Case 2:18-cv-03466-DMG-SK Document 103 Filed 07/11/19 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:2551

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 18-3466 DMG (SKx)

Date

JS-6

July 11, 2019

Title Big3 LLC, et al. v. Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, et al.
Present: The Honorable

Page

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DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

KANE TIEN
Deputy Clerk

NOT REPORTED
Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s)
None Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)
None Present

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS - ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION [68] AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [84]
On December 20, 2018, Plaintiffs Big3 Basketball, LLC (“Big3”), O’Shea Jackson, and
Jeff Kwatinetz (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), alleging
the following causes of action against Defendants Ahmed Al-Rumaihi and Ayman Sabi:
(1) defamation per quod, (2) defamation per se, (3) trade libel, and (4) intentional interference
with prospective economic relations.1 [Doc. # 59.] On March 21, 2019, Sabi filed a Motion to
Compel Arbitration (“MCA”). [Doc. # 68.] On May 6, 2019, Al-Rumaihi filed a Motion to
Dismiss the claims against him for lack of jurisdiction (“MTD”). [Doc. # 84.] Both motions
have since been fully briefed. [Doc. ## 69, 70, 93, 100.] The Court finds these matters
appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.
Having duly considered the parties’ written submissions, the Court GRANTS Sabi’s MCA,
STAYS the SAC’s claims against Sabi pending arbitration, GRANTS Al-Rumaihi’s MTD, and
DISMISSES the SAC’s claims against Al-Rumaihi without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
I.
SABI’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION [Doc. # 68]
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that written arbitration agreements in
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
“[U]pon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under . . . an agreement,” the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement . . . .” See 9 U.S.C. § 3. The Supreme Court has held that “parties may agree to have
1

This Order incorporates by reference the procedural and factual background included in the Court’s
November 29, 2018 Order. See Nov. 29, 2018 Order at 1–4 [Doc. # 57].
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 18-3466 DMG (SKx)

JS-6

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an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also ‘“gateway” questions of
“arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement
covers a particular controversy.’” See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S.
Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)). To
determine whether the parties delegated to an arbitrator the authority to decide the arbitrability of
a dispute, a federal court must determine whether the arbitration agreement “clearly and
unmistakably delegates arbitrability questions to the arbitrator . . . .” See Brennan v. Opus Bank,
796 F.3d at 1125, 1128–29, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015).
It is undisputed that on July 14, 2017, Plaintiff Big3 and Sport Trinity, LLC executed the
Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (“LLA”), and that the
LLA includes an arbitration agreement.2 See LLA at 2, 44 (listing signatories to the LLA) [Doc.
# 68-3];3 LLA at §§ 9.1–9.2 (arbitration agreement) [Doc. # 68-3]. Although Sabi signed the
LLA only in his capacity as a member of Sport Trinity, LLC, see LLA at 39 [Doc. # 68-3], Sabi
claims that he has standing to invoke the LLA’s arbitration agreement under agency and
equitable estoppel principles, see Mem. of P. & A. re MCA at 14–17 [Doc. # 68-1].
Furthermore, Sabi claims that the LLA delegated to the arbitrator the authority to determine
whether Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See Mem. of P. &
A. re MCA at 12–13 [Doc. # 68-1]. The parties dispute whether Sabi waived the right to compel
arbitration under the LLA. See, e.g., Opp’n re MCA at 13–19 [Doc. # 69]; Reply re MCA at 8–
15 [Doc. # 70].
A.

