State of New York
Offices of the Inspector General

Investigation of New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision
Office of Special Investigations
Evidence Integrity and
Former Senior Investigator Todd Johnson

July 2019

Letizia Tagliafierro
Inspector General

 STAFF FOR THIS INVESTIGATION AND REPORT
SPENCER FREEDMAN
Executive Deputy Inspector General
MICHELE HOST
Chief Counsel
JAMES R. DAVIS
Deputy Inspector General
GEORGE FRANY III
Investigative Counsel
SHERRY AMAREL
Chief Investigator
DANIEL WALSH
Deputy Chief Investigator
JOHN JURS JR.
Investigator
DENNIS GRAVES
Director of Audit
ELEANORE RUSSOMANNO
Investigative Auditor
JONATHAN MASTERS
Director of Investigative Reporting
and Senior Investigative Counsel

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On February 12, 2019, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision’s (DOCCS) Office of Special Investigations (OSI) alleged to the New York State
Inspector General that in January 2019, Todd Johnson, a senior investigator in OSI’s Narcotics
Investigations Division, falsified the chain of custody written on an evidence bag he transferred
from OSI’s Clinton field office in Dannemora, New York, to OSI’s central office in Albany,
New York.
The Inspector General’s investigation found that Johnson took possession of an evidence
bag at OSI’s Clinton field office on Friday, January 25, 2019, maintained the evidence at his
residence over the weekend contrary to OSI policy, and then transferred the evidence to a
subordinate on Monday, January 28, 2019. Additionally, the investigation found that Johnson
failed to record the date he took possession of the evidence on the written chain of custody and
then directed a subordinate to forge the chain of custody written on the evidence bag to make it
appear that Johnson took possession of the evidence bag on Monday, January 28, 2019, the same
day the subordinate transported it to Albany. Johnson testified to the Inspector General, admitted
to this wrongdoing, and retired from DOCCS.
Given this finding of misconduct by Johnson, the Inspector General audited all evidence
transferred by Johnson to OSI’s central office from January 2017 through January 2019. This
audit found two other occasions on which there were inconsistencies between the written chain
of custody on the evidence bags transferred by Johnson and Johnson’s activity and travel logs,
swipe card access records, and the testimony of witnesses. On these two other occasions,
Johnson transferred a total of 98 evidence bags. The Inspector General concluded from this audit
that Johnson likely falsified or directed the falsification of the written chain of custody on the 98
evidence bags.
The Inspector General also found that Johnson falsified entries on his activity and travel
logs when he purportedly transferred evidence on three occasions. Notably, the investigation
found no indications that the evidence bags had been tampered with by Johnson or others while
being transported to Albany.
The Inspector General has referred these findings to the Office of the Albany County
District Attorney for its review.
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 The consequences of Johnson’s misconduct are significant. The Inspector General found
that the 99 aforementioned evidence bags transferred by Johnson contained such items as witness
statements, marijuana, synthetic cannabinoids, Suboxone strips, drug paraphernalia and
packaging, and, in one instance, small weapons, which are routinely collected by OSI in its
investigations. In total, 53 criminal narcotics investigations of inmates and correctional facility
visitors were implicated. None of the implicated investigations were of correction officers.
Of the 53 investigations, 32 were either declined by prosecutors prior to the findings of
this investigation or not referred by OSI for prosecution; nine were declined for prosecution due
the Inspector General’s findings of Johnson’s misconduct; and 12 were accepted by the district
attorneys of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, and Washington counties for prosecution. Of the
12 cases accepted for prosecution by the aforementioned district attorneys, the district attorneys
advised the Inspector General that as seven of the cases had yet to reach a final disposition, the
appropriate courts and/or defense counsels had been notified of the breaks in the chains of
custody. As for the remaining five cases accepted for prosecution, the chain of custody breaks
occurred after the disposition of the criminal action and therefore had no effect on the criminal
proceedings.
