UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Case No. 3:18cr00011

JAMES ALEX FIELDS, JR.
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
The essential property of mercy is that it applies to the undeserving. The
hope attached to the expression of mercy is that, in time, the undeserving can
change. Due to his tender age, his consistent history battling various mental health
diagnoses, the ongoing effects of trauma he endured as a child, and as an expression
of the unbending conviction that no individual is wholly defined by their worst
moments, this court should resist the temptation to conclude James Fields’ story
after its first twenty years by imposing a life sentence.
With respect to his age, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth
Amendment clearly limits the sentences that can be imposed upon children. This is
due, in part, to the scientific consensus around two ideas that are as true as they
are intuitive: first, that the physiological processes of growth extend well past
adolescence and, second, that emerging adults have a greater capacity for reform.
In short, we are increasingly coming to understand that adolescence—and the wellunderstood immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness, and recklessness that
accompany it—does not end at age 18. In fact, contemporary neuroscience proves
that the constitutionally distinct status of juveniles must extend to at least the age

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 of 21. As a result, it would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to sentence
someone who was 20 at the time of an offense to a sentence of life imprisonment.
Even in the absence of such a conclusion about the Eighth Amendment, the Court
must still consider the mitigating aspects of James’ youth at the time of the offense.
In addition, James has battled mental illness since he was a young child. He
inherited a strong family history of bipolar disorder, and was hospitalized three
times during his school years for his mental illness, with a myriad number of
doctors and interventions in between. Fundamentally, James’ mental illness causes
him to lose emotional and behavioral control in stressful situations. His cognitive
distortions cause him to respond with aggression and anger. By high school, his
medications were stabilized, and he was able to exercise control over his symptoms.
This period ended when James was rejected from military school due to his
medications, and he made the decision to stop treatment so he could enlist after
high school. He only started taking medication again while incarcerated after
August 12th.
Finally, James’ story cannot be told without understanding the childhood
trauma of growing up with the knowledge that his Jewish grandfather (who
suffered from bipolar disorder) had murdered James’ grandmother (who also
suffered from bipolar disorder) before committing suicide. James’ father—who also
suffered from bipolar disorder—was killed in a car accident before James was born.
James’ mother was in an accident that made her a paraplegic before he was born.
She raised him from a wheelchair as a single mother.

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 If mercy is extended only to the undeserving, we do so as an act of hope. In
particular, we extend mercy in the hope that an individual’s worst act is neither
their only act, nor their last. This worst act was committed in the shadow of James’
own history and was the result of a terrible decision he made in a few minutes when
he found himself trying to get back to Ohio but was instead unexpectedly blocked by
a crowd of counter-protesters.
In this case, there is reason for hope. The reason adolescent behavior must
be judged differently is because “predictions about adolescents’ future character and
behavior based on assessments made prior to maturation amount to little more than
speculation.” 1 There is an “absence of proof that assessments of adolescent behavior
will remain stable into adulthood [which] invites unreliable…sentencing based on
faulty appraisals of character and future conduct.” 2 Given James’ age and state of
brain development, and his mental illness, it would be speculation to assume that
he would make the same hateful decision in the future.
For these reasons, James asks this Court for a sentence of less than life
imprisonment.

Declaration of Dr. Laurence Steinberg, Distinguished University Professor of
Psychology, Temple University, attached hereto as Exhibit B, at 7 [hereinafter Ex.
B].
2 Id at 24 (citing Brief for the American Psychological Association and the Missouri
Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)).
1

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 I.

James’ history and characteristics are marked by childhood
trauma and mental illness and support a sentence of less than life.
James’ family history is one of trauma, violence, and mental illness—

beginning before his birth, and exerting a powerful influence on his neurological,
psychological, and social development.
A. James’ Mother’s Family.
James’ mother is

, who is

and has lived since

in

Ohio, where she is employed as an
. 3 Before moving to Ohio, she lived in
of

Kentucky, a suburb

parents both suffered from bipolar disorder, and the

father was hospitalized at least once due to his illness and treated with lithium.
’s parents divorced and she went to live with her mother in an apartment
in

Kentucky. In

, several months after

and her

mother moved, the father came to the apartment building and got into a violent
argument with her mother. He shot and killed her mother, then himself, with a 12gauge shotgun outside the apartment.

was inside at the

time.
When

was

she was injured in an automobile accident and

suffered severe injuries that rendered her paraplegic. She requires the use of a
wheelchair for mobility. James is her only child. She has not been diagnosed with
or treated for any mental health problems.

A letter from James’ mother has been provided to the Court by the probation
office.
3

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 B. James’ Father’s Family
James never met his father.
vehicle crash near

was killed in a motor

Kentucky, in December 1996, five months before

James was born. He was

who was known as

was a big man

and worked as a bouncer at a local bar. He had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, dyslexia, and alcoholism. His siblings,
diagnosed with bipolar disorder.

and

were also

was killed when he was a passenger in the

back seat of a car driven by

. They had been drinking and the car

crashed into a utility pole. After the wreck,

and another passenger left

for dead and walked back to the bar where they had been drinking.
was later charged with murder and pled to reckless homicide. James learned about
his father’s death as a young child.
C. James’ Childhood and History of Mental Illness
As a result of the events mentioned above, James was born into a single
parent family—and that parent was wheelchair-bound. He inherited a strong
history of bipolar disorder. He experienced the significant negative impact of
maternal stress and anxiety from his father’s death while he was in utero which
only increased his risk for mental illness. 4

See, e.g., Deborah Kim et al., Prenatal Programming of Mental Illness: Current
Understanding of Relationship and Mechanisms, 17 Current Psychiatry Reps., no.
2, Feb. 2015, at 1 (“[A]lthough somewhat inconsistent, there are compelling data
which suggest that exposures to severe stressors such as loss of a first-degree
relative or a spouse early in pregnancy or even immediately prior to conception
increase the risk of schizophrenia primarily in male offspring, which bereavement
stress during the third trimester is associated with an increased risk for
4