Sabi’s Standing to Invoke the LLA’s Arbitration Agreement

With regard to Sabi’s claim of standing to compel arbitration, Plaintiffs challenge only
Sabi’s assertion that he may invoke the LLA’s arbitration provisions via agency principles. See
Opp’n re MCA at 19–22 [Doc. # 69]. Plaintiffs utterly fail to raise any argument to rebut Sabi’s
claim that he may compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See id.;
Mem. of P. & A. re MCA at 16–17 (advancing this contention) [Doc. # 68-1]. Therefore,
2

Plaintiffs do not challenge Sabi’s assertion that all three Plaintiffs are bound by the LLA’s terms. See
Mem. of P. & A. re MCA at 6–7 (“Plaintiffs and Sport Trinity are among the parties to the . . . []LLA[] . . . . The
LLA, governed by Delaware law and signed by . . . Plaintiffs in their individual capacities, contains Plaintiffs’
unambiguous agreement arbitrate . . . .”) [Doc. # 68-1]; Opp’n re MCA at 5–23 [Doc. # 69]; see also Stichting
Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[I]n most
circumstances, failure to respond in an opposition brief to an argument put forward in an opening brief constitutes
waiver or abandonment in regard to the uncontested issue.”).
3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 18-3466 DMG (SKx)

Title Big3 LLC, et al. v. Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, et al.

Date

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July 11, 2019
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Plaintiffs have waived their challenge to Sabi’s standing to compel arbitration under equitable
estoppel principles. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
B.

The Arbitrator’s Authority to Determine Arbitrability

With respect to the arbitrator’s authority to determine arbitrability, the arbitration
agreement provides in pertinent part: “Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity
thereof, including the determination of the scope or applicability of this agreement to arbitrate,
shall be determined by arbitration in Los Angeles, California before an arbitrator.” See LLA at §
9.1 (emphasis added) [Doc. # 68-3]. This language clearly and unmistakably delegates to the
arbitrator the authority to determine whether the SAC’s claims against Sabi fall within the scope
of the arbitration agreement. Cf. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1207–10 (9th
Cir. 2016) (holding that a similar provision “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the issue of
arbitrability to the arbitrator). Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that the SAC’s claims “are clearly not
covered by this agreement to arbitrate” because these allegations are “far outside of any
formalized agreements as to the parties’ business affairs.” See Opp’n re MCA at 21 [Doc. # 69].
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs are correct on this point, the Court must still enforce the
delegation clause. See Henry Schein, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 531 (“[W]e reject the ‘wholly
groundless’ exception [to the enforcement of a delegation clause] . . . . When the parties’
contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties’
decision as embodied in the contract.”).
C.

Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate

“[A]ny party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden” of establishing three
elements: “(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with
that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such
inconsistent acts.” See Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fisher v. A.G. Becker, Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th
Cir. 1986)). Sabi concedes that the first element has been satisfied. See Reply re MCA at 9
(“Sabi’s knowledge of his right to arbitrate is not disputed . . . .”) [Doc. # 70.] Plaintiffs argue
that Sabi undertook acts inconsistent with the right to compel arbitration by removing the action
to federal court, filing an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike after removal, opposing Plaintiffs’
requests to conduct limited discovery, and stipulating to continue Sabi’s deadline to respond to
the SAC. See Opp’n re MCA at 14–17 [Doc. # 69]. Assuming arguendo that such acts are
inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, Plaintiffs nonetheless must submit their claims against

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 18-3466 DMG (SKx)

Title Big3 LLC, et al. v. Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, et al.