Following the discovery of Johnson’s wrongdoing, OSI performed an audit of all
evidence contained in temporary safes in its field offices and found no indication of additional
breaks in the written chains of custody on other evidence bags. As a precaution, OSI
subsequently reassigned the transport of evidence from its field offices to designated evidence
technicians working in OSI’s Intake and Case Management Unit in its central office in Albany.
Additionally, OSI advised that evidence held in its field offices will be regularly audited by an
evidence technician.
The Inspector General reviewed DOCCS and OSI evidence storage and handling policies
and procedures and found some lacked specific controls that could have prevented, deterred, or
more easily detected Johnson’s improper actions. The Inspector General has been advised by
DOCCS that it has tasked an internal workgroup to examine and amend its policies as necessary
in the wake of Johnson’s actions. The Inspector General is conferring with this workgroup and
has identified additional policies that will improve OSI’s operations. The Inspector General has
also been advised by DOCCS that it has acquired funding for an electronic evidence tracking
system and recommends that DOCCS continue towards the goal of instituting this system as
soon as possible.
2

 The Inspector General recommends that DOCCS promulgate and implement policy and
procedures for this new system, and train on the same. Additionally, the Inspector General
recommends that any new policies comport with New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services (DCJS) evidence guidelines. The Inspector General further recommends that DOCCS
act to ensure that temporary evidence safes and lockers in OSI’s satellite offices are properly
isolated from general access and that DOCCS consider the incorporation of surveillance and
intrusion alarms in each area where evidence is stored. In addition, the Inspector General
recommends that DOCCS enforce its policy requiring the contemporaneous recording of
evidence transactions in logs at its field offices. The Inspector General also recommends that
OSI policy include the “Two-Person Rule,” which mandates the presence of at least two
investigators when handling evidence. Lastly, the Inspector General recommends that DOCCS
train all OSI investigators on proper evidence handling and storage policies and procedures and
require all OSI investigators, not just new recruits, to attend the OSI training academy.
DOCCS advised the Inspector General that it has adopted and is implementing all of the
Inspector General’s recommendations.
BACKGROUND
DOCCS derives its investigative authority from section 112 of New York State
Correction Law. DOCCS issues directives establishing standards and procedures for prison
operations, and these directives are supplemented and may be modified by operations manuals
for the individual correctional facilities and central office functions. In DOCCS Directive 0700,
the DOCCS commissioner designated investigative authority to OSI, which is tasked to “prevent,
detect, identify, expose, and eliminate criminal activity, misconduct, fraud, waste, abuse,
corruption, and other improper behavior within [DOCCS].” OSI also assists other law
enforcement agencies with criminal investigations within the corrections system.
OSI’s Narcotics Investigations Division, which is also referred to as the Narcotics
Investigations Unit, detects and investigates the introduction and promotion of contraband into
state correctional facilities by visitors, inmates, and corrections officers. Pursuant to Directive
0700, when the unit finds evidence of contraband, a case is established, evidence is collected,
and, if appropriate, findings are referred to the appropriate prosecutorial authority. Contraband
commonly collected by investigators of this unit include marijuana, synthetic cannabinoids,
Suboxone strips, drug paraphernalia and packaging, and weapons. Once obtained, contraband is
secured in a plastic evidence bag, sealed, and relevant identifying information is written directly
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 on the evidence bag before it is secured in a safe or locker. Subsequently, upon transfer of the
evidence bag between custodians and locations, other information is written on the evidence bag,
including the name of the individual who received the evidence, date evidence was received,
location(s) to which or name(s) of individual(s) to whom evidence was transferred, and date
transferred. This information is known as the “chain of custody.”
OSI advised that it is its practice to utilize OSI’s Clinton field office in Dannemora as a
temporary repository for all evidence obtained by OSI in the “Clinton Hub,” which includes
Clinton, Upstate, Bare Hill, Altona, and Franklin correctional facilities, as well as Adirondack
Adolescent Offender Facility. The field office contains a “drop safe,” into which evidence bags
containing contraband are inserted through a door on the top of the safe. The evidence bags can
only be accessed by a door on the bottom of the safe, which is secured by combination locks.