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 As a young child James got along well with
children in his neighborhood and engaged in karate and
little league. But when James was in preschool, he also
began having over the top “tantrums” that were so
severe he was removed from the school. 5 He then
started having more difficulty sustaining attention at
school.
At age 7, James’ behavior shifted and he showed significant aggressive
behaviors including a threat to kill his mother. His mother described a pattern
where he would be aggressive for about 3
days in a row, and then calm down for the
next few days. He threw chairs at school,
refused to get on a bus, or car, would run
through parking lots, argue, scream, hit,
and kick. It was then he was diagnosed

externalizing behaviors and ADHD.”); Adrianne Lange, Prenatal Maternal Stress
and the Developing Fetus and Infant: A Review of Animal Models as Related to
Human Research, 10 J. Infant, Child, & Adolescent Psychotherapy 326 (2011)
(prenatal stress influences psychological and physiological systems as well as
neuroanatomical structure).
The following information is all summarized from the very detailed Forensic
Psychiatric Evaluation prepared by Dr. Bruce J. Cohen, Department of Psychiatry
and Neurobehavioral Sciences, University of Virginia Health System, which is
attached to this memorandum as Exhibit A. This summary is consistent with the
mental health history from paragraphs 249-256 of the presentence investigation
report.
5

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 with likely childhood bipolar disorder, prompting a referral and referred to the
Cincinnati Children’s Pediatric Bipolar Disorder program. There he was again
evaluated and provisionally diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The evaluating doctor
felt that his mood instability and aggression were so severe that even at age 7, he
should be medicated.
After attempts at medicating his condition achieved varying degrees of
success, James was admitted to a psychiatric hospital when he was still just 7 years
of age. With adjusted medication
and support from his school, James
started doing better with fewer
behavioral episodes. Over the next
several years, James was
consistently monitored by the school
and his doctors. His medications
were adjusted, he attended different after-care programs, and he would have
periods of success controlling his aggression, anxiety, and outbreaks. During this
time, James was diagnosed with ADHD. He continued to have significant
behavioral and social difficulties through fourth grade, but seemed to be doing
better by fifth grade.
At age 10, James was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for a second time
after a significant aggressive incident where he hit a teacher, threw chairs, and
threatened harm. His doctors continued to try to get his medications and diagnoses

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 correct over the next months, and he attended a different school program. James
returned to the regular classroom and struggled academically. Then in the winter
of his 7th grade year, he threatened a teacher and triggered a formal threat
assessment by the school. The school concluded that his bipolar disorder and
ADHD likely contributed to his behavioral problems, poor self-control, rapid change
in mood, and state of intense anger/frustration.
The cycle of behavioral incidents, changes to medication, diagnoses, and
interventions continued through his middle school years. There also began to be
signs that James had odd beliefs about history and the world, and that he enjoyed
provoking reactions from people by making racist comments. By eighth grade,
teachers had noted overall improvement, but he was admitted for his third and final
psychiatric inpatient admission that year at age 13. He started public high school
in the fall of 2011, and received juvenile charges that year concerning violent and
threatening behavior with his mother. For ten months he was placed at a group
home where he performed okay academically, but continued to struggle with
impulsive aggression.
In September 2012, James returned to high
school as a sophomore and, finally, he was doing
well. Regular psychiatric treatment and medication
was key—his mood was more stable. The mix of
medications and treatment were finally working.
His behavior improved with no more suspensions.

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 He had a small number of friends, and did normal high school things like go to
dances. Mostly, however, he played video games and interacted with people on
social media.
James made plans to join the Fishburne Military
Academy in Virginia during his 11th grade year.
He was accepted, and his mom was driving him
to his new school when they received a call
saying that his acceptance was revoked due to
the program receiving copies of his medical
records which showed he was taking psychiatric
medications. James was crushed. His grades
declined, but he did not have any more
behavioral issues in high school.
James desperately wanted to join the Army after graduation. The rejection
from military school due to his psychiatric medications made him worry that he
would not be able to join the Army if he was medicated, so James told his doctor
that he would no longer take the medications. He remained generally stable
through the rest of high school and graduated.
James did enlist after graduation from high school in May 2015, but
separated from the Army soon thereafter. His Army records show a “lack of
motivation and failure to train.” The physical training aspect was very difficult for

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 him and he wrote at the time that “I feel this isn’t how I want to spend my life. So
I’m going to college.”
After leaving the Army, he initially moved in with his mother, and worked as
a security guard, and then at Starbucks. He then went back to work as a security
guard and was placed with a company
where he only worked the third shift and
had less interaction with other people. He
then moved into his own apartment with his
cat around April of 2017. James and his
mother lived only about 5 minutes apart,
and he frequently went by her apartment to
do his laundry and help her with groceries, taking out the garbage, and picking up
her mail. His mom was the only person he had regular contact with aside from
friends online that he played video games with. He applied to Owens Community
College and was accepted. His orientation was supposed to start on August 16,
2017.
Like many, James spent a lot of time online throughout adolescence and
emerging adulthood. He started using Twitter in search of a community. He
quickly learned that provocative and hateful comments led to more exposure and
engagement and took joy in that. He felt more and more popular as he played to an
increasingly radicalized crowd. He followed Richard Spencer, Michael Peinovich,
and Identity Evropa on Twitter, had an abiding interest in racialized ideology, and

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 heard about the August 12 Unite the Right rally through its organizers’ online
recruiting campaign. Having some familiarity with some of the rally’s speakers, he
formed his intention to attend, and found out that he would be able to take off of
work only two days before the rally.
II.

