Case 2:18-cv-00262-TSZ Document 40 Filed 04/09/19 Page 1 of 3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

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BRENDA TAYLOR, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
C18-262 TSZ

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v.
MINUTE ORDER
CITY OF SEATTLE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable
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(1)

Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint under 12(b)(6), docket no. 33, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as follows:
a. Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims
against the City of Seattle. Plaintiffs have alleged that the City of
Seattle employs a custom of “officers giving conflicting commands”
followed by application of excessive force, which proximately caused
Plaintiffs’ injuries. Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”), docket no. 29,
¶ 2.4. This is more than a barebones recital of the elements of a Monell
claim and is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Services of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Although proof
of isolated constitutional violations does not result in municipal liability,
Plaintiffs are entitled at this stage to develop proof supporting their
allegation that these violations are part of a larger pattern. Cf. City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (“Proof of a
single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it

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MINUTE ORDER - 1

 Case 2:18-cv-00262-TSZ Document 40 Filed 04/09/19 Page 2 of 3

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was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which
policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”); Trevino v. Gates,
99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that that, to establish custom,
plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from a permanent and wellsettled practice) (internal quotation marks omitted).
b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims of
negligence is DENIED. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to plead
negligence claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs specifically allege that
these Defendant officers had direct contact with Taylor and issued
inconsistent verbal commands to Taylor before he was shot. Plaintiffs
allege that these officers owed duties to the public in general and to
Taylor specifically to not “create a chaotic scene” likely to result in
physical harm and to “give orderly commands that can and should be
followed, not commands that . . . would endanger the public in general.”
SAC ¶ 4.13. Plaintiffs go on to allege that Defendants’ breach of that
duty resulted in Taylor’s death. Viewing the allegations in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Complaint states claims of negligence
against Defendants. This case involves alleged negligence that “was the
result of direct contact with the [deceased], not the performance of a
general public duty.” Garnett v. City of Bellevue, 59 Wash. App. 281,
286, 796 P.2d 782 (1990).

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c. Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims of
negligence against Defendants Barnes and Acuesta. Plaintiffs have
alleged that Acuesta and Barnes owed Plaintiff a duty not to create
confusion by shouting conflicting commands and violated that duty by
shouting conflicting commands while Defendants Spaulding and Miller
approached Che Andre Taylor with weapons drawn. SAC ¶¶ 4.12-4.14.
Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the shooting by Defendants Spaulding and Miller is not an intervening
act.
d. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive
due process claim. Plaintiff concedes that Brenda Taylor’s substantive
due process claim should be dismissed (Response, docket no. 36, at 13).
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim is dismissed with prejudice.

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MINUTE ORDER - 2

 Case 2:18-cv-00262-TSZ Document 40 Filed 04/09/19 Page 3 of 3

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(2)
record.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Minute Order to all counsel of

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Dated this 9th day of April, 2019.
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William M. McCool
Clerk

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s/Karen Dews
Deputy Clerk

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MINUTE ORDER - 3