Foreign Minister last night, {Or example, presented a
thoughtful package of alternatives on which we might be able to
Proceed. We have sous pronoun with that tor-elation, not 311:):
the.nbjectivegluitn thigh we tanner. but uith.the 

can go back and review ite?v-and respond in m. Wy-

 

   
 
 
 

desire on the part :11.
?9

9" do have domestic ditticuit

I could just explain briefly why 9reside
we meeting and ?f

Chairman Gorbachev, something 0
at the

to me with
finds ltsel

the situation in which we feel the world

mat. .

His original notion of the timing for a us-Soviet Summit. was

after the comletion o: the various negotiations we have underway

on different aspects of arms control and different elements in

our bilateral relationship. After his visit to Poland. and

Hungary last summer, however, he came to the conclusion that

there were very tundanental, very important and accelerating
aovezaents taking place in that area and that it was important to

di
scuss those trends and developments in Eastern Europe at the

point of convergence of US and Soviet forces

the neetin

was designed not to negotiate specific issues, not to
come 

agreements, or issue commiques. but simply to nan
views 0 xc 9e

:2 developments taking place in the world and on the
possible cons

equeuces of those maents in order that there not

be aisun
derstandiogs between the two leaders At the
. meeting t:

txo a
greed to try to mutate mistinne m.

 9
zed account. Because time is so short today i will

touch on several issues. I can fully understand

   
 

??"3he tact that President Bush has sent Your Excel iency to

and aiso that some of his previous measures are aimed at

ingravinq the current Sine relations. I can also under tand

another point that Struck me -- that President Bush was now in a

rather difficult position.

of the relationship between Congressional

with my background I have some

American?ML

I don't say that I have a full grasp

acrivities and power of

the Presidency but I think,

understanding of this because I began to receive a

British style education when I was a young student.

First of all I want to say that both sides are now proceeding in

their own interests, as was the case when President Nixon came

here on his first visit to reestablish Sinofrelations. I am


especially aware of the teat that you came here with the advance

team in 1972 and together with President Nixon. Events have come
Z?ax?kci
a long way since 1972 and at that time our leader Ghee-anusai was

still alive and he had a very important principle: to find

canon interest or a Chinese saying that we should find the

common ground while reserving minor diiterences.

Just now you have brie?fie on your views or international
developments and also on mosaics nearing hem. Presidents such

and Chairman Gorbachev. ?tumimcmm mines

10

   
   

reminds me of some remarks which are quite

ff"' -$ualu
?gz~ . .gory oevtnree Kingdoms that under the sun everythinc

2 am not



time of unity they will certainly be separated.
saying this is so but that the world situation is in constart

I think both China and the United State -: are committed to

ziux.
peace in the world and I think we can both agree on two ma3ox

themes: peace and development.

The second point is that in the Asia-Pacific region our two
onntries share several common points. In terms of economic
development in the future, this Asia-Pacific area will develop

very rapidly in the years to come. So we share a common

interest.



The third point is China is a country with 1.1 billion people;
4


therefore come what may China will develop more trade potential
rah

and this will provide us for a number of opportunities in 
6634:? 6" 
Ever since 1972 when China and the United States

future narket.?

issued the Joint tShanghai Connonique,1 can't say there have been
I

no differences between us. Actually Taiwan was the major

And in regard to Taiwan, our position has always

been a clear one. That is a principle of one country. two
so I think in general terns the tendency is increasing

difference.

systens.
even in peoples coningito the mainland to visit their brothers,



 
   

- 
. I


.
91.1: b.2ee J02 tic 3?2'52933 hes aluays

   

1 .. 
intent a recon: press conference 



     
 

f?

sated it China would abandon use 0 force agains* Taiwan.

    


. . I
. ii laid we couldn make soon a coamitaent. ?Brutally ?9 hope

Mcx?ufwn
for a peaceful cona?uofon?so?at?on}with Taiwan returning to the
sotherland. Some 0: sy classmates are now working in Taiwan 1n
some rather high posts. Secondly. there is a question of
ideology. Your being a capitalist country and our being a
socialist countr?zbut I don?t think this should constitute an
obstacle because we have always stood for the five principles of

peaceful coexistence. Ideological differences should not lead to

any obstacles to our relations. when Mr. Nixon came last tioe he

said that he found it quite different to understand how China can

W) WW hmjd?
we 4? ?hwf a bluadxm,
widows? Mm 5m H?ia. we ware? 
5: a same MM momma? my dz.
Concgging the moments in ?Eastern agape, 
several points especially clear.
Europe you can find several difterences.

has devel i and owing in all kinds of struggles since
Ma?a-g gr

#0
3a May ?1919?) . Second?our Peoples Liberation Army (PIA) has been

developing under the leadership of the Communist lusty of China
through all kinds of struggles, including the anti-Japan war.
Third, the Chinese geople liberated themselves by themselves.
Fourth, difference is: because of geographic location and the
historical background"aw tradltlooaof. Chloe because itetem

By comparing China with Eastern

Lv??m

The first is our party

. I ?(M'an

 
  

of when President Bush Came to China. Deng
Bro told him A made by Russia against China. Also
there is the 8-year anti?JaPanese war which left a very permanent
impression on the Chinese mind. ~3:130 the Chinese people want to
maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people but an 3"
year war still remains vivid on their minds and cannot be so


easily wiped. A the minds of the people. So I think after .

have explained the above Points I believe that our two sides can

-



find many common interests in the current turbulent situation.

think we should adopt a forward-looking approach with a sincere

desire to work for common interests. Our after 5 to improve

bilateral relations will be successful.

Give my best regards to President Bush and Mr. Nixon and Dr.

Kissinger.

Both President Nixon and

W: I certainly will-

Dr. Kissinger spoke very highly of their visit here.
Bush invited both of then to the White House immediately upon

President

their return to have discussions on their meetings.

Time is limited. we had a long time to

WW:

talk with Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. I hope next time we can

(Imam .




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RCLAYIONS tn:

YHC BIS 4 LIGIYI. 
(AR '30? NORRIL. il(?l?6(S? HILIYIRY
A?b OUR SUPPORT soc UORLD 



(VII STEP SIGNIFICANT 
Bu

in fut 
INXYXATCS Tu: ulna or a: tut

ton Tut vcovtz 0! nova 
acctouaL tub cLoasL SYsBIthv. ARC ?ac? aa?.rcn.

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