The safe, which is located in an open area inside OSI’s field office, is not monitored by
surveillance cameras or alarmed.
Chapter 17 of OSI’s Policy and Procedure Manual, entitled “Evidence,” sets forth the
“uniform guidelines for the collection, custody, and disposal of all evidence within [OSI], in
order to ensure that evidence is not improperly accessed or stolen, and to maintain a chain of
custody for court and administrative proceedings.” It requires that evidence collected by OSI
investigators be stored at an OSI field office or in the OSI central office evidence room. When
securing evidence at a field office, the manual requires OSI investigators to “assure the evidence
is properly labeled [and] . . . then secure the item in an evidence locker . . . .” Concurrently, the
investigator must “log each piece of evidence in the assigned Log Book and make a record of the
evidence . . . in OSI’s electronic case management system.” 1 The manual further requires, “The
transferring of evidence from one location to another must and [sic] be documented in the chain
of custody.” Under “Securing of Custody,” the manual directs, “No evidence shall be secured in
any other manner without prior approval from their respective Deputy Chief or Assistant Deputy
Chief (vehicles and case folders are not acceptable locations for securing evidence overnight).”
(Emphasis original.) 2
Further, it is OSI’s evidence policy to operate “within the guidelines set forth by the
Division of Criminal Justice Services.” 3 DCJS oversees the New York State Law Enforcement
Accreditation Program, which publishes a Standards and Compliance Verification Manual that
OSI Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter 17, Section III – Procedures.
OSI Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter 17, Section III(2) - Securing of Custody.
3
OSI Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter 17, Section II(1) - Policy.
1
2

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 delineates policy guidelines for law enforcement agencies’ voluntary use, including “Evidence
and Non-Agency Property Management.” 4 DCJS policy guidelines recommend that
documentation for the obtained evidence include the contents of the evidence bag, name of the
investigator who collected the evidence, date evidence collected, date evidence transferred, name
of individual who received evidence after transfer, reason for transfer, appropriate case numbers,
and inventory control numbers, among other information. DCJS guidelines further recommend
that an access log be maintained in order to track those who have had contact with evidence,
noting that “Controlled access to storage areas is critical to ensure the integrity of the
property/evidence being held in custody for courtroom purposes.” 5 DCJS guidelines also
recommend that agencies develop a “Right of Refusal” policy, which authorizes an evidence
custodian to refuse to accept evidence where a chain of custody is not properly documented, or
evidence is improperly or unsafely packaged, among other things. Additionally, DCJS training
on evidence room management recommends the use of intrusion alarms in secure evidence
locations.
Beginning in 2015, OSI has held an annual training academy for new OSI investigators at
Wallkill Correctional Facility using DCJS investigators’ curriculum as a basis. 6 The OSI Basic
Investigators’ School, which entails three weeks of courses, includes training on evidence
collection and handling. However, only new OSI investigators participate in this training—those
investigators on staff before 2015 have not been required to complete the academy.
Todd Johnson Directed a Subordinate to Forge the Written Chain of Custody on an
Evidence Bag to Conceal Johnson’s Mishandling of Evidence
In February 2019, OSI informed the Inspector General that Todd Johnson, a senior
investigator in OSI’s Narcotics Investigations Unit primarily based at Washington Correctional
Facility, falsified the written chain of custody on an evidence bag. At the time, Johnson
supervised four investigators, and his job duties included the coordination of periodic transfers of
evidence from temporary storage at OSI’s Clinton field office to OSI’s long-term evidence
storage in Albany, New York.
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation Council,
Standards and Compliance Verification Manual, 8th Edition (September 2015), Revision 8.2 (December 2018).
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ops/docs/accred/SCVM_Version_8_December2018_Revision_8.2.pdf.
5
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Office of Public Safety, Property/Evidence Room
Management Student Manual 2016.