James’ age at the time of the offense (20) requires a sentence of
less than life.
It would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to sentence anyone who was

20 at the time of the offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
In lieu of agreeing that such a sentence would be unconstitutional, this Court
should consider James’ age as a mitigating factor under the guidelines and sentence
him to less than life imprisonment for that reason.
A. A sentence of life imprisonment would violate the Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court has made it clear that juveniles are different. The
Eighth Amendment limits the sentences that can be imposed on children. 6 This is
because youth are understood to have reduced culpability but also greater capacity
for reform. This understanding has derived from psychology and brain science
showing “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.” 7

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution of children under 18
at time of offense); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010) (children convicted
of non-homicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole and must have
“realistic” and “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 718,
733 (2016) (extending Graham to even homicide cases except in the rarest of cases
where the sentence determines the particular child “exhibits such irretrievable
depravity that rehabilitation is impossible”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473
(2012) (same).
7 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
6

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 Contemporary neuroscience and “evolving standards of decency” compel the same
conclusion for a 20-year-old. Adolescence, and the well-understood immaturity,
irresponsibility, impetuousness, and recklessness that accompany it, do not end at
age 18. Contemporary neuroscience proves that the constitutionally distinct status
of juveniles must extend to at least the age of 21. As a result, it would be
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to sentence someone who was 20 at the time of
an offense to a sentence of life imprisonment for the reasons set forth below.
1. Roper, Graham, and Miller clearly relied on then up-to-date
neuroscience to determine that adolescents are “constitutionally
different” from adults for sentencing purposes
Beginning with Roper in 2005, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
prohibit treating offenders who commit murder when under 18 as adults for
sentencing. 8 This is based on the Eighth Amendment’s “proportionality”
requirement which prohibits certain punishments from being imposed on categories
of individuals with diminished culpability. 9 These punishments are deemed
disproportionate “based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of

543 U.S. at 551; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.
See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(capital punishment for non-homicide offense unconstitutional); Roper, 543 U.S. at
551; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (capital punishment unconstitutional
for the intellectually disabled); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (capital
punishment unconstitutional for offenders who did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill).

8
9

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 offenders and the severity of a penalty.” 10 These cases all hold that “children are
constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes.” 11
The constitutionally distinct status of juveniles is premised on the
constitutional finding that juvenile offenders “have diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform” than adults. Id. “Youth is more than a chronological
fact.” 12 Adolescence is a “transient” period of “immaturity, irresponsibility,
‘impetuousness, and recklessness.’” 13
Miller holds that the “distinctive attributes of youth” are not “crime-specific,”
but apply even to adolescents who “commit terrible crimes,” and identifies “three
significant gaps between juveniles and adults:”
•

Adolescents’ “lack of maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of
responsibility” engender “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risktaking.”

•

Adolescents are more susceptible to negative environmental influences
and pressures, “including from their family and peers,” in part because
adolescents “have limited control over their own environment and lack the
ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”

•

Adolescents are more likely to change: “a child’s character is not as wellformed as an adult’s, his traits are less fixed and his actions are less likely
to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.” 14

Roper, Graham, and Miller all relied heavily on then-available advances in
neuroscience which documented the highly significant neurobiological differences
between adolescent and adult brains. “Our decisions rested not only on common

Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.
Id.
12 Id. at 476 quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
13 Id. quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).
14 Id. at 471.
10
11

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 sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.” 15 As
detailed below, current developments in neuroscience, many of which were not
available when Roper, Graham, and Miller were decided, conclusively demonstrate
that the same neurobiological “transient qualities of youth” last beyond the age of
17. The adolescent brain does not magically mature on its eighteenth birthday.
This fact is significant because the adolescent brain is so different from the adult
brain.
2. Neuroscience demonstrates that adolescents are different because
of their distinct developmental phase characterized by heightened
proclivity to risk taking, impulsivity, and a diminished capacity for
self-regulation
Research pioneered by Dr. Laurence Steinberg, Distinguished University
Professor of Psychology, Temple University, demonstrates that the human brain
undergoes a “massive reorganization” during the teenage years. These changes are
both structural and functional and make adolescence a stage of life biologically
distinct from childhood and adulthood. 16 Although the brain’s logical capabilities
are generally fully formed at 16, the systems controlling more complex judgments—
such as risk/reward evaluations, responses to environmental stressors, and impulse
control—do not completely develop until the mid-twenties. 17

Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent
Brain Development, 72 Brain & Cognition 160, 160 (2010) [hereinafter Steinberg,
Behavioral Scientist]; see Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice, 5 Ann. Rev. Clinical Psychol. 459, 465 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg,
Adolescent Development].
17 See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, Comm. on Assessing Juvenile Justice Reform,
Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach 132 (Richard J. Bonnie et
15
16

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 As the adolescent brain matures, it undergoes a temporary developmental
imbalance between two neurobiological systems: the limbic system, associated with
emotions and reward-seeking, and the prefrontal regulatory system, which governs
rational judgment and impulse control. 18 During early and middle adolescence, the
limbic system experiences a “rapid and dramatic increase in dopaminergic activity,”
causing a marked increase in reward seeking, sensation seeking, and accompanying
risky behavior. 19 The reward centers of the adolescent brain are more active than
those of adults, leading to an overestimation of rewards versus risks. 20
At the same time, “compelling neurobiological evidence” demonstrates that
the brain’s regulatory system undergoes a more gradual, linear maturation over the
course of adolescence. 21 This means that adolescents have a qualitatively higher
neurological inclination to engage in risky activity, while at the same time they
have a qualitatively lower ability to control impulses or accurately assess future
consequences. “Adolescents develop an accelerator a long time before they can steer

al. eds., 2013); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of
Judgment in Adolescents: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18
Behav. Sci. & L. 741, 744 (2000).
18 See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, supra, at 2; Steinberg, Adolescent Development,
supra, at 466-65; Alison Gopnik, What’s Wrong With the Teenage Mind, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 28, 2012.
19 Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra, at 466; see Nat’l Research Council,
supra, at 97-98; Gopnik, supra.
20 See, e.g., Gopnik, supra; David Dobbs, Beautiful Brains, Nat’l Geographic Mag.,
Oct. 2011.
21 Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra, at 466; see, e.g., Nat’l Research
Council, supra, at 92, 96-99; Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective
on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 Dev. Rev. 78, 83 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, RiskTaking].