Date

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Sabi to arbitration because they have not shown that they suffered prejudice as a result of Sabi’s
conduct.
“[I]n order to establish prejudice, the plaintiffs must show that, as a result of the
defendants having delayed seeking arbitration, they have incurred costs that they would not
otherwise have incurred, that they would be forced to relitigate an issue on the merits on which
they have already prevailed in court, or that the defendants have received an advantage from
litigating in federal court that they would not have received in arbitration.” Martin, 829 F.3d at
1126 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that because Sabi has “spent over eleven months
litigating this matter in [his] chosen forum, . . . . [they] have incurred considerable expenses in
[an] attempt to deflect Defendants’ aggressive litigation tactics, including expenses involved in
opposing Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion and Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain limited discovery to
remand this case to Plaintiffs’ chosen forum.” See Opp’n re MCA at 18–19 [Doc. # 69].
Plaintiffs further claim that Sabi’s “delaying tactics have resulted in lost evidence”—i.e., the
filing of the Anti-SLAPP motion stayed discovery and prevented Plaintiffs from acquiring
evidence to remand this matter to state court. See id. at 19. Additionally, they contend that “the
delays caused by Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP also allowed . . . Al-Rumaihi time to obtain his
purported diplomatic status thus to avoid the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, arbitration or otherwise,
entirely.”4 See id. Plaintiffs also contend that Sabi’s decision to seek continuances of his
deadline to respond to their claims has prevented them from receiving “vital information as to
Defendants’ defenses, admissions, and/or denials,” which would have allowed them to
“conduct[] discovery accordingly.” See id.
Critically, Defendants Al-Rumaihi and Sabi jointly filed the Anti-SLAPP motion to
strike. See Anti-SLAPP Mot. at 2 [Doc. # 8]. Consequently, Al-Rumaihi expressed his intention
to challenge the legal sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, regardless of whether
Sabi had done so as well. Thus, there is no indication that Plaintiffs would have saved on
attorneys’ fees or costs if Sabi had moved to compel arbitration immediately after removing the
action to federal court.5 Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ attempts to remand the action to state court and
obtain discovery in opposition to the Anti-SLAPP motion were “self-inflicted wounds” that do
4

As discussed infra Part II, Al-Rumaihi maintains that on August 27, 2018, he was appointed as the
“Commercial Attaché for Investment for the State of Qatar.”
5
In passing, Plaintiffs suggest that compelling them to arbitrate their claims would prejudice them because
Sabi would secure a “mulligan” on the Court’s ruling on Sabi’s Anti-SLAPP motion. See Opp’n at 6 [Doc. # 69].
Yet, Plaintiffs would not be forced to relitigate whether they pleaded sufficient facts to state claims for relief in
arbitration. Therefore, this assertion does not satisfy Plaintiffs’ “heavy burden” of showing prejudice. See Martin,
829 F.3d at 1124.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

CV 18-3466 DMG (SKx)

Date

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not constitute prejudice. See Martin, 829 F.3d at 1126 (“To prove prejudice, plaintiffs must
show more than ‘self-inflicted’ wounds that they incurred as a direct result of suing in federal
court contrary to the provisions of an arbitration agreement.”). The Court previously explained
that Plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery was “futile,” and that Plaintiffs were not
entitled to discovery on their claims because Sabi and Al-Rumaihi challenged only the legal
sufficiency of the First Amended Complaint.6 See Nov. 29, 2018 Order at 4–7, 13 [Doc. # 57].
Moreover, even if Sabi had attempted to invoke his right to arbitration earlier in the proceedings,
that motion would have no effect on whether Al-Rumaihi would later seek immunity from suit.
Lastly, Plaintiffs offer no evidence showing that they are no longer unable to obtain “vital
information as to [Sabi’s] defenses, admissions, and/or denials” in arbitration. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not discharged their “heavy burden” of proving that they “would be prejudiced
should the court now compel arbitration . . . .” See Martin, 829 F.3d at 1124, 1128.
The Court exercises its discretion to stay (and not dismiss) Plaintiffs’ claims against Sabi
pending arbitration. See Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir.
2014) (“[A] district court may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when . . . the court
determines that all of the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.”).
II.
AL-RUMAIHI’S MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. # 84]
Al-Rumaihi moves to dismiss on the ground that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
deprives this Court of jurisdiction over him.7 See MTD at 2 [Doc. # 84]. The Vienna
Convention limits this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over claims against diplomatic agents.
See United States v. Sharaf, 183 F. Supp. 3d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2016); see also 22 U.S.C. § 254d
(“Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with
respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention . . . shall be dismissed.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits Al-Rumaihi to move for dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
6