6
Pursuant to the findings and recommendations contained in the Inspector General’s June 2016 report entitled
“Investigation of the June 5, 2015 Escape of Inmates David Sweat and Richard Matt from Clinton Correctional
Facility,” DOCCS implemented a number of corrective measures including this comprehensive training for new OSI
investigators.
4

5

 The Inspector General’s investigation of the allegation against Johnson found that he took
possession of an evidence bag on Friday, January 25, 2019, transported it in his State-issued
vehicle to his personal residence in South Glens Falls, New York, where he maintained the
evidence over the weekend, and then transferred the bag to his subordinate on Monday, January
28, 2019. Johnson, who had failed to record on the evidence bag’s written chain of custody
when he took possession of the evidence bag, then instructed this subordinate to forge a false
chain of custody to cover up the fact that Johnson had obtained custody of the evidence the
Friday before.
Specifically, the Inspector General’s investigation found that on Friday, January 25,
2019, Johnson and at least one of his subordinates took inventory of evidence stored in the
temporary safe at OSI’s Clinton field office in preparation for the transfer of one evidence bag to
Albany. According to Johnson’s testimony to the Inspector General, Johnson then removed one
evidence bag from the temporary safe and, that evening, transported it to his South Glens Falls
home where he secured the evidence bag in his home safe. Johnson further testified that he took
the evidence bag that Friday for convenience, so that he could leave directly from his home the
following Monday, January 28, 2019, and transport the evidence bag to Albany, without having
to first travel to the Clinton field office. The written chain of custody on the evidence bag did
not reflect that Johnson took possession of the evidence on January 25, 2019.
The Inspector General also found that Johnson attempted to conceal his wrongdoing by
enlisting a subordinate to meet him on the morning of Monday, January 28, 2019, to assist in the
transfer of the evidence bag to Albany. In furtherance of this, Johnson called the subordinate on
Sunday, January 27, 2019, and requested his assistance on Monday, January 28, 2019. The
subordinate, who testified that he had never assisted in such an evidence transfer before and
found Johnson’s request highly unusual, declined the request due to a prior personal obligation.
The Inspector General found that Johnson’s attempt to involve this subordinate was so that
Johnson could justify his inclusion of the subordinate on the written chain of custody and thereby
conceal the fact that Johnson actually took custody of the evidence on Friday, January 25, 2019.
Later on Sunday, January 27, 2019, a second subordinate advised Johnson in an email
message that he (the second subordinate) would be transferring evidence on a separate case from
Great Meadow Correctional Facility to Albany on Monday, January 28, 2019. That Monday
morning, Johnson emailed the second subordinate and instructed him to call Johnson on his
office telephone. The second subordinate did so, and the two agreed to meet at Washington
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 Correctional Facility. The second subordinate testified to the Inspector General that when he
met Johnson at the facility, Johnson instructed him to perform an evidence relay to Albany. The
second subordinate then took possession of the evidence bag from Johnson and transported it to
OSI’s central office in Albany.
Upon arriving at the Albany office, the second subordinate noticed a break in the written
chain of custody on the evidence bag. Specifically, the written chain of custody did not reflect
any transfer of the evidence from OSI’s temporary safe at Clinton Correctional Facility to
Johnson or another recipient but listed only a transfer from the first subordinate to Johnson on
Monday, January 28, 2019. The second subordinate testified to the Inspector General that he
then sent an email message to Johnson in which he wrote of the apparent break in the written
chain of custody and included a photograph of the evidence bag. Johnson replied via email and
instructed the second subordinate to contact him by telephone at Johnson’s Washington
Correctional Facility office.