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 and brake.” 22 The ability to regulate and assess increases gradually as adolescents
age. 23
Studies further show that emotionally-charged situations exacerbate this
discrepancy, leaving teenagers—especially young men—even less able to exercise
the regulatory functions of the brain in the very contexts when those moderating
functions are most needed. While young men may be good at “cold reasoning,” their
ability to reason at times of stress and excitement—“hot reasoning”—remains
undeveloped and immature. 24
Ultimately, this developmental imbalance explains why “adolescence is a
time of inherently immature judgment.” 25 Although teenagers might seem as

Gopnik, supra.
See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking,
52 Developmental Psychobiology 216 (2010); Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The
Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive Control, 93 Pharmacology,
Biochemistry, & Behav. 212, 215-18 (2009).
24 See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council, supra, at 92-93; Bernard Figner et al., Affective
and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice, 35 J. Experimental Psychol. 709, 709
(2009). Anatomically, these changes can be explained as follows. The brain
experiences a loss of “gray matter”—the shedding of excess, unused synaptic
connections—and a gradual increase in “white-matter,” a coating of myelin which
speeds neural-transmission. See, e.g., M.R. Asato et al., White Matter Development
in Adolescence: A DTI Study, 20 Cerebral Cortex 2122 (2010); Dobbs, supra; Geier &
Luna, Cognitive Control, supra, at 215-16 ; Steinberg, Adolescent Development,
supra, at 466. Together, the reduction in gray matter and the increase in white
matter improves the efficiency and connectivity of neural signaling in the prefrontal
cortex and among multiple regions of the brain. See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council,
supra, at 99; Geier & Luna, supra, at 215-16; Steinberg, Risk-Taking, supra, at 9395. These functional changes are associated with improved “response inhibition,
planning ahead, weighing risks and rewards, and the simultaneous consideration of
multiple sources of information.” Steinberg, Risk-Taking, supra, at 94; see, e.g.,
Nat’l Research Council, supra, at 99; Asato et al., supra, at 2123; Geier & Luna,
supra, at 215
25 Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra, at 467.
22
23

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 intelligent as adults, “their ability to regulate their behavior in accord with these
advanced intellectual abilities is more limited.” 26 Adolescents overvalue immediate
rewards and are less future-oriented compared to adults; they are more impulsive,
more susceptible to emotion and stress, and less likely to perceive the consequences
of their actions, especially negative ones. 27
In summary, adolescents and people in their early 20s are:
•

More likely than adults to underestimate the number, seriousness, and
likelihood of risks involved in a given situation;

•

Prone to engage in what psychologists call “sensation-seeking”—the
pursuit of arousing, rewarding, exciting or novel experiences;

•

Less able to control their impulses and consider the future consequences
of their actions and decisions;

•

More socially and emotionally immature than their intellectual maturity
would suggest.

These are the fundamental reasons that youth is different, and the Supreme Court
has agreed.
3. Advances in neuroscience render any hardline distinction between
17-year-olds and 20-year-olds irrational and invalid
The Supreme Court’s conclusions in Miller, Graham, and Roper were largely
informed by the work of Dr. Laurence Steinberg discussed above. Dr. Steinberg was
the lead scientist for the American Psychological Association (“APA”) in drafting the
APA’s amicus briefs in Roper, Graham, and Miller. He was responsible for assuring
that the briefs accurately reflected the science of adolescent development as it was

Id.
Id. at 468-70; Human Rights Watch & Amnesty Int’l, The Rest of Their Lives: Life
Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States 46 (2005).

26
27

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 understood at the time. 28 However, Dr. Steinberg has explained that research has
advanced considerably in recent years and that “knowing what we know now, one
could’ve made the very same arguments about 18-, 19- and 20-year-olds that were
made about 16- and 17-year olds in Roper.” 29
Dr. Steinberg has prepared a declaration in this case, attached hereto as
Exhibit B. In this declaration he states that “[f]urther study of brain maturation
conducted during the past decade has revealed that several aspects of brain
development affecting judgment and decision-making are not only ongoing during
early and middle adolescence, but continue at least until age 21.” 30 Further, [a]s
more research confirming this conclusion accumulated, by 2015 the notion that
brain maturation continues into late adolescence became widely accepted among
neuroscientists.” 31 One reason researchers have learned so much more is the

Testimony of Laurence Steinberg, Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787 (JCH),
2017 WL 3638176, (D. Conn. September 13, 2017).
29 Commonwealth v. Bredhold, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute
as Unconstitutional, No. 14-CR-161 (Fayette [Ky.] Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017),
(summarizing Dr. Steinberg’s testimony in that case).
30 Ex. B at 5.
31 Id. at 6, citing N. Dosenbach, et al., Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity
Using fMRI, 329 Science 1358 (2011); D. Fair, et al., Functional Brain Networks
Develop from a “Local to Distributed” Organization, 5 PLoS Computational Biology
1 (2009); AM Hedman et al., Human Brain Changes Across the Life Span: A Review
of 56 Longtitudinal Magnetic Resonance Imaging Studies, 33 Human Brain
Mapping 1987 (2012); A. Pfefferbaum et al., Variation in Longitudinal Trajectories
of Regional Brain Volumes of Healthy Men and Women (Ages 10 to 85 Years)
Measured with Atlas-Based Parcellation of MRI, 65 NeuroImage 176 (2013); D.
Simmonds, et al., Developmental Stages and Sex Differences of White Matter and
Behavioral Development Through Adolescence: A Longitudinal Diffusion Tensor
Imaging (DTI) Study, 92 NeuroImage 356 (2014); L. Somerville et al., A Time of
Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive
and Aversive Environmental Cues 72 Brain & Cognition 124 (2010); C. Tamnes et
28