Admittedly, Defendants initially did not clarify whether their Anti-SLAPP motion merely contested the
legal sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Nov. 29, 2018 Order at 7 n.8 [Doc. # 57]. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs
presumably could have obtained such clarification during a meaningful meet-and-confer on the Anti-SLAPP Motion
and/or their Motion to Lift Discovery Stay.
7
Al-Rumaihi also claims that Article 29 of the Vienna Convention bars this Court from exercising
jurisdiction over him. See MTD at 2 [Doc. # 84]. Yet, Article 29 merely: (1) constrains a receiving state’s
authority to arrest or detain a diplomatic agent, and (2) obligates the receiving state to protect the diplomatic agent’s
“person, freedom or dignity.” See Vienna Convention, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227. Article 29 does not bar this
Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the SAC’s claims against Al-Rumaihi.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

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Title Big3 LLC, et al. v. Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, et al.

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Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the
purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the
sending State; [or]
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
See Vienna Convention, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.
In the course of ruling on Plaintiffs’ request for the entry of default against Al-Rumaihi,
the Court concluded that Article 31.1(c)’s exception to immunity applied to at least some of
Plaintiffs’ claims against Al-Rumaihi—i.e., those that “(a) occurred prior to August 27, 2018,
and (b) relate to the parties’ commercial dealings.” See Apr. 15, 2019 Order at 2 [Doc. # 77].
The Court reasoned that such “claims necessarily concern ‘the pursuit of trade or business
activity that is unrelated to [Al-Rumaihi’s] diplomatic assignment[.]’” See id. (quoting Sabbithi
v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D.D.C. 2009)).
The parties do not dispute that Al-Rumaihi was appointed as the “Commercial Attaché
for Investment for the State of Qatar” on August 27, 2018, nor do they dispute that all of the
SAC’s claims against him arise out of misconduct allegedly occurring before that date. See
MTD at 10 [Doc. # 84]; Opp’n re MTD at 4 (“On May 5, 2019, Plaintiffs’ counsel assured
Defendant Al-Rumaihi’s counsel that all claims asserted against Defendant Al-Rumaihi were
premised on conduct that occurred prior to Defendant Al-Rumaihi’s August 27, 2018 diplomatic
appointment . . . .”) [Doc. # 93]; Reply re MTD at 3 (“Plaintiffs’ Opposition concedes that this
suit does not relate in any way to commercial activity during . . . Al-Rumaihi’s diplomatic tenure
. . . .”) [Doc. # 100]. The parties also do not dispute that as a sitting diplomatic agent, AlRumaihi may invoke the Vienna Convention’s protections, even though he became a diplomatic
agent after this suit was commenced. See MTD at 19–20, 27 [Doc. # 84]; Opp’n re MTD at 1–6
(failing to controvert these assertions) [Doc. # 93]; Abdulaziz v. Miami Dade Cty., 741 F.2d
1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 1984) (“We hold that . . . diplomatic immunity . . . serves as a defense
to suits already commenced.”). Further, it is apparent that the SAC’s allegations against AlCV-90

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

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Title Big3 LLC, et al. v. Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, et al.