According to testimony of the second subordinate, Johnson then directed the second
subordinate to place a line through the written notation on the evidence bag reflecting the
transfer from the first subordinate to Johnson, and to write a new chain of custody including a
transfer from the temporary safe to the first subordinate, from the first subordinate to Johnson,
and then from Johnson to the second subordinate. The second subordinate testified that he
complied with Johnson’s instructions because he believed the break in the written chain of
custody was due to a “clerical error—sometimes guys take stuff out of the safe and they . . .
forget.” The second subordinate further testified that he then took a photograph of the altered
written chain of custody and forwarded the photograph in an email message to Johnson. In
response, Johnson replied, “Very good.” Johnson received two hours of overtime for this
purported evidence transfer.
According to testimony of both the first and second subordinates, on or about the
following day, the second subordinate telephoned the first subordinate and advised about his
conversation with Johnson and his alterations to the written chain of custody on the evidence
bag. The first subordinate responded that he never possessed the evidence in question, was not
physically present on that date at the Clinton field office to give the evidence to Johnson, and did
not know why Johnson would direct that his name be written on the evidence bag’s chain of
custody. The first subordinate soon after referred his concerns to Johnson’s OSI supervisor and
the matter was subsequently referred to the Inspector General.
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 Todd Johnson May Have Falsified or Directed Others to Falsify the Written Chain of
Custody on 98 Other Evidence Bags
Given these findings, the Inspector General reviewed all evidence transferred by Johnson
to OSI’s long-term evidence storage in Albany during the period January 2017 through January
2019 and found two other instances where evidence suggests Johnson may have falsified or
directed the falsification of the written chain of custody on a total of 98 other evidence bags. 7
In the first instance, OSI’s evidence log indicates that on Tuesday, November 6, 2018,
Johnson removed 77 evidence bags from the temporary safe at OSI’s Clinton field office and
transported them to Albany. Each of the 77 evidence bags reflect a written chain of custody
from the OSI field office safe to Johnson and then from Johnson to the second subordinate on
that Tuesday. However, the Inspector General found evidence indicating that Johnson likely
obtained the 77 evidence bags on the day prior, held them overnight, transferred the evidence to
Albany the following day, and falsified the written chain of custody to cover it up.
Specifically, the Inspector General found that on Monday, November 5, 2018, Johnson
completed a Daily Activity Log in which he reported he was preparing evidence to be transferred
to OSI’s central office in Albany. 8 Johnson also reported in his Daily Activity Log on that date
that he was en route to his residence in South Glens Falls at 2 p.m. and off duty at 4 p.m. On the
following day, Tuesday, November 6, 2018, Johnson reported in his Daily Activity Log that he
was on duty at OSI’s Albany office at 7 a.m., and his vehicle mileage logs reflect that he drove
directly from South Glens Falls, where he lives, to Albany. The second subordinate testified that
he received the evidence bags from Johnson on Tuesday, November 6, 2018, in Albany. As
neither Johnson’s Daily Activity Log nor vehicle mileage log reflect any travel to the Clinton
field office on Tuesday, November 6, 2018, the evidence strongly suggests that after preparing
the evidence on Monday, November 5, 2018, Johnson transported the 77 evidence bags to his
personal residence and then delivered the evidence bags to Albany the following day.
Further, although Johnson purported in OSI’s Clinton field office evidence log that he
obtained and transferred the 77 evidence bags to Albany on November 6, 2018, the Inspector
General learned that in practice, the evidence log is completed at some point after evidence has
been transferred, and would not have been completed until after November 6. Additionally,
DOCCS was only able to provide complete records for the transfer of OSI evidence from its field offices to Albany
for this period.
8
Pursuant to practice, OSI investigators complete Daily Activity Logs each workday. The logs are maintained by
the investigators and may be reviewed by their supervisors.
7

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 Johnson received two hours of paid overtime for his preparation of evidence on November 5,
2018.
In the second instance, OSI’s evidence log indicated that on Tuesday, July 31, 2018,
Johnson removed evidence bags from the temporary safe at OSI’s Clinton field office and
transported them to Albany. The written chain of custody on each of 21 evidence bag reflects a
transfer from OSI’s field office safe to Johnson and then from Johnson to an evidence custodian
in Albany on Tuesday, July 31, 2018. Once again, the Inspector General’s investigation found
evidence indicating that Johnson likely obtained the evidence bags on the day prior, held them
overnight, transferred them to Albany the following day, and falsified the written chain of
custody to conceal his wrongdoing.