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 advent of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) which permits
observation of the brains of living individuals. “The results of this examination
demonstrated that key brain systems and structures, especially those involved in
self-regulation and higher-order cognition, continue to mature throughout
adolescence until at least the age of 21 and likely beyond in some areas of
function.” 32 Dr. Steinberg explains that the “contemporary view of brain
development as ongoing at least until age 21 stands in marked contrast to the view
held by scientists as recently as 15 years ago.” 33
We now know that, in many respects, individuals between 18 and 21 are
more neurobiologically similar to younger teenagers than had previously
been thought; their character has not yet been fully formed (as those brain
regions most determinant of character are the last to mature), they remain
amendable to change, and they are able to profit from rehabilitation. 34
As a result, courts have begun extending the Eighth Amendment protections
of Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery to young adults. For example, a trial
court in Kentucky declared the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under
21. 35 The court reasoned that “given the national trend toward restricting the use
of the death penalty for young offenders, and given the recent studies by the

al., . Development of the Cerebral Cortex Across Adolescence: A Multisample Study of
Inter-related Longitudinal Changes in Cortical Volume, Surface Area, and
Thickness, 37 J. Neuroscience 3402 (2017); K. Whitaker et al., Adolescence Is
Associated with Genomically Patterned Consolidation of the Hubs of the Human
Brain Connectome, 113 PNAS 9105 (2016).
32 Id. at 5.
33 Id. at 6-7.
34 Id. at 7.
35 See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, Order Declaring Kentucky’s
Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional (Fayette [Ky.] Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017)
(Scorsone, J.).

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 scientific community, the death penalty would be an unconstitutionally
disproportionate punishment for crimes committed by individuals under twenty-one
(21) years of age [at the time of the offense].” 36 A New Jersey appellate court
similarly relied on Miller to support its decision to remand for resentencing a 75year aggregate sentence imposed for murder committed by a 21-year-old defendant,
reasoning that where the sentence is the practical equivalent of life without parole,
courts must “consider at sentencing a youthful offender’s failure to appreciate risks
and consequences as well as other factors often peculiar to young offenders.” 37
The American Bar Association has relied upon this change in neuroscience as
the reason for its Resolution 111, which “urges each jurisdiction that imposes
capital punishment to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on or execution of
any individual who was 21 years or younger at the time of the offense.” 38 The
resolution explains its rationale as based on “findings [that] demonstrate that 18 to
21 year olds have a diminished capacity to understand the consequences of their

Id. (relying heavily on brain science-related testimony to conclude that the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for offenders younger than 21 because
such individuals are categorically less culpable and have a better chance at
rehabilitation); see also Commonwealth v. Diaz, No. 15-CR-584-001, Order
Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional (Fayette [Ky.] Cir.
Ct. Sept. 6, 2017) (Scorsone, J.).
37 State v. Norris, No. A-3008-15T4, 2017 WL 2062145, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. May 15, 2017); see also Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787 (JCH), 2017 WL
3638176 (D. Conn. April 3, 2017) (granting defendant’s motion for a hearing on a §
2255 motion, concluding that he raised an issue of material fact as to whether a
youth of 18 years and 20 weeks is legally and developmentally a child such that his
mandatory life-without-parole sentence violates the Eighth Amendment).
38 American Bar Association Resolution 111, available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/mym2018res/111.pd
f [hereinafter ABA Resolution].
36

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 actions and control their behavior in ways similar to youth under 18.” 39
“Additionally, research suggests that late adolescents, like juveniles, are more
prone to risk-taking and that they act more impulsively than older adults in ways
that likely influence their criminal conduct.” 40 Nor are “18 to 21 year olds…fully
mature enough to anticipate future consequences.” 41 Furthermore, “profound
neurodevelopmental growth continues even into a person’s mid to late twenties.” 42
The resolution cited to a study sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health
which tracked the brain development of 5,000 children and discovered their brains
were not fully mature until at least 25 years of age. 43
4. Evolving standards of decency strongly suggest Miller relief should
be extended to the age of 21
Community standards of decency are relevant to an Eighth Amendment
analysis. When Roper banned the death penalty for those under 18, it cited not only
neuroscience, but a “national consensus” that offenders under 18 should not be

Id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 339, 343 (1992); Kathryn L. Modecki,
Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and
Delinquency, 32 L. & Hum. Behav. 78, 79 (2008) (“In general, the age curve shows
crime rates escalating rapidly between ages 14 and 15, topping out between ages 16
and 20, and promptly deescalating.”)).
40 Id. (citing Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal
Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 644
(2016)).
41 Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and
Delay Discounting, 80 Child Dev. 28, 35 (2009)).
42 Id. (citing Christian Beaulieu & Catherine Lebel, Longitudinal Development of
Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood, 27 J. Neuroscience
31 (2011); Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 9).
43 Id. (citing Dosenbach et al., supra note 9).
39

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 treated as full adults. Roper recognized that the national consensus had changed
since 1988 when the Court declared, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988), that the death penalty was unconstitutional only for those under 16.
The national consensus now recognizes that youth does not end at 18. The
United States Sentencing Commission, for example, issued a report in 2017,
Youthful Offenders in the Federal System, Fiscal Years 2010 to 2015 (“The Youthful
Offenders Report”) that affirms this view. The Commission, based on “recent case
law and neuroscience research,” redefined “youthful offender” to include offenders
“25 years old and younger.”
Traditionally, youthful offenders often have been defined as those under the
age of 18, but for purposes of this study, the Commission has defined youthful
offenders as a federal offender 25 years old or younger at the time of
sentencing. The inclusion of young adults in the definition of youthful
offenders is informed by recent case law and neuroscience research in which
there is a growing recognition that people may not gain full reasoning skills
and abilities until they reach age 25 on average. 44
Multiple federal statutes now recognize that 20 year olds lack the full
maturity of adulthood. The Foster Care Act of 2008, permits states to define “child”
as “an individual . . . who has not attained 19, 20 or 21 years of age.” The Gun
Control Act of 1968 prohibits individuals under age 21 from purchasing handguns.
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1), (c)(1). The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984
prohibits those under 21 from purchasing alcohol. 23 U.S.C. §158.
State legislatures have responded to the advances in neuroscience by
affording greater protections to youthful offenders who have passed their 18th

44

The Youthful Offenders Report, at *5.

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 birthday. “[A]s of 2016, all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized
extended age jurisdiction for juvenile courts beyond the age of 18, in comparison to
only 35 states in 2003.” Cruz, 2017 WL 3638176, at *56. “Between 2016 and 2018, 5
states and 285 localities raised the age to buy cigarettes from 18 to 21.” Id. The
majority of states now set 21 as the line at which children age out of foster care. 45
Other states that do not establish the line at 21, nevertheless set it above 18. 46
Vermont sets it at age 22. 47
There are a plethora of nationwide initiatives designed to protect late
adolescents who have passed their 18th birthday. “Young Adult Courts” have been
created in San Francisco, CA (begun 2015 for age 18-25); Omaha, NE (up to age 25);

Alabama, Ala. Code § 38-7-2(1); Alaska, Alaska Stat, § 47.10.080(c); Arizona,
Ariz. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 8-501(B); California, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 303(a);
Colorado, Colo. Rev.Stat. § 19-3-205(2)(a); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a93(a); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 929(a); Washington, D.C., D.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-2303; Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.013(2); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 15-112(10)(c); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. §§39-1202(3) & (9); Illinois, Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §
405/2-31(1); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. §31-28-5.8-5(a); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 382203(c); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 620.140(1)(d)-(e); Maryland, Md. Code Ann., Cts.
& Jud. Proc. § 3-804(b); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 772.981-85; Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260C.451; Mo. Ann. Stat. §110.04 (12); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 43-905 & 43-4502; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 432B.594; New
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-C:4; New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4C2.3; New York, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1087(a); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.81;
Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419B.328; Pennsylvania, 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann.
§6302; South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws § 26-6-6.1; Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann.
§§37-1-102(4)(G) & 37-2-417(b); Texas, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.602; Virginia, Va.
Code Ann. § 63.2-905.1; Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 74.13.031(16); West
Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 49-2B-2(x); and Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3431(b).
46 Maine, (age twenty), Maine Rev. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 4037-A(1) & (5); New Mexico,
(age nineteen), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-25.3; Wisconsin, (age nineteen), Wis. Stat.
Ann. §48.355(4).
47 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4904 (age twenty-two).
45

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 Kalamazoo County, MI (begun in 2013 for age 17-20); Lockport City, NY; and New
York, NY (begun 2016 for age 18-20). The Youthful Offender Report details
probation/parole programs, programs led by prosecutors, community-based
programs, hybrid programs, and prison programs all reflecting the national,
nonpartisan recognition that late adolescents should not be subject to the full brunt
of adult criminal penalties. Id. at *25-29, 30-40.
Finally, the ABA Resolution mentioned above cites additional evidence that
community standards have evolved, including some of the examples presented
above. 48 In addition, the resolution notes that many rental car companies set
minimum rental ages at 20 or 21, with higher rental fees for individuals under age
25. 49 Under the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), the Federal
Government considered individuals under the age of 23 legal dependents of their
parents. 50 Relatedly, the Internal Revenue Service allows students under 24 to be

ABA Resolution, supra note 12 at 7-9.
ABA Resolution, supra note 12, (citing What are Your Age Requirements for
Renting in the US and Canada, Enterprise.com,
https://www.enterprise.com/en/help/faqs/car-rental-under-25.html (last visited June
18, 2019); Restrictions and Surcharges for Renters Under 25 Years of Age,
Budget.com, https://www.budget.com/budgetWeb/html/en/common/agePopUp.html
(last visited June 18, 2019); Under 25 Car Rental, Hertz.com,
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=Hertz_Renting_to_Drive
rs_Under_25.jsp (last visited June 18, 2019)).
50 ABA Resolution supra note 12, (citing Dependency Status, Federal Student Aid,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/fillingout/dependency (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
59 (last visited June 18, 2019)).
48
49

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 dependents for tax purposes and the Affordable Care Act allowed individuals under
26 to remain on their parents’ health insurance. 51
5. The result is that it would violate the Eighth Amendment to
sentence someone who was 20 at the time of the offense to life
without the possibility of parole.
In conclusion, based on both current neuroscience and contemporary
understandings, this Court should not sentence James, or any other offender who
was 20 years of age at the time of the offense, to a sentence of life or it would be
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
B. A life sentence would not take seriously the mitigating qualities of youth
combined with James’ history for mental illness.
All of the arguments above equally support a sentence to less than life in this
specific case based on the role that youth had in the offense, separate and apart
from any Eighth Amendment analysis. Sentencing guideline § 5H1.1 specifically
provides that youth “may be relevant in determining whether a departure is
warranted, if considerations based on age, either individually or in combination
with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” In addition,
the guidelines specifically provide that mental conditions “may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in

ABA Resolution (citing 26 U.S.C. § 152 (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2017);
Dependents and Exemptions 7, I.R.S, https://www.irs.gov/faqs/filing-requirementsstatusdependents-exemptions/dependents-exemptions/dependents-exemptions-7
(last visited June 18, 2019)).
51

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 combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree
and distinguish the case from the typical case covered by the guidelines.” 52
The following summary is excerpted from Dr. Cohen’s assessment of James:
The above detailed review of Mr. Fields records indicates longstanding,
severe difficulties with loss of emotional and behavioral control when in
situations where he has felt stressed by having been challenged, threatened,
or singled out. The primary goal of all of the pharmacologic,
psychotherapeutic, and educational interventions that he has received since
early childhood has been to help him to achieve greater self-control when he
finds himself in such situations. He also has demonstrated some
longstanding cognitive distortions when in such situations, including a
tendency to externalize the nature of his difficulties, becoming angry and
aggressive toward the people around him, whom he has seen as threatening
him in some way. 53
Dr. Cohen reported that if James presented the same childhood symptoms today as
he did when he was 7 years of age in 2004, the current Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders would have led to a diagnosis of disruptive mood
dysregulation disorder (DMDD). DMDD is characterized by the presence of very
unstable moods “chronic, daily irritability along with superimposed acute, severe
tantrums or anger outburst with minimal provocation.” 54 Dr. Cohen noted that in
one study, when presented with a series of ambiguous facial expressions,
individuals with DMDD were “more likely to see anger in the faces than were
control subjects, suggesting that they are prone to experience more ‘hostile bias
attribution’ (i.e., a greater tendency to see a threat) than do other individuals.” 55

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3.
Ex. A at 31.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 32.
52
53

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 The combination of James’ age and mental conditions would warrant a
sentence of less than life on their own. But this Court must also consider the effect
of the childhood trauma that James experienced, growing up with a single parent
who was in a wheelchair, the knowledge that his father was killed in an accident
before he was born, and that his grandfather had murdered his grandmother. “[I]t
is clear that adverse childhood experiences have a profound, proportionate, and
long-lasting effect on emotional state, whether measured by depression or suicide
attempts, by protective unconscious devices like somatization and dissociation, or by
self-help attempts that are misguidedly addressed solely as long-term health
risks.” 56 Childhood trauma is strongly linked to mental and physical health
problems over the lifespan. “It negatively impacts brain development, cognitive
development, learning, social-emotional development, the ability to develop secure
attachments to others, and physical health; it is also associated with a shortened
lifespan . . . A considerable body of research demonstrates that children suffer the
most severe, long-lasting, and harmful effects when trauma exposure begins early
in life . . . .” 57

Vincent J. Felitti & Robert F. Anda, The Relationship of Adverse Childhood
Experiences to Adult Medical Disease, Psychiatric Disorders, and Sexual Behavior:
Implications for Healthcare 7, in The Hidden Epidemic: The Impact of Early Life
Trauma (R. Lanius & E. Vermetten, eds., 2009),
http://www.acestudy.org/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/LaniusVermetten_FINAL_8
26-09.12892303.pdf.
57 Jessica Dym Bartlett & Kathryn Steber, How to Implement Trauma-Informed
Care to Build Resilience to Childhood Trauma, Child Trends,
https://www.childtrends.org/publications/how-to-implementtrauma-informed-careto-build-resilience-to-childhood-trauma (last visited June 18, 2019).
56

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 Critically, there is reason for hope. The reason adolescent behavior must be
judged differently is because “predictions about adolescents’ future character and
behavior based on assessments made prior to maturation amount to little more than
speculation.” 58 There is an “absence of proof that assessments of adolescent
behavior will remain stable into adulthood [which] invites unreliable…sentencing
based on faulty appraisals of character and future conduct.” 59 In other words, given
James’ age and state of brain development, it would be speculation to assume that
he would make the same decision in the future.
Further, James’ past history suggests that when he is medicated, he is able to
control his moods and anger. The medications he has been taking while
incarcerated since August 12, 2017 have successfully controlled his symptoms,
although also giving him a flat affect. Therefore, if this court agrees that a sentence
less than life is appropriate, a condition of supervised release requiring James to
participate in mental health treatment and comply with the recommendations of his
treatment providers should help assure the Court that James would not commit
another offense in the future.

Ex. B at 5.
Id. (citing Brief for the American Psychological Association and the Missouri
Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 2, at
24).
58
59

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 III.

The nature and circumstances of the offense reflect the
immaturity, irresponsibility, and impetuousness of James’
adolescence combined with his mental health diagnoses. 60

By the time James drove his car into the crowd on the afternoon of August
12th, he had been sleep-deprived, dehydrated by the hot weather, fatigued by
walking, yelled at by counter-protesters, and had urine thrown on him. He was a
person ill-equipped to handle such a situation. He had never before been in an
uncontrolled crowd situation, and did not have the emotional tools or maturity to
react to what confronted him, nor had he been taking medication for his underlying
mental health conditions.
Taking a step back, James was not the organizer of the Unite the Right rally
held on August 12, 2017. He was not part of any group that planned to attend.
While James had absolutely previously posted racist and pro-Hitler comments and
photographs to social media accounts, he was never a member of any alt-right or
white supremacist organizations. He came alone, with no plan other than to hear
some speakers that he followed on Twitter.

The following information is intended to supplement the summary of the offense
conduct contained in paragraphs 4-15, with particular focus on the events that
occurred immediately before Fields drove his car into the crowd on Fourth Street,
S.E., at approximately 1:53 p.m. on August 12, 2017. Much of the information
referenced is found in the “Heaphy Report,” Independent Review of the 2017 Protest
Events in Charlottesville, Virginia. https://www.policefoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Charlottesville-Critical-Incident-Review-2017.pdf. Also,
much of it was introduced at Fields’ trial in Charlottesville Circuit Court in
November 2018.
60

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 Before the Unite the Right rally, he had never attended a political event of
any kind—or really any event involving a large crowd. After finding out on
Thursday that he could take off work that weekend, he left his apartment in Ohio
on Friday evening, and drove straight through the night. After arriving in
Charlottesville around 2:00 A.M, he parked at the McDonald’s and napped and
played video games. At some point on Saturday morning he drove to the Waffle
House and ate breakfast. He then returned to the McDonald’s parking lot at the
corner of Preston Avenue and Ridge-McIntire Street. Although the rally was not
supposed to start until noon, James saw that people were walking toward the rally
site and followed suit. He was wearing a white polo shirt and khakis, the unofficial
attire of the alt-right protestors.
James was in Emancipation Park 61 with the alt-right protestors when the
police declared an unlawful assembly and dispersed the crowd. Forcing the altright protesters out of the park exacerbated the violence as they were pushed into
confrontation with the Antifa counter-protesters. After a morning of yelling, fights,
tear gas, and fear, the alt-right protesters and the counter-protesters dispersed in
various directions in downtown Charlottesville. James followed a group that
walked to McIntire Park where an impromptu rally was supposed to occur, but by
the time James arrived that group had dispersed.

Because it is referred to in all the case documents as Emancipation Park, that is
the name that will be uses in this memorandum although it has since been renamed
Market Street Park.
61

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 On the way from Emancipation Park to McIntire Park, James met three
other people walking the same direction. They agreed to walk together for safety’s
sake on the way back downtown from McIntire Park. Since James’ car was closest,
he offered to drive everyone else back to their vehicles. After dropping off two of the
people at the Jefferson School on 4th Street, N.W., James drove to the Market Street
parking garage to drop off the third person.
James had never been to Charlottesville before, and he had relied on his cell
phone for directions. After dropping off the last person, he entered “Maumee, Ohio”
into his Google Maps application. Confusion ensued. The directions instructed him
to continue straight, traveling west on Market Street right past Emancipation Park
and eventually coming to the intersection of Preston Avenue and Ridge-Market
Street (near the McDonald’s where he had parked) where he would turn south and
come to I-64. But unbeknownst to Google Maps, the police had left a wooden
sawhorse barricade blocking traffic at the intersection of Market Street and 4th
Street, N.E., so James could not continue west on Market Street. At the same time,
the barricade that the police had put to block the entrance to Fourth Street, N.E.,
had been moved to the side, leaving that street unobstructed.
James turned down Fourth Street and crossed the Downtown Mall. Three
other vehicles had turned down Fourth Street in the minutes before he took that
route. It was coincidentally, in these exact minutes, that two crowds of counterprotesters converged on Water Street blocking the intersection. As James pulled up
at the bottom of the street, two other cars were ahead of him, unable to proceed

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 because of the crowd. The third vehicle (a truck) had pulled off to the right of the
street to wait. It was then that the crowd of counter-protesters began marching
northward on 4th Street.
James was not driving around looking for counter-protesters or anyone else
to injure. But he did back up his vehicle and then made the impulsive, angry, and
aggressive decision to deliberately drive his car into the gathering crowd.
Interviewed immediately after the event, James told police that he was “scared” and
that he thought people were “attacking him.” He thought that the two cars parked
ahead of him on Fourth Street were being “swarmed” by the crowd and that he was
next. PSR ¶¶ 11-12. In reality, of course, he was not being attacked, just as the
occupants of the two cars ahead of him were not being attacked. Despite that he
may have felt trapped, in fact there were no vehicles behind him and he could have
backed up and driven away without further incident.
Dr. Cohen’s report explains that James has a lifetime history of “outbursts of
impulsive aggression when feeling stressed.” Ex. A at 2. The most mature, stable
personalities would have been tested by the events of August 12. The scene was
absolute chaos, lasting several hours, involving hundreds of people, spread out over
the entire downtown area, and with authorities seemingly having no control over
the situation. There were helicopters overhead, smoke grenades and tear gas in the
air, police shouting through bullhorns, numerous acts of public violence overlooked
by the police, insults and anti-Semitic chants endlessly repeated, and firearms
displayed and discharged. James' impetuousness and bad decision making was

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 exacerbated in this environment. Of course it must be said plainly that none of this
excuses what he did.
IV.

The Court should impose this sentence to run concurrently to the
sentence that will be imposed in the state.
James will be sentenced for his state convictions in Charlottesville Circuit

Court on July 15, 2019, following this sentencing in federal court. As this Court
knows, the state jury recommended a sentence of life plus 419 years and $480,000
in fines. As a practical matter, because the parties intend for James to serve
whatever sentence this Court imposes in federal custody before serving any state
sentence, the state sentence is the one that the Virginia Department of Corrections
will interpret for whether or not his state sentence is consecutive or concurrent to
his federal sentence. It is also appropriate for the state sentencing judge to make
that call because this case was tried in the City of Charlottesville before James pled
guilty to these federal charges. To ensure that nothing impedes the state judge
from making decision, and consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(3), the “sentence for the
instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of
imprisonment” in the state.
CONCLUSION
To impose a life sentence in this case would require the court to focus almost
exclusively on the seriousness of the offense to the exclusion of all other sentencing
factors this Court must consider in determining a sentence for James.
James committed a terrible crime and deserves a harsh punishment. This
Court must weigh that uncontested fact against other mitigating factors—

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 particularly his youth, his traumatic childhood, and his mental illness. James did
not come to Charlottesville with any plan to commit an act of violence. In the space
of only a few minutes, caught in circumstances he did not intend to create, he acted
in an aggressive and impulsive manner consistent with his mental health history
and his age. In a matter of seconds he caused irreparable harm for which there is
no excuse. But this Court can understand his actions, without excusing them, as
symptomatic of transient immaturity, and not consider them to be predictive of who
he might be in the future with time and medication.
No amount of punishment imposed on James can repair the damage he
caused to dozens of innocent people. But this Court should find that retribution has
limits. A sentence of life imprisonment would be greater than necessary to comply
with the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES ALEX FIELDS, JR.
By Counsel
Counsel:
S/Frederick T. Heblich, Jr.
Frederick T. Heblich, Jr.
First Assistant Federal Public Defender
401 East Market Street, Suite 106Charlottesville, VA 22902
VSB 21898
Tel. (434) 220-3380
Fax (434) 220-3390
Fred_Heblich@fd.org
Lisa M. Lorish
Assistant Federal Public Defender
401 East Market Street, Suite 106

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 Charlottesville, VA 22902
VSB 81465
Tel. (434) 220-3380
Fax (434) 220-3390
Lisa_Lorish@fd.org
Denise Y. Lunsford
414 East Market Street, Suite C
Charlottesville, VA 22902
Tel. (434) 328-8798
dylunsford@prodigy.net
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 21, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of such
filing (ECF) to all parties of record
/s Lisa M. Lorish
Lisa M. Lorish
Assistant Federal Public Defender

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