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Rumaihi all concern commercial activities he undertook in this country, and Al-Rumaihi
advances no argument to the contrary. See, e.g., SAC at ¶ 23 (“Defendants, in their individual
and personal capacity, and using corporate shells including Sport Trinity LLC . . . attempted to
seize operational control over Big3 . . . by, among other conduct . . . defaming Plaintiffs . . . .”)
[Doc. # 59].
Al-Rumaihi argues that Article 31.1(c)’s exception to a diplomatic agent’s immunity for
civil suits “only applies to for-profit conduct of a ‘diplomatic agent’—that is, conduct that occurs
concurrent with the diplomatic posting.” See MTD at 21 [Doc. # 84]. Therefore, Al-Rumaihi’s
position relies on his interpretation of the term “the diplomatic agent” as it is used in
Article 31.1(c). This term is ambiguous. On the one hand, the term could simply be a means of
clarifying that the person who engaged in the professional or commercial activity must be the
same person who seeks to invoke Article 31.1’s general immunity provision, regardless of
whether that person was a “diplomatic agent” at the time he or she engaged in that activity. See,
e.g., Gale v. First Franklin Loan Servs., 701 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In construing [a]
statute, [the] definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes and is [a] word of
limitation as opposed to [the] indefinite or generalizing force [of] ‘a’ or ‘an.’” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Onink v. Cardelucci, 285 F.3d 1231, 1234
(9th Cir. 2002))). Conversely, the provision’s use of that term arguably suggests that the
professional or commercial activity must be undertaken by someone who has the characteristics
of a “diplomatic agent,” which Article 1(e) defines as “the head of the mission or a member of
the diplomatic staff of the mission[.]” See Vienna Convention, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.
As noted above, it is undisputed that Al-Rumaihi was not a diplomatic agent when he engaged in
the alleged malfeasance at issue.
To resolve this ambiguity, the Court may consider the executive branch’s interpretation
of the provision, which is entitled to “great weight.” See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)); see also
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, S.p.A., 347 F.3d 448, 457 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“[W]hen a treaty is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, secondary sources
must be employed to ascertain appropriate meaning.”). Al-Rumaihi points out that “[f]ederal
government officials have consistently interpreted the provision narrowly” such that “it merely
expose[s] diplomats to litigation based upon activity expressly prohibited in Article 42.” See
Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538 n.6 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); MTD at 12 (“Likewise,
the Executive Branch—whose interpretation of the Vienna Convention is entitled to great
deference—has explained that Article 31.1(c) works in conjunction with Article 42 to make clear
that, if a diplomat does engage in such an activity, he does not have immunity from related civil
actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted) [Doc. # 84]. Article 42 provides that “[a] diplomatic
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agent shall not in the receiving State practise for personal profit any professional or commercial
activity.” See Vienna Convention, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227. Article 42 does not purport to
impose any obligations on a diplomatic agent that arise out of his or her pre-appointment
conduct. Rather, Article 42 simply forbids diplomatic agents—and only diplomatic agents—
from engaging in certain activities.
Plaintiffs offer no substantive response to Al-Rumaihi’s interpretation of Article 31.1(c),
but instead simply rely upon the Court’s April 15, 2019 Order for the proposition that the
exception is applicable. See Opp’n re MTD at 4–5 [Doc. # 93]. Plaintiffs do so at their own
peril. This Court “has a continuing obligation to assess its own subject-matter jurisdiction,” see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004), and “it possesses the inherent
procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to
be sufficient[,]” see City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 889
(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis deleted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Melancon v.
Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)). Furthermore, it is unsurprising that AlRumaihi did not proffer this interpretation of Article 31.1(c) earlier in the proceedings because
the Court raised the potential application of that exception sua sponte and without the benefit of
the parties’ briefing on the issue. See Apr. 15, 2019 Order at 2–3 [Doc. # 77].
In sum, having reviewed the language of the relevant provisions of the Vienna
Convention and the case law construing them, the Court concludes that Article 31.1 confers
immunity upon Al-Rumaihi from this Court’s jurisdiction, and Al-Rumaihi has demonstrated
that Article 31.1(c)’s exception to that immunity does not apply to his pre-appointment conduct.
As all of the SAC’s allegations against Al-Rumaihi arise out of such activities, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against him. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES
Al-Rumaihi from this action without prejudice. See Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201,
204 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Ordinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should
be dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court.”).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Sabi’s MCA, GRANTS Al-Rumaihi’s
MTD, DISMISSES without prejudice all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Al-Rumaihi, and STAYS
the remainder of this action and places it on inactive status pending the completion of Plaintiffs’
arbitration against Sabi. Plaintiffs and Sabi shall notify the Court within ten days after the
receipt of an arbitral ruling or other disposition of their dispute, whichever is later, and inform

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.

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the Court how they wish to proceed with Plaintiffs’ claims against Sabi. The July 12, 2019
hearing on Al-Rumaihi’s MTD is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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