According to entries in Johnson’s Daily Activity Log and vehicle mileage log, on July
31, 2018, Johnson left his South Glens Falls home at 6 a.m. and traveled to OSI’s Clinton field
office. After arriving at the Clinton field office, he secured the evidence bags and returned to
Albany. Johnson’s access card (swipe card) records reveal that he was at OSI’s Albany office at
9:45 a.m. According to Google Maps, this almost 300-mile trip would take approximately four
hours and 40 minutes to complete, not including time for any activities conducted along the way,
such as collecting the evidence. Thus, the Inspector General concluded that Johnson’s report of
his activities this day was likely falsified.
Additionally, the Inspector General found that Johnson falsified his vehicle mileage log
for July 31, 2018. Johnson’s mileage log reflects travel from South Glens Falls to Washington
Correctional Facility and back to South Glens Falls. Despite the fact that his Daily Activity Log
and access card records place Johnson in Albany on this date, his vehicle mileage log does not
reflect this. Moreover, Johnson collected two hours of paid overtime for his preparation of
evidence on July 30, 2018.
Impact of Johnson’s Wrongdoing
The Inspector General found that the 99 evidence bags implicated in Johnson’s
misconduct were related to 53 OSI criminal investigations of inmates and visitors at DOCCS
correctional facilities. None involved investigations of correction officers and there were no
indications that the evidence bags had been tampered with by Johnson or others while they were
in his possession.

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 Of the 53 investigations, 32 were either declined by prosecutors prior to the findings of
this investigation or not referred by OSI for prosecution, nine were declined for prosecution
following the Inspector General’s findings of Johnson’s misconduct, and 12 were accepted by
the district attorneys of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, and Washington counties for
prosecution. Of the 12 cases accepted for prosecution by the aforementioned district attorneys,
the district attorneys advised the Inspector General that as seven of the cases had yet to reach a
final disposition, the appropriate courts and/or defense counsels had been notified of the break in
the chain of custody. As for the remaining five cases accepted for prosecution, Johnson’s
handling of the evidence occurred after the criminal matters had ended and therefore had no
effect on the criminal proceedings.
Following the discovery of Johnson’s wrongdoing, OSI performed an audit of all
evidence contained in temporary safes and lockers in its field offices and found no indication of
additional breaks in the written chain of custody on other evidence bags. As a precaution, OSI
subsequently reassigned the transport of evidence from its field offices to Albany to designated
evidence technicians working in OSI’s Intake and Case Management Unit. Additionally, OSI
advised that evidence held in its field offices will be regularly audited by an evidence technician.
Of note, at the conclusion of Johnson’s testimony to the Inspector General, Johnson
stated, “It was wrong, time to retire,” and he retired from State service the following day.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Inspector General found that former OSI Senior Investigator Todd Johnson directed
one of his subordinates to forge the written chain of custody on an evidence bag on January 28,
2019. Additionally, although Johnson claimed he transported a total of 98 other evidence bags
from OSI’s Clinton field office to OSI’s Albany office on November 6, 2018 and July 31, 2018,
based on the Inspector General’s review of Johnson’s Daily Activity Logs, vehicle mileage logs,
access card records, and testimony from witnesses, the Inspector General found that Johnson
likely took possession of these evidence bags on the respective days before, kept them at his
residence overnight, and transferred them to Albany the next day. As such, the Inspector
General also found that Johnson falsified his Daily Activity Log and vehicle mileage log for July
31, 2018. Additionally, the Inspector General found that Johnson collected two hours of paid
overtime for his alleged transfer of evidence on each day. The Inspector General has referred
these findings to the Office of the Albany County District Attorney for its review.
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 The Inspector General found that although OSI has evidence policies and procedures in
place, Johnson acted in violation of those policies. For example, OSI policy requires that all
transfers be reflected in the written chain of custody, yet Johnson chose to violate this policy and
take actions to cover up his transgressions. The Inspector General has been advised by DOCCS
that it has tasked an internal workgroup to examine and amend its policies as necessary in the
wake of Johnson’s actions. The Inspector General is conferring with the internal workgroup on
OSI’s evidence policies and procedures and has identified the following additional policies that
will improve OSI’s operations.
Primarily, it is apparent that an electronic evidence tracking system could have prevented
or deterred Johnson from falsifying written chain of custody records. Such a system would allow
DOCCS to determine the status and location of its evidence at any time. During the course of
this investigation, DOCCS advised the Inspector General that it has acquired funding for an
electronic evidence tracking system. The Inspector General recommends that DOCCS adopt an
electronic evidence tracking system as soon as possible, promulgate and implement policy and
procedures for this new system, and train on the same.
The Inspector General also recommends that OSI review and incorporate changes to its
evidence policy that comport with DCJS guidelines. Although OSI’s evidence policy states it is
“within the guidelines set forth by the Division of Criminal Justice Services,” the Inspector
General found that OSI’s practices did not comport with DCJS policy guidelines. DCJS policy
guidelines recommend that documentation for the obtained evidence include the contents of the
evidence bag, name of the investigator who collected the evidence, date evidence collected, date
evidence transferred, name of individual who received evidence after transfer, reason for
transfer, appropriate case numbers, and inventory control numbers, among other information.
Additionally, DCJS policy guidelines recommend the maintenance of evidence access logs.
Upon review of the evidence that Johnson transferred, the Inspector General found numerous
items of evidence with incomplete information. The Inspector General also found that the
evidence logs in OSI’s field offices are not completed until after the evidence is transferred. The
Inspector General recommends that OSI enforce the prompt recording of all movement of
evidence in the appropriate logs.
The Inspector General also found that OSI policy lacks a “Right of Refusal” provision.
DCJS evidence guidelines recommend that agencies develop a “Right of Refusal” policy, which
authorizes a designated evidence custodian to refuse the submission of evidence where a broken
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 chain of custody or lack of proper documentation exists. According to DCJS guidelines, the
right of refusal “is a tool…to maintain good practices in evidence management. It gives
[evidence custodians] clear authority to ensure necessary data (chain of custody, location of
seizure) is completely documented . . . .”
Additionally, the Inspector General found that temporary safes and lockers located in OSI
field offices are not isolated from personnel and are neither digitally surveilled nor possess
intrusion alarms. DCJS training on Property/Evidence Room Management recommends the use
of intrusion alarms in secure evidence locations. As such, the Inspector General recommends
that OSI evaluate the need for isolated evidence storage, digital surveillance, and intrusion
alarms on the temporary safes and lockers.
The Inspector General also found that OSI policy and procedures lacked the “Two-Person
Rule” or “Rule of Two,” which is a widely accepted best practice in property and evidence room
management in the law enforcement community and could have deterred or prevented Johnson’s
mishandling of evidence. The “Two-Person Rule” requires the presence of at least two
investigators when handling evidence, to theoretically deter mishandling of evidence by one
investigator with sole access and to strengthen foreseeable testimony of proper evidence
handling. Therefore, the Inspector General recommends the incorporation of the “Two-Person
Rule” in OSI policy and procedure.
Lastly, the Inspector General found that post-2015, new OSI investigators are required to
attend a three-week training academy; however, there was no requirement for existing OSI
investigators to attend this academy. The Inspector General therefore recommends that DOCCS
require all OSI investigators, not just new recruits, to attend its OSI Basic Investigators’ School
and train each of its OSI investigators on all proper evidence handling and storage policies.
DOCCS’S RESPONSE TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S INVESTIGATION AND
REPORT
DOCCS advised the Inspector General that it has adopted and is implementing all of the
Inspector General’s recommendations